Natural Persons

A.Birth
GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the
defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 through her Aunt Paula Yambot.
1.

2.

3.

In 1950 she became pregnant by her

present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting
on the advice of her aunt, she had
herself aborted by the defendant.
After her marriage with the plaintiff,
she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the COMELEC
and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by the defendant in October
1953. Less than two years later, she
again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, accompanied by
her sister Purificacion and the latter's
daughter Lucida, she again went to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the
three met the defendant and his wife.
Nita was again aborted, of a two-month
old foetus, in consideration of the sum
of 50 pesos. The plaintiff was at this
time
in
the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know of,
nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes

plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant
Geluz we granted certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in
behalf of his unborn child?
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus
does not have civil personality. According to
Article 40, birth determines personality. In this
case, the fetus does not yet possess a
personality to speak of because it was aborted
in uterus. The child should be born before the
parents can seek any recovery for damages.
Action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured. There could be no action for
such damages that can be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child for the injuries it received
because it lacked juridical personality. The
damages which the parents of an unborn child
can recover are limited to moral damages, in
this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to
perform the abortion. However, moral damages
cannot also be recovered because the wife
willingly sought the abortion, and the husband
did not further investigate on the causes of the
abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not
seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment.

the consent of the woman or that of her

husband does not excuse it. But the immorality
or illegality of the act does not justify an award
of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.
DE JESUS V Syquia
Facts: This is an action by Antonia Loanco de
Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose
of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia
damages arising from
(1) breach of promise to marry,
(2) to compel the defendant to recognize
Ismael and Pacita as natural children and pay
maintenance for them.

Love story:
Cesar met Antonia at the barbership
where she works as a cashier. Soon,
she became pregnant. Cesar was a
constant visitor at her home, and wrote
a letter to the priest saying that if the
child was a boy, it will be christened in
his name.
On his trip to China, he was writing
letters to Antonia cautioning her to
keep in good condition so that junior
will be strong.
When she gave birth, Syquia took her
and the child to live in a house where
they lived together for 1 year as a
family, with expenses being shouldered
by Syquia.
She became pregnant again, but soon
Syquia left her to marry another
woman.

Issue: (1) Whether or not breach of promise to

marry is actionable. (2) Whether the letters
written by the defendant to the appellant
proves paternity.
Held:
1.

The SC upheld the decision of the trail

court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry.
The action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in civil law,
apart from the right to recover money
or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise.

2.

As for the recognition of the child, the

acknowledgment
of
paternity
is
satisfied by the production of more
than 1 document of indubitable
authenticity, containing, all together,
the admission of the father recognizing
a particular child as of his paternity,
the admission of one writing being
supplemented by those of another.

could not be applied to a fetus that

never acquired juridical personality.
8.

CONTINENTAL STEEL v MONTANO

Doctrines: Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life.
In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law
or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor.
Facts:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

Labor arbiter Montao argued that the

fetus had the right to be supported by
the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived. The fetus had to
rely on another for support; he/she
could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or
aid of someone else, specifically,
his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed

the Labor Arbiters resolution. Then when filed
a Motion for Reconsideration in SC. Both
petitions were denied.
Issues:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner

Continental
Steel
Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement
Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
The claim was based on the death of
Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos
wife had a premature delivery while
she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
The female fetus died during labor due
to
fetal
Anoxia
secondary
to
uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner
immediately
granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave
but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano,
through the Labor Union, that the
provisions of the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent
should have first been born alive or
must
have
acquired
juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA
death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express
provision
of
the
CBA
did
not
contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality.
It claimed that there are two elements
for the entitlement to the benefits,
namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case. Continental
Steel contended that only one with civil
personality could die, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code.
Hence according to the petitioner, the
unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned
that a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person
at all. Hence, the term dependent

1. Whether or not only one with juridical

personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as
a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA
provisions shall be settled in favor of the
employee.
Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40
provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article
42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death. The issue of civil
personality is not relevant in this case.
The above provisions of the Civil Code do not
provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that
civil personality may be extinguished by death,
it does not explicitly state that only those who
have acquired juridical personality could die.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of
its parents. Hortillanos child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without
depending
upon
its
mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did
not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been
born or must have acquired civil personality.
Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers
womb.
3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in
enunciating that in case of doubt in the
interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of

labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA

provisions should be interpreted in favor of
labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt
concerning the rights of labor should be
resolved in its favor pursuant to the social
justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services
Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)])

MARCOS v MANGLAPUS(Sec. of Foreign

Affairs)

Bereavement leave and other death benefits

are granted to an employee to give aid to, and
if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss
of a loved one. It cannot be said that the
parents grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case,
had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.

To issue a travel documents to former Pres.

Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

LIMJOCO v INTESTATE OF PEDRO

FRAGANTE
FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the
time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an
ice plant in San Juan Rizal.
His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public
Service
Commission
through
Deputy
Commissioner Fidel Ibaez issued a certificate
of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate.
Estate
through
its
special
or
Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that
the granting of certificate applied to the estate
is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante
may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:Yes. The estate of Fragante could be
extended an artificial judicial personality
because under the Civil Code, estate of a
dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties.
It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which
survived after his death.
One of those
surviving
rights
involved
the
pending
application for public convenience before the
Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the
purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its
final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be
deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in
harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed

Facts: This case involves a petition of

mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, etc.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcos

Family to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres.
Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Family because only a court may
do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor
the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international
law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the
individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right
to travel would normally connote. Essentially,
the right involved in this case at bar is the right
to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is a wellconsidered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle
of International Law and under our Constitution
as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused
by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away
the gains achieved during the past few years
after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat and therefore prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

1.
2.
3.

Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin

(mother) died before his son.
Court of Appeals ruled that Joaquin Jr.
died before his mother.
Petition for review by certiorari

Issue: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and

Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
Held: Reversed.
Rationale:
1.Rule 123, Section 69, Revised Rules of Court:
When two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is
not (a) shown who died first and there are no
(b) particular circumstances from which it can
be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from
the probabilities resulting from the strength
and age of the sexes.

Joaquin v Navarro
May 29, 1953

Petitioner: Ramon Joaquin (Tito), natural child

of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of Joaquin
Navarro Sr. and Angela Joaquin
Respondent: Antonio Navarro (son of Jr), son of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. in first marriage
Facts:
Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila,
Joaquin Navarro, Sr.70, wife Angela Joaquin 67,
daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and
Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30
and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the
ground floor of German Club Building

2.Art. 33, Civil Code 1889: Whenever a doubt

arises as to which was the first to die of the
two or more persons who would inherit one
from the other, the person who alleges prior
death of either must prove the allegation; in
the absence of proof the presumption shall be
that they died at the same time and no
transmission of rights from one to the other
shall take place.
3.Both 1 & 2 will be substitute if there are no
facts. But since there are facts in this case,
they wont be applicable. Where there are facts
known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, presumption does not
step in. Facts are credible because witness was
found disinterested, trustworthy and entitled to
credence by courts.
4.Fair and reasonable inference would suggest
that Jr. died before his mother based on Lopez
testimony and deduced from established facts
and has strong probability. Opposite theory
would be based on surmises, speculations and
conjectures.

Building was set on fire and Japanese started

shooting hitting the three daughters who fell.

5. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into

case because it involves issue of correctness of
the
conclusion/judgment
and
not
the
evidence/facts.

Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didnt

want to leave so he left with his son, his sons
wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez.

CATALAN v BASA

As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the

ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid
bullets
German Club collapsed trapping may people
presumably including Angela Joaquin.

Facts:
1.

Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an

air raid shelter where they hid for three days.
Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa
Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and
Adela were hit and killed.
Procedure:

2.
3.

In
1948, Feliciano
Catalan
was discharged from active military
service. The Board of Medical Officers
of
the
Department
of Veteran
Affairs found that he was unfit to
render military service due to his
"schizophrenic reactions
In
1949,
Feliciano
got
married
to Corazon Cerezo.
On
June 16,
1951,
a document
was executed, titled Absolute Deed
of DONATION,
wherein
Feliciano
allegedly
donated
to his
sister

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Mercedes Catalan a parcel of land

located at Pangasinan. The donation
was then registered with the Register
of Deeds.
In 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust
Company (presently known as BPI) filed
a Special Proceeding before the CFI of
Pangasinan
to
declare Feliciano
incompetent.
The trial
court
issued its
order for adjudication of Incompetency
for Appointing Guardian for the Estate
and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. The
court
consequently
appointed BPI as Felicianos guardian.
In 1978, Feliciano and Corazon donated
a real property to their son Eulogio. The
spouses again, in 1983, donated to
their
children, Alex,
Librada,
and
Zenaida a parcel of land. On the same
year, the spouses donated a parcel of
land in favor of Eulogio and Florida
Catalan.
Conversely, on March 26, 1979,
Mercedes
sold
the
property
in
issue in favor of her
children
Delia
and Jesus Basa (herein
respondents).
The Deed
of Absolute SALE was
then registered with the Register of
Deeds.
In April of 1997, BPI acting as
Felicianos guardian, filed a case before
the trial court for the Declaration of
Nullity
of
Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership
with damages against
herein
respondents.
BPI
contented that Feliciano
was not
of sound mind and was therefore
incapable of giving a valid consent.
Thus, it claimed that the Deed
of Absolute DONATION was void and
the subsequent Deed of Absolute SALE
should likewise be void, for Mercedes
had no right to sell the property.
When Feliciano passed away on August
of 1997, the original omplaint was
amended to substitute his heirs in lieu
of BPI as complainants.The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of
respondents.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.Hence, the
present petition.

Trial Court Ruling:

The evidence presented by the complainants
was insufficient to overcome the presumption
that Feliciano was sane and competent at the
time he executed the deed of donation
in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus the
presumption of due execution of the donation
in question must be upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation made by Feliciano
was valid?
Held:

Yes. A donation is an act of liberality where

by a person disposes gratuitously a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like
any
other contract, an agreement of the parties is e
ssential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following
requisites:
(1) its should be intelligent or with an exact
notion of the matter to which it refers;
(2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous.
The parties' intention must be clear and the
attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable. In
order for donation of property to be valid, what
is
crucial
is
the
donors capacity to give consent at the
time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges
onconsent freely given. However, the burden of
proving such incapacity rests upon the person
who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this
effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
In the case at bar, the evidence presented by
the
petitioners
was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that F
eliciano wascompetent when he donated the
property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners
make much ado of the fact that, as early as
1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering
from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs.
By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove
the incompetence of Feliciano.
According to medical references, on one hand, i
n persons with
schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symp
toms, with
symptoms becoming increasingly
bizarre as the disease progresses.
It has been proven; on the other hand, that
administration of correct medicine helps the
patient to
manage
such symptoms and reduces the chances of rel
apse .
Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness
similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease.
However,
the
illness
will
wax
andwane over many years, with only very slow
deterioration of intellect.
From these scientific studies
it can
be deduced that a person
suffering from schizophrenia does not necessar
ily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his propert
y.
By merely
alleging
the
existence
of
schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the
donation,
Feliciano
Catalan
had lost total control of his mental faculties.

Furthermore, the presumption was bolstered by

the
existence
of
the
other
contract
she entered into
like his
marriage
with Corazon and the other donations made in
favor of petitioners.

Issue:

It must be noted that sufficient proof of his

infirmity to give consent to contracts was only
established when the CFI of Pangasinan
declared him an incompetent on December 22,
1953. Finally, the petitioners raised the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time on
appeal before this Court. It is sufficient to note
that even if the
present appeal
had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a
voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it
remained binding as it was not annulled in a
proper action in court within four years.

Held:

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when

the minors presented themselves that they
were of legal age?

The courts have laid down the rule that the

sale of real estate, made by minors who
pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they
are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted
to excuse themselves from the fulfilment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have
them annulled.

(Refer to Article 1390 and 1391)

Note:

BRAGANZA v VILLA-ABRILLE
Facts:

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable

or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties:

1.

1. Those where one of the parties is incapable

of giving consent to a contract;
2. Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake,
violence,
intimidation,
undue
influence or fraud. These contracts are binding,
unless they are annulled by a proper action in
court.
They
are
susceptible
of
ratification. Art. 1391. The action for annulmen
t shall be brought within four years xxx

2.

3.

Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned

from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in
Japanese
war
notes
and
in
consideration thereof, promised in
writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per
annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation
of the war.
Because they have no paid, Abrille is
sued them in March 1949. The Manila
court of first instance and CA held the
family solidarily liable to pay according
to the contract they signed.
The family petitioned to review the
decision of the CA whereby they were
ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille
P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for
consideration of the minority of the
Braganza sons when they signed the
contract.

Issue: Whether or not the boys, who were 16

and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the
contract of loan they have signed.
MERCADO v ESPIRITU
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters
Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado,
were the children and sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu;
that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as
her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48
hectares.
The defendant (Luis Espiritu) was accused to
have induced, and fraudulently succeeded in
getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum
of P400 as opposed to its original value. The
annulment of a deed of sale was sought by the
plaintiffs. They asserted that two of the four
parties were minors.
These two minors (Domingo & Josefa Mercado)
presented themselves to be of legal age upon
signing it and they made a manifestation in
front of the notary public.

Held: The SC found that Rosario will still be

liable to pay her share in the contract because
they minority of her sons does not release her
from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of
P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the
decision of the CA which found them similarly
liable due to their failure to disclose their
minority. The SC sustained previous sources in
Jurisprudence in order to hold the infant
liable, the fraud must be actual and not
constructive. It has been held that his mere
silence when making a contract as to his age
does not constitute a fraud which can be made
the basis of an action of deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the provisions
of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual
amount they have profited from the loan. Art.
1340 states that even if the written contract is
unenforceable because of their non-age, they
shall make restitution to the extent that they
may have profited by the money received. In
this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66,

which when converted to Philippine money is

equivalent to P1,166.67.
3.

ATIZADO v PEOPLE
FACTS:

4.

become an easy prey for deceit

from his girlfriend, Luisa Agamata.
On January 23, 2004, the petitioner
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
a petition for him and his companion to
be appointed as guardians over the
respondents property
RTC dismissed the petition due to lack
of evidence, and later on the Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue:WON respondent is considered an

incompetent person and should be placed
under guardianship.
Held:NO. respondent is not incompetent and
should not be placed under guardianship and
therefore
thepetition
was
denied.Ratio:According to the respondent,
petitioner did not present any relevant
documentary or testimonialevidence. The Court
noted the absence of any testimony of
a medical expert which states that Gen.Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional,
and physical capacity to manage his own
affairs.

ISSUE:

HELD:

On the contrary, Respondent pointed out in

the petitioners evidence which includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report stating
that Gen. Oropesa,
(1) performs on the average range in most of
the domains that were tested;
(2) is capable of mental calculations;
US v VAGUILIAR
FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

OROPESA v OROPESA
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J

and (3) can provide solutions to problem

situations. The Report concludes that Gen.
Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning,
except for mildly impaired abilities in memory,
reasoning and orientation.
It is the observation of the Court that oppositor
is still sharp, alert and able. It is also long
settled that "factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not
be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such
findings by the lower courts are entitled to
great weight and respect, and are deemed final
and conclusive on this Court when supported
by the evidence on record." We therefore adopt
the factual findings of the lower court and
the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of
respondents demurrer to evidence was proper
under the circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar.

Petitioner: Nilo Oropesa(Son)

Respondent: Cirilo Oropesa(Father)
CREWLINK v TERINGTERING(wife)

Facts:
1.

2.

Petitioner claimed that the respondent

has
been afflicted
with
several maladies and has been sickly
for over 10 years and was observed to
have had lapses in memory and
judgement.
Due to respondents condition, he
cannot manage his property wisely
without the help of others and has

Facts: Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse

of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and in
behalf of her minor child filed a complaint
against Crewlink for the payment of death
benefits, benefit for minor child, burial
assistance, damages and attorneys fees.
1.

Editha alleged that her husband

entered into an overseas employment
contract with Crewlink he took a

2.

3.

4.

5.

medical exam and was declared fit to

work.
On April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to
drowning.
Editha
claimed
for
compensation but was denied by
Crewlink.
She claimed that in order for her to get
compensation it is enough that Jacinto
died during the term of his contract
and while still on board.
She asserted that Jacinto was suffering
from a psychotic disorder, or mood
disorder bipolar type. She further
alleged that the death was not
deliberate and of his own will but as a
result of a mental disorder.
Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped
off the ship twice. He was saved the
first time and someone was assigned to
watch over him. He jumped off a
second time and was no longer saved.
Crewlink asserted that Editha was not
entitled to the benefits because Jacinto
committed suicide.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is still entitled to

compensation
considering
her
husband
committed suicide in the ship?
Held:No. In the instant case, petitioner was
able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death
was attributable to his deliberate act of killing
himself by jumping into the sea.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA
"Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is
provided that:

rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness

on six counts is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue: Does membership in Congress exempt
an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general?
Held: Election to high government office does
free accused from the common restraints of
general law.
Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution,
a member of the House of Rep is privileged
from arrest only if offense is punishable by not
more than 6 years imprisonment.
Confinement of a congressman charged with a
crime punishable by more than 6 years has
constitutional foundations.
If allowed to attend the congressional
sessions, the accused would be virtually made
a free man.
When he was elected into office, the voters
were aware of his limitations on his freedom of
action.
Congress can continue to function even without
all its members being present. Election to the
position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement.

xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect
of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful act on his own life by
the seaman, provided, however, that the
employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly
attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the
death of the employee should occur during the
effectivity of the employment contract. The
death of a seaman during the term of
employment makes the employer liable to his
heirs for death compensation benefits. This
rule, however, is not absolute. The employer
may be exempt from liability if it can
successfully prove that the seaman's death
was caused by an injury directly attributable to
his deliberate or willful act.

JALOSLOS v COMELEC
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo G.
Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory

CORDORA v COMELEC
FACTS: Cordora filed a complaint affidavit
before Comelec law department against
Tambunting asserting that Gustavo Tambunting
made false assertion in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming that Natural Born
Filipino and resident before the election in
2001and 2004.
Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not
eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and
residency requirements.
Cordora presented a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in
two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is
an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on
16 December 2000 and upon departure from
the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on
the other hand, maintained that he did not
make any misrepresentation in his certificates
of candidacy.

To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is

not
a
natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting
presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother
and an American father. Tambunting further
denied that he was naturalized as an American
citizen.
The certificate of citizenship conferred by the
US government after Tambuntings father
petitioned him through INS Form I-130(Petition
for Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntings
citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambuntings
possession
of
an American
passport did not mean that Tambunting
is not a Filipino citizen.
Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance
on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.The
Comelec law department recommended the
dismissal of complaint because it failed to
substantiate the charges. TheCOMELEC
En Banc affirmed the findings and the
resolution of the COMELEC Law Department.
The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that
Cordora failed to support his accusation
against
Tambunting
by
sufficient
and
convincing evidence.Commissioner Sarmiento
wrote a separate opinion which concurred
with the findings of the
En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento
pointed out that Tambunting could be
considered
a
dual
citizen.
Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American
citizenship when he filed his certificates of
candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public
office. Petitioner filed a MRbut was denied,
hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural
born Filipino.

that he is an American. However, the same

certification showed nine other trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly,
Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before
the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or morestates, a
person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. Thus, like any other naturalborn Filipino, it isenough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his
certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath
of allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought
about by the individuals active participation in
the
naturalization process.AASJS states that, under
R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country is
allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by
swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an
oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of
a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.

OLAGUER V PARUNGGANAN
FACTS:
1.

Alleges that he was the owner of

60,000 share of stocks (worth 600k),
employed as EVP Business day
Corporation, President of Business day
Info System and Svces & Businessday
Marketing Corp.

2.

Active in the political opposition

against Marcos together withresps Raul
Locsin and Enrique Joaquin. Locsin,
Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an
unwritten agreement that, in the event
that Eduardo was arrested, they would
support the Eduardos family by the
continued payment of his salary.

3.

Executed a Special Power of Attorney

on 5/26/79 appointing Locsin, Joaquin
and Hofilea for the purpose of selling
or transferring petitioners shares of
stock with Business day.

4.

During trial, Eduardo testified that he

agreed to execute the SPA in order to
cancel his shares of stock, even before
they are sold, for the purpose of
concealing that he was a stockholder of
Businessday, in the event of a military
crackdown against the opposition.

5.

Parties acknowledged the SPA before

respondent Emilio Purugganan,Jr., who
was then the Corporate Secretary of

HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is

born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he
underwentthe process involved in INS Form I130 (Petition for Relative) because of his
fathers citizenship.
Tambunting claims that because of his parents
differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and
American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand,
insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos
observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of
his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization
process to acquire Americancitizenship.
The process involved in INS Form I-130 only
served
to
confirm
the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth.
The
certification
from
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
which
Cordora
presented
contained two trips where Tambuntingclaimed

Business day, and at the same time, a

notary public for Quezon City.

NO. If it were, then the very existence of that

SPA would be rendered nugatory.

6.

By the time he was released from

prison 6 years later, he was no longer a
shareholder in the said bank.

Olaguer has to be a minor or insane for that

SPA to have function.

7.

According to the respondents, they

were just doing what was accorded in
the SPA, given that the price of theirs
plummeted
below
market
value
because of the stigma brought about
by Olaguer being a very prominent
oppositionist.

ISSUE:Whether absence as mentioned in SPA

should be understood as that of NCC 381.

RULING:

An SPA has to be construed strictly but its

provision has to be construed as to its
existence,
i.e. understood in a way that will give more
power/ function to that SPA.
Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave
powers to the respondents to actually dispose
of his share, he cannot therefore assail such
now. And even if the said contract is assailable,
it was already ratified by the reception of the
amount 600,000 by Olaguers wife and in-laws
from 1980-1982.