Sec 11 - 19

C O N S T I 1 [ A RT.
I I ] P a g e | 1
Section 11
33. Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
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DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are
not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that
covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for
a writ of amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 [1] of the
Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) [2] filed
before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners
(therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII,
Section 5(5)[3] of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the
arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to
life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They
prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule;
(2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs
allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule;
(4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just
and equitable reliefs.[8]
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule and further resolved,viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with
the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of
the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice
C O N S T I 1 [ A RT. I I ] P a g e | 2
Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00
p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are
hereby REQUIRED:
1.
To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision
all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case,
except those already on file herein;
2.
To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3.
To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to
include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from
February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP
Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express and made apparent
on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the
gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At
past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not
Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed,
brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand
and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers
stopped her and told her to stay.[12]
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz,
Puti de la Cruz, and Pulade la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and
residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza,
also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he
saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one
who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or
older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curlyhaired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30
years old.[14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his
brother Reynaldos. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo
were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for
about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn
to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each
time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were,
how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none,
they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would
salute them, call them sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high
officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the
uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and
thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much
about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents abduction.
[16]
While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier
guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond
was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.[17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him
up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice
with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he
could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the
same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the
next day and kill him.[18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise
with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he
managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a
forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing
the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He
reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and
caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw
was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured
gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond
before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where
Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents guards got drunk.[21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He
stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating,
removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people[22] had been detained in
that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small
house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing
range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained
in what he only knew as the DTU.[24]
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine
samples and marked them.When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating,
their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white
arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and
mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents urine test and advised them to drink plenty
of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent
through the master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU
for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to
monitor and take care of them.[25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed
men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained
for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house.Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was
beaten up by Hilarios men.[26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They
were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they
arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them.They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the
center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms
length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied
in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if
he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he
did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin
nyo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa
hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat
sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa
gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At
about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that abducted them - brought
them to their parents house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he
still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if
they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were
then brought back to Sapang.[29]
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the
four masters who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. [30] When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he
called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to
gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the
medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove
that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. [31] During his
testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.[32]
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine,
named Alive, was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and
instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive
made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.[33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed
Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon,
assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and
got acquainted with other military men and civilians.[34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry
Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond
was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was
kept in the barracks.[35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he
learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were
training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks.In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan
from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of thePhilippines and was abducted in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and
longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do
the laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later
came to know as Donald Caigas, called master or commander by his men in the 24 th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at
night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.[37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful
they were still alive and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had
already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to CampTecson. They stayed in that camp from
September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding
himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and
descriptions he stated in his affidavit.[38]
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the
24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May
8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew
as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns.Sherlyn and Karen also suffered
enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.[39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and
Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayanbayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. [40] Another
time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed.When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed
only his son right before Raymonds eyes.[41]
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse
near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the
house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.[42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked
to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the
camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na
inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming
makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga
bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy sinunog. Masansang
ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa
6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila
ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng
kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog.Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril
siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita
malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay
mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong
mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin
na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya
ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng
mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o
ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga
sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni
Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si
Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay
magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.
[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise
poultry for Donald (Caigas).Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take
care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell
their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond)
and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped
farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When
they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to
exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did
not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their
guards lived in the other three.Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents
house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening
of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the
volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound
for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as they related to
matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14,
2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he
got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA
because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until
he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated
from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario,
in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent himself as a military trainee
from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought
to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was
also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips, Hilario
drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the
blindfold
once
outside
the
province. In
one
of
their
trips,
they
passed
by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr.
Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization
handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by
an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their
ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents
were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted
on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr.
Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the
examination.[47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October
25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying
any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted,
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents before the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as
head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry
Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU),
namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ On July 4, 2006, the
Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S.
Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to
establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated
June 27, 2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers,
although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and
ordered them to release the latter.[48]
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary
of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the
Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations,
neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and
agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8.
In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case,
I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with
Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance Likewise, in a
Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive
addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action
in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as
any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.[49]
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the
Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that
acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused
to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB
PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose
favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and
Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the
surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the
commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.[50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA,
earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino,
which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion
detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and
found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in
Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine
National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed
that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was
used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and
Merino.[51]
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S.
Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners
could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.[52]
C O N S T I 1 [ A R T . I I ] P a g e | 10
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost
Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The
territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.[53] The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.[54]
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palaran,[55]through his Assistant Chief of Staff, [56] to investigate the alleged abduction of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz,
aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning;
and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative
liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a
complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of
the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial
jurisdiction.[58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished
at 10:00 in the evening.[60] The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn
statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated [61] as according to Jimenez, the directive to
him was only to investigate the six persons.[62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. [63] The six persons were not known to Jimenez
as it was in fact his first time to meet them.[64] During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of
his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.[65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza
had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a
power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed onMay 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated
that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he
personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it
on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.[68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is
herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who
were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil
court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula
Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit B)
states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the
concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor
thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo
Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the
allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he
was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members
of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the
abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
C) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the
CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA
Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2)
brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he
was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He
claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when
he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit O) states
that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of
CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware
about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the
CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN:
Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy.
Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident
when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated
him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason
they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit E) states that he
is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since
childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence
in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the
incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted
by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated
him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of
summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA
leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he
was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit F) states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a
former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are
active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any
participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident
when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated
because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit G) states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of
Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their
barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are
active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and
he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the
matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of
the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains
loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking
them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that
transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of
the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not
suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As
it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first
place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGUs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V.
CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction
committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence,
it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is
therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI.
RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza,
and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.[69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts assessment of the foregoing
evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND
GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO
BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN
WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO
THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND
REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF
MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us
hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from
a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by
the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summitwas envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the
issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, [71] hence representatives from all sides of the
political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system [72] participated in mapping out
ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing
and enforced disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. [74] As theAmparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in
its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings
committed without due process of law,i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. [75] On the other
hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of
a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection in Spanish.[77] In 1837, de
Tocquevilles Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the
practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,[79]which granted judges the power to
protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the
national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant
hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making
no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.[80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. [81] If, after hearing,
the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the
officials superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full
enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from
the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails
in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.[82]
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in
response to the particular needs of each country.[83] It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived.[84] What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several
purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
(2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the
judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived
from the agrarian reform process.[85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect
against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries
adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic
rights.[86] Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.[87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the
above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended
by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to
the remedy of habeas corpusfound in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.[88] The Clause is an offspring
of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,[90] these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ ofamparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule,
this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine
experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably
yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative
roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order[92] to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to
liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, [93] prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also
sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and
Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007,
they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners first argument in disputing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit
to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners cause of
action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents
were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February
14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention,
torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious
will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the
following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. [96] (N)ilakasan ng mga
sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel.
[97]
May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang
bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena.
[99]
Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang
isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar.[100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit
and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners
(herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the
six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their
attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and
residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure
that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who
drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners
were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for
Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely
superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division focused on the
one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact
that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even
then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware
of the petitioners captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or
any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan)
met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their
parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the abduction might
not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long
captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable
command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians
without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon,
chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no
clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the
abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could not, indeed, be then established after
Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings atrollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the
petitioners were brought away from their houses onFebruary 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that
Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which
was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a
house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought
them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren
also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners parents, where only
Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join
anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their
sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse)
with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to
take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the
petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of
the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata,
Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the
abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.[101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the
affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr.
Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, [103] also corroborate
respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity
with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col.
Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit,[104] firms up respondents story that they were detained for some time
in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was
abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and
tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and
credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. [106] These statements were
supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.[107] She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that
the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of
cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.[108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention,
it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written
and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left
by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where
powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes
as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel
that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they
have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and
are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every sense of the word [109] as their movements continue
to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case
of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to
life, liberty and security.[110](emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once
again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of
person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that this right is often associated
with liberty; it is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and
unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987
Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free from torture and fromincommunicado detention and
solitary detention places[112] fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of
Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in
view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching inMoncupa v. Enrile[113] that the
right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of
that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of
liberty[115]or being put under monitoring and surveillance.[116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and
a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the extensions of his/her person
houses, papers, and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a
persons home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.
[117]
The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon
City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give
remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v.
Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is anessential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of
persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable
can only be for the best causes and reasons.[119] (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 [120] guarantees essentially the right to be alive [121] upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of
the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his
person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and
property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of
mans existence.[122] In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual.[123]
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights(UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
(emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right.[124] It is the right to security of person as the word security
itself means freedom from fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights(ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as
people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the amparocontext, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.[127]
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. [128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases,
the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons
because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.[129]
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free
will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion
of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free
will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving
invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom
from threat as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for
the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant,
who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby
violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases
supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was
found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time
when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure
his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural
obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations. [131] (emphasis
supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the
protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions
is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to
liberty and security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life
and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutionand the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right
to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for
human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. [133] As the government is the chief guarantor
of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and
be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.[135]
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases involving Article 9[137] of the
ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In
other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be
invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary
school inLeticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part
of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of
arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence
did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and
the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses
in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of
person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the
concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the
same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to
the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a
State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its
jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis
supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and prisoner
of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release
from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v.
Equatorial Guinea,[141] involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party
in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the complainants husband who was a supporter
of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving the murder of the complainants partner and the
harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,
[144]
involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to security not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty.[145] The ECHR interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.
[146]
In this case, the claimants son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The
familys requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant
suggested that this was a violation of her sons right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very
purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed
control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and
has not been seen since.[147] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine
whether there is a continuing violation of respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them,
would be killed. In Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first
time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before he
was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should
be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in
June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them
that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his
affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga
sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.[148]
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With
their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated
specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons
known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to
limit their movements or activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators
of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ ofamparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of
military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed
by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall
of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied
on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the
sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their
credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the
family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt
rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP,
which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.
[150]
Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive
of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be
issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.[151]To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results
of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat
to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts,
and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo
brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February
14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents
partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application
must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause
must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, selfserving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit,
the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other
supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but
this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused
with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,[153] the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27,
issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of
Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it
violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ ofAmparo has been sought for as soon as the same has
been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of
medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a
writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions
and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury
or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and
detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and
court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of
medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make
appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys
of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
Section 12
34. Imbong vs. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
...
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving
our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have
been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a
problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a
trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the
executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the
reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental
body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive,
yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy
of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the
seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society
came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens
and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S.
Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and
several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and
Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty.
Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of
the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political
party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates
the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed
to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment
and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RHIRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial,
City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff
nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should
not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH
Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited
under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services
for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would
mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among
the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing
from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall
be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations
for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family
planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by
religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to
perform the service or procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure,
the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually
decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that
the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether
their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product
is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense
of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented
on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the
Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino
Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De
Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4,
2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not
yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred
and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or
identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An
Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such
sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no
drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the
Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly
licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that
the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development,
enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among
these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National
Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned
that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be
provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further
reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.)
No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational
program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all
acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or
preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of
family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International
Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or
"The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health
services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable
pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over
76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the
measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To
make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full
range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health
education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in
particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law,
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and
promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be
maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under
Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited
unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and
repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet
secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State
then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the
program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning
methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined
them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to
resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law,
it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by
certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the
Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law
has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the
wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation
of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three
branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other
branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily,
the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address
this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within
its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at
a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are
null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality
or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in
the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court
may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to
review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or
instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on
just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not
yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that
there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern
a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was
put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no
concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents,
the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are
in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the
RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in
the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental
right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to
one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit
with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental
Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only
when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the
"as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and
applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before
the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can
be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest
so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance
where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality
of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus
standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed,
thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and
bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at
stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive
reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article
VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of
due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as
they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population
control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While
it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the
country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion
of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire
RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other
positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services,
prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the
Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives
effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an
abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation,
contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already
has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the
fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State
sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively
confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually
supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can
truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the
said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products
and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients
by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and
consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted
that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular
drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or
the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs
and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of
the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two
cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed
later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12
which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute
as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization.
They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers
to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described
and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by
the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the
original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has
respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the
moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there
is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered
is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like
all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization.
Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in
the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question
that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception,
the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I
repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both
alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from
six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science
that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any
doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that
we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum
to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the
opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed,
these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore,
would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the
State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life,
that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the
Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it
determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional
provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established
evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and
thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like
not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for
a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term
"protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this
afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question
again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are
also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this
point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet.
That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intrauterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So
if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to
be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners
during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not
classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section
12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a
spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union
of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that
dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union
of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and
ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically
distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus
results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is
formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no
matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being
begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political
conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective,
consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view
of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception
and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that
would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate
religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn
from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that
even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent
of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any proabortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While
the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law
itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice
Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized
ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do
so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That
reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section
4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By
using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those
that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of
the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect
it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion
(first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of
the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins
only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given
upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect
the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it
becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent
any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law
does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance
of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug
or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply
included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA,
with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the
agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives,
however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean
that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that
said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a
construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or
equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method,
device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a
fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its
approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out,
with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for
being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that
the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm
or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as
abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its
declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS
and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws
should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules
must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G)
of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and
prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of
life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug
Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast
and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who
never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased
risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on
risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections
4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that
women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a
mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that
medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete
with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people,
viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and
problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, selfdevelopment, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need
for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing,
as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729,
the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly
licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No.
4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be
complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH
Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation
of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729
in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used
without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy
and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed
by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly
governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation
or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine
of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or
both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of
whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made
available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly
established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the
pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining
supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to
LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with
all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The
supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the
following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent
with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A.
No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means.
As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to
the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA
as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public
consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is
premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick
as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and
intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion
by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only
after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family
planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies
by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA
that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can
be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially
claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and
cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely
opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving
of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of
their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their
religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this
amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without
violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly
limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient
seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right
of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in
Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the
matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare
service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion
of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory
pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom
they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the
objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While
the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts
which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how
the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health,
education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs
and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the
impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the
provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their
religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of noncompliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and
facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They
point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality
the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only
seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned
natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious
objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs
access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act
professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of
others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in
duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information
received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given
to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they
highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general
acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse
ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and
the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived
Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence
and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature
and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the
mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the
1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as
tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the
affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in
Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State
cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It
cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in
the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an
iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the
"Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and
Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion
as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it
prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a
religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the
Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes
of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's
chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S.
Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a
single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice,
while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to
use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part
is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only
with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it
was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent
and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on,
or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and
that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the
Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did
not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona
case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established
institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as
the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling
state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave
and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back
to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the
cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one
form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand,
the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of
society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag
which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of
the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not
congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on
the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of
the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the
"aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in
Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The
test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to
batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state
interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work
on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state,
seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint
or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that
matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes
in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions.
It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in
turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, nonabortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as
those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR
and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide
funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children
they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and
affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section
3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under
various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil
society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive
health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women,
the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking
into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with
their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the
principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups.
To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state
religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will
cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse
religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect
to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in
Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been
burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side
coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him
to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin
A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal,
but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights
guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the
interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan
and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious
objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise
or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if
'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would
actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be
forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to
Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was
stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without
set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual.
Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right
the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court
cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they
should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public
or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values.
The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its
beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or
in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of
the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is
any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is
replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you
affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " ....
skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors."
Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors,
skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in
their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is
the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously
silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a
conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral
arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes
disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this
duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is
a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief
or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of
their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On
the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the
moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's
religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents
have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be
momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as
violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be
undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The
health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive healthrelated procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an
act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of
Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent
provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times,
provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all
stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's
religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions,
and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs,
devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health
and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without
prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers,
and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors
shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic,
medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms
and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects
as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of
women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the
development of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He,
however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time.
Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling
state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in
exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of
freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always
to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty.
Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the
child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the
life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of
one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is
intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not
intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The
mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever
burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the
life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the
Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the
assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is
for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It
does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be
natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance
in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject
the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters
animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In
fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which
tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in
the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their
authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the
ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their
very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State
shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore,
is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to
the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision
would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the
marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the
policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not
just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the
family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the
procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own
destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any
compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i)
of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family
by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our
jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling
of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense
on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld
wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family
planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need
to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own
parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and
comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the
family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social
institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion
that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or
the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that
is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his
family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties
and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as
one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state
interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7
or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access
to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the
minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper
care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates
the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable
a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to
such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents
might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a
miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting
the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions
discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the
parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right
would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Ageand Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment
violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable
to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data
gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of outof-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners
and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of
society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior
to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the
youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important
role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive
health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection
against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and
children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that
Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the
Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the
rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest
groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV,
Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those
who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that
confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious
groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however,
if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining
whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference
must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is
a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care
services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government
and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been
accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health
care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical
procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and
access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and
failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and
correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care
service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and
services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety.
The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH
Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and
definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public
bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.
What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to
the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall
into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law
only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does
not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks
to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper
look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the
implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less
fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and
private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition
against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and nongovernment health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health
services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts
against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a
right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public
health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the
point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers to render
pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth,
the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or
not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services
and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether
or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order
is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been
observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the
agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the
safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to
the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
"service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified
its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably
to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time,
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers
devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17
vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as
follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves
the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute.
The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services.
There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services
mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment
by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the
ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A.
No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the
operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the
regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State
of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not
duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution.
While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see
if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an
acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused
by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed
into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case
cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only
in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by
providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to
impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and
pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these
perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is
controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The
number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers
represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their
economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This
is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them?
This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2)
children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures
(like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of
the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as
enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct
rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor
to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every
unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold
neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and
existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking
body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior
existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the
RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive
Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710),
sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "noncoercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16,
2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Section 12
35. Virtuoso vs. Municipal Judge (G.R. No. L-47841, March 21, 1978)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and
CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN,respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 1978,
premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the pre examination which led to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles,
Bataan, 1 failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable
cause. 2 He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in
the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. 3 It was in the amount of Pl6,000.00, the
alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978,
justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary
examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in
accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless
reduced the amount to P 8,000.00.
Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In the course
of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was
ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. 4 a youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but under
eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense." 5 As such, he could be provisionally
released on recognizance in the discretion of a court. 6 According accordingly, after the hearing, the Court
issued the following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr.,
the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old
minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and
Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such
capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance
with law." 7 This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code,
which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 8
Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by
respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it
must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or
indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated in this
petition, the rights of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is much more importance
attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is a creature of the
Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that there
should be fealty to the constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt
fromDe la Camara v. Enage: 9
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition,
the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a
guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that that United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, 'the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and
declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is
'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15,
1978 as set forth above.
Section 12
36. Pacu vs. Secretary of Education (97 Phil 806)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5279
October 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and
colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive
parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions
conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to the record.
The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the matter
constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions;
(2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally
valid.
Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools
and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of
Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently
without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for
avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor
allege anyfrom the enforcement of the criticized statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the
judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where
he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon,
the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system
of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that
before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of
Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present
this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And
they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have
suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a
direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has
sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed.
493.)
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that
he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610;
Coffmanvs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require
the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat
being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)
Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority
to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims
under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital
controversy between litigants. (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks
(Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief.
(Salonga vs.Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where
the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid
decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv.
Rep., May 23, 1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)
The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Court quoted by
petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have decided to look into the
matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of
liberty and property.
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of
Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth
Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?
In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to
make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and
agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully
selected technical members performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the
local educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The
following paragraphs are taken from such report:
PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS
There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, however disqualified
by ignorance, greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the young. It it true that
in order to post over the door "Recognized by the Government," a private adventure school must first be
inspected by the proper Government official, but a refusal to grant such recognition does not by any
means result in such a school ceasing to exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized
private schools than of the recognized variety. How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private
Schools keeps records only of the recognized type.
Conclusion.An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private Adventure
Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to university
are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and administer them. The people whose
children and youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes
a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The
suggestion has been made with the reference to the private institutions of university grade that some
board of control be organized under legislative control to supervise their administration. The
Commission believes that the recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more likely to
bring about the needed reforms.
Recommendations.The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of
any school by an individual or organization without the permission of the Secretary of Public
Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary assure himself that such school measures
up to proper standards in the following respects, and that the continued existence of the school be
dependent upon its continuing to conform to these conditions:
(1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms, the nature of
the lavatories, closets, water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and methods of cleaning shall be
such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils and teachers.
(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in the subjects
taught.
(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commission recommends
40 as a maximum.
(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools of the same
grade.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise of
its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by
petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions.
And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power
to regulate establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C. J. S.
4.)
What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on account of violation
of rules or regulations of the Department.
II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power."
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in
all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to
the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said
schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,
"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific, of what
constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis or
condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of
conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the 'efficiency
of instruction.'"
The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:
The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the
minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting the
degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degree. It shall also from time
to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law, medical, dental,
pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical or vocational schools or colleges giving
instruction of a technical, vocational or professional character.
Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of
Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain
language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to
formulate standard. . . .."
It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing
minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges
as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the
provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The
best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure
adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school
calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of
private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the
Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the
Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis
of government recognition of any private school.
At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their
operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power
by the Secretary of Education.
True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and
that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private
schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those
inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no
argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per
se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.
Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra vs. Collector of
Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture to "designate
standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal" against vigorous attacks on the ground of
invalid delegation of legislative power.
Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare"
"necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See
Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power.
In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended
the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate which of such official documents
was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional
practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court
will not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)
We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the Secretary of
Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why the statute should be struck
down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does not in express terms give the
Secretary completecontrol. It gives him powers to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give
them official permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not
amount to completecontrol. If any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go
beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it would surely be invalid.
Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having before us the text of such circulars, the
petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the
National Board of Education, opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or
encroachments is amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically
competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or relevancy of the measures criticized
by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)
If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, the question arises
whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV was meant to
include control of private educational institutions. It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think
the Constitution provides for control of Education by the State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine
Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)
The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic
conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine
Constitutional Law, 1936.)
The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and
quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education
was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the Constitution grants power to supervise and to
regulate. Which may mean greater power than mere regulation.
III. Another grievance of petitionersprobably the most significantis the assessment of 1 per cent levied on
gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision
and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as
follows:
SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the regular
amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for additional expenses
in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and universities and in the purchase of
textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges and universities and President of the Philippines
may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy an equitable assessment from each private educational
institution equivalent to one percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and
non-payment of the assessment herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be
sufficient cause for the cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted
to it.
Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open a school, the
liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling
religious literature or of publishing a newspaperboth constitutional privilegeshave been held, in the United
States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right.
The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the further
collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction, and in
so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against the State without its consent. Anyway
he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere feeand
not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the
exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and examination of relevant data, which should
best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the
original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.
The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1 provides:
The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be
submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of
said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the
government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the
government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.
This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U. S. cases (Miss.
and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon publication of newspapers, or curtail the
right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of government institutions or policies.
Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the law may be
enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private
schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this
connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses
by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For
instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private
education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the formerconflict of two express powers. But
if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express
individual right, as was probably the situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and
Minnesota, states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced.
However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed
that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to
submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceive anything
objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the
Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper? What's the power of regulation and
supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger
to civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with
obvious alarm. Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that
constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations
strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of "dictatorship"
and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review
will develop. Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal
to the National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.
Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize
and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts will not
shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protect individual liberties.
IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the proper court, and
at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented by them, this petition for
prohibition will be denied. So ordered.
Section 16
37. Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, . . . petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action
to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage
of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection
of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by
the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land
area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological
and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as
a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of
the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6
hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and wellbeing. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based
on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain
that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if
TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the
State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles
the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action
to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence
to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions
may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of
the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law
and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases
for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already
paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D.
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued.
The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it
speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that
the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus
be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of
the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to
the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections
3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been
passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,
or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect
to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners
may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber
license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Section 16
38. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA (G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A.
ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage
it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of
this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for
adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court
referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin,
Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the
operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The
LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as
required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No.
4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other
than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991,
the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila
Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or
kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in
August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government
of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental
Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another
order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias
Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area
being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the
City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge
Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding
judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control
Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon
the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with
Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et
al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being
independent of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated
cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its
cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin
dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order
dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to
dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA);
and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a
motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city
government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the
issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to
this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the
case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the
restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing
Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on
December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of
LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly
authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of
respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of
respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their
respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has
no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order,
including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since
appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par.
(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority
to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813
and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said
case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining
order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the
condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and
protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of
the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the
corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the
necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now
docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be
re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and
authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to
maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to
which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the
general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the
dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it
questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and
authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay
Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No.
813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding
against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to
Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and
the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the
prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued
under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for
the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders
and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions
of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on
pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the
issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect
was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint
against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government
of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open
garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not
prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of
1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created
under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the
Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard
that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under
such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA
for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its
charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the
City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as
required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the
LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter
acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of re-opening the open
dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the
LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No.
4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the
LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA
to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D.
No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion
that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law,
there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may
well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court
ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the antipollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort
of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to
the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution.
Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of nonimpairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to
be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no
further legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the
LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the
power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de
Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise
of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To
meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the
power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the
related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with
the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court
on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Section 19
39. Taada vs. Angara (G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate
and as taxpayers; et al. , petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al., , respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of
the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst
states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic
globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are
ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas,
quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in
specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-thyneighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the
words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, Increased participation in the world economy has
become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to
address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International
Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral
protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What
remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties
governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the
agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo
Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World Trade
Organization -- with the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as
articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for
the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x, and (the
attraction of) more investments into the country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in
his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from the WTO
system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1)
Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through
negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where
naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or
impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court
assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization?Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2)
for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by
respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate
Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations
(Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the
President of the Philippines,[3]stating among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of
P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby
resolved, that the Senate concur, asit hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. [6] The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages
137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes
various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3
thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed[7] the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after
having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify
and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and
its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the Solicitor
General describes these two latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute
settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or
limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national
treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial
service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents comment
and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and
the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R.
Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper,[9] for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2)
summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript
of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the
Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the
multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996,
he listed the various bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on
January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to
the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the
provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict
and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI,
1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the
exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following:[10]
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article
II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has
effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng)
are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse
of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing
notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very
jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled
upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have
effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents favor, will not cause the petitions dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who
are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an
integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus
standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably
realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of
the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met
head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:

(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED,
DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR
IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF
JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE
THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.[12] Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters [14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution,[15] as follows:
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in
our political law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, [17] the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, [18] it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due
course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon
the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on
the propriety of the governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in various
parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and
in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions
quoted in their memorandum:[19]
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4
of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law
or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source,
whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in
terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the
volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary
to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting
its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or
value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents,
p.22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means
of transport and not on the nationality of the product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol
Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph
1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.177,
emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments,
p.25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out
therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect
of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers
of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it
modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610 emphasis
supplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase
effectively controlled by Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the
context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements.
[20]
Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in
national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are
not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution
invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art.
XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the
Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries
like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution [21] is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean
Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action
in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them, thus:
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of
Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and
policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly
define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If
the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial
but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature
through the language of the ballot.(Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion
in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a right
cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or
may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social
and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management,
our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the
legislative and executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced
Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles
relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections
in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony[27] and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; [28] and (3) by requiring
the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. [29] In
similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit
of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity;[30] and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,
[31]
this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to
the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every
aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule.The issue here is not whether this
paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair.[32] In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect
weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where
major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on
the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO
equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments
would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will
require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six
months from the date of notice of withdrawals.[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through
one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful
blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter
of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. These basic principles are
found in the preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view
to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure ashare in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all
of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading
system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles,
the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries
some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential
treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which
the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for
developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries -- including the
Philippines -- are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to
agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be
effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their
budgetary outlays for export subsidyby 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a
period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that
prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices
including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local
businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is
hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be
wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker
situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis
to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a
bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision
cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply
because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this
case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will
only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy[35] does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence
on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it
means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue
foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural
resources and public utilities.[36]
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity,[37] the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear
policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does
it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make
available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most
reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare
of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will -- as promised by its
promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable
rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not
subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in
1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not
have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not
yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then
Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines
signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the
decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the
credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time
bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer
and respected jurist[38] explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in
time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention,
nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march
apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will
keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. [39] Petitioners maintain
that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative
power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could
not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not
conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of
investments and money x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is
subject to specified limits and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide, [42] as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on
this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision
a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations."[43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. [44] One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely
diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war,
the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the
settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international
organizations.[46] The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in
the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today,
no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence
is here.[47]
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN
Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not
merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by
the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were expenses of the United Nations
under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in
such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the
said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again
the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example: although sovereign
equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under
Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present
charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign power to
make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both bilateral
and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor
General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed,
among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal
Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar
remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal services performed by
them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs
duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment,
spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties,
excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts,
regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the
same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service
agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted
Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the
Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit
and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special
Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of
the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and
related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of international obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers
of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the
sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless
anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the
reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade
treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller
countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically
stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will
provide access to a larger set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining
enhanced success to the smaller countrys market.[48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all
nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) [49] intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, [51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as
follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to
in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the
judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an
identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one
of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent
owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented
process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner
of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the
alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the absence
of proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a
patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1)
where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not
determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated
by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going
forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced
without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented
process and the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption
in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or
product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility
model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of
copying. (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies
only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to
determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems
and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of
legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than
justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.[52]
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final
Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the other
documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding
on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the
Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the
Senate[53] which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions,
recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. [54] It
is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have
taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one page [55] in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic
of the Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the
members can meet to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally
with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to
the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included
as its integral parts,[58] as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to
as Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them,
and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or
rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as
GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947,
annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified
(hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation on August 25, 1994.After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, [59] the
senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of
this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate
was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round
which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator
Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion
for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the
Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be
clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making a new submission which
improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his
intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this
question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for
ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well
as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali
Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his
earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The Constitution
does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final
Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance
with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance as
whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the
one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately
reflected in the journal of yesterdays session and I dont see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein
via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be
issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[62] Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.[63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two
sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body
independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless
convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and
the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave
abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by
Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while
serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a
trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such
exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with
petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that
is not a legal reasonto attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so
would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance[65] where the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and
culturally in the next century. He refers to the free market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming
Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating
for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty,
the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic selfdestruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles
the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the
people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Section 19
40. Garcia vs. Board of Investments (G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner, vs. THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LUZON PETROCHEMICAL
CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas
and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. the Board
of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a decision, ordering the BOI as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is ordered: (1) to publish
the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the
petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, as a
petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however,
privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, and (3) to set
for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such
hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the
BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period of ten (10) days
from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by personal service to the petitioner
through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a
period of ten (10) days without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary
injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451)
However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the import of P.D.
Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim of right of final choice of plant site, in the light of the
provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this Court on October 24, 1989,
made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the Limay site should be the only
petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the
country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No.
1803.
Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances
surrounding its first choice of plant site may change it simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The
Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear at the
hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of
the judgment. On this ground, the motion for partial reconsideration was denied.
A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve the basic issue
of whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-attendance of the
petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory; and that the petitioner had
not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI.
In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:
Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor in
the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's
choice is subject to processing and approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus
Investments Code). By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the
investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or
disapprove the same after determining whether its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and
beneficial to our country. By asking that his opposition to the LPC's amended application be heard by
the BOI, the petitioner likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word or the
"final choice" on the matter.
Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the BOI may not be 'final',
for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding
change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit
only when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)
Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.
A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted to grant the
motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing set by the BOI was premature as the decision of the Court
was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court must first rule on whether or not
the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a
useless exercise; that in the October 19, 1989 resolution, the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of
the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has the final choice; that they agree with the observation of the
majority that "the investor has no final choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments
Code and that it is the BOI who decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be
granted to give him the chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard
look at the matter.
Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17, 1990 in G.R.
No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice under the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Investments Code.
Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao, Limay,
Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and
ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at Bataan. It
produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and
applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan
as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the use of "naphtha cracker"
and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture
with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1) exemption from taxes
on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made
and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on investments. As
additional incentive, the House of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the
48%ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No.
88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442)
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC,
personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's
desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan,
to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the
presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell
Corporation.
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her preference that
the plant be established in Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National
Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC filed on April
11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments. Its application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment
amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker,
polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to
Petition; Rollo, p. 25)
Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to Secretary
Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its attachments which was denied by the
BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition,
Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.)
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of the Senate
asserted that:
The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical
complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In
advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however,
made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the BOI or the
government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project should be located. The BOI
recognizes and respect the principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent who would in the
final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)
This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present petition.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be
transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who
has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the paramount issue.
We grant the petition.
First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why it
organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land
precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy
expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful
study long before any covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted
and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order
situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these
were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence
proves the contrary.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the national
output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock
requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to import the same for
use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers
for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to
feed the furnaces of the transferred petrochemical plant.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of Republic Act
No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted
specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both Congress and the President is
clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the
feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national
goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national economy in
consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set goal of government.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the project from
local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal", the capital requirements would be
greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to
naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be
imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great benefit
and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the management of the project instead of a
firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown
to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely
choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
xxx xxx xxx
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of national
interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the development and utilization of
our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and
priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a garment or
embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips,
where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the
national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the
industry by controlling the upstream or cracker facility.
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among them:
(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an eligible relending
credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or
a total accommodation of US $80 million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.
(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources but from loans,
initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both government banks and a consortium of
Philippine private banks or in common parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.'
(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.'
(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian Development Bank
portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).
but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial
choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in
the best interests of the Filipino people.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the
transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other
circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this
transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the
Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind having a
government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a
foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our
heritage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of Investments approving
the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under
its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The
original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and
naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained. SO ORDERED.

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C O N S T I 1 [ A RT.

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

(a) Induces abortion; or

2-The Right to Health

To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:

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