ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

1.

PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO

G.R. No. L-1800

January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties,

petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
Ramon Diokno for petitioner.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the
City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting
at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the groun that the respondent
refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature
deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15,
1947, without prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision.
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized
and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal
and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the
Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code
grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following legislative power, to wit: "(p)
to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and
disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries
and other public places" and "for the abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."

Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted
sections 844 and 1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an
offense against public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:
"SEC. 1119
Free for use of public The streets and public places of the city shall
be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as
provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games,
sports, or exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public
places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be
permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets
or public places or portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises
may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any
streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the
Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public
places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And
provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted
to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or
procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City
regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the
provisions of saif section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any
street or public paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street
or public places.
Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of
Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other
public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a
permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the
purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use
of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing
to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the
second construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that
it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the
discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places
where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145,
section 2, providing that "no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon,
shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select
men of the town or from licensing committee," was construed by the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse

to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States in its
decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes firming the judgement of the State
Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using the public streets for a
parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is
not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech
and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing
authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time,
place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... ."
We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under
consideration as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit,
which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and
other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a
construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional
limitations. As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets,
parks, and the other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of
the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern,
and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with construed "suppressed"
or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can not
grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides, the powers and duties of the
Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of them is "to comply
with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and
execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative
Code), the ligislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating
reasonably the excercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets
and other public places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by
conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and
control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and
oppression prevented.
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois
that, under Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to
regulate the use of public streets, the council has no power to ordain that no
processions shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the
superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion, since
the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them.
The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585;
54 N.W., 1104, held the following:
"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were
also, in substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to
the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it
was held void because "it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be
secured, or partiality and oppression prevented." and that "when we remember that
action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or
animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of
concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to
suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such

a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment's
consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power
hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative
and void." ... In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate
the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly
or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other
officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be
exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer
upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no
person or persons, or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive,
in ou upon or through the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical
instrument, banners, flags, ... without first having obtained the consent of the mayor or
common council of said city;" was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be
unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held:
". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so
far as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects
referred to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance
with the limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as
secured by the principles of law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under
the constitution than under the common law."
"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and
disorder in cities than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable
precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the
fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to
suppress lawful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."
"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized
countries, for people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by
day or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music
of various kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations
are resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and
frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of union and
numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable
factors in furthering them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for
purposes opposed to private or public security, they become unlawful, and their
members and abettors become punishable. . . ."
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public
disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible
public or private mischief, that the law interferes."
"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful,
and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier
courses, to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all,
must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."
In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the
city ordinance which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of

any kind, to parade any of the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums,
horns, or other musical instruments, without the permission of the city council first had
and obtained. The appellants were members of the Salvation Army, and were
prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance
invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive;
they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement
to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower
the right to assemble and worship accordingto the dictates of one's conscience, and
the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose, have been fostered
and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free
institutions allows great latitude in public parades and emonstrations whether religious
or political ... If this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades
of those whose nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and
permit like parades of those whose nations do. When men in authority are permitted in
their discretion to exercise power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of
our free institutions violated. ... Where the granting of the permit is left to the
unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other
than partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The law abhors partiality and
discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)
In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the
Supreme Court of Colorado, in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No.
273 of the City of Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person
or persons or association to use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any
parade, procession or assemblage without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of
Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do," held the following:
"[1]
The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public
streets is conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the
interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be excercised in subordination
to the general, be abridged or denied." Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.
[2, 3]
An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in
the use of public streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312
U.S., 569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the
following appears; "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means
of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel
on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.
Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
excercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because
he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that
means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of
the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional excercise of control
by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted
so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities
for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially

associated with resort to public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct.,
666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949 [953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437];
Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of Irvington]; 308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct.,
146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306, 307;
60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."
[4]
Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to
the uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to
say who shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets.
No standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance
as drawn, the chief of police may for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny
this privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed.,
1049, 1054, said:
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the
public streets in a lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance
before us, and we therefore hold it null and void."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal
ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public
streets, highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the
director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly
assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the facts and
circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue
a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in the course of its
opinion in support of the conclusion said:
". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must
be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.
"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon
its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the
standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his
mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary
suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all
speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official
suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order
in connection with the exercise of the right."
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila,
which provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal

licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny
the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is
predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or
permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or substantive power
independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief
Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover
"one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or
authority," except certain powers of local government, specially of police regulation
which are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation. Taking this
into consideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of streets and other
public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the
Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be
presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor
in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise
may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact
has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all
classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter,
and the provisions of section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the
Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and
unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places
for processions, parades, or meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons
stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted, specially in Willis Cox vs. New
Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also the validity of a similar
statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same constitutional limitations applicable to
ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal ordinance which
grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that
confers unlimited power to any officer either of the municipal or state governments.
Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly
granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The discretion with
which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the
law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary
authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."
It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the
Administrative Code apparently in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs.
Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255- 261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made
by the writer of the decision under a mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter
dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered. The popular meeting or
assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines was
clearly an unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power to
grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting been held, it was his duty
to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844, which is
punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and principles advocated and
urged in the Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines,
and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings

or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite
rebelious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that
there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the
petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of
that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the
refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of the
decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make
comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It
enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal
will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record
discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views
on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.),
1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . .
.
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious.
Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are
education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free
speech and assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp.
1106-1107.)
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing
no reasonable objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting
applied for, the respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested.
So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

2.

MALABANAN v. RAMENTO

G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984

CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO
LEONERO, and JUNE LEE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, in his capacity as the Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, THE
GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION; CESAR MIJARES, in his
capacity as the President of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, GONZALO
DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation; TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean of
Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY. LEONARDO
PADILLA, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel & Security Supervisor of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation; ATTY. FABLITA AMMAY, ROSENDO GALVANTE and
EUGENIA TAYAO, in their capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, respondents.
Honesto N. Salcedo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Leonardo G. Padilla & Pablita G. Ammay for respondents.

FERNANDO, CJ.:
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable
assembly and free speech is the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, in this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
proceeding. The principal respondents are Anastacio D. Ramento, Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports and the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. 1 The nullification of the decision of
respondent Ramento affirming the action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them
is sought in this petition.
The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated
in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby.
At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition
to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science
Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They
continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the
University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result,
disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within
hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked
to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal

assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that
they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an
illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged
by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus
with damages against private respondents 2 and before the Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the
National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par.
146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in
the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the urgent
ex-parte motion for the immediate issuance of a temporary mandatory order filed by
counsel for petitioners, dated November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining all respondents or any person or
persons acting in their place or stead from enforcing the order of the Ministry of'
Education and Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the
charges against them and suspending them for one (1) academic year with a stern
warning that a commission of the same or another offense will be dealt with utmost
severity, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court,
thus allowing them to enroll, if so minded. 3
Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the petition "for lack of factual and legal basis and likewise
[prayed] for the lifting of the temporary restraining order dated November 16, 1982." 4
Public respondent Ramento, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on the following conclusion:
"Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that respondent Director of the MECS did
not commit any error, much less abused his discretion, when he affirmed the decision
of respondent University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the provisions of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Revised Student's Code of
Discipline .and ordering their suspension for one (1) academic school year. However,
since said suspension has not been enforced except only briefly, thereby enabling
petitioners Leonero, Jr., Lucas and Malabanan to finish their courses, and allowing
petitioners Lee and Jalos to continue their schooling, if they so desire, this proceeding
is now moot and academic. 5
With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public and private
respondents, the case was ready for decision.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that
by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were
allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester, with three of them doing so and with the other
two equally entitled to do so. Moreover, there is the added circumstance of more than
a year having passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent Ramento issued the
challenged decision suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its validity having
been put in issue, for being violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable
assembly and free speech, there is need to pass squarely on the question raised.
This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable
assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent

Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held the
rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it longer than the
time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the work of the
non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have
been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the
permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed.
The petition must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much
lesser penalty being appropriate.
1.
As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of
the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right
to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." 7
2.
In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally
from the Luneta public park to the gates of the united States Embassy, hardly two
blocks away, where in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. Necessarily then, the question of the use of a public park and of the streets leading
to the United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets and parks
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for
purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens and to discuss public
issues. 8
3.
The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public
place but in private premises, property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes
opinion as part of the summary this relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required." 9 Petitioners did
seek such consent. It was granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by
virtue of a permit granted to them by the school administration, the Supreme Student
Council where your petitioners are among the officers, held a General Assembly at the
VMAS basketball court of the respondent university." 10 There was an express
admission in the Comment of private respondent University as to a permit having been
granted for petitioners to hold a student assembly. 11 The specific question to be
resolved then is whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly
and its cognate right of free speech.
4.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They
are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their
views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such
as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 12 "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 13 While, therefore, the
authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it
cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level
there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours

for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the
process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A
student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in
the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he
may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if
he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights
of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 14
5.
As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of
petitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification in view
of their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit
for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the
disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the
vicinity of such assembly.
6.
Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the
student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was
to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a
move as it confronted them with a serious problem (iisang malaking suliranin.") 15 They
believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional
headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang."). 16 If
in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to
be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the
guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic
audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take
into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate,
the exuberance of youth, They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but
with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear
and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the
taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
7.
Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were
denied the right to peaceable assembly. In a 1907 decision, United States v. Apurado,
17 the facts disclosed that shortly before the municipal council of San Carlos,
Occidental Negros, started its session, some five hundred residents of the municipality
assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the opening of the session, a
substantial number of such persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that
the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police be dismissed,
submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council gave its
conformity. Such individuals were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; the
crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the
council chamber during a session of that body could be called disorder and

misbehavior. It turned out that the movement had its origin in religious differences. The
defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other participants were indicted and convicted
of sedition in that they allegedly prevented the municipal government from freely
exercising its duties. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Carson, who
penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that "if the prosecution be permitted to seize
upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as
an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against
the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances
would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most
righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the purposes which they sought to
attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities." 18 The principle to
be followed is enunciated thus: "If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the
utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising." 19 A careful reading of this decision is in order before private respondents
attach, as they did in their comments, a subversive character to the rally held by the
students under the leadership of petitioners.
8.
It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the
events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The
rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than
the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued
longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the
"concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p. m. 20 Private
respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an
admonition, even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the appropriate
penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such
infraction considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took
place-there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view
of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While
the discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized,
the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept
of proportionality between the offense connoted and the sanction imposed is not
followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a oneweek suspension would be punishment enough.
9.
One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question
is presented. Such being the case, especially so where a decision on a question of law
is imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has invariably
viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is
that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked by
petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will continue to be in the future,
militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great
importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. That they have a
right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.

10.
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v.
Bagatsing, 21 for this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school
authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are
guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary,
the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by
an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be
aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to
be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are
devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such
permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of
respondent Ramento imposing a one-year suspension is nullified and set aside. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court in the resolution of November 18, 1982
is made permanent. As of that date, petitioners had been suspended for more than a
week. In that sense, the one-week penalty had been served. No costs.

3.

DE LA CRUZ v. CA

[G.R. No. 126183. March 25, 1999]

LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO, CORAZON
GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA, ROSALINA JINGCO, LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA
PIZARRO, petitioners vs., COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 129221. March 25, 1999]
ROLANDO ALURA, CLARA ALVAREZ, PORFIRIO AUSTRIA, VICENTE CARRANZA,
ELMER DALIDA, ROSALINDA DALIDA, NELSON DULDULAO, LEA POCONG,
ENRICO REYMUNDO, MARGIE SERRANO, SUSAN SIERTE, JESSIE VILLANUEVA,
NORBERTO ABAD, MARIA ACEJO, ELVIRA ALANO, SUSANA BANUA, CAROLINA
BULACLAC, DANILO CABALLES, ECHELITA CALMA, JESUSA CARAIG, CECILLA
CASTILLO, ANACLETA CORRALES, GLORIA CUEVAS, CONCORDIA DE GUZMAN,
ROWENA DEL ROSARIO, MATILDE DINGLE, ROSARIO DULDULAO, CONRADA
ENDRINA, LUZVIMINDA ESPINO, VIRGILIO ESTRADA, DAMIAN FETIZANAN,
DEMOCRITO FLORES, ROSALIA GARCELINA, CORAZON GONZALES, VIOLETA
GUANIZO, SURENA GUNDRAN, HILARIA HALAGO, NERISSA IGNACIO, LEONOR
LACERNA, TERESITA LAGUMBAY, TERESITA LAURENTE, CARMELITA LEGION,
LEONARDO LIMBO, EDGARDO LIWANAG, ERLINA MAGALLANES, NEDA
MAGSULIT, AMELITA MANGAHAS, GUIA MORRIS, HIPOLITA NATIVIDAD,
NATIVIDAD NEPOMUCENO, ROSALINA NOCUM, MAXIMA NON, ESTELA
PALILEO, ANA PALMA, GLICERIA PANGINDIAN, MA. LUZ PEREZ, LYDIA
QUINTANA, LORENZA REAL, BERNARDITA RINO, CELIA RONQUILLO, GLORIA
SALVADOR, CATHERINE SAN AGUSTIN, LIBERTY SISON, ERLINDA SOLAMO,
ALMA TALAMANTE, GINA TIMBAS, BENJAMIN VALBUENA, DONATO
VALDEMORO, ROSEMARIE VEDEJA, RIZALINA VICTORIO, MYRNA VILLAMIN,
FLORENDA VILLAREAL, WILSON PEREZ, ENRICO PILANDE, JOSEPHINE
PARMISANO, FELIPE ALACAR, JOSE FETALVERO, JR., MYRNA BARLISO,
CAROLINA COLIGADO, ROLANDO CERBO and LORA CLEMENCIA, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
These consolidated petitions[1] are among several petitions filed with this Court arising
from the much-publicized public school teachers' mass actions of September/October
1990.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October
1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariio of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), in decisions issued by him which uniformly read This is a motu-propio administrative complaint separately filed by the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports against the following public school teachers x x x x based
on the report submitted by their respective school principals wherein it was alleged that
the above-named teachers participated in the mass action/illegal strike on Sept. 19-21,
1990 and subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990

issued by this Office, which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation
of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines.
Required to explain within a period of not less than 72 hours but not more than 5 days
from receipt of the complaint, respondents failed to submit the required answer within
the given time up to the present, and despite the denial of their request for extension of
30 days within which to submit their answers dated September 25, 1990 filed by their
counsel, Atty. Gregorio Fabros, in a letter of this Office to him dated September 28,
1990, respondents failed to submit the same, which failure, is considered a waiver on
their part of their right to answer the charges and to controvert the same.
Wherefore, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Office finds the respondents
guilty as charged.
In accordance with Memorandum Circular 30 s. 1989 of the Civil Service Commission
on Guidelines in the Application of Penalty in Administrative Cases, the herein
respondents are dismissed from Office effective immediately.
The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). In 1993 the CSC found petitioners guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service" for having participated in the mass actions
and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six (6) months' suspension. However,
in view of the length of time that petitioners had been out of the service by reason of
the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario, the CSC
likewise ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service without back wages.
Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision. They initially filed petitions for
certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 111998,[2] 114435-5506,[3] and
116312-19,[4] which were all referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95,[5] and there re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37620,
CA-G.R. SP No. 37619 and CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37784, 37808-37014, respectively.
On 29 November 1995 the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals[6] rendered
a joint decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37619-20 dismissing the petitions for lack of
merit.[7] The appellate court ruled that the questioned resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service were based on reasonable and justifiable grounds; that petitioners' perceived
grievances were no excuse for them not to conduct classes and defy the return-to-work
order issued by their superiors; that the immediate execution of the dismissal orders of
Secretary Cario was sanctioned by Sec. 47, par. (2), of the Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292) as well as Sec. 37, par. (b), Art. IX of PD No. 807,[8] and Sec. 32, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.0. No. 292. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied on 15 May 1997,[9] petitioners then appealed by
certiorari to this Court on 26 June 1997, docketed as G.R. No. 129221.

Meanwhile, on 24 April 1998 the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals[10] rendered a
joint decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37784 and Nos. 37808-14 likewise dismissing the
petitions for lack of merit.[11] The appellate court rejected petitioners' contention that
they should not have been penalized for participating in the September/October 1990
mass actions because they were merely exercising their constitutional right to free
assembly. In so ruling the Court of Appeals cited Manila Public School Teachers
Association v. Laguio, Jr.[12] wherein this Court ruled that the public school teachers'
mass actions of September/October 1990 were "to all intents and purposes a strike x x
x constitut[ing] a concealed and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which
it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons."
Petitioners' contention that Secretary Cario's decision to dismiss them was not
supported by evidence was likewise rejected in view of petitioners' admissions and/or
failure to refute the factual finding that petitioners actually joined the mass actions
based on the report of absences submitted by their respective school principals. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied in the resolution of 20 August 1996,[13]
petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court on 1 October 1996,
docketed as G.R. No, 126183.
By resolution of 7 October 1997 we granted petitioners' motion for the consolidation of
G.R. Nos. 126183 and 129221 involving as they did common questions of fact and law.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC
resolutions finding them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
when their only "offense" was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. Moreover
petitioners insist that the mass actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes"
as there was no actual disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration
or, in the alternative, award of back wages for the period of three (3) years when they
were not allowed to work while awaiting resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and
CSC, deducting the period of six (6) months' suspension eventually meted them.
The petitions must be denied in view of previous rulings of this Court already settling
all the issues raised by petitioners. It is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice
that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.[14] Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled.[15]
As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases
of Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr.[16] and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario[17] that the mass actions of
September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to
a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty
to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons -- to protest and pressure the
Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the
unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they
were concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and
allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads
and longer teaching hours." In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission,[18] we
denied the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this

constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within
reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school
teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights
within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning
their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had
the teachers availed of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to
dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds
of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court - could have held
them liable for their participation in the mass actions.[19]
With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc.,[20] invoked by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan
case[21] that the PBM ruling - that the rights of free expression and assembly could not
be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil
liberties - was not applicable to defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions because
what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and of assembly were
inferior property rights while the higher consideration involved in the case of the striking
teachers was the education of the youth which must, at the very least, be equated with
the freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances.[22]
We affirmed the foregoing rulings in Bagana v. Court of Appeals[23] by denying a
similar petition filed by another group of teachers who participated in the 1990 mass
actions but who claimed to have been merely exercising their constitutional right to free
assembly. We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and imposing penalties of six (6) months' suspension without
pay. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals[24] we added that the persistent refusal of the
striking teachers to call the mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase
the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of
which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. We
again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right
to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised,
i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various
schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that classes
were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed
by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot
take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt remedial action taken
by Secretary Cario might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass
protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended
consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action
became necessary.
Considering the foregoing, we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the CSC resolutions finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
As an alternative prayer, petitioners ask that in the event their exoneration is not
decreed they be awarded back wages for the period when they were not allowed to
work by reason of the supposed unjustified immediate implementation of the dismissal

orders of Secretary Cario while awaiting resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and
CSC.
The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to
the service after the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario were commuted by the CSC
to six (6) months' suspension is already settled.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals[25] we resolved the issue in the negative on the
ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2)
circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in administrative disciplinary
cases. Like herein petitioners, those in Bangalisan were also teachers who participated
in the 1990 mass actions for which they were dismissed by Secretary Cario but ordered
merely suspended for six (6) months by the Civil Service Commission. On a plea that
the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario was
unjustified, thus warranting an award of back wages the Court said As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the
same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Order No. 292, thus:
"The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decision shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
And since it was already the final dismissal orders of Secretary Cario which were being
carried out, immediate implementation even pending appeal was clearly sanctioned by
the aforequoted provision of the Administrative Code of 1987.[26] Hence, being legal,
the immediate execution of the dismissal orders could not be considered unjustified.
The cases cited by petitioners to support their prayer for back salaries, namely, Abellera
v. City of Baguio[27] and Bautista v. Peralta[28] being cases which involved the
unjustified immediate execution of the dismissal orders of the then Civil Service
Commissioner pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals are therefore not
applicable to justify petitioners' prayer. Neither could petitioners be considered to have
been exonerated from the charges levelled against them by Secretary Cario from the
mere fact that they were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service by the CSC. It must be remembered that Secretary Cario charged
petitioners with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service
law, rules and regulations, etc., for having participated in the 1990 illegal mass actions.
On appeal the CSC while affirming the factual finding that petitioners indeed
participated in the mass actions found them liable only for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Clearly the CSC decision did not proceed from a finding
that petitioners did not commit the acts complained of. Having been found to have
actually participated in the illegal mass actions although found answerable for a lesser
offense, petitioners could not be considered as fully innocent of the charges against
them.[29] Being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration.[30]
Thus in Bangalisan we denied the claim for back wages of those teachers who were
found to have actually participated in the 1990 mass actions but granted the claim of

one Rodolfo Mariano who was absent only because he attended the wake and
interment of his grandmother. In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals[31] we again denied the
claim for back wages of teachers found to have given cause for their suspension, i.e.,
their unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their students but granted
the claim of Merlinda Jacinto who was absent because of illness.
Petitioners do not deny, nay they even admit, having participated in the 1990 mass
actions. Thus having given cause for their supension, their prayer for back wages must
be denied conformably with settled rulings of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

4.

PBM EMPLOYEES v. PBM

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred
to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police,
to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as
those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties parties

stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been
agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has
nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6.
That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers
who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7.
That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining
the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd
and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV:
NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers
shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union
panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8.
That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are
as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

4.
That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr.
Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For
the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.
on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other
employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875,
and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.).
The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de
Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed,
dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting
Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

5.
That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu
who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise

3.
That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in
the morning of March 4, 1969;

of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because
it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein
petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to
have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56,
rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order
(p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969
fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September
15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for
ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of
the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969,
the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15
of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five
(5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their
motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two
(2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which
held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses
(Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments
dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp.
65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion
for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear
the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days
from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or
order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their
motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of

their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes
"K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October
9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice
of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the
issues posed by the case at bar.
(1)
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth
of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2)
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is
to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion
by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to
the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3)
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition
are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the
ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want
to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one
are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4)
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate
not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5)
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions

may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill
of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a
mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion
of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in
Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times
Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger
rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the
occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad
faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It
was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up

the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself
at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it
encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive
police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly
employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing
only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation
was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were
by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the
shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice
have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers
the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual
tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the

freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or

strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in
any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate
in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular
shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the
firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate
the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on
the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover,
the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication
of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of
their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only
the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the
morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There
was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting
the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its
mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration
held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the
part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal
protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint
charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle
of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long
as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed
by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)"
(p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from
joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed
with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen
to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has
a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right
of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the
mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of
the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section
4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers
of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against
alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of
the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from
the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police,
it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to
the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation
and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company,"
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of
loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that
the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether
it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that
penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by
reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or
materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969.
On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its

hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have
sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well
as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the
eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by
the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of
the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of
the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is
most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by
the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court
of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights.
Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual,
who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26
even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights
and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned
orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise
of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,
the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity

to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to
be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he
cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay
for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its
order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments
in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such
motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were
promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2)
days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it
was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural
rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to
the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate
rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point
of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial
Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too
short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to
meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion
for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could
have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27,
1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to

Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on
October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for
the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma
since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day
reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or
decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all
these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently
available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of
action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears
that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case,
the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete
determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of
Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant
case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress,
must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before
the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to
the said charge.

it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered
as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to
avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this
particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which
denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right
to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar,
no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property
rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash
with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the
instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers
in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms ..."

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice
Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc.,
et. al., 30-e thus:

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes
of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new
trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for
the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of
Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers
as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said
court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v.
C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71
Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have
enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that
petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any
case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in
court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari
and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the
court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the
errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being
jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should

meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong
v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the
instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to
them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing
that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September
22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is
only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315
[1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat.
Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy
v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality.
when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that
norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe,
(63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule
should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves
for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128).
We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix,
to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to
the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968,
23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice
Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure
"are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders
of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of
the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed
and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 1620, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for
respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that

were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on
March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day
and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply
to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the
eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated
the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of
their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at
the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek
to destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow
their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression
of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The
only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the
Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that
our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and
good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete
lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are
being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is
sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent
company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where
the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming
that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they
were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise
of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members
of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by
a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right
of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB
324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine
Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied.
The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer
to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of
that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor
practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in
the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech,
free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1)
setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2)
directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back
pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's
pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their
separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

5.

BAYAN v. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169838

April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA,

Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO,
NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen.
PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 169848

April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante,
Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida
Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute,
Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn
Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo
De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his
personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior
and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief,
Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief,
National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official
capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC
OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR
CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 169881

The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,1 allege that they are citizens
and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals
were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R.
No. 169848,2 who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful
mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed
by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in
marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the
country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed
violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,3
allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations
and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful
assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated
Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be
conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their
members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU
also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the
University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked
them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were
then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.4 Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.

April 25, 2006

B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and

Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National
President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT.
PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners come in three groups.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880

An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To
Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital
to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or
any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of
presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages
for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That
the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action
in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by
the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa
Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or
other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership
where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or
sound system and similar changes.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or
made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution
which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for
by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof,
and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of
persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at
a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant
a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall
be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate
court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48)
hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required.
A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under
Section 8 hereof.

Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the proposed public assembly involve
the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue,
road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or

reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue
interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders
and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the
end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with
the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end
that the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated
in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act
unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public
assembly.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies
shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure
public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away
from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the
latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent
shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly
will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is
held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:

Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement
agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform
their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those
exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall
be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy
of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not
be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those
set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held
criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the
provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit
shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may
disperse such public assembly as follows:

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the
area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb,
and the like;

Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
On Unlawful Mass Actions
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the
use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Sec. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited
acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and
one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall
be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to

inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duly
constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government
units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of
this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances
on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum
tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a
witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to
public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six

months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential
Decree No. 1866;

Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the
right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government.

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by

imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful

conduct befitting of a democratic society.

Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable
"freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall
be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be
held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall
establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails
the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression
is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or
influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against
the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Sec. 16. Constitutionality. Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be
affected thereby.
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions,
orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated
September 21, 2005, shown in Annex "A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of
the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.5

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as
it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards.
The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave
danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard
of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague
and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to
assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a
permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits
provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the
five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive
order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of
B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise
by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila
City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo
Lomibao, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal
Querol, and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary
his personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the Interior and
Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO;
Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all other public officers and private individuals
under their control, supervision and instruction.

and in
Local
Pedro
acting

Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director
General Arturo Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief
Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they
had been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested
stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses."
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim
that the time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the threepronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has
no reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served
by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves
open alternative channels for communication of the information.6

3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires
the statement of the public assemblys time, place and manner of conduct. It entails
traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue
interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No.
880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program content or the
statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear
and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation
has been recognized in Osmea v. Comelec.7
4. Adiong v. Comelec8 held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time,
place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such
regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to
support them.
5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court9 held that a local chief executive has the
authority to exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms
of traffic decongestion and public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to
the mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13
and 15 of the law.
6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present
danger test."10
7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws
and ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not
accurate to call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement
of existing laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not
replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his Comment that the
petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No.
7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his
denials of permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as there was a clamor
to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other people; that J.
B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,11 Primicias v. Fugoso,12 and Jacinto v. CA,13 have affirmed
the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the use of a public place
and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based
regulation because it covers all rallies.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the submission of
all the Comments, the Court set the cases for oral arguments on April 4, 2006,14 stating
the principal issues, as follows:
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12
13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?

(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?

(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5
and 6, 2005?
During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments took place and
were approved and/or noted by the Court:
1. Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the
portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of
whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20,
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
2. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR
should no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch as, according to respondents, it
was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a
misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that,
as stated in the affidavit executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and
submitted to the Ombudsman, it does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum
tolerance policy embodied in that law.
The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking into account the
foregoing developments.
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage
in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who
would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no
such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and
dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a
right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other
rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court,
as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to
assembly and petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful
concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section
3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and
promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century,
this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and
even went as far as to acknowledge:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of
the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and
to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the
attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most
unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to
be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on
such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising."
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom
of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of
streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
In Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a
settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or

safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by
the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those
and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions,
such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.18
Reyes v. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate
rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The
Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing,
as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution,
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our
republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the
opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court
in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of
speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All
these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there
is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine
the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable
assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
"It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the
Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal
to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication
that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context
of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an
instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution."
What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether
verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that
this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give
vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the
peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means
may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It
means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who

is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be
something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas.
There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly.
One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion
under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.
The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case,
penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected
that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more
intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the constitutional
right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to
make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of
values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would
start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of
1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was
quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit
in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically
affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus
nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was
made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only
purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should
not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the
Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the
US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has
resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the
City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the
case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute
of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession
upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor
shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was
construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the
licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And
the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice

Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that a statute
requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a
special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment
of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade
or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to
issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a
subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is
the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the
use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the
interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right
which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."

the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments
rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to
such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense
with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight
of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy. x x x.

xxx

8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at
the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.

6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice
Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution
protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were
marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only
the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here
respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit
would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may
probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must
be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of
Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
xxx
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at

B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)

B.P. No. 880

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A written permit shall be required
for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place.
However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a
freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or
in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall
be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings
or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not
covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof,

and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of
persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at
a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant
a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall
be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies
but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as a
"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies.21
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds
of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause"
does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the
words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so
its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit
of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This
is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, thus:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 20

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.

Article 29

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate
court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48)
hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required.
A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall be immediately executory.

xxx

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development
of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

Article 19.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of his choice.

This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he
added.

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its
provisions. "Public" does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known.
Websters Dictionary defines it, thus:23
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished
by common interests or characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly
and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the
substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to
the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to
"imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the
same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has
the same power independently under Republic Act No. 716024 is thus not necessary
to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative
forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for
peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable
"freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall
be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be
held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall
establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only
Cebu City has declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea.

If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every city and
municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or
20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been
taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of
1986.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the laws
system of regulation of the peoples exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and
petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public
park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied
with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would
in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the
authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General
has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not
mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This
is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted
by the Solicitor General, thus:
14. The truth of the matter is the policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in
consonance with the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P.
Blg. 880, which is the "highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other
peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of
the same." Unfortunately, however, the phrase "maximum tolerance" has acquired a
different meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of
law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so,
other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this
would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular connotation of "maximum tolerance" has
departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.
15. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under
the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the
dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water
cannons may be used. This could only mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict
with a "no permit, no rally policy" or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under
certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is
dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should
calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to
preempting the outbreak of violence.
16. Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu
of maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted

and much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the
minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of
keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I
wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but
would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said, "we have instructed the PNP as well
as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy . . . arrest
all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be dispersed."
None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to
violate any law.25
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P.
No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance
and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which
specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:

Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit
shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may
disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the
latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent
shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly
will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

xxx
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
xxx
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies
shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure
public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away
from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement
agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform
their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those
exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial.1avvphil.net Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the
following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall
be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy
of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
xxx
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is
held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the
area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

xxx

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not
be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the
use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where

mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit
and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a
situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who
can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from
said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit,
the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of
the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case
the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance
prescribed by the law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our
people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the
liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving
liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor
of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed,
laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy
presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened
scrutiny."26
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It
merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On
the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the
time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance"
is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound
"clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving
local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom
parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so
identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the
municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit
of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement
will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination
and orderly activities.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No.
880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality
of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are
ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements

of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.