ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs.

JUSTO LUKBAN
39 PHIL 778, March 25, 1919

Facts: Justo Lukban the Mayor of Manila out of good intentions, in order to
exterminate vice, ordered the district for prostitutes closed. Between
October 18 and 25 of 1918, the women were confined in their houses by the
police, within this period the city government managed to arrange with the
bureau of labor for the women to be sent to Davao, Mindanao as Laborers, and
secured two coast guard cutters
to transport the women with the
constabulary as guards. About midnight of October 25 upon the orders of the
chief of police Anton Hohman and Mayor Lukban, the police hustled some 170
women in patrol wagons and delivered them to the steamers ready to transport
them to Davao.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo,
The governor and the hacendero of Davao. While the two vessels were underway
to Davao the relatives and friends of the deported women filed an
application for habeas corpus. The application set forth and alleged that
the women were illegally re- strained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, and by certain unknown parties.
The fiscal appeared in begalf of Mayor Lukban, Chief Anton Hohman and prayed
that the writ should not be granted because the action should have been
begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and
Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their
custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the
boundaries of the city of Manila.
Issue: Whether or Not the granting of the writ of Habeas corpus is proper?
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the application for the writ of Habeas
Corpus and commanded the respondents Mayor Justo Lukban, Chief Anton Hohman,
Governor Felician Ynigo and Rafael Castillo.
It is a general rule to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the
court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands.
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before
an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is

restraint of liberty any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of
that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which
began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to
Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.
To agree with the contention of respondents would mean that The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action,
could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within
the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of
the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. The respondents, within the
reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of
liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
42 OG 4282, March 26, 1949
Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese
Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, now charged before a
Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge
his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against noncombatant civilians and prisoners war, in violation of the laws
and customs of war came before the supreme Court seeking to establish the
illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to
enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military
Commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the
case of petitioner.

He presents the following arguments:

1. E.O. 68 violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but
also our local laws because the Philippines is not is not a signatory
to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare
hence, he is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international
2. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against him in
behalf of the United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hussey
and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the Philippines, is a diminution of our personality
as an independent state.
3. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the
United States not being a party in interest in the case.
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 68 is
Philippines is not a signatory of
Regulations covering Land Warfare?

illegal due to the fact that

the Hague Convention on Rules

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of E.O.

the
and

therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not
a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
When the crimes were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together
with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations
contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights
and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at
all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our
own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Ichong v. Hernandez
101 Phil 1155, May 31, 1957

68

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and
prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of
July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the nation."
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of
the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been
guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are
held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement
of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of
international law which are part of our Constitution.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who
were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles,

Facts: In 1954 The Congress passed Republic Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalized the retail trade
business. Its mainly provided:

a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and

associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are
not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade
an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue
to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons
an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of
the United States
a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail
business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry;
a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business
a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business
to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters,
the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of juridical entities;

A provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail

business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months
for purposes of liquidation.

LAO H. ICHONG for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents,
corporations
and
partnerships
adversely
affected
by
the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act
Contending inter alia that the Act violates
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines

international

and

treaty

Issue: Whether or Not R.A. 1180 violates the international and treaty
obligations of the Philippines by nationalizing retail business and hence
contrary to the constitution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of R.A. 1180 and dismissed
petition.
The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding
the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. That such is the
import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations
Organization, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging
in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners
engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic
of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging
in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the
police power of the State.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

332 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000
Facts: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition
of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country."
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of
Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty.
On June 18, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale
No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez, , to the United States. The request was forwarded the following day
by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private
respondent requested for copies of the official extradition request and all
pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his
request was denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to an
action for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition.
The trial court issued an order enjoining the DOJ from conducting further
proceedings, hence, the instant petition.
Issue: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private
respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing?
Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the entitlement of the Mark of due process
The petition of the Secretary of Justice was dismissed. The rule of pacta
sunt servanda, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement
therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a
treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the
doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law
of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or

local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted
to harmonize them in the case at bar, is there really a conflict between
international law and municipal or national law, the law is silent as to
these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests
this silence. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic
due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of
extradition proceeding
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee.

All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted

in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that a treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the
Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of
international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking.
Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these
crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty.
Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the
perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state. It
ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an
interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees
from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial.
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------X
In Re:Garcia

RESOLUTION: October 17, 2000

Decision Reversed.
The private respondent is not entitled to the right of notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process; that there is no
provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 giving an
Jxtradite such right; that a court cannot alter, amend or add to a treaty
any clause, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or
substantial justice; that the terms of the treaty should be interpreted in
the light of their intent; that other countries with similar extradition
treaties with the Philippines have expressed the same interpretation adopted
by the Philippine and US governments; and that an extradition proceeding is
sui generis, not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069
which gives an Jxtradite the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary
of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving
private respondent that right where there is none.
It is well-settled that a court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by
the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its
conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part
of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or
substantial justice. Second.

2 SCRA 984, August 15, 1961

Facts: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his
verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen
born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage;
that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato
Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de
Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he
studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En
Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in
Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and
the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
Issue: Whether or Not Arturo Garcia should be admitted to the practice of
law without taking the bar exams by virtue of Treaty on Academic Degrees and
the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state?
Ruling: The
grounds:

high

court

resolved

to

deny

the

petition

on

the

following

(1) The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;

"The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained
recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the
stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the
territory of the other,
From which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his
own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides:
"The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or diplomas
to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States,
issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to
exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws
and regulations of the latter. . . ."
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in
by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws
the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with
16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that
practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must
pass the required bar examinations; and

the Treaty invoked

and regulations of
exercise the legal
Sections 2, 9, and
before anyone can
first successfully

(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the

Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to
repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress
of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Phil. Constitution).
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Alih et al v. Castro
151 SCRA 279, June 23, 1987
Facts: On
Philippine

November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred

marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the

compound occupied by the Alih et al at Gov. Alvarez Street, Zamboanga City,

in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the
invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose
was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering.
Unfortunately, the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned
fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male
occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and
photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and
confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several
rounds of ammunition found in the premise
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these
from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right
against self-incrimination.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required search warrant,
sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under
superior orders. There was also the suggestion that the measure was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem
generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.
Issue: Whether or Not the fact of lawlessness in Zamboanga city may excuse
military elements to raid the petitioners, conduct arrests, and seize
articles without warrant?
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition. The search of the
petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms
and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence
in any of the proceedings against the petitioners.
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was inforce at the
time of the incident in question, provided as follows:
"Sec. 3. The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that

"Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in
question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of
hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
committed therein against the petitioners.
In acting as they did, they defied the precept that "civilian authority is
at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the
Constitution.
In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts,
which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause
to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the
raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the
petitioner's guilt.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
IBP v. Zamora
338 SCRA 81, August 15, 2000
Facts: The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a
verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of
Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition
to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines
null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines

in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency

situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in
derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or Not the deployment of Marines for visibility patrols

together with the police force violative of the constitutional provision of
civilian supremacy?
Ruling: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition hence dismissed.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom.
This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President's wisdom or substitute its own.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's
decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The petition failed to discharge such heavy burden as there was no evidence
to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces nor was grave abuse committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP. Under the LOI, the police forces are
tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is
their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It
is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistical support to these soldiers. It cannot be properly
argued then that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force.

X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X

People v. Lagman and Sosa

66 Phil 13, July 13, 1938
Facts: Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation
of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law.
It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached
the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said
year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to
register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said
appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of
filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they
have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is
fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the
accused
were
sentenced,
is
impugned
on
the
ground
that
it
is
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or Not the national defense law is unconstitutional for
requiring Tranquilino and Primitivo to be conscripted in the armed forces?
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the appeal of Tranquilino and Primitivo.
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as
follows:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service."

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military

service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this
duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein.
Compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world
war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is
derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State
and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizen.
without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled
need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and
his religious or political convictions, to take his place in
the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot
defense.

by force, if
even against
the ranks of
down in its

The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does
not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance
Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in
complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper
pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities.
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Lim v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002
Facts: Beginning January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United
States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction
with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called
"Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving
Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in
1951.
The last "Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any
formal agreement relative to the treatment of United States personnel
visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective governments of the
two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of

consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999.

sovereignty, territorial
self-determination.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in

the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W.
Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001.

SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed

this
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition,
attacking
the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. 2 They were joined subsequently by
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed
a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.

integrity,

national

interest,

and

the

right

to

The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign

military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence,
foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception. Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our
obligations arising from international agreements.
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. Witness our jurisdiction as
stated in section 5 of Article VIII:

Petitioners Lim and Ersando present the following arguments:

1. The Philippines and the united states signed the mutual defense treaty
(MDT) in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with
the 'constitutional processes' of each country only in the case of an
armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country against
one of them. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the
Abu Sayyaf bandits in basilan constitute an external armed force that
has subject the Philippines to an armed external attack to warrant
U.S. military assistance under the MDT of 1951

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

2. Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American soldiers to engage in

combat operations in Philippine territory, not even to fire back "if
fired upon".

We ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification

or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power
of the State. Our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.

Issue: Whether or Not Balikatan 02-1 the entry of U.S. troops and its
conduct of combat operations in the country covered by the VFA?
Ruling: both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement,
as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the
Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded way
before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a
valid source of international obligation. The present Constitution contains
key provisions useful in determining the extent to which foreign military
troops are allowed in Philippine territory.
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as

the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of
lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international
or
executive
agreement,
law,
presidential
decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The foregoing premises
leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. However, it is all too apparent that
the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this
point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present subject
matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. We have
held in too many instances that questions of fact are not entertained in
such a remedy. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this connection, it will not
be amiss to add that the Supreme Court is not a trier of fact.
We find that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint military exercise has not
intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for
correction on our part. In other words, respondents in the case at bar have

not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.
The petition and the petition-in-intervention were DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance
in the proper Regional Trial Court.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Calalang v. Williams
70 Phil 726, December 2, 1940
Facts: the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to
5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads;
On August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter
the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga
Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of
Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the
points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of

Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition
against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as
Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police
of Manila.
Maximo among other things raised this particular argument. That the rules
and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed rules and regulations closing off certain
streets in Manila to animal drawn vehicles violates the precept of social
justice in the Constitution
Ruling: The writ of prohibition was denied. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
The rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.
It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. Which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state.
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but

liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen
should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for
all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government,
logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in
the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X

Guido v. Rural Progress Adm.

G.R. No. L-2089. October 31, 1949.
Facts: Justa G. Guidos land two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a
combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal,
just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this
city to the north. Was expropriated by the Rural Progress Administration.
She now brings this petition to for prohibition to prevent the Rural
Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation. She contends that
that the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded
within the purview of the provisions of Act 539
Issue: Whether or Not the expropriation of Justas land was proper?
Ruling: The petition is granted. Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
539, copied verbatim, are as follows:
SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private
lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to
subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable
prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or

occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and
who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.
The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4
of Article XIII of the Constitution which provides:
"The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost
to individuals."
The intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for
interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense if carried to extremes,
would be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It
would be in derogation of individual rights and the time-honored
constitutional guarantee that no private property shall be taken for private
use without due process of law.
The protection against deprivation of property without due process of law
and against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation occupies the forefront positions in the Bill of Rights. The
taking of private property for private use relieves the owner of his
property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private
property should not be taken for public use without just compensation"
(Section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the Constitution) forbids by necessary
implication the appropriation of private property for private uses. It has
been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the
legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another,
even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted
thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just
principle and fundamental maxim of a free government.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply
paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural
Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social
justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic
status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of
opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality
between values given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and
material goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their production.
The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and
their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree
sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings
at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid
of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other
public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's
property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her

and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse
to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.
No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what
is not can be made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar
circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the
case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for
public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far
removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by
the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would
open the gates to more oppressive expropriations.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Carino v. CHR
204 SCRA 483, December 2, 1991
Facts: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public
school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what
they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass
concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response
from the Secretary of Education.

evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents

submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy
and Del Castillo.
The respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990
to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them.
The Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file
a motion to dismiss the case on the ground "that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
The CHR denied the motion to dismiss It held that the "striking teachers"
"were denied due process of law; they should not have been replaced without
a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation
of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to
investigate.
Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, commenced the present
action of certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or
hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights?

The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that
followed.

Ruling: Petition is granted. The Court declares the Commission on Human

Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given
five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended
for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily
replaced

But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial

function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.

The administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 resulted in a

Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after

262 U.S. 390, June 4, 1923

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings
of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.

X-------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Meyer v. Nebraska

Facts: On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer, while an instructor in Zion

Parochial School, a one-room schoolhouse in Hampton, Nebraska, taught the
subject of reading in the German language to 10-year-old Raymond Parpart, a
fourth-grader, the Hamilton County Attorney entered the classroom and
discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German.
He charged Meyer with violating the Siman Act. Meyer was tried and convicted
in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, and fined $25. The
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his conviction by a vote of 4 to 2. The
majority thought the law a proper response to "the baneful effects" of
allowing immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with
results "inimical to our own safety." The dissent called the Siman Act the
work of "crowd psychology.

Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on

the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Issue:

Ruling: The decision of the Nebraskan Supreme Court was

The "liberty"
protected by the Due Process clause "without doubt...denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The
protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it
would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary
speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitutiona desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. He
allowed that wartime circumstances might justify a different understanding,
but that Nebraska had not demonstrated sufficient need "in time of peace and
domestic tranquility" to justify "the consequent infringement of rights long
freely enjoyed.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters

The Sisters of the Holy Names and Hill Military Academy separately sued
Walter Pierce, the governor of Oregon, along with Isaac H. Van Winkle, the
state attorney general, and Stanley Myers, district attorney of Multnomah
County (of which Portland is the county seat, and where both the Sisters and
the Academy were headquartered). The two cases, heard and decided together,
were slanted along slightly different lines. The Sisters' case alleged that:
The enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where
their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the
right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right
of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession
Its primary allegation was that the State of Oregon was violating specific
First Amendment rights (such as the right to freely practice one's
religion). Their case alleged only secondarily that the law infringed on
Fourteenth Amendment rights regarding protection of property (namely, the
school's contracts with the families).
Issue: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control?
Ruling: The U.S. Supreme Court decided in favor of the appellant
The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or guardians
right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may
not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably
relate to a viable state interest.
The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected
liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within
the
competency
of
the
state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be
destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate
all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.
While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper
education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty
interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------X

262 U.S. 390, June 1, 1925

DECS v. San Diego

Facts:
On November 7, 1922, the voters of Oregon passed an initiative
amending Oregon Law Section 5259, Compulsory Education Act it required
Oregon children between eight and sixteen years of age to attend public
school.

180 SCRA 583, December 21, 1989

Facts: Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner DECS claims

that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.
When he
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the rule.
A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After
three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the
NMAT for the fourth time.
He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to
compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional
rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.
In an amended
petition
filed
with
leave
of
court,
he
squarely
challenged
the
constitutionality of DECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,
declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Held that
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
Issue: Whether or Not Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is
valid and constitutional?
Ruling: The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated,
is REVERSED.
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right
to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in
which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer
the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness
its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no
less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner
that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is

entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private

respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is
stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he
is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another
calling that has not excited his interest
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge
82 SCRA 191, March 21, 197
Facts: On February 23, 1973 the petitioner Francisco Virtuoso a 17 year old
minor through counsel filed an application of Habeas corpus on the ground
that the preliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of
Mariveles, Bataan, failed to meet the strict standard required by the
Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause.
He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail
imposed was clearly excessive, in the amount of P16, 000.00, the alleged
robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. The Municipal Judge
justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no
impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the
excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in
accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of
Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge erred in issuing a warrant of
arrest without properly ascertaining the probable cause?
Ruling: The Court decided in favor of Francisco and granted his petition.
it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to
the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, 4 a
youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but
under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense." 5
As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the
discretion of a court. 6 Accordingly, after the hearing, the Court issued
the following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for
petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section
191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to
[order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents

Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty.
Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity,
without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against
petitioner being taken in accordance with law." 7 This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code,
which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The
State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of
such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
PT&T v.NLRC
G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997
Facts: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by PT&T as a reliever,
specifically as a Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on
maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with
petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1,
1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents
services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in
replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.
After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services
were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join
Petitioner Company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to
cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be
filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status
therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in
the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and
July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its
branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private
respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy
of not accepting married women for employment.

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that
she was not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and
that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private
respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992,[6]
which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission in Baguio City.
Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that
private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee,
was illegally dismissed by petitioner.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Arbiter except that grace should be
suspended for 3 months.
Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of grace pursuant to a company policy of
not accepting married women is valid?
Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of labor arbiter and the NLRC
and dismissed the PT&Ts petition for certiorari.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women
in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of
protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones,
Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the
State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of
the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that
her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the
companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Oposa v. Factoran
224 SCRA 792, July 30, 1993

Facts: Juan Antonio Oposa and several other minors represented by their
parents filed a civil case before the regional trial court of Makati to
order the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to Cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country, and Cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on
two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
The trial court
certiorari

granted

the

motion

to

dismiss

hence

this

petition

for

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners have a cause of action against

Secretary factoran and the DENR? Is the case a political question that
courts should not entertain?

Ruling: The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners. Petition is granted.

The decision of the lower court dismissing the case is reversed and set
aside.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this.
The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article
II of the Constitution.
The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly

mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title
XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a
cause of action.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for
the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court
to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Guingona v. Carague
192 SCRA 221, April 22, 1991
Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation
(with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under
Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or
a total of P233.5 Billion, 1 while the appropriations for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,8l3,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No.

18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD
No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize
the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled
An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of
the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for
education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the

Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to

education.
Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education?
Ruling:
The
Supreme
Court
dismissed
the
petition
and
constitutionality of automatic appropriation for debt service

service
upheld

is
the

while it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to
education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy
is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional.
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------X
PASEI v. Drilon
163 SCRA 386, June 30, 1988
Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short),
a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is
assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII,
of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law."

Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior

consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's
non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury"
that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988,
the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of
Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged
"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
Issue: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an
exercise of police power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of D.O. No. 1 of DOLE. PASEIs
petition was dismissed.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under
the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men
and
women.
It
admits
of
classifications,
provided
that
(1)
such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not
impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the
requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department
Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its
impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is
not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone.

What concerns the Constitution more paramount is that such an employment be
above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has
to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is
duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the

Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously

dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its
duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Tanada v.Angara
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts: On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity),
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Negotiations
Senators Wigberto Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).
They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the
national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our
Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
Issue: Whether or Not the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization
and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated
and privatized?
Ruling: The Court ruled in favor the validity of the concurrence of the
Philippine senate with the ratification of the international agreement
establishing World Bank. The petition is dismissed.

The 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide
trade
liberalization
and
economic
globalization
and
from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized.

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,

services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national
economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that
is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most
basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it
means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy,
especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural
resources and public utilities.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Association of Small Land Owners v. Sec.
175 SCRA 342, July 14, 1989
Facts: R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8,
1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on
October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized
the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.

This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the

Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its
own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement
of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on
June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions.
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O
Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To
the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also
allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process
and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate
the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department
of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the
decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

Issue: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of

Police power or Power of Eminent Domain?

Luz Farms v. Secretary

192 SCRA 51, December 4, 1990
Facts: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No.
6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as
embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as
they are made to apply to it:

(a)
Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)"
in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity.
(b)
Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c)
Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a productionsharing plan.

(d)
Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform
the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for
lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e)
Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in
Section 13
Whereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such
lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year
as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive
Issue: Whether or Not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage?

197 SCRA 52, May 14, 1991.

Facts: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted
PAGCOR the power to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which
expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was updated through PD
1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize
all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Section 1 of PD 1869 provides: Declaration of Policy.
It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games
of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by
law.

the

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the
law creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a)
it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local
autonomy clause of the constitution.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of

1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was
never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock
and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated
agrarian reform program of the Government.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because
it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling
are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Ruling: The Court granted the petition

assailed provisions as Unconstitutional

of

Luz

Farms

and

declared

Said provisions are unconstitutional.

Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi

namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm
worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657
which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is
invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are
made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is
simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of
agrarian reform.
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X

Basco v. PAGCOR

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced
cities like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far
as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
Ruling: The Supreme Court rejected the contetntion of Atty. Basco and ruled
that the Loacal autonomy principle has not been violated. Petition was
dismissed.
Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source
of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy
(particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing

power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may
provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject
to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of
the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over
local governments.
X------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Dadole v. COA
G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002
Facts: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving
monthly allowances of P1, 260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991,
Mandaue City increased the amount to P1, 500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the
disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55)
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor
issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the
amount
(maximum
of
P1000
and
P700
in
provinces
and
cities
and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional
monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were
also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the
last six months.
On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in
behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the
motion.

Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local
autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local
government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed
therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and
therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
Issue: Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President and infringes local autonomy?
Ruling: The Supreme Court rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner
Judges. Petition is granted.
Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by
Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987
Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter
egos of the President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of
the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their
officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and
by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject
to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can
only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds
that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
President's supervisory powers over LGUs
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------X
Pamatong v. Comelec
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Facts: Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its
Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated
by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party
with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G.

Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed
he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the
resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to
equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates
only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the
COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral
process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their
leaders.
Issue: Whether or Not The COMELEC in disqualifying Rev.Elly Velez Pamatong
violated a constitutional right to equal access to opportunities for public
service? Is there such a right to hold public office?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the right claimed by Rev. Elly is
nonexistent and remanded the case back to COMELEC for further proceedings
Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision
ensuring equal access to opportunities for public office is the claim that
there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the
individual board members after a review of the movies and television
productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned,
cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she
has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of
MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film,
their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the
nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private
and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting
slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who
wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent,
otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine
are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions
regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the
classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking
examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the
MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said
meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their
individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.

The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the

Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, 2
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. 3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.

Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary,

which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate
comment.

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The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law."

Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato
203 SCRA 515, November 13, 1991
Facts: In February 1989, Carmen G. Aquino-Sarmiento, herself a member of
respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB),

Issue: Whether or Not The refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records
of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as
well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of
petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Carmen

This constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by

means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise
on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id. at p. 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full
public
disclosure
of
all
transactions
involving
public
interest
(Constitution, Art. II, See. 28)." (See also Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
[1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).
. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in
character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the
case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a

governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of
public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no
invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged
is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official
functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official
with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their
official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature
but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access
to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law
of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made
contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged
with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The
Constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official
records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the
board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.
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