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Davidson:PhilosophyofLanguage

Donald Davidson (19172003) was one of the mostinfluentialanalyticphilosophersof


language during the second half of the twentieth century and the first decade of the
twentyfirst century. An attraction of Davidsons philosophy of language is the set of
conceptual connections he draws between traditional questions about language and
issues that arise in other fields of philosophy, including especially the philosophy of
mind, action theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. This article addresses only his
work on the philosophy of language, but one should bear in mind that this work is
properlyunderstoodaspartofalargerphilosophicalendeavor.
Itis usefulto thinkofDavidsonsprojectinthe philosophyof languageascleavinginto
two parts. The first, which commences with his earliest publications in the field
(Davidson 1965 and 1967), exploresand defendshisclaim thataTarskistyletheoryof
truth for a language L, modified and supplemented in important ways, suffices to
explainhow themeaningsof thesentencesofalanguageL dependupon themeanings
of words of L, and thus models asignificantpartoftheknowledgesomeonepossesses

when she understands L. In other words, Davidson claims that we can adapt a
Tarskistyle theory of truth to do duty for a theory of meaning. This claim, which is
strongerandmorecomplexthanitappearsatfirstreading,isexaminedinsection1.
The second part of Davidsons work on language (in articles beginning withDavidson
1973and 1974) addressesissuesassociatedwithconstructingthesortofmeaningtheory
he proposes in the first part of his project. A Davidsonian theory of meaning is an
empiricaltheorythatoneconstructsto interpretthatis,todescribe,systematize,and
explainthe linguistic behavior of speakers one encounters in the field or, simply, in
line at the supermarket. Again, this problem turns out to be more complex and more
interestingthanitfirstappears.Thissetofissuesisexaminedinsection2.

TableofContents
1. DavidsonsTheoryofMeaning
a. ConstraintsonaTheoryofMeaning
i. Compositionality
ii. NoMeaningEntities
b. TheoriesofTruthasTheoriesofMeaning
c. MeaningandTruth
d. FormalandNaturalLanguages
i. Indexicals
ii. IndirectDiscourse
2. DavidsonsTheoryofInterpretation
a. RadicalTranslation
b. RadicalInterpretation
i. PrinciplesofCharity:Coherence
ii. PrinciplesofCharity:Correspondence
c. LanguagewithoutConventions
d. IndeterminacyofInterpretation
e. MeaningandInterpretation
3. ReferencesandFurtherReading
a. AnthologiesofDavidsonsWritings
b. IndividualArticlesbyDavidson

c. PrimaryWorksbyotherAuthors
d. SecondarySources
i. Anthologies
ii. CriticalDiscussionsofDavidsonsPhilosophy

1.DavidsonsTheoryofMeaning
Davidson takes the notion of a theory of meaning as central, so it is important to be
clearatthe outsetwhathemeansbytheterm. Startingwithwhathedoesnotmean,itis
no part of his project to define the concept ofmeaninginthe sensein whichSocrates
asks Euthyphro to define piety. Davidson writes that it is folly to try to define the
conceptoftruth(Davidson,1996),andthesameholdsforthecloselyrelatedconceptof
meaning: both belong toacluster ofconceptssoelementarythatweshouldnot expect
theretobesimplerormorebasicconceptsintermsofwhichtheycouldbedefinitionally
reduced.NordoesDavidsonask aboutmeaning insuch a waythatwewouldexpecthis
answertotaketheform,
themeaningsofaspeakerswordsaresuchandsuches.
Locke,whosaysthatmeaningsof aspeakerswordsareideasinhermind,hasatheory
of meaning in this sense, as do contemporary philosophers of language who identify
meaningswiththecontentsofcertainbeliefsorintentionsofthespeaker.
Davidson, therefore, pursues neither a theory ofwhatmeaningisnoratheoryofwhat
meaningsare.Rather,forDavidsonatheoryofmeaningisadescriptive semanticsthat
shows how to pair a speakers statements with their meanings, and it does this by
displaying how semantical properties or values are distributed systematically over the
expressions of her language in short, it shows how to construct the meanings of a
speakers sentences out of the meanings of their parts and how those parts are
assembled. Asafirstapproximation,onecanthinkofaDavidsoniantheoryofmeaning
for thelanguage Lasasetofaxioms thatassignmeaningstothelexicalelementsofthe

language and which, together with rules for constructing complex expressions of L,
implytheoremsoftheform,
(M)Smeansm,
for each sentence S of the language and mitsmeaning.IfanobserverofAslinguistic
behavior has such an Mtheorem for eachof his sentences, then she canexplainand
even make predictions about S'sbehaviorconversely,wecanthinkof theMtheorems
asexpressinga bodyoflinguisticknowledgethatApossessesand whichunderwriteshis
linguisticcompetence.

a.ConstraintsonaTheoryofMeaning
Much of the interest and originality of Davidsons work ontheoriesof meaningcomes
from his choice of Tarskistyle theories of truth to serve as the model for theories of
meaning. This choice is not obvious, though as early as 1935 Quine remarks that in
point ofmeaningawordmaybesaidtobedeterminedtowhateverextentthetruthor
falsehood of its contexts is determined (Quine 1935, p. 89) it is not obvious since
meaningisaricherconceptthantruth,forexample,snowiswhiteandgrassisgreen
agree in both being true, but they differ in meaning. As Davidson sees the matter,
though, only theories of truth satisfy certain reasonable constraints on an adequate
theoryofmeaning.

i.Compositionality
The first of theseconstraintsis thatatheoryof meaningshouldbecompositional. The
motivationhereistheobservationthatspeakersarefinitelyendowedcreatures,yetthey
can understand indefinitely many sentences for example, you never before heard or
read the first sentence of this article, but, presumably, you had no difficulty
understanding it. To explain this phenomenon, Davidson reasons that language must

possess some sort of recursive structure. (A structure is recursive if it is built up by


repeatedlyapplyingoneofasetofprocedurestoaresultofhavingapplied oneofthose
procedures, starting from one or more base elements.) For unless we can treat the
meaning of every sentence of a language L astheresultofaspeakersor interpreters
performing a finite number of operations on a finite (though extendable) semantical
base, L will be unlearnable and uninterpretable: no matter how many sentences I
master, there will always be others I do notunderstand.Conversely,if themeaningof
each sentence is a product of the meanings of its parts together with the ways those
parts are combined, then we can seehowan infiniteaptitudecanbe encompassed by
finite accomplishments (Davidson 1965, p. 8). If every simple sentence of English
results from applyingaruletoacollectionof lexical elements,forexample,Combinea
noun phrase and an intransitive verb (Socrates + sits Socrates sits) and if
every complex sentence results from applying a rule to sentences of English, such as
Combinetwosentenceswithaconjunction(Socratessits+PlatostandsSocrates
sitsandPlatostands),thenalthoughhumanbeingshavefinitecognitivecapacitiesthey
can understand indefinitely many sentences. (Socrates sits, Socrates sits and Plato
stands,SocratessitsandPlatostandsandAristotleswims,andsoforth.)
This, then, gives us the requirement that a theory of meaning becompositional in the
sense that it shows how the meanings of complex expressions are systematically
composed from the meanings of simpler expressions together with a list of their
modesofsignificantcombination.

ii.NoMeaningEntities
Davidsons secondadequacyconstraintonatheoryofmeaningisthatitavoidassigning
objects (for example, ideas, universals, or intensions) to linguisticexpressionsastheir
meanings. In making this demand, Davidson does not stray into a theory of what
meaningsarehispoint,rather,isthattheonethingmeaningsdonotseemtodoisoil

thewheelsof atheoryofmeaningMyobjectionstomeaningsinthetheoryofmeaning
isthattheyhavenodemonstrateduse(Davidson1967,p.20).
Toseethis,considerthat traditional logiciansandgrammariansdividedasentenceinto
a subject term and a predicate term,forexample,Socratessitsintothesubjectterm
Socrates and the predicate term sits, and assigned to the former as its meaning a
certainobject, themanSocrates,andtothelatteradifferentsortofobject,theuniversal
Sitting, as its meaning. This leaves obscure, however, how the terms Socrates and
sits, orthethingsSocratesandSitting,combinetoform a proposition,asopposedto,
say, the terms Socrates and Plato (or the objectsSocratesand Plato)which cannot
combine to form a proposition.Italsoleavesobscurewhatrolethecopulaisplaysin
sentences such as Socrates is wise. Does is refer to a third object that somehow
binds Socrates to Wisdom? But how does this work? Or does is represent some
relation?Butwhatrelation?
Onemightsolvethesedifficultiesfacedbytraditionalaccountsbyassigningtodifferent
types of expressions different types of entities as their meanings, where these types
differinways thatmaketheentitiesamenabletocombiningin patternsthatmirrorthe
waystheir correspondingexpressionscombine.IfwereadFregeasaPlatonist,thenhis
mature semantics is such a theory, since it dividesexpressions andtheirmeanings,or
Bedeutungen,intotwotypes:saturatedorcompleteexpressionsandmeanings,and
unsaturatedorincompleteexpressions andtheirmeanings (see,forexample,Frege,
1891). The proper noun Annette is an expression of the first type, and it means a
particularobjectofthefirsttype,thewomanAnnettewhilethefunctionexpressionthe
father of()belongstothesecondtypeandmeansacertainnonspatiotemporalentityof
the second type, namely, the function that maps objects to their fathers. (The open
parentheses marks the argument place of thefunctionexpression, whichisto befilled
with a saturated expression such as Annette, and it lines up with a corresponding
empty position in the function itself.) There is also the semantical rule thatfillingthe
parentheses of the expression, the father of ( ), yields a complete expression that

means the father of whomever is meant by the saturated expression that fills the
parentheses:AnnettesfatherifAnnettefillstheparentheses,Annettesfathersfather
if the father of Annette fills the parentheses, and so forth. But now one has to ask,
what is the point of our having said that the expression, the father of ( ) means a
certain entity? Alltheworkis beingdonebytherulewehave formulated, andnone by
theontology.
There are other methodological considerations that lie behind Davidsons hostility
towarddoingsemantics byassigningobjects andothersortsofentitiestowordsastheir
meanings.People acquirealanguagebyobservingthesituatedbehaviorofotherpeople,
that is, by observing other people speaking about objects and occurrences in their
sharedenvironmentinturn,when theyspeak,whattheymeanbytheirwordsgenerally
reflects the causes that prompt them to utter those words. These causes are usually
mundanesortsofnaturalthingsandevents,suchasotherpeople,grass,peoplemowing
the grass, and the like. This picture of meaning is vague, but it suggests that the
psychological achievement of understanding or being able to produce a sentence like
grassisgreenrestsonthesame(orverynearlythesame)naturalabilitiesasknowing
that grassisgreenanditsuggeststoDavidsonthattheoriesofmeaningshouldeschew
the esoteric objects and relations that many contemporary philosophies of language
presuppose, such as intensions, possible worlds, transworld identity relations, and so
forth. By avoiding such things,Davidsonpositionstheoriesofmeaningmorecloselyto
theepistemologyoflinguisticunderstanding,inthesenseofanaccountofthewaythata
speakersactionsand othereventsareevidenceforaninterpretersattributingmeaning
tothespeakerswords.

b.TheoriesofTruthasTheoriesofMeaning
TobegintoseewhataDavidsoniantheoryofmeaninglookslike,recallschemaM,

(M)Smeansm,
wheresentenceSbelongsto languageLandmisitsmeaning.Recastingthis inamore
instructiveversion,
(M)Smeansthatp,
we replace m in schemaMbytheschematic variablep inschemaM.Inthe latter,
theschemaisfilled outbyreplacingpwithasentenceintheinterpretersbackground
ormetalanguagethat translatesthetargetorobjectlanguagesentenceS.Forexample,a
theory of meaning for German constructed by an Englishspeaking interpreter might
includeasaninstanceofschemaMthetheorem,
Schneeistweissmeansthatsnowiswhite,
whereSchneeistweissreplacesSandsnowiswhitereplacesp.
Now, schema M is more instructive than its predecessor because while the m in
schema Mnames anobjectthatSmeansinviolationofDavidsonssecondconstraint
theexpression pholds theplaceforasentence(forexample,snowiswhite)thatthe
interpreter uses to track the meaning of S (Schnee ist weiss) without reifying that
meaning,that is,withouttreatingthatmeaningasanobject.Thesentencethatreplaces
p tracksthemeaning ofSin thesensethatschemaM correlatesS(again,Schneeist
weiss) with the extralinguistic condition that p (that snow is white) which the
interpreterdescribesusingherownsentence(snowiswhite.)
Schema M points the way forward, but we are not there yet. Davidson is not really
interested inconstructingtheoriesofmeaning in thesenseoffillingoutschemaMfor
every sentence of German or Urdu rather, he theorizes aboutconstructing theoriesof
meaning to gain insight into the concept of meaning. And in this regard, schema M
comes up short: it relies on the relation means that which is essentially synonymy

across languages, which is as much in need of explication as meaning itself. What


Davidsonis reallyinterestedinisgivinganexplication,in Carnapssense(Carnap1947,
pp.78), ofanobscureexplanandum, meaning, usingaclearandexact explanans,and
hefindshisexplanansinTarskissemantictheoryoftruth.
The semantic theory of truth is not a metaphysical theory of truth in thewaythatthe
correspondence theory oftruthis.That is, thesemantictheory oftruthdoesnot tellus
whattruthis,rather,itdefinesapredicatethatappliestoallandonlythetruesentences
ofaspecified language(technically, trueinL)byshowinghowthetruthconditionsofa
sentence of the language depend on the sentences internal structure and certain
propertiesof itsparts.Thisshouldsoundfamiliar:roughly,thesemantictheoryoftruth
does for truth what Davidson wishes to do for meaning. Therefore, Davidsonreplaces
schemaMwithTarskisschemaT:
(T)Sistrueifandonlyifp.
Schema T sits at the center of Tarskis project. A formallyadequate (thatis,internally
consistent) definitionoftruthforalanguageLis,inaddition,materiallyadequateif it
appliesto allandonlythe true sentencesofLTarski showsthatanaxiomatictheory
meets this condition if it satisfies what he calls Convention T, which requires that
entailfor eachsentenceSof L aninstanceof schemaT.Theideaisthattheaxiomsof
supplybothinterpretationsforthepartsofS,forexample,
(A.i)Schneemeanssnow,
and
(A.ii)anobjectasatisfiestheGermanexpressionxistweissifandonlyifaiswhite,
andrulesforformingcomplexGermanexpressionsfromsimplerones,suchasthat

(A.iii)Schnee+xistweissSchneeistweiss,
TogethertheseaxiomsimplyinstancesofschemaT,forexample,
Schneeistweissistrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite.
More precisely, an internally consistent theory of truth for a language L meets
Convention T if it implies for each S of L an instance of schema T in which p is
replaced by a sentence from the metalanguagethattranslatesS.Clearly,such atheory
will get it right in the sense that theTsentences(thatis,theinstancesof schemaT)
thatimpliesdostatetruthconditionsforthesentencesoftheobjectlanguage.
Now, Davidsons claim is not that a Tarskistyle theory of truth in itself is atheoryof
meaning in particular, he remarks that a Tsentence cannot be equated with a
statement of a sentences meaning. At best, a Tarskistyletheory oftruth isapartofa
theoryofmeaning,withadditionalresourcesbeingbroughtintoplay.

c.MeaningandTruth
NoticethatTarskisConventionTemploysthenotionoftranslation,orsynonymyacross
languages, and so a Tarskistyle theory of truth cannot, as it stands, supply the
explanans Davidson seeks. The underlying point, which Davidsonacknowledges only
gradually dawned on me (1984, p. xiv), isthat Tarskianalyzesthe concept oftruth in
terms of the concept of meaning (or synonymy), while Davidsons project dependson
makingtheoppositemove:heexplainsthenotionofmeaningintermsoftruth.
Davidson, therefore, dispenses with translation and rewrites Convention T to require
that
an acceptabletheory oftruth mustentail, foreverysentences oftheobjectlanguage,a
sentenceoftheform:sistrueifandonlyifp,wherepisreplacedbyanysentencethat

istrueif andonlyifsis.Giventhisformulation,thetheoryistestedbytheevidencethat
Tsentences are simply true we have given up the idea thatwe mustalsotellwhether
whatreplacesptranslatess.(Davidson1973,p.134)
Thus,whereTarski requiresthatptranslateS,Davidsonsubstitutesthemuchweaker
criterionthattheTsentencesaresimplytrue.
But Davidsons weakened Convention T is open to the following objection. Suppose
thereisatheoryoftruthforGerman,1,thatentailstheTsentence,
(T1)Schneeistweissistrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite.
Suppose,further, thatthereisasecondtheoryoftruthforGerman,2,thatisjustlike1
exceptthatinplaceof(T1)itentailstheTsentence,
(T2)Schneeistweissistrueifandonlyifgrassisgreen.
A theory of truth that entails (T2) is clearly false, but 1 satisfies Davidsons revised
ConventionTifandonlyif2alsosatisfiesit.
Hereiswhy.Thesentencessnowiswhiteandgrassisgreenbothhappentobetrue,
andhencethetwosentencesaremateriallyequivalent,thatis,
Snowiswhiteifandonlyifgrassisgreen.
(Sentences are materially equivalent if they contingently have the same truthvalue
sentences are logically equivalent if they necessarily have the same truthvalue.) But
sincetheyaremateriallyequivalent,itturnsoutthat:
(T1)istrueifandonlyif(T2)istrue.

Therefore, all the Tsentences of 1 are true if and only ifalltheTsentencesof2are


true, and thus 1 satisfies Davidsons revised Convention T if and only if 2 does.The
rootofthisproblemisthatwhenitcomes todistinguishingbetweensentences,truthis
too coarseafilterto distinguishbetweenmateriallyequivalentsentences withdifferent
meanings.
Davidsonhasanumberofresponsestothisobjection(inDavidson1975).Hepointsout
that someonewhoknowsthatisamateriallyadequatetheory oftruthforalanguageL
knows more thanthatitsTsentencesaretrue.Sheknowsthe axiomsof,whichassign
meaning to the lexical elements of L, the words and simple expressions out of which
complex expressions and whole sentences are composed and she knows that these
axioms imply the Tsentence correlations between object languagesentences (Schnee
ist weiss) and their interpreting conditions (that snow is white). Thus, someone who
knows that is a materially adequate theory of truth for a language L

knows a

systematicprocedureforassigningtothesentencesofL theirtruthconditions,making
ones grasp of a theory of truthcummeaningaholistic affair:knowingtheTsentence
for anyoneobject languagesentenceistiedtoknowingtheTsentencesformanyobject
language sentences. (For example, knowing that Schnee ist die Farbe derWolkenis
true if and only ifsnowis thecolorof clouds,andthatSchneeistweiss istrueifand
only if snow is white, is tied to knowingthatWolken sindweissistrueifand onlyif
cloudsarewhite.) Inthisway,although DavidsonsversionofConvention Tstatedin
termsoftruthrather thantranslationdoesnotprimafaciefilterouttheorieslike2,
such theories will raise red flags as deviant assignments (such as grass to Schnee)
ramify throughthelanguageandinterpretersconsidertheevidenceofspeakerspointing
tosnowanduttering,DasistSchnee!
Itmatters, too,thattheTsentencesofaDavidsoniantheoryoftruthcummeaningare
laws of an empirical theory and not mere accidental generalizations. The important
difference here is that as empirical laws and not simple statements of chance
correlations, Tsentences support counterfactual inferences: just as it is true that a

certainrockwouldhavefallenat32ft/sec2ifithadbeendropped,evenifitwasnot,itis
also true that a German speakers utterance of Schnee ist weisswould betrueifand
only if snow is white, even in a world where snow is notwhite. (Butinaworldwhere
grass is green, and snow is not white, it is not the case that a German speakers
utteranceofSchneeistweisswouldbetrueifandonlyifgrassisgreen.)
Thismeansthatthereisalogicallytighterconnectionbetweentheleftandrighthand
sides of the Tsentences of materially adequate theories. This logically tighter
connection underwrites the role that Tsentences have in constructingexplanationsof
speakers behavior and, in turn, is a product ofthenature oftheevidenceinterpreters
employ in constructing Davidsonian theories of truthcummeaning. An interpreter
witnesses German speakers uttering Schnee ist weiss! while indicating freshly fallen
snow the interpreter singles out snows being white as the salient feature of the
speakers environment and she infers that snows being white causes himtohold the
sentence,Schneeistweiss!,true.Thus,theconnectionbetweensnowsbeingwhite and
theTsentenceismorethanachancecorrelation,andthis getsexpressedbythere being
something stronger than an extensional relation between a statement of the evidence
andthetheory.
Thishasoftenbeentakentobeafatalconcession, inasmuchasDavidsonisunderstood
to be committed togivinganextensionalaccountoftheknowledge someonepossesses
when she understands a language. However, Davidson denies that he is committedto
givinganextensionalaccountofaninterpretersknowledgeallheisafterisformulating
thetheoryoftruthcummeaningitselfinextensionalterms,andheallowsthatancillary
knowledgeaboutthattheorymayinvolveconceptsorrelationsthatcannotbeexpressed
in extensionalist terms. Thus, it is not an objection to his project that aninterpreters
backgroundlogic, forexample, inherunderstandingofherowntheory,shouldinvolve
appealtointensionalnotions.

d.FormalandNaturalLanguages
Tarski restricts his attention to investigating the semantical properties of formal
languages, whereas Davidsons interest lies in the investigation of natural languages.
Formal languages are wellbehaved mathematical objects whose structures can be
exactly and exhaustively described inpurelysyntacticalterms,while naturallanguages
are anything but wellbehaved. They are plastic and subject to ambiguity, and they
containmyriadlinguisticformsthat resist,toonedegreeoranother,incorporationinto
a theory of truth via the methods available to the logical semanticist. Davidson has
written on the problems posedbyseveral oftheselinguisticforms(inDavidson1967a,
1968, 1978, and 1979) including indexicals, adverbial modifiers, indirect discourse,
metaphor,mood,andthepropositionalattitudes.

i.Indexicals
It is instructive to see how Davidson handles indexicals. The key insight here is that
truthisproperlyapropertyofthesituated productionof asentencetokenbyaspeaker
at a certain time, that is, it is a property of an utterance, not a sentence. We define,
therefore, an utterance to be an ordered triple consisting of a sentence token, a time,
and a speaker. Truth is thus a property of such a triple, and in constructing a
TarskistyletheoryoftruthforalanguageLthegoalistohaveitentailTtheoremssuch
as:
Dasistweissistruewhenspokenbyxattifandonlyiftheobjectindicatedbyxattis
white.
This Ttheorem captures two distinct indexical elements. First, the German pronoun
dasreferstotheobjectthespeakerindicateswhenshemakesherutterancewemodel
itscontributiontotheutterancestruthconditionbyexplicitlyreferringontherightside
of the Ttheorem to that object. Second, the German verb ist is conjugated in the

present indicative tense and referstothetimethe speakerperformsher utterance.We


represent this indexical feature by repeating the time variable t on both sidesofthe
Ttheorem. Not all sentences contain indexicals (that, she, he, it, I, here,
now, today, and so forth, but unless it is formulated in the socalled eternal
present (for example, 5 plus 7 is twelve), every sentence contains an indexical
elementinthetenseofthesentencesmainverb.

ii.IndirectDiscourse
Thephilosophyoflanguage isthickwithproposalsfortreatingtheanomalousbehavior
of linguistic contexts involving intensional idioms, including especially indirect
discourse and propositional attitude constructions. In such contexts, familiar
substitutionpatternsfailforexample,itistruethat
(1)TheEarthmoves,
andthat
(2)TheEarth=theplanetonwhichD.D.wasbornin1917.
BythePrincipleofExtensionality,
Coreferring terms can be exchanged without affecting the truthvalue of contexts in
whichthosetermsoccur,
wecaninferthat
TheplanetonwhichD.D.wasbornin1917moves.
However,ifwereportthatGalileosaidthat(1),thatis,

(3)GalileosaidthattheEarthmoves,
weareblockedfrommakingthesubstitution,
(4)GalileosaidthattheplanetonwhichD.D.wasbornin1917moves,
for surelyGalileodidnotsaythat,sincehediednearlythreehundredyearsbeforeD.D.
wasborn.(2)and(3)are true,while(4)isfalsehence(2) and(3)donotentail(4),and
thePrincipleofExtensionalityfailsforsaysthatcontexts.
Davidsons solutiontothisproblemisasingeniousasitiscontroversial, foritcomesat
thepriceofsomegrammaticalnovelty.Hearguesthatthewordthatthatoccursin(3)
is a demonstrativepronoun andnot,asgrammarbookstellus,arelativepronounthe
direct object of saidisthisdemonstrative,andnotthesubordinatenoun clausethat
theEarth moves.In fact,underanalysis thisnounclausedisappearsand becomestwo
separate expressions: the demonstrative that, which completes the open sentence
Galileo said x, andthe grammaticallyindependentsentenceTheEarthmoves.This
new sentence is the demonstratives referent or, rather, its referent is the speakers
utterance of the sentence, The Earth moves, which follows her utterance of the
sentence Galileo said that. ThusDavidsonproposesthatfromalogicalpointof view,
(3)iscomposedoftwoseparateutterances:
(5)Galileosaidthat.TheEarthmoves.
In other words, the grammatical connection between TheEarthmovesandGalileo
said that is severedandreplacedbythesame relationshipthatconnects snowandmy
pointingtosnowandsayingThatiswhite.
Moreproperly,(5)shouldbe:

(6)Galileosaidsomethingthatmeantthesameasmynextutterance.TheEarthmoves.
This qualification is needed, since the utterance to which that refers in (5) is my
utteranceofasentenceinmylanguage,whichIusetoreportanutteranceGalileomade
inhislanguage. AsDavidsonsometimesputsit,Galileo andI aresamesayers:whathe
andImean,whenheperformshisutteranceand Iperformmine,isthesame.Finally,a
carefulsemanticalanalysisof(6)shouldlooksomethinglikethis:
(7) There exists some utterance x performed by Galileo, and x means the same in
Galileosidiolectasmynextutterancemeansinmine.TheEarthmoves.
Now in my utterance, the Earthcanbeexchangedfortheplaneton whichD.D.was
born in 1917becauseasIusethembothexpressionsrefertothe sameobject,namely,
theEarth.Thus,thePrincipleofExtensionalityispreserved.
Davidson proposes that this account can be extended to treat other opaque
constructions in the object language, such as the propositional attitudes (Davidson
1975) andentailmentrelations(Davidson1976).Lookingattheformer,theideaisthat
byanalogywith(3),(5),and(6),
(8)GalileobelievedthattheEarthmoves,
shouldbeglossedas
(9)Galileobelievedthat.TheEarthmoves,
or,better,
(10) Galileobelievedsomethingthathadthesamecontentmeantasmynextutterance.
TheEarthmoves.

A question, then, is what is this something that Galileo believed? In the analysis of
indirect discourse, my sentence (The Earth moves) tracks an actual utterance of
Galileos (Si muove), but Galileo had many beliefs he never expressedverballysoit
cannot be an utterance of Galileos. Alternatively, one might treat thoughts as inner
mental representations and belief as a relation between thinkers and thoughts so
conceivedthenwhathasthe samecontentasmyutteranceofmysentence,TheEarth
moves, is Galileos mental representation in his language of thought. However,
Davidson argues elsewhere (Davidson 1989) that believing is not a relation between
thinker and mental objects this point isimportanttothepositionhestakesoutin the
internalism/externalismdebateinthephilosophyofmind.
Instead,Davidsonproposes(inDavidson1975)that(3)isto(6)as(8)isto:
(11) Galileowouldbehonestlyspeakinghismindwerehetosaysomethingthathadthe
samecontentasmynextutterance.TheEarthmoves.
Galileo never actually saidsomethingthatmeans thesameasmysentence,The Earth
moves, but had he spokenhismindaboutthematter,hewould have.(Historically,of
course, Galileo did say such a thing, but letussupposethathe did not.) Thisanalysis,
however, imports a counterfactual condition into the Tsentences of an interpreters
theoryforGalileos words andthoughts,which Davidsonwantstoavoid.Finally,inthe
samearticleDavidsonseemstosuggestthatwetreatGalileosthoughtmoredirectlyasa
beliefstate,whichmightbeglossedas:
(12) Galileo was in some belief state that had the same content meant as my next
utterance.TheEarthmoves.
Intuitively, this seems right: what I track withmyutteranceispreciselythecontentof
Galileos belief.This leaves open,however,whatbeliefstatesaresuchthattheycanbe
quantified over (as in (10)) and have contents that canbe tracked byutterances.This,

though, isaproblemforthephilosophyofmindratherthanthephilosophyoflanguage,
and there is no reason to suppose that it affects Davidsons proposal morethan other
accountsofthesemanticsofthepropositionalattitudes.

2.DavidsonsTheoryofInterpretation
Consideration of the exigencies of interpreting a persons speech behavior yields
additional constraints on theories of truthcummeaning, and it also provides deep
insights into the nature of language and meaning. Davidson examines interpretation
and the construction of theories of meaning bydrawing extensivelyonthe workofhis
mentor,W.V.Quine.

a.RadicalTranslation
In Quines famous thought experiment of radical translation, we imagine a field
linguist who observes the verbal behavior of speakers of a foreign language, and we
reflect on her task of constructing a translation manual that maps the speakers
language ontoherown. The translationtaskis radicalinthesense thatQuineassumes
she has no prior knowledge whatsoever of thespeakerslanguageoritsrelation toher
home language. Hence her only evidence for constructing and testing her translation
manual are her observations of the speakers behavior and their relation to their
environment.
The linguists entering wedge into a foreign language are those of the speakers
utterancesthat seemtobeardirectlyonconspicuousfeaturesofthesituationsheshares
with her subject. TakingQuineswellknown example,supposearabbitscurries within
the field of view of both the linguist andanalienspeaker,who then utters,Gavagai!
With this as her initial evidence, the linguist sifts through thefeaturesofthe complex
situation that embeds his speech behavior she reasons that were she in the subjects
position of seeing a rabbit, she would bedisposedtoassert,Lo,arabbit!Supposing,

then,thatthealienspeakersverbaldispositionsrelate tohisenvironmentasherverbal
disposition are related to her own, she tentatively translates Gavagai! with her own
sentence,Lo,arabbit!

b.RadicalInterpretation
Taking his inspiration from Quine, Davidson holds that a radical interpreter thus
beginswithobservationssuchas:
(13) A belongs to a community of speakers of a common language, call it K, and he
holdsGavagai!trueonSaturdayatnoon,andthereisarabbitvisibletoAonSaturday
atnoon,
and eliciting additional evidence from observing Kspeakers situated verbal behavior,
sheinfersthat
(14) If x isaKspeaker,thenxholdsGavagai!trueat tifandonlyifthereis a rabbit
visibletoxatt.
This inference is subject to the vagaries that attend empirical research, but having
gathered an adequate sample of instances of Kspeakers holding Gavagai true when
and only when rabbits cross their paths, she takes(14)to beconfirmed.Inturn,then,
she takes (14) as support that (partly) confirms the following Tsentence of a
TarskistyletruththeoryforK:
(15)Gavagai!istruewhenspokenbyxattifandonlythereisarabbitvisibletoxatt.
Note that in reconstructing the language K, Davidsons linguist does not mention
sentencesofherhomelanguage.Ofcourse, sheusesherownsentencesinmakingthese
assignments,buther sentencesaredirected uponextralinguisticreality.Thus,unlikea
Quinean radical translator, who does mention sentences of his home language, a

Davidsonian radical interpreter adopts a semantical stance: she relates speakers


sentences to the world by assigning them objective truth conditions describing
extralinguisticsituationsandobjects.Itisinthissensethat aDavidsonianlinguistisan
interpreter, and Davidson calls the projectundertakenbyhislinguisttheconstruction
ofatheoryofinterpretation.

i.PrinciplesofCharity:Coherence
Like anyempiricalscientist,aDavidsonianradical interpreterreliesonmethodological
assumptions she makes to move from her observations (13) to her intermediate
conclusions (14) and to the final form of her theory (15). Davidson identifies as the
radical interpreters two most important methodological assumptions the Principle of
(Logical)Coherenceand thePrincipleofCorrespondence.Takentogetherthesecanons
ofinterpretationareknown,somewhatmisleadingly,asthePrinciple(s)ofCharity.
Since a Davidsonian theory of interpretation is modeled on a Tarskistyle theory of
truth, oneofthefirststepsaninterpreter takesistolookforacoherentstructureinthe
sentencesofalienspeakers.Shedoesthisbyassumingthataspeakersbehaviorsatisfies
strong, normative constraints, namely,thathereasonsin accordancewithlogicallaws.
Making this assumption, she can diagram the logical patterns in speakers verbal
behaviorandleverageevidenceshegleansfromherobservationsintoadetailedpicture
oftheinternalstructureofhislanguage.
Assumingthataspeaker reasonsinaccordancewithlogical lawsisneitheranempirical
hypothesisabout a subjectsintellectualcapacitiesnoranexpressionoftheinterpreters
goodwill toward her subject. Satisfying the norms of rationality is a condition on
speaking a language and having thoughts, and hence failing to locate sufficient
consistencyinsomeonesbehavior meansthereisnothingtointerpret.Theassumption

that someone is rational is a foundation on which the project of interpreting his


utterancesrests.

ii.PrinciplesofCharity:Correspondence
Theproblemtheradicalinterpreterfacesisthatbyhypothesisshedoesnotknowwhata
speakerssentencesmean,andneitherdoesshehavedirectaccesstothecontentsofhis
propositional attitudes, such as his beliefs or desires. Both of these factors bear on
making sense of his verbal behavior, however, for which sentences a speaker puts
forwardastruedependssimultaneouslyonthe meaningsofthosesentencesandonhis
beliefs.Forexample,aKspeaker uttersGavagai!onlyif()thesentenceistrueifand
onlyif a rabbitpresentsitselftohim, and()hebelieves thatarabbitpresentsitselfto
him.
Aspeakersholdingasentencetrueis thus (as Davidsonputit)a vectorof two forces
(Davidson1974a,p.196),whatmeaningshiswordshaveandwhathebelievesaboutthe
world.Theinterpreterthusfacestheproblemof toomanyunknowns, whichshesolves
byperformingherown thoughtexperiment:sheprojectsherselfintohersubjectsshoes
and assumes that he does or would believe what she, were she in his position, would
believe.This solvestheproblem ofhernot knowingwhatthe speakerbelieves sinceshe
knows whatshewould believeweresheinhissituation,andhencesheknowswhather
subject does believeifhebelieveswhatshethinks he oughtto believe.ThePrincipleof
Correspondenceisthemethodologicalinjunctionthataninterpreteraffirmtheifclause.
The Principle of Correspondence applies especially tospeakersobservationsentences,
for example, there goes a rabbit! These are the points of immediate causal contact
between the world shared by speakers and interpreters, on the one hand, and the
utterances and attitudes of speakers, on the other. Where there is greater distance
between cause (features of the speakers situation) and effect (which sentences the

speakerputs forward as true),thereareextradegreesoffreedominexplaininghowthe


speakermightreasonablyholdtruesomethingthattheinterpreterbelievesisfalse.
Davidson sometimes formulates the Principle of Correspondence in terms of the
interpreters maximizing agreement between her and the speakers she interprets, but
this ismisleading.Aninterpreterneedsto fill outthecontentsofthespeakersattitudes
if her project is to move forward and she doesthisbyattributingtohimthosebeliefs
that allow her to tell the most coherent storyaboutwhathebelieves. Thus,sheroutes
attributions of beliefs to the speaker through what she knows about his beliefs and
values.Aninterpreterwillstillexporttoher subjectagreatdeal ofherownworldview,
but if there are groundsforattributingtohimcertainbeliefsthat shetakestobefalse,
then she does so ifwhatsheknowsabouthim makesitmorereasonablethannot.She
thus makes use of whatever she knows about the speakers personal history and
psychology.

c.LanguagewithoutConventions
Davidsontypically presents radicalinterpretationastargetingacommunityslanguage,
but in his more careful statements he argues that the focus of interpretation is the
speechbehaviorofasingle individualoveragivenstretchoftime(Davidson 1986).One
reason for this is that Davidson denies that conventions shared by members of a
linguisticcommunityplayanyphilosophicallyinterestingroleinanaccountofmeaning.
Sharedconventions facilitatecommunication,buttheyareinprincipledispensible. For
solong asanaudiencediscernsthe intentionbehindaspeakersutterance,forexample,
he intends that his utterance of Schnee ist weiss mean that snow is white, then his
utterancemeansthatsnow iswhite,regardlessofwhetherheandtheysharethepractice
that speakersuseSchneeistweisstomeanthatsnowiswhite.Thispointisimplicitin
theprojectofradicalinterpretation.

Thisimplies,accordingto Davidson,thatwhatweordinarilythinkofasasinglenatural
language,such asGermanorUrdu,islikeasmoothcurvedrawn throughtheidiolectsof
differentspeakers.Italsounderwrites Davidsonsclaimthatinterpretationisdomestic
as well as foreign (Davidson 1973, p. 125), that is, there is no essential difference
betweenunderstanding thewordsspokenby radicallyalienspeakers andour familiars
thereis onlythepracticaldifferencethatonehasmoreandbetterinformationaboutthe
linguistic behavior and propositional attitudes of those with whom one has more
contact.

d.IndeterminacyofInterpretation
Davidson, following Quine, argues that although the methodology of radical
interpretation (or translation,forQuine)winnowsthefieldofadmissiblecandidates,it
does not identify a unique theory that best satisfies its criteria. At the end of the day
there will be competing theories that are mutually inconsistent but which do equally
well in making sense of a speakers utterance, and in this sense interpretation (and
translation)isindeterminate.
Quinedraws fromthistheskepticalconclusionthatthereisnofactofthe matterwhen
it comestosayingwhatspeakers ortheir wordsmean.DavidsonstopsshortofQuines
skepticism,andhedrawsadifferent moral fromthe indeterminacyarguments.(In this
section we emphasize Davidsons agreements with Quine, in the following his
disagreement.)
Here is how indeterminacy infects the task of theradicaltranslator.Shebeginswitha
speakerssituatedobservationsentences,andshefindsherfirstsuccessincorrelatinga
sentence SH of her home language with a sentence SO of her subjects language. She
hypothesizes that SH and SO are synonymous, and this isherwedgeintothespeakers
language. Next, the translator makes hypotheses about how to segment the speakers
observation sentencesintowords(or morphemes)andabouthow tolinetheseupwith

words of her own language. For example, she may identify the initial vocable of
Gavagai!, ga, with the demonstrative there in her home language,andgaiwith
the common noun rabbit. This permits her to puzzle out the translation of
nonobservationsentences thatshare someoftheirpartswithobservationsentences.(In
theDavidsonianversion,thesecorrelationstaketheformofinterpretationsratherthan
translations,butthepointisthesame.)
Theseadditionalhypothesesareessentialtoher project,buttheyarenotbackedbyany
direct behavioral evidence. They are confirmed just so long as the translations or
interpretations theywarrantareconsistentwith thelinguistsevidence forher evolving
theory however, that evidence has the form of information about the translation or
interpretationofcompletesentences.Indeterminacyarrivesonthescene,then,because
differentsetsofhypothesesandthetranslationsorinterpretationstheyimplydoequally
well in making sense of a speakers sentences, even though they assign different
translationsorinterpretationstothepartsofthosesentences.
Indeterminacy, however, also infects the translation and interpretation of complete
sentences. This is because the evidence for a translation manual or theory of
interpretationdoesnot,infact,comeat thelevelof sentences. The radicaltranslatoror
interpreter does not test hertranslationsorTsentencesonebyonerather,whatgoes
before the tribunal of evidence is a complete translation manual or theory of
interpretation for the entire language (Quine 1953). This means that in the case of
sentences,too,thereisslackbetweenevidenceandatranslationorinterpretationasthe
linguist may vary the translation or interpretation of a given sentence by making
complementarychangeselsewhereinhertranslationmanualortheoryofinterpretation.
Thustheinterpretationofsentencesaswellastermsisindeterminate.

e.MeaningandInterpretation

Davidsons response to the indeterminacy argumentsisat thesametimemoremodest


andmoreambitiousthanQuines.ItismoremodestbecauseDavidsondoesnotendorse
the skeptical conclusion that Quine draws from the arguments that since thereare no
determinate meanings, there are no meanings. This reasoning is congenial to Quines
parsimony andhisbehaviorism:allthereis,accordingtoQuine,arespeakersbehavior
anddispositionstobehaveandwhatevercanbeconstructedfromorexplainedin terms
ofthatbehaviorandthosedispositions.
ItismoreambitiousthanQuinesresponseinsofarasDavidsonoffersinplaceofQuines
skepticism what Hume would call a skeptical solution to the indeterminacy problem.
That is, while acknowledging the validity of Quines argument that there are no
meanings,heundertakestoreconceivetheconceptofmeaningthatfiguresasapremise
in that reasoning (as Hume reconceives the concept of causation that figures in his
skeptical arguments). There are no determinate meanings, therefore, meaning is not
determinate. In place of the traditional picture of meanings assemanticalquanta that
speakers associate with their verbal expressions, Davidson argues that meaning is the
invariant structure that is common to the competing interpretations of speakers
behavior (Davidson1999,p.81).Thatthereissuchastructureis implied byholism:in
assigning acertainmeaning toasingleutterance,aninterpreterhasalreadychosenone
of a number of competing theories tointerpretaspeakersoveralllanguage.Choosing
that theory, in turn, presupposes that she has identified in the speakers utterances a
patternorstructureshetakesthattheorytodescribeatleastaswellasanyother.Herein
liesthe Indeterminacy ofInterpretation,forthattheorydoesonlyatleastaswellasany
other. There is, therefore, no more an objective basis for choosing one theory of
meaningover anotherthanthereisforpreferringtheFahrenheittotheCelsiusscalefor
temperatureascriptions.
Thisconclusion,however,has noskepticalimplications,for byassumptioneachtheory
does equally well at describing the same structure. Whether there is a fact of the
matter when it comes to saying what speakers or their sentences mean, therefore,

becomesthequestionwhetherthereareobjectivegroundsforsayingthatthatstructure
exists. That structure is a property of a system of events, and hence the grounds for
saying that it existsarethecriteriaforattributingthose propertiestothoseeventsthe
skeptical conclusion would follow, therefore, only if there were no such criteria. The
argumentfortheIndeterminacyof Interpretationdoesnotprovethat,however.Onthe
contrary,themethodologyofradicalinterpretationprovidesaframeworkforattributing
patternsofpropertiestospeakersandtheirutterances.
As Davidson reconceives it, therefore, understanding a persons sentences involves
discerning patterns in his situated actions, but no discrete meanings. Aninterpreter
makes senseofherinterlocutorbytreating him asarationalagentandreflectingonthe
contents of her own propositional attitudes, and she tracks what his sentences mean
with her own sentences. This project may fail in practice, especially where the
interpretation is genuinely radical and there is moral as well as linguistic distance
separating an interpreterandaspeaker butinprinciplethere isnolinguisticbehavior
that cannotbe interpreted,thatis,understood,byanother.Ifaninterpretercandiscern
a pattern in a creatures situated linguistic behavior, then she can make sense of his
wordsalternatively,ifshecannotinterprethisutterances,thenshehasnogroundsfor
attributing meaning to the soundsheproducesnorevidencetosupportthehypothesis
that he is a rational agent. These observations are not a statement of linguistic
imperialismrather,theyareimplicationsofthemethodologyof interpretationandthe
role that Tarskistyle theoriesoftruthcummeaning playintheenterprise.Meaning is
essentiallyintersubjective.
Further, meaning is objective in the sense that most of what speakers say about the
worldis true oftheworld.Somecriticsobjectthat thisstatement restsonanoptimistic
assessment of human capacities for judgment however, Davidsons point is not an
empirical claim that could turn out to be mistaken. Rather, it is a statement of the
methodology of radical interpretation, an assumption an interpreter makes to gain
accesstohersubjectslanguage. Heronlypathintohislanguageis by wayofthe world

they sharesinceshemakessenseofhissentencesbydiscerningpatternsintherelations
betweenthosesentencesand theobjectsand eventsinthe worldthatcausehimtohold
thosesentencestrue.Iftoo manyofhisutterancesarefalse,thenthelinkbetweenwhat
he says and thinks, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, is severedandthe
enterprise of interpretation halts. Finding too much unexplainable error in his
statementsabouttheworld,therefore,isnotanoption,ifsheisgoingtointerprethim.

3.ReferencesandFurtherReading
a.AnthologiesofDavidsonsWritings

Davidson, Donald. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford
UniversityPress.[CitedasITI]
Davidson, Donald. 2001. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford UniversityPress.[Cited as
EAE]
Davidson, Donald. 2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. New York: Oxford
UniversityPress.[CitedasSIO]
Davidson, Donald.2005.Truth,Language, andHistory.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
[CitedasTLH]
Davidson,Donald.2005A.TruthandPredication.Boston:HarvardUniversityPress.

ContainsthetextsofDavidsons1989DeweyLectures(givenatColumbiaUniversity)on
theconceptoftruthtogetherwithhis2001HermesLectures(givenattheUniversityof
Perugia).Thefirsthalfisusefulinunderstandingtheroletruthplaysinhissystematic
philosophy,andthesecondhalfcontainsDavidsonsinterestingcriticismsofhis
predecessors,rangingfromPlatotoQuine.

b.IndividualArticlesbyDavidson

Davidson,Donald.1965.TheoriesofMeaningandLearnableLanguages,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1967.
TruthandMeaning,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1967a.TheLogicalFormofActionSentences,reprintedinEAE.
Davidson,Donald.1968.OnSayingThat,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1973.
RadicalInterpretation,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1974.
BeliefandtheBasisofMeaning,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1974a.OntheVeryIdeaofaConceptualScheme,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1975.
ThoughtandTalk,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1976.
ReplytoFoster,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1978.
WhatMetaphorsMean,reprintedinITI.
Davidson,Donald.1986.
ANiceDerangementofEpitaphs,reprintedinTLH.

Davidson,Donald.1989.
WhatisPresenttotheMind?,reprintedinSIO.
Davidson,Donald.1996.TheFollyofTryingtoDefineTruth,reprintedinTLH.
Davidson,Donald.1999.ReplytoW.V.Quine,printedinHahn1999.

c.PrimaryWorksbyotherAuthors

Carnap, Rudolf. 1947., Meaning and Necessity, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Frege, Gottlob. 1891. Funktion und Begriff, translated as Function and Concept and
reprinted in Brian McGuinness et al. (eds.), Collected PapersonMathematics, Logic, and
Philosophy,1984.NewYork:BasilBlackwell.
Quine, W.V. 1935. Truth by Convention, reprinted in The Ways of Paradox, 1976.
Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

d.SecondarySources
i.Anthologies

De Caro, Marion. 1999. Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald


DavidsonsPhilosophy.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers.

Dasenbrock, ReedWay. 1993. Literary Theory After Davidson. UniversityPark: PennState


Press.

Ausefulcollectionofarticles,includingDavidsonsintellectualautobiographyandhis
repliestoauthors.

Kotatko, Petr, Pagin, Peter and Segal, Gabriel. 2001. Interpreting Davidson. Stanford, CA:
CenterfortheStudyofLanguageandInformationPublications.
Lepore, Ernest. 1986. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives onthe Philosophy of Donald
Davidson.Oxford:BasilBlackwell.

ArticlesaddressingthesignificanceofDavidsonsphilosophyoflanguageforliterary
theory.

Hahn, Edwin Lewis. 1999. The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. The Library of Living
Philosophers,volumeXXVII.Peru,IL:OpenCourtPublishingCompany.

Articlesbyaninternationallydiverserangeofauthorsfocusingontheinterplaybetween
thenotionsofinterpretationandcausationinDavidsonsphilosophy.

AnexcellentcollectionofarticlesaddressingarangeoftopicsinDavidsonsphilosophyof
language.

Stoecker, Ralf. 1993.ReflectingDavidson:DonaldDavidsonRespondingtoanInternational


ForumofPhilosophers.Berlin:deGruyter.

ii.CriticalDiscussionsofDavidsonsPhilosophy

Evnine,Simon.1991.DonaldDavidson.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress.

Joseph,Marc.2004.DonaldDavidson.Montreal:McGillQueensUniversityPress.
Lepore, Ernest,and Ludwig, Kirk.2005.Davidson:Meaning,Truth,Language,andReality.
NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Lepore, Ernest, and Ludwig, Kirk. 2009. Donald Davidsons TruthTheoretic Semantics.
NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

AdetailedandtechnicalexaminationofDavidsonsuseofTarskistyletheoriesoftruthin
hissemanticalproject.

Ramberg,Bjrn.1989.DonaldDavidsonsPhilosophyofLanguage.Oxford:BasilBlackwell.

AuthorInformation
MarcA.Joseph
Email:majoseph@mills.edu
MillsCollege
U.S.A.

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