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Isanthropologicalinquirybettersuitedtoascientificorahermeneuticmethodological

approach?

CandidateNumber:657880
MasterofScienceinSocialAnthropology2008

Abstract

Overthelastfewdecadesanthropologistshavebecomeincreasinglydividedintheir
methodologicalpreferencesthosewhochoosetofollowinthefootstepsofthenaturalsciences
aimtoformulatecausalexplanationsforculturalphenomenawhileothersoptforhermeneutical
methodsentailingtheinterpretationofmeaningswhichunderlieculturalforms.Underpinning
thesepositionsarecontentiousepistemologicalissueswhichhaveoccupiedvariousphilosophers
andsocialscientistsoverthelastthreecenturiesregardingthenatureofsocialphenomenaand
theappropriatemethodsfortheiranalysis.Inthispaper,Icontrasttheargumentsoftwo
contemporaryphilosophersofsocialscience,whohavepassionatelyarguedinfavorof

humanistic(Winch:1958)andscientific(Jarvie:1972)methodsrespectively.Throughan
analysisoftheirworks,Ishowthatscientificexplanationplaysanindispensableroleinsocial
science,asevidencedbyKarlPoppersmethodofsituationallogic,whichJarvieoutlines
.
However,buildinguponWinchscontentions,Iarguethatsinceanthropologylargelydealswith
phenomenawhichareeither,a)conceptuallyalientotheanalystorb)metaphysical(e.g.
religion,law,politics),thehermeneuticalprocessofinterpretingandunderstandingthe
conceptualmeaningsofsocialphenomena,whichprovidesthefoundationforscientific
explanation,surpassesthelatterinsignificanceandoughttobetheprimarytaskof
anthropologists.

Introduction

WhenEricWolf(1964:88)suggestedthatanthropologyisperhapsthemostscientificofthe
humanitiesandthemosthumanisticofthesciences,hemayhavecapturednotonlythe
disciplinesbroadpotentialbutalsoasusceptibilityinitsequivocalnature,especiallytothe
extentthatthesciencesandhumanitiesaredeemedtobetheoreticallyandmethodologically
opposedtooneanother.Overthelastfewdecades,thedisciplinemayhavesuccumbedtowhat
Lett(1997)termsanidentitycrisisasanthropologistsfollowdivergentpaths.Aportionofthem
haverootedforamoretraditionalscientificmethodologicalapproachinlinewithearlier
anthropologicalwork,entailingtheformationandevaluationoflogicaltheorieswithempirical
datawiththeaimofformingcrossculturallyapplicablelawsforexplainingempirical
phenomena.Asareactiontothistreatmentofanthropologyasifitwereanalogoustothenatural

sciences,asignificantbodyofanthropologistshaveemphasizedthattheuniquenatureand
objectsofanthropologicalinquirymeansthatitrequiresaninterpretivemethodological
approachfollowingthehumanisticorheuristictraditionofinquiry.Interpretiveanthropologists
criticizeattemptstoexplainsocialstructuresandhumanbehaviorusinganalyticaltheoriesof
materialcausalityandemphasizedescriptiveinterpretationsofthemeaningsofactions,words
andideaswhichlieembeddedwithincultures.

Underlyingtheseopposedmethodologicaltraditionsarecontentionsepistemologicaland
metaphysicalissues,theresolutionofwhichcouldpotentiallydeterminehowanthropological
inquiryshouldbeconductedandforwhatreasons.Thustheyhavebeenthesubjectofheated
debatesinacademicliteraturebothwithinanthropologyandrelateddisciplines.Sincethe
interpretiveapproachhasgrownexponentiallyinpopularity,therehasbeenacorresponding
trendofscientificmindedanthropologists(Keesing1987Lett1991&1997OMeara1989
Reyna1994Carrithers1990Kuznar1997)someofwhomhaveprovidedlucidevaluationsof
bothperspectivesalongsidecriticismsoftheepistemologicalassumptionsoftheinterpretive
schoolwhichhaveinturninvitedresponsesfrominterpretivetheorists(Shore1991Valeri
1987).Manyoftheformerareconcernedwithdivisionswhichtheyfeelthreatentotearthe
disciplineapart(Rubel&Rosman1994:342)whileamongthelatter,thereisasenseinwhich
theinterpretiveapproachmustrightfullydisplaceanoutdatedpositivismfortheretobe
methodologicalprogression.Therearehowever,relativelyfewstudieswhichimpartially
evaluatethemethodologicalriftbyassessingthestrengthsandweaknessesoftherespective
approachesinordertoexplorefuturedirectionsforanthropologicalanalysisorevenpossibilities
forcommensuration.Thispaperattemptssuchabroadanddispassionateoverviewspecifically

bytacklingthetheoreticalissueswhichlieattherootsofthedivisionandwhicharecrucialfor
determiningexactlyhowanthropologistsshouldconducttheirinquiries.

Thecentraltheoreticalquestionofwhetherhumanphenomenacanbeanalyzedandexplained
usingthescientificmethodsofthenaturalscienceshasbeenawardedsignificantattentionin
mostofthesocialsciencesaswellasintheanthropologicaldebatesmentionedabove.Formany
suchasRabinow(1979:3),theepistemicobjectofinquiryofanthropologyasasocialscience
dealingwithhumanphenomenaiswhollydistinctfromthatofthephysicalsciencesandthus
requiresadifferentmethodologicalapproachoneadequatetotakeintoaccountthedefinitionof
humansassuspendedinwebsofmeaningstheythemselveshavespunasfirstarguedbyMax
Weber(Weber1968,I,p.22).ThisisdirectlyopposedbyRoscoe(1995)andOMeara(1989)
whosuggestthathumanbehaviorcanbeexplainedusinggeneralizedscientificlaws,thoughthey
emphasizetheneedforaseparationbetweenscientificandmetaphysicalinquiry.Arigorous
evaluationofthetheoreticalprinciplesunderlyingtheseargumentsshouldmakeroomfora
considerationoftheappropriategoalsandfunctionsofanthropologyandacademicinquiryinthe
humansciences.Itiscrucialtounderstandwhetheranthropologistscanorshouldaimtoproduce
acumulativebodyofcrossculturallyapplicableknowledgewhichofferscausalexplanationsof
thesocialphenomenaofanexternalknowableworldorwhethertheyshoulddirecttheirenergies
totheevocationandinterpretationofculturesandculturalvariabilityandtheunderstanding
ofthecontextualmeaningswhichconstituteformsoflifeorperhapstofocusuponexploring
thecharacteroflivedexperience.(Jackson1989:2)Ultimately,itisthescientificmethod,its
capacityanditsepistemologicalassumptions,especiallywithrespecttoitspotentialrolewithin
thedisciplineofanthropologythathasbeencalledintoquestionandthispaperwillattemptto

addresswhetheritremainsofrelevancenotonlyinanthropology,butalsoincontemporary
socialscience.

Whilethepaperwilluseanthropologicalsourcestoshowhowtheoreticaldebateshavebeen
incorporatedintoanthropologicaldiscoursestomakeargumentsinfavorofeitherascientificor
interpretivemethodologicaloutlook,themajorityofthetheoreticalpointsofcontentionare
considered,asmuchasispossible,usingtheworkofphilosophersofscienceandsocialscience
fortworeasons.Firstly,muchoftheanthropologicalliteratureonthissubjectisheavilyoriented
towardsaspecificmethodologicalapproach,andsomeofitisstrewnwithstrawmenor
totalizingdescriptionsoftheparadigmwhichtheauthorsfinddisagreeable.Secondly,the
underlyingdisputesinquestionarenotconcernedwithanthropologicaldatabutratherwitha
prioritheoreticalpositionswhichhavebeenconsideredindepthintheaforementioned
disciplines.Whilethereisagrowingbodyofanthropologicallyinclinedworkofthissort,often
labeledasanthropologyofknowledge,thelattertypicallyhailsfrominterpretive
anthropologists.

Thepaperisdividedintofoursections,thefirstofwhichchartstheoriginsofboth
methodologicalparadigmsinanthropology,evaluatingtheworkofrespectivetheoristsand
highlightingthemajortheoreticaldifferenceswhichsetthemapart.Inordertoemphasize
impartiality,anthropologicalsourcesfrombothinterpretiveandscientificperspectivesareused
ineveryaspectofthisoverview.Thesecondsectiondealsspecificallywiththepointsof
theoreticalcontentionmentionedabove,contrastingtheperspectivesofphilosophersofscience
PeterWinch(1958)andIanJarvie(1972)whohaveeachofferedsignificantcontributionstothis

issue,thoughtheirrespectivesympathieslieonoppositeendsofthemethodologicalspectrum.
Thethirdsectionbuildsupontheseargumentsusingrelevantliteratureandethnographicor
philosophicalexamplesinordertoillustrateandevaluatetheepistemologicalpositionspresented
inthefirstpart.Thisisfollowedbyanevaluativeandconclusivesectionwhichsummarizesany
theoreticalfindingsinthecontextofthemethodologicaldivisionsinanthropologyinorderto
determinewhetherpositivistic/scientificandhumanistic/interpretiveinquiriesare
commensurabletoanyextentand/orwhetheranyparticularmethodologicalapproachismore
suitedforanthropologicalinquiry.

Inthispaper,Ishowthatscientificexplanationplaysanindispensableroleinsocialscience,as
evidencedbyKarlPoppersmethodofsituationallogic,whichJarvieoutlines(1972:1920)
.
However,buildinguponWinchscontentions,Iarguethatsinceanthropologylargelydealswith
phenomenawhichareeither,a)conceptuallyalientotheanalystorb)metaphysical(e.g.
religion,law,politics),thehermeneuticalprocessofinterpretingandunderstandingthe
conceptualmeaningsofsocialphenomenawhichprovidesthefoundationsforscientific
explanationsurpassesthelatterinsignificanceandoughttobetheprimarytaskof
anthropologists.

Section1:OverviewoftheAnthropologicalParadigms

Originsofscientificanthropology

InterpretivetheoristssuchasHoly(1987),tracetherootsofthepositivisticapproachin
anthropologytotheuseofthecomparativemethodinanthropology,whichtheysuggestprovides

evidenceofthefirstlucidportrayalofthedisciplineasanaturalscience.Underpinningthe
methodweretheoreticalnotionsregardingculturesasisolatedsocialsystemswhich,while
elicitingcertaincleardistinctionshadsimilarsocialstructureswhichcouldbecomparedinorder
toformgeneralizedtheoriesexplainingsimilarphenomenainallsocieties.Thismethodis
thoughttohavebeeninheritedfromDurkheimiancomparativesociologywheredescriptionsof
socialfactswouldbeusedinordertoformulateandtesthypothesesorgeneralizations,albeitin
anthropology,ethnographywouldprovidethedescriptionsofexoticculturalsystems.Holynotes
thatthesedescriptionsofspecificsocietiesweresometimesaccompaniedbylargerscale
worldwidestatisticalcomparisonsbetweenculturesinordertoestablishcorrelationsbetween
phenomena.Examplesoftheseprovidefurtherevidenceofthemethodsofthenaturalsciences
beingadoptedforanthropologicalanalysis.(1987:4)Duringthisperiod,anthropologists
describedtheprocessofcomparisonastheanthropologicalequivalentofthescientific
experimentwhilefieldworkallowedthetestingofexistinggeneralizationsbyprovidingnew
observations(EvansPritchard1951:8990)

Hobart(1987)agreesthatthecomparativemethodepitomizedearlyscientificapproaches.Using
theworkofRadcliffeBrown,anearlyproponentofthisapproach,hehighlightsthemannerin
whichthelattersworkequatescomparisonwiththecontrolledexperimentationofthenatural
scientists.ThefollowingquotefromRadcliffeBrownservestoelucidatetheseunderlying
methodologicalassumptions.

ForSocialAnthropologythetaskistoformulateandvalidatestatementsabouttheconditionsof
existenceofsocialsystems(lawsofsocialstatics)andtheregularitiesthatareobservablein

socialchange(lawsofsocialdynamics),Thiscanonlybedonebythesystematicuseofthe
comparativemethod(RadcliffeBrown1958a:128)

ForRadcliffeBrownthen,allsocialphenomenaweresubjecttonaturallawsandbytheuseof
thelogicalmethodofinduction,asisstandardinthenaturalsciences,itwaspossibletodiscover
andprovethesegenerallaws(1987:2324).Underpinningsuchamethodologyarestrictnotions
regarding:i)themannerinwhichtheobjectsofinquiryareconceptualized,ii)theoriesregarding
theappropriatemethodsofobservationanddataanalysisiii)thecapacityofthescientificmethod
toformulateandtesttheoriesorlawsinordertoexplainsocietalphenomenaiv)thegoalsof
anthropologicalinquirytoprovidegenerallawswhichcanexplaintheconditionsofexistenceof
socialsystemsandtheregularitiesthatareobservableinsocialchange(1958a:128).InEllens
reviewofethnographicfieldwork(1984),hetakesthesecondpointfurtherbyexploringthe
mannerinwhichearlymethodsofobservationanddataanalysiswereshapedbypositivistic
theoreticalperspectives.Henotesthatthetensionbetweenobservationandexperimentalresults
ontheonehandandtheoryontheotherhasbeenresolvedindifferentwaysdependinguponthe
methodologicalapproachoneadopts.

Inthedisciplinesearlypractice,thetechniqueofparticipantobservationwaslargelyassociated
withthestructuralfunctionalistapproachwhichasmentionedaboveentailedthesynchronic
analysisoftheinterrelationsofinstitutionswithintheexistingsocioculturalwhole(1984:17).
Ellensuggests,inlinewithHoly,thatDurkheimianideologylaybehindstructuralfunctionalist
theoryandtheearlyuseofparticipantobservation.ForDurkheim,thesocialnotionsofpeople
whoparticipateinsociallifewerenotimportant,rathertherewerecertainprofoundcausesor

underlyingsociallawswhichheclaimedwereunperceivedbyconsciousness(Durkheim1964:
141)Thesesocialforcesweredeemedtobeexternaltotheindividualandwerethedeterminants
ofhis/herbehavioraswellastherestofsociallife.RadcliffeBrownsworkcarriedthistradition
forwardwiththeaimofforminganaturalscienceofsociety.Inpracticehowever,
RadcliffeBrownsmethodwassomewhatunscientificinthathewouldoftenuseparticularistic
descriptionsofsociallifetoaffirmpreconstructednotionsoftheregularityofsocial
relationships.SituationalanalystssuchasTurnerwerestricterintheirinterpretationsofthe
positivisticmethodologyandconcentratedonconcretesituationsinvolvingsocialinteractions
whichwouldbethemainsourceofanalysisandwouldprovideempiricalevidenceofsocial
structure.(1984:20)Importantly,thepositivisticparadigmalsoconceivedofanthropologys
subjectmatteranddataasakintothedataofthenaturalscientist.Participantobservationwasthe
scientifictoolallowingdirectobservationofsocialdatawhichwasdeemedtobeinformation
aboutthesocialworldacquiredthroughsenseexperienceandasEllennoteswasreal,factual
andhadtoconsistofempiricalphenomenawhichexistsomewhereoutthereintheworld.
(1984:21).

ContemporaryScientificAnthropology

Whilethereareconsiderabledifferencesinthetheoreticalapproachesthatscientific
anthropologistsadopt(i.e.fromculturalmaterialismtostructuralismtocognitiveanthropology),
andwhilemanydisagreeonafewepistemologicalissuesandespeciallyonwhetherornot
scientificmethodsshouldbescrutinizedusingphilosophicaldiscourse,theyallemphasizetheir
respectforthescientifictraditionandthesuperiorityofthescientificmethodforproviding

informationabouttheempiricalworld.Inaddition,theyarekeentoemphasizethatthe
foundationalcharacteristicsofthemethodremainthesamewhetherthesubjectmatterisphysical
orsocial.Inaddition,definitionsofscientificanthropologygivenbyanthropologistsareusually
abstractandunconcernedwiththespecificsofanthropologicalinquiry.Kuznar(1997)
emphasizesthreeimportantcharacteristicsoftheapproachassumptionsofanexternalknowable
world,anemphasisontheneedtoevaluatesubjectivehumanlyconstructedtheorieswith
objectiveempiricaldataandtheuseoftheproceduralrulewhichstipulatesthatatheorysfitto
allrelevantdataisthemostimportantfactorleadingtoitsacceptanceorrejection(1997:18).
Manyhaveprovidedconcisedefinitionsofwhatscientificanthropologyshouldentail.OMeara
(1989)notesaskey,thesystematicdescriptionsandclassificationofobjects,eventsand
processesandtheexplanationofthelatterwiththeorieswhichemploylawfulregularitiesand
whichmustbetestableusingpubliclyobservabledata(1989:354).Watson(1976,1992),
mentionsthatthesetheoriesmust,inthesocialsciences,leadtoexplanationsandpredictionsof
humanculturalbehavior(Kuznar1997:18).Finally,duetotherecentemphasisonreflexive
critiquesinanthropology,manyscientificanthropologistsarekeentohighlighttheselfcritical
natureofscientificinquiryespeciallyevidentinthehistoryofanthropology.Thus,Kuznarnotes
thattheories,dataandmethodsmustbecontinuallyreevaluatedespeciallyincaseswherenew
theoriesmaybetterexplainthedataorwhenfurtherdatafromothersourcesfalsifiesatheoretical
approach.Infact,thecomparativemethodmentionedabovehasoftenbeenusedinanthropology
toreevaluateandcriticizeoncetrustedandrespectedtheoreticalconceptswhichwerenot
crossculturallyapplicable.Forexample,RadcliffeBrownspentmuchtimerefuting
nineteenthcenturyconceptsofunilinealevolutionwhileinturn,manyofhissuccessors

suggestedthattheycouldnotfindcrossculturalevidenceofsocietiesorganizedinaccordance
withhisstructuralfunctionalistprinciples(1997:24).

Assumptions

Underlyingthemethodsandtheoriesofcontemporaryscientificanthropologyarecertain
epistemologicalandontologicalassumptionswhichlargelyresemblethoseoftheearliest
scientificallymindedanthropologistssuchasRadcliffeBrown.Whileconceptionsoftheobjects
ofinquiryareimportantforconsiderationofappropriatemethodsandgoalsofanalysis,even
moreelementaryareconceptionsoftheworldandofrealityandwhetherornotitcanbe
apprehendedandunderstoodbyanobserver.Empiricalanalysisforscientificanthropologists
restsonassumptionsofanorderlypredictableworldwhichexistsexternallytotheobserverwho
canobservetheworlddirectlyorthroughtheuseofscientificinstruments.Specificallyfor
anthropologists,thisexternalworldconsistsofsocialstructuresandthebehavioralpatternsof
humansandthesenaturalphenomenacanbeobservedandexplainedwithoutrecourseto
mysteriousforcesbeyondinvestigation.(Bernard1994b:168).Scientificanthropologistsand
positivisticphilosophersofscienceoftendebatewhetherideasconcerningtheworldare
ontologicalassumptions(i.e.thoseconcernedwiththeactualexistenceofrealityandworldly
phenomena)orepistemological(i.e.thoseconcernedwithhowwecometoknowandunderstand
whatweobserve).Kuznarnotesthatsuchconsiderationsofwhetherornottheremaybeatrue
realitybeneathwhatweexperienceareinsignificant,especiallysincescienceisonlyconcerned
withphenomenawhichareempiricallytestable(1997:29)Thus,whileeverythingweperceive
maybepartiallyconstructedbyourmindsasthephilosopherImmanuelKantsuggested,since

thatistheonlyrealitywecanexperienceandtheonlyrealitywhichisempiricallytestable,it
becomestheappropriatesubjectofscientificanalysis.

Moreimportantly,scientificanthropologistsoftenmakeallusionstoanunderlyingpurereality
whichforaneverydayobserverisadulteratedbyculturalandtheoreticalbiases,thestateof
empiricalknowledgeandonespowersofobservation.Theaimofscienceistoescapefrom
theselimitationsasmuchasispossibleanddrawnearertoanidealnotionoftruth.Thusin
anthropology,thereistheneedtoreviewallthecurrentethnographicdataandtheoretical
conceptionsregardinganissueinordertodeterminewhichideasandexplanationsarethemost
complementaryandthereforeprovidethemostaccurateavailableversionofthetruthwhileatthe
sametimeattemptingtobypasstheperceptions,interpretations,motivations,feelingsetcofthe
observerwhichthreatentoskewtherealityhidingunderneath(1997:30).Ontheotherhand,
sciencequalifiesitsdiscoveriesbyemphasizingthatitisonlyabletoprovidethebesttemporary
explanationofthefactsratherthanabsolutetruthsandthusremainsopentosystematic,scientific
revisions.Kuznarnotesthatinanthropologyforexample,therehasbeenanefforttoestablish
whetherthe!KungaretheindigenouspeopleoftheKalahariregionwheretheypresentlyreside
andifso,howlongtheyhavelivedthere.Differentanthropologistshaveprovideddifferent
interpretationsoftheKung!andtherealityoftheirexistencewhichvarytremendously
dependinguponmanyofthefactorsmentionedabove(1997:28).Underlyingalltheseaimsand
goalsarecertainnotionsofscientificobjectivitywhichisdeemedtobeatriskofbeingveiledby
subjectivepolitical,religiousandideologicalpositionstowhichitisdirectlyopposed.Thelatter
areaboutmaintaininganormativepositionregardingtheworldandscienceisconcernedonly
withknowingabouttheworldfromaneutralalbeitelevatedstance.Inlinewiththis,since

metaphysicalphenomenaarenotempiricallytestable,theyareconsideredtobebeyondthe
purviewofscientificinquiry,althoughasmallgroupofanthropologists(e.g.Murdock1980
Schneider1965)supporttheuseofempiricalevidencetofalsifymetaphysicalstatementssuchas
thoseregardingtheexistenceofasoulorGod(Lett1997:52).

Originsofinterpretive/humanisticanthropology

Whiletherehavebeenseveralearlyanthropologicalstudieswhichhaveadoptedahumanistic
approach,forexampleRuthBenedicts(1934)Patternsofculture,themajorityofscientificand
interpretiveanthropologistswouldagreethatthecontemporarysurgeofanthropologicalinterest
intheinterpretivemethodologicalapproachtrulybeganwiththepublicationofCliffordGeertzs
earlyworkandspecificallytheoftcitedintroductiontohisTheInterpretationofcultures
publishedin1973inwhichheclaimsthattheanalysisofcultureshouldnotbeanexperimental
scienceinsearchoflawbutaninterpretiveoneinsearchofmeaning(Geertz1973:5).While
thereareothertrendswhichhaveaccompaniedtheearlydevelopmentoftheinterpretive
paradigmandwhichtakeanthropologybeyonditsscientificlimits,forexampleHymes(1972)
callforaliterallyhumanisticanthropologywhichwouldbepoliticallyandethicallysensitiveto
thedominationofweakerpopulationsbytheworldshegemonicpowersorAsads(1973)
descriptionsoftheimplicitassociationbetweenearlyanthropologyandwesterncolonialism,
sincethesearenotstrictlyandexplicitlydealingwithconceptualissuesassociatedwiththe
interpretiveparadigmwhichmightclearlydistinguishitfromascientificmethodological
approach,theyarenotofprimaryconcern.Geertzontheotherhand,deemshishumanistic
approachasbeingdirectlyandfundamentallyopposedtotheunderlyingtenetsofthematerialist

traditioninscientificanthropologyandgoesontoexplainthebenefitsofthehermeneutical
methodasanalternativeoptionforanthropologicalinquiry.

Geertzemphasizesthatinordertointerpretthewebsofmeaningwhichconstituteaculturethe
anthropologistsmustdescribeandunderstandtheactionsandwordsofindividualsthroughthe
useofthickdescriptions.Thespecificaimofsuchdescriptionistountanglethecontextual
meaningsandintentionsunderlyingbehaviorwhichmaynotbeapparentthroughsuperficial
description.Forexample,whetheranindividualistwitchingorwinkingmaynotbeimmediately
obviousthroughsimpleobservationofphysicalbehavior,thoughadeeperconsiderationofthe
situationmayclarify.Furthermore,itisimportanttohavethemoregeneralgoaloffocusing
uponactorsandhowtheyshapeandareshapedbytheirculture.Inordertoachievethese
hermeneuticalgoals,theanthropologicalobservermustenmeshthemselvesinaculture,
eventuallybecominganinsiderinordertotransformhis/herperspectiveandhelpdecodethe
complexmeaningsdeeplyembeddedwithinthecoreofthelifeform.(1973:310)

Geertzconceptualizeshissubjectmatter,i.e.cultureasanalogoustoatextinthatbothare
constructedandrequiresimilarmethodsforinterpretationwhiletheethnographicwritingsofthe
anthropologistaredeemedtobefictions(1973:15)Thustheworkoftheethnographer
becomesakintothatoftheliterarycriticthoughGeertzmakessuretohighlightthatdespitetheir
constructednature,ethnographictextsarestronglytiedupwithrealwaysoflife,i.e.what
peoplesay,whattheydo,whatisdonetothem(1973:18).Regardingthislatteraspect,
Geertzimpliesthatdespitethenovelmethodologyoftheinterpretiveapproach,itsunderlying
goalsremainscientificinthatitaimstoevaluatetheoriesaccordingtosystematicmodesof

assessment(1973:24)Ultimately,theambitionsremainempiricalinthatparticular
ethnographicexperiencesareusedtounderstandthefunctionofmeaninginhumanculture.On
theotherhand,rigidscientificmethodswhichaimtocodifyabstractregularitiesorgeneralize
acrosscasesareinadequateforsuchaninquirywhichdealswiththeunpredictabilityand
complexityofculturallife(1973:26).

ContemporaryInterpretiveAnthropologyanditsassumptions

Whilecontemporaryinterpretiveanthropologistsshareagoodamountofmethodological
principles,theyalsodisagreeonseveralfundamentalissues,sometimesassignificantaswhether
interpretiveanthropologycanaimtoformempiricalandverifiablelawsorexplanationsof
culturalmeanings(inGeertz(1973:27)wordstouncovertheconceptualstructureswhich
informoursubjectsacts)orwhetheritmustdevoteitselftoareflexiveanalysisandcritiqueof
ethnographiesandthusfunctionasavehicleforselfreflectionandselfgrowth(Marcusand
Fischer1986:1)Itmaybefairtosuggestthatinmanyrespectswhatunitestheinterpretive
traditionarethecriticismswhichmanyofitsmembershavemadeagainstpositivistic
methodologyanditsassumptionsbutespeciallywhatisdeemedtobethelattersmisguided
questfornaturalisticcrossculturallyapplicablelawswhichmayexplainandpredicthuman
behavior.

ThusHobart(1987)dealingwiththeuseofthecomparativemethod,criticizesscientific
crossculturalcomparisonsofoperationallydefinedvariableswhichwhethertheyare
institutions,beliefsorinstitutionalizedrelationships,aredeemedtohaveessencesdiscernable
independentofobserversandframesofreferencedespitethefactthattheobjectsofcomparison

aresocialdiscoursesratherthanobjectiveontologicalforms(1987:4).Furthermore,heargues,
thereisageneraldisregardoftheextenttowhichcomparisonandtranslationareaffectedbythe
interpretiveactsoftheanalystwheretherealwaysexistrivalinterpretations.Rabinow(1977)
notesthatanthropologistsarenotneutralscientistscollectingunambiguousdataandthatthe
individualslivesthattheystudyarenotunconsciouslydeterminedbyaliensocialforces.For
Rabinow,thefactsoftheanthropologistarefictitiousandcrossculturalinthesensethatthey
becomeobjectivethroughthemutualinteractions(i.e.questionings,observationsand
experiences)oftheanthropologistandthepeoplehe/shestudies(1977:152).

Holy(1987)addsthatsinceobservationisnolongertakenforgrantedasprovidingobjective
information,interpretivetheoristshaveemphasizedhowtheobserverhascometoknowwhathe
claimstoknowaboutaparticularsocietyorcultureandthustheneedforadequatedescriptions
hasreplacedtheneedforsociologicalgeneralizations(1987:7).Aninterpretivemethodological
approachthereforeemphasizestheextenttowhichtheanthropologistsownexperiencesand
conceptualtoolsaffecttheconstitutionofanethnographicaccount.Crossculturalcomparisons
ontheotherhandarenolongerdeemedcapableofprovidingthescientificfunctionoftheory
testing,ratherinterpretiveapproachesarecharacterizedbyanalyticaldescriptionsofculturally
specificprocessesofmeaningconstruction.ThisdoesnotnecessarilyleadHolyawayfrom
havingempiricalambitions.Hesuggeststhatinterpretivemethodsofculturalcomparisonmust
aimtocomparesimilarforms,objectsorconstructsintwoormorecultureswiththeobjectiveof
elucidatingthedefiningprocessesthroughwhichtheirmeaningsareconstructedinorderto
discoverunderlyingculturallogics.Furthermore,throughintraculturalcomparison,onemay
comparedissimilarconstructswithinasocietywiththeaimofdiscoveringsimilarprocessesof

meaningcreationwhichunderliethem(1987:710).

Ellen(1984)takestheissueofethnographicanalysisfurtherbyexploringwhatdistinguishesit
fromnaturalscientificanalysis.Henotesthatinterpretiveparticipantobservationisconceivedof
differentlyfromthesimplepositivisticnotionofascientistobservinghissubject,inthat
emphasisisplacedontheenmeshingoftheobserverwithhisobjectofstudy,somuchsothat
he/sheisprimarilyaparticipantandonlysecondarilyanobserver.InEllenswords,this
eliminatesthedistinctionbetweentheobserverandtheobservedphenomenaandthus,through
his/hersocializationintotheculturebeingstudiedtheobservercanlearntheembedded
meaningsofsociallife(1984:2930).Manyofthesereconsiderationsaretheresultoftherecent
moveininterpretiveanthropologyawayfromthefield(i.e.aposteriorianalysis)andbackinto
thearmchair(i.e.apriorianalysis).Phillips(1973:78)writesthatthecurrentcrisisinsocial
scienceisduetothefactthatknowledgeofappropriatemethodologyforanthropological
analysisisdependentuponbetterknowledgeoftheanthropologicalobjectofanalysis(i.e.social
phenomenon).Sincethelattercanonlybeachievedbyacquiringbettermethods,interpretive
anthropologistsarguethatexistingdatamustbereanalyzedandthatthetheoreticalassumptions
ofpositivisticmethodologymustbeinterrogatedandadaptedtosuitinquiryinthesocial
sciences(Ellen,1984:27).

Regardingtheanthropologistsobjectofstudy,Barnes(1982)arguesthattheassumptionthat
humanphenomenaaresubjecttonaturallawswhichonemustdiscover,ignoresthe
immeasurablycomplexnatureofexperienceevenabovelanguagewhichiscomplexandrich
enough.ForBarnes,thereislittleincommonbetweenphysicalobjectsandsocialevents(1982:

28)Rabinowaddsthatanthropologistsarenotdealingwithlogicalepistemicsubjectswhose
activitiesmaybegeneralizedandunderstoodascontextfreeoperations(1979:4).Inthe
CritiqueofPurereason
,Kantnotesthatthehumansubjectisuniqueinthatthroughreflection
uponactions,itcomestoknowitselfasasubjectinaworldwhichisnotonlypassively
experiencedbutalsoactivelyconstitutedthroughonesintendedthoughtsandacts.Rabinow
notesthatinlinewiththisunderstandingofhumanexperience,interpretivetheoristsmust
criticizeanysystemofknowledgewhichreduceshumanphenomenatoasystemofcategories
definedonlyintermsoftheirrelationstooneanother(1979:4).Hefurthernotesthat
interpretivetheoristsunderstandthatthewebofmeaningconstituteshumanexistencetosuchan
extentthatitcannoteverbemeaningfullyreducedtoconstitutivelypriorspeechacts,dyadic
relations,oranypredefinedelements(Rabinow1979:6)

Anotherconcernofinterpretivetheoristsistheculturallymediatedandthereforerelativeposition
ofwesternscience.Rabinowisskepticalofabsoluteperspectivesorprivilegedpositions
especiallysinceinhisperspective,allintellectualparadigmsarehistoricallyconstituted.He
suggeststhatthewesternconstitutionofrealityisexoticandthatscientificclaimstotruthare
linkedtosocialpractices(Lett1997:15)Tylerconcurs,suggestingthatallhistorically
constitutedrulesandcriteriaforlogicalandrationalanalysisareselfaffirmingandnot
necessarilyobjectiveguidestoaction,knowledge,andbeliefanddeniesthatthediscourseof
oneculturaltraditioncouldeverencompassthatofanother.(Tyler1991:80)Inaddition,Tyler
followspostmodernphilosophersofsciencesuchasFeyerabendandQuinebyfurthersuggesting
thatthescientificmethodisonlycapableofachievingconsensusandaffirmationforits
discoverieswithinthesubcultureofscience,whichisfarremovedfromitsgoalsofobjective

crossculturalknowledge(1997:15).Ingeneralhowever,interpretivetheoristsdonotexplicitly
criticizenaturalscienceanditsresults.Theyfeelhowever,thatscientificmethodsandgoalsare
circumspectwhentheyarethoughtlesslyimportedforuseinthesocialsciencesandregardedas
suitableforacquiringcumulativeknowledgeofhumanphenomenawithoutconsiderationofthe
importantdistinctionswhichmakeanthropologicalanalysisradicallydifferenttotheworkofthe
scientistinthelab,especiallyconsideringthesubjectiveinteractionsinvolvedintheuseof
participantobservation.

Theaimofthenextsectionistoconsidertheunderlyingepistemologicalarguments
underpinningthemostdestructiveaccusationwhichvariousinterpretivetheoristshaveleveled
againstscientificanthropologistsinordertoassessitsvalue.Itcanbesummarizedasfollows:

Scientificmethodsareinappropriatefordealingwiththesubjectmatterofanthropology

Attherootofallsocialphenomenaarereflectinghumanswhoarecaughtupinwebsofmeaning
whichtheythemselveshavespun.Datafromthissubjectmatteriscollectedinauniquemanner
whichisnotanalogoustotheworkofthenaturalscientist.Itinvolvesthegraspingofsocial
meaningthroughsubjectiveinteractionratherthanobservationofobjectivefactsintheformof
humanbehaviororsocialstructures.

Section2:WinchandJarvie

Whilemanyphilosophersofscienceandsocialsciencehaveattemptedtoexplainandelucidate
theuniqueaspectsofsocialscientificinquirywhichdistinguishitfromnaturalscientific
explanation(e.g.Taylor1979Palmer1969),themostinfluentialandlucidattemptmustbe

Winchs(1958)TheIdeaofaSocialScience.Inthiswork,Winchpromotestheunderstanding
ofprincipleswhichunderlietheconductofhumanbehavior,highlightingitsimportanceabove
andbeyondtheformationofgeneralizationsfrombehavioralregularities.Throughoutthebook,
Winchrailsagainstscientificapproacheswhichattempttosearchforsociallogicswhichmay
helptoexplainsocialphenomenaandpredictdevelopments.WinchfocusesuponJ.S.Milland
hisattemptstoformascienceofanysubjectmatterwhichdisplaysasenseofregularity,even
whenthefactsuponwhichthephenomenadependaredifficulttoobserve.ForMill,sciences
suchasTidologyandMeteorologyaresuchexampleswherethecomplexityandvariabilityof
thephenomenoninquestionhavemadescientificanalysisdifficultandpredictionimprecise.
Thesephenomenonshareaspectssuchasirregularity,especiallyacrossspaceandtime,with
socialphenomenon,andthebestonecouldhopeforaccordingtoMillarestatistical
generalizationsconcerningtheprobableoutcomeofsituationswhich,inthecaseofhuman
behavior,wouldbepossibletoagreaterdegreeofaccuracywhendealingwiththecollective
conductofmasses(18:BookVI).Whiletheseprobableoutcomesdovarysomewhat
spatiotemporally,regularitiesareevidenceofanunderlyinglogicwhichMilllocatesinthemind,
exhibitedaspsychologicalstateswhichhesuggestsmayormaynotcorrespondtospecific
physiologicalstates(1958:6265).

DespiteMillspsychologicalreductionismwhichKarlPopperhascriticized,Winchhasgreater
concernswithhisconflationoftheappropriatelogicofexplanationrequiredforsocialand
naturalphenomenonwhich,accordingtoWinch,risksmaskingtheuniquenatureandaspectsof
humanbehaviorwhichunderliesuperficialstatisticalregularities.WhileMillfeelsrightlythat
complexitysetshumanorsocialphenomenaapartfromnaturalones,hemisapprehendswhatthis

complexityentails.Winchispointingoutthatthequalitativelyjudgedregularitiesofhuman
behaviorbelongtoaseparateanddistinctconceptualframeworkfromtheoneusedtojudge
physicalregularitiesinnaturalphenomena.Withregardstosocialphenomena,inordertodecide
whentwosituationsarethesame,onemustunderstandthekindofactivityinthecontextof
whichthequestionarisessincetheconceptsderivefromthisactivityandbelongtoaparticular
formoflife.Theycannotbeimposedbyexternalobserverssuchassocialscientists(Winch
1956:23).Theparticipantsunderstandtherulesandrequirementsforcorrectperformanceofthis
activityanditistheconceptsbelongingtothisactivitywhichsubjectivelydeterminewhat
constitutesregularityofbehavior.Toanoutsideobserver,similarbodilymovementsduringa
religiousritualmayconstituteregularitywheninfactanunderstandingoftheritualmayreveal
themtohavedistinctmeanings.Ontheotherhand,whendealingwithnaturalphenomenasuch
astidesorphysicalobjects,itisthescientificcommunitywhichformsconceptsintheformof
methodsandproceduresofinvestigationwhichitusestojudgewhatconstitutesregularity.
Winchusestheexampleofaphysicsexperimentdealingwithgravity.Theexperimentwillhave
certainvariablessuchastheinclinationofaplaneorthematerialoftheplane,andunderstanding
theprocedureentailsunderstandingthesevariablesandwhatitwouldmeanforthemtovaried
orkeptthesameindistinctexperiments(1956:2629)Theseinanimateobjectsdonotin
themselvesfunctioninaccordancewithaconceptualframeworkbutratheraframeworkis
externallyapplied.Inordertofullyappreciatehowthisappliesinthecaseofanalysisinsocial
science,itisnecessarytoconsiderwhatexplanationofhumanregularitiesimplicitlyassumes.
ForWinch,complexconceptsexplaininghumanbehaviormaynotbeintelligibledirectlyto
participants.However,whatisimportantisthattheconceptsarerootedinunderstandingsof

contextualwaysoflifefromwhichtheyderive.Toexplainthehighrateofdivorceinacertain
villageusingcomplexalienconcepts,onemustfirstunderstandfullywhatdivorceentailsinthat
particularculturalformoflifebeforeonecangofurthertoofferappropriateexplanations.Winch
usestheexampleofaneconomicconceptof
liquiditypreference
which,althoughitisnot
generallyusedineverydaybusinessconductexplainshowthebusinessmansbehaviorbrings
aboutchangesinthevalueofmoney.Crucially,theconceptislogicallytiedtoconceptswhich
areunderstoodbybusinessmensuchasmoney,marketsandvalue(1956:19).

InordertofullyevaluateWinchsarguments,itisnecessarytoexploretwofurtherissueswhich
hisanalysisraises.Firstly,thereisthequestionofwhatliesattherootofhumanbehaviorand
regularitiesorratherwhatmeaningfulbehavioractuallyconsistofandsecondly,thekindsof
explanationsandgeneralizationsitwouldbefeasibletoofferoncethisistakenintoaccount.The
firstissueiscrucialforWinch,sinceitsumsupthemostsignificantaspectofsociological
inquiry,namelytounderstandthenatureofsocialphenomenabyunderstandingthe
understandingsofotherswhichallowthemorrathergivethemthecapacitytoactappropriately
orinappropriatelyinsociallife.ThusthephilosophicaltaskofepistemologybecomesforWinch,
theprimarygoalofthesocialsciences.Buthowdowegetfromtheunderstandingsofothersto
theirbehaviors?ThecentralpremiseofWinchsworkisthatallbehaviorwhichismeaningful
(thereforeallspecificallyhumanbehavior)isipsofactorulegoverned(1958:48).Thisbehavior
isfarfromblindhabitinthesensethatitispurposefulandgoaldirected.ForWinch,ahuman
societyconsistsofawholeconstitutingdifferentkindsofrulegovernedbehavior.Rulegoverned
behavioriscontrastedbyWinchwithanimalbehaviorsuchastheperformanceofatrickbya
dog.Adogmaylearntodoatrickandrepeatitregularlyinresponsetoacertainstimulus.This

kindofactionisunreflectiveanddoesnotinvolveanintentionalactoranattemptatperforming
thetrickcorrectly.Ontheoccasionthatthedogdoesntmanagetoperformthetrick,theremay
perhapsbeaconflictingstimulusbutitwouldbesenselesstospeakofafailedattemptunlesswe
refertothedoginananthropomorphicfashion.Ontheotherhand,forahumantogettoworkon
timeregularly,hemustunderstandwhatthelatterentailsanddespitevaryingsituationsattempt
tofollowrulesinaccordancewithhisunderstandingsofsuchconceptsastime,workand
earlywhilealsounderstandingwhatitmeanstobehaveconsistentlyasopposedto
inconsistently.Thecentralpointisthatoncesomeonehaslearntaruleandknowsforexample
whatitmeanstoarriveearlytoworkonaregularbasis,hemustbeabletousetheserulesand
applytheminvaryingconditionsandsituationsandthisiswhatmakesbehaviorreflectiverather
thanblindregurgitation(1958:5660).

Despiteanemphasisonunderstandingrulefollowingbehavior,inmuchofhisearlierwork,
Winchstillassumesthattheultimatetaskofsocialsciencemustbethedetectionandformulation
ofhumanbehavioralregularities,albeitwithgreaterregardforthepeculiarnatureofhuman
regularitiesinrelationtophysicalregularities.ForWinch,thisnovelaspectrequiresarenewed
proceduralapproachandanabandonmentofolderexplanatorymodelswhichapparentlydonot
takerulefollowingbehaviorintoaccount.Perhapsifthesemodelsareconsidered,itmaybe
possibletounderstandtheirweaknessesandhowanemphasisonunderstandingmayhelpto
improvetheircapacitytodetectandformulatebehavioralregularities(1958:48).Winchsfirst
concernisamodelwhichattemptstounderstandasocialinstitutionbyobservingregularitiesin
thebehaviorofitsparticipantswithoutunderstandingthecontextualnatureofregularity
(1958:81).Asmentionedearlier,theanalystmustunderstandwhatregularitymeansinthe

particularcontextofthisinstitutionandinordertodosohemustfamiliarizehimselfwiththe
relevantsocialactivitiesandtheirmeanings.AsWinchemphasizes,theanalystofreligionmust
havesomereligiousfeelingifheistomakesenseofthereligiousmovementheisstudyingjust
asthehistorianofartmusthavesomeaestheticsense(1958:83).Thusexternallyrelated
judgmentsofregularityfromforexamplecommonbehavioralorphysiologicalstateswouldbe
inadequateandthatispreciselywhatWinchcensures.ItisquitepeculiarthatWinchuses
examplesofcertaininstitutionssuchasreligionandartandinotherplacesreferstoloverather
thanusingexamplesofnonmetaphysicalrulefollowingbehaviorsuchasdrivingor
scubadiving,especiallysinceitisthelatterwhichareusuallypronetoanalysesinvolving
statisticalgeneralizations.Thisaspectwillbefocusedingreaterdepthbelow.

ThesecondaspectofsocialscientificexplanatorymodelswhichWinchcriticizesistheir
tendencytoformpredictionsfromgeneralizations.ForWinch,socialpredictionsareunlike
scientificoneswhileitmaybepossibletopredictdecisionsincertainsituations,attherootofall
socialphenomenaaretheintentionaldecisionsofindividualsasattemptstoapplylearntrulesto
novelsituations,andanextraordinarysituationmayleadtoacompletelyunpredictableoutcome.
Thiscanbecontrastedwiththeexampleofadogsperformanceofatrickwhichreliesona
singlestimulus.Onecanpredictthataslongasthereisnocounteringstimulus,suchasfood
nearby,thedogwillperformthetrick.Toofferanotherexample,amechanicmayeasily
determinehowaslightmodificationwillaffecttheperformanceofhismachinebutachancellor
willstruggletoofferanequallyvalidpredictionoftheoutcomeofaparticulareconomicpolicy
duetothecomplexactionsandinteractionsofrulefollowingindividuals.Itmustbementioned
howeverthatitwouldbeunusualtofindsocialscientificanalyseswhichattempttopredictthe

outcomesoffinancialpoliciesorcriminaltrialswiththeaccuracythatonemayusetopredict
physicalornaturalchanges.Rather,theconceptofliquiditypreferencewhichWinchlauds
isthekindofpredictionwhichiscustomaryinthesocialsciencesandasdescribedabove,it
involvesageneralexplanationofhowthevalueofmoneymaylikelybeaffectedbytheactivities
ofbusinessmen.(1956:3033)

IanJarvieisaphilosopherofsocialsciencewhohaswrittenmuchtocountermanyofWinchs
argumentswhileacceptingthevalidityofsomeofhisconcerns.Hisargumentsrevolvearound
thenotionthatwhilehumansmaybecomplexrulefollowingindividuals,thegoalofsocial
scienceisnottoexplainthisbehaviori.e.consciousaction,butrathertoexplaintheunintended
outcomesofhumanactionsentitiessuchasgroups,marriage,moralsandknowledgewhichfor
Jarvieareproductsoftheiractionsbutnotnecessarilyoftheirintentions(Jarvie1972:3)While
novelmethodssuchashermeneuticsmayberequiredforasocialsciencetodealwith
understandingsatthelevelofrulefollowingandgettingtogripswithapersonspsychologyin
ordertounderstandanindividualsreasonsforsaydeclaringwarordivorcinghisspouse,
explainingwhywarbrokeoutinaparticularsituationetcisadifferentkindofinquiry,one
whichcanmakeuseofscientificmethods.InhismajorworkConceptsandSociety,Jarviegoes
ontooutlineKarlPoppersmethodofsituationallogicwhichhefeelsisanappropriate
explanatorymodelforsuchaninquiry.Themainfunctionofthismodelistoweighuptheaims
andgoalsofindividualsalongsidetheirsituationalcontextwhichwouldincludeanynatural,
social,psychologicalandethicalcircumstanceswhichconstitutebothmeansbywhich
individualsachievetheiraimsandconstraintsonthoseaims.Themodelassumesthatgivena
certaincontext,humansattempttofindthemosteffectivemeansofachievingtheiraimsora

logicwhichsuits.Jarvienotesthattheactorsideas,inclinationsandproclivitiesarepartofhis
situationinacomplicatedway(1972:4).

Amajorassumptionisthatanobjectiveappraisalofthesituationbysocialscientistswillreveal
certainfavorablemeansofachievingaimsasmoreeffectiveandtherebyrationalthanothers.
ThisistermedasthelogicofthesituationwhichJarviedescribesasanempiricaldescriptionof
theprocedureofexplanationwhichgoesoninthesocialsciencesandisdescribedasaspecial
caseofthedeductiveanalysisofcausalexplanationingeneraltherebyillustratingwhatiskeyin
thisargument,namelytheunityofmethodinthesciences(1972:45).Jarviegoesontooffera
fewexamples.Inoneofthese,heusesthemethodofsituationallogicinordertoexplainwhyin
aparticularsituationadriverwhoisgenerallycautiouscausesamajoraccidentby.Henotes
thataproperanalysisofthesituationmayrevealthatforexamplethedriverwasusingthe
motorwayonthisoccasionwhenheismoreaccustomedtocitydriving.Thus,inordertoexplain
thecollision,onemustunderstandtheexperienceofthedriverandtheconditionsunderwhich
he/shewasdrivingbutalsothekindsofnormswhicharerespectivelyinvolvedincityand
motorwaydriving.ThislatteraspectiswhatWinchissokeentoemphasize,specificallythe
understandingofwhatthesocialandphysicalactofdrivingentails.Inordertofullyappreciate
drivingconditions,onemustperhapshavedrivenoneselforatleastonemustfullyunderstand
thesocialregulationsandvariableconditionswhichadrivercanpotentiallymeetatanytime.In
otherwords,onemustappreciatewhattherulefollowingbehaviorofdrivingentails,namely,the
rulesanindividualmustunderstandandactinaccordancewithinordertodrivesuccessfully.In
factJarviehimselfsuggeststhatlearningabouttrafficisamodelforlearningaboutsocietyin
thatthelatterincludescertaincustoms,institutionsandexpectationswhichinaccordancewith

Winch,anindividualcanchoosetofollowinordertodrivesuccessfullyorignoreperhapsin
ordertowillinglycrash.(1972:7)

Section3:Analysis

ThereisnoneedtogoanyfurtherintoJarviesaccountinordertoexploretheassumptionsof
situationallogicregardinghowhumanbehaviorshouldbedefinedorwhetherallbehaviorcanbe
explainedbythelogicofthesituation.Therearesurelynumerouscaseswhensuchamethodcan
beusedtoexplaintheunintendedoutcomesofhumanactionsbutthereappearstobeasetof
assumptionswhichunderliesuchexplanationsinvolvingthe
understanding
oftherelevantsocial
activities.Insociologicalanalysisdealingwithmundaneactivitiessuchasdriving,thislatter
processofunderstandingisnotimmediatelyobviousanddoesnotevenappearasaseparate
stepintheinquiry.Forexample,EnglishsociologistsanalyzingavehiclecollisiononaBritish
roadwillbemostlikelyhaveagoodunderstandingofBritishtrafficnormsandwhattheactivity
ofdrivinginvolves.ButEnglishanthropologistswishingtoexplainasimilarincidentinan
exoticlocationwheretherulesofdrivingareentirelydifferentwillfirstneedtospendagood
dealoftimeinordertobecomeaccustomedtothisnewstyleofdriving.Furthermore,theinquiry
ofunderstandingthisnewformofdrivingasavariantofawidespreadhumanactivityconstitutes
amuchmoreprofoundscientificactivitythanexplainingacollision.Ratherthanbeingthefirst
steptowardsexplanationofspecificevents,theunderstandingofasocialphenomenonbecomes
initselfasignificanttaskandadistinctkindofanalysis,onewhichisbettersuitedtoa
hermeneuticalmethodologycoupledwithparticipantobservationwherethelatterisanefficient
mannerofunderstandinganewrulesinceitinvolvestheactualpracticeofrulefollowing.

ThispointiselaboratedsomewhatbyphilosopherofsciencePalmerandanthropologistsWatson
andWatsonFranke(1975),whoemphasizethatexplanatorymodelstypicallytendtoask
questionssuchasWhatisthetime?andWhydidwarbreakout?inordertogetsome
informationandasegmentofacontextwhilehermeneuticalunderstandingsofsocial
phenomenonasunderstandingsofawholeaskmorebasicandfundamentalquestionssuchas
Whatistime?andWhatiswar?(1975:251).Thelattermodelattemptstoreflexively
questionpreunderstandingsandremainsopentonewconceptsderivedfromthephenomena
underanalysiswhiletheformermodelismoreconservativeinthatitsetsrigidboundariesofits
ownandwantssuperficialinformationwhichsuitsitsownconceptualframework.WhileWinch
tendstosuggestthataconsiderationofthecomplexitiesofrulefollowingmakessocial
predictionsandcausalexplanationsofhumanbehaviormuchharderandredundanttoacertain
extent,whatbecomesclearisthatwhilesuchexplanatorymodelsareindeedpartiallycapableof
predictionandexplanation,theyarethoroughlyconfinedbytheirownaims.

Ofevengreatersignificanceisthefactthathermeneuticsbecomesindispensablewhenthe
subjectmatterismetaphysicalasisoftenthecaseintypicalanthropologicalanalysesofexotic
culturesalthoughWinchdoesnotfullyappreciatethisimportantdistinction.Throughouthis
workheseemstosuggestthatwhateverthesocialactivity,unlessonecangraspanindividuals
reasonsforbehavinginacertainmanner,onecanneverexplainhisactionsandinthesameway,
thedevelopmentofsaysocialinstitutionsmustbeanalyzedbyfocusinguponindividualsand
theirintentions,expectationsandrelations.ButasJarvie(1972)notes,anexplanatorymodel
baseduponsituationallogic
is
suitedtoexplainingthe
unintendedoutcomes
ofhumanactions
suchasacaraccidentwhilstgenerallytakingintoaccountthekindsofcustomary,purposeful

andreflexive(rulefollowing)behaviorwhichdrivingentails(1972:27)Inasimilarmanner,
suchamodelcouldevenattempttoexplainwhatallowsahuntergathertribetodevelopintoa
complexindustrialsocietythroughanevaluationofsocialdevelopmentsastheunintended
productsofhumanbehaviorinparticularsituationalcontexts.Furthermore,asmentionedabove,
Winchappearstosupporttheeconomicconceptofliquiditypreferencewhichcouldbeusedin
suchanexplanatorymodelinordertoexplainachangeinthefinancialvalueofabusiness
institutionbyassociatingthiscausallywiththeunintendedconsequencesofthebehaviorof
businessmen.Thus,scientificmethods
can
potentiallybeusedtoexplainthedevelopmentsof
nonmetaphysical
socialphenomenathroughlegitimateethnoscientificanalysis,althoughitis
truethatexplanationsandpredictionsofsocialphenomenawillneverbeasaccurateasthose
dealingwithnaturalorphysicalphenomenaforallthereasonsWinchoutlines.However,
assumingthisistheonlyappropriatekindofsocialscientificanalysiseschewsanotherkindof
inquiry,namelytheunderstandingsofotherpeoplesunderstandingwhichbecomesespecially
significantwhenthesubjectmatteris
metaphysical
.WhileWinchelaborateshisdescriptionsof
rulefollowingbehaviorinordertoexcoriatethestatusofsocialscience,whatheisactually
outliningisacompletelydistinctmethodologyonewhichlegitimatelystandsalongside
explanatorymodelssuchassituationallogic.Andinanthropology,thiskindofanalysis,inthe
formofhermeneutics,surpassesethnoscientificexplanationinimportancesinceits
understandingsdeterminewhatkindsofexplanatorymodelswillbeappropriatefor
explainingnotonlyalienwaysoflife,butalsometaphysicalmatterssuchasart,morality,
politicsandreligionwhicharecentraltotheappreciationofanycultureandwhichcanonlybe
explainedbydeterminingwhatconstitutesrationalorlogicalbehaviorwithinthem.

NielsenisaphilosopherwhodrawsuponWinchsideastoelucidatethemannerinwhich

verstehen
analysisallowsananalysttograspthemeaningswhichmetaphysicalsocial
phenomenaholdinparticularwaysoflife.Hesuggeststhatethnoscientificexplanatorymodels
oftenpreliminarilyjudgeexoticbeliefsystemstobeirrationalandthereforedismissthetaskof
understandinginfavorofexplainingawaybysearchingforcausalexplanationswhichmay
uncovertheoriginsofthesephenomenaorthepsychologicalneedstheysatisfy(Nielsen1982:
469).Hesuggeststhatafavorableunderstandingofthesephenomenawouldinvolvegettingto
gripswiththecontextualrationaleforthebelief,actionorrulefollowingbehaviorasWinchis
keentohighlight.Thisprocessinvolvesanappreciationofthelocalrationalitywhichunderlies
themodeofsociallifewhetheritisreligion,morality,law,naturalscienceorAzandemagical
conceptions.Tounderstandwhatthisappreciationentailswearriveatthecentralthemeof
WinchsworkwhichNielsenrecallsnamelytheunderstandingofconceptswhicharepossessed
bythoseengagedintheseactivities(1982:469).

Anexampleshouldhelptoclarifytheperilsofutilizingascientificmodelinordertoexplain
metaphysicalbeliefs,somethingwhichhasplaguedanthropologicalinquiryeversince
Malinowski.InhisessaynamedsocialscienceWinchcountersapropositionofItalian
sociologistandphilosopherVilfredoPareto.Paretoclaimsthatallhumansocietiescontain
culturallyspecificdiscoursesakintoideologieswhichofferpseudoexplanationsofsociallife
butwhichdisguisetherealityofthesocialphenomenabymakinggroundlessrationalizationsfor
pointlessactivities.Paretosuggeststhattheseactivities,
Derivations,
areactuallytheresultsof
certainuniversalhumansentimentsandthatthesocialscientistmustattempttousescientific
techniquesinordertouncovertherealitywhichunderliestheseideologiesi.e.the
residues
or

therealnatureandcausesofthebehaviorwhichisunderanalysis(Winch:1958:97100).Thus
whileacertainreligiousgroupmayexplaintheirbeliefsbyreferringtotheologicaltextsetc,
theseforParetowouldconstitutederivationswhileotherrealscientificexplanationswould
clarifytheactualreasonsforbelief.ButunlikeJarviesexplanatorymodel,(whichtakesinto
accounttheconceptsorrulefollowingbehaviorrequiredfordrivingonapublicroadinorder
toscientificallyexplainunintendedevents),thiskindofanalysisdoesntattempttoachievean
understandingofthemeaningsunderlyingthisexoticsocialactivitybygraspinglocalconcepts
ratheritattemptstoimposescientificstandardsofrationalityuponanexoticmetaphysicalsocial
activity.AndifWinchhastaughtusonethingitisthattheconceptofsocietalbehaviorcannot
begraspedexceptintermsoftheconceptofrulefollowingandrulegovernedbehavior
(Winch1956:25)ThoughParetoprobablyappreciatesthattherulefollowingbehavior
constitutingreligiousbelief(asametaphysicalactivity)isperhapsnotaseasytolearnasisthe
behaviorinvolvedinJarviesdrivingexample.Indeed,Winchremindsusthattheanalystof
religionmusthavesomereligiousfeelingifheistomakesenseofthereligiousmovementheis
studyingjustasthehistorianofartmusthavesomeaestheticsense(1958:83).Asmentioned
abovethereissomethingspecialaboutartandreligionisthisnotacallforametaphysical
hermeneutics?

Section4:Conclusion
Verstehenvs.Eklren?
Inordertoevaluatewhatkindofmethodologicalapproachisappropriateforanthropology

inquiry,itisfirstnecessarytoappreciateoneunderlyingnotionwhichrunsthroughoutthe
philosophicaldiscussionintheprevioussection.Scientificexplanationandhermeneutical
interpretationorunderstandingarenotasdiametricallyopposedtooneanotherasitwouldseem
tooneglancingacrossthecontemporaryanthropologicalliterature.Infact,thesemethodologies
neednotevenmeeteachotherfacetoface,sincetheirrespectiveterritoriesareclearlydistinct.
However,itisperhapsclosertotheboundariesdividingtheseterritorieswhere
misunderstandingshaveoftenarisen.Thispaperhasexploredtheoreticaldebatesregardingthe
suitabilityofthesedistinctmethodologiesfortheanalysisofavarietyofsocialphenomenon,
whilstspecificallyfocusinguponhowthesemethodsweighupinthekindsofanalysiswhich
setsanthropologyapartfromothersocialsciences.

Intheforegoingdiscussion,itwasmadeclearthatmethodologiessuchasJarvies(1972)
situationallogic
are
appropriateforexplainingsocialphenomenaastheunintended
consequencesofhumanactionsthroughtheanalysisofthedispositionsofagivensituational
contextbutitwasalsonotedthatsuchanalysesareconfinedintheiraimsinthreeprimaryways.
Firstly,asWatsonandWatsonFranke(1975)highlight,bytheirvarynature,theyareonly
capableofconsideringasegmentofasocialcontextratherthandealingwithasocialwholei.e.
theymayattempttoexplainaparticularincident(suchasreasonsforwarbreakingout)butnot
thesocialphenomenonofwarasameaningfulsocialactivity.Themostprofoundexplanation
wouldbeonedealingwiththediachronicdevelopmentofsocialphenomenonperhaps
consideringthesocialevolutionofsocietalinstitutions.Secondly,asWinch(1958)reiterates,
theirconsiderationsandexplanationsofthissegmentofaparticularsocialphenomenonmust
dependuponunderstandingsoftheconceptswhichbelongtothisactivity.Indeed,Jarviewhois

usuallyquiteantagonistictowardsWinchsargumentsconcedesthispointbyhighlightingthe
necessityofunderstandingtheentailmentsofdrivingacarsuchascustoms,institutionsand
expectationsinordertoexplainadrivingincident(1972:4).Thiskindofunderstandingis
straightforwardinananalysisofonesownsociety,buttypicallyinanthropologicalcases,this
wouldrequireaseparateanalysisinvolvingthefamiliarizationofoneselfwiththe
rulefollowingbehavioroftheexoticsocialactivityinquestion.

Wecaninferfromthisthatinallcaseswheresuchananalysisfallsshort,itisthemethodof

verstehen
orunderstandingwhichisthemissingfactor.Needlesstosay,thereareaplethoraof
caseswhenanunderstandingofrelevantconceptscanbetakenforgrantedandscientific
methods
can
offerusefulexplanations.Winchhimselfhighlightsthebenefitsofascientific
conceptsuchas
liquiditypreference
commonlyusedineconomics.However,inanthropology,
theemphasisonunderstandinganaliensocialactivityorcultureinitsowntermshasprovedto
beaprofoundinquiryonelargeenoughtofillupthewholeofananthropologiststodolist.
Thisisbeforeoneconsidersthethirdissueconstrainingtheuseofscientificmethodsin
anthropology.Namelythatthesocialphenomenonwhichusuallyoccupyanthropologists,such
asreligion,politics,art,lawandmoralityaremetaphysicalandanyscientificexplanationof
themwouldrequireonetofirstappreciatetherationaleunderlyingsuchactivities.Itappearsthat
themajorityofanthropologistshavetakentheseconsiderationsintoaccountasmentionedinthe
introduction,thegeneraldisciplinarytrendhasbeentowardsthegreateruseofhermeneutical
methodsandthishasbeencoupledwithacriticalstancetowardstheinappropriateuseof
scientificmethods.

Anthropologicalscience?

Moregenerally,thegoalofthispaperwastoexplorethesuitabilityofemployingscientific
methodsfortheanalysisofsocialphenomenonespeciallywithinthecontextofanthropology,in
ordertoconsiderthemeritsoftwoopposedmethodologicalpositionswhichdivide
anthropologists.Itisnotofconcernheretoevaluatetheargumentsofthosemostradically
opposedtotheuseofempiricalscienceinananthropologicalcontext.Whatismoreimportantis
tousethefindingsofthispaperinordertopinpointthelimitsofscientificanalysisin
anthropology,inordertotherebyconsiderthevalueofthehermeneuticalargumentsadvancedin
opposition.Asoutlinedinthefirstsection,thedefinitionofanthropologicalscienceprofferedby
OMeara,oneofitsmostardentfollowersisasfollows:scientificanthropologyshouldaimfor
thesystematicdescriptionandclassificationofobjects,eventsandprocesses,andthe
explanationofthoseeventsandprocessesbytheoriesthatemploylawfulregularities(1989:
354).Intheprevioussection,itwasmadeclearthattheexplanationofsocialandtherefore
humanphenomenaisnotanalogoustothedescriptionofphysicalornaturalphenomena,
althoughasoutlinedabove,thisdoesnotrenderscientificexplanationwhollyredundant.An
anthropologicalexamplemayhelptoillustratethis.Aslongasananalystisfamiliarwiththe
KulaexchangesystemsoftheTrobriandIslanders,isfullyawareofthekindsofrules,customs
etcrequiredtoparticipatesuccessfullyinsuchasystemandperhapshasaspecificunderstanding
ofhowsuchasystemcustomarilyaffectsthesocialstatusofparticipatingmembers,he/sheis
qualifiedtoattemptascientificexplanationoftwomainkinds.Firstly,onemayexplorea
specificincidentwithinthecontextofthesocialactivityforexampleonemayaskwhyan
islanderhasmanagedtoretainallofhisKulavaluableswhileatthesametimeincreasinghis/her

prestige.Secondly,onemayattemptacausalexplanationoftheoriginsoftheexchangesystem
withanemphasisonthepolitical/religious/economicrolesitplaysgenerallyinTrobriand
society.

However,eachoftheseinquiriesisthoroughlydependentuponanunderstandingoftheexotic
exchangesysteminquestionandagraspingoftheconceptswhichbelongtoit.Thisisexactly
whatanthropologistshavehistoricallymanagedtodobyprovidingmeaningfultranslationsof
theworkingsofaliensocialactivitieswhichwecanallagreewith.Ingeneral,thisinvolvesan
interpretationofthemeaningsandlogicalstructuresthathavebeenascribedtosocial
phenomenoninparticularcontextsandisthecentralgoalofhermeneuticalinquiry.By
describingscientificanthropologyasthedescriptionofobjectsandtheirexplanation,
OMearahaspurposefullyneglectedthecomplexitiesinherentintheprocessofdescribing
humanphenomenaanditsignalsthathedeemsthedescriptionstobelesssignificantthanthe
explanationsoratbestequaltothem.ThefactthatthedefinitionOMearaadvancescouldbe
directlyimportedforuseinthenaturalscienceswithoutevenaslightalterationisquitetellingof
hisimplicitassumptions.

Theconflationbetweennaturalandsocialphenomenonisacommonoccurrenceinscientific
anthropologicalliteratureandagoodexamplecanbefoundinapaperbyRoscoe(1995)in
whichhearguesthatsinceourknowledgeofnaturalandphysicalphenomenonarebasedupon
thesocialinterpretationsofascientificcommunity,ourknowledgeofhumanaffairsshould
similarlybederivedfrominterpretationsofthesameorderthroughtheuseofanalogous
interpretiveconceptualframeworks(1995:496).However,akeyinsightofthispaper,as

elucidatedbyWinch(1958)hasbeentocontrastthenatureof
human
phenomenon,which
functioninaccordancewiththeirownconceptualframeworks,with
physical
phenomenonwhich
weunderstandthroughtheexternalapplicationofourownscientificconcepts.Inhiswork,
OMearapleasforanthropologiststofocusuponthecausesofhumanaffairsandnotdelveinto
interpretationsoftheirmeaningsandquotesEinsteinwhohadsuggestedthattheaimofscience
isnottogiveatasteofthesoup(quotedinOMeara1989:366).However,thispaperhasshown
thatitispreciselythroughatasteofthesocialactivityinquestionthatanthropologistscaneven
attemptcausalexplanationsandthatultimately,tastingisoftensuchasignificantandtime
consumingactivity,thatanthropologistsoughttohavetimeforlittleelseafterwards.

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