Kha Le

Professor Leib

March 30, 2016

Report 3

1. Kennedy's choice was eventually a political choice made as far as the Cold War system
that does not stand up now that the Cold War is over. The decision was lacking
consideration for other important tasks at hand. Furthermore, Kennedy, himself, was not
certain about the decision. It was very much a strategy to create a distraction for the
American. The several billion of dollars spent in the 1960s on what Kennedy basically
considered as world purposeful publicity could presumably have been exceptional given
to U.S. defense or the American economy. The US might have persuaded the Soviets
more rapidly of the vanity of the meaningless clash with the United States.
2. Through Beschlosss point of view of the American space program, the dedication was
to a great extent a result of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviets for universal distinction
and overwhelming nature in science and innovation as symbolized by the race into space.
This race was accelerated in the U.S. by the centering on the Soviet firsts of the primary
satellite and first man in space in 1957 and 1961. While centering these events can give a
new impulse and bearing to technologies developments and advances, they can likewise
bring about the passage and narrow vision as well as folly to the detriment of the longterm objectives and necessities.
3. Although Kennedy did receive an overwhelming support from the Congress, not
everybody was excited about Kennedy's choice. Many representatives and leaders were
against this idea. Previous President Dwight D. Eisenhower called it practically crazy and
somewhat juvenile. [Page 61] The decision takes up a large amount of money that could
have been used for other purposeful causes. Some members of the congress and scientists
believed that the money could have been utilized on more essential experimental
activities. At the point when Kennedy learned in 1962 that the Soviets did not expect to
contend with the U.S. in getting to the moon, Kennedy admitted that the project was
nothing more than a Cold War prestige.
4. It is a measure of Kennedys aversion to long-term planning and his tendency to be
rattled by momentary crises that one may conclude that in the absence of the Gagarin
triumph and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, he might never have gone to the length
of asking Congress to spend $20 billion on a crash program. Kennedys desire for a
quick, theatrical reversal of his new administrations flagging position, especially just
before a summit with Khrushchev, is a more potent explanation for his Apollo decision
than any other. [Page 63]
5. a) What were the long-term problems proposed by Kennedys decision?
b) Was this decision based off of Kennedys personally interest for re-election?
c) What are the explanations behind the overwhelming support for Kennedy even
though the amount of spending was absurd?
Work-cited
Beschloss, Michael, Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon, in Spaceflight and
the Myth of Presidential Leadership. Edited by Roger Launius and Howard McCurdy,
pages 51-67. Urbana (IL): University of Illinois Press, 1997.