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OCTOBER 2000
Many hydrologists and hydrotechnical organizations are reluctant to assign a recurrence interval to
the PMF, something that must be done in order to
estimate costs and benefits of a proposed modification. The National Research Council provided guid-
INTRODUCTION
uation or risk analysis which considers the significance of consequences attributable to dam failure
(FEMA, 1998).
1Paper No. 99138 of the Journal of the American Water Resources Association. Discussions are open until June 1, 2001.
2Hydraulic Engineer, D-8540, Water Resources Services, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver Federal Center, Denver, Colorado 80225-0007
(E-Mail: wgraham@do.usbr.gov).
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION
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TABLE 1. U.S. Dam Failures Causing More Than 50 Fatalities.
Dam
Williamsburg
South Fork
Walnut Grove
Austin
St. Francis
Buffalo Creek
Canyon Lake
Age of
Dam
Deaths
1911
9
9
2
2
138
2209
85
78
1928
420
1972
1972
State
Year
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Arizona
Pennsylvania
1874
1889
1890
California
West Virginia
South Dakota
125
39
unknown
Failure Cause
Seepage
Overtopping
Overtopping
Structural Defect
Structural Defect
Slumping of Mine Waste
Overtopping
years old.
There are approximately 24,000 dams in the Unit-
saving lives.
954
chance of being exceeded" (p. 19). This apparent recommendation to use the PMF sold short the potential
to use risk analysis that the guideline also supported.
The National Research Council published "Flood
and Earthquake Criteria" in 1985. The criteria stated,
".
and results in unacceptable incremental consequences. The guidelines state: "there are times when
(selecting the inflow design flood using the incremental hazard procedure) becomes difficult and it may be
based approach."
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the PMF. Some of these "unsafe" dams have subsequently been removed or modified.
An article published in the Austin AmericanStatesman newspaper (Haurwitz and South, 1997)
contained information indicating that 49 percent of
the 817 high hazard dams in Texas could fail during
the PMF and 14 percent could fail during a flood half
the size of the PMF.
The PMF design standard has been criticized. Federally owned Hyrum Dam in Utah provides a useful
example. In the late 1970s and early 1980s there were
plans to construct an auxiliary spiliway at a cost of
about $8 million. Local opposition to the project was
strong. The Hyrum City Council passed a resolution
on June 26, 1978 and sent it to Congress stating, "We
petition the Congress and Senate not to consider the
criticism of the subjective nature of hydrometeorological analysis and the ambiguous relation of the proba-
JAWRA
Graham
The major criticisms of using the full PMF for modifying dams, and the basis for the criticism, are as follows.
Most dam safety modifications, designed to eliminate hydrologic deficiencies, include increasing spillway capacity and/or strengthening or raising the dam.
Dam safety program managers may overlook the fact,
the interplay between damages resulting from overtopping failure of the dam and those associated with
successful passage of large floods can cause the total
indicated that "dam building worldwide causes several hundred job site deaths annually (and perhaps several thousands)" (ICOLD, 1989). They suggested that
"At most sites, the risk of fatal accidents to workmen
during construction is greater than the risk from dam
failure." In addition, they stated (emphasis is original): "overdesign may, in effect, increase rather than
reduce the risk to human life." The implication here is
clear: modifying a dam that already has a very small
chance of failure may increase overall risk to human
958
modification construction.
The expenditure of $75 billion to correct hydrologic
as follows.
(number of lives).
which are whether the risks are voluntary or involuntary, within one's control, common or dreaded, etc.
The cost-per-life-saved in many dam safety modifications is high, sometimes exceeding $1 billion.
Tengs and Graham (1996) estimated that a more
rational allocation of resources in the United States
could save 60,000 more lives annually than are currently being saved, at no increased cost to the taxpay-
EM, (dollars).
3. Annualized Life loss caused by flooding, LM,
(number of lives).
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TABLE 2. Recommended Action on a Proposed Modification.
EB
L8
Action
Reject
o to CM
Reject
<CM
Compute
Compute Cost-Per-Life-Saved.
CM
Compute
Compute Benefit-Per-Life-Lost.
CM
Accept
if overtopped by one foot and not fail with lesser overtopping. Note that floods less than about the 700-year
AN EXAMPLE
A large flood control dam in Colorado is being studied by the owner because the dam is unable to accom-
information on several alternatives designed to prevent dam failure during the PMF. One of the alternatives called for the construction of a new spillway
combined with a nine-foot dam raise at a cost of about
$31 million. The new 200-foot wide spillway would
have a sill about 45 feet below the dam crest. Infor-
report and by attending public meetings and presentations made by the dam owner from 1997 through
1999.
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Flood Size:
Inflow to Reservoir
(cubic feet
(percent
of PMF)
per second)
Probability
of
Flood of
This Size
(per year)
Flood of
This Size
(per year)
and Reservoir
Annualized
Damage
Damage
After Construction of
Left Abutment Spiliway
and Dam Raise
Annualized
Damage
Damage
Chance
of
0 to 15
0 to 99,000
0.9985
1 in 1.0015
$0
$0
$0
$0
15 to 25
99,000 to 166,000
0.0012
1 in 833
$0
$0
$0.2 Billion
$240,000
25 to 50
166,000 to 331,000
0.00028
1 in 3,600
$04 Billion
$11,200
$0.82 Billion
$229,000
50 to 75
331,000 to 497,000
0.000017
1 in 58,800
$0.1 Biffion
$1,700
$1.57 Billion
$26,700
75 to 100
497,000 to 662,700
0.0000035
1 in 286,000
$3.14 Billion
$11,000
$1.88 Billion
$6,600
1.0
1 in 1
TOTAL
$502,900
$23,900
TABLE 4. Summary of Annualized Values for Status Quo and New SpillwaylDam Raise.
Alternative
Measurement
Status Quo
Ls = 0.004
LM = 0.003
L = 0.0
L = 0.002
LB = -0.001
Cost of Alternative
$0
CM = $1,550,000
E5 = $23,900
EM = $502,900
EB = $-479,000
life-saved would be about $2 billion and this alternative would again be rejected using the recommended
procedure. If construction fatalities were not considered and if no deaths occur from spiliway outflows,
the cost-per-life-saved would be about $500 million,
be less than the peak inflow for all inflows. The owner
DISCUSSION
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Graham
"All lifesaving measures sound good . . . Lifesaving measures vary enormously in their effective-
alleviated with nonstructural actions. Implementation or adoption of warning systems or plans to follow
in a flood emergency can significantly reduce life loss
from large spillway flows or dam failure.
CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
LITERATURE CITED
failure if the PMF occurs, can have very serious negative consequences. Additional spillway capacity is frequently chosen by itself or in combination with a dam
Ad Hoc Interagency Committee on Dam Safety of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Thchnology, 1979.
Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety. Washington, D.C.
962
Research 26(5):1093-1098.
ASCE 90(HY3):239-259.
Dubler, James Roger, 1995. Dam Safety Policy for Spiiway Design
Floods, Master's Thesis, Civil Engineering Department, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Dubler, James R. and Neil S. Grigg, 1996. Dam Safety Policy for
Spiiway Design Floods. Journal of Professional Issues in Engi-
94.
York.
Virginia, 25 pp.
FEMA, 1995-1996. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Water
Engineers, CD-ROM.
FEMA, 1998. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mitigation
8: 19-41.
7(1).
Haurwitz, Ralph and Jeff South, 1997. Texas Dams Hold Deadly
Threat: With Inspection a Rarity, Hundreds Might Fail in Worst
Storms. Austin ATnerican-Statesman (May 18). Austin, Texas, p.
1.
ICOLD, 1989. Savings in Dam Construction: Comments and Proposals. Bulletin 73, International Commission on Large Dams,
Paris, France.
Langseth, David E. and Frank E. Perkins, 1983. The Influence of
Dam Failure Probabilities on Spillway Analysis. Summer 1983
ASCE Hydraulics Conference.
Langseth, David E. and Frank E. Perkins, 1984. Spillway Analysis
in Dam Safety Evaluation. Report No. 298, Department of Civil
Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 310 pp.
Lave, Lester B. et al., 1990. Safety Goals for High-Hazard Dams:
Are Dams Too Safe? Water Resources Research 26(7):1383-1391.
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