Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171531

January 30, 2009

GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL and VICTORIA V. MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA
P. TUGADE (ILUMINADA and LEONORA P. TUGADE, HEIRS OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA G.
DELA CRUZ (by and through ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ), HILARIA G. COBERO and ALFREDO G.
COBERO) and SIONY G. TEPOL (by and through ELENA T. RIVAS and ELESIO TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS
OF DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA,Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals Decision
dated 22 March 20052 and Resolution dated 9 February 2006 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462. The
Court of Appeals reversed the 12 November 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo City, Branch 734 which granted the motion to dismiss filed by Guaranteed Homes, Inc.
(petitioner). The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

confirmed the sales made by the decedent during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the
disputed property to spouses Rodolfo.
Respondents likewise averred that on the following day 14 February 1967, TCT No. T-824116 was
issued in the name of Cipriano "without OCT No. 404 having been cancelled." 17 However, TCT
No. T-8241 was not signed by the Register of Deeds. On the same day, TCT No. T-8242 was
issued in the name of the spouses Rodolfo and TCT No. T-8241 was thereby
cancelled.18 Subsequently, on 31 October 1969, the spouses Rodolfo sold the disputed property
to petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Consequently, on 5 November 1969,
TCT No. T-8242 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1086319 was issued in the name of petitioner.20
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed on 24 January
1997 a petition before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate of OCT No. 404, docketed as Other Case No. 04-0-97.21 The RTC denied the
petition.22 The trial court held that petitioner was already the owner of the land, noting that the
failure to annotate the subsequent transfer of the property to it at the back of OCT No. 404 did
not affect its title to the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss23 the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by
the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed from the issuance of TCT No. T10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the complaint states no cause of action as it is
an innocent purchaser for value, it having relied on the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
Impleaded as defendants, the heirs of Cipriano filed an answer to the complaint in which they
denied knowledge of the existence of the extrajudicial settlement allegedly executed by
Cipriano and averred that the latter, during his lifetime, did not execute any document
transferring ownership of the property.24

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed a complaint seeking
reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of 23.7229 hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic,
Zambales and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404 in the name of Pablo.5 In the
alternative, the respondents prayed that damages be awarded in their favor. 6
OCT No. 4047 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents complaint. It contained
several annotations in the memorandum of encumbrances which showed that the property had
already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales.
Respondents also attached copies of the following documents as integral parts of their
complaint: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-8241,8 TCT No. T-8242,9TCT No. T10863,10 the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales 11 executed by
Cipriano Pascua, Sr. (Cipriano), and the Deed of Sale with Mortgage12 between spouses Albino
Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo (spouses Rodolfo) and petitioner.
In their complaint,13 respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945 and
was survived by his four children, one of whom was the deceased Cipriano. 14 On 13 February
1967, Cipriano executed a document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir
and Confirmation of Sales,"15 wherein he declared himself as the only heir of Pablo and

The Register of Deeds and the National Treasurer filed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, an answer averring that the six (6)-year period fixed in Section 102 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for the filing of an action against the Assurance Fund had long prescribed
since the transfer of ownership over the property was registered through the issuance of TCT
No. T-10863 in favor of petitioner as early as 1969. They also claimed that respondents have no
cause of action against the Assurance Fund since they were not actually deprived of ownership
over the property, as they could have recovered the property had it not been for their inaction
for over 28 years.25
The RTC granted petitioners motion to dismiss. 26 Noting that respondents had never claimed
nor established that they have been in possession of the property and that they did not present
any evidence to show that petitioner has not been in possession of the property either, the RTC
applied the doctrine that an action to quiet title prescribes where the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property.
The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a case of implied or
constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately claimed to be the sole heir of
Pablo in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate which led to the issuance of TCT No. T8241 in his favor. As the prescriptive period for reconveyance of a fraudulently registered real

property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the title, the trial court held
that the action for reconveyance had already prescribed with the lapse of more than 28 years
from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969 as of the filing of the complaint on
21 November 1997.
The RTC added that it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
The RTC further held that petitioner had the right to rely on TCT No. T- 8242 in the name of
spouses Rodolfo. Petitioner is not obliged to go beyond the title considering that there were no
circumstances surrounding the sale sufficient to put it into inquiry.
Concerning the Assurance Fund, the RTC held that the claim against it had long prescribed since
Section 102 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for a six-year period within which a plaintiff may file an
action against the fund and in this case the period should be counted from the time of the
issuance of the challenged TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969 and thus expired in 1975.
Undaunted, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.27
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order.28 In ordering the reinstatement of the complaint,
the appellate court ruled that the averments in respondents complaint before the RTC make
out a case for quieting of title which has not prescribed. Respondents did not have to prove
possession over the property since petitioner as the movant in a motion to dismiss
hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The appellate court found
that possession over the property was sufficiently alleged in the complaint which stated that
"neither petitioner nor the Rodolfo spouses ever had possession of the disputed property" as
"a number of the Pascua heirs either had been (still are) in actual, continuous and adverse
possession thereof or had been enjoying (still are enjoying) the use thereof." 29 By the same
token, laches had not set in, the Court of Appeals added.
The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value is contrary to the allegations in respondents complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the RTCs granting of the
motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court of Appeals reversal of the RTCs
ruling.

must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 30 The admission,
however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the
complaint.31
The factual allegations in respondents complaint should be considered in tandem with the
statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts. In a
number of cases, the Court held that in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted
by the parties should be considered in deciding whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.32 Likewise, other facts not alleged in the complaint may be
considered where the motion to dismiss was heard with the submission of evidence, or if
documentary evidence admitted by stipulation discloses facts sufficient to defeat the
claim.33 For while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint, the
motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor
does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts
which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded. 34
In the case at bar, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the hearing,
the parties presented documentary evidence. Among the documents marked and offered in
evidence are the annexes of the complaint.35
Based on the standards set by this Court in relation to the factual allegations and documentary
annexes of the complaint as well as the exhibits offered at the hearing of the motion to dismiss,
the inescapable conclusion is that respondents complaint does not state a cause of action
against petitioner.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the name of the spouses
Rodolfo, who were petitioners predecessors-in-interest, or any circumstance from which it
could reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any actual knowledge of facts that would impel
it to make further inquiry into the title of the spouses Rodolfo. 36 It is basic that a person dealing
with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his
predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned," it follows that where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens
title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely
be futile and nugatory. The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting
and observing the Torrens system of registration. In the end, the business community stands to
be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.37

The petition is meritorious.

It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and
the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss

Contrary to the assertion of respondents, OCT No. 404 was expressly cancelled by TCT No. T8241. The alleged non-signature by the Register of Deeds Soliman Achacoso, , does not affect
the validity of TCT No. T-8241 since he signed TCT No. T- 8242 and issued both titles on the
same day. There is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The
presumption is further bolstered by the fact that TCT No. T-8241 was certified to be on file with
the Registry of Deeds and registered in the name of Cipriano. It is enough that petitioner had

examined the latest certificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of the
immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original
certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the
property.38
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales executed
by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is not binding on such other
heirs, nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree,
which provides that:
SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title
in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances
which may be subsisting, namely:
xxxx
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a forgery, the Court still has to
uphold the title of petitioner. The case law is that although generally a forged or fraudulent
deed is a nullity and conveys no title, there are instances when such a fraudulent document may
become the root of a valid title.39 And one such instance is where the certificate of title was
already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that
way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the
right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.40
The Court cannot give credence to respondents claims that the Extrajudicial Settlement of a
Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales was not registered and that OCT No. 404 was not cancelled
by the Register of Deeds. The Register of Deeds of Zambales certified that the extrajudicial
settlement was recorded on 14 February 1967, per Entry No. 18590. This is in compliance with
Section 56 of Act No. 496,41 the applicable law at the time of registration, which provides that:
Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in which he shall enter in the order of
their reception all deeds and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of writs and other
process filed with him relating to registered land. He shall note in such book the year, month,
day, hour, and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they are
received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of
each instrument when made on the certificate of title to which it refers shall bear the same
date. [Emphasis supplied]

Thirdly, respondents cannot make out a case for quieting of title since OCT No. 404 had already
been cancelled. Respondents have no title to anchor their complaint on.43 Title to real property
refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the
extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to
exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.44
Moreover, there is nothing in the complaint which specified that the respondents were in
possession of the property. They merely alleged that the occupants or possessors are "others
not defendant Spouses Rodolfo"45 who could be anybody, and that the property is in actual
possession of "a number of the Pascua heirs"46 who could either be the respondents or the heirs
of Cipriano. The admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not
extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even
if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor
conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matters.47
The other heirs of Pablo should have filed an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust within ten (10) years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. 48 The legal relationship between
Cipriano and the other heirs of Pablo is governed by Article 1456 of the Civil Code which
provides that if a property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
From the above discussion, there is no question that petitioner is an innocent purchaser for
value; hence, no cause of action for cancellation of title will lie against it.49 The RTC was correct
in granting petitioners motion to dismiss.
Lastly, respondents claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper. Section 101 of P.D.
No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss, damage or
deprivation of any right or interest in land which may have been caused by a breach of trust,
whether express, implied or constructive. Even assumingarguendo that they are entitled to
claim against the Assurance Fund, the respondents claim has already prescribed since any
action for compensation against the Assurance Fund must be brought within a period of six (6)
years from the time the right to bring such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67462 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 12 November 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 73 in Civil Case No. 432-097 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall be,
if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where
the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering.42

THIRD DIVISION
RABAJA RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

Respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System
G.R. No. 177181

(AFP-RSBS) is a government corporation, which manages the pension fund of the Armed Forces

Present:

of the Philippines (AFP), and is duly organized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, [5] as

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CORONA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ

- versus -

amended by P.D. No. 1656[6] (respondent). Respondent is a holder of TCT No. T51382[7] covering the same subject property.

On September 1, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint [8] for Quieting of Title and/or Removal
of Cloud from Title before the RTC. Trial on the merits ensued.

AFP RETIREMENT AND

SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
July 7, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Petitioner averred that on September 6, 1955, Free Patent No. V-19535[9] (Free Patent)
was issued in the name of Jose Castromero (Jose). On June 1, 1982, the Free Patent was
registered, and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2612[10] covering the subject property
was issued in the name of Jose. Sometime in the first half of 1982, Jose sold the subject property

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

to Spouses Sigfriedo and Josephine Veloso[11] (spouses Veloso), and TCT No. T-17104[12] was
issued in favor of the latter. Spouses Veloso, in turn, sold the subject property to petitioner for
the sum of P634,116.00 on January 17, 1997,[13] and TCT No. T-88513 was issued in petitioners

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil

name. Petitioner alleged that it was the lawful owner and possessor of the subject property.

Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated June 29, 2006,
which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, dated June 3, 2004.

Traversing the complaint, respondent, in its Answer,[14] claimed that its title over the subject
property was protected by the Torrens system, as it was a buyer in good faith and for value; and
that it had been in continuous possession of the subject property since November 1989, way

The Facts

Petitioner Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation (petitioner), a domestic corporation, is

a holder of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88513[4] covering the subject property
particularly identified as Lot 395, Pls 47, with an area of 211,372 square meters more or less,
and located at Barangay (Brgy.) Conrazon, Bansud, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro (subject
property).

ahead of petitioner's alleged possession in February 1997.

Respondent stated that on April 30, 1966, Homestead Patent No. 113074 (Homestead
Patent) was issued in the name of Charles Soguilon (Charles). On May 27, 1966, the Homestead
Patent was registered[15] and OCT No. RP-110 (P-6339)[16] was issued in Charles's name, covering
the same property. On October 18, 1982, Charles sold the subject property to JMC Farm
Incorporated (JMC), which was then issued TCT No. 18529. [17] On August 30, 1985, JMC
obtained a loan from respondent in the amount ofP7,000,000.00, with real estate mortgage
over several parcels of land including the subject property. [18] JMC failed to pay; hence, after

J.M.C.
Farm Incorporated and TCT No. T-51392, in the
name of the defendant AFP Retirement Separation and
Benefits
System;

extra-judicial foreclosure and public sale, respondent, being the highest bidder, acquired the
subject property and was issued TCT No. T-51382 in its name. Respondent contended that from
the time it was issued a title, it took possession of the subject property until petitioner disturbed

4.
DIRECTING the Register of Deeds, City
of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, to cancel TCT No. T-51392, in
the
name of defendant
AFP Retirement Separation
&
Benefits System and its registration from the Records
of the Registry of Deeds;

respondent's possession thereof sometime in 1997. Thus, respondent sent petitioner a

Demand Letter[19] asking the latter to vacate the subject property. Petitioner replied that it was
not aware of respondent's claim.[20] Presently, the subject property is in the possession of the

5. NO PRONOUNCEMENT as to damages and attorney's fees

for
plaintiff
and
defendant's
counterclaim
is
hereby dismissed. No Cost.

petitioner.[21]
The RTC's Ruling

SO ORDERED.
On June 3, 2004, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner's
title emanated from a title older than that of the respondent. Moreover, the RTC held that there

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.[23]

were substantial and numerous infirmities in the Homestead Patent of Charles. The RTC found
The CA's Ruling

that there was no record in the Bureau of Lands that Charles was a homestead applicant or a
grantee of Homestead Patent No. 113074. Upon inquiry, the RTC also found that a
similar Homestead Patent bearing No. V-113074 was actually issued in favor of one Mariano

On June 29, 2006, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision upon the finding that

Costales over a parcel of land with an area of 8.7171 hectares and located in Bunawan, Agusan

Charles's Homestead Patent was earlier registered than Jose's Free Patent. The CA held that

in Mindanao, per

Certification[22]

issued by the Lands Management Bureau dated February 18,

Jose slept on his rights, and thus, respondent had a better right over the subject

1998. Thus, the RTC held that Charles's Homestead Patent was fraudulent and spurious, and

property. Further, the CA opined that while it is interesting to note that petitioner's claim

respondent could not invoke the protection of the Torrens system, because the system does

that Homestead Patent No. V-113074 was issued to Mariano Costales, per Certification issued

not protect one who committed fraud or misrepresentation and holds title in bad faith. The RTC

by the Lands Management Bureau, there is nothing on record which would show that said

disposed of the case in this wise:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, as follows:

Homestead Patent No. V-113074 and Homestead Patent No. 113074 granted to Charles were

1.
DECLARING as valid OCT No. P-2612, in the name of Jose
Castromero, and the subsequent TCT No. T-17104
in the
name of the spouses, Siegfriedo A. Veloso and
Josephine
Sison Veloso and TCT No. T-88513, in the
name of plaintiff
Rabaja Ranch & Development
Corporation;
2.
the
3.
6339),
titles,

one and the same.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[24] which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution[25] dated March 26, 2007.

DECLARING plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of

lot in question covered by TCT No. T-88513;
DECLARING as null and void OCT No. RP-110 (Pin the name of Charles Soguilon and its derivative
TCT No. T18529 registered in the name of

The Issues

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

a) The CA decided a question of substance not in accordance with existing law and
jurisprudence.

the Free Patent on June 1, 1982; that the CA was correct in ruling that Section 122 [27] of Act No.
496 (The Land Registration Act) as amended by Section 103[28] of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property
Registration Decree) provides that registration of the Patent with the Register of Deeds is the

b) The CA Decision was based on a gross misapprehension or non-apprehension of facts.

operative act to affect and convey the land; and that the fact that the Homestead Patent was
duly registered, said Patent became indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Moreover, respondent avers

Petitioner asseverates that Homestead Patent No. 113074 is not found in the files of the
Land Management Bureau, nor does Charles's name appear as an applicant or a patentee; that,
similarly, Homestead Patent No. V-113074 was actually issued to Mariano Costales over a parcel

that the petitioner failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Homestead Patent is
spurious or fake. Respondent maintains that it is the Free Patent which is spurious since what
was registered was only the certified and not the original copy of the Free Patent. [29]

of land in Mindanao and not in Mindoro; that, being fake and spurious, Charles's Homestead
Patent is void ab initio and, as such, does not produce or transmit any right; that the CA

The issues may, thus, be summed up in the sole question of

completely ignored the RTC's factual findings based on documentary and testimonial evidence,
particularly of the invalidity and infirmities of the Homestead Patent; that said Homestead
Patent does not legally exist, hence, is not registrable; that respondent's assertion -- that since

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S TITLE WHICH ORIGINATED FROM A

FAKE AND SPURIOUS HOMESTEAD PATENT, IS SUPERIOR TO PETITIONER'S
TITLE WHICH ORIGINATED FROM A VALID AND EXISTING FREE PATENT.[30]

the issuance of the Homestead Patent in 1966, records and documents have not been properly
kept -- should be discarded, as petitioner's Free Patent which was issued way back in 1955 is
still intact and is of record; that a Homestead Patent, being a contract between the Government

Simply put, the issue is who, between the petitioner and respondent, has a better right
over the subject property.

and the grantee, must bear the consent of the Government; and, Charles's Homestead Patent
being a simulation, cannot transmit any right; that the earlier registration of the Homestead

Our Ruling

Patent has no legal effect, as the same is merely simulated; and that OCT No. No. RP-110 (P6339) and all derivative titles issued, including respondent's title, are null and void.

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner submits that it has a better right over the subject property than respondent.[26]

While this Court, is not a trier of facts and is not required to examine or contrast the oral
and documentary evidence de novo, nonetheless, it may review and, in proper cases, reverse

Respondent takes issue with petitioners claim that the Homestead Patent is spurious or
fake, the same being a question of fact not proper in a petition for review oncertiorari before

the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of fact of the trial court are in conflict with
those of the appellate court.[31] In this case, we see the need to review the records.

this Court. Respondent also posits that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive and binding
on this Court, as such findings are based on record; that respondent has a better right over the

The special circumstances attending this case cannot be disregarded. Two certificates of

subject property because only the certified copy and not the original copy of the Free Patent

title were issued covering the very same property, deriving their respective authorities from

was transcribed and registered with the Register of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro; that

two different special patents granted by the Government. The Free Patent was issued to Jose

the Homestead Patent was duly transcribed on May 27, 1966, way ahead of the registration of

on September 6, 1955 as opposed to the Homestead Patent which was issued to Charles on

April 30, 1966. The latter was registered on May 27, 1966, ahead of the former which was
registered only on June 1, 1982. Each patent generated a certificate of title issued to a different
set of individuals. Over the years, the subject property was eventually sold to the contending
parties herein, who both appear to be buyers in good faith and for value.

We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be
granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic
and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, we have
underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted
in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false
and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent
compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of
the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the
case.[33]

Petitioner now seeks relief before this Court on the main contention that the registered
Homestead Patent from which respondent derived its title, is fake and spurious, and is,
therefore, void ab initio because it was not issued, at all, by the Government.

No actual and extrinsic fraud existed in this case. In our jurisdiction, fraud is never
presumed.[34] Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. Intentional acts to deceive and deprive

We are not convinced.

another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be specifically alleged and
proved.[35] The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner failed to discharge the

Our ruling in Republic v. Guerrero,[32] is instructive:

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests
and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic
where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original
action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties
of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to
the property registered in the name of the applicant.
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud
had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or
reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived
of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or
in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him
not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of
the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw
his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is
one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.

burden. Petitioner did not convincingly show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles is
indeed spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the
alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966 when Charles supposedly secured the fake and
spurious Homestead Patent.

In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[36] citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[37] this
Court stressed the fact that it was never proven that private respondent St. Jude was a party to
the fraud that led to the increase in the area of the property after it was sub-divided. In the
same case, citing Republic v. Umali,[38] we held that, in a reversion case, even if the original
grantee of a patent and title has obtained the same through fraud, reversion will no longer
prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot affect the
titles of innocent purchasers for value.

This conclusion rests very firmly on Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained

by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in
no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights
may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or
an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.
Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue
his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person
responsible for the fraud. (Underscoring ours)

the owner of more than twenty-four (24) hectares of land in the Philippines
or has not had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more than
twenty-four (24) hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines
by the United States. The applicant must show that he has complied with
the residence and cultivation requirements of the law; must have resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is
situated; and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.
On the other hand, a Free Patent may be issued where the applicant
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; not the owner of more than
twelve (12) hectares of land; that he has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interests, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition for at least
30 years prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940; and that he has
paid the real taxes thereon while the same has not been occupied by any
person.[41]

Settled is the rule that no valid TCT can issue from a void TCT, unless an innocent purchaser
for value had intervened. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of

It bears stressing that a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration

another, without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in the property, for

Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title.[42] Verily, Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529

which a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of

mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act to convey the

any notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. The protection given

land to the patentee, thus:

to innocent purchasers for value is necessary to uphold a certificate of title's efficacy and
conclusiveness, which the Torrens system ensures.[39]
Clearly, respondent is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value. Thus, as far as
respondent is concerned, TCT No. 18529, shown to it by JMC, was free from any flaw or defect
that could give rise to any iota of doubt that it was fake and spurious, or that it was derived
from a fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise, respondent was not under any obligation
to make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself when, significantly, a foreclosure sale was conducted

Sec. 103.
. . . . . The deed, grant, patent or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between
the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall
be the operative act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases under
this Decree, registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds
of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be
paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of
title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents and
purposes under this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

and respondent emerged as the highest bidder.

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of
In Republic v. Court

of Appeals,[40]

this Court distinguished a Homestead Patent from a Free

Patent, to wit:
Homestead Patent and Free Patent are some of the land patents
granted by the government under the Public Land Act. While similar, they
are not exactly the same. A Homestead Patent is one issued to: any citizen
of this country; over the age of 18 years or the head of a family; who is not

registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should
not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents,
in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The
real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question
as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the

registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.

Otherwise, the integrity of

the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. [43]

The general rule that the direct result of a previous void contract cannot be valid will not
apply in this case as it will directly contravene the Torrens system of registration. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
rights over the property, this Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of
the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone
dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as
to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of
the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.[44]

Respondent's transfer certificate of title, having been derived from the Homestead Patent
which was registered under the Torrens system on May 27, 1966, was thus vested with the
habiliments of indefeasibility.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147928. January 11, 2005]

EMMANUEL F. CONCEPCION, HEIRS OF JESUS F. CONCEPCION, Namely: BETTY CONCEPCION and

JIMMY CONCEPCION; and HEIRS OF REGINO F. CONCEPCION, JR. Namely: ROSARIO
VDA. DE CONCEPCION and JERNIE CONCEPCION, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE F. CONCEPCION, Namely: ANTONIO CONCEPCION, LOURDES C. WATTS and IDA C.
HORVAT, (and HON. COURT OF APPEALS), respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to nullify and set aside the decision dated November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 28665, dismissing, for lack of merit, the appeal thereto taken by the herein
petitioners contra an earlier order dated January 22, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch V,
Cebu City, then sitting as a land registration court.
All the parties in this case are descendants of the late spouses Regino Concepcion, Sr. and
Concepcion Famador. Petitioner Emmanuel is a son of the late spouses while the other
petitioners Betty, Jimmy, Rosario and Jernie (all surnamed Concepcion) and the respondents
Antonio Concepcion, Lourdes C. Watts and Ida C. Horvat are grandchildren of the spouses.
The deceased spouses Regino Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion Famador had seven
children namely: Jose (father of respondents Antonio Concepcion, Lourdes Watts and Ida
Horvat), Jesus (father of petitioners Betty Concepcion and Jimmy Concepcion), Maria, Vicente,
Regino, Jr. (father of petitioners Rosario Vda. De Concepcion and Jernie Concepcion), Elena and
Emmanuel. During their marriage, the couple acquired the following real properties:
1. A parcel of land situated at Zulueta Street, Cebu City containing an area of 110
sq. meters, more or less, and with an assessed value of P11,000.00 hereinafter
referred to as the Zulueta property, the realty involved in this case;
2. A parcel of agricultural land situated at Pit-os, Cebu City, now known as Lot No.
10110, covered by Tax Dec. No. 007441, with an assessed value of P2,732.00;
3. A parcel of agricultural land also situated at Pit-os, Cebu City, now known as Lot
No. 10132, covered by Tax Dec. No. III-05158, with an assessed value
of P740.00; and

4. A parcel of agricultural land likewise situated at Pit-os, Cebu City, now known as
Lot No. 10129 and covered by Tax Dec. No. 23728 with an assessed value
of P223.00.
Regino, Sr. died in 1944. Ten (10) years later or in 1954, his wife, Concepcion Famador,
also passed away. Upon the latters death, she left a will[1] disposing of all her paraphernal
properties as well as her share in the conjugal partnership of gains.
The will was subjected to probate in Special Proceedings No. 1257-R of the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu City. Jose, one of the sons of the late spouses and father of the herein
respondents, contested the probate on the ground that the disposition made therein impaired
his legitime.
Eventually, the will was allowed probate. However, on July 6, 1960, the probate
court motu proprio dismissed the probate proceedings because Jesus, as the estates executor,
neglected to perform his duties after the will was probated. Consequently, the probate court
was not able to adjudicate to the heirs their respective shares in the estate.
On account thereof, Jose filed a complaint for partition with damages against his six (6)
brothers and sisters before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, thereat
docketed asCivil Case No. R-13850. In a decision[2] dated August 10, 1978, said court rendered
judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.

Declaring the plaintiff (i.e., Jose) entitled to a share of 1,183.57 square

meters as his legitime from his mothers estate and 1,829 square meters as
his intestate share from the estate of Regino Concepcion, Sr.;

2.

Ordering defendants Regino, Jesus and Emmanuel Concepcion to contribute

proportionately to the completion of plaintiffs legitime.

3.

Confirming the titles of the additional defendants over the

properties conveyed to them.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken there from by the herein
petitioners. Thereafter, the same court (CFI-Cebu, Branch XIII) issued a writ of execution[3] dated
February 23, 1982. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied. Hence, on February 12, 1987,
said court issued an alias writ of execution.[4] To this, a Sheriffs Report was submitted stating,
among others, that the writ of execution is only partially complied with pending the turn over
of the share of the plaintiff (Jose) by the defendants (Jesus, Regino, Jr. and Emmanuel).
Inasmuch as the herein respondents have not yet complied with the
aforementioned August 10, 1978 decision of CFI-Cebu, Branch XIII, the same court issued an
Order dated 27 May 1987[5], directing its branch sheriff Candido A. Gadrinab to execute a deed
of conveyance covering the Zulueta property in favor of Jose.

Complying with the above, Sheriff Gadrinab executed a Deed of Conveyance over
the Zulueta property in favor of Jose. Unfortunately, when Jose presented the same deed for
registration, the Register of Deeds required him to surrender the owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-52227 covering the Zulueta property, which title was then in the possession of the
petitioners. Despite demands, petitioners refused delivery of the title.

The pivotal issue, then, is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
petitioners appeal in CA-G.R. CV 28665, thereby effectively sustaining the cadastral courts
order dated January 22, 1988.[8]

Hence, Jose filed with the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch V, then sitting as a
land registration court, a Petition for the Cancellation of TCT No. T-52227. In an Order dated
January 22, 1988[6], said court granted Joses petition thus:

Before going any further, we find it necessary to speak herein on the jurisdiction of
cadastral courts in the light of what transpired in this case prior to the issuance of the
questioned order of January 22, 1988.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, defendant Mr. Jesus F. Concepcion,

defendant in Civil Case No. R-13850, is hereby ordered to surrender and/or deliver to the
Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu the owners copy of TCT No. 52227 covering Lot No. 204B-SWO-24914 [Zulueta property] within ten (10) days after this Order becomes final and
executory.
SO ORDERED.
There from, herein petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an ordinary appeal in CAG.R. CV No. 28665.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein assailed decision
dated November 27, 2000,[7] dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.

We resolve the issue in the affirmative.

The pleadings before us disclose that in the proceedings before the cadastral court,
petitioners filed an opposition claiming that the action of Sheriff Gadrinab in levying the Zulueta
propertywas with grave abuse of authority since said property is not within the scope of the
dispositive portion of the decision dated August 10, 1978 of CFI-Cebu, Branch XIII, in Civil Case
No. R-13850.
In dismissing said opposition and in eventually ordering the surrender and/or delivery of
the title covering the Zulueta property, the cadastral court explained in its same order of January
22, 1988:
The matters brought out by the oppositors in their written opposition are not within the
province of this Court to resolve, acting as a Cadastral Court with special and limited
jurisdiction. Oppositors complaint on the way the decision in said civil case was executed
must be brought before the Court which tried the civil case and which have already resolved
the issue of ownership between the parties therein,

Petitioners are now with us via the present recourse, on their following submissions:
I.
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA G.R.-CV NO. 28665 AND
SUBJECT HEREOF IS A TOTAL DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES, EXPRESS LEGAL
PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW; THUS SAID APPELLATE COURT, IN SUSTAINING THE
FINAL ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO A
WANT, IF NOT TOTAL LACK, OF JURISDICTION;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO REVERSIBLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IGNORING AND DEFYING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE FOR PETITIONERS
(OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS THEREAT) WHICH SHOW THE GLARING VIOLATION OF SAID COURT
IN ITS DECISION OVER THE BASIC RIGHTS OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.
It is petitioners thesis that the cadastral court (RTC, Cebu City, Branch V), had no authority
to order the surrender and/or delivery to the respondents of the owners copy of TCT No. T52227 covering the Zulueta property, because the parcel of land subject thereof had been
devised to them by their common ascendant, the late Concepcion Famador, as indicated in her
will.

a view evidently shared by the Court of Appeals in its impugned decision of November 27, 2000.
In Junio vs. De Los Santos and Register of Deeds of Pangasinan,[9] we made clear the
following:
[d]octrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court),
as a Land Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions,
since the Court of First Instance are at the same time, [c]ourts of general jurisdiction and
could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity of respondents adverse claim, with a
view to determining whether petitioner is entitled or not to the relief that he seeks. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ligon vs. Court of Appeals,[10] we even went further by saying:
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. 1529, it is now provided that Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to
lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but

also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine
all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. (Emphasis supplied)
Clear it is from the foregoing that both the cadastral court and the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in holding that the former is without jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the
opposition thereat filed by the petitioners.
Be that as it may, it is, to us, improper for the cadastral court to issue its order of January
22, 1988, directing the petitioners to surrender and/or deliver the title covering the Zulueta
property. That order is void and definitely without force and effect.
As it were, said order is premised on an earlier order issued on May 27, 1987 by the RTCCebu (former CFI-Cebu) Branch XIII in its Civil Case No. R-13850, which latter order is very much
challenged by the herein petitioners. Accordingly, the propriety or validity of the cadastral
courts order of January 22, 1988 is, in turn, dependent on the propriety or validity of the order
dated May 27, 1987 of RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII, in Civil Case No. R-13850.
It is undisputed that the August 10, 1978 decision of RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII, in the main
case (Civil Case No. R-13850) has long become final and executory. In fact, a writ of execution
as well as two (2) alias writs of execution have been previously issued by the same court. It was
the non-satisfaction of these writs that prompted said court to issue its order dated May 27,
1987, directing Branch Sheriff Gadrinab to execute a deed of conveyance on the Zulueta
property in favor of Jose Concepcion.
By issuing its order of May 27, 1987, RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII, sought to amend its August
10, 1978 decision. We must emphasize, however, that there is nothing in the August 10, 1978
decision of said court which authorizes the surrender and/or delivery of the title covering
the Zulueta property. It merely required the defendants therein to contribute proportionately
to the completion of the plaintiffs legitime. In fact, said court has previously denied a Motion
for Projected Partition and Execution of Judgment filed before it by the respondents precisely
because, according to it, to allow partition of the Zulueta property will in effect amend or alter
the decision (referring to its earlier decision dated August 10, 1978) which has long become
final and executory.
The subsequent issuance of the order dated May 27, 1987 which amends the final and
executory decision dated August 10, 1978 cannot be allowed. We have repeatedly held that a
judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected except
for clerical errors and mistakes. This rule holds true regardless of whether the modification is
to be made by the magistrate who rendered the judgment or by an appellate tribunal which
reviewed the same.[11] Doubtless, then, the order dated May 27, 1987 of RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII,
in Civil Case No. R-13850 is a nullity.
And because a spring cannot rise higher than its source, it follows that the cadastal courts
order of January 22, 1988 which merely seeks to implement the earlier void order dated May
27, 1987 in Civil Case No. R-13850 is infected with the same nullity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision dated
November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals VACATED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19615

On July 25, 1961 a "Report" was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner, stating:
1. That the parcel of land described as Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857, applied for in the
above-entitled land registration case, is a portion of that described on plan Psu148997, previously patented on June 12, 1961 under Patent No. 95856 in the name
of Julio Hidalgo; and

December 24, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND. LEONOR DE LOS

ANGELES, FEDERICO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.
ISIDORO O. SANTOS, ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, oppositors-appellees.
Antonio G. Ibarra and H. I. Benito for other oppositors-appellees.
Jose W. Diokno for applicants-appellants
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositors-appellees Director of Lands and Province of Rizal.
BENGZON, JP, J.:
Squarely before this Court in this appeal is the important and fundamental question of whether
a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for
registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by
a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Director of Lands of a
homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.
The court a quo held in effect that it could be, as it dismissed the application to register title
to the land in its order brought here on appeal.
On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid
San Mateo Rizal was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor de los Angeles and
seven co-applicants. Among other things it alleged that "applicants are owners pro-indiviso
and in fee simple of the aforesaid land."
The required notices were given in which May 27, 1960 was set for the initial hearing. On
March 3, 1960 the Director of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land "is a portion of
the public domain". The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition on May 24, 1960,
asserting "the required 3.00 meters strips of public easement" on lots along Ampid River and
a creek.
At the initial hearing on May 27, 1960 an order of general default was issued except as against
the Director of Lands, the Province of Rizal and eleven private oppositors who appeared
therein. On July 10, 1960 the aforesaid private oppositors, Julio Hidalgo among them, filed
their written opposition claiming they "are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question
for having acquired homestead patents over said lots".

2. That Case No. N-2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, was set for hearing on May 27,
1960 but no decision has as yet been received by this Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to this Honorable Court that Case No.
N-2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, be dismissed with respect to Lot 11 of plan Psu158857 only, giving due course, however, to the other lots in the application.
Acting thereon, the court required applicants in its order of July 29, 1961, to show cause why
their application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 (10.6609 hectares). On August 15, 1961
applicants filed an "opposition to motion to dismiss". But on September 18, 1961 the court
issued an order dismissing the application with respect to Lot 11 "without prejudice on the
part of applicants to pursue the corresponding remedy in any ordinary action". After a motion
for reconsideration was filed and denied, applicants appealed to this Court.
As lone assignment of error it is alleged that "the lower, court grievously erred in
dismissing the application for registration as regards Lot No. 11, over which a
homestead patent was issued by the Director of Landsduring the pendency of the
registration proceeding". (Emphasis supplied.)
To start with, it is well settled that the Director of Lands' jurisdiction, administrative
supervision and executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands
already of private ownership. (Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Vital vs. Anore 53 O.G. 3739;
Republic vs. Heirs of Carle L-12485, July 31, 1959; Director of Lands vs. De Luna, L-1441, Nov.
23, 1960.) Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by him over land not of the public domain
is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the owner (Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil.
416; Vital vs. Anore supra).
Now, in the land registration proceedings applicants contended that as of November 21, 1959
the date they applied for registration they were already "owners pro-indiviso and in fee
simple of the aforesaid land". As a result, if applicants were to successfully prove this
averment, and thereby show their alleged registrable title to the land, it could only result in
the finding that when Julio Hidalgo's homestead patent was issued over Lot 11 on June 12,
1961 said lot was no longer public. The land registration court, in that event, would have to
order a decree of title issued in applicants' favor and declare the aforesaid homestead patent
a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the real owners (Rodriguez vs. Director
of Lands, 31 Phil. 273; Zarate vs. Director of Lands,supra; Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 63 Phil.
654).

Since the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of the
validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a
quo's jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the
homestead patent's issuance.
Proceedings for land registration are in rem whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead
patent are not (De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480; Philippine National Bank vs. Ortiz Luis, 53
Phil. 649). A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private
character of the land as far as courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned (De los Reyes vs.
Razon, supra). Applicants should thus be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11.
WHEREFORE, we hereby set aside the orders appealed from and remand the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings, without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.