People vs Gesmundo

Facts:
According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose
Luciano
gave
money
and
instructed
his
civilian informer to
buymarijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the
accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano
applied
for
a search warrant.
About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went
to the Brgy captain for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant
at the residence of the accused. The police was allowed to enter the house
upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The accused begged
the police not to search and to leave the house. The police still searched the
house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table
as the hiding place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic
bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered from a native uway
cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper.
According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt.
Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while
Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While inside the
house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as a searchwarrant,
when someone coming from the kitchen uttered eto na They proceeded to
the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other
companions. They confronted the accused and insisted that the bags
belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them that she
doesnt know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepareddocument.
She was brought to the police station and was detained.
The

court

renders

judgment

finding

the

accused

guilty.

Issue: Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.

Held:
In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during
the search they discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the

suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a
flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was
no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their
testimonies. There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned,
as to what was recovered and where, the trial court concluded that these
inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that
themarijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs.
Remorosa, Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his
culpability
to
the
crime
charged.
The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police
violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of a house,
room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure
regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in
fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused
was not informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she
informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact
that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not proved that
themarijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person
making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property
seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly
verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to
preclude
substitution
of
the items seized
by
interested
parties.
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed

PEOPLE VS YIK BUN ET AL

FACTS:

On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment
of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon
instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a
team in coordination with a PNP detachment, and, along with the operative,
the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort
from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men
loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been
noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua
Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it
was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A
total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on
samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be
shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article
III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not
guilty upon re-arraignment.
RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In questioning the
RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants alleged that the trial court
erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent
arrest of the accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite
circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest. CA affirmed decision of RTC.
Hence this appeal to the SC. Accused-appellants claim that no valid in
flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that the police
officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no
evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant
of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently
made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a
result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless search.
RULING:

YES.
Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is
that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not
require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid
under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;XX
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case,
contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.
Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest
of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an
operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers,
with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a
distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accusedappellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a
white L-300 van.
The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accusedappellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and
pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho

were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into
a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425 is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on
the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it
can be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of
possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when
the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the
crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly
observed by the arresting officers.
The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived
their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their
plea.
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal
possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the
said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the
individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to
be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly
authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto,
there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part
of accused-appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the
defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their
allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of
Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants
loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at
the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that
they were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading bags
onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was
arrested inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who
could have corroborated their version of events were not presented in court.

The only witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony

corroborated Tans alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm
the trial courts finding that the police officers testimonies are deserving of
full faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial
courts assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano

FACTS:
Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high
ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,
1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428
documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at
Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an underground house of the
CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and
rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her
and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque
asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of
the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants
witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.
It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure
of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an allembracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It
does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter
and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.