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Alexander Lynskey
ZHSS1201-History1A
March 24, 2016
any
British
government
could
ever
prepare
to
take
the
country
to
war
again5.
Appeasement
was
a
reflection
of
the
public
sentiment
and
experience
of
WWI
and
a
determination
to
prevent
by
all
mean
a
second
accidental,
guiltless
war,
which
expounds
the
willingness
of
Britain
to
enter
the
war
in
1939
and
not
1938.
These
sentiments
were
mirrored
in
France.
France,
much
like
Britain,
had
a
fervent
revulsion
of
war,
a
belief
in
the
vitality
of
the
League
of
Nations
and
a
strong
support
of
demilitarisation6.
Throughout
the
Paris
Peace
Conference,
Clemenceau
had
lobbied
extensively
for
the
creation
of
a
neutral
buffer-state
along
the
Rhine,
in
order
to
shield
France
from
future
acts
of
German
aggression7.
Clemenceau
did
not
receive
his
wishes,
settling
for
a
Rhineland
compromise
consisting
of
French
occupation
of
the
Rhine
until
1925
followed
by
the
demilitarisation
of
the
region8.
When
the
Rhineland
was
remilitarised
by
Hitler
in
March
1936,
there
was
little
will
in
France,
and
equally
within
Britain
to
pressure
the
French,
to
enter
into
a
war
with
Germany,
even
over
areas
of
land
considered
vital
to
the
defence
of
France9.
France,
much
like
Britain
was
pursuing
foreign
policy
that
aimed
to
stop
the
outbreak
of
war
in
mainland
Europe
rather
than
ignite
conflict
through
acts
of
political
aggression.
It
is
for
this
reason
that
France
was
not
willing
to
enter
the
war
until
1939
when
German
aggression
posed
a
direct
and
significant
threat
to
French
interests
and
vitality.
Ibid., p.25.
Bell, P. M. H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe. London: Longman, 1986, p. 101.
7
Jeanneson, Stanislas. "French Policy in the Rhineland." Diplomacy & Statecraft 16, no. 3 (2005): 475-86. Accessed March 17,
2016. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592290500207792.
8
Ibid.
9
Robbins, op cit. p. 72.
6
10
Thomas, Martin. Britain, France and Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations in the Popular Front Era. Washington, D.C.:
Berg, 1996, p.14.
11
Levy, James P. Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936-1939. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.
p.14.
12
Ibid., p. 15.
13
Robbins. Op cit. p. 50.
14
Bell, P. M. H. op cit. p. 235.
15
Thomas, op cit. p. 15.
result
of
Britain
realising
that
its
military
was
too
weak
to
support
a
large
far-
flung
Empire,
whilst
dealing
with
simultaneous
threats
in
Asia,
India
and
the
Middle
East
and
the
European
mainland16.
Politicians
on
both
sides
of
the
Channel
thought
it
prudent
to
believe
in
a
world
that
had
an
underlying
harmony
between
nations17.
Whilst
both
sides
were
not
blind
to
the
threat
that
Nazism
posed
to
Europe,
both
did
not
grasp
the
dynamic
nature
of
Hitlers
regime,
nor
a
deep
understanding
of
the
practices,
ideals
and
beliefs
of
Nazi
policy18
that
were
at
odds
to
British
and
French
foreign
policy.
The
final
agreement
signed
by
Hitler
and
Chamberlain
in
Munich
is
reflective
of
this.
Chamberlain
believed
the
agreement,
settling
the
dispute
over
the
Sudetenland,
would
result
in
a
British-German
friendship
that
would
stop
the
rearmament
race
and
stabilise
the
European
continent19.
Hitlers
views
were
markedly
different.
Hitler
regarded
the
agreement
as
a
defeat
for
German
interests,
launching
a
violent
attack
on
Churchill,
Eden
and
Duff
Cooper
on
the
9th
of
October
193820.
German
aggression
was
not
halted
following
the
agreement,
with
Germany
increasing
pressure
on
the
Czechoslovakian
government
for
lands
not
covered
under
the
Munich
agreement.
This
was
a
precursor
for
its
withdrawal
from
the
German-Polish
Non-Aggression
Pact
of
1934
and
the
London
Naval
Agreement
of
1935,
leading
to
the
invasion
of
Poland
commencing
World
War
Two.
The
Anglo-French
pursuance
of
this
foreign
policy
is
why
both
countries
avoided
war
in
1938
until
absolutely
necessary
in
1939
for
16
the
peace
and
security
of
Europe,
that
was
crumbling
under
increased
German
military
aggression.
Whilst
Britain
and
France
were
willing
to
go
to
war
in
1939,
their
lack
of
will
to
enter
into
conflict
a
year
earlier
is
reflective
of
the
policy
of
appeasement.
The
pursuance
of
such
a
policy
is
a
reflection
of
deeply
rooted
ideals
in
the
immorality
of
war,
economic
constraints
and
in
a
belief
that
it
would
be
inconceivable
for
governments
to
deliberately
use
force21.
The
British
and
French
decision
to
enter
the
war
in
1939
was
as
a
result
of
the
threat
that
Hitlers
Germany
posed
to
the
security
of
not
only
France
and
Britain,
but
also
Europe,
with
military
action
the
only
suitable
solution
to
resolve
the
threat
of
German
influence.
21
Bibliography
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& Littlefield Publishers, 2006.
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