The Good, the Just, & the Happy in Four Platonic Dialogues:

Socrates' Defense Speech, the Euthyphro, the Crito, & the Meno

translated literally & annotated by Scott J. Senn

 The Good, the Just, & the Happy in Four Platonic Dialogues:

Socrates' Defense Speech, the Euthyphro, the Crito, & the Meno
translated literally & annotated by Scott J. Senn

Revised: December 20, 2020

Please refer to the most up-to-date version, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727511

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives

4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Table of Contents

page
Translator's Note ..................................................................................................................2
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................7
The Meno ...........................................................................................................................10
The Euthyphro ...................................................................................................................68
Socrates' Defense Speech...................................................................................................93
The Crito ..........................................................................................................................140
English-Greek Glossary ...................................................................................................160
Greek-English Glossary ...................................................................................................162

Cover: Reconstruction of Myron's bronze Athena-Marsyas group of c. 450 BCE. Photo by Oskar Waldhauer 1923,
MIRON, Berlin: Z.I. Grschebin Verlag, http://ancientrome.ru/art/artworken/img.htm?id=1432
Translator's Note

Before commenting on the translation, let me first briefly address the reasons for
including these four dialogues of Plato in a single volume, and their historical and philosophical
importance. Socrates' life (470-399 BCE) is widely held to mark a watershed in the history of
Western philosophy because his philosophical methods, views, and arguments seem (primarily
through Plato's work) to have had a fundamental impact on how philosophy has been understood
and practiced by every major philosopher who came after him in the West. All four dialogues
translated here focus prominently on Socrates himself, his chief concerns (what is involved in
living a good life and in being a just and good human being), and the reasons that led to his own
notorious trial and execution. Each of these dialogues purports to give considerable insight into
those matters, which all plainly made a deep and lifelong impression on Plato himself (c. 428-
347 BCE)—and without which Plato might have devoted his life to conventional politics instead
of writing and philosophy. Had he done so, Western culture and civilization would likely have
developed in a fundamentally different way. Without hyperbole, Plato's work is that significant.
Furthermore, the dramatic date of these four dialogues is roughly the same: near the very end of
Socrates' life. They are presented here in the order of their dramatic dates. No one knows with
any certainty when, or in what order, Plato originally wrote and published them, except that they
were all almost certainly written sometime after Socrates' death.
The Meno illustrates what a typical philosophical discussion with Socrates might have
been like. Also, dramatically foreshadowing Socrates' trial, it includes the only conversation that
Plato ever depicted between Socrates and his most powerful prosecutor, Anytus. The Meno
purports to inform us of Socrates' unusual religious, political, and educational views, which may
have played a crucial role in his prosecution and ultimate demise.
The focus of the Euthyphro is the nature of impiety—for which Socrates was prosecuted
and ultimately convicted. The dialogue depicts Socrates being contemptuous of a conventional
religious view according to which a principal element of service to the gods involves offering
them material gifts.
Socrates' Defense Speech (conventionally known as the "Apology of Socrates") echoes
the views expressed in the Meno and Euthyphro, and purports to present not only the seventy-
year-old philosopher's defense against the prosecutors' charges, but an elaborate and moving

2
defense of a lifestyle devoted deeply and unapologetically to philosophy, which he believed was
under attack.
The Crito purports to explain why Socrates submitted to what he regarded as an unjust
sentence (his execution), when it seemed possible to avoid it, and even his trial, altogether.
The dialogues can only be said to "purport" to do such, because no one really knows how
historically accurate any of Plato's writing is. (Socrates himself never committed his
philosophical views to writing, for perhaps principled reasons.) Still, these works richly reward
close study. As a venerable scholar of ancient Greek once observed, Plato was "one of the most
consummate dramatic artists the world has known" (Burnet 1911 p. xi). And, besides sheer
artistic brilliance, we are presented in these works with historically unmatched philosophical
brilliance—both that of the author and that of his protagonist, whether the latter is fictional in
many details or accurately reflects the historical Socrates.
Now a word on the translations. I read Plato for the first time one summer during my
high school years. It was Allan Bloom's English edition of Plato's Republic, and it transformed
an interest in philosophy and ancient Greek into a lifelong commitment to studying both. That
inspiration originated ultimately in the power of Plato's words. But it was Bloom's translation
that really made me feel as though I had direct access to Plato's thought. When I acquired in
college a reading knowledge of Attic Greek, and began to read Plato in his own language, I saw
with deeper insight how sound were the principles governing Bloom's translation. Bloom held
that "the serious student, the one who wishes to arrive at his own understanding" of the Greek
text, "must be emancipated from the tyranny of the translator, given the means of transcending
the limitations of the translator's interpretation, enabled to discover the subtleties of the elusive
original. The only way to provide the reader with this independence is by a slavish, even if
sometimes cumbersome, literalness—insofar as possible always using the same English
equivalent for the same Greek words. … The translator should conceive of himself as a medium
between a master whose depths he has not plumbed and an audience of potential students of that
master who may be much better endowed than is the translator" (p. vii).
Reflecting Bloom's principles, the translations in this volume are the fruit of over a
decade of meticulous study, research, and repeated revision aimed at conveying, as accurately
and consistently as possible, the meaning of Plato's words so as to affect the modern English
reader as Plato's original text would have affected his own ancient Greek readership—as much as

3
the distance of time and inevitable barriers of language and culture permit. As a long-time
student of ancient Greek and scholar of Plato's work, I believe these translations are as a whole
more reliable and more consistently faithful to the original texts than any previously published
English translations. More specifically, I believe that I have translated a number of pivotal
words and crucial passages more literally and reliably than most alternative English versions that
I have seen.
As Bloom understood very well, there are fundamental insights available to a Greek
reader which are, for the Greekless reader, obscured or even blocked when certain terms are
inconsistently translated and when the translator takes liberties with the text or imposes upon it
an interpretation that does not cleave as closely as possible to Plato's original language. Every
honest translator wants to make the original text as accessible as possible; but too often this
laudable aim is frustrated whenever, in a genuine effort to make the text easier to read or easier
to understand, the translator embellishes by expanding on the original (on the grounds that
something was "really meant but not explicitly said") or effaces the original work by pruning it
(because something seemed "superfluous"). Every translator falls prey to such tendencies,
especially when the languages themselves are so unalike. But to give the reader as much
proximity to the original author's thinking, the translation must be as close to a semantic mirror
of the original as the languages allow. Mirrors do not, like prisms, always create pleasing and
colorful images, but nor do they distort what is seen through them as prisms do.
Here is an illustrative example of how inconsistency in the translation of key terms can
mislead the reader. Aretē is one of the most fundamental concepts in the entire Platonic corpus,
and central to Socratic philosophy. The traditionally most common English translation is
"virtue" (which I agree is most appropriate). It is also commonly translated as "excellence",
which doesn't completely distort the meaning of the Greek. But "excellence" in English is a
comparatively vapid term; it lacks the ethical and moral connotations of the ancient Greek aretē.
G.M.A. Grube's "modern, readable" English translations of the Euthyphro, Socrates' Defense
Speech, the Crito, and the Meno are very widely read; indeed, they are included in what has been
for the last couple decades the standard, single-volume collection of the Platonic corpus in
English: Plato: Complete Works, edited by John Cooper. In the last half of his translation of
Socrates' Defense Speech, Grube renders aretē as "virtue" (31b, 35a-b, 38a, 41e). However,
when the term is first used in Socrates' speech, Grube translates it as "excellence" (18a). Also, in

4
its next occurrence, when Socrates' raises the question of the kind of aretē that is peculiar to a
human being qua human being—surely a crucial moment in the text—Grube also renders the
word as "excellence" (20b). Subsequently, in a similar context, at 30a, Grube translates the term
as "goodness" and, a few sentences later at 30b, as "excellence". Then, as I mentioned, in the
rest of the dialogue Grube shifts to using "virtue" as a translation of the same Greek term. Now,
there is no question that in English the words "virtue", "excellence", and "goodness" are roughly
synonymous. So, considering the passages individually, I cannot claim that Grube has
inaccurately translated aretē. The problem, however, is that it's not at all clear why Grube chose
three different English words to translate the same Greek word: it is not clear, for example, that
Grube chose "excellence" at 20b and 30b because he really thought that was a better translation
of aretē in those contexts than "virtue" would have been. Indeed, the context makes it
unmistakable that Plato is invoking the very same concept there as he does in 31b, 35a-b, 38a,
and 41e. The most fundamental problem then with Grube's inconsistency in translation is that
the Greekless reader cannot be sure, and may even begin to question, whether Plato was indeed
using the very same concept in all these passages. So, not only is there no good reason for the
inconsistent translation, but more importantly it could lead to misinterpretation.
A related problem arises with Grube's handling of the important ancient Greek expression
kalos kagathos. In Grube's translation of the Meno, he consistently translates the term as
"gentleman". That is indeed a common translation of the Greek expression, and it is not
altogether inaccurate. But it somewhat obscures the full range of meaning and connotation of the
ancient Greek. First of all, the Greek expression is a contraction of three words: its most literal
translation is "beautiful and good" or "admirable and good". As it is used in Plato, and probably
in ordinary ancient Greek of his day, the expression was sometimes used to refer to those who
were genuinely virtuous, and other times used to refer to those who were simply regarded as
being genuinely virtuous—or else simply those who occupied an elite social or political status.
Perhaps one could argue that "gentleman" in English has similar ambiguities. However, in
ancient Greek the phrase kalos kagathos is so intimately related to the concept of peculiarly
human aretē that Socrates' first use of each concept in his Defense Speech occurs in the exact
same passage: 20b. Indeed, Grube understands this relationship, which presumably is what leads
him to translate kalos kagathos there with the word "excel". However, in the two other passages
where the Greek expression occurs in Socrates' Defense Speech, Grube translates it as

5
"worthwhile" (21d) and "fine good men" (25a). Again, Greekless readers of Grube's translations
are unable to track the various occurrences of the same concept throughout both the Meno and
the Defense Speech, nor even within the Defense Speech itself.
Now a word on the annotations in this volume. However well Plato's works are
translated, they include too many obscure historical references and too many idiosyncrasies for
them to be fully understood and appreciated by the modern English reader without the aid of a
close commentary. The translations in this volume are therefore accompanied by extensive
footnotes, aimed at helping not just students and scholars but also readers who are entirely new
to philosophy and/or Plato. In the footnotes, I give special attention to issues that are often
overlooked or misunderstood. As much as possible, I have tried to relegate my own
interpretation of the text to the notes, so as not to blur the line between translation and
interpretation. Where my interpretations are particularly controversial, I attempt—as much as
brief notes can allow—to justify them with references to other passages in Plato's dialogues
and/or to the secondary literature. Some of these interpretations are defended at greater length in
papers I have published (see the Bibliography). It should be clear from the notes how much I am
indebted to John Burnet's 1924 commentary on three of the dialogues translated here; Burnet's
work more generally has crucially shaped my own views of Plato and Socrates. E. Seymer
Thompson's 1901 commentary on the Meno has likewise been indispensable.
Scott J. Senn
scottjsenn@outlook.com

6
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the notes I have cited ancient authors (e.g., Homer, Aristophanes, Xenophon) by the name and
title of their works, without referencing specific modern editions, as there are many available.
Platonic works I cite by title: Charmides, Cratylus, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias,
Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Laws, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus,
Protagoras, Republic, Seventh Letter, Socrates' Defense Speech, Symposium, Theaetetus,
Theages, Timaeus. These too are available in many modern editions. Modern works cited are
listed below.

Adam, A.M. 1914. The Apology of Socrates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adam, James. 1890. Platonis Euthyphro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1893. Platonis Crito. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1916. Platonis Apologia Socratis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1963. The Republic of Plato. 2nd edition. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Adam, James, and A.M. Adam. 1893. Platonis Protagoras. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Adkins, Arthur. 1960. Merit and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benardete, Seth. 1984. The Being of the Beautiful. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1986. Symposium. In Erich Segal (ed.), The Dialogues of Plato, New York: Bantam.
Bloom, Allan. 1968. The Republic of Plato. New York: Basic.
Bowden, Hugh. 2005. Classical Athens and the Delphic Oracle. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Brickhouse, Thomas, and Nicholas Smith. 1989. Socrates on Trial. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
———. 1994. Plato's Socrates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burkert, Walter. 1985. Greek Religion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Burnet, John. 1900. The Ethics of Aristotle. London: Methuen and Co.
———. 1903. Platonis Opera. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1911. Plato's Phaedo. Oxford: Clarendon.

7
———. 1914. Greek Philosophy. London: MacMillan.
———. 1919. "Socrates". In James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,
Vol. 11, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
———. 1924. Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito. Oxford: Clarendon.
Burnyeat, Miles. 1997. "The Impiety of Socrates". Ancient Philosophy 17:1-12.
———. 2003. "Apology 30B 2-4: Socrates, Money, and the Grammar of [gignesthai]".
Journal of Hellenic Studies 123:1-25.
Cooper, John, ed. 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett.
de Strycker, Emile, and Simon Slings. 1994. Plato's Apology of Socrates. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Denyer, Nicholas. 2001. Plato: Alcibiades. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dodds, E.R. 1959. Plato's Gorgias. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Duke, E.A. et al., eds. 1995. Platonis Opera. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fontenrose, Joseph. 1978. The Delphic Oracle. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Garland, Robert. 2001. The Greek Way of Death. 2nd edition. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
———. 2013. Ancient Greece. New York: Sterling.
Guthrie, W.K.C. 1955. The Greeks and Their Gods. Boston: Beacon Press.
Howatson, M.C., ed. 1989. The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Martin, Thomas. 2013. Ancient Greece. 2nd edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
McPherran, Mark. 1996. The Religion of Socrates. University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Mikalson, Jon. 2005. Ancient Greek Religion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Most, Glenn. 2003. "Philosophy and Religion". In David Sedley, The Cambridge Companion
to Greek and Roman Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OCD2 = Hammond, N., and H. Scullard, eds. 1970. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd
edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
OCD4 = Hornblower, Simon, Antony Spawforth, and Esther Eidinow, eds. 2012. The Oxford
Classical Dictionary. 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parke, H. and D. Wormell. 1956. The Delphic Oracle. Vol. 1. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

8
Parker, Robert. 1995. "Early Orphism". In Anton Powell (ed.), The Greek World, New York:
Routledge.
Pendrick, Gerard. 2002. Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Penner, Terry. 1992. "Socrates and the Early Dialogues". In Richard Kraut (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Plato, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rhodes, P.J. 1992. A Commentary on the Aristotelian "Athenaion Politeia". 2nd edition.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2010. A History of the Classical World: 423-323 BC. 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Riddell, James. 1877. The Apology of Plato. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rowe, C. 1993. Plato: Phaedo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2010. Plato: The Last Days of Socrates. London: Penguin.
Senn, Scott. 2005. "Virtue as the Sole Intrinsic Good in Plato's Early Dialogues". Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28:1-21.
http://ancphil.lsa.umich.edu/-/downloads/osap/28-Senn.pdf
———. 2012. "Socratic Philosophy, Rationalism, and 'Obedience': Decision Making without
Divine Intervention". PLATO: Journal of the International Plato Society 12. https://digitalis-
dsp.uc.pt/jspui/bitstream/10316.2/42170/3/Socratic_philosophy.pdf
———. 2013. "Ignorance or Irony in Plato's Socrates?: A Look Beyond Avowals and
Disavowals of Knowledge". PLATO: Journal of the International Plato Society 13:77-
108. Coimbra University Press.
https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/platojournal/article/view/1970
Stokes, Michael. 1992. "Socrates' Mission". In B. Gower and Michael Stokes (eds.), Socratic
Questions, London: Routledge.
———. 1997. Plato: Apology of Socrates. 2nd printing. Oxford: Oxbow Books.
Smyth, Herbert. 1984. Greek Grammar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thompson, E. 1901. The Meno of Plato. London: Macmillan.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Philosopher. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
________. 1994. Socratic Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
White, Steven. 2000. "Socrates at Colonus". In Nicholas Smith and Paul Woodruff (eds.),
Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

9
 The Meno1
(translation and annotation by Scott J. Senn, 20 December 2020)

{70a}2 MENO: Are you able to tell me, Socrates, whether virtue3 is taught?4 Or is it not taught, but
acquired by training?5 Or is it neither acquired by training nor learned, but is generated in some
humans by nature, or by some other manner?

1
As Pendrick says, "Early Greek prose works as a rule lacked formal titles..." (p. 32). Though Plato
himself may not have given a title to any of his dialogues, they were even in his own time, at least
informally, referred to by the titles now associated with them—in most cases, the name of one of their
main speakers (cf. J. Adam 1893 p. 21).
2
The worldwide, universal way of referencing and locating passages in Plato is based on the page-
numbers and section-letters of Henricus Stephanus' influential 1578 edition of Plato's complete works. I
have inserted these reference marks so as to match, as closely as possible, their position in the
corresponding Greek text of the latest editions of the authoritative Oxford Classical Texts (Burnet 1903
and Duke et al.), on which these translations are based. Most decent editions of Plato's works use
Stephanus' pagination.
3
The ancient Greek word for "virtue" (aretē), as our English word, refers to what makes a person, animal,
or thing be good or outstanding (Gorgias 506d, Republic 353b, 601d). Indeed, the Greek word translated
as "good" (agathos) is the standard adjective corresponding to aretē. Often in Plato, "virtue" is used to
refer what makes a human being be good or outstanding as a human being (e.g., Defense Speech 20a-b;
occasionally it was used to refer to more specific virtues that a human might have relative to a particular
job or function, e.g., the virtue of a judge; Defense Speech 19a, Protagoras 322d; cf. Meno 71e-72a). It is
important to note that aretē as applied to humans usually connoted competence, often outstanding
competence (Meno 77b, 78b-c, 95d-e). Those who lacked aretē were said to be "worth nothing" (Defense
Speech 41e) and not "beneficial" (Crito 45e-46a, Defense Speech 28d, Meno 87e). Burnet notes, "…The
political condition of Athens was such in [Socrates'] days that the word tended to acquire a peculiar
colour. That comes out better than anywhere else in the passage of Thucydides [8.68] where he tells us
that Antiphon, the chief contriver of the [oligarchic] Revolution of the Four Hundred, was second to no
other Athenian in 'goodness' (aretē)" (1914 p. 173). That is, he was exceptionally shrewd and influential
politically: Thucydides goes on to point out that Antiphon was "the one man most capable of benefiting
those who competed in court and in the public [assembly]—whoever consulted him on anything."
Compare Meno's account of the virtue "of a man" (71e, cf. 73c, 91a).
4
The Greek word is inherently ambiguous: it may mean either already taught or capable of being taught.
In this dialogue, the ambiguity of the word is important; see 89d and my note 130 below. The English
word "taught" has similar ambiguities; but the reader should keep in mind that the Greek word sometimes
implied "teachability" without the suggestion that anything had actually been taught.
5
Or exercise or practice. In some contexts, the Greek word may imply learning by example.

10
SOCRATES: Meno,6 before now the Thessalians were well-accepted among the Greeks and
were wondered at for horsemanship and wealth,7 {70b} and now, as it seems to me, also for
wisdom—and not least your comrade Aristippus' fellow citizens in Larissa. And for you
Gorgias8 is responsible for that. For, having arrived in the city, he has gotten as lovers of his
wisdom the foremost of the Aleuadae9 (of whom your lover Aristippus10 is one) and of the other
Thessalians. And surely he11 has habituated you in this habit also: answering frightlessly and
magnificently if anyone asks anything (just as is likely for people12 {70c} who are aware), just
as he too himself holds himself forth to be asked by any of the Greeks who wishes, whatever one
may wish to ask; and there's no one whatsoever whom he doesn't answer.13

6
Socrates' interlocutor Meno is a visitor to Athens from Thessaly who is "beautiful", "wealthy", and
"well-born" (71b), and quite a young man, still young enough to be found sexually attractive by older
males (see 70b, 76b, and note 10 below). The dramatic date of this dialogue must be sometime between
September 403 BCE (when democracy was restored in Athens, after being abandoned by Spartan rule,
which began at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404) and the spring of 401 (when Meno generalled a
division of mercenaries in the expedition of the "Ten Thousand", Cyrus' attempt to overthrow his brother
the Persian king Artaxerxes). According to Xenophon (c.425-c.354 BCE), Meno was selfish and
treacherous (Anabasis 2.6.21ff.) and died on the expedition of the Ten Thousand. Socrates, who describes
himself in this dialogue as "elderly" (76b), is executed by the Athenians in 399 at the age of seventy.
7
Thessaly was a region in northern Greece which was very wealthy but which Athenians generally
considered semi-barbarous; cf. Crito 53d.
8
c. 485-c. 380 BCE. A hugely successful and influential teacher of rhetoric, masterfully depicted by
Plato in the Gorgias, Gorgias is often classified with "Sophists" like Protagoras who claimed to teach
virtue (Defense Speech 19d-20b, Protagoras 319a ff.; see also note 136 below). Meno claims that
Gorgias differed from the others by not claiming to teach virtue (see 95c and note 158 below).
9
An "aristocratic family of Larissa in Thessaly" (OCD4 p. 55).
10
Aristippus was an older aristocrat of Thessaly who also was a general in Cyrus' expedition (see note 6
above). (Not to be confused with Aristippus of Cyrene who was one of Socrates' followers.) The same-
sex erōs (love) Aristippus is here described as having toward the much younger Meno was most
commonly found in mentor-protégé relationships between older aristocrats and adolescents of wealthy
families, where it was not generally considered unusual or inappropriate. Outside such relationships,
however, same-sex attraction was generally frowned upon. Though Socrates is represented as being
himself affected by such attraction (e.g., Charmides 155d), Plato consistently represents Socrates as
resisting it (see, e.g., Symposium 216d-e, 219c-d, 222b). There is some reason to think that Plato himself
thought same-sex attraction was "unnatural" (Laws 636, 836b-837d). For a fuller account of same-sex
love relationships in ancient Greece, see Martin pp. 177-179, OCD4 pp. 700ff., Garland 2013 pp. 182-3.
11
Gorgias.
12
Masculine-gendered demonstrative and relative pronouns are regularly used in Greek to refer
indefinitely to people of either or both sexes. Also, in Greek adjectives may be used "substantively":
they can stand alone and function as nouns. So masculine-gendered adjectives, unaccompanied by a
noun, are often used to designate indefinitely a person or persons of either or both sexes. In all such
contexts, I try to use the gender-neutral English words "one", "ones", "person", or "people", unless it is
obvious that the referent happens to be male. The Greek word specifying an actual man or men, however,
I always translate as "man" or "men".
13
Cf. Gorgias 477c. Socrates reports (Defense Speech 33b) having a similar standing offer, but he

11
 But here in Athens, friend Meno, things have come around to the contrary: as it were,
some drought of wisdom has come to be, and I {71a} daresay14 that wisdom has gone away
from this place to yours.
Anyway, then, if you are willing to ask in this way anyone here, no one whatsoever15 will
not laugh and say, "Foreigner, I daresay I seem to you to be someone blessed. But I am so far
from being aware of whether it is taught, or in what manner it is generated, that I happen16 to be
not at all aware of even what exactly virtue itself is." {71b}
I, therefore, myself, Meno, am thus disposed too: I am, with my fellow citizens, in
poverty concerning this thing, and I reproach myself because I am not at all aware about virtue.
And as I'm not aware of what it is, how would I be aware of what sort it is? Or does it seem to
you to be possible for anyone who does not at all recognize who Meno is to be aware of whether
this person is beautiful17 or wealthy or even well-born or even the contraries of these? Does it
seem to you to be possible?
MENO: Not to me at least. But are you, Socrates, truly {71c} not even aware of what virtue is?
But are we to report these things about you even back home?
SOCRATES: Not only those, comrade, but also that I did not yet, as I seem to myself, even
happen upon another one who is aware.
MENO: What, then? You didn't happen upon Gorgias when he was here?
SOCRATES: I did.

significantly adds that the questioner need not pay him to ask questions of him, as Gorgias and other
Sophists demanded.
14
The word kinduneuein means to risk. In some contexts, however, it is used idiomatically to mean may
possibly/probably be.... Since in some of such cases it is hard to tell whether risk is intended to constitute
any part of the meaning of kinduneuein, I have, in all such contexts, always translated the word "I
daresay", in order to mark the original meaning of to risk.
15
Socrates was often accused of dissembling regarding his own abilities (cf. my note 206 on Defense
Speech 38a). Here he appears to be dissembling on behalf of his fellow-citizens. Contrast what he says
here with his general assessment of his fellow-citizens at Defense Speech 23c, and in particular with
Anytus' confident responses to similar questions at Meno 92e ff. Anytus of course was an Athenian.
16
This is the verbal form of the Greek noun I translate as "fortune".
17
The Greek word can signify mere physical beauty (as at 76b-c and 80c) or, more generally, anything
that is worthy of great admiration or desire (as at 77b). "The word beautiful (kalos), which is distinct
from good (agathos), also means fair, fine, and noble; and everything outstanding in body, mind, or action
can be so designated. What is lovable, either to sight or mind, is beautiful. It is the Greek term for what
is moral, with the qualification that it designates what is beyond the sphere of obligation and duty, what
one cannot expect everyone to do. It has a higher rank than the just" (Benardete 1986 p. 235 n. 1).

12
MENO: Then he didn't seem to you to be aware?18
SOCRATES: I'm not entirely remembering, Meno; so I'm not able to tell at present how he
seemed to me then. But probably that man is aware and you are aware of the things that man
was saying. Make me, therefore, remember {71d} how he was speaking. But if you wish, you
yourself say; for indeed the statements of that man certainly seem true to you.
MENO: To me at least.
SOCRATES: Well, then, let's let that man be, especially since he is away. But what, by gods,
do you yourself, Meno, assert virtue is? Tell, and don't begrudge it, in order that, by the best
fortune, I will have spoken a falsehood if you make it apparent that you and Gorgias are aware,
whereas I have said that I never yet have happened upon anyone who is aware. {71e}
MENO: But it isn't hard, Socrates, to tell. First, if you wish me to tell what is virtue of a man, it
is easy to tell that this is virtue of a man: to be sufficient to transact the things of the city and, in
transacting them, do his friends well and his enemies ill,19 and to be apprehensive himself lest he
be subjected to anything of that sort.20 And if you wish me to tell what is virtue of a woman, it's
not hard to go through: there is a need21 that she manage the family of her household22 well,
making safe the ones in it and listening to her man. And there's another virtue of a child, both of
female and of male, and of an elderly man; (if you wish) of a liberated one and (if you wish)
{72a} of a slave. And there are entirely many other virtues. So I'm not unprovided for23 in
telling about what virtue is; for virtue for each of us is with reference to each of the actions and
of the ages and in relation to each person's work.24 And, I'm supposing, Socrates, badness25 is
the same way.

18
Contrast 95c.
19
The Greek word is the same as the one I usually translate as "bad/badly". Unfortunately, the English
word "bad" isn't as grammatically flexible as the Greek, so I occasionally substitute it with "ill".
20
i.e., bad.
21
In Greek, the expression "There is a need..." often has moral implications, implying that what follows it
should be or is supposed to be.
22
This capacity is displayed legendarily by Penelope in Homer's Odyssey while her husband's military
obligations keep him away from home for over twenty years.
23
I translate the Greek word aporia literally as "being unprovided for", partly because the "capacity of
providing" is such a prominent subject in the Meno (78c ff.). The word is often translated as "perplexity".
But it refers to any impasse—any condition or situation involving lack of passage, solution, or resource.
24
The Greek word is ergon, and it can mean work either abstractly as job or function, or more concretely
as the actual activity or product. I try to translate it consistently as "work", but will sometimes use
"deed". In its verbal form, I will occasionally use the word "produce".
25
i.e., vice.

13
SOCRATES: I seem like I've been given much of some good fortune, Meno, if when searching
for one virtue I have found a swarm of virtues laid up in you! But, Meno, (in reference to this
likeness {72b} concerning the swarms) if, being asked by me about the substance of a bee,
"What exactly is it?", you said that they are many and of all sorts, then what would you answer
me, if I asked you, "Are you asserting that they are many and of all sorts and they differ from
each other in this way: in that they are bees? Or do they differ in no way in that way, but in
some other way, such as in beauty or greatness of size or in some other way of those sorts?" Do
tell: what would you answer if you were asked thus?
MENO: I at least would answer that one differs from another in no way in this way: in that they
are bees. {72c}
SOCRATES: If, then, I said after those things, "Well, then, tell me that thing itself in which they
differ in no way but are all the same. What do you assert that is?", you would certainly be able
to tell me what.
MENO: I would.
SOCRATES: It's thus, then, concerning the virtues too. Even if they are many and of all sorts,
at least they all have some one and the same form,26 because of which they are virtues, and
having looked to which, the one who would answer is certainly beautifully disposed to make
clear, to the one who asked, that which {72d} virtue happens to be. Or don't you understand27
what I'm saying?
MENO: I seem to at least myself to understand. I don't, however, yet grasp, as much as I wish,
what is being asked.
SOCRATES: But does it seem thus to you concerning virtue only, Meno: that there is one of a
man, and another of a woman, and others of the others? Or does it seem the same way
concerning health and concerning greatness of size and concerning strength? Does there seem to
you to be one health of a man, and another of a woman? Or is the form the same everywhere, if
indeed it is health, {72e} whether it's in a man or in any other thing whatsoever?

26
"Form" in English can mean appearance, essence, or kind. This is practically the same range of
meanings for the Greek word translated here, which originates from the verb for to see or to be aware of.
In the present context, Socrates seems to be using the word to mean the same as "substance/essence"
(72b). "Substance" translates an ancient Greek world (ousia) whose most basic meaning is being. So
Socrates' question, What is the substance of a bee?, is really a question of what it is to be a bee. However
much they differ in other respects, all bees have this in common: being a bee. Cf. my note 113 below.
27
The Greek verb is the same as the one I translate as "learn".

14
MENO: At least health seems to me to be the same both of man and of woman.
SOCRATES: Then strength and greatness of size, too? If indeed a woman is strong, will she be
strong by the same form and by the same strength? For in speaking of "the same", I am speaking
of this: strength differs in no way in relation to being strength, whether it is in a man or in a
woman. Or does it seem to differ in some way to you?
MENO: Not to me at least. {73a}
SOCRATES: But will virtue, in relation to being virtue, differ in some way, whether it is in a
child or in an elderly person or in a woman or in a man?
MENO: This still somehow doesn't seem to at least me, Socrates, to be similar to those other
things.
SOCRATES: What then? Didn't you say that virtue of a man is to manage the family of a city
well, and that of a woman is to manage the family of a household well?
MENO: I did.
SOCRATES: Is it, then, possible to manage well the family of a city or of a household or of any
other thing whatsoever, if one doesn't manage the family with a sound mind and justly?28
MENO: Surely not. {73b}
SOCRATES: Therefore, if indeed people manage a family justly and with a sound mind, they
will manage a family with justness and sound-mindedness?
MENO: It's a necessity.
SOCRATES: Then both the woman and the man need the same things, if indeed they are going
to be good:29 justness and sound-mindedness.

28
For the typical ancient Greek, sound-mindedness and justness are "the two virtues that constitute
ordinary civil [i.e. citizen's] virtue" (Thompson p. 82). Cf. Protagoras 322e-323a, Gorgias 504d, Phaedo
82a-b, Symposium 209a. As in English, the Greek word for what is "just" (dikaios) is often closely
associated with what is lawful or conventional; the words that I have translated as "judicial", "judiciary",
and "adjudication" are directly related to dikaios; in fact, for ancient Greeks, a common conception of
what is dikaios was simply what is required or allowed by law and/or convention (Pendrick p. 321). But
the term was not restricted to human law/convention; it sometimes referred to divine law/convention.
And, by Socrates and Plato's time, the word was extended further to refer to "natural" justice: i.e.,
prescriptive rules of conduct established by nature itself (see Gorgias 483c ff. and Dodds p. 268). The
idea of a "justice" governing the natural universe—as a matter of physical necessity—was as old as
Anaximander (born c. 611 BCE) and Heraclitus (born c. 540), though not very clearly articulated. In
ancient Greek, "justness" in human affairs was often used to refer very broadly to all of human "virtue"
(Republic 335c; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1129b14ff.; Burnet 1900 p. 202), which may be why
Meno is so quick to say that "justness is virtue" (73e).
29
I.e., "if they are going to be virtuous". In ancient Greek, the word for "virtue" had no adjectival cognate

15
MENO: They appear to.
SOCRATES: What then? A child and an elderly person wouldn't indeed ever become good if
they were unrestrained30 and unjust?
MENO: Surely not.
SOCRATES: Rather, if they were sound-minded and {73c} just?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then all humans are good in the same manner; for they become good if they
happen upon the same things.
MENO: It seems like it.
SOCRATES: They would certainly not be good in the same manner, if the same virtue were not
characteristic of them.31
MENO: Surely not.
SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same virtue is characteristic of them all, try to tell and to be
made to remember what Gorgias—and you with that man—assert it is.
MENO: What other than being the sort to rule32 humans? {73d} If indeed you are searching for
some one thing with reference to all.
SOCRATES: But I am indeed searching so. But, then, is the same virtue characteristic of a
child too, Meno, and a slave: to be the sort to rule his master? And does the one who rules seem
to you still to be a slave?
MENO: He does not entirely seem to me to be, Socrates.

(like our word in English does: namely, "virtuous"); the word I translate as "good" was used for this
purpose (see note 3 above). So, at 87e, it is agreed that it is by virtue that good people are good.
30
The Greek word for "unrestrained" was often used as an antonym for the word for being "sound-
minded", since "sound-mindedness" was typically regarded as involving orderly control over desires (cf.
Charmides 159b, Phaedo 67c). But being "sound-minded" was also often regarded simply as the opposite
of being "unmindful" (Protagoras 332b). This connection is lost if the word that I have translated as
"sound-mindedness" is translated, as others often do, as "temperance" or "moderation".
31
I.e., if the same virtue didn't belong to them.
32
When we think of a "ruler", typically what comes to mind is an autocrat. It is not that being an autocrat
was an unusual aspiration for an ancient Greek (some certainly desired that goal in a more or less perfect
form); but for ancient Greeks a "ruler" was simply a person who occupied a political office or was
otherwise an authority over some domain or other. In democratic Athens, adult male citizens were all
expected to serve in such offices at one time or another, or at the very least be prepared to. This helps
explain Meno's remarks at 71e about the virtue of a man. Here at 73c, Meno espouses a popular
conception of the nature and importance of "virtue"; cf. Protagoras 318e-319a with 320b, Laches 185a
with 190b, Republic 600c-d.

16
SOCRATES: For it isn't likely, best man. And, moreover, consider this too: You assert it's to
be the sort to rule. Shall we not add to this "justly, and not unjustly"? {73e}
MENO: I at least suppose so; for justness, Socrates, is virtue.
SOCRATES: Virtue, Meno, or some virtue?33
MENO: How are you saying that?34
SOCRATES: As I do say about any other thing whatsoever: such as, if you wish, I might about
roundness tell you that it is "some shape", not that it's "shape" simply so. And I would tell you
thus because of these things: there are other shapes too.
MENO: You would be speaking correctly, since I also say that not only justness but other things
too are virtues. {74a}
SOCRATES: What are those? Do tell, as I too might tell you about other shapes too, if you
exhorted me. You too, then, tell me other virtues.
MENO: Well, then, manliness35 seems to at least me to be a virtue, and sound-mindedness and
wisdom and magnificence36 and entirely many others.
SOCRATES: Again, Meno, we have been subjected to the same thing: We again have found
many virtues when searching for one, in a manner other than how we did just now.37 But we are
not capable of finding out the one that is throughout all of those.
MENO: For I'm not yet capable, Socrates, of {74b} apprehending one virtue, as you are
searching for, with reference to them all, just as in the other things.
SOCRATES: As is likely, at least. But I will be spirited about our going forward, if it's
possible. For you certainly understand that it stands thus concerning everything: If someone
asked you that which I just now was saying "What is shape, Meno?", and if you told him that it is

33
Socrates attempts to disambiguate Meno's statement, which, because of the lack of the indefinite article
("a" and "an") in Greek, could be taken either as "Justness is (the same as) virtue" or "Justness is a virtue."
34
I.e., what do you mean?
35
The ancient Greeks considered courage the preeminent character trait of a "real" man; so their word for
it actually derives from their word for "man".
36
Or "munificence"; literally, the word means conspicuously great. "This was a form of goodness
regularly expected of the Athenian [and other Greek] upper classes…" (Burnet 1900 p. 173). It was in
Athens and other cities partly institutionalized, e.g., in form of the leitourgia (literally "public work"), "by
which rich men were required to undertake work for the state at their own expense. It channelled the
expenditure and competitiveness of rich individuals into public-spirited directions, and was perhaps felt to
be less confiscatory than an equivalent level of taxation" (OCD4 p. 850).
37
At 71e-72a.

17
roundness, and if he told you just the things I did, "Is roundness shape or some shape?", then you
would certainly tell that it is some shape.
MENO: Entirely. {74c}
SOCRATES: Because, then, of these things: that there are also other shapes?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if, at least, he asked you again in addition "Of what sorts?", you would say?
MENO: I would.
SOCRATES: And, further, if he asked in the same way about color "What is it?", and if, when
you tell him that it's "white", after those things the asker retorted, "Is white color, or some
color?", you would tell that it's some color, because there happen to be others too?
MENO: I would.
SOCRATES: And if, at least, he exhorted you to say other colors, you would say {74d} others
which happen to be colors in no way less than white.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: If, then, he went after this statement38 just as I did, and said, "We are always
arriving at many! But don't speak to me in that way. Rather, since you announce these many
things by some one name, and you assert that none of them is not a shape—and this too: they are
even contrary to each other!—what is this which takes hold of the rounded no less than the
straight, which then you name 'shape', {74e} and you assert that the rounded is no more shape
than the straight? Or don't you speak thus?"
MENO: I do.
SOCRATES: "Therefore, when you speak thus, are you then asserting that the rounded is no
more rounded than straight, and the straight is no more straight than rounded?"
MENO: Certainly not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: "But yet you assert that the rounded is no more a shape than the straight is, and the
latter no more than the former."
MENO: You say true things.

38
The Greek word is logos, from legein, which is to speak or state. Logos "is speech and what speech
implies—human reason as expressed in speech" (Bloom p. 444). "…In common usage [logos] meant
'thought' as well as 'speech', and…implied rational discourse…" (Dodds p. 196). Of all Greek words, it is
particularly hard to settle on just one English word as its translation; depending on the context it can mean
statement, discussion, story, argument, explanation, rationale, rule. I have mostly translated it as
"statement"; but in some places I have used "discussion", "account", "argument".

18
SOCRATES: "What exactly, then, is that whose name is this: 'shape'? {75a} Try to say." If,
then, you told the one who's asking thus about shape or color, "But I myself don't even
understand what you wish, human, nor am I even aware of what you're saying", probably he'd
wonder and say, "You don't understand that I am searching for what's the same over all those
things?" Or would you not even on these terms, Meno, be able to tell, if someone asked you,
"What is the same over all—over the rounded and straight and over the others which indeed you
call 'shape'?" Try to tell, even so that attention may be generated for you, for your answer
concerning virtue. {75b}
MENO: No. Rather, you, Socrates, tell.
SOCRATES: Do you wish that I gratify you?
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Will you also be willing, then, to tell me about virtue?
MENO: I will.
SOCRATES: Well then, I must be spirited; for it's worthwhile.
MENO: Actually, entirely.
SOCRATES: Come then. Let me try to tell you what shape is. Consider, then, whether you
accept that it's this thing itself: for let, then, shape for us be that which—alone of the things that
are—happens always to follow39 color. Is this for you a sufficient way of telling what it is, or are
you searching for some other way? For I would even {75c} admire that way, if you told me
what is virtue in that way.
MENO: But that is simple-minded, Socrates.
SOCRATES: How are you speaking?
MENO: Shape is, certainly according to your statement, what always follows color. All right.
But if, then, someone asserted that he wasn't aware about color, but was unprovided for in the
same way, just as about shape, what do you suppose would be answered by you?
SOCRATES: I would answer the true things. And if, at least, the asker were someone of the
wise40 and contentious and competitive people, then I would tell {75d} him, "Let that much be
said by me; and if I am not speaking correctly, your work is to apprehend an argument and refute
me." But if people, being friends just as I and you now are, wished to discuss with each other,

39
Or, "come with".
40
See my note 17 on Defense Speech 18b.

19
there is then a need to answer somehow more mildly and more like a discussant. And probably
what is more like a discussant is not only to answer the true things, but also to answer through
those things that the asker beforehand agrees that he is aware about. I too, then, will try to tell
you in that way. {75e}
So say to me: do you call something an "end"? I'm speaking of such a thing: as a
"conclusion" and an "extremity". All those things are the same in some way, I say. And
probably Prodicus would differ with us.41 But you at least certainly call something "concluded"
and "ended". I wish to speak of that sort of thing—nothing intricate.
MENO: But I do, and I'm supposing I understand what you're saying. {76a}
SOCRATES: What then? Do you call something "plane" and, further, another thing "solid",
such as those things in geometrical matters.
MENO: I do.
SOCRATES: Well, then, you may already from those statements of mine understand what I'm
saying shape is. For I say that, with reference to every shape, that at which the solid concludes—
that is shape. In order to apprehend it at once, I would tell you that shape is the conclusion of a
solid.
MENO: And what do you say color is, Socrates?
SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno! You order troubles for an elderly man, ordering me to
answer. But you yourself are not willing {76b} to tell (once you have been made to remember)
what exactly Gorgias says virtue is.
MENO: But when you tell me that, Socrates, I will say the latter for you.
SOCRATES: Even someone whose eyes have been covered would recognize, Meno, when you
are discussing, that you are beautiful and that there still are lovers of you.
MENO: Whatever for?
SOCRATES: Because you do nothing other than order in your statements—which indeed
luxuriating people do—as people who tyrannize while they are in their hour. {76c} And,
simultaneously, you have probably recognized of me that I am worse than42 the beautiful people.
I will therefore gratify you and answer.

41
Prodicus the Sophist was notorious for insisting on fine distinctions between the meanings of words
that colloquially were practically synonyms; see, e.g., Protagoras 358a and 358d-e and Laches 197d.
42
sc., weaker than. Or perhaps, "worsted by"—implying that beautiful people have control over him. It
is usual in Plato's dialogues for Socrates to flatter his interlocutors sarcastically, and for his interlocutors

20
MENO: Well, then, gratify me, entirely.
SOCRATES: Do you wish, then, for me to answer according to Gorgias' way, in which way you
may most go along with.
MENO: I do wish it; for how could I not?
SOCRATES: Then, do you people speak, according to Empedocles,43 of some "outflows" from
the things that are?
MENO: Vehemently.
SOCRATES: And of "passages"44 into which and through which the outflows pass?
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: And that some of the outflows fit into some of the {76d} passages; but some are
too little or too great?
MENO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: Then you also call something "sight"?
MENO: I do.
SOCRATES: From those things, then, "contemplate what I of course am saying" (as Pindar
asserted);45 for color is, from shapes, outflow commensurate with and sensible to sight.
MENO: You seem to me, Socrates, to have said that answer in the best way.
SOCRATES: (Probably since it was said according to a habit of yours.) And simultaneously, I
suppose, you understand that you would be able to tell, from that, what voice is, {76e} and
smell and many other things of that sort.
MENO: Well, actually, entirely.
SOCRATES: For the answer, Meno, is grandiloquent;46 so it appeases you more than the one
about shape.
MENO: It does appease me.

who are often quite pompous to accept such flattery obliviously. Compare Socrates' assumption (at 71c-
d) that Meno must know what virtue is.
43
c. 492-432 BCE. He was a philosopher who introduced an influential account of sense-perception
alluded to here. Gorgias was said to have been a "pupil" of Empedocles, though Gorgias' interest in
"natural" philosophy was probably rather slim.
44
I.e., "passages" in, or on the surface of, the organs of sense.
45
The phrase, originating with Pindar, became proverbial, used to express "a modest request" (Thompson
p. 96).
46
I.e., characteristic of poetic language (cf. Republic 413b). Empedocles wrote his philosophical works
in verse.

21
SOCRATES: But it is not, child of Alexidemus, better, I myself am persuaded. (Rather, that
other one is.) And I am supposing that this one wouldn't seem to be better to you either, if it
weren't—just as you said yesterday47—necessary for you to go away before the initiations; but if
you abided, you would be initiated too.48 {77a}
MENO: But I would abide, Socrates, if you said to me many things of that sort.
SOCRATES: But I will indeed in no way leave behind spiritedness for saying things of that sort,
both for your sake and for mine; but perhaps I will not be the sort to say many things of that sort.
But come now. You too try to give what you promised to me—to tell, about virtue, what
it is on the whole—and stop making many out of the one (as jesters assert each time that people
who crush something49 do so); rather, letting it be whole and healthy, tell what virtue is. And
paradigms {77b} you have gotten from me.
MENO: Well, then, virtue seems to me, Socrates, to be, just as the poet50 says, "being gratified
by beautiful things and being capable." I too say this is virtue: having an appetite for the
beautiful things and being capable of providing them for oneself.
SOCRATES: Do you say that the one who has an appetite for the beautiful things is one who
has an appetite for good things?
MENO: Most of all.
SOCRATES: Because there are some who have an appetite for the bad things, and others who
have an appetite for the {77c} good things?
Don't all people, best man, seem to you to have an appetite for the good things?
MENO: Not to me at least.
SOCRATES: But some have an appetite for the bad things?
MENO: Yes.
47
We are to assume that Meno had announced plans to leave Athens soon.
48
As a metaphor for accepting the rigors of proper philosophical method, Socrates uses the concept of
initiation into a secret religious cult. Cf. Gorgias 497c, Euthydemus 277d-e, Phaedo 69c-d, Symposium
210a, Theaetetus 155e. Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 143 and 250ff.
49
Cf. Republic 422e.
50
Perhaps Simonides (c. 556- c. 468 BCE) (Thompson p. 100). Reference to renowned poets was
typically considered an appeal to authority (cf. de Strycker and Slings pp. 280-281). Homer (8th century
BCE), for instance, was popularly considered the great "educator" of the ancient Greek world (Republic
606e; cf. Protagoras 325e-326a, Laws 673a, 810e-811a), which was one reason why educated youths
were actually made to memorize his poems. Socrates thought that such appeals were largely
unproductive and a waste of time (Protagoras 347c-348a), though he did sometimes pretend to take them
seriously. Meno may be attempting to imitate Socrates' definition of color, as it was based on the writings
of Empedocles who wrote in verse.

22
SOCRATES: Supposing that the bad things are good, do you say? Or even recognizing that
they are bad, they nonetheless have an appetite for them?
MENO: Both, it seems to me at least.
SOCRATES: For, does anyone seem to you, Meno, recognizing that the bad things are bad, to
have nonetheless an appetite for them?
MENO: Most of all.
SOCRATES: For what do you say he seems to have an appetite? That the bad things be
generated for him?51
MENO: That they be generated. For, what {77d} else?
SOCRATES: Regarding the bad things as benefiting that one for whom they are generated, or
recognizing that the bad things injure the one in whom they are present?
MENO: There are some who regard the bad things as benefiting, and there are also some who
recognize that they injure.
SOCRATES: And do the ones who regard the bad things as benefiting seem to you to recognize
that the bad things are bad?
MENO: That does not entirely seem to me to be so.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it's clear that those people have an appetite not for the bad things {77e}
—the people who don't discern them—but for those things that they were supposing to be good,
though those things are bad.52 So it's clear that the people who don't discern those bad things and
suppose they are good have an appetite for the good things. Or not?
MENO: I daresay those people do, at least.
SOCRATES: What then? The people who have an appetite for the bad things, as you assert—
but who regard the bad things as injuring that one for whom they are generated—certainly
recognize that they will be injured by them?
MENO: {78a} It's a necessity.
SOCRATES: But don't those people suppose that the ones who are injured are wretched
inasmuch as they are injured?
MENO: That too is a necessity.

51
Cf. Symposium 204d-e, Republic 437c.
52
Socrates seems to be struggling to make a distinction between the actual objects of these people's desire
(which, he says, are things that are in fact good) and the things that appear (to them) to be the objects of
their desire (things that are in fact bad).

23
SOCRATES: And aren't the wretched ones unhappy?
MENO: I at least suppose so.
SOCRATES: Is there, then, anyone who wishes to be wretched and unhappy?
MENO: There doesn't seem to me to be, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No one, then, wishes, Meno, the bad things, if indeed he does not wish to be a
person of that sort. For what is being wretched, other than having an appetite for the bad things
and acquiring them?
MENO: I daresay you {78b} say true things, Socrates, and that no one wishes the bad things.
SOCRATES: Weren't you, then, just now saying that virtue is wishing the good things and
being capable of providing them for oneself?
MENO: I did tell that.
SOCRATES: Then the "wishing", concerning what was said, belongs to everyone; and, in at
least that, one person is in no way better than another?
MENO: It appears so.
SOCRATES: But it's clear that if indeed one person is better than another, he would be better in
being capable.
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: That, then, as is likely, is, according to your account, virtue: {78c} capacity for
providing the good things for oneself.
MENO: Quite entirely it seems to me, Socrates, to stand thus, as you now are conceiving.
SOCRATES: Let us, then, see this too: whether you say a true thing. For you may perhaps be
speaking well. Are you asserting that being the sort to provide the good things for oneself is
virtue?
MENO: I am.
SOCRATES: And don't you call "good" such things as health and wealth?
MENO: I say that both acquiring gold and silver, and esteemed offices and rulerships in the city,
are good.
SOCRATES: You aren't saying that the good things are anything other than things of that sort?
MENO: No; rather, {78d} I say all good things are things of that sort.

24
SOCRATES: All right. And, then, providing gold and silver for oneself is virtue. So asserts
Meno, the ancestral guest-friend53 of the Great King.54 Do you add "justly" and "in a pious way"
to this providing, Meno, or does it differ in no way to you? Rather, even if someone provides
them for himself unjustly, you similarly call it "virtue"?
MENO: Certainly not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But "badness"?
MENO: Entirely certainly.
SOCRATES: There is a need, then, as is likely, that justness or sound-mindedness or {78e}
piousness, or some other part of virtue, be added to this providing; and if not, it will not be
virtue, even though the providing indeed provides the good things.
MENO: For how, without those things, would virtue be generated?
SOCRATES: And not providing gold and silver, whenever it is not just either for oneself or for
another to do so, — Isn't this lack-of-providing also virtue?
MENO: It appears to be.
SOCRATES: Then providing the goods of this sort would be virtue no more than not providing
them; rather, as is likely, the providing that comes to be with justness will be virtue, and that
which {79a} comes to be without all the things of that sort is badness.
MENO: It seems to me to be necessary, as you say.
SOCRATES: Didn't we, then, a little earlier, assert that each of these things is a part of virtue:
justness and sound-mindedness and all the things of that sort?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then, Meno, are you kidding with me?
MENO: In what way exactly, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Though I just now have requested not to break apart and chop up virtue, and
though I gave paradigms according to which there was a need to answer, you didn't attend to

53
The "guest-" or "host-friendship" was a special relationship steeped in ancient tradition and cultivated
between socially elite families who lived in different parts of the ancient world. Among other duties,
guest/host-friends were expected to provide each other hospitality when visiting each other's cities. Such
friendship was considered inviolable no matter what the circumstances, even if guest/host-friends
belonged to opposing armies during war.
54
I.e., Xerxes, the former king of Persia and father of Cyrus and Artaxerxes. The relationship between
Meno's family and the Persian royal family may account for the part Meno played in Cyrus' attempted
coup against Artaxerxes. References to "the Great King [of Persia]" were often proverbially references to
enormous wealth.

25
that; but you say to me that virtue {79b} is being the sort to provide the good things for oneself
with justness. And that, you assert, is a part of virtue?
MENO: I do.
SOCRATES: Then it comes out of the things you agree on, that acting (which one might do in
whatever way) with a part of virtue—that is virtue; for you assert that justness, and each of those
things, is a part of virtue. For what exactly, then, am I saying this? Because, having requested
that you tell what is virtue as a whole, you are far from telling what it is, and you assert that
every action is virtue if it is done with a part of {79c} virtue, just as though you have said what
virtue is on the whole and I already would recognize it, even if you chop it up into parts. There
is for you, therefore, a need, it seems to me, of the same asking, friend Meno, again from the
beginning: What is virtue, if every action with a part of virtue is virtue? Or doesn't there seem
to you to be a need again of the same asking? Rather, do you suppose that someone is aware of
what a part of virtue is, when not being aware of what virtue is?
MENO: It doesn't seem so to at least me. {79d}
SOCRATES: For, if you just remember, when I answered you about shape, we certainly threw
away the answer of that sort which attempted to answer through the things which are still being
searched for and not yet agreed on.
MENO: And we threw it away correctly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Well then, best man, surely, while what is the whole of virtue is still being
searched for, do not even suppose that, by answering through the part of that thing, you make it
clear to anyone whatsoever—or make anything whatsoever clear when you speak in this same
{79e} manner. Rather, you make it clear that again there will be a need of the same asking:
"You say the things you say because virtue is what?"
Or do I seem to you to be saying nothing?
MENO: You seem to at least me to be speaking correctly.
SOCRATES: Well then, answer again from the beginning: What do you assert virtue is, both
you and your comrade Gorgias?
MENO: Socrates, I myself, before even coming {80a} to be with you, used to hear that you
yourself are nothing other than unprovided for, and that you make others be unprovided for. And
now, as at least you seem to me, you are enchanting and drugging me and simply spellbinding
me, so that I've become replete with provisionlessness. You even completely seem to me—if

26
there is somehow a need even of jesting—to be similar, in form and the other ways, to that broad
numbing fish55 of the sea. For it too makes numb anyone who at the time is near it and fastens
on it.56 You too now seem to have made me in some way of that sort;57 for truly I myself—both
{80b} in soul58 and in mouth—am numb, and I do not have anything with which I might answer
you. And yet I have at least ten thousand times and before many people spoken entirely many
statements about virtue, and entirely well, at least as I seemed to myself. But now I am not at all
even able to say what it is. And you seem to me to have resolved well not to sail out of here and
not even go away from your home city.59 For if you did things of this sort as a foreigner in
another city, you would quickly be led away because you are "an enchanter".
SOCRATES: You are unscrupulous,60 Meno, and you almost beguiled me.
MENO: In what way, mostly, Socrates? {80c}
SOCRATES: I recognize the thing for the sake of which you made a likeness of me.
MENO: For the sake of what exactly, do you suppose?

55
I.e., the electric ray.
56
For the "enchanting" and "numbing" effect of Socrates' words, cf. Symposium 215b-d and Crito 54d.
57
I.e., numb.
58
I translate the Greek word psuchē, in the usual way, as "soul", though with some reservation. Unlike
"soul", psuchē was sometimes used to refer simply to life or even breath. Its primary meaning was that
which animates the body; absence of psuchē was death. In fact, as Burkert explains, typically ancient
Greeks speak of psuchē "only when there is a question of life and death"; during the normal course of life,
its presence and mysterious power was "never given a second thought" (p. 195). Moreover, we cannot
read into the word the modern, religious/spiritual connotations of the English word "soul". Burkert notes
that, in ordinary ancient Greek, psuchē "is not the soul as the bearer of sensations and thoughts, it is not
the person…" (p. 195). Likewise, Burnet: "In ordinary language it is only spoken of as something that
may be lost; it is, in fact, 'the ghost' which a man 'gives up' "; "…whenever it means more than this, we
may trace the influence of mysticism or philosophy" (1911 p. liii). In Plato and other philosophers, the
word psuchē is mostly used to refer to the seat of the mental and emotional faculties; it is what defines the
"self". But in Socrates' and Plato's time it was not commonly believed that a person's psuchē retained the
person's awareness or other mental faculties after the body's death. Indeed, after death, the person's
psuchē was often regarded as only a mindless shade or ghost—"in a very literal sense" the dead were
"mere shadows of their former selves", as Garland puts it (2001 p. 12). It was also a common belief that
the psuchē did not survive bodily death at all or for very long. Also, the notion of the psuchē's
immateriality was not clearly articulated until philosophers like Socrates and Plato drew attention to the
issue; before them, the makeup of the psuchē—when it was reflected on at all—was mostly thought to
consist of a kind of gaseous substance, like breath or smoke. See 81b ff. and the accompanying notes, as
well as Defense Speech 40c ff. and the notes there.
59
Cf. Crito 52b and Defense Speech 37d-e.
60
"Unscrupulous" is not quite the right translation. The Greek term here means something like someone
who is willing to do and say anything and everything. It usually has bad moral connotations; some have
therefore translated it as "villain" or "scoundrel".

27
SOCRATES: In order that I might make a likeness of you in return. And I'm aware of this about
all beautiful people: they are gratified by being likened; for it profits them; for I suppose the
likenesses of beautiful people are also beautiful. But I will not make a likeness of you in return.
And if the numbing fish itself is numb and thus makes others numb, I am like it. But if
not, I'm not. For it's not that, being well-provided for, I make others be unprovided for. Rather,
being myself unprovided more than everything, I make others also be in the same way {80d}
unprovided for. And now, about virtue, I am not aware of what it is; you however probably were
aware earlier before being fastened upon by me; now, however, you are similar to one who is not
aware. But, nonetheless, I am willing to consider with you and search with you for whatever it
is.
MENO: And in what manner, Socrates, will you search for that of which you are not at all aware
what the thing is? For you will search, putting forth61 exactly which of the things of which you
are not aware whether it is it? Or, even if you happen upon it as much as possible, how will you
be aware that that is the thing you weren't aware of? {80e}
SOCRATES: I understand what sort of thing you wish to say, Meno. Do you see how
contentious is this statement which you are bringing up: that it isn't possible for a human to
search either for what he's aware of or for what he's not aware of? For the one who is aware
wouldn't search (for he's aware, and in no way is there, for a person of that sort, a need of
searching); nor would the one who is not aware (for he is not even aware of what he will search
for). {81a}
MENO: Doesn't, therefore, this statement seem to you to be beautifully spoken, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Not to me at least.
MENO: Are you able to say in what way?
SOCRATES: I am. For I have heard men and women who are wise about godly practices—
MENO: —who say what statement?
SOCRATES: A true one, it seems to me, and beautiful.
MENO: What is that, and who are the ones who say it?
SOCRATES: They who say it are the male sacrificers and the female sacrificers, however many
of whom have paid attention to being the sort to give an account of the things they handle;62

61
I.e., as the object of your search.
62
As Thompson notes, "there was in Greece no priestly caste…" (p. 118). Citizens were appointed to

28
{81b} and Pindar63 says it and many others of poets,64 however many are godly.65 And the
things they say are these (but consider whether they seem to you to say true things): For they
assert that the soul of the human is deathless, and at one time comes to an end—what people
actually call "dying"—and at another time comes to be again, but is never destroyed.66 There is
actually a need, because of these things, to live one's life as piously as possible.67
"For, the ones from whom Persephone accepts the redemption for the suffering of long
ago68—in the ninth year she gives their souls back again to the sun above; {81c} from

priesthood just as they were to any other political office. Cf. Martin p. 161, Garland 2013 pp. 222-223.
Thompson explains, "…Plato does not refer to priests and priestesses as a class, but to those of them who
have been led by the accident of their position to speculate on the meaning of the rites they performed,
and give an account…of their practice" (ibid.). Perhaps the distinction suggested here between priests
who reflect on their practice and those who don’t parallels the distinction made at Phaedo 69c-d between
genuine and nongenuine devotees of Bacchus/Dionysus.
63
Pindar (born 518 BCE) was one of the first popular Greek poets to publicize some of the religious
views known as Orphism, whose primary deity was Dionysus. Unlike popular ancient Greek religion,
Orphism was founded on sacred texts (Burnet 1924 p. 34). Moreover, Orphic texts offered things largely
unheard of in traditional Greek religion: an account of the origin not only of gods but of human beings
(Parker p. 495), and accounts of an afterlife (and of the rewards and punishments therein) aimed at
influencing behavior in the here and now (ibid. p. 500). According to Orphic doctrine, each person is in
reality divine and immortal by nature but has been "exiled" and "imprisoned" in a mortal body as
punishment for an ancient crime (ibid. p. 499). The punishment involves a "dire cycle of deep grief":
repeated reincarnation into one mortal body after another (ibid. p. 500). To be guaranteed eventual
"release" from the "dire cycle" of reincarnation, one had not only to perform initiation rites, but to live an
ascetic life which included vegetarianism (ibid. p. 487). Successful adherence to ritual would eventually
be rewarded with reunion with the gods and other individuals who had likewise been "released". Almost
all of this departs dramatically from popular ancient Greek religion, which not only required regular
animal sacrifice (and so was inconsistent with strict vegetarianism) but was founded on a strict divide
between the human and the divine (ibid. pp. 502-503; Burnet 1911 pp. xlix ff.).
64
Socrates is referring here at least to the philosopher Empedocles who wrote in verse and accepted a
Pythagorean or Orphic version of the doctrine of immortality.
65
"Socrates intends the word ['godly'] to be taken in its colloquial sense, 'gifted,' 'distinguished,' though
for him it has a deeper meaning [see 99c]" (Thompson p. 119).
66
Compare Phaedo 70c ff.
67
In other dialogues, Socrates manifests more clearly his belief that there is a kind of postmortem
"judgment" of actions performed during life. See my note 227 on Defense Speech 41a.
68
"No myth is known which really explains the allusion except that [in Orphic religion] of the murder of
[Zeus and] Persephone's son Dionysus by man's ancestors [the Titans]" (Parker p. 496). According to
Orphic doctrine, Dionysus was to succeed Zeus as ruler of the gods, but was eaten by the jealous Titans,
whom Zeus then destroyed with a thunderbolt. "…[F]rom the soot deposited by the smoke arising from
these burning sinners emerged mankind" (p. 494). Orphics believed that each of us is imprisoned in our
body as a form of punishment for that ancestral crime (cf. Phaedo 62b, Cratylus 400c). We may win our
release from the body only by "purification".

29
 them grow marvelous kings and men rapid in power and greatest in wisdom; and for the
rest of time they are among humans called 'hallowed heroes'."69
Then, as the soul is deathless and has come to be many times, and has seen the things here and
the things in Hades and all things, there isn't anything that it hasn't learned. So it is in no way
wondrous that it's possible that it has been made to remember70 both about virtue and about the
other things, which it knew even earlier. For, as all nature {81d} is of the same breed,71 and the
soul has learned all things, nothing restrains it, after having been made to remember (actually,
what humans call "learning") one thing only, from finding out by itself all the other things, if one
is manly and does not weary of searching. For searching and learning as a whole are being-
made-to-remember.72
There is a need, therefore, not to be persuaded by that contentious statement of yours.
For that would make us not work, and is for the soft humans pleasant to hear; whereas this73
{81e} makes us likely to work and likely to search. Trusting that this is true,74 I am willing to
search with you for what virtue is.
MENO: Yes, Socrates. But how are you saying this: that we do not learn, but what we call
"learning" is being-made-to-remember? Are you able to teach me how this stands thus?
SOCRATES: I told you just now, Meno, that you are unscrupulous. And {82a} now you are
asking—in order indeed that I myself may straightaway be made to appear to be saying things

69
This appears to be an excerpt of one of Pindar's dirges (cf. Pindar Olympian 2.68ff.; the allusions here
also match those in the text of Orphic gold plates recovered from graves in Italy, Greece, and Crete from
the 5th and 4th centuries BCE; Parker pp. 496-498). It is all that is now extant of the poem.
Traditionally a "hero" in Greek religion was the offspring of a human and a divinity; a hero was
thus a demigod. In popular Greek religion heroes were the only humans who could avoid death
altogether. The poem thus suggests that ordinary humans are not totally separate from the divine, as they
were in traditional Greek religion.
70
Or, "that it has been reminded".
71
The view that all life is of the same kind is a Pythagorean view, probably arising from a belief in the
"transmigration" of a soul from a human life into a non-human animal life, and so on. According to
Pythagoreanism, not only humans, but all animals are supposed to have souls, which at one time or
another occupied or will occupy human bodies. Orphism similarly accepted transmigration (see 81b-c and
Phaedo 70c) and also shared with Empedocles and some later Pythagoreans the practice of vegetarianism,
presumably because of the doctrine that all animals—human and nonhuman—were "of the same breed".
72
Or, "being reminded". Cf. Phaedo 72e ff.
73
sc., the account I just mentioned.
74
At 86b-c Socrates confesses that he is not willing to "strongly insist" upon the details of the account
that he has just described, and would strongly insist only on its implication: viz., that it's both possible and
"needful" to search for what we are unaware of.

30
contrary to myself—, if I'm able to "teach" you—I who assert that there is no teaching, but only
being-made-to-remember!
MENO: No, by Zeus, Socrates. I spoke not while looking toward that, but by habit. But if you
are somehow able to show me that it stands just as you say, show me.
SOCRATES: But while it isn't easy, I nonetheless am willing to be spirited for your sake. But
call to me one of those many {82b} attendants of yours—whomever you wish—in order that I
may show you with him.
MENO: Entirely.
You, come forward, here.
SOCRATES: He is Greek and speaks Greek?
MENO: Quite entirely; he's homebred.75
SOCRATES: Then discern this: Which appears to be so to you: is he being made to remember,
or is he learning from me?
MENO: But I will do so.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, child:76 do you recognize that there is a space with four equal
angles of this77 sort?
SLAVE: I do.
SOCRATES: Then is {82c} a space with four equal angles one that has all these lines78—
which are four—equal?

SLAVE: Entirely.

75
I.e., "not bought or captured [in war]" (Thompson p. 129)
76
"Child" was the obviously demeaning, but standard way of referring to and addressing any slave,
whether in fact child or adult.
77
Presumably, Socrates has drawn a square figure, perhaps in the dirt or dust on the ground. See Figure
1. (The "Figures" that I have provided do not appear in Plato's text, but they are helpful in following it.)
78
The Greek word for "line" literally means what is drawn/written, and in some cases is used specifically
to refer to the side of a geometrical figure or, e.g., to the diameter of a circle.

31
SOCRATES: Isn't it one that also has these here through the middle79 equal?

SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then might there be a space of this sort, both greater and lesser?
SLAVE: Entirely.
SOCRATES: If, therefore, this line were two feet and this line two, how many square80 feet
would the whole be?
Consider it in this way: If it were two feet this way, but only one foot this way, would
the space be not anything other than one times two square feet?81

SLAVE: {82d} Yes.

SOCRATES: But since it's also two feet this way, does it come to be anything other than twice
two?82
SLAVE: It does not.

79
See Figure 2. He cannot be referring to diagonal lines drawn through the figure's center, since at 82d he
says that "all the lines" of the figure are equal—presumably referring to all the lines already drawn,
including the internal ones mentioned here.
80
As Thompson notes, "the same expressions are used in Greek for linear and superficial [i.e. surface]
measure. You have to judge by the context whether [the expression 'how many'] means a linear foot or a
square foot" (p. 131).
81
See Figure 3.
82
See Figure 4.

32
SOCRATES: Then it comes to be twice two square feet?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: How many, therefore, are twice two square feet? When you've counted, do tell.

SLAVE: Four, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Might, then, there come to be another space,83 two times this space, but of this
sort, having all the lines equal just as this one?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: How many square feet will it be?
SLAVE: Eight.
SOCRATES: Come, then: try to tell me how great will {82e} each line of that be. For, of this
one, each line is two feet; but of that which is two times the size, what is each?

SLAVE: It's clear, then, Socrates, that each line is two times the size.

83
See Figure 5.

33
SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, that I'm teaching this person in no way; rather, I ask all the
things? And now this person supposes he is aware of what sort of line it is, from which will be
generated the space that's eight square feet. Or does he seem to you to suppose so?
MENO: To me at least.
SOCRATES: Is he, therefore, aware?
MENO: Surely not.
SOCRATES: But he supposes that it's from the line that is two times the size?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Contemplate him, then, being made to remember one thing after another, in the
way there's a need to be made to remember.
And you, speak to me: You assert that {83a} the space that's two times the size is
generated by the line that's two times the size? I'm speaking in this sort of way: not long this
way, and short that way;84 rather, let it be equal everywhere just as this one here85 is, but two
times this: eight square feet. But see if it still seems to you that it will be from the line that is
two times the size?
SLAVE: To at least me it does.
SOCRATES: Therefore does that line come to be two times this one, if we add as great a line
from here?86

SLAVE: Yes.

84
Like the rectangle in Figure 3.
85
The square depicted in Figure 4.
86
I.e., starting from this point. (Socrates presumably points to one of the corners of the original square.
See Figure 6.)

34
SOCRATES: From that new line, then, you are asserting, there will be the eight-square-foot
space, if four lines as great are {83b} generated?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let us, then, draw four equal lines from it. The space which you assert to be eight
square feet would not be anything other than this?87

SLAVE: Entirely.
SOCRATES: In it, therefore, are these four spaces here, each of which is equal to this four-
square-foot one?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: How great, therefore, does it come to be? Isn't it four times as great?
SLAVE: But how could it not?
SOCRATES: Is, therefore, the thing that is four times as great two times the size?
SLAVE: No, by Zeus!
SOCRATES: Rather, it's how many times the size?
SLAVE: Four times.
SOCRATES: From the line two times the size, {83c} then, child, is generated not a space two
times the size, but four times the size?
SLAVE: You say true things.
SOCRATES: For four times four is sixteen. Isn't it?
SLAVE: Yes.

87
Figure 7.

35
SOCRATES: But an eight-square-foot space is generated from what sort of line? Isn't a space
four times the size generated from this four-foot line?
SLAVE: I assert it is.
SOCRATES: While this quarter88 is generated from this half?89

SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: All right. And isn't the eight-square-foot space two times the size of this,90 but
half that?91
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: Won't it be from a line greater than one this great,92 but from one less than {83d}
one that great?93 Or not?
SLAVE: It seems thus to at least me.
SOCRATES: Beautifully so! For answer that which seems so to you. And say to me: Wasn't
this two feet, while that was four?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: There is, then, a need that the line of the eight-square-foot space be greater than
this two-foot one, but less that the four-foot one?
SLAVE: There is a need. {83e}
SOCRATES: Try, then, to say how great you are asserting it is.
SLAVE: Three feet.

88
I.e., of the sixteen-square-foot square.
89
I.e., of the side of the sixteen-square-foot square. See Figure 8.
90
The four-square-foot square.
91
The sixteen-square-foot square.
92
Socrates points to a side of the four-square-foot square.
93
pointing to a side of the sixteen-square-foot square.

36
SOCRATES: Then, if indeed it is three feet, then will we take half again of this line and it will
be three?—for these here are two feet, and this is one foot—and this becomes the space that
you're asserting?94

SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then if it's three feet this way and three this way, then the whole space becomes
thrice three square feet?
SLAVE: It appears to.
SOCRATES: And how many square feet are thrice three?

SLAVE: Nine.95
SOCRATES: And how many square feet was there a need that the space two times the size be?
SLAVE: Eight.
SOCRATES: So the eight-square-foot space still isn't generated from the three-foot line?
SLAVE: Surely not.

94
See Figure 9.
95
See Figure 10.

37
SOCRATES: But from a line of what sort? Try to tell us precisely? And {84a} if you don't
wish to assign it a number, then rather show us: from a line of what sort is the eight-square-foot
space generated.
SLAVE: But, by Zeus, Socrates, I at least am not aware.
SOCRATES: Again, Meno, do you understand where—having already gotten here—he's at in
his being-made-to-remember? First, he was not aware of what was the base line of the eight-
square-foot space, just as even now he is not yet aware. But then he supposed he was aware of
it, and boldly answered as though he was aware, and didn't regard himself as unprovided for.
But now he regards {84b} himself as already unprovided for, and, just as he is not aware, he
doesn't suppose he is aware either.
MENO: You say true things.
SOCRATES: Now, then, is he better disposed concerning the thing that he isn't aware of?
MENO: That too seems so to me.
SOCRATES: Therefore, in making him be unprovided for and be numbed, just as the numbing
fish, we haven't injured him in any way?
MENO: It doesn't seem so to at least me.
SOCRATES: We have at least made something of consequence—as is likely—for finding out
how this matter stands; for now he would search with pleasure since he is not aware, whereas
then he would have easily supposed that, both before many people and often,96 {84c} he spoke
well concerning the space that is two times the size, saying that it needs to have a line two times
in size.
MENO: It's likely.
SOCRATES: Do you suppose, therefore, that he would have attempted earlier to search for and
learn that which he supposed that he was aware of though he wasn't aware—before he fell down
into provisionlessness, regarding himself as not aware, and before he yearned for being aware?
MENO: It doesn't seem to me that he would have, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then he was helped by being numbed?
MENO: He seems to me to have been.
SOCRATES: Consider, then, what from this provisionlessness he will actually find out,
searching with me, with me doing nothing other than asking and not {84d} teaching. Be on

96
Compare Meno's claim at 80b.

38
guard lest you find me teaching and going through everything with him, rather than asking for
the opinions of this person.
Now you, speak to me: Is this not, for us, a four-square-foot space? Do you understand?
SLAVE: I do.
SOCRATES: And we could add on to it this equal space here?97

SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this third space here equal to each of those?98

SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then we could in addition fill in this one here in the corner?99

97
Socrates presumably has drawn another four-square-foot figure alongside (let's say, directly above) the
original one, so that the two figures share a side. See Figure 11.
98
Socrates has presumably drawn another four-square-foot figure alongside another side of (let's say,
immediately to the right of) the original one, so that these too share a side. See Figure 12.
99
Finally, Socrates makes a third square, using the corner that was created by the addition of the two new
squares. The four squares together now form one big, sixteen-square-foot square. See Figure 13.

39
SLAVE: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Therefore, would there be generated anything other than these four equal spaces
{84e} here?
SLAVE: No.
SOCRATES: What then? This whole space here100 will come to be how many times the size of
this101 one here?
SLAVE: Four times.
SOCRATES: And there was a need for us that a space two times the size be generated; or don't
you remember?102
SLAVE: Entirely.
SOCRATES: There is, then, this line from corner to corner, {85a} cutting each of these spaces
in two?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: These four lines, then, come to be equal, encompassing this space here.103

100
I.e., the new big square.
101
I.e., the original square.
102
See 82d.
103
I.e., a new space has been created by drawing a diamond-shaped square inside the big sixteen-square-
foot square. The sides of the new space are diagonals of each of the four four-square-foot squares. See
Figure 14.

40
SLAVE: They do come to be equal.
SOCRATES: Consider, then: How great exactly is this space?
SLAVE: I don't understand.
SOCRATES: Hasn't each inside line cut off half of each of those spaces that are four? Or not?
SLAVE: Yes.
SOCRATES: Therefore, how many spaces so great104 are there in this space?

SLAVE: Four.
SOCRATES: Whereas how many are there in this here?105

104
I.e., how many halves of a four-foot-square figure are in the new diamond-shaped square? See Figure
15.
105
Socrates points to one of the four-foot-square figures. See Figure 16.

41
SLAVE: Two.
SOCRATES: And what is four with respect to two?
SLAVE: Two times.
SOCRATES: This here,106 then, {85b} comes to be how many square feet?
SLAVE: Eight square feet.
SOCRATES: Out of what sort of line?
SLAVE: Out of this one.
SOCRATES: Out of the one that stretches from corner to corner of the four-square-foot
space?107

SLAVE: Yes.

106
Pointing to the diamond (Figure 15).
107
See Figure 17.

42
SOCRATES: And sophists108 at least call that a "diagonal". So that if the name for that is
"diagonal", then—you would say, slave-child of Meno—it is "out of the diagonal" that the space
two times the size would be generated.
SLAVE: Now then, entirely, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What seems to you to have occurred, Meno? Has this person answered anything
whatsoever that was not his opinion? {85c}
MENO: No; rather, his own opinion.
SOCRATES: And surely he wasn't aware, as he asserted a little earlier.
MENO: You say true things.
SOCRATES: But these opinions were in him; or not?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: In someone, then, who isn't aware about things—whatever things he is not aware
about—, there are true opinions about those things about which he isn't aware?
MENO: There appear to be.
SOCRATES: And now for him these opinions—just as a dream—have suddenly been aroused.
But if someone were to ask him often and in many ways these same things,109 he would in the
end be less precisely aware that it is so than no one who {85d} knows about these things.
MENO: It's likely.
SOCRATES: Will he know not by anyone's teaching but by being asked—by his getting back
the knowledge from himself?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is his getting back knowledge that is in himself not being-made-to-
remember?
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: The knowledge, therefore, that this person now has110—didn't he surely either get
it at some time or always had it?

108
"Sophist" in Greek sometimes, as here (cf. Lysis 204a), simply meant wise person or expert, without
pejorative connotations. With the rise, however, of the professional teachers of wisdom, the term
acquired pejorative or sarcastic connotations in some contexts, as at 91b-c. See note 136 below.
109
Or: "…about these same things…"
110
I.e., the knowledge that is "in" him, which he could "get back", with continued questioning. When
Socrates describes him as "having" knowledge and being "knowledgeable", he doesn't mean that he
actually "knows"—until he "gets back" the knowledge that is somehow "in" him (see 85c-d and 86b).

43
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: If he always had it, then he was always knowledgeable; but if he got it at some
time, then he would not have gotten it in this life now. Or {85e} has someone taught him to do
geometry? For this person will do these same things concerning everything geometrical and
concerning all the other learned things. Is there, therefore, anyone who has taught him all
things? For it certainly is just111 that you be aware if there is, especially since he has been born
and nurtured among your family.
MENO: But I at least am aware that no one has ever taught him.
SOCRATES: But does he have these opinions, or not?
MENO: It's a necessity, Socrates, it appears.
SOCRATES: And if he didn't get them in this life now, isn't this already clear: {86a} that in
some other time he had them and learned them?
MENO: It appears so.
SOCRATES: That is the time when he was not a human?112
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: If, therefore, in the time he is human and the time he is not, there were going to be
in him true opinions which, when they have been awakened by asking, become knowledges, then
will his soul, therefore, be for all time in a state of having learned? For it's clear that in every
time he either is or is not a human.
MENO: It appears so. {86b}
SOCRATES: If, then, the truth about the things that are113 is always in the soul, then the soul
would be deathless; so what one doesn't happen to know now—that is, what one doesn't happen
to remember now—one ought to attempt to search for and to be made to remember?
MENO: You seem to me to speak well, Socrates—I'm not aware how.
SOCRATES: I seem to to myself too, Meno. And the other things I would not, on the

111
The ancient Greek expression which is translated here as "it is just" often means it is required by
justice, rather than simply it is allowed by justice.
112
"Human" here is evidently understood as the combination of soul and body. Cf. Phaedo 79b, Phaedrus
246c, Timaeus 87e. A "human" in traditional ancient Greek thought was by definition mortal.
113
"The things that are/exist" is the standard expression Socrates uses to refer to the "forms"—i.e. the
kinds of thing Socrates was asking about at 72c: e.g., the "form" of virtue (i.e. what virtue is), the "form"
of shape (i.e. what shape is). Here, however, he may just be using the expression more broadly, in its
colloquial sense, to refer to all existing things.

44
account's114 behalf, entirely insist strongly upon. But that, by supposing that there's a need to
search for the things about which one isn't aware, we will be better and more manly and less
averse to work than if we supposed that the things we don't know it is neither {86c} possible to
find nor needful to search for—Concerning that, I would entirely insist on strongly both in
statement and in deed, if it were possible.
MENO: You seem to me to say that especially well, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Do you wish, therefore, —since we similarly discern that one must search for that
about which one isn't aware—that we attempt to search in common for what exactly virtue is?
MENO: Now then, entirely. Actually, no, Socrates. Rather, I at least would be most pleased to
consider and to hear that which indeed I asked first: whether there is a need to attempt to search
for it as though it were taught {86d} or as though it were by nature or in whatever manner virtue
is generated in humans.
SOCRATES: But if I, Meno, ruled not only myself but you too, we wouldn't consider whether
virtue is taught or not taught earlier than we searched for what it is. But since you don't even
attempt to rule yourself—surely, so that you may be liberated!115—but attempt to rule me and do
rule me,116 I will accede to you. For what ought one to do? It seems, therefore, like one must
consider {86e} what sort it is—the thing about which we aren't aware what it is.
Then, if you would, slacken somewhat—but a little—your ruleship and accede to its
being considered, from a hypothesis, whether virtue is taught or is generated in whatever way.
In saying "from a hypothesis", I'm speaking in this way:117 just as the geometricians often
consider, when someone asks them—for example, about a space—whether "this space118 is the
sort {87a} to be stretched out as a triangle [ACG] inside119 this circle here."

114
He here refers to the account he related at 81a-e.
115
Cf. Gorgias 491d-492c. Socrates characterizes Meno's great ambition for rulership (73c, 77b) as
requiring maximal freedom from being ruled.
116
Cf. 75b and 76a-b.
117
The general method of hypothesis is the same as that used in the Phaedo 100a ff., 101d-e.
118
I.e., evidently, some given rectangle. Let us imagine it is the rectangle ABCD, in a circle whose
diameter is AF in Figure 18.
119
I.e., inscribed as a triangle in. The problem is that of converting the area of a given rectangle into a
triangle of the same area.

45
Some one of the geometricians might tell him, "I'm not yet aware of whether that space is of that
sort; but, even so, I suppose that I have some hypothesis that is of consequence relative to the
problem—a hypothesis of this sort: If that space [ABCD] is of the sort that, when one has
stretched it out along the given line [AF] of the circle,120 it falls short by a space [CEFD] that is
such as the one [ABCD] that has been stretched out along the given line,121 then it seems to me
that one thing results; and some other thing, on the other hand, results if those things are
incapable of occurring. Once I have made a hypothesis, therefore, I am willing {87b} to tell
you the result concerning the stretching out of the space into the circle—whether it is capable of
occurring or not."
Let us, then, in that way concerning virtue too—since we are not aware of either what it
is or what sort it is— Let us, having made a hypothesis, consider whether it is taught or not
taught, saying this: "It would be taught or not taught, if virtue were what sort of thing, of the
things that are, concerning the soul?" First, then, if it is of a sort other than a sort of knowledge,
would it be taught or not—or, as we were just now saying, would it be remembered? But let it
make no difference to us {87c} which of the two names we use; rather, let's just ask: would it
then be taught? Or is this at least clear to everyone: that a human is taught nothing other than
knowledge?

120
I.e., along the circle's diameter.
121
I.e., the remainder of the circle's diameter—the part of it not "used" by the original rectangle ABCD—
may be used to construct another rectangle CEFD that is proportional to the original rectangle.

46
MENO: It seems so to me at least.
SOCRATES: And if virtue is some sort of knowledge, then it's clear that it would be taught.
MENO: For how could it not?
SOCRATES: Then we've quickly been released from that problem: namely, that this sort of
thing is taught, whereas this sort of thing is not.
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: After that, then, it seems like, there is a need to consider whether virtue is
knowledge or other than knowledge. {87d}
MENO: It seems at least to me that, after that, this must be considered.
SOCRATES: What, then? Do we say anything other than that virtue is itself good, and does that
hypothesis abide for us: that it is itself good?
MENO: Well, entirely.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if any other thing is good, separate from knowledge, virtue might
perhaps not be some kind of knowledge; but if nothing is good that knowledge doesn't
encompass, then in suspecting that it is some kind of knowledge we would be suspecting
correctly.
MENO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: And surely {87e} it is by virtue that we are good?122
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are beneficial; for all the good things are beneficial;
aren't they?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And virtue, then, is beneficial?
MENO: It is a necessity from the things that have been agreed on.
SOCRATES: Let's consider, then,—taking up each of them by itself—what are the sorts of
things that benefit us. Health, we say, and strength and beauty and wealth surely. We say those
things and things of that sort are beneficial; {88a} don't we?123
MENO: Yes.

122
Cf. 73b ff.
123
Socrates characteristically adopts, for the sake of argument, the position of his interlocutor. The list of
beneficial things was Meno's (78c-d).

47
SOCRATES: But we say those same things sometimes injure too. Or do you speak in a way
other than in that way?
MENO: No; rather, in that way.
SOCRATES: Consider, then, what concerning each of those things leads it to benefit us when it
benefits us, and what leads it to injure us when it injures? Doesn't each of them benefit when
there is correct use; and when there is not, it injures?
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Let's now moreover consider also the things concerning the soul. You call
something sound-mindedness, and something justness, and manliness, and facility at learning,
and memory, and magnificence, and all the things {88b} of that sort?
MENO: At least I do.
SOCRATES: Consider, then, which of those to you seem to be not knowledge, but other than
knowledge—whether any of them doesn't sometimes injure and sometimes benefit. For
example, manliness—if manliness is not mindfulness124 but is like some sort of boldness. When
a human is bold without discernment, isn't he injured; but when he's bold with discernment, he's
benefited?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Therefore, sound-mindedness and facility at learning are also the same way.
When learned and adjusted with discernment, they are beneficial; but without discernment, they
are injurious.
MENO: Very entirely. {88c}
SOCRATES: Therefore, taken together, all the things attempted and endured by the soul, if they
are led by mindfulness, end in happiness,125 but if by lack of mindfulness, end in the opposite.

124
As Burnet notes, the Greek word that I translate as "mindful" is used by Plato as a synonym for "wise
(sophos)" (Burnet 1916 p. 258 and 1924 p. 12; see my note 17 on Defense Speech 18b). In any case, the
word always connotes attention or attentiveness. Aristotle (384-322 BCE) uses the term in a narrow,
technical sense that departs from both Plato's use of it and its colloquial meaning. In my translations,
"mindfulness" should be understood in its ordinary-English sense; it is not intended to bring to mind the
contemporary, therapeutic fad known as "mindfulness" in Western popular psychology and culture.
125
Or: "bring one, in the end, to happiness". The Greek word eudaimonia often, in ordinary usage,
implied good luck (cf. 97c), which is why I translate it, as it usually is, as "happiness". As Burnyeat puts
it, the word originally meant "being favored by divinity (daimōn)" (Burnyeat 1997 p. 7). Likewise,
Burnet explains, "In popular Greek [eudaimonia] meant having a good [daimōn], and [daimōn] means
fortune or luck. Generally speaking, then, it meant an abundance of worldly goods…" (1900 p. 1). Burnet
goes on to point out that "the Greek philosophers had long been trying to deepen the significance of the

48
MENO: It seems likely.
SOCRATES: If, then, virtue is any of the things in the soul and it is necessary that it is
beneficial to it, then there is a need that it be mindfulness, since indeed all the things concerning
the soul are themselves by themselves neither beneficial nor injurious, but {88d} become
injurious and beneficial when mindfulness or lack of mindfulness have been added. By this
argument, then, since it is at least beneficial, there is a need that virtue be some sort of
mindfulness.
MENO: To at least me it seems to be.
SOCRATES: And actually, then, do the other things too that were just now spoken of—wealth
and the things of that sort—seem to be sometimes good and sometimes injurious? Just as for the
rest of the soul, mindfulness, when it leads, makes the things of the soul beneficial and lack of
mindfulness makes them injurious; so again {88e} for those things too, the soul, when it uses
and leads them correctly, makes them beneficial, and when not correctly, makes them injurious.
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: And the mindful soul leads correctly, and the unmindful one leads erroneously?
MENO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is, then, possible to speak thus with reference to all things: for the
human, all other things are dependent on the soul, and the things of the soul itself are dependent
on mindfulness, if {89a} they are going to be good. And according to this argument what's
beneficial would be mindfulness. And we say that virtue is beneficial.
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: We say, then, that virtue is mindfulness—either, of course, mindfulness altogether
or some part of it.126

old term. [Heraclitus] had said, 'Man's character is his [daimōn],' and [Democritus] declared that
'Happiness lieth not in flocks and herds: the soul is the dwelling-place of the [daimōn].' This was of
course the view of Plato too…" (1900 pp. 1-2). In the present context, we see Socrates attempting to
argue for a similar view. In the Euthydemus (278e-282a), we find a parallel argument. It should be noted
that eudaimonia, unlike the English "happiness", does not refer to a subjective state of mind or feeling. It
is, instead, an objective condition of a person's life and/or actions (see Adkins p. 257 n. 12, and de
Strycker and Slings p. 77 n. 55)—so much so that one's eudaimonia was sometimes thought to be
affected, even after one's death, by the fate of one's descendants (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics
1100a18ff., 1101a22ff.). The word "success" might be a suitable translation except that it fails to reflect
the sense of (divine) fortune that eudaimonia continued to connote, despite the efforts of philosophers.
126
Penner defends this reading by saying that if Socrates instead were suggesting that mindfulness could
be only a part of virtue (as Plato's Greek certainly allows), then he would not infer (89c) that virtue must

49
MENO: The things that are being said, Socrates, seem to me to be spoken beautifully.
SOCRATES: Then if those things stand thus, then the good people would not be so by nature.
MENO: They don't to me seem so. {89b}
SOCRATES: Yes, and certainly this would be so too: If the good became so by nature, there
would certainly be for us ones who would recognize about youths that they were good by nature;
having apprehended the ones they made apparent as good, we would guard them in the
Acropolis,127 sealing them up128 much more than gold, in order that no one might ruin them—
rather, in order that, when they come of age, they might become useful to their cities.
MENO: It's at least likely, of course, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Therefore, since the good don't become good by nature, {89c} do they do so by
learning?
MENO: It seems to me now to be necessary. And it's clear, Socrates—according to the
hypothesis, if indeed virtue is knowledge—that it is taught.
SOCRATES: Perhaps, by Zeus. But perhaps we did not beautifully agree on that.
MENO: And yet it seemed just before to be beautifully said.
SOCRATES: But perhaps there's a need that it seem beautifully said not only just before, but
now and hereafter, if there's going to be anything healthy concerning it. {89d}
MENO: What then? Having looked to what, are you intolerant of it and distrust that virtue is
knowledge?
SOCRATES: I will tell you, Meno. For I'm not putting back,129 as not beautifully said, the
statement that it is taught if indeed it's knowledge. But that it is knowledge—consider whether I
seem to you to distrust it appropriately. For tell me this: If anything whatsoever—not only
virtue—is taught, is it necessary that there be teachers and learners of it?130
MENO: It seems so to me at least. {89e}

therefore be taught/teachable (Penner pp. 154-155), since virtue is taught/teachable just in case it is
knowledge (87c, 98d).
127
"as the treasury of the city" (Thompson p. 162). The Acropolis was the city's fortified plateau, the hub
of religious activity, where during Socrates' lifetime the famous Parthenon was built.
128
As one would put "a seal on a door…containing valuables, to mark them as public property"
(Thompson p. 162).
129
"the metaphor is from revoking a move in a game" (Thompson p. 167).
130
It is here that the ambiguity of the Greek becomes problematic. The answer to Socrates' question is
yes if he means actually taught, but no if he means teachable. The actual Greek word may mean either.
See note 4 above.

50
SOCRATES: Furthermore, contrariwise, the thing of which there were neither teachers nor
learners—wouldn't we, having imagined beautifully, imagine that it is not taught.
MENO: Those things are so; but don't there seem to you to be teachers of virtue?
SOCRATES: Though having searched out whether there were any teachers of virtue—though
having made every search—I am not capable of finding them. And yet I search with many, and
most of all those who I suppose are most experienced about the matter.
And indeed even now, Meno, it is beautiful that Anytus here has just sat down beside us;
let's give him a share of the search. {90a} And we would give him a share appropriately; for
Anytus here, first, is of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who didn't become wealthy
spontaneously or by someone's gift—as indeed now Ismenias the Theban has recently
apprehended the money of Polycrates131—but by acquiring it by his own wisdom and attention;
besides, in the other things too, he didn't seem to be an obtrusive citizen or swollen and
aggravating, but a composed and well-equipped {90b} man. Besides, he nurtured and educated
this man Anytus well, as it seems to the multitude of Athenians; at least they choose him for the
greatest rulerships.132 It is just, then, to search with people of this sort concerning teachers of
virtue, whether there are or aren't, and who they are.
Therefore, you, Anytus, search with us, me and your guest-friend Meno here, concerning
this matter, who might be teachers. But consider it in this way: if we wished Meno here to
become a good healer {90c} to which teachers would we send him? Wouldn't we send him to
the healers?
ANYTUS: Entirely.
SOCRATES: What then? If we wished him to become a good leathercutter, wouldn't we send
him to the leathercutters?
ANYTUS: Yes.

131
"[T]he name of Polycrates…is here used proverbially as a type of wealth" (Thompson p. 171).
Ismenias was a leader of those in Thebes who supported democratic ideals. He became wealthy through
taking political bribes. (The reference to Ismenias is sometimes regarded as anachronistic given the
dialogue's dramatic date; but see Thompson p. 171 and Burnet 1911 pp. xxxi-xxxii.)
132
Anytus was prominent among the leaders of the Athenian democrats who were exiled in 404 BCE by
the Thirty and who restored the democracy in 403. He would later, in 399, be the main force behind
Socrates' prosecution. His family's wealth came from its tanning business (Xenophon Apology 29ff.).
See my note 78 on Defense Speech 23e. The setting of the Meno is perhaps Anytus' house or its
courtyard, where Meno was probably staying during his visit to Athens. This would explain Anytus'
otherwise coincidental entrance and Socrates' reference to Meno as Anytus' "guest-friend" at 91a.

51
SOCRATES: And the other things in the same way?
ANYTUS: Entirely.
SOCRATES: About the same things again, then, tell me this: Having sent this man here to the
healers, we said, we would have sent him beautifully, if we wished him to become a healer.
When we say that, {90d} are we saying this: that we would be sound-minded if we sent him to
those who lay claim to the art133 (rather than to ones who don't)—the ones who exact a wage for
this thing itself, making themselves appear to be teachers of anyone who wishes to go and learn?
By looking to those things, wouldn't we be beautifully sending him?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And concerning aulos-playing134 and the other arts, these things themselves are
so? {90e} It is a great lack of discernment for ones who wish to make someone an aulos-player
not to be willing to send him to the ones who profess to teach the art and who exact a wage, and
to hold forth troubles for certain others by searching for learning from those people neither who
lay a claim to being teachers nor of whom is there any learner of that teaching that we deem it
worthwhile for the one whom we sent to learn from them. Doesn't it seem to you to be a great
lack of reasoning?
ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, it does to me at least, and a great lacking of learning in addition.
SOCRATES: You speak beautifully. Now, then, you are free {91a} to take counsel in common
with me concerning this man Meno your guest-friend. For this man, Anytus, has since long
ago135 been saying to me that he has an appetite for that wisdom and virtue by which humans
beautifully manage the family of the household and of the city, minister to their genitors, and
know how to receive and send off fellow-citizens and guest-friends in a way worthy of a good
man. For this {91b} virtue, therefore, consider to whom we would correctly send him. Or is it
clear, then, according to the discussion from just before, that it would be to those who profess
and make themselves appear to the community to be teachers of virtue for anyone of the Greeks
who wishes to learn, arranging and exacting a wage for this?
ANYTUS: And who are these you speak of, Socrates?

133
This word in Greek often means more broadly skill or expertise, usually one practiced professionally.
134
An aulos (literally "pipe") was a reed wind-instrument similar to the clarinet or oboe.
135
Cf. 71e.

52
SOCRATES: Certainly you too are aware that those are the ones humans call "Sophists".136
{91c}
ANYTUS: Heracles! Speak of no such ill, Socrates! Let that sort of madness apprehend none
of my family or friends (whether townsperson or foreigner) so that they come to be debased by
those people, since those people themselves are the apparent debasement and ruination of the
ones who are with them!
SOCRATES: In what way are you speaking, Anytus? Those people, alone of the ones who lay

136
Cf. Laches 186c. "Sophists" refers to a diverse group of independent professionals who were the main
source of higher education in Greece in the fifth century BCE. (Early in the following century, the
profession would mostly die out with the opening of formal academic institutions like the school of
Isocrates and Plato's Academy.) Though such men differed greatly in their views, methods, and what they
taught, they were (and still are) often lumped together under the label "Sophists". The Greek word for
"sophist" sometimes simply meant wise person or expert (Lysis 204a, Meno 85b). But the word's form
(sophistēs) suggests one who makes a profession out of being wise (sophos) (Burnet 1914 p. 108). So it
was also used to refer to professional teachers. What seems to have been "perhaps their distinctive
common feature" (Dodds p. 7) was their claim to be able to teach "virtue" or "wisdom" (Defense Speech
20a-b, Euthydemus 273d, Gorgias 519c, Meno 91b, Laches 185e-186c, Protagoras 318a-319a; cf.
Xenophon Memorabilia 1.6.13). Traveling from city to city, they were hired mainly by wealthy citizens to
teach their sons the skills needed to protect their wealth, political power, and freedom. Because of the
prominent role speech played in the Athenian democracy (in the courts and other public assemblies), the
lessons consisted mostly in how to be a good public speaker and debater (Martin pp. 179-180)—hence the
Sophists' promise to teach young men how to live a good, successful life (Protagoras 318e with 321d,
Euthydemus 273c, Gorgias 452d, Laches 185e-186c). Though students were taught other things besides
oratory, teaching methods and subject matters varying from one Sophist to another, the ultimate aim was
always material gain, rather than knowledge or truth; the Sophists at least themselves generally became
quite wealthy (OCD2 p. 1000). As he was interested in some of the same topics and interacted in the same
elite social networks as Sophists and their students, Socrates' fellow citizens doubtless presumed (Defense
Speech 18b-c) he was a Sophist despite his claim (19d-e, 33b) that he was not a teacher and did not accept
pay. Note that Plato makes Anytus here claim that Sophists "ruin" those who associate with them (mostly
young men)—one of the main charges made against Socrates (Euthyphro 2c, Defense Speech 24b).
Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias were the three leading Sophists at the time of Socrates and Meno's
conversation. Other famous Sophists—Protagoras, Antiphon, and Thrasymachus—were by then dead.
None of the most renowned Sophists (except Antiphon) happened to be citizens of Athens; because of the
influence they had on the young, particularly the wealthy (usually oligarchic) young, they were generally
not well loved by the typical Athenian, particularly the democratically inclined (Euthyphro 3c-d, Laches
197d, Protagoras 312a, 316c-d, Laches 197d, Gorgias 520a, Meno 91c, Republic 492a). The popular
view evidently was that it was shameful to pay a Sophist for education, since (according to the view)
whatever important one learned from a Sophist is what one could learn from any Athenian gentleman
(Defense Speech 19e-20a and 24d-25a, Meno 92e, Protagoras 327e, Gorgias 461c, 482d; cf. Gorgias
520e). Wisdom concerning good and bad, just and unjust, was not popularly considered an art or science
of which there were experts and nonexperts (Protagoras 319b-d, Euthyphro 7b-d). Such wisdom was of
course respectable, but it was considered going too far to devote one's life to pursuing it or to practice or
teach it professionally (Protagoras 312a-b, Euthydemus 304e-305a, Gorgias 484c-486d). Socrates clearly
disagreed with the popular idea that there are no experts about virtue (Protagoras 361a-b, Crito 48a,
Laches 184d-e), though he shared the popular doubt that the Sophists were such experts (Euthydemus
307a-b, Gorgias 319c).

53
claim to knowing how to produce something good, differ from the others so much as this?: they
not only do not benefit what one has given over to them—as the others indeed do—but, to the
contrary, actually ruin?! {91d} And they apparently deem it worthy to exact money for these
things?! Well, I actually am not able to be persuaded by you; for I am aware that one man,
Protagoras,137 acquired more money by his wisdom than Pheidias—who produced such
outstandingly beautiful works—and ten other sculptors. And surely you speak of a prodigy, if
the ones who work on old shoes and mend garbs would not be capable of being unnoticed for
thirty {91e} days if they gave back garbs and shoes more faulty than they received—rather, if
they did things of that sort, they would quickly die from hunger; whereas Protagoras has been
unnoticed for more than forty years by the whole of Greece in ruining the ones who are with him
and sending back ones more faulty than he received?! For I suppose that he died having become
nearly seventy years old, and having been in the art for forty; and in all that time and still to this
very day his good reputation138 has in no way stopped.139 And not only Protagoras has been thus
unnoticed, but also {92a} entirely many others, ones who came earlier than that man,140 and
others who are still around even now.141 Therefore, are we to assert, according to your
statement, that they are aware that they beguile and debase the young, or that their beguiling and
debasing are unnoticed even by themselves. Shall we actually deem thus mad142 these who some
humans assert are most wise?
ANYTUS: They are far from being mad, Socrates. Rather, much more so are the ones of the
young who give those people silver, {92b} and still more so than these are the ones—their
relatives—who turn them over to those people, and most mad of all are the cities who let them
arrive and don't drive them out, whether some foreigner attempts to do something of this sort, or

137
c. 500-430 BCE.
138
"Reputation" in ancient Greek is literally the "opinion" that others have of one.
139
According to some later writers, Protagoras was convicted of impiety in Athens in 411 BCE. But
Socrates' remark here suggests that the story was apocryphal, even if we overlook the fact that Protagoras
was probably long since dead by 411.
140
As Protagoras was likely among the first to profess to teach virtue (see Protagoras 349a), it is unclear
to whom Socrates here refers. Perhaps he means the poets whose works were popularly regarded as a
good source for moral education (Protagoras 325e-326a, 339a; Republic 606e; Laws 810e-811a; cf.
Aristophanes Frogs 1009f.), though they were not popularly grouped with Protagoras and the other
"Sophists". Plato makes Protagoras characterize the poets as the oldest "Sophists" (Protagoras 316d ff.).
Socrates later in the Meno (95c-96b) offers a proof that poets cannot be teachers of virtue.
141
Referring most prominently to Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus. Cf. Defense Speech 19e.
142
Cf. Defense Speech 25d-e.

54
a townsperson.143
SOCRATES: But, Anytus, has one of the Sophists done you injustice, or what are you so hard
on them for?
ANYTUS: No, by Zeus, I have never been with144 any of them, nor would I allow anyone else
of mine to be!
SOCRATES: Then you aren't experienced with them at all?
ANYTUS: May I always be so too! {92c}
SOCRATES: Then how, you divine man,145 would you be aware about this practice—with
which you aren't experienced at all—whether it has anything good in it or anything paltry?
ANYTUS: Easily: I am aware at least of what sort these people are, whether I am experienced
with them or not.
SOCRATES: You are a diviner probably, Anytus, since I would wonder how else you would be
aware concerning these things—from the things you yourself say. But, anyhow, we weren't
searching for who are those who {92d} Meno, after having gone to them, would become
faulty—for those people, if you wish, are the Sophists. But tell us—and do something good for
your ancestral comrade146 by pointing out to him—who are those people in so great a city who,
after having gone to them, he would become worthy of account147 in the virtue that I went
through just now.
ANYTUS: And why didn't you point them out to him already?
SOCRATES: But I did tell of those people I supposed were teachers, but I happen to be saying
nothing, as you assert (and you are probably {92e} saying something). Rather, you, then, for
your part, tell him which Athenians he should go to. Tell whatever name you wish.

143
Given the fact that Socrates was one of probably only a couple of Athenian natives (e.g. Antiphon)
who was generally considered a Sophist (see note 136 above), this is probably intended to be a
foreshadowing of Anytus' suit against Socrates. The Defense Speech likewise makes it obvious that
Anytus initially only wished Socrates to leave Athens (29c), rather than actually be put to death.
144
sc., been a student of.
145
Or: "supernatural man". This form of address "expresses reproach or remonstrance" (Burnet 1924
p.178).
146
As was usually the case with such relationships, Meno and Anytus' guest-friendship (90b) had its roots
in a bond formed either by their fathers or earlier ancestors.
147
"worthy of account" = noteworthy. The concern is over being a person who is worth talking about.
Cf. Protagoras 316b-c. There is no reason to think that a clear distinction between really being a good
person and merely seeming (to others) to be good was commonly observed before Socratic criticism
forced it into the light. One could compare our modern notion of "coolness" or "hipness" and recognize a
similar difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between really being cool/hip and merely seeming so.

55
ANYTUS: What need is there to hear the name of one human? For there's no one of the
beautiful-and-good148 Athenians whom he might happen upon who wouldn't make him better
than the Sophists would, if indeed he's willing to be persuaded.
SOCRATES: And did these beautiful-and-good people come to be of this sort spontaneously,
having learned from no one, yet nevertheless are the sort to teach these things that they
themselves didn't {93a} learn?
ANYTUS: I at least deem these people to have learned from earlier people, from people who
were beautiful-and-good. Or don't many good men seem to you to have come into being in this
city?
SOCRATES: To at least me, Anytus, people good at the political things seem to be even at this
time; they seem to have come into being before now too, no less than to be at this time. But have
they also come to be good teachers of their own virtue? For that is the thing that our discussion
happens to be about. Since long ago we were considering, not whether or not there are good men
at this time, nor whether they have come to be in an {93b} earlier time, but whether virtue is
taught. And in considering that, we are considering this: did the good men—both of the ones
now and of the ones in earlier time—know how to give over to another too that virtue with
respect to which they themselves were good, or is this something that isn't given over or gotten
from one person to another? That is the thing that I and Meno were searching out since long ago.
Therefore, consider it in this way from your own statement: Wouldn't you assert that
Themistocles149 {93c} came to be a good man?
ANYTUS: I at least would assert he did most of all people.

148
Colloquially, the Greek term, translated here "beautiful-and-good", connoted the possession of
character-traits greatly valued in a social context—the traits of a so-called "good man" (see 91a). Hence,
the Greek term is sometimes rendered "gentleman". It was commonly assumed that the social elite either
did or ought to possess such traits, and the term "beautiful-and-good" often was used to refer simply to
the social and political elite. So, as Dodds explains, a "beautiful-and-good" person is just "someone who
is 'well thought of' " (p. 273), often without any other evaluative connotation (cf. J. Adam 1916 p. 59); cf.
92d and note 147 above. Socrates himself tends to use the term to refer to qualities that are genuinely
valuable, whether or not they are in fact valued (Dodds pp. 242-243). Those with great social and/or
political ambitions (as Hippocrates at Protagoras 316b-c and Meno at Meno 92d) were generally satisfied
with possessing a character that was well-respected, deservedly or not.
149
c. 528-462 BCE. A greatly admired and influential Athenian general and politician who championed
democratic ideals (see Gorgias 455e). He was most remembered for his persuading the Athenians to
invest in a strong navy, and for his leading the Greek forces in their successful resistance of an attempted
Persian invasion in 480-479. In the Gorgias, Socrates is highly critical of Themistocles and other popular
politicians and admits only that they were good at gratifying the fickle appetites of the masses (503c-d,
515d-517c).

56
SOCRATES: Therefore, you would assert that that man too was a good teacher, if indeed
anyone else was a teacher of his own virtue?
ANYTUS: I at least suppose so, if indeed he wished to be.
SOCRATES: But don't you suppose that he would have wished that certain others become
beautiful-and-good, and certainly mostly his own son? Or do you suppose that he begrudged
him it and purposefully didn't give {93d} over to him the virtue with respect to which he
himself was good? Or haven't you heard that Themistocles taught his son Cleophantus to be a
good horseman? At least, having stood upright on his horse, he used to abide there and throw a
javelin from his horse upright, and he used to do many other wondrous deeds in which that man
educated him and made him wise—however many things depend on good teachers. Or haven't
you heard those things from the elderly?
ANYTUS: I have heard.
SOCRATES: No one, then, would blame his son's nature as being bad. {93e}
ANYTUS: Probably not.
SOCRATES: But what about this: have you ever heard from anyone younger or elder that
Cleophantus son of Themistocles came to be a man good and wise in the things in which his
father was?
ANYTUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Therefore, do you suppose that he wished to educate his son in those other things,
but, in the wisdom with respect to which he himself was wise, he wished to make him in no way
better than his neighbors, if indeed virtue were taught?
ANYTUS: Probably, by Zeus, not.
SOCRATES: Yet, to you, the one of that sort was a teacher of virtue—the one who even you
agreed was best among earlier people. {94a} But let's then consider another person: Aristides,150
son of Lysimachus. Or don't you agree that that man came to be good?
ANYTUS: At least I certainly do entirely.
150
c. 525-466 BCE. He was known as "Aristides the Just"; traditionally he is cast as a political rival of
Themistocles, championing oligarchic/aristocratic ideals, though in fact he may have worked with him
more closely. In the Gorgias, Socrates seems to distinguish Aristides as one of those few politicians who
have been "beautiful-and-good" (526a-b). But he is said to be beautiful-and-good at "handling justly the
things that someone turns over [to him]". We can certainly imagine that such an ability was less than
what Socrates would characterize as virtue par excellence. Furthermore, as a matter of historical fact,
Aristides fell prey to one thing Socrates seems to consider (Gorgias 516d-e) distinctive of a bad politician:
viz., ostracism (a fate that Themistocles and Thucydides (see below) also suffered).

57
SOCRATES: Therefore, that man too educated his son Lysimachus151 in the most beautiful
Athenian things—however many things depend on teachers; but does he seem to have made him
a better man than anyone whatsoever? For you certainly have actually been with that man and
may see what sort he is. But if you wish, {94b} let's consider Pericles,152 a man so
magnificently wise. You are aware that he nurtured two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?
ANYTUS: I am.
SOCRATES: Of course, as you are also aware, he taught those men to be horsemen worse than
none of the Athenians, and he educated them to be worse than no one in music and in athletic
competition and the other things—however many depend on art; but he didn't, then, wish to
make them good men?153 It seems to me that he did wish it, but that perhaps it may not be
taught. And in order that you not suppose that few Athenians and the most paltry of them come
to be incapable in this {94c} thing, ponder in what way Thucydides154 in turn nurtured two sons,
Melesias155 and Stephanus, and educated those men well in the other things. And they wrestled
the most beautifully of all Athenians; for he gave one to Xanthias and the other to Eudorus, and
those men certainly seemed to wrestle the most beautifully of the men of their time. Or don't you
remember?
ANYTUS: I do, by hearsay.
SOCRATES: Therefore is it clear that it would not ever be the case that that man {94d} taught
his children those things for which there is a need to expend money in order to teach, while he
didn't teach those things for which there is in no way a need to spend in order to make them good
men, if it were taught? But anyhow, was Thucydides perhaps a paltry man, and was there

151
The first speaker in Plato's Laches. He was a friend of Socrates' father (Laches 180e). Plato leads us
to believe (Laches 179c-d) that Lysimachus had the same opinion of himself as Socrates here seems to
imply. Lysimachus' son Aristides seems to have in turn inherited the defects of his father (see Theaetetus
150e-151a).
152
c. 495-429 BCE. The most renowned Athenian politician, Pericles was the greatest leader of the
democrats and dominated Athenian politics for over three decades. He was responsible for many
democratic reforms and the massive building-projects of the so-called Golden Age of Athens. Though
extremely popular, Pericles began to fall from favor during the second year of the Peloponnesian War
when a plague broke out in besieged Athens. Socrates severely criticizes Pericles in the Gorgias (503c-d,
515d-517c).
153
Cf. Protagoras 319e-320a.
154
This Thucydides (c. 500-c. 423 BCE) was son of the elder Melesias and a leader of those who
supported oligarchic ideals and opposed Pericles. Not to be confused with Thucydides the historian.
155
Thucydides' son Melesias is depicted in the Laches (179c-d) as having the same problems as his friend
Lysimachus. Melesias was a member of the oligarchic council of Four Hundred which ruled Athens for
two months in 411 during the Peloponnesian War.

58
perhaps not for him very many friends among Athenians and Athens' battle-allies? Actually,
there was for him a great family, and he was greatly capable in the city156 and among the other
Greeks, so that if indeed that was taught, he would have found whoever was going to make his
sons good—someone either of the countrymen or of the {94e} foreigners—if he himself had not
the leisure because of his attention to the city. But anyhow, comrade Anytus, perhaps virtue is
not taught.
ANYTUS: Socrates, you seem to me to speak badly of humans too easily. I would, therefore,
counsel you, if you are willing to be persuaded, to be apprehensive. Perhaps even in another
city—but entirely in this one—it is so much easier to do humans ill than to do them well. {95a}
But I suppose that you are aware of it yourself.
SOCRATES: Meno, Anytus seems to me to be harsh, and I in no way wonder at it; for, firstly,
he supposes that I speak badly of those men; moreover, he regards himself as one of those
men.157 But if that man ever recognizes what sort of thing speaking badly is, he will stop being
harsh; but now he fails to recognize it.
But you tell me: aren't there beautiful-and-good men among you Thessalians too?
MENO: Entirely. {95b}
SOCRATES: What, therefore? Are these men willing to hold themselves forth as teachers of
the young and to agree that they are teachers and that virtue is taught?
MENO: No, by Zeus, Socrates. Rather, sometimes you might hear from them that it's taught,
and sometimes that it's not.
SOCRATES: Are we to assert, therefore, that these men, who don't even agree on this thing
itself, are teachers of this matter?
MENO: It doesn't seem so to me, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What then? Do those men, the Sophists—the only ones indeed who announce
themselves as teachers—seem to you to be teachers of virtue? {95c}
MENO: Actually, concerning Gorgias, Socrates, I admire these things most: that you would
never hear him promising that;158 rather, he laughs at the others when he hears them promising it.

156
This calls to mind a passage in the Gorgias (466d ff.) in which Socrates argues that orators do not have
great power in their cities.
157
I.e., one of the so-called beautiful-and-good political men.
158
Contrast 71c-d. In Plato's Gorgias (459e-460a), Gorgias claims to admit that he will teach a student
what is good and bad, just and unjust, if the student comes to him without such knowledge. However, his

59
But he supposes that there is a need only to make his students fearsome159 at speaking.
SOCRATES: Then the Sophists don't seem to you to be teachers either?
MENO: I'm not able to say, Socrates; for actually I myself am affected in the way the many160
are: Sometimes they seem to me to be teachers, and sometimes not.
SOCRATES: But are you aware that not only to you and to the other161 political people does this
seem sometimes to be taught and sometimes not? {95d} But are you aware that Theognis the
poet says these same things?
MENO: In which verses?
SOCRATES: In the elegiac couplets where he says:
"And drink and eat beside, and sit with, and please the ones whose capacity is great. For
from good people you are taught good things, and if with bad people {95e} you mix, you
will destroy even what discernment there is in you."
Are you aware that in these he is saying that virtue is taught?162
MENO: He appears to.
SOCRATES: Whereas in other couplets he goes back on this a little: "And if," he asserts,
"discernment is made and put into a man," then, he somehow says, the ones who are capable of
doing this "would maintain many great wages", and "from a good father a bad person would
never come to be, {96a} since he would be persuaded by sound-minded stories. But you will
never make the bad man good by teaching." Do you understand that he, reversing himself, says
contrary things about the same things.
MENO: He appears to.

protégé Polus is made to defend Gorgias, claiming that Socrates "shamed" Gorgias into making the claim
(Gorgias 461b-c). And Gorgias' host Callicles criticizes all Sophists (i.e. those who claim to teach virtue)
as "worth nothing" (520a). Gorgias and his associates seem not to have considered him technically a
Sophist. Still, it is interesting that Socrates in the Defense Speech (19e) seems to lump Gorgias together
with the other "Sophists" (20a) who claim to provide education in "citizen's virtue" (20b).
159
See my note 3 on Defense Speech 17b.
160
The Greek words hoi polloi ("the many") can be used generally to mean something like most people or
the general public, or more specifically to mean most within some subset of people assumed by the
context.
161
Meno was soon to become a general in Cyrus' expedition (see note 6 above). No one in Greece at this
time in history could become a general without being a politician. In Athens, for example, generals were
elected by the Assembly.
162
If training is not to count as a kind of "learning" or "being taught" (cf. 70a), then Aristotle appears to
interpret the lines a bit differently, saying that according to Theognis "a sort of training concerning virtue
comes about from living with good people" (Nicomachean Ethics 1170a11-13; cf. Xenophon
Memorabilia 1.2.20). See 70a and note 5 above.

60
SOCRATES: Therefore, are you able to tell of any other matter whatsoever about which the
ones who claim to be teachers are not in any way agreed to be teachers of others, but are not
even agreed to be knowledgeable themselves, but are agreed to be defective163 {96b} about that
thing itself of which they assert they are teachers; whereas the ones who are agreed to be
beautiful-and-good themselves sometimes assert that it is taught, and sometimes not? Would
you, therefore, assert that people who have been so perturbed concerning anything whatsoever
are achieved teachers?
MENO: No, by Zeus, at least I would not.
SOCRATES: Then if neither the Sophists nor the ones who are beautiful-and-good themselves
are teachers of the matter, is it clear that there wouldn't be others?
MENO: It doesn't seem to me that there would. {96c}
SOCRATES: And if there aren't at least teachers, then there aren't learners either?
MENO: It seems to me to stand as you say.
SOCRATES: And we have agreed that that matter of which there were neither teachers nor
learners wouldn't be taught either?
MENO: We have agreed.
SOCRATES: Of virtue, then, teachers appear to be nowhere.
MENO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: And if there aren't at least teachers, then there aren't learners either?
MENO: It appears thus.
SOCRATES: Virtue, then, would not be taught?164 {96d}
MENO: It doesn't seem like it, if indeed we have considered it correctly. So I actually wonder,
then, Socrates, whether there are not even good men ever, or what is the manner of coming-to-be
of the ones who have come to be good.
SOCRATES: I daresay, Meno, that I and you are some sort of paltry men, and that Gorgias
didn't educate you sufficiently, nor Prodicus me.165 More than everything, therefore, we must be
discerning about ourselves and must search for someone who will make us better in some way.

163
"Poneria ('wickedness') can characterize anything in a poor state, and morally it implies baseness more
than viciousness. It is very close to [mochthēria]…" (Benardete 1984 p. 171 n. 21). I translate
mochthēria as "faultiness".
164
See my note 130 above.
165
There is no reason to take seriously Socrates' claim here (cf. Protagoras 341a, Charmides 163d) to have
been a student of Prodicus. Contrast Cratylus 384b.

61
{96e} I am saying these things, having looked back to the search we made just before, because
that things are done correctly and well by humans, not only by knowledge leading, was most
laughably unnoticed by us—whereby probably escaping us also is the recognition of in what
manner exactly the good men come to be.
MENO: In what way are you saying this, Socrates?
SOCRATES: In this way: that there is a need that the good men be beneficial— {97a} we
have correctly agreed to that at least and that they may not be otherwise; or not?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Also that they will be beneficial if they lead matters correctly for us—we certainly
agreed to that beautifully too?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But that they wouldn't lead correctly if they weren't mindful— With respect to
that, we are similar to people who haven't agreed correctly.
MENO: In what way exactly, are you speaking?
SOCRATES: I will say. If one who was aware of the road to Larissa—or whichever other place
you wish—walked and led others there, would he be leading in any other way than correctly and
well?
MENO: Entirely. {97b}
SOCRATES: But what if someone who opined correctly which road it was—not having gone
and not knowing—walked and led others there? Wouldn't that person too lead correctly?166
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: And certainly as long as he had correct opinion about those things the other person
has knowledge about, he will—though supposing truly while not being mindful—be in no way
worse at leading than that person who is mindful.
MENO: In no way indeed.
SOCRATES: True opinion, then, is—in relation to doing correct things—in no way worse at
leading than mindfulness. And that is the thing that we just now left aside in the search
concerning what sort of thing virtue is, when we said {97c} that only mindfulness leads correct
action. Whereas then we saw that there is also true opinion.
MENO: It seems like it.

166
Cf. Theaetetus 200e; contrast Republic 506c.

62
SOCRATES: Then correct opinion is in no way less beneficial than knowledge.
MENO: Only so much, Socrates, because the one who has knowledge is always fortunate,167
whereas the one who has correct opinion sometimes is fortunate but sometimes is not.
SOCRATES: How are you speaking? Wouldn't the one who has correct opinion always be
fortunate just as long as he opines correct things?
MENO: It appears to me to be a necessity. So I wonder, {97d} Socrates, since that stands thus,
in what way exactly is knowledge much more estimable than correct opinion, and because of
what is each different from the other.
SOCRATES: Are you aware, therefore, what it is because of which you wonder? Or shall I tell
you?
MENO: Tell me, entirely.
SOCRATES: Because you have not discerned the statues of Daedalus.168 But probably there are
none for you people in Thessaly.
MENO: And in relation to what exactly do you say this?
SOCRATES: Because those too abscond and run away if they are not bound; whereas, if they
are bound, they abide. {97e}
MENO: So what?
SOCRATES: For someone to have acquired the things made by that man, if they are loose, is
not worthy of much esteem (just as it isn't worthy of much esteem to have acquired a runaway
human slave); for they don't abide. But it is worth much esteem to have acquired them if they
are bound; for his works are entirely beautiful. In relation to what exactly, then, am I saying
these things? In relation to opinions—the true ones. For opinions—the true ones, for as much
time as they abide, are a beautiful thing and {98a} produce things entirely good. But they aren't
willing to abide for much time; rather, they run away out of the soul of the human, so that they
aren't worth much, until one binds them with reasoning about what's responsible.169 And that,

167
Or: "always meets with success".
168
A craftsman and inventor of legend and mythical founder of Greek sculpture. His statues were metal
or wooden (Burnet 1919 p. 668), and his skills in statuary presumably so far surpassed those of
predecessors that his works seemed in his day extraordinarily lifelike (Thompson p. 219), though would
not have been so considered in Socrates' own time (Hippias Major 282a). In Plato's Euthyphro, Socrates
claims him as an ancestor (11b-c); but there is probably no truth to the commonly accepted view that
Socrates himself (and his father) ever practiced statuary (Burnet 1924 pp. 50-51). Cf. my note on Defense
Speech 22e.
169
I.e., about why the beliefs are true. Compare Gorgias 465a, Phaedo 73a and 76b, Symposium 202a,

63
comrade Meno, is being-made-to-remember, as was agreed by us in our earlier statements.170
And when they have been bound, first they come to be knowledges, secondly they come to be
abiding. And because of those things, then, knowledge is more estimable than correct opinion,
and knowledge differs from correct opinion by being bound.
MENO: By Zeus, Socrates, it seems like it's something of that sort. {98b}
SOCRATES: And surely I too am speaking as one who is not aware, but as one who is making a
likeness.171 But that correct opinion and knowledge are in some way different— About that, I
don't seem to myself to be only making a likeness. Rather, if indeed I were to assert that I was
aware of anything else—and I would assert so of few things—then I would anyhow posit this
one thing too to be among the things I am aware of.
MENO: And you speak correctly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What then? Do I say this correctly: that when true opinion leads, each action's
work is produced no worse than when knowledge leads?
MENO: That too seems to me to be truly spoken. {98c}
SOCRATES: Correct opinion, then, will be in no way worse than knowledge nor less beneficial
in actions; nor is the man who has correct opinion worse or less beneficial than the one who has
knowledge.
MENO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: And surely it was agreed by us that at least the good man is beneficial.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, then, since men are good and beneficial to their cities (if indeed they are)
not only because of knowledge but also because of correct opinion, and since by nature {98d}
neither knowledge nor true opinion is in those humans— Or does one of the two seem to you to
be in them by nature?
MENO: Not to me at least.
SOCRATES: Therefore, since it is not by nature that either is in them, the good ones would not
be so by nature either.

Republic 534b, Theaetetus 200e ff.

170
This appears to be a reference to 85c-d.
171
I.e., likening the difference between knowledge and opinion to the difference between being bound
down and not being bound down. In Plato, making analogies or "likenesses" constitutes only conjecture
not knowledge. Those who can't explain the real nature of something can only work with analogies.

64
MENO: Surely not.
SOCRATES: And since it is not by nature that either is in them, the thing we considered after
that was whether it is taught.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it seemed that it would be taught, if virtue were mindfulness?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And it seemed that if it were taught, then it would be mindfulness?
MENO: Entirely. {98e}
SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it would be taught; whereas, if there weren't, it
wouldn't be taught?
MENO: It is so.
SOCRATES: But actually we have agreed that there aren't teachers of it?
MENO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: Have we agreed, then, that it is neither taught nor mindfulness?
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: But surely we agree that it is at least good?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that the thing that leads correctly is beneficial and good?
MENO: Entirely. {99a}
SOCRATES: And that these things alone—which are two: true opinion and knowledge—lead
correctly, and that if a human has them he leads correctly? For what is generated correctly by
some fortune is not generated by human leading. But the things by which a human leads things
to what's correct are these two: true opinion and knowledge.
MENO: It seems so to me.
SOCRATES: Therefore, since virtue is not taught, it no longer seems that it is knowledge
either?
MENO: It doesn't appear to be. {99b}
SOCRATES: Then we have set loose one of the two things that are good and beneficial:
knowledge would not be what leads correctly in political action.
MENO: It doesn't seem to me to be.

65
SOCRATES: Then the men of this sort—Themistocles and those around him and the ones
Anytus here spoke of just before—lead not by some wisdom or by being wise. Wherefore, then,
they also are not the sort to make others be the sort of people they are, as it is not by knowledge
that people are of that sort.
MENO: It seems like it stands thus, Socrates, as you say.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if not by knowledge, then what's left is that they come to be by opining
well, {99c} which the political men use to make their cities correct, being no differently
disposed toward mindfulness than oracles and godly diviners; for these people too say many true
things with a god in them, while being in no way aware of what they are saying.
MENO: I daresay they are disposed thus.
SOCRATES: Therefore, Meno, are they worthy of being called "godly" those men who, without
discernment, make many great things be correct, both in acting and in speaking?
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Then we would correctly call "godly" {99d} the oracles and diviners we were
speaking of just now and also all the poets.172 And we would correctly assert that the political
people are not least of those who are godly and who have a god in them, being inspired and taken
hold of by some god, when by speaking they make many and great matters correct, though being
in no way aware about the things they are saying.
MENO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: And women too, Meno, certainly call good men "godly"; the Laconians173 too,
when they laud a good man, say, "This man is godly!" {99e}
MENO: And they appear at least, Socrates, to say so correctly. And yet probably Anytus here is
aggravated by your saying so.
SOCRATES: Our attention is in no way on that—at least not mine. Actually, with that man,
Meno, we'll be discussing hereafter. But, now, if we have searched and spoke beautifully in this
entire discussion, then virtue would be neither by nature nor taught, but is generated in the ones
in whom it's generated without discernment by godly dispensation, {100a} unless there were
one of the political men of such a sort as to make another person political174 too. And if there

172
Cf. Defense Speech 22b-c and Ion 533d-534e. Contrast Meno 95c-96a: so far from having true
opinions, the poets actually contradict themselves!
173
i.e., Spartans.
174
I.e., someone competent in politics.

66
were, that man could somehow almost be said to be of such a sort among the living as Homer
asserts Tiresias was among the dead, when he says about him, "That one alone of those in Hades
had breath,175 while the others were darting shades."176 In the same way, in this place here, the
man of that sort177 would be, just as among shades, a true thing in relation to virtue.178 {100b}
MENO: You seem to me to say most beautiful things, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Well, then, from this reasoning, Meno, it appears to us that it's by godly
dispensation that virtue is generated in those in whom it's generated. But we will be aware of the
plain truth about it only at that time when—before searching for in what manner virtue is
generated in humans—we attempt to search for what exactly it is itself by itself.
But now is the hour for me to go somewhere. But persuade your host-friend Anytus here
too of those same things that you yourself are persuaded of, in order that {100c} he be more
mild, because if you do persuade this man, it is possible that you will help the Athenians too.179

175
The expression implies both the literal breath "of life" and the ability to speak (and so to reason), all of
which the dead in Homer's Hades lacked. The Greek word for "being inspired" (at 99d) comes directly
from this word for "breath".
176
Cf. Odyssey 10.495. Tiresias was a seer of legend who alone was supposed to have in death been
exempt from the usual fate of the dead in Homeric myth, which was deprivation of full cognitive powers.
177
I.e., the political expert who can make another person a political expert.
178
"This place" is the place of the living, as opposed to Hades. It is noteworthy that in Plato's Gorgias
Socrates claims to be "beautiful-and-good" (511b)—the very term that Socrates uses in his Defense
Speech when the issue of "human's and citizen's virtue" is first raised (20b). See note 148 above. Also in
the Gorgias he claims that he "alone of the men today [genuinely] practice[s] the political things" (521d).
179
This alludes either generally to Anytus' status as a prominent political leader in Athens or more
specifically to the instrumental part he played in Socrates' prosecution and eventual execution, and to
Socrates' opinion that his own practice of examining and exhorting his fellow-citizens does them a great
service (cf. Defense Speech 30a-c). If the latter, then Plato evidently means for us to conclude that some
of the opinions Socrates is made to express in this dialogue (particularly in his discussion with Anytus)
led directly to Anytus' decision to prosecute Socrates.

67
 The Euthyphro
(translation and annotation by Scott J. Senn, 20 December 2020)

{2a} EUTHYPHRO:1 Has something new come to be, Socrates, that you are now spending time here
around the King's Portico,2 having left the places in the Lyceum where you spend your time?
For surely there doesn't happen to be for you too a judicial case before the king, just as for me?
SOCRATES: Indeed, Athenians at least, Euthyphro, don't actually call it a "judicial case", but
an "indictment".3 {2b}
EUTHYPHRO: What are you saying? Someone has written an indictment against you, as is
likely; for, this I will not recognize: that you did so against another.
SOCRATES: Certainly not.
EUTHYPHRO: Rather, another against you?
SOCRATES: Entirely.
EUTHYPHRO: Who is this person?
SOCRATES: I myself don't even entirely recognize the man in any way, Euthyphro; for he
appears to me to be someone young and unrecognized. However, as I suppose, they name him

1
We know of Euthyphro only from Plato, who also mentions him in the Cratylus 396d ff. As we shall
see, he is an eccentric, but "well-born" (7e) diviner who, though evidently not popularly respected,
considered himself an unsurpassed expert on religious matters.
2
Located in Athens' Agora, this was the building that housed the chambers of the "king" (see note 3
below). On the significance of Socrates' presence here in the Agora, as opposed to the Lyceum, see my
note 9 on Defense Speech 17c.
3
"Indictment" was the legal term for a judicial case that was considered "public", in that the alleged
victim was the whole community, rather than a private individual (OCD4 p. 803). In Athens, religious
crimes fell in this category. A private case could be prosecuted only by the victim (or, in the case of
homicide, by a close relative of the victim); a public case could be prosecuted by any citizen. Socrates'
actual trial was early in 399 BCE—spring (White p. 171 n. 31), perhaps March (Burnet 1919 p. 665) or
April (Riddell p. xxxvii n. 18) (cf. Rowe 1993 p. 109, Rhodes 1992 p. 606). So the dramatic date of the
Euthyphro is probably late in 400 (cf. Burnet 1924 p. 25). Socrates here is to appear before the "king" as
part of the case's pre-trial inquiry (ibid. p. 2), wherein statements and evidence from both parties would be
heard before the case would be granted a trial (OCD4 p. 804). (Euthyphro, having just done so in his own
case, is exiting the King's Portico.) The "king" was actually a magistrate who was in charge mainly of the
religious duties formerly taken care of by the kings of Athens' ancient monarchy; in particular, the "king"
oversaw any court case concerning religious offenses, which included homicides.

68
"Meletus". And he is from the deme4 Pittheus—if you're able to discern some Pitthean Meletus,
one with straight hair and not entirely full-bearded and somewhat hook-nosed.5
EUTHYPHRO: I don't discern him, Socrates. But what then is the indictment {2c} that he has
written against you?
SOCRATES: What one? Not an ill-born one, it seems to me at least. For it is no paltry thing for
one, while being young, to come to recognize a trouble of this sort: for, as he asserts, he is aware
in what manner the young are ruined and who ruins them. And I daresay he is someone wise;
and, having become aware of my lack of learning, he is going before the city, just as before a
mother, to arraign me for "ruining" his peers. And he appears to me {2d} alone to begin the
political things correctly; for the correct way is to attend first to the young so that they will be the
best possible, just as a good farmer attends first, as is likely, to the young plants, and after that to
the others too. And now {3a} Meletus too probably is first cleansing away us: the ones who
are ruining the young sprouts, as he asserts. Then after that, it's clear that, when he has attended
to the elder ones, he will, for the city, become responsible for the most numerous and greatest
goods—as at least is the likely thing to turn out for one who begins from a beginning of this sort.
EUTHYPHRO: I would wish it, Socrates; but I'm afraid lest the contrary will come to be; for to
me he seems simply to be producing bad things for the city, beginning at its hearth, by putting
his hand to doing injustice to you. And say to me: by doing what exactly, does he assert that you
ruin the young? {3b}
SOCRATES: Out of place things, wonderful man—at least to hear them thus: for he asserts that
I am a maker of gods—i.e. that I make "novel" gods while "not acknowledging"6 the ancient
ones. For the sake of those things themselves, he has indicted me, as he asserts.
EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates: then it's because you assert that the divine thing comes
to you each time.7 Therefore he has written this indictment, according to which you make

4
A deme was one of a number of townships or neighborhoods within the city of Athens.
5
On Meletus' identity and possible motive for the indictment, see my note 7 on Defense Speech 23e.
6
See my note 22 on Defense Speech 18c. On the indictment itself, see Defense Speech 24b-c.
7
Socrates often claimed to have been "very frequently" affected by a phenomenon which, whenever it
"came/happened" to him, "turned" him away or "held" him back from doing what he had been about to do
(Defense Speech 31c-d, 40a-b). He described the phenomenon as "divine" and "of/from" a god (though
the deity in question is never identified), and he interpreted it as "divinatory/prophetic"—as a "sign" that
what he had been about to do in such cases was "incorrect" or would have been "bad" or "unbeneficial"
for him to do (Defense Speech 40a-c, 31d-e), presumably due to his conviction that a divinity cannot be
responsible for anything bad or misleading (Defense Speech 21b, Republic 379b ff.). He twice describes

69
innovations concerning the godly things, and then he is going to the Judiciary8 to asperse you,
being aware that things of that sort are easy to make aspersions about before the many. Me too,
{3c} of course: whenever I say something in the Assembly9 concerning the godly things, saying
beforehand the things that are going to be, they laugh at me as though I were mad. And yet, of
the things that I foretold, I have said nothing that is not true. But nonetheless they begrudge all
us people of this sort.10 But in no way ought one to be mindful of them; rather, one ought to
come right into close quarters with them.
SOCRATES: Friend Euthyphro:11 but being laughed at probably is no trouble. For the
Athenians actually, as it seems to me, don't attend vehemently to anyone who they suppose is
fearsome12—unless of course they suppose he's likely to teach his own wisdom. But toward one
who {3d} they may suppose makes others too be of that sort, their spiritedness is roused—
whether from grudge as you say, or because of some other thing.
EUTHYPHRO: Because of that, I have entirely no appetite for making at any time a trial of how
they are disposed toward me.
SOCRATES: For probably you seem to be scarce at holding yourself forth and seem not to be
willing to teach your own wisdom. Whereas I'm frightened that I seem to them, because of my
friendship toward human beings, to say profusely whatsoever I have to every man, not only
without payment, but even being, with pleasure, put out of pocket if anyone is willing to hear
me. Now then, if, as I said just now, they were going to laugh at me, just as {3e} you assert
they do at you, it would in no way be unpleasant to pass the time kidding around and laughing
before the Judiciary. But if they are going to be serious, then in what way this case will turn out
is unclear except to you diviners.

the phenomenon as "a sort of voice", which he may not have meant literally, especially as he never says
what it said or even whether it ever actually said anything. The phenomenon is usually described by
modern commentators as an order or a warning. But Socrates never speaks of it that way, always
describing it instead as a restraint or obstruction from a chosen course of action (see Senn 2012 pp. 15-20
for a full defense of my own interpretation).
The reason that Euthyphro here speculates that Meletus alludes to Socrates' divine sign is because
such things would be easily misrepresented in court, not because it is real evidence for religious
"innovation" (Burnet 1924 p. 18; cf. pp. 15-16, 128 and Burnet 1914 pp. 183-185).
8
See my note on Defense Speech 17a.
9
See my note 91 on Defense Speech 25a.
10
He feels an affinity with Socrates due to the divine sign's "divinatory" nature (see note 7 above).
11
As Burnet notes, when the vocative is out in front, it is emotional; here it "expresses remonstrance"
(1924 p. 19).
12
See my note 3 on Defense Speech 17b.

70
EUTHYPHRO: But probably it will be no trouble, Socrates; but you will compete in the judicial
case as you would mean to, and I suppose that I will in mine too.
SOCRATES: And what judicial case then is yours, Euthyphro? Are you defending yourself, or
are you prosecuting?
EUTHYPHRO: I am prosecuting.
SOCRATES: Whom? {4a}
EUTHYPHRO: One whom in prosecuting I, again, seem to be mad.
SOCRATES: What then? Are you prosecuting something that flies?13
EUTHYPHRO: He is far from flying, as he happens to be very elderly.
SOCRATES: Who is this person?
EUTHYPHRO: My father.
SOCRATES: Yours, best of men?!
EUTHYPHRO: Actually, entirely.
SOCRATES: What is the charge, and what is the judicial case concerning?
EUTHYPHRO: Concerning murder, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, what's the correct way is not recognized by the
many; for I at least don't suppose that it is characteristic of just any person {4b} who happens
along to do this;14 rather, it's characteristic surely of one who is already riding far into wisdom.
EUTHYPHRO: Far indeed, by Zeus, Socrates.15
SOCRATES: And then is the one who was put to death by your father someone of your family?
Or is it, then, clear? For you wouldn't proceed16 with a murder-charge against him on behalf of
one of another's.
EUTHYPHRO: It's laughable, Socrates, that you suppose it makes any difference whether the
one who was put to death is of one's family or of another's. Rather, there is a need to be on guard
about only this: whether the killer killed in justice or not; and if he did so in justice, to let it be;
but if not, to proceed against him—if the killer {4c} is one who shares one's hearth and the same
table. For the foulness is equal if you are with one of that sort while being aware along with

13
Socrates uses a proverbial expression, better understood if we translate the Greek technical term for
"prosecute" literally—i.e., as "chase". The proverb was similar to our "wild goose chase".
14
I accept Burnet's deletion of "correctly" at 4b1 (1924 p. 21).
15
As we shall see much more of below, Euthyphro is irrepressibly arrogant.
16
A legal term for formally pursuing a judicial case once a charge has been made (Burnet 1924 p. 22).

71
him,17 and do not expiate18 yourself and also that one by proceeding against him in a judicial
case.
Besides, the very one who was put to death was a laborer of mine, and when we were
farming on Naxos, he was hired there by us.19 Then, drunk with wine and irate with some one of
our familial servants, he cuts their throat. Therefore, my father, having bound together his feet
and hands and thrown him into some ditch, sends a man back here in order to learn from the
Exegete20 what he ought to do. And during this {4d} time, he cares little for and is inattentive
to the one who's bound, as he is a murderer and it is "no trouble" if he dies—which is just what
he is then subjected to too; for he dies from hunger and shivering and the bonds before the
messenger arrives back from the Exegete.
Therefore, my father and the other family-members are irritated at these things: because
on behalf of the murderer I am proceeding with a murder-charge against my father, who "didn't
even kill him" (as they assert)—and even if he very much did kill him, since the one who was
put to death was a murderer, "there is no need to be mindful on behalf of one of that sort"; for "it
is impious"21 {4e} for a son to proceed with a murder-charge against his father—they being ill
aware, Socrates, of how the godly stands concerning the pious and the impious.

17
sc., of his guilt.
18
The word in Greek comes from the word I have translated as "pious".
19
The fact that the victim was not a slave makes Burnet conclude that Euthyphro's case was never granted
an actual trail (1924 pp. 24, 25), on the grounds that the right to prosecute such a case would be confined,
under Athenian law, to the victim's near relatives (or else slave-owner) (ibid. p. 22), as Socrates himself
had assumed in Euthyphro's case (4b). Homicide was regarded as affecting the whole community with an
ungodly "foulness (miasma)" that had to be purged, which is why such cases were overseen by the "king";
however, they were not technically considered "public" cases, and so could not be prosecuted by just any
citizen (Burnet 1924 p. 3; see note 3 above).
The island of Naxos was an Athenian colony until Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War in
early 404 BCE (OCD4 p. 334). At that time Euthyphro's family would therefore have likely lost the
farmland allotted to them there. So the incident that he describes seems to have occurred before then.
Burnet explains the delay in Euthyphro's proceedings by citing the legal complexities of the case and
especially the major overhaul of Athenian law between the restoration of democracy in September 403
and 401/0 (see note 99 on Defense Speech 26d), during which time "the courts were practically inactive"
(Burnet 1924 pp. 25-26).
20
This probably refers to a consultation with Pythian Apollo, whom the Athenians traditionally regarded
as Exegete ("interpreter") of sacred and ancestral law (OCD4 p. 559; cf. Republic 427c and Xenophon
Memorabilia 1.3.1). It wasn't until c. 400 BCE that Athens entrusted such interpretation to appointed
officials. "Back here" means back from Naxos to the Greek mainland.
21
As this is the first occurrence in this dialogue of the concept that becomes its preoccupation, a word is
in order about what kind of thing the Greeks at this time had in mind in using the terms I translate as
"pious" and "impious". First, it is important to keep in mind that "…the sacred/secular dichotomy as we

72
SOCRATES: And then do you, by Zeus, Euthyphro, suppose that you are so precisely
knowledgeable of how things stand concerning the godly things, and the pious and the impious,
that—if those things are done as you say—you aren't frightened in bringing a judicial case
against your father lest you in turn happen to do an impious act?
EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, there would be no benefit in me, Socrates, {5a} nor would Euthyphro
be in any way different from the many of humans, if I weren't precisely aware about all things of
that sort.
SOCRATES: Therefore, wonderful Euthyphro, isn't it best for me22 to become your disciple,
and, before the indictment with Meletus, to call him out23 on these things themselves, stating
that, even in previous time I myself made being aware about the godly things be of most
importance, and now, since that man asserts that I am erring by acting offhandedly and by
making innovations concerning the godly things, I have then become your disciple? "And,
Meletus," {5b} I would assert, "if you agree that Euthyphro is wise in the things of this sort,
regard me too as acknowledging them correctly and do not bring the judicial case. But if not,
then bring a judicial case against that one who is my teacher rather than me, as he is ruining the

know it has little meaning for the Greek world. Greek religion is community-based, and…therefore polis-
based [i.e., city-based]. …Greek religion is primarily a public religion rather than a religion of the
individual" (OCD4 p. 1262). "Piety", however, did have specifically to do with what concerned the gods.
The gods of traditional Greek religion paid little attention to the affairs of ordinary humans, except insofar
as they deemed themselves affected (Most p. 309; Mikalson pp. 24-25; Guthrie p. 121; Martin pp. 159-
160; Garland 2013 p. 209; cf. Euthyphro 12d-e: piety is only a part of justice). So "piety" primarily had
to do with "offering of appropriate honors to the gods on appropriate occasions", including gifts in the
form of prayers, libations, hymns, dedications, or animal sacrifices, the participation in religious festivals,
and the construction and maintenance of temples (Mikalson pp. 25ff.). The gods' concerns, and thus the
domain of piety, also extended to observance of the ancestral religious customs of one's community,
attending to the dead in funeral rites and making offerings at tombs, treating one's parents well, adherence
to oaths taken with divine witness, and honoring of the guest/host-relationship (ibid. pp. 182ff.). Also,
acts of murder and treason were considered impious. One major difference between traditional, ancient
Greek religion and some religions with which we are more familiar is that, for the Greeks, "the focus of
devotion [to the gods] was not upon belief but upon action" (Garland 2013 p. 208; cf. Burkert p. 275,
Most p. 303). (The focus on outcomes, more than what was in the mind or heart of the individual,
characterized the popular Greek view of virtue more generally; see my note 3 on Meno 70a and note 132
on Defense Speech 30b.) As Burnet explains, "the conception of [religious] 'orthodoxy' in the sense of
assent to statements of an historical character or to speculative dogmas did not exist" (1924 p. 5; Cf.
Martin p. 161). See note 30 below.
22
sc., the strongest position for me would be…
23
This was a legal term, referring to a process, during the pre-trial inquiry, whereby one party could make
on record an offer to or demand of the other party. Burnet explains, "If one of the parties declined a
reasonable [offer/demand], that would prejudice his case" (1924 p. 28; cf. his note on 5b6).

73
elderly, me and his own father, by teaching me and by admonishing and restraining24 him." And
if he isn't persuaded by me and doesn't either let go of the judicial case or indict you instead of
me, then isn't it best for me to say before the Judiciary those things themselves that I called him
out on?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates. If he then puts his {5c} hand to indicting me, I would
find out, as I suppose, in what way he is flawed, and for us the discussion before the Judiciary
would come to be about that man much before it would about me.
SOCRATES: And of course, comrade-friend, recognizing those things, I have an appetite for
becoming your disciple, being aware that, whereas both this Meletus and certainly anyone else
seem not even to see you, he is so sharply and easily aware of me that he indicts me for
irreverence.25
Now then, before Zeus, say to me what you were just now strongly insisting that you
were plainly aware of: what exactly do you assert the reverent and the irreverent is, {5d} both
concerning murder and concerning the other things? Or isn't the pious itself the same as itself in
every action? And again isn't the impious—everything whatsoever that is going to be impious—
contrary to everything pious, and is itself similar to itself and has, with respect to its impiety,
some single aspect?26
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly, entirely.
SOCRATES: Say, then: what do you assert is the pious and the impious?
EUTHYPHRO: Well, then, I say that the pious is just what I am now doing: proceeding against
anyone who does injustice by erring with regard to murder or with regard to stealing sacred
things or any other of the things of that sort, whether it {5e} happens to be father or mother or
any other one whatsoever. And the impious is not proceeding. For, Socrates, contemplate how
great a mark I will tell you of that the law27 is thus disposed (a mark—which I already told of to

24
In Greek, this was the term for corrective punishment—punishment for the good of the recipient (J.
Adam 1890 p. 73), to check the desires that lead him to do injustice. (I translate the word literally to keep
this sense in view.) Self-restraint was thus a virtue ("sound-mindedness" or "mindfulness"), as the
individual who has it controls and corrects himself, rather than leaving it to others.
25
In this dialogue at least, "reverent" and "pious" seem to be used either synonymously or co-
referentially.
26
In this dialogue at least, the Greek word for "aspect" seems to be synonymous with the Greek word for
"form" (6d). See my note on Meno 72c.
27
As Burnet points out (1924 p. 33), Euthyphro here is clearly invoking unwritten law, ultimately divine
in its authority. This explains his obliviousness to the fact that he really had no legitimate legal case

74
others too—that these things would come to be correctly if they come to be thus): to not permit
the irreverent one, whosoever it happens even to be. For the humans themselves happen to
acknowledge Zeus as, of the gods, {6a} best and most just, and on this they agree: that he
bound his own father because he drank down his sons28 not in justice, and that the latter in turn
castrated his own father29 because of other things of that sort. And they are harsh with me
because I am proceeding against my father who does injustice, and thus they say things contrary
to themselves both concerning gods and concerning me.
SOCRATES: Is it, Euthyphro, for the sake of this that I am defending against the indictment:
that whenever someone says things of that sort concerning the gods, I accept them intolerantly?
Because of it, then, as is likely, someone will assert that I err.30 Now, therefore, if those things
seem so to you too, who {6b} are well aware concerning the things of this sort, it's surely a
necessity, as it likely, for us too to accede. For what shall we even assert, we ourselves who also
agree that we are in no way aware about them? But tell me, before the god of friendship,31 do
you truly regard those things as having happened thus?

against his father (see note 19 above).

28
Hesiod describes the titan Cronus swallowing his divine children at birth, except Zeus, who later would
lead the army of Olympian gods to defeat and imprison the Titans (Theogony 459ff., 617-721).
29
Hesiod tells of Cronus being prompted by his mother Gaia to commit the act against his hated father
Uranus (Theogony 154-181).
30
Socrates wonders whether he is being prosecuted because he does not accept the poets' stories about the
gods according to which they behave like humans by acting unjustly and battling with each other (cf.
Republic 377d ff.). However, Burnet is perfectly right in rejecting this as a serious explanation of the
indictment (1924 pp. 34-35; 1914 pp. 182-183). The poets' stories about the gods were not sacred: As
Burkert explains, in popular ancient Greek religion "there are no founding figures and no documents of
revelation, no organization of priests and no monastic orders. …Among the Greeks these tales [in
traditional myths] are always taken with a pinch of salt: the truth of a myth is never guaranteed and does
not have to be believed. …The importance of the myths of the gods lies in their connection with the
sacred rituals for which they frequently provide a reason, an aetiology, which is often playfully
elaborated. The art of poetry then gave individual myths a fixed and memorably form…" (pp. 8-9). In
fact, Socrates' belief that the stories are not to be accepted literally was probably closer to the mainstream
view than Euthyphro's was (cf. note 32 below). Mikalson makes an important distinction between the
gods as they appear in literature and the gods that the ancient Greeks actually worshipped: "Many today
have come to know the Greek gods primarily or solely from [poetic] literature and therefore imagine the
gods to have been as they are presented in the epics, tragedy, comedy, and the other poetic genres. …
Because they share the same names, many naturally assume that the familiar gods of Greek literature,
with their interesting personalities and all too human vices, were the gods actually worshipped by the
Greeks, but this leads to a very mistaken conception of the gods to whom real Greeks prayed, sacrificed,
and offered their dedications. … The deities of Greek poetry, in a sense, both were (by name, physical
appearance, and sometimes function) and were not (by local cult myths, rituals, and sometimes function)
the deities whom each Greek personally worshipped" (pp. 34, 37).
31
Traditionally, Zeus.

75
EUTHYPHRO: And even things still more wonderful than those, Socrates, which the many are
not aware of.32
SOCRATES: And do you regard that there really is war among the gods against each other, and
fearsome enmities and battles, and many other things of that sort, which are spoken of by the
poets and {6c} with which the other sacred things are variegated by the good painters?—and
surely too in the Great Panathenaea the Robe, replete with variegations of that sort, is led up to
the Acropolis.33 Do we assert that those things are true, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Not only those, Socrates; but, just as I told of just now, I will, if you wish, also
lead you through many other things concerning the godly things—things which, when you hear
them, I know well that you will be stunned at.
SOCRATES: I wouldn't wonder at it. Those other things you will lead me through hereafter, at
leisure. But now, those things that I was just now asking you, try {6d} to tell most plainly. For
you did not, comrade, teach me sufficiently when I asked you what exactly the pious is. Rather,
you told me that that which you are now doing—proceeding with a murder-charge against your
father—happens to be pious.
EUTHYPHRO: And I was saying true things, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Perhaps. But indeed, Euthyphro, you assert that many other things are pious too.
EUTHYPHRO: For there are too.
SOCRATES: Then do you remember that I was not exhorting you to do that—to teach me one
or two of the many pious things—, but to teach me that form itself by which all the pious things
are pious? For you were asserting that it is surely by a single {6e} aspect that the impious
things are impious and the pious pious. Or don't you remember?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.

32
Burnet notes, "This is clear indication that Euthyphro belonged to some peculiar sect" (1924 p. 35).
Indeed, Parker claims that the stories to which Euthyphro here alludes "are very likely to have been
Orphic" (p. 489). As Burnet and Parker point out, Isocrates (11.89) castigated Orpheus "most of all" of
the poets for telling scandalous stories about the gods. A pre-Homeric poet of ancient Greek legend,
Orpheus was considered the founding theologian of Orphism and other Bacchic/Dionysian cults. The
doctrines of Orphism were "not to be spoken" to the uninitiated and so would not have been widely
known, let alone accepted. See my note 63 on Meno 81b.
33
The Panathenaea was an annual civic festival held in honor of Athens' patron goddess Athena. Every
four years, a much more elaborate Panathenaea (the "Great Panathenaea") was celebrated, during which a
new robe, embroidered with scenes of the battle between gods and giants, was carried in a ceremonial
procession through the streets of Athens and presented to the statue of the goddess in her temple on the
Acropolis (OCD4 p. 1073).

76
SOCRATES: Well then, teach me what exactly that aspect itself is, so that, looking to that and
using it as a paradigm, I may assert that the thing of that sort—among the things that you or
anyone else may do—is pious, and I may assert that the thing not of that sort is not.
EUTHYPHRO: But if you wish thus, Socrates, then I will instruct you thus.
SOCRATES: But I do indeed wish it.
EUTHYPHRO: Well then, what is friendly toward the gods34 is pious, {7a} and what is not
friendly toward them is impious.
SOCRATES: Entirely beautiful, Euthyphro! And, as I was searching for you to answer, so are
you answering. If you are answering truly, however—that I am not yet aware of. But it's clear
that you will teach that the things you are saying are true.
EUTHYPHRO: Actually, entirely.
SOCRATES: Come then. Let us consider what we are saying: the god-befriended thing and the
god-befriended human are pious, while the god-hated thing and the god-hated human are
impious. The pious is not the same as—but most contrary to—the impious; isn't it thus?
EUTHYPHRO: Actually, thus.
SOCRATES: And it appears to have been well said? {7b}
EUTHYPHRO: I seem to have done so, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And that the gods are factionalized, Euthyphro, and differ with each other, and
among them there are enmities against each other—that too was said?
EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, it was said.
SOCRATES: And about which things, best of men, does the difference make enmity and ire?
But let's consider it in this way: If you and I were to differ about number—which of two groups
is more numerous—, then would the difference concerning those things make us enemies and
make us be irate at each other? Or, having gone to reasoning,35 would we quickly be released
from our difference, at least concerning the things of that sort? {7c}
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.

34
The Greek is "tois theois prosphiles". The expression is practically indistinguishable from "tois theois
philon" (e.g., at 15b-c and Crito 43d), which I translate as "friendly to the gods". The term "philon" is
often translated as "loved", and "phileitai" as "to be loved". But such translations rather obscure the
relation to the word "philos", which means friend. Also, it is best to keep "philia (friendship)" distinct
from "erōs", which means erotic love.
35
The word in Greek here has its most basic sense, meaning reckoning or counting.

77
SOCRATES: And if we were to differ about the greater and lesser, then, having gone to
measuring, wouldn't we quickly stop the difference?
EUTHYPHRO: Those things are so.
SOCRATES: And, having gone to weighing, we would, as I suppose, judge the heavier and
lighter?
EUTHYPHRO: For how could we not?
SOCRATES: But having differed about what, then, and not being capable of coming to a
judgment about what, would we be enemies and irate at each other? Perhaps there isn't for you a
thing at hand. But, while I {7d} am speaking, consider whether it is these: the just and unjust,
and beautiful and shameful, and good and bad. Having differed concerning those things, and not
being capable of coming to a sufficient judgment about them, don't we come to be enemies to
each other, whenever we come to be enemies—I and you and all the other humans?
EUTHYPHRO: But that is the difference, Socrates, and it's concerning those things.
SOCRATES: And what about the gods, Euthyphro? Wouldn't they—if indeed they differ in any
way—differ about those things themselves?
EUTHYPHRO: It's much a necessity. {7e}
SOCRATES: Then even among the gods, well-born Euthyphro, some, according to your
account, regard some things as just (and beautiful and shameful and good and bad), and others
regard others. For surely they would not be factionalized among each other if they didn't differ
concerning those things; or what?
EUTHYPHRO: You speak correctly.
SOCRATES: Those very things that they each regard as beautiful and good and just—don't they
also befriend those things, whereas they hate the contraries of those?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely?
SOCRATES: But the same things, as you assert, some regard as just, while others {8a} regard
as unjust—concerning which they, controverting, are factionalized and war with each other. Isn't
it thus?
EUTHYPHRO: Thus.
SOCRATES: Then the same things, as is likely, would be hated and befriended by the gods, and
the same things would be both god-hated and god-befriended.
EUTHYPHRO: It is likely.

78
SOCRATES: Then the same things would be both pious and impious, Euthyphro, by that
account.
EUTHYPHRO: I daresay.
SOCRATES: Then you didn't answer what I asked, divine one! For I wasn't asking for that,
which, being the same thing, happens to be pious and impious—and which would be god-
befriended and god-hated, as is likely. {8b} So, Euthyphro, what you are now doing in
restraining your father is nothing wonderful if, by performing that, you do what is befriended by
Zeus, but inimical to Cronus and Uranus,36 and friend to Hephaestus, but enemy to Hera.37 And
if any other of the gods differs with another concerning it, it is with those too according to the
same things.
EUTHYPHRO: But I suppose, Socrates, that none of the gods differs with another concerning
this38 at least, saying that there isn't a need for one who kills another unjustly to receive justice.39
SOCRATES: What then? Have you, Euthyphro, by now heard any of the humans {8c}
controverting, saying that there isn't a need for one who kills unjustly—or does unjustly any
other thing whatsoever—to receive justice?
EUTHYPHRO: Well, actually, they in no way stop controverting in those ways and others,
especially before the Judiciaries. For, though they have done entirely many injustices, they do
and say all things to escape justice.
SOCRATES: Do they also, Euthyphro, agree that they do injustice, and, though agreeing,
nonetheless assert that there isn't a need for them to receive justice?
EUTHYPHRO: In no way do they do that.
SOCRATES: Then they will not do and say everything. For I suppose they don't dare to speak
nor to convert in this way: saying that, even if they {8d} do do injustice, they mustn't receive
justice. Rather, I suppose, they don't assert that they do injustice; or what?
EUTHYPHRO: You say true things.

36
This recalls the stories of father-punishment alluded to at 6a (see the accompanying notes).
37
Burnet explains the reference to Hephaestus and Hera: "…When Hera had thrown Hephaestus out of
heaven, he took his revenge by sending her a golden throne with invisible bonds, so that, when she sat
upon it, she was fast bound" (1924 p. 40).
38
I.e., Euthyphro's prosecution of his father.
39
Literally translated the phrase is "to give justice". Idiomatically, it meant to pay a penalty in
accordance with justice.

79
SOCRATES: Then they don't controvert in this way: saying that there is no need for the one
who does injustice to receive justice; rather, they probably controvert about this: about who is
the one who did injustice, and what he performed, and when.
EUTHYPHRO: You say true things.
SOCRATES: Aren't the gods too affected in the same ways, if indeed they are factionalized
concerning the just things and the unjust things, as your account says? And don't the ones assert
that the others do injustice, while the others assert they don't? For certainly this, you wonderful
man, no one either of gods or {8e} of humans dares to say: that the one who does injustice
mustn't receive justice.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, in that, you say a true thing, Socrates—at least principally.
SOCRATES: But I suppose, Euthyphro, it's about each of the things that has been done that the
ones who controvert controvert—both humans and gods, if indeed gods controvert. Differing
about some action, the ones assert that it's been done justly, while others assert it's been done
unjustly. Isn't it thus?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely. {9a}
SOCRATES: Go on then, Euthyphro: teach me too—so that I become wiser—what is for you a
mark that all gods regard as having died unjustly this man, who, having became a murderer while
under hire, having been bound up by the master of the one who had been put to death, came to an
end because of the bonds before the one who had bound him learned from the Exegete what he
ought to do concerning him; and that, on behalf of the one of this sort, it is then correct for the
son to proceed against the father and accuse him of murder. Go on: {9b} concerning those
things, try to show me in some plain way that, more than everything, all gods regard that action
as correctly done. And if you show me sufficiently, I will never stop lauding you for wisdom.
EUTHYPHRO: But probably it is no little work, Socrates, although I would be able to give you
a show40 entirely plainly.
SOCRATES: I understand. Because I seem to you to be worse at learning than the
Adjudicators, since it is clear that you will show those men that the things of that sort are unjust
and all the gods hate them.

40
As J. Adam points out, the term Euthyphro uses "suggests a long, somewhat windy sermon, rather than
a cogent proof… The word is regularly used of a sophistic display…" (1890 p. 77; cf. Gorgias 447b-c,
Protagoras 347a-b). Euthyphro complains that simply to "show" Socrates would be too much work;
instead, he says he could "give a show".

80
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely plainly, Socrates, if indeed they will at least hear me speak.41 {9c}
SOCRATES: But they will hear you, if indeed you seem to speak well.
But just as you were speaking, I discerned this, and considered to myself, "If Euthyphro
were very much to teach me that all the gods regard the death of one of that sort as unjust, what
more have I learned from Euthyphro about what exactly is the pious and the impious? For that
deed may be god-hated, as is likely. But in fact it appeared just now that the pious and what's
not is not defined by that; for it appeared that the god-hated is also the god-befriended."42
So I will let you go from this, Euthyphro. If you wish, let all {9d} gods regard it as
unjust and let all hate it. But are we now making this correction in the account: that what all the
gods hate is impious, and what all befriend is pious, and what the ones befriend while the others
hate is neither or both? Do you wish for us to have now defined thus concerning the pious and
impious?
EUTHYPHRO: For what restrains us, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Nothing restrains me, Euthyphro. But you consider now for your part if, in
positing that, you will thus teach me most easily what you promised. {9e}
EUTHYPHRO: But at least I would assert that the pious is what all the gods befriend, and the
contrary—what all gods hate—is impious.
SOCRATES: Are we to consider this in turn, Euthyphro: whether it is beautifully stated? Or
are we to allow and thus accept it from us ourselves and from others, acceding that it stands thus
if only someone asserts that something stands thus? Or must one consider what the person who
speaks states?
EUTHYPHRO: One must consider it. Yet at least I suppose this now is beautifully stated.
{10a}
SOCRATES: Soon, good man, we will be better aware. For discern this sort of thing: Is the
pious befriended by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is befriended?
EUTHYPHRO: I'm not aware in what way you're speaking, Socrates.

41
As we have seen, Euthyphro's "proof" invokes scandalous stories about the gods (5e-6c). As Burnet
says (1924 p. 43), Euthyphro expects to be laughed at in court, just as he has in the Assembly (3c).
42
See 7e-8a. The point is that, even if all the gods happen to agree about a particular act, it wouldn't
mean that what's god-befriended is the same as what's pious, because, as we have seen, the gods disagree
in other cases.

81
SOCRATES: But I shall try to instruct more plainly: We speak of something borne and
something bearing, and of something led and something leading, and of something seen and
something seeing. And you understand that all the things of that sort are other than each other,43
and in what way they are other?
EUTHYPHRO: At least I seem to me to understand.
SOCRATES: Therefore, also, there is something befriended, and the one that befriends is other
than that thing?
EUTHYPHRO: For how could it not? {10b}
SOCRATES: Say, then, to me whether what's borne is a borne thing because it's borne, or is it
because of some other thing?
EUTHYPHRO: No; rather, it's because of that.
SOCRATES: And what's led, then, is a led thing because it's led; and what's seen is a seen thing
because it's seen?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Then one is seen, not because that is a seen thing; rather, the contrary: one is a
seen thing because that is seen.44 And one is led, not because that is a led thing; rather, one is a
led thing because that is led. And one is borne, not because it is a borne thing; rather, one is a
borne thing, because it is borne.
Is it {10c} very clear, Euthyphro, what I wish to say? And I wish to say this: that if
anything comes to be something,45 or anything is affected in some way,46 then it comes to be not
because it is a thing that comes to be; rather, it is a thing that comes to be because it comes to be;
and it's affected not because it is an affected thing; rather, it is an affected thing because it's
affected.47 Or don't you accede thus?

43
i.e., each member of every such pair is distinct from the other member of the pair (see, e.g., 10a10-11;
cf. 11a4).
44
The point is expressed perhaps more clearly in the somewhat more expanded way of 10c10-12: i.e.,
according to Socrates, a thing's being seen by the agent who sees it is what explains why the thing
happens to be a thing that is "seen". (In other words, the fact that the agent sees the thing accounts for its
being "seen".) Socrates rejects the alternative form of explanation: viz., that the thing's being "seen" is
what explains why a thing is seen by the agent who sees it. (In other words, the fact that a thing is seen
doesn't account for the agent's seeing it.)
45
E.g., comes to be seen, or comes to be stated.
46
The two alternatives are: something is done, or something has something done to it.
47
The point is that, whether someone does something (e.g. states something), or a thing has something
done to it (e.g. is led), one cannot make sense of why the agent did it by citing the very thing that was

82
EUTHYPHRO: At least I do.
SOCRATES: Then, also, is what's befriended something that comes to be or something that is
affected in some way by someone?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Then this too, just as the things before, stands thus: one is befriended by the ones
by whom it's befriended, not because it is a befriended thing; rather, it is a befriended thing,
because it's befriended.
EUTHYPHRO: It's a necessity. {10d}
SOCRATES: What, then, do we therefore say about the pious, Euthyphro? Anything other than:
it's befriended by all gods, as your account says?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because of this: that it is pious? Or because of some other thing?
EUTHYPHRO: No; rather, it's because of that.48
SOCRATES: Then it's befriended because it is pious; but it's pious not because it's befriended?
EUTHYPHRO: It's likely.
SOCRATES: But, yet, it certainly is a befriended thing and god-befriended because it is
befriended by gods.
EUTHYPHRO: For how could it not?
SOCRATES: Then the god-befriended is not the pious,49 Euthyphro; nor is the pious the god-
befriended, as you state. Rather, this is other than that. {10e}
EUTHYPHRO: How, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Because we agree that the pious is befriended because it is pious, but not that it is
pious because it's befriended. Or what?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that the god-befriended, because it's befriended by gods, is god-befriended by

done (i.e., by saying "he states it because it's a stated thing", or "they are led because they are led
individuals"). Rather, the thing was done because of what the thing was in the first place (e.g., "he states
it because it's true", "they are led because they are sheep").
48
The point is supposed to follow directly from the generalization at 10c: the reason why the gods
befriend the pious cannot be because of the befriending itself; rather, the gods befriend the pious because
of what it was in the first place, before they befriended it. See note 47 above.
49
I.e., they are not identical (cf. 10e10-11).

83
that being befriended itself;50 but not that it is befriended because it's god-befriended.
EUTHYPHRO: You say true things.
SOCRATES: But if, friend Euthyphro, the god-befriended and the pious were the same, then: if
the pious were befriended because of being pious, {11a} the god-befriended too would be
befriended because of being god-befriended; and if the god-befriended were god-befriended
because of being befriended, the pious too would be pious because of being befriended.
But now you see that they are disposed in contrary ways, as they are quite entirely other
than51 each other. For the one52, because it's befriended, is the sort to be befriended;53 whereas
the other54 is befriended because it is the sort to be befriended.
And I daresay, Euthyphro, when you were asked what exactly the pious is, you wished
not to make clear to me the substance55 of it, but to speak of some affection concerning it: "The
pious has been affected in this way: being befriended by {11b} all gods." But what it is, you
did not yet tell. Therefore, don't conceal it from me, if it's friendly to you not to; rather, tell
again from the beginning what exactly the pious is, whether it is befriended by gods or is
affected in any way whatever; for we shall not differ about that. But tell spiritedly what is the
pious and the impious.
EUTHYPHRO: But, Socrates, at least I have no way of telling you what I discern it is; for,
somehow, what we posit is always going around for us and isn't willing to abide where we settle
it.
SOCRATES: The things stated by you, Euthyphro, are likely to be our progenitor {11c}
Daedalus'.56 And if I stated them and posited them, you would probably jest at me, saying that
therefore, in accordance with that genealogy, the works I produce in my statements also abscond
and are not willing to abide where someone puts them. But indeed, as it now is, the hypotheses

50
The god-befriended is of course what it is (viz., god-befriended) because it is god-befriended. Unlike
the pious, which is what it is (viz., pious) not because it is god-befriended.
51
sc., distinct from.
52
The god-befriended.
53
sc., is fit to be befriended. Presumably, the same wouldn't be true of whatever is befriended (i.e., by
anyone); just because something is befriended doesn't make it thereby fit to be befriended. Significantly,
the point in this passage is about the god-befriended, since while a mere human may be mistaken about
whether an object deserves his/her friendship, an infallible god may not.
54
The pious.
55
See my note on Meno 72c.
56
See Meno 97d and my note there.

84
are yours. There is then a need of some other jest; for they aren't willing to abide for you, as it
seems even to you yourself.
EUTHYPHRO: But it seems to me that the things that are stated, Socrates, are in need of nearly
the same jest; for I am not the one who is putting into them that going around and not abiding in
the same place; {11d} rather, you seem to me to be doing so—you the Daedalus—since, as for
me, those things would abide thus.
SOCRATES: Then I daresay, comrade, that I have become more fearsome in the art than that
man inasmuch as this: he made only his things not abide, whereas I, besides my things, do so to
those of others too, as is likely. And surely, for me, this is the most elegant thing of the art: that
I am involuntarily wise; for I would wish that the statements for me would abide and would have
been settled immovably rather than {11e} that the money of Tantalus57 came to be for me
besides the wisdom of Daedalus.
And enough of those things. Since you seem to me to be luxuriating,58 I will be spirited
with you about teaching me concerning the pious. And don't you get weary beforehand.
For, see if it doesn't seem to you to be a necessity that all the pious is just.
EUTHYPHRO: To me at least.
SOCRATES: Therefore, all the just is pious too? Or is the pious {12a} all just, while the just is
not all pious? Rather, is some of it pious, while some of it is something else?
EUTHYPHRO: I don't, Socrates, follow the things that are being stated.
SOCRATES: And yet you are no less younger than I than you are wiser! But, as I say, you are
luxuriating due to a wealth of wisdom. But strain yourself, blessed59 one; for what I am saying
isn't even hard to discern; for I am saying just the contrary of the poet who made the verses:60
"Zeus the one who wrought it—even the one who grew all these things {12b}
is not willing to revile.61 For where is fear, there is also awe."
I therefore differ with the poet in this. Shall I tell you how?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.

57
A legendary king in Asia Minor whose wealth was proverbial.
58
As Euthyphro himself confesses, he is not quite up to the rigors of philosophical proof (9b).
59
See my note on Crito 44c.
60
Even Plato may not have known the identity of the poet (see J. Adam 1890 p. 92).
61
I have tried to preserve the ambiguity that seems inherent in the original text: it's not clear whether
Zeus is or is not supposed to be one and the same with "the one who grew all these things" (see J. Adam
1890 pp. 92-93).

85
SOCRATES: It doesn't seem to me that "where is fear, there is also awe"; for many seem to me
to fear when they fear sicknesses and poverty and many other things, but seem in no way to be in
awe of those things that they fear. Doesn't it seem to you too?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: But it seems to me that where there is awe, there is also fear; for has whoever is in
awe of and is ashamed at some action been simultaneously not fright- {12c} ened and fearful of
a reputation of defectiveness?
EUTHYPHRO: Actually, they have been fearful.
SOCRATES: Then it is not correct to state, "For where is fear, there is also awe." Rather, where
there is awe, there is also fear—surely not "everywhere fear is, awe is". For I suppose that fear
extends further than awe; for awe is part of fear, just as odd is part of number; so it's not "where
there is number, there is also odd", but "where there is odd, there is also number". For surely
you follow now.
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Well then, when I was speaking there, I was asking something of that sort too:
{12d} where just is, is pious also there? Or where pious is, there is also just; but not everywhere
there is just, there is also pious; for the pious is part of the just? Do we assert it, or does it seem
to you another way?
EUTHYPHRO: No; rather, thus. For you appear to me to be speaking correctly.
SOCRATES: See, then, what is after that. For if the pious is part of the just, then there is of
course a need for us, as is likely, to find out exactly what part of the just is the pious. Now then,
if you were asking me about any one of the things mentioned just now, such as exactly what part
of number is the even and which does this number happen to be, then I would tell that it is not
scalene but isosceles.62 Or doesn't it seem to you?
EUTHYPHRO: At least to me. {12e}
SOCRATES: You too, then, try to teach me exactly what part of the just is the pious, so that we
may also say to Meletus not to do us injustice anymore nor to indict us with irreverence, saying
that we have already sufficiently learned from you about the reverent and pious things and the
things that are not.

62
As J. Adam explains, "Greek arithmetic was largely geometrical… An even number is of course called
isosceles as being divisible by 2" (1890 p. 95).

86
EUTHYPHRO: Well then, this seems to at least me, Socrates, to be the reverent and pious part
of the just: the one concerning the ministering to the gods. Whereas the one concerning the
ministering to the humans seems to be the remaining part of the just.63
SOCRATES: And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to be speaking beautifully. {13a} But I am
still in need of something small: For I don't yet comprehend which ministering you are naming.
For surely you aren't stating that, just as are the ministerings concerning the others, of that sort
too is the ministering concerning the gods. For surely we speak so: as when we assert that not
everyone is knowledgeable about ministering to horses; rather, the horseman is. Or what?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: For surely horsemanship is ministering to horses?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor even is everyone knowledgeable about ministering to dogs; rather, the kennel-
leader is.
EUTHYPHRO: It is thus.
SOCRATES: For surely kennel-leadership is ministering to dogs. {13b}
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And cattlemanship is ministering to cattle.
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: And then piety and reverence are ministering to gods, Euthyphro? Are you
speaking thus?
EUTHYPHRO: At least I am.
SOCRATES: Doesn't every ministering accomplish the same thing?—as of this sort: it is for
some good and a benefit for the one whom is ministered to, just as you of course see that the
horses are benefited and become better, being ministered to by the horseman. Or don't they seem
to you.
EUTHYPHRO: At least to me.
SOCRATES: And surely too the dogs by the kennel-leader, and the {13c} cattle by the
cattleman, and all the others in the same way. Or do you suppose that the ministering is for the
injury of the one whom is ministered to?
EUTHYPHRO: By Zeus, not I.

63
Cf. Gorgias 507b, Laches 199d-e.

87
SOCRATES: But for benefit?
EUTHYPHRO: How could it not?
SOCRATES: Therefore, is piety too, being ministering to gods, a benefit to gods and does it
make the gods better? And would you accede this: that when you do something pious, some
god is better by your work?
EUTHYPHRO: By Zeus, not I.
SOCRATES: Nor indeed, Euthyphro, do I suppose that you are stating that. Far from it.
Rather, it was actually for the sake of this {13d} that I asked you exactly which ministering to
the gods you were speaking of: I didn't regard you as stating that sort of thing.
EUTHYPHRO: And correctly, Socrates; for I am not stating that sort of thing.
SOCRATES: All right. But then piety would be which ministering to the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: The very one, Socrates, by which slaves minister to their masters.
SOCRATES: I understand: as is likely, it is some assistantship64 to gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Actually, entirely.
SOCRATES: Would you be able, therefore, to tell me: for producing which work does the
assistantship to healers happen to be an assistantship? Don't you suppose it is for health?
EUTHYPHRO: At least I do. {13e}
SOCRATES: And what about the assistantship to shipbuilders? For producing which work is it
an assistantship?
EUTHYPHRO: It's clear, Socrates, that it's for a vessel.
SOCRATES: And surely the one to housebuilders is for a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, best of men: the assistantship to gods would be assistantship for
producing what work? For it's clear that you are aware, since indeed you assert that you are
aware about the godly things most beautifully of all humans.
EUTHYPHRO: And I state it truly, Scorates.

64
From the word "hupēresia (assistance)" Socrates coins the term "hupēretikē" to parallel the examples of
"horsemanship (hippikē)", "kennel-leadership (kunēgetikē)", and "cattlemanship (boēlatikē) at 13a-b.
The suffix "-ikē" connotes a kind of professional competence. As usual, Socrates discusses virtue as
though it were a kind of "art" (cf. 14e). "Assistants" in ancient Greek originally referred to the rowers of
a ship.

88
SOCRATES: Then tell me, before Zeus, what exactly is this entirely beautiful work that the
gods produce using us as assistants?65
EUTHYPHRO: Many beautiful things, Socrates. {14a}
SOCRATES: Indeed the generals do too, friend; but you could nonetheless easily tell of their
principal one: they produce victory in war; or not?
EUTHYPHRO: How could they not?
SOCRATES: And the farmers too, I suppose, produce many beautiful things; but nonetheless
the principal one from their producing is nourishment from the earth.
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: And what, then, of the many beautiful things that the gods produce? What is the
principal one from their producing?
EUTHYPHRO: I told you a little before too, Socrates, that {14b} to learn precisely how all
these things stand is much work. However, I simply state this: that if someone is knowledgeable
about stating and doing things gratifying to the gods by praying and sacrificing, those are the
pious things. And the things of that sort keep safe the private families and the communities of
the cities, whereas the contraries of the gratifying things—which indeed overturn and undo all
things—are irreverent
SOCRATES: Through things much shorter, Euthyphro, you could, if you wished, have told me
the principal thing of the things I was asking. But indeed you are not {14c} spirited about
teaching me; it is clear. For you turned away, just now when you were at the point at which, if
you answered, I would already have learned the pious from you sufficiently. But now—for it's a
necessity for the lover to go after the beloved66 wherever he may lead—what, again, do you say
is the pious and the impious? Isn't it some knowledge of sacrificing and praying?
EUTHYPHRO: At least I say so.
SOCRATES: Isn't sacrificing giving to the gods,67 while praying is petitioning them?
EUTHYPHRO: Very much, Socrates. {14d}
65
A hint as to what Socrates thinks is the answer is perhaps to be found in his Defense Speech, especially
where he describes his own "assistance to the god" (30a). See Senn 2013 pp. 85-86.
66
I accept Burnet's reading (ton erōnta tōi erōmenōi) (1924 p. 59). Burnet aptly compares Euthyphro's
"luxuriating" (11e-12a) to Meno's at Meno 76b, where Socrates confesses his incapacity to resist
gratifying "beautiful" people (76c, 86d). (An alternate reading of Euthyphro 14c4 would be: "…the one
who asks to go after the one who is asked…")
67
That sacrifice constituted a kind of "gift" given to the gods seems to have been the conventional view
(OCD4 p. 1307).

89
SOCRATES: Then, from that account, piety would be knowledge of petitioning and giving.
EUTHYPHRO: You comprehended entirely beautifully, Socrates, the thing I told you.
SOCRATES: For I am, friend, one who has an appetite for your wisdom and I am holding forth
my discernment toward it so that whatever you may tell me doesn't fall to the ground. But state
for me what is this assistance to the gods? You assert that it is petitioning them and giving to
them?
EUTHYPHRO: At least I do.
SOCRATES: Therefore, wouldn't correctly petitioning be to petition them for those things that
we need from them?
EUTHYPHRO: What other things? {14e}
SOCRATES: And correctly giving, in turn, would be to give back to them in turn those things
that they happen to need from us? For it surely wouldn't be artful for one who gives to give to
someone those things that he in no way needs.
EUTHYPHRO: You say true things, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then piety would for gods and humans, Euthyphro, be some art of trading from
each to the other.
EUTHYPHRO: An art of trading—if it's pleasant for you to name it thus.
SOCRATES: But it is in no way pleasant for me, if it happens not to be true. But instruct me:
what benefit does there happen to be for the gods from the gifts that they receive from us? For,
what things they give, {15a} it is clear to everyone; for there is for us no good which they do
not give. But the things they receive from us— In what way do they benefit? Or do we get so
much more in the trading than they, that we receive all the good things, while they receive none
from us?
EUTHYPHRO: But do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited from those things they
receive from us?
SOCRATES: But then whatever would those things be, Euthyphro: the gifts from us to the
gods?
EUTHYPHRO: But, I suppose, what other than esteem and honors and, just as I was just now
saying, gratification? {15b}
SOCRATES: Is the pious, then, gratifying, Euthyphro, but not beneficial nor friendly to the
gods?

90
EUTHYPHRO: At least I suppose that it is of all things most friendly.
SOCRATES: Then this again, as is likely, is the pious: what is friendly to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Most of all.
SOCRATES: Will you wonder, therefore, in saying those things, if the statements for you
appear not to abide but to walk? And will you hold me "the Daedalus" responsible for making
them walk when you are much more artful than Daedalus and make them go around in a circle?
Or don't you sense that the discussion for us has gone around and come back again to the same
place? {15c} For surely you remember that in the discussion from before the pious and the god-
befriended appeared to us not to be the same but other than each other. Or don't you remember?
EUTHYPHRO: At least I do.
SOCRATES: Therefore, don't you now discern that you are asserting that what is friendly to the
gods is pious? And does that come to be anything other than god-befriended? Or not?
EUTHYPHRO: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Therefore, either we didn't then agree beautifully, or—if we did beautifully then—
we aren't positing correctly now.
EUTHYPHRO: It is likely.
SOCRATES: Then we must, from the beginning, consider again what is the pious, as I will not
voluntarily be fearful about considering it before I learn it. {15d} But do not disesteem me;
rather, holding forth your discernment in every manner as much as possible, tell me now the
truth. For you are aware, if indeed any other of humans is, and you, like Proteus,68 must not be
let go before you tell. For, if you were not plainly aware about the pious and the impious, it's not
possible that you ever would have put your hand to prosecuting for murder an elderly man—your
father—on behalf of a hired man. Rather, concerning the gods, you would have feared risking it
lest you not do it correctly, and concerning humans, you would have been ashamed to do so. But
as it now is, I am well {15e} aware that you suppose that you are plainly aware about the pious
and what is not. Therefore, tell, best of men, Euthyphro, and don't conceal what you regard it as
being.
EUTHYPHRO: I will of course hereafter, Socrates; for now I hasten somewhere, and for me it
is the hour to go away.

68
An "unerring" sea-god in Homer's Odyssey (4.384ff.) who, if caught, changes shape to avoid answering
questions. If he is tightly kept hold of, he will eventually return to his original shape and submit to
questioning.

91
SOCRATES: Such things you do, comrade! You go away, throwing me down from a great
anticipation that I had that, by learning from you the pious things and the things that are not, I
would be released from the indictment from Meletus, show- {16a} ing to that man that I have
already, from Euthyphro, become wise about the godly things, and that I no longer act
offhandedly from lack of discernment nor make innovations concerning them, and also then that
I would live the rest of life better.

92
 Socrates' Defense Speech1
(translation and annotation by Scott J. Senn, 20 December 2020)

{17a} SOCRATES: In what way you, men of Athens,2 have been affected by my arraigners, I'm not
aware. But anyway, even I myself was almost made by them to forget who I am, so persuasively
did they speak. And yet they've said, in a word, nothing even true.
But of the many things that they falsified, I wondered most at this one of them in what
they said: that "you ought to be apprehensive lest you be beguiled" by me, {17b} as I'm
"fearsome3 at speaking." That they were not ashamed that they'll immediately be refuted by me

1
This is a more literal, less misleading translation of the title of the Platonic work best known to English
readers as the Apology of Socrates. (The Greek word apologia has virtually none of the connotations of
our "apology".) That this is a true dialogue isn't diminished by the fact that Socrates speaks mostly to his
judges and only briefly (at 24c ff.) to his only interlocutor Meletus. Socrates regards it as such: he
resolves to "interrogate though no one answers" (18d).
As for the dialogue's historical accuracy, Burnet's observations are worth noting: "it is not a word-for-
word reproduction of the actual speech delivered by Socrates", though Burnet does think it significant that
Plato represents himself as being present (34a, 38b), as he never does in any other dialogue (1924 p. 63).
2
The date is early in 399 BCE (see my note 3 on Euthyphro 2a). Socrates is on trial addressing a body of
judges (the "Judiciary," composed of "Adjudicators"). The charge against him (described at Defense
Speech 24b-c and Euthyphro 2a-3b) was brought by Meletus (backed by Anytus and Lycon) on behalf of
the city for alleged public offenses. In Athens, there were no public prosecutors; any citizen could
prosecute a case where a crime against the public was alleged.
For each such case in Athens, the judges (usually several hundred) were chosen by lot from a group
of six thousand male citizens, thirty or older, who had volunteered for judicial service at the beginning of
the year. Each judge was paid half a drachma for the service (Rhodes 2010 p. 61; see note 101 below).
Since this "was less than an able-bodied man would earn by an ordinary day's work,…many of the
volunteers were men who were too old for work" (OCD4 p. 803). Also, considering that Athens had
recently been defeated in a war that had lasted a generation, and had suffered a devastating plague during
430-426, the number of younger men available for judicial service would have been well below average
(Burnet 1924 p. 75). It is not known for certain how many judges sat on Socrates' trial. The numbers
Diogenes Laertius supplies (2.41-.42) are confusing in themselves and have been contested (cf. note 211
below). Burnet assumes there were five hundred judges, the size of a "normal" court (1924 pp. 150-151).
See also Brickhouse and Smith 1989 p. 26.
Athenian judges were not, as jurors today are, given directions or advised about how to interpret laws
and consider evidence. In the trial, "the prosecutor spoke first and the defendant afterwards. ...Each party
had to speak for himself, unless clearly incapable, though he might deliver a speech written for him..., and
he might call on friends to speak too in his support. ...He could request to have laws or other public
documents read out to the court. He could also call witnesses. ...Witnesses gave their evidence orally,
and might be questioned by the speaker who called them (but not cross-examined by his opponent). ... A
certain length of time...was allowed for each litigant to make his speech..." (OCD4 p. 804).
3
Here the Greek word implies cleverness. In some contexts, it has pejorative connotations, suggesting
sophistry; cf. its use at 28d-29a. The Athenian public was wary of people who had a reputation for crafty
speech (Thucydides 8.68.1; Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.31), especially teachers of it (Euthyphro 3 c-d)—

93
in deed when I make it apparent that I'm not in any way whatsoever fearsome at speaking—
That seemed to me to be most shameless of them. Unless, after all, these men call speaking the
truth "fearsome speaking." For, if they're saying that, then I myself would agree that I'm a
rhetorician not among them.4
Now then, these men, just as I say, have said either nothing true or only some; but from
me you'll hear the entire truth (not, however, by Zeus, men of Athens, statements that've been
spoken beautifully, {17c} as these men speak—nor even in expressions and terms that've been
carefully composed.5 Rather, you'll hear me speaking at random, with any terms I happen upon;6
for I trust that the things I say are just.) And let none of you expect otherwise. For it certainly
wouldn't be becoming either, you men, at my age to come before you molding accounts7 just as a
lad8 would.
And yet, men of Athens, I very much request of you, and beg off, this: If you hear me
speaking my defense with the same statements with which I've been in the habit of speaking in
the Agora9 at the banking tables (where many of you have heard me) and other places, don't

not without reason: their form of government and law-enforcement depended heavily on public speaking.
4
See 18a and note 12 below.
5
J. Adam's gloss on the word is: "sc. with metaphors and tropes..." (1916 p. 43). Burnet, however, says
the word must mean ordered or arranged rather than adorned, explaining that it is supposed to be opposite
of "speaking at random with any terms I happen upon" (1924 p. 70).
6
Cf. Symposium 199b.
7
sc., making up stories. This refers not to the rhetorician's "carefully composed expressions and terms"
spoken of at 17c, but to an adolescent's inclination to fib. Socrates is here returning to the subject of lying
versus truth-telling.
8
This seems to be an allusion to Meletus' testimony. Though surely not literally a "lad", Meletus was (in
Socrates' words) "young and unrecognized/unknown", "not entirely full-bearded" (Euthyphro 2b), at the
time of the trial. Cf. "youthfulness" at 26e.
9
The common impression (e.g. Garland 2013 p. 41) that Socrates spent most of his time in the Agora (the
social, civic, and commercial heart of the city) comes mainly from this comment as well as Xenophon's
Memorabilia 1.1.10. Other evidence suggests his favorite haunts were rather the Lyceum and other
gymnasia like the Academy located outside the city walls; see particularly Euthyphro 2a, Lysis 203a-b,
Euthydemus 271a, Symposium 223d (cf. Burnet 1924 p. 7). There is some indication that Socrates may
have preferred to avoid the Agora (see his desire to avoid "the mob" at Symposium 174a, and the way a
philosopher's relationship to the Agora is characterized at Gorgias 485d and Theaetetus 173d; Socrates is
made to speak disdainfully of the "paltry humans who frequent the Agora" at Protagoras 347c4-5; cf. note
160 below). Note also that none of Plato's dialogues takes place in the Agora except the Euthyphro,
where the setting is the "king's" portico and it is explicitly cited as a surprising place for Socrates to be as
opposed to the Lyceum (2a). In the Gorgias, it is Chaerephon, not Socrates, who made them spend their
time in the Agora; evidently Socrates had wanted instead to hear Gorgias speak (447a-b), probably near
the Lyceum or some other gymnasium. In the present passage, Socrates' emphasis seems to be on "where
many of you have heard me"; the Agora is the place where the general populace would have encountered
him most frequently. Socrates' only point here is to stress how vulgar his manner of speaking is. Riddell

94
wonder and don't {17d} make an uproar10 because of that. For it stands thus: I have come
before the Judiciary now for the first time, having come to be seventy years old. Therefore, I'm
simply a foreigner to the way of speaking here. Just as if I happened really to be a foreigner, you
would therefore, certainly, pardon me if I spoke in that very idiom and manner in which {18a}
I'd been nurtured; then also even now I request of you this—a just thing, as at least it seems to
me: To let my manner of speaking be—for it may be perhaps worse and perhaps better—and to
consider this itself and discern this: whether I say just things or not.11 For that is the virtue of an
Adjudicator; whereas that of a rhetorician is to say the true things.12
Now then, it's just that I speak my defense first, men of Athens, against the first falsifying
arraignments of me and the first arraigners, and then against the later arraignments and {18b}
the later arraigners. For many arraigners of me have come before you,13 even long ago, for many
years already, and saying nothing true. Of them I'm more frightened than of the ones around
Anytus,14 even though these are fearsome too. But those earlier ones are more fearsome, you

points out that those who frequented the banking tables "would be the richer class" (p. 45).
10
Cf. 27a-b. In an Athenian court (as at any Athenian public assembly), those present showed their
approval and disapproval of the speakers with sometimes clamorous clapping or shouting. In Laws 876b,
Plato's main speaker condemns such behavior, and compares it to that of spectators in a theater.
11
Someone unaccustomed to the Athenian courtroom will overlook an important fact that Burnet rightly
emphasizes (1924 p. 66-67), quoting Riddell: Socrates' exordium (17a-18a)—including the denial of
being a "fearsome" speaker, the begging leave to speak in one's accustomed way, the refusal to speak in a
style "unbecoming" an old man, the claim of unfamiliarity with the courtroom—"may be completely
paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators", sc. from such illustrious speech-writers as Lysias, Isocrates,
and Demosthenes, which suggests that Socrates' real abilities belie his claims of incompetence. As
Burnet explains, "...The exordium is, amongst other things, a parody, and the very disclaimer of all
knowledge of forensic diction...is itself a parody. ... It is impossible to doubt that Socrates was perfectly
familiar with contemporary rhetoric..." (1924 pp. 66-67; cf. Burnet's notes on 19d4, 28a4). Socrates has
claimed that he will be "speaking at random" (17c), that he will be speaking in his ordinary and natural
way, not as litigants usually do in court (17c, 17d-18a). The claim is so far from being true that it was
itself a commonplace among defendants (Riddell and Burnet cite Isocrates Antidosis 15.179 and
Demosthenes Against Aristogeiton 1 25.14). The accumulation of so many such commonplaces in this
brief passage by itself suggests that Socrates can hardly be "speaking at random" as he claims, which
must have been obvious to most of his listeners. Burnet's observation is apt: "It is just like Socrates to say
he knows nothing about forensic diction at the very moment when he is showing his mastery of it" (1924
p. 73). In Plato's Symposium the illustrious politician Alcibiades praises Socrates' power of speaking,
claiming that it was greater than that of Pericles (215d-e).
12
Socrates refers here to the "beautiful" kind of rhetoric mentioned at Gorgias 503a-b, 504d-e, and 527c
(cf. Phaedrus 270b), and not the kind of rhetoric actually taught by Gorgias and others (which is not even
considered a genuine art/skill by Socrates in the Gorgias). Socratic rhetoric aims at truth and justice, not
mere persuasion.
13
Here Socrates addresses the judges simply as citizens of Athens, as opposed to officers of the court.
14
Though Meletus is treated nominally as the instigator of the charge against Socrates (19b, 24c, 36a-b;

95
men; having apprehended the many of you in childhood,15 they arraigned me and persuaded
you—of not anything more true16—that there is some Socrates, a wise17 man, a minder18 of the

Euthyphro 2b9), this remark suggests that Anytus was the most significant of his three prosecutors (cf.
29c, 30b, 31a, 36a-b). He was certainly the most politically influential. He was at any rate the one who
suggested that Socrates, given that he chose to come to the trial instead of voluntarily fleeing Athens,
should be sentenced to death (29c). This Anytus is surely meant to be the same as the Anytus of Meno
89e ff. See note 78 below.
15
Cf. 18c. This is an indication that Socrates' notoriety as a "wise man", clever with words, and interested
in "inquiring into nature" was very old, especially considering the age of most of his judges (see note 2
above). If we assume, for instance, that "childhood" ends no later than fifteen and that many of Socrates'
judges were sixty or older, the time period Socrates here is referring to began around 445 BCE or earlier,
when Socrates was only in his twenties, well before the production of Aristophanes' Clouds in 423. We
know from Laches 187d-188a that Socrates' characteristic habit of cross-examination went back to his
early adulthood. This would have been nearly around the time that Socrates is reported (by Ion of Chios
in Diogenes Laertius 2.23) as having been a companion of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras.
Adolescent Alcibiades is described in the Symposium as having, no later than 437 (Burnet 1924 p. 138),
attempted to seduce Socrates in order "to hear [from him] everything—as much as the man knew" (217a;
cf. 219d). In Plato's Protagoras, the Sophist tells Socrates: "…Concerning you, I have said to many that I
admire you much more than any I have happened upon, certainly more than anyone your age at any rate.
Indeed, I even say that I would not wonder at it if you came to be among the famous men for your
wisdom" (361e). The passage implies that Protagoras had met Socrates at least once before the probable
dramatic date of the dialogue, circa 433. According to Adam and Adam (p. 80), Protagoras' prior visit to
Athens occurred "probably about 445 BC". Cf. Burnet 1924 p. 91
16
sc., than the arraignments of Anytus and company.
17
Socrates regards being called a "wise man" as the most severe of the earlier aspersions of him (see
23a3), notwithstanding his own peculiar conception of what constitutes widsom. "Wise man", Burnet
notes, "was not a compliment in the mouth of an Athenian of the fifth century B.C." (1924 p. 75). The
Defense Speech indicates that the expression was associated often with the Sophists and atheistic natural
philosophers (18b-c, 19c, 20a, 20d-e; compare Socrates' use of the term at Ion 532d and at Meno 75c8;
see also Euthydemus 304d). In some contexts the Greek word that I translate as "wise" (sophos) has
much the same connotation as the English word "crafty" or "sly". All by itself, however, the word did not
generally have the same pejorative connotations as "Sophist" (sophistēs) (pace Burnet 1914 p. 108; see
my note on Meno 91b). Indeed, sophos often just meant skilled or expert. There was a recognized
difference between simply being wise and making a profession out of being wise (i.e. being a professional
teacher; see Euthyphro 3c7-9); and certainly the former would have been held in high regard. J. Adam
says that sophos was "a fashionable epithet of praise in Plato's time", "especially applied to poets" (1963
p. 297; cf. Burnet 1924 p. 94 and my note on Meno 77b). At Republic 426c, Socrates says that the typical
politician—who gratifies the city with flattery and is clever at satisfying its desires—will be popularly
honored as "a good man and wise in the greatest things". Cf. Laches 197e. But, as Riddell says, the
expression "wise man" in the context of Socrates' trial would have been "understood as a class-
appellation" (p. 47), alluding to the Sophists and natural philosophers which the general public would not
carefully distinguish.
18
This word (phrontistēs) comes from the verb I translate as "to be mindful of", which Socrates seems to
have used in a nonstandard way to mean simply to think (Burnet 1924 p.76). In his Clouds Aristophanes
seems to make fun of the usage, calling Socrates "the minder" (266) and his school "Minders' Hall" (94),
coining a new word (phrontistērion) by adding the suffix "-ion" to "phrontistēs" in the manner of familiar
place-names like gumnasion ("gymnasium"), prutaneion ("Presidents' Hall"), bouleutērion ("Councilors'
Hall"). Similarly, the chorus in Ameipsias' Connus was composed of "minders". See note 24 below.

96
celestial19 things and one who searches into all the things under the earth20 and {18c} one who
makes the worse statement a superior one.21 Those, men of Athens, who scattered that assertion
around, are the fearsome arraigners of me. For the ones who hear it regard the ones who search
into those things as not acknowledging22 gods. And those arraigners are many and they've been
arraigning for much time already. And, moreover, they spoke to you during that age during
which you (being children and some of you lads) would be persuaded most, arraigning me
simply in a case defaulted because no one spoke a defense. The thing that's most unaccountable
of all is that it's not possible {18d} to be aware of or to say their names,23 except if one of them
happens to be a maker of satires.24 And however many, using grudge and aspersion, persuaded
you—and also the ones who, having themselves been persuaded, persuaded others— All those
are most difficult to overcome; for it's possible neither to make them come up here nor to
interrogate any of them. Rather, it's a necessity simply, as it were, to battle with shades in
speaking my defense and to interrogate though no one answers.
Deem it so, then, just as I say, that the arraigners of me have come to be twofold: the
ones who were just now arraigning, and the ones {18e} who arraigned long ago, whom I'm

19
Cf. Aristophanes' Clouds 228. The Greek is meteora. Meteorologia was "the study both of what might
now be called meteorological phenomena and…of (supposedly) related phenomena on and within the
earth itself, such as tides, earthquakes, volcanoes, and the formation of minerals and metals" (OCD4 p.
941). It would, in Socrates' time, also have included the study of the heavenly bodies (cf. 19b); in those
days, no distinction was made between astronomical as opposed to what we now call "meteorological"
phenomena (Burnet 1924 p. 76). The famous decree of Diopeithes provided an impeachment procedure
against impiety. Originally it was directed specifically against Anaxagoras (see note 99 below); but
generally it denounced all "those who do not acknowledge the godly things or who teach statements about
the celestial things" (Plutarch Pericles 32; OCD4 p. 465). Because of the amnesty of 403 BCE, the decree
would have officially been inadmissible against Socrates.
20
Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 187.
21
Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 112-115 (cf. 98-99, 883ff.). This ability was also attributed to Protagoras the
Sophist (Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a23). It was termed "the art of statements/speeches", and teaching it
seems to have been outlawed during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants (Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.31).
22
The verb is nomizein which is from a word meaning law (or custom). Other translators often render it
simply "to believe in/that." But the idea that it is meant to put in mind is rather to acknowledge,
recognize, or observe as a matter of law or custom—commonly implying performance of an action, such
as a sacrifice or other ritual (see, e.g., its use at Symposium 176a; cf. Burkert p. 275, Most pp. 303-4).
Accordingly, I translate it "to acknowledge." (See 27b and note 106 below.)
23
An indication that it is probably popular gossip and not primarily the claims of the comic poets that
Socrates is referring to. See note 27 below.
24
Though Socrates here probably has in mind Aristophanes (whom he names at 19c2), there were two
other comic poets who satirized Socrates around the same time Aristophanes did: Eupolis in his
Flatterers of 421 BCE, and Ameipsias in his Connus of 423. However, only fragments of the two plays
survive.

97
speaking of. And do suppose that there's a need that I speak my defense against these latter first;
for you've heard these arraigning earlier too and much more than those later ones.
All right. I must then speak my defense, men of Athens, and must put my {19a} hand to
taking away from you in so brief a time that aspersion which you have gotten during much time.
Now then, I would wish that this might come to be, if it is any better for both you and me, and
that I might make somehow a full defense-speech. But I do suppose that it is a hard thing, and
how hard it is is entirely not unnoticed by me. Nonetheless, let this go whichever way is friendly
to the god.25 But I must obey the law and speak my defense.
Let us, then, resume from the beginning. What is the arraignment from which {19b}
was generated the aspersion of me in which surely26 even Meletus trusted when he wrote down
that indictment against me? All right. By saying what, then, did the ones who aspersed asperse
me? Just as though they were arraigning me, there is therefore a need to make known their
sworn statement: "Socrates does injustice; i.e., he works overmuch at searching into the things
under the earth and into heavenly things, and {19c} he makes the worse statement a superior
one, and he teaches those same things to others." It is something of that sort. For even you
yourselves have seen those things in Aristophanes' satire:27 some "Socrates" being borne
around28 there, asserting that he was walking in air and babbling much other babble concerning
which things I am an expert in no way either greatly or a little. (And I am not speaking as
though I disesteemed knowledge of that sort, if someone is wise concerning things of that sort;
may I in no way be indicted by Meletus in judicial cases so great!)29

25
At Crito 43d Socrates uses the same phrase but uses "gods" instead of "god". The expression "the god"
in ancient Greek need not, and as a rule should not, be interpreted as implying monotheism. Its meaning
is usually rather the relevant god, referring to whichever divinity happened to exercise control or
dominion over the domain in question, when its identity is either obvious or else uncertain (see, e.g.,
Phaedo 60c2 and Rowe 1993 p. 119; also Smyth p. 289).
26
Socrates maintains that he is capable only of guessing at the meaning of Meletus' charge (Burnet 1924
p. 81). Cf. 31d1. After all, Socrates argues that Meletus' charge involves a contradiction (27a ff.).
27
The Clouds, produced in 423 BCE. (The only extant version of the play is a revision of the original and
was never performed.) Though Aristophanes may seem responsible for much of the aspersion lain on
Socrates, the comic poet was probably to a large extent reflecting an opinion about Socrates that had
already been framed long before the composition of his play (Burnet 1924 p. 75). See 18b with note 15
above, and 18c-d with note 23.
28
In the play, the actor playing Socrates was somehow suspended above the stage to make it appear
(probably, and perhaps intentionally, not very realistically) that he was walking on air (225-226).
29
sc., so great as to involve accusing me of disesteeming knowledge of that sort.

98
 But anyway, I, men of Athens, {19d} partake of those things in no way. And moreover
I hold forth the many of you as testifiers: I deem it worthy that you teach and instruct each other:
However many have ever heard me discussing (and many of you are of that sort)— Instruct each
other therefore, if anyone of you has heard me discussing about things of that sort either a little
or greatly.30 And from that, you will recognize that the other things the many say about me are
also of the same sort. But anyway, none of those things is so.
And if you've heard from someone that I put my hand to educating humans and {19e}
exact any money,31 that is not true either. However, at least that32 too seems to me to be
beautiful, if it were possible for someone to educate humans,33 as Gorgias the Leontinian and
Prodicus the Cean and Hippias the Eleatic do.34 For it is possible, you men, for each of those
men, when going to each of the cities, to persuade the young—who can be with35 any of their
own citizens they wish at no cost— {20a} to be with those former men while leaving behind
being with these latter, and to look upon them with gratitude besides giving them money.
Besides, there is also another wise man, from Paros, whom I sensed was staying here. For I
happened to come across a man who has defrayed more money to Sophists than all the others
together have: Callias,36 the son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked this man—for there are two
sons of him—, "Callias," said I, "if your sons had been born as foals or calves, we'd be able to

30
Note that Socrates doesn't say he never studied such matters; nor does he claim never to have discussed
such things. He says only that he isn't an expert in them, he doesn't (now) partake of them, and that his
judges here never heard him discussing them (which would stand to reason, if Socrates had given up such
studies by the time most of his judges were old enough to have the opportunity to hear and understand
Socrates' talks). In fact, the present passage seems rather to indicate his respect for such knowledge (19c)
and his belief that it would be "beautiful" (19e, just as the knowledge of how to educate humans is). In
the Phaedo Socrates reports that he did eagerly study such matters in his youth; there he is made to blame
himself for the fruitlessness of his own "inquiries into nature" (96b); but one can't help inferring that
Socrates came to regard that kind of inquiry as inherently fruitless (cf. Phaedo 100e, 101e-102a).
31
As Burnet says, "...it is noteworthy that he does not make Aristophanes responsible for this" (1924 p.
84).
32
sc., the education of humans.
33
Socrates here subtly expresses doubt as to whether such education (sc., making people good/virtuous) is
possible (cf. Protagoras 319b ff., Gorgias 521d, Euthydemus 282c).
34
At 20a he attaches the usual label of "Sophists" to such professional teachers. See my note on Meno
91b.
35
"To be with" was the regular expression for to be a student of (cf. Meno 92b and Protagoras 316c,
318e).
36
Grandson of the more famous Callias who fought in the battle of Marathon. Cf. Protagoras 311a ff.

99
apprehend and hire for them a supervisor37 who is going to {20b} make them beautiful-and-
good38 in their appropriate virtue: and that one would be either one of the horsemen or one of
the farmers. But as it now is, since they are humans, who do you mean to apprehend as
supervisor for them? Who is knowledgeable about the virtue of that sort: about the human's and
citizen's virtue? (For I suppose that you have considered it, because of your possession of the
sons.) Is there anyone," asserted I, "or not?" "Entirely," said he. "Who," said I, "and where
from, and how much does he teach for?" "Euenus, Socrates," he asserted, "from Paros, for five
minas."39 And I deemed Euenus blessed if he truly has that {20c} art and teaches so modestly.40
I would then beautify41 myself and luxuriate, if I were to know those things; but anyway I do not
indeed know them, men of Athens.
Someone of you, therefore, might probably retort: "But, Socrates, what is your practice?
Whence were those aspersions of you generated? For surely, in practicing nothing more
exorbitant than others, an assertion and a statement of that sort would not then have been
generated—if you weren't doing something other than the many do. Therefore, say {20d} to us
what it is, in order that we may not act offhandedly concerning you." To me it seems that the
one who says those things says things that are just. And I'll try to show what exactly is that
which has made for me this name and aspersion.
Hear, then. Probably it'll even seem to some of you that I'm kidding;42 be well aware,
however, that I'll be saying to you the entire truth. For I, men of Athens, have got this name
because of nothing other than some wisdom. Just what sort is this wisdom? Just one that is
probably human wisdom. (For really I daresay I'm wise in this human wisdom; whereas

37
The word is epistatēs; since it originates from the verb that I translate "to know," one who knows is
implicit in its meaning. Whenever Socrates uses the word, he is acutely aware of its double meaning. See
20b5, just below.
38
J. Adam notes, "It is very probable that the habitual use of ['beautiful-and-good'] by Socrates as a term
of commendation aggravated the suspicion that he favoured the oligarchical party and so contributed
indirectly to his condemnation and death" (1916 p. 59). See my note on Meno 92e.
39
It would have cost as much to retain a "superior" domestic servant (Burnet 1924 p. 87)—not a
substantial fee, compared to the hundred minas Protagoras is reported to have charged.
40
sc., for such a modest fee.
41
i.e., preen.
42
In other dialogues, apparently foreshadowing his own trial, Socrates says that a philosopher is bound to
seem ridiculous if he is made to defend himself in court (Republic 517a, d; Theaetetus 172c, 174c). It
may have been Plato's way of letting us know that Socrates' defense-speech did sound ridiculous to most
who heard it.

100
those43 of whom I was just now {20e} speaking are probably wise in some wisdom too great for
a human,44 or I don't have anything to say. For I myself surely do not know their wisdom. But
anyone who asserts that I do is falsifying and is speaking for the purpose of aspersion of me.)
And don't be put into an uproar by me, men of Athens, not even if I seem in some way to
you to be speaking grandiosely.45 For I shall say the statement that I'm gong to say not as mine;
but I'll refer you to the worthy one who says it. For I hold forth to you the god at Delphi46 as
testifier to my wisdom, if indeed it is any wisdom, and such as it is.47 For certainly you are
aware of Chaerephon. This man {21a} was a comrade48 of mine from youth and a comrade to
your multitude,49 and he went into that exile with you and came back with you.50 And you surely
are aware of what sort of person Chaerephon was: how vehement he was about anything toward
which he was instigated.51 And indeed, one time,52 having gone to Delphi, he even dared to

43
sc., the Sophists.
44
Cf. 23a. In response to the Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus' claim to be able to teach virtue,
Socrates says they must have received this skill from the gods, and that they should be treated as gods
(Euthydemus 273e). We are not supposed to think that Socrates is convinced that they had this divine
knowledge (see 274e, 306e-307b). In fact, at Gorgias 519c, Socrates seems to be concluding that no
Sophist has the skill.
45
Xenophon says all who wrote about Socrates' trial depicted him as "speaking grandiosely" (Apology 1).
46
I.e., Pythian Apollo, whose priestess "the Pythia" responded, when possessed by the god, to queries
with oracular answers. "…The ordinary Athenian had no great respect for the Pythian Apollo. The oracle
had taken the Persian side and the Spartan side [during past wars], and generally opposed the
Athenians..." (Burnet 1924 p. 92; cf. Thucydides 1.118.3). Socrates does not actually even think the
judges will take his talk of the oracle seriously (see 20d, 28b, 37e-38a; Senn 2012).
47
Socrates seems unsure of whether what knowledge he has should be called "wisdom". Cf. "...if indeed I
were to assert that I'm wiser than anyone in something..." (29b; cf. 23a-b, 38c). See also Symposium
175e: "For my own [wisdom] may be something paltry, or even disputable just as a dream is…."
48
"The associates of a philosopher or the members of his school are regularly called his ['comrades'], and
so are the adherents of a political party. We must carefully distinguish the original [comrades] of
Socrates like Chaerepho[n]...from the rich young men whom he influenced in the course of his public
mission (23c2)" (Burnet 1924 p. 90).
49
sc., the Athenian democracy.
50
The oligarchic Thirty Tyrants (at the time, called simply "the Thirty") seized control of Athens shortly
after the Peloponnesian War in 404 BCE. During their reign, prominent citizens with democratic
sympathies either fled or were banished or executed. The "democrats" returned to power in Athens eight
months later. Socrates remained in Athens throughout this period, for which many democrats probably
resented him.
51
Cf. Charmides 153b2.
52
Though the specific date is unknown, some scholars speculate that it must have been around 430 BCE
or earlier (J. Adam 1916 pp. vi-vii; Burnet 1914 p. 136; Brickhouse and Smith 1989 p. 94 n. 76; Stokes
1992 p. 48; McPherran p. 214 n. 90; cf. Vlastos 1991 p. 252 n. 60). As Stokes astutely observes, Laches
187d-188a strongly suggests that Socrates' famous habit of cross-examination dates back to very early
adulthood (1992 pp. 53-54). In the Crito we are told that Socrates' own "attention to virtue" spanned his
"entire life" (45d). That means that either we are not meant to take too seriously Socrates' description in

101
consult the diviner about this: —And, just as I say, you men, don't make an uproar; for he
actually asked whether anyone was wiser than I. The Pythia then responded that no one was
wiser.53 (And concerning those things, his brother—this man here—will testify for you, since he
himself has met his end.) {21b} Consider the things for the sake of which I'm saying these
things: For I'm going to teach you whence the aspersion of me came to be. For, having heard
those things, I pondered about these things: "What exactly is the god54 saying, and what exactly
is he speaking riddlingly55 about? For I am quite self-aware that I am wise surely neither greatly
nor a little. What exactly then is he saying when he asserts that I'm wisest?56 For he certainly
isn't falsifying at least; for it isn't sanctioned for him to do so." And for much time I was
unprovided with what exactly he is saying.
Then, entirely with travail, I turned myself to some search of it of this sort: I went to one
of the ones who is opined to be wise, so that there— {21c} if indeed anywhere—I might refute
the divination and make it apparent to the oracle that "this one here is wiser than I; whereas you
asserted that I am."57 Having, therefore, thoroughly considered that one person— There is no
need for me to say his name; but he is, men of Athens, one of the political people, with whom I
discussed and by whom I was affected in some way of this sort: it seemed to me that that man

the Defense Speech of the oracular motivation for his cross-examination of others, or else Socrates thinks
"attention to virtue" does not necessarily require cross-examination of others.
53
Some have concluded that the oracle's proclamation indicates Socrates must already have had a
reputation for being a "wise man" even before the Delphic oracle instigated his search for a wiser man
(unless the "oracle" was indeed oracular!). Cf. note 15 above. But it is just as likely that the oracle's
response was not due to Socrates' reputation for wisdom, but due to his reputation for disavowing
wisdom; there is a record of oracular responses that highlight the virtues of ordinary, humble men as
opposed to more illustrious figures (Parke and Wormell pp. 384-385).
54
sc., Pythian Apollo, via the Pythia.
55
It is usual in this connection to claim that the oracle was known for making cryptic responses that
required interpretation (e.g., Brickhouse and Smith 1989 p. 96). That appears, however, to be an
assumption largely based on the now-notorious oracular responses recounted in Herodotus' quasi-
historical Histories (e.g. 1.53, 7.141). In fact, the presumption has been questioned by Fontenrose who
makes a thorough review of the oracular responses that have come down to us and concludes that the
oracle's reputation for ambiguity or obscurity "is wholly modern: Delphi had no such reputation in
antiquity" (p. 236; cf. p. 6; see also Stokes 1992 p. 33). In practice, ancient Greeks did not think it was
reasonable to expect oracular responses to be cryptic and in need of special interpretation that went
beyond the most obvious one. As Bowden says, "…ambiguity was an important element of stories about
oracles, but was nonetheless not a feature of how oracles actually worked" (p. 51, emphases added).
56
Strictly speaking, even according to his own account, the oracle asserted only that no one was wiser
than he (21a), not that he was wisest. Maybe here he just means among the wisest. Cf. 23b.
57
Again, strictly speaking, the oracle's assertion wouldn't necessarily imply that the man was less wise
than Socrates; it would only imply that he was no wiser than Socrates.

102
seemed to many other humans, and mostly to himself, to be wise, but that he was not. And then I
tried to show him that he supposed that he was {21d} wise, but that he was not. After that, I
therefore was an enemy to that one and to many of the ones who were present.58 And therefore,
having went away, I reasoned to myself: "I am wiser than that human. For I daresay that neither
of us is aware of anything beautiful-and-good; but that one supposes he is aware of something
beautiful-and-good, though he isn't aware; whereas I, as indeed I'm not aware, neither suppose
that I am. Therefore, I'm at least likely to be wiser than that person at least in just this one small
thing: that the things that I'm not aware of I don't suppose I'm aware of either."
After that, I went to another,59 one of the ones opined to be wiser than that one; {21e}
and those same things seemed to me to be so; and then I was an enemy to that one too and to
many others. After that, I therefore forthwith went from one to another, sensing with pain and
fear that I was making enemies; but it nonetheless seemed to me necessary that I make the god's
thing60 be of the most importance. I must, therefore, in considering what the oracle is saying, go
to all {22a} the ones who are opined to be aware of something. And, by the Dog,61 men of
Athens,—for there is a need to speak the true things to you—I actually was affected in some way
of this sort: The ones who are most well-reputed seemed to me, in searching in accordance with
the god, to be close to being in need of the most; whereas other ones, who are opined to be more
paltry, seemed to me to be more decent in relation to being mindfully disposed. There is a need,
then, to show you my wandering, just as though I had toiled through some toils only so that the
divination would come to be actually unrefuted by me.
For, after the political people, I went to the makers of the tragedies and {22b} the
makers of the dithyrambs and of the other things, so that there I might apprehend myself in the
act of being more unlearned than those people. Therefore, apprehending the poems of theirs that
seemed to me to have been most troubled over by them, I would ask what they said, in order that
I might at the same time also learn something from them.62 I'm ashamed, then, you men, to tell

58
See Gorgias 457d-e for what was probably the usual reaction to Socrates' interrogations.
59
Another person active in politics (22a). It would have seemed natural for Socrates to describe himself
as approaching such people first on the subject of wisdom, as they were commonly regarded as "wise in
the greatest things" (Republic 426c; see note 17 above).
60
sc., the god's statement made via the oracle.
61
This was an oath (not exclusive to Socrates) apparently used euphemistically or jocularly (Burnet 1924
p. 93; Dodds pp. 262-263). Gorgias 482b suggests that the reference is to Anubis, an Egyptian god.
62
As poets were often considered authorities on learned topics, it would have seemed only natural that
Socrates would have turned to them (de Strycker and Slings pp. 280-281). As J. Adam notes, "wise" was

103
you the true things; but they must nonetheless be said. For, in a word, almost all of the ones who
were present might have spoken better than they about the things they themselves had made.
Therefore, even concerning the poets, I again came to recognize, in a little time, this: that it's not
with wisdom that they make {22c} the things they make, but with something natural and by
having a god in them, just as the godly diviners and the oracles do.63 For those people too say
many beautiful things, but they are in no way aware about the things they say. The poets too
appeared to me to be affected by some affection of that sort. And at the same time I sensed that,
because of their poetry, they supposed that they were the wisest of humans in the other things
too64—things in which they were not. I therefore went away after that, supposing that I was
above them with respect to the same thing with respect to which I was above the political people.
In the end, therefore, I went to the manual artisans.65 For I was {22d} quite self-aware
that I knew, in a word, nothing, but was aware that I would find that at least these people know
many beautiful things. And concerning that, I was not falsified; rather, they knew things that I
didn't know and, inasmuch as that, they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, even the good
craftspeople seemed to me to have the same error that the poets also had: because of beautifully
working out his art, each deemed himself to be wisest in the other things too—the greatest
things.66 And this lack of modesty of theirs {22e} seemed to conceal that wisdom they do have.
So I asked myself on behalf of the oracle whether I would accept being thus as I am—being
neither in any way wise with respect to the wisdom of those people,67 nor unlearned with respect

a term "especially applied to poets" (see note 17 above and my note on Meno 77b).
63
Cf. Meno 99c-d.
64
i.e., presumably, in what their poems were about, as opposed to how they were composed (the "poetry"
itself). Republic 598d-601b suggests which subjects Socrates was likely most interested in: "We hear
from some that [the poets] know all arts and all things human with respect to virtue and badness, and even
the godly things" (598d-e); "…the greatest and most beautiful things of which Homer puts his hand to
speaking" are "wars and generalships and managings of cities, and about the education of a human"
(599c-d).
65
"Manual artisan" refers to a practitioner of any productive art or craft that requires skilled use of hands,
including sculptors, painters, even doctors. It is here used synonymously with "craftspeople
(dēmiourgos)", which derives from the word for "work". "A [dēmiourgos] is the possessor of any sort of
professional or trade skill, manual or intellectual, in contrast with the [idiōtēs (layman; literally, private
man)]: he may be a painter, an architect, or a shipbuilder…; already in Homer, Od. 17.383 ff., diviners,
physicians, carpenters, and minstrels are classified as [dēmiourgoi]" (Dodds p. 208).
66
For craftspeople considering themselves wise in the greatest things, see Gorgias 452a-c. What Socrates
regards as "the greatest things" is indicated by his use of the same expression at Gorgias 487b5 and 527e1
(cf. 472c-d, 487e-488a, 500c). Cf. Defense Speech 38a. Of course, the popular conception of wisdom in
the greatest things was quite different (see Republic 426c, Laches 127e, Gorgias 484c).
67
This alone refutes the idea (mentioned only by Timon of Phlius (3rd century BCE) and later writers)

104
to their lack of learning—or having both the things those people have. I then answered to myself
and the oracle that it profited me to be as I am.
From this examination, then, men of Athens, {23a} many enmities have been generated
for me, and they are of the most harsh and most heavy sort. So, many aspersions have been
generated from them, and I'm spoken of by this name: as being "wise." For, each time, the ones
who are present suppose that I myself am wise in those things in which I refute another.68 But
actually I daresay, you men, that really the god is wise and that, by that oracular thing, he is
saying this: that human wisdom is worth something little—actually, nothing.69 And he appears
to be speaking of this Socrates, and to have used {23b} my name too, making me a paradigm,
just as if he were saying, "That one among you, humans, is wisest who, just as Socrates, has
come to recognize that in relation to wisdom he is in truth worth nothing."70 That's why I still
even now, going around, search out and ask—in accordance with the god—anyone, both of the
townspeople and of the foreigners, who I suppose is wise. And whenever he seems to me not to
be, aiding the god I show that he isn't wise. And because of this business, there has come to be
for me no leisure worth speaking of either for any of the practices of the city71 or for any
familial72 ones; rather, {23c} I am in poverty ten-thousandfold because of my service to the
god.73
But besides those things, the young people who come with me spontaneously—for whom
there is leisure most of all, and who are sons of the wealthiest74—are gratified by hearing
humans being examined; and they on their own many times imitate me and so put their hand to

that Socrates had ever practiced or even learned the art of working with stone, said to be his father's art.
That his father ever practiced such an art is doubtful considering not only the aristocrats with whom both
Socrates and his father interacted (see, e.g., Laches), but also that Plato here has depicted Socrates as
approaching craftspeople "as a hitherto unexplored class of society" (Burnet 1924 p. 50). Socrates'
alleged ancestral connection with Daedalus (Euthyphro 11b) does not support the idea that Socrates'
family profession was stonework, since Daedalus' media were of wood and metal (Burnet 1919 p. 668).
68
Cf., e.g., Charmides 165b, Laches 200e.
69
See Smyth p. 650 and A. Adam p. 68.
70
Cf. Theaetetus 176b-d.
71
Contrast 31c-d.
72
The term was used to refer broadly to "one's own" things, including property, family, and friends.
73
Cf. Euthyphro 3d9. As Socrates had served as a hoplite (a heavy-armed infantryman) earlier in life, he
must once have been fairly well-off (Burnet 1924 p. 98), as only about 30 to 40 percent of citizens could
afford hoplite armor (Garland 2013 p. 257). He may have inherited his, but it would still mean he came
from a well-off family. On Socrates' "service/assistance [23c1, 30a7] to the god [Apollo]," compare
Phaedo 85b. On service to the gods in general see Euthyphro 12e ff.
74
Later Socrates identifies a number of these young men (33d-e).

105
examining others.75 And then I suppose they find an ungrudging many of humans who suppose
they are aware of something but are aware of few things or nothing. After that, therefore, the
ones who are examined by them are irate at me, {23d} not rather at themselves, and say,
"Socrates is someone most foul and ruins the young." And whenever anyone asks them, "By
doing what?" and "By teaching what?", they aren't able to say anything but are undiscerning; but
in order that they not seem to be provisionless, they say those handy things that are against all
who philosophize:76 that "he teaches about the celestial things and the things under the earth,"
and "teaches them not to acknowledge gods" and "teaches them to make the worse statement a
superior one." For I suppose they wouldn't be willing to say the true things: that they come to be
very clearly ones who make as if they are aware but who are aware of nothing. Since, therefore,
{23e} they are friends of esteem and are vehement and many, speaking persuasively and with
strain about me, they fill your ears, vehemently and since long ago aspersing. From those things
Meletus and Anytus and Lycon set upon me, Meletus being aggravated on behalf of the poets,77
and Anytus on behalf of the craftspeople and the political people,78 {24a} and Lycon on behalf

75
This evidently is where the charge that Socrates "makes the worse statement a superior one, and he
teaches those same things to others" (19b-c) came from. The tendency to imitate the refuter is described
in the Republic too (539b), as well as the general effect of Socratic questioning on the minds of the young
(538c-539c). It should be no surprise, then, that someone who valued conventional beliefs and practices
might think Socrates' influence was corruptive.
76
Our word "philosopher" comes directly from the ancient Greek word, which literally meant
friend/devotee of wisdom, i.e. someone who values wisdom most highly. (Compare, just below (23e),
"friends/devotees of esteem", meaning those who value esteem most highly.) The Greek word for
"philosopher" was colloquially used in Socrates' time to refer to one who was occupied with the topics
listed at 18b-c and 19b-c. Socrates himself did not typically use the term so narrowly. For Socrates,
"philosophizing [being devoted to wisdom]" (28e, 29d) refers to the kind of "discussing and
examining/questioning" described at 23b-c, 29e, 33c, 38a, 41b-c—i.e., the core activities involved in the
attempt to acquire wisdom/virtue. See Senn 2012.
77
Due to his youth, it is unlikely that Meletus was the tragic poet ridiculed more than once by comic poets
(e.g. Aristophanes Frogs 1302), though his father may have been (Burnet 1924 pp. 9-11, 99; de Strycker
and Slings p. 91). Meletus also had religious motives for prosecuting Socrates if he is the same Meletus
who joined in the prosecution of Andocides earlier the same year. Andocides had been tried for impiety
and acquitted. The speech of one of his prosecutors (possibly our Meletus) is preserved in pseudo-Lysias'
Against Andocides; its author "was driven by an almost fanatical zeal to defend traditional religion" (de
Strycker and Slings p. 94; cf. Burnet 1924 pp. 9-11).
78
Anytus, who was wealthy from running his family's tannery (Xenophon Apology 29ff.), had also been a
general and was "one of the two or three leading statesmen of the time" (Burnet 1924 p. 99), having been
among those who fought successfully to restore democracy to Athens in 403 BCE. In Plato's Meno 93e
ff., Anytus is represented as claiming that many of Athens' statesmen are capable of teaching virtue,
against which claim Socrates argues that those statesmen did not teach their sons virtue. Socrates'
criticism of democratic principles (Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.9, 3.7.6, 3.9.10; cf. Protagoras 319c-d with
Crito 47a-48a and Laches 184d-e; see also Defense Speech 31e) and specifically of Athenian politics

106
of the rhetoricians.79 So, as I said when I began, I would wonder at it if it were possible for me
to take away from you in so little time this aspersion which has become so much.
Those things are, men of Athens, the true things for you. And I speak not having
concealed nor having withheld from you either a great or a small thing. And yet I'm pretty well
aware that it's by these things80 themselves that I'm an enemy. And that is a mark that I'm saying
true things and that that is the aspersion of me and those are the things responsible. {24b} And
whether you search into these things now or hereafter, you will find them thus.
Now then, concerning the things about which my first arraigners arraigned, let that be a
sufficient defense-speech to you. And after those things I will try to speak a defense against
Meletus the "good man and friend of the city" (as he asserts) and against the later arraigners.
Now, again, as though these were other arraigners, let us in turn apprehend the sworn statement
of these men. And it stands somehow81 in this way: Socrates, it asserts, does injustice by
ruining the young and acknowledging not the gods that the city {24c} acknowledges,82 but other

(31d-32c, 32e-33a) and Athens' leading democratic politicians (Protagoras 319e-320b, Gorgias 515d ff.,
Meno 93e-94e), his association with traitors to the Athenian democracy and their relatives (see note 157
below), as well as his admiration of the ways of oligarchic Sparta and Crete (Crito 52e, Defense Speech
37a-b, Aristophanes Birds 1281), seem to be the reasons behind Anytus' involvement in indicting
Socrates (Burnet 1924 p. 103, 137). Indeed, in the Meno Anytus warns Socrates about his critical attitude
(94e), surely meant to foreshadow the trial (cf. Gorgias 521c). Though Meletus is put forth as the
prosecutor, and Anytus and Lycon only advocates of the prosecution (see Defense Speech 36a8), Anytus
was, according to Burnet, the "moving spirit" behind the case; Meletus publicly led the prosecution, only
in order "to avoid giving the prosecution a political appearance" (Burnet 1924 p. 151). See note 99 below.
79
We know little else of Lycon, except that he was a politician (which is just what "rhetorician" in some
contexts meant; cf. Dodds p. 194 and de Strycker and Slings pp. 294, 345). According to Burnet (1924 p.
151), it is "most improbable" that this Lycon is the same as the Lycon of Xenophon's Symposium.
80
sc., my habit of not holding anything back when speaking. Cf. 21c-d, 29e-30a.
81
Socrates appears to be only paraphrasing the official indictment (Burnet 1924 p. 102). What seems to
be as close to the original as we now have appears in Diogenes Laertius 2.40: "Socrates does injustice by
not acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges, while introducing other novel divine things. And he
also does injustice by ruining the young." Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.1.1.
82
In Plato's Euthyphro, Socrates wonders whether he is being prosecuted because he does not accept the
traditional stories about the gods according to which they behave like humans by acting unjustly and
battling with each other (5e-6c; cf. Republic 377d ff.). However, Burnet is perfectly right in rejecting this
as a serious explanation of the charge (1924 pp. 34-35; 1914 pp. 182-183). The poets' stories about the
gods were not sacred: As Burkert explains, in popular ancient Greek religion "there are no founding
figures and no documents of revelation, no organization of priests and no monastic orders. …Among the
Greeks these tales [in traditional myths] are always taken with a pinch of salt: the truth of a myth is never
guaranteed and does not have to be believed. …The importance of the myths of the gods lies in their
connection with the sacred rituals for which they frequently provide a reason, an aetiology, which is often
playfully elaborated. The art of poetry then gave individual myths a fixed and memorably form…" (pp. 8-
9).

107
novel divine things.83 The charge, then, is of that sort. But let us examine each part of that
charge singly.
For it asserts, then, that I do injustice by ruining the young.84 But I, men of Athens,
assert that Meletus does injustice, that in seriousness he acts gratifyingly85 by easily putting
humans in judicial competition, and by making as if he were serious and concerned about things
none of which he has ever attended86 to. And that that stands thus, I will try and show you.
Come here, Meletus; tell me:87 Do you make anything to be of the most importance
{24d} other than that the younger ones will be as good as possible?
MELETUS: I don't indeed.
SOCRATES: Come, then. Tell these men now: Who makes them better? For it is clear that
you are aware,88 since it's attended to by you. For, having found out the one who ruins them—as
you assert, me—, you bring me before these men here and arraign me. But come, then. Tell
them who makes them better, and disclose to them who it is.
Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and aren't able to tell them? And yet, doesn't it
seem to you to be shameful and a sufficient mark of the thing I'm now saying: that you have in
no way attended to those things? But do tell, good man: who89 makes them better?
MELETUS: The laws.
SOCRATES: {24e} But I'm not asking that, best man; rather, what human—whichever one is in
the first place aware about even that thing itself (the laws)?
MELETUS: These, Socrates: the Adjudicators.
SOCRATES: How are you speaking, Meletus? Are they the sort to educate the young and make
them better?
MELETUS: Most of all.
83
Though the exact words of the indictment itself don't make it clear, Socrates seems to assume that they
referred to divine/religious practices (27c).
84
As in the Euthyphro 2c4, Socrates mentions this part of the charge first; he obviously considers it the
most significant part of the charge, especially as he takes (27a4) the rest of it to be incoherent.
85
Or, "merely for the purpose of gratification"; sc., in jest.
86
The use of the word melein, meaning to attend to or to be attentive (and hence to care about) is here
(and throughout the whole passage up to 26b) a pun on Meletus' name.
87
In the following discussion, it may be observed (with Burnet) that "Socrates does not condescend to use
serious arguments against Meletus: his purpose is simply to show that his accuser does not understand his
own [sworn statement to the Adjudicators]" (Burnet 1924 p. 106). See note 99 below.
88
Cf. Euthyphro 2c.
89
Socrates evidently means who? (24e), but the word in Greek may also mean what?, which is how
Meletus chooses to interpret it.

108
SOCRATES: All are? Or some of them, but not others?
MELETUS: All.
SOCRATES: By Hera, you speak very well and of an ungrudging many of benefactors. And
what then? Do the hearers here make them better too, {25a} or not?
MELETUS: These do too.
SOCRATES: And what? The Councilors?90
MELETUS: The Councilors too.
SOCRATES: But then, Meletus, not the ones in the Assembly?91 Do the Assemblymen ruin the
younger ones? Or do all those too make them better?
MELETUS: Those too.
SOCRATES: Then, it seems like, all Athenians make them beautiful-and-good except me; and I
alone ruin them. Are you speaking thus?
MELETUS: I'm entirely vehemently saying those things.
SOCRATES: You have imputed very much misfortune to me. And answer me this: Does it
seem to you to stand thus concerning horses too: that the ones {25b} who make them better are
all humans, while the one who ruins them is some one person? Or, entirely the contrary of that,
is the one who is the sort to make them better some one person or very few—the horsemen—,
while the many—if they are with and use horses—ruin them?92 Doesn't it stand thus, Meletus,
concerning both horses and all the other living beings? Certainly entirely—whether you and
Anytus deny it or assert it. For, concerning the young, there would be much happiness if one
alone ruined them, while the others {25c} benefited them.

90
Among many other administrative and judicial duties, the Council of Five Hundred drafted proposals
for new laws for the people to debate and vote on in the Assembly. The Council consisted of fifty male
citizens, thirty or older, from each of the ten tribes of Athens; members served for one year, though a
second term was possible after an interval. Members were appointed by lot from candidates chosen by
the demes (townships) that constituted each tribe; the number of representatives each deme had on the
Council was in proportion to its population. (OCD4 p. 247)
91
The main function of the Assembly was to consider resolutions drafted by the Council and to vote on
whether to accept, amend, or veto them as decrees of the Athenian people. The Assembly was open to
every male citizen of at least 18 (or else 20) years (Rhodes 1992 p. 703; OCD4 p. 435). Meetings were
normally attended by at least six thousand (OCD4 p. 435); every member had the right to speak and to
vote. Payment for attendance was not introduced until the 4th century BCE (Rhodes 1992 pp. 491-492).
Though, Socrates' Athens was a relatively "radical" form of democracy (Martin p. 144), it was, in
absolute terms, still very limited: adult male citizens constituted only about ten to twenty percent of the
total population (Rhodes 2010 pp. 61-62; OCD4, p. 435).
92
Cf. Republic 492a-e, Crito 47b, Euthydemus 307a.

109
 But anyway, Meletus, you have shown sufficiently that you have never yet been mindful
of the young, and you make your own inattention plain: that in no way have you attended to the
things concerning which you bring me here.
And moreover tell us, before Zeus, Meletus, whether it is better to dwell among useful93
citizens or among defective ones? Answer, sir; for I am of course asking nothing hard. Don't the
defective produce something bad for the ones who are at the time nearest them, while the good
produce something good?
MELETUS: Entirely.
SOCRATES: {25d} Then is there anyone who wishes rather to be injured by the ones who are
with him than to be benefited? Keep answering, good man; for even the law exhorts you to
answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be injured?
MELETUS: Surely not.
SOCRATES: Come then: do you bring me here because I ruin the young and make them
defective voluntarily or involuntarily?
MELETUS: Voluntarily, I say.
SOCRATES: What then, Meletus? Are you at your age so much wiser than I am at mine that
you have recognized that the bad always produce something bad for the ones who are most
{25e} near them, while the good produce good; but I then have come to such lack of learning
that I don't discern even this: that if I make faulty anyone of the ones who are with me then I
risk receiving something bad from him, so that I make that much of a bad thing voluntarily, as
you assert?94 I'm not persuaded of those things by you, Meletus, and I suppose that no other
human is either.95 Rather, either I don't {26a} ruin them, or if I ruin them then I do so
involuntarily; so, according to both accounts at least, you are falsifying. And if I ruin them
involuntarily, the law is not to bring me here for errors of that sort, but rather, having
apprehended me privately, to teach and admonish me.96 For it's clear that if I learn, I will stop at

93
The Greek term has moral implications. In some cases, it simply meant good.
94
Cf. Meno 92a.
95
The idea that these corrupted youths could really injure Socrates is contradicted by the claim at 30c-d. I
suspect that he offers this argument only to get the jury to think that Meletus' charge is ridiculous. In the
Crito, Socrates presents what he evidently considers a better reason against making others bad: Making
others bad is unjust (49c), and doing injustice is never in one's own interest because doing injustice does
damage to one's own soul (47d, 49b). He does not offer this argument here, I think because he doesn't
think most people believe it (cf. Crito 49b, d).
96
Contrast Hippias Minor 372a.

110
least the thing I'm doing involuntarily. But you escaped being with me and teaching me and
were not willing to, and you bring me here, where it is the law to bring the ones who need
restraining, but not learning.
But anyway, men of Athens, that is now clear {26b} —what I was saying: that Meletus
has never yet attended to these things either greatly or a little.
But nonetheless say to us now how you assert I ruin the younger ones, Meletus. Or is it
actually clear that, according to the indictment that you wrote down, it's by teaching them to
acknowledge not gods that the city acknowledges, but novel divine things? Aren't you saying
that by teaching those things I ruin them?
MELETUS: Well, actually, I'm entirely vehemently saying those things.
SOCRATES: So then, Meletus, before those gods themselves whom the discussion is now
about, tell me and these men {26c} here still more plainly. For I'm not capable of understanding
whether you're saying that I teach them to acknowledge that there are97 some gods (and then I
myself acknowledge that there are gods and I'm not godless altogether nor do I do injustice in
that way), not however at least the ones the city acknowledges, but others, and that that is the
thing for which you're indicting me: that I teach them to acknowledge other gods; or whether
you're saying that I myself don't acknowledge the gods at all and that I teach others those things.
MELETUS: I'm saying these things: that you altogether don't acknowledge gods.
SOCRATES: {26d} Wonderful Meletus, what are you saying those things for? Do I not
acknowledge that even the sun and moon are gods, just as the other humans do?98
MELETUS: No, by Zeus, men of the Judiciary, since he says that the sun is stone and the moon
earth.99

97
Socrates here introduces the words "that there are"; they do not appear in the charge as originally stated
(24b-c). The claim that Socrates does not acknowledge (nomizein) certain gods certainly may imply the
claim that he does not believe in them, and this is evidently at least part of what Meletus meant by the
charge (26e). But the Greek verb nomizein plus a simple accusative (i.e., without the words "that there
are") does not generally mean merely to believe in; the meaning is rather to acknowlege as a matter of
custom (nomos), and in this specific context to claim that Socrates does not acknowledge (nomizein)
certain gods seems to mean that he does not in practice worship them or pay them the homage that is
customarily their due (whether or not he believes that they exist) (see Burnet 1924 p. 104). See note 22
above and 106 below.
98
No one was expected by the public religion of Athens actually to worship the sun and moon; but it was
generally acknowledged that they were gods, though not ones deserving such attention as those that
existed on earth, like Zeus and Athena (Burnet 1924 p. 111; OCD2 p. 494). In one situation, Socrates is
reported (by Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium 220d4) as saying a prayer to the sun.
99
This was a tenet of Anaxagoras (c.500-c.428 BCE), the first foreign philosopher to have settled in

111
SOCRATES: Do you suppose you're arraigning Anaxagoras, friend Meletus? And do you thus
despise these men and suppose they are so inexperienced about writings that they are not aware
that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are loaded with those statements? And then do
even the young "learn" from me things one sometimes can {26e} buy at the Orchestra100 for a
drachma101 (if for very much), and laugh at Socrates if he makes as if they are his own,
especially since they are so out of place?102 But, before Zeus, do I seem to you thus? I don't
acknowledge that any god is?
MELETUS: No, indeed, by Zeus; not even in any way whatsoever.
SOCRATES: You are at least without persuasiveness, Meletus, and actually are thus—as you
seem to me—to yourself.103 For this one here seems to me, men of Athens, to be entirely

Athens. Here Socrates has at last provoked Meletus enough to admit the true intention behind his
purposefully vague charge that Socrates acknowledges "novel divine things": Meletus probably would
like to have charged Socrates with following the doctrines of Anaxagoras, whose works Socrates in the
Phaedo says he at one time studied ravenously, though ultimately with disappointment (97c ff.). In either
circa 450 or circa 437 BCE, Anaxagoras was, putatively because of his unusual views about the natural
world, charged with impiety (OCD2 p. 61; OCD4 p. 82; he seems to have escaped Athens with the help
of Pericles). But Socrates, though he had once been a "comrade" of Anaxagoras' successor Archelaus,
could not legally have been charged with following Anaxagoras' views: "After the restoration of the
democracy in 403 B.C.,...a commission was appointed to revise and codify the laws of Athens, which did
not complete its work till...401/0 B.C..." (Burnet 1924 p. 25). "These laws were to have validity from
[403 BCE] onwards…, and no law could be appealed to which was not entered in the new code.... The
effect of these provisions was to invalidate all [decrees] passed before [403 BCE], and therefore, among
others, the [decree] of Diopeithes...directed against Anaxagoras" (ibid. p. 100), which specifically
mentioned the teaching of "celestial" things (ibid. p. 18). Being a strong proponent of the amnesty,
Anytus, therefore, evidently had not allowed Meletus to be more specific in the written charge than to say
that Socrates acknowledged "novel divine things" (ibid. p. 101).
For the same reasons, Socrates also could not legally be charged with remaining in Athens during
the reign of the Thirty, nor with having once been friendly with Critias, who was later one of the Thirty;
any such political offences were, under the amnesty, unassailable (ibid.).
Incidentally, the work of revising and codifying the laws effected a postponement of almost all
litigations in Athenian courts; Socrates might otherwise have been tried closer to 403 (ibid. p. 25).
100
"The orchestra" was the name "given, not only to the orchestra in the Dionysiac theatre, but also to the
part of the Agora where the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton stood" (Burnet 1924 p.112; cf. J.
Adam 1916 pp. 74, 120-122). Socrates here seems to mean the latter, unless de Strycker and Slings are
correct in their conjecture that the reference is to paying not for Anaxagoras' books, but for attendance at
a reading of his work (p. 307).
101
There were one hundred drachmas to one mina. See note 39 above. One drachma was a very modest
price. "...A single man could feed himself for a little over a drachma a week" (Howatson p. 74). "In the
late fifth century an unskilled worker could earn ½ drachma a day and a skilled 1 drachma…" (Rhodes
2010 p. 11).
102
Cf. Phaedo 98c2.
103
Socrates means that Meletus does not even convince himself of what he is saying, because it is
contradictory.

112
outrageous and unrestrained, and to have written down this indictment simply in outrageousness,
unrestraint, and youthfulness.104 {27a} For he seems like one who's making a trial of me by
putting together, as it were, a riddle: "Will the 'wise' Socrates recognize that I'm actually acting
gratifyingly and speaking contrary to myself, or will I beguile him and the others who are
hearing?" For this one appears to me to say himself in his indictment things that are contrary to
himself, just as if he were to say: "Socrates does injustice by not acknowledging gods, but does
injustice by acknowledging gods." And that of course is characteristic of one who kids around.
Consider with me, then, you men, in what way he appears to me to be saying these
things. And you, Meletus, answer us. (But you men, just as {27b} I petitioned you in the
beginning, remember not to be put into an uproar by me if I make my statements in my
habituated manner.) Is there any human, Meletus, who acknowledges that there are human
practices, but who does not acknowledge humans? (Make him answer, you men, and let him not
make one uproar after another.) Is there anyone who does not acknowledge horses, but
acknowledges horse practices? Or anyone who doesn't acknowledge that there are aulos-
players,105 but acknowledges aulos practices?
There is not, best of men. If you don't wish to answer, then I state it for you and these
others here.
But answer this next thing at least: {27c} Is there anyone who acknowledges that there
are divine practices, but does not acknowledge divinities?106
MELETUS: There is not.
SOCRATES: How helpful you are that you should answer, with travail, having been
necessitated by these men! You're asserting, therefore, that I acknowledge and teach divine
things, whether novel or of long ago. But I do therefore acknowledge at least divine things
according to your statement, and you even swore those things in your indictment. And if I
acknowledge divine things, then it is certainly a great necessity that I acknowledge divinities.

104
sc., youthful rashness.
105
The aulos was a reed wind-instrument similar to the clarinet or oboe.
106
The argument yields only the weaker conclusion that Socrates believes that there are divinities, not the
stronger conclusion—which the language (viz., the absence of the words "that there are") here and at
27c8-9 could suggest—that Socrates acknowledges divinities by paying them due homage. The grammar
of the Greek word for "acknowledge" does not require, but may appear with, the construction "that there
are...." Leaving "that there are" out of the text makes "acknowledge" ambiguous, and Socrates' argument
seems to trade on the ambiguity.

113
Doesn't it stand thus? Of course it does. (For I posit107 that you agree, since you aren't
answering.) And {27d} don't we regard the divinities as indeed either gods or children of
gods?108 Do you assert it or not?
MELETUS: Entirely.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if indeed I, as you assert, regard divinities, and if the divinities are
some sort of gods, then that is what I assert when I assert that you're speaking riddlingly and
acting gratifyingly:109 that you're asserting that, while not regarding gods, I on the other hand
conversely regard gods, since indeed I regard divinities at least. And on the other hand if the
divinities are some sort of bastard children of gods, either from nymphs or from some other110
mothers, from whom indeed they are even said to be, then what human would regard children of
gods as existing but not gods? {27e} For it similarly would be out of place as it would be if
someone were to regard children of horses or even of asses—the half-asses111—but didn't regard
horses and asses as existing. Rather, Meletus, it's not possible that you didn't write down this
indictment in order to make a trial of us or because you were unprovided with what true injustice
you might indict me for. There is no device in order for you to persuade any human who has
even a little discernment that regarding both divine things and godly things is not characteristic
of the same person, and on the other hand {28a} that it is characteristic of the same person112 to
regard neither divinities nor gods nor heroes.113
But anyway, men of Athens, that I don't do injustice according to Meletus' indictment
seems to me not to come from much of a defense-speech; rather, even those things are sufficient.
But what I said also in the things that I said before—that much enmity has been generated
for me, and from many—, be well aware, is true. And this is what will condemn me, if indeed it
does condemn: not Meletus or Anytus either, but the aspersion and grudge of the many, which
107
The answer is supposed to follow logically from Meletus' previous admissions (see note 106 above); so
Socrates is supposedly not merely putting words in Meletus' mouth here.
108
I translate the Greek word daimōn as "divinity". In earlier Greek writers, the word daimōn was
practically synonymous with theos ("god"), except that the former term often suggested the strange,
unexplainable, or impersonal; in Plato, however, and other later writers, a daimōn was sometimes treated
as something between divine and human (see 27d; Symposium 202d-203a; Burnet 1924 p. 115). The
word in Socrates and Plato's time did not have the malevolent connotations of the English word "demon".
109
See note 85 above.
110
sc., human. Nymphs, like Thetis, were goddesses. Cf. 28c.
111
The Greek word for half-ass is hemionos, which reminds one of hemitheos, the word for demigod. See
28c1.
112
sc., the one who regards both divine things and godly things.
113
A hero, like Achilles (28c), is the offspring of a human and a divinity. A hero was thus a demigod.

114
of course have condemned many other {28b} good men too,114 and I suppose will also keep
condemning. And there's no fear of their stopping at me.
Someone then might probably say: "Aren't you even ashamed, Socrates, for making your
purpose a purpose of the sort that you now risk dying from?" But to that one I would say back a
just statement: "You're not speaking beautifully, human, if you suppose that there's a need for a
man in whom there's any even small benefit to take into account risk of living or dying, but not
consider only this whenever he acts: whether he does just things or unjust things, and whether he
{28c} does works of a good man or a bad one. For however many of the demigods who have
met their end at Troy would, according to at least your statement, be paltry, especially the son of
Thetis, who so much despised any risk in comparison with withstanding anything shameful, that
when his mother, who was a god, spoke to him, because he had a spiritedness for killing
Hector,—somehow, as I suppose, in this way: 'Child, if you avenge the murder of your comrade
Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for, of course,' the text115 asserts she said,
'immediately after Hector your downfall is ready'— And having heard that, he cared little about
death and risk, and much more feared to live {28d} while being bad and not to avenge even his
friends. 'May I,' the text asserts he said, 'die immediately when I've laid justice upon the one
who does injustice, in order that I may not abide here beside the crow-beaked ships, a laughable
burden of the land.' You don't suppose that he was mindful of death and risk?"
For it stands thus, men of Athens, in truth: Wherever someone orders himself to do a
thing that he regards as best or is ordered by a ruler, there is then a need, as it seems to me, to
risk abiding by it, in no way taking into account116 either death or any other thing before taking
into account something shameful. I would therefore have produced fearsome117 deeds, men
{28e} of Athens, if whereas when the rulers who you men chose118 to rule me ordered me in

114
Rowe misinterprets the phrase, translating it "many others before me, good men too", and explaining
that "Socrates carefully avoids the implication that he's 'good'…" (2010 p. 179 n. 42). J. Adam (1916 p.
78) and Burnet (1924 pp. 117-118), however, both render it: "many other good men too". The first kai
(="too") is adverbial, the second (untranslated) conjoins "many" and "good" (cf. Smyth 1984 pp. 651-652;
A. Adam p. 76).
115
Homer's Iliad 18.94-104. The son of Thetis is of course Achilles. As Socrates indicates, he is not
quoting Homer exactly.
116
sc., consideration. Cf. 28c.
117
We might rather say "dreadful."
118
The "rulers" here are military officers, who were elected yearly by the people of Athens, not by the
Adjudicators as a body; but since the Adjudicators are representatives of the people, Socrates can refer to
the latter indirectly by addressing the former ("you men").

115
Potidaea119 and in Amphipolis120 and at Delium,121 I then abided what those men were ordering,
just as any other also did, and risked dying; but when the god orders—as I supposed and
conceived he does—that there is a need for me to live philosophizing and examining myself and
the others,122 {29a} I should then leave behind the order,123 being frightened by death or any
other thing whatsoever. It would of course have been fearsome, and then someone might have
truly justly brought me to the Judiciary because I didn't acknowledge that there are gods,
disobeying the divination and fearing death and supposing I was wise when I wasn't.
For, of course, to fear death, you men, is nothing other than opining to be wise when one
isn't; for it is to opine that one is aware of things that one is not aware of. For no one is aware
whether death happens not to be, for the human, even greatest of all the goods;124 but people fear
it as though they were well aware that it was greatest {29b} of the bad things. And yet how is
this lack of learning—the one of supposing that one is aware of things that one isn't aware of—
not to be reproved? But, you men, I probably differ from the many of humans by this here too—
and if indeed I were to assert that I am wiser than anyone in something, it would be in this: that,
not being sufficiently aware about the things in Hades,125 so also I don't suppose that I am aware.
But that to do injustice and to disobey someone—both god and human—who's better is bad and
shameful, I am aware. Therefore I will never be frightened of or try to escape things that I'm not
aware whether they happen even to be good, before the bad things that I'm aware are bad. {29c}

119
In 432 BCE, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Potidaea revolted from Athens with
the aid of Corinth; Athens finally conquered Potidaea in 429 BCE (OCD4 pp. 1199, 1364). In Plato's
Symposium 219e5 ff., Alcibiades gives an account of Socrates' remarkable service in that battle,
including saving Alcibiades' life.
120
This refers either to the battle in 437 BCE that resulted in Athens' colonization of Amphipolis, or to
Athens' unsuccessful attempt to regain it from Sparta in 423 BCE during the Peloponnesian War. It may
be less probable that Socrates means the latter, since he would have been over forty-seven then and the
enlistment of such older men would probably have been unnecessary for that particular battle (Burnet
1924 p. 120).
121
In 424 BCE Athens attempted to overthrow Boeotia but was defeated at Delium. Though Socrates
was about forty-five then, all able-bodied soldiers in Athens were called on to fight in that battle. Plato
makes Alcibiades (in Symposium 221a1 ff.) and Laches (in Laches 181b1) testify to Socrates' courage in
that battle.
122
See 23b-c.
123
In military parlance, the word for to order had a technical sense, meaning to station at a post. "Order",
then, connotes post or station in this context.
124
Cf. 40b ff.
125
"Hades" was a generic way of referring to death. The reference did not, in and of itself, imply any
particular view about what exactly death involved.

116
 So not even if you men now were to let me go, not trusting in Anytus, who asserted that
either there is no need for me to have come here in the beginning,126 or, since I have come, it is
not possible not to have me killed,127 saying before you that if I now were let by you to escape
conviction then "your sons, making their purpose the things Socrates teaches, will all be quite
entirely ruined"— If in relation to those things you were to say to me, "Socrates, we are not now
persuaded by Anytus; rather, we let you go, on this condition, however: on the condition that
you no longer spend your time in this search nor philosophize; and if you're caught still doing
that, {29d} you will die"— If, then, as I say, you were to let me go on those conditions, then I
would say to you, "I embrace and am friends of you, men of Athens; but I will obey the god
more than you, and as long as I breathe and it is possible for me I surely will not stop
philosophizing and exhorting you and showing up128 anyone of you I at the time happen upon,
saying in just the sort of way in which I've been in the habit of, 'You best of men, being of
Athens, of a city that is greatest and most well-reputed in wisdom and strength,129 aren't you
ashamed of your attending to {29e} money and reputation and esteem in order that there will be
for you as much of them as possible, while not attending to or being mindful of mindfulness and
truth130 and the soul in order that it will be as good as possible?' And if someone of you
controverts and asserts that he does attend, I will not straightaway let him go nor will I go away;
rather, I will ask him and examine him and interrogate him, and if to me he doesn't {30a} seem
to have acquired virtue but asserts that he has, then I'll reprove him because he makes the things
worth most be of least importance and makes the paltrier things be of more importance. I will do
those things for whomever I happen upon, both younger and elder, both foreigner and

126
because Socrates could have fled Athens instead. Cf. Crito 45e.
127
i.e., to sentence him to death.
128
Cf. 23b7.
129
This was undeniably untrue of Athens at the time Socrates was speaking; in 399 BCE Athens was still
just recovering from the heavy losses it had suffered from the Peloponnesian War and the reign of the
Thirty Tyrants. Probably, Socrates is nostalgically referring instead to the age of Pericles, during which
he lived most of his life.
130
"Truth" here probably alludes to genuine—as opposed to apparent—goodness of soul (compare real
vs. apparent happiness at 36d10-e1). It is just this contrast that is made so much of in the Gorgias (459e,
464a ff., 527b), which I think explains the similar, seemingly cryptic references to truth (525a3, 526c2,
526d6) in that dialogue. (Dodds' (n. on 526d6) reading "truth" in these Gorgias passages as truthfulness
or sincerity is liable to make one interpret Socrates' reference too narrowly, as though Socrates here had
in mind merely telling the truth.) To live the life of philosophy (as opposed, e.g., to conventional politics)
is to live according to the truth rather than to be satisfied with appearances or mere opinion. Compare
"truth" at Crito 48a7.

117
townsperson—but more for the townspeople,131 inasmuch as you are nearer to me in genealogy.
For the god exhorts those things, be well aware, and I suppose that no greater good for you has
yet been generated in the city than my assistance to the god. For I go around doing nothing other
than persuading you, both younger and elder, to attend to {30b} neither bodies nor money
before—nor as vehemently as—you attend to the soul in order that it will be as good as possible,
saying, 'Virtue does not come to be from money;132 rather, from virtue, money and the other
things come to be good133 for humans—all other things, both in private and in public.' Now
then, if by saying those things I ruin the young, then those things are injurious. But if anyone
asserts that I say things other than those, he is saying nothing. Men of Athens," I would assert,
"in relation to those things be persuaded by Anytus or not, and let me go or not, as I {30c}
wouldn't do other things, not even if I'm going to have died many times."
Don't make an uproar, men of Athens, but abide by the things I requested of you: not to
make an uproar at the things I say but to hear. For, as I suppose, you'll even be helped by
hearing. For I'm now going to say to you some other things at which you'll probably shout out
(but do that in no way): For be well aware that if you were to have me—a person of the sort
such as I say I am—killed, you would not injure me more greatly than you yourselves. (Now
then, neither Meletus nor Anytus would injure me in any way; for neither would even be capable
of it; {30d} for I don't suppose that it is sanctioned that a better man be injured by a worse one.

131
Cf. Theaetetus 143d. Socrates here separates himself from the Sophists, who were mostly foreigners
(19e) and so had no such preference. The willingness to speak to the old would also distinguish Socrates
from the professional teachers of his day; as de Strycker and Slings note, "only young people ha[d]
teachers" (p. 349).
132
As de Strycker and Slings explain (p. 138), Socrates' words are "meant to contradict explicitly a
proverbial verse of Hesiod": "…Virtue and glory follow wealth" (Works and Days 313, circa 700 BCE).
Likewise, the phrase "Money! Money is the man!" found in Pindar (Isthmian 2.11, circa 472 BCE)
expressed a popular view and, again, was proverbial (J. Adam 1916 p. 84). The type of view Socrates
here expresses was perhaps first maintained in some lines attributed to the (c.640-c.600 BCE) elegiac poet
Theognis (see Adkins p. 77-78). Though most of Socrates' audience would agree with his idea that virtue
is a state of the soul, virtue was popularly associated mainly with acting in a certain sort of way (e.g.,
rearing and educating one's children, helping friends, injuring enemies, avoiding certain indulgences,
facing certain fears, sacrificing to gods), and was identified with the power to act in that way. People
were at any rate judged virtuous or unvirtuous on the basis of their conduct. On this conception of virtue,
it would be natural to think, contrary to Theognis and Socrates, that virtue was crucially dependent on
wealth. See, e.g., Meno's view at Meno 78c-d (also my note 36 on Meno 74a), and Cephalus' view at
Republic 331b.
133
I accept Burnet's (1924 p. 124) reading of this passage, recently defended by Burnyeat 2003.
(Another, less likely translation would be: "from virtue, money and all the other good things come to
humans".) Cf. Protagoras 313a; Charmides 156e6-8; Euthydemus 281d-e; Gorgias 513e-514a.

118
Indeed he may perhaps have me killed or drive me out or disenfranchise me. But whereas that
one, and certainly some other, may perhaps suppose that those things are greatly bad; I do not
suppose so, but rather that doing these things that he's now doing—putting his hand to having a
man unjustly killed—is much more bad.) Now, therefore, men of Athens, I am far from
speaking a defense on behalf of myself, as someone might suppose; rather, I do so on behalf of
you, lest you somehow err regarding the god's gift to you {30e} by voting against me; for if you
have me killed, you won't easily find another of this sort, since I simply—even if to say so is
rather laughable—have been attached to the city by the god, just as to a horse who's great and
well-born, but who, by its great size, is rather sluggish and needs to be wakened by some gadfly.
So, then, the god seems to me to have put on the city me, someone of this sort: one who,
wakening134 and persuading and reproving {31a} each one, does in no way stop from settling
everywhere on you the whole day.
Another of this sort, therefore, won't easily be generated for you, you men.135 But if
you'll be persuaded by me, you'll spare me. But being perhaps aggravated, just as people who
while nodding off are awakened, you might perhaps strike136 me; if you are persuaded by
Anytus, you easily might have me killed, and then you might end up slumbering for the rest of
your life, unless the god in concern for you sends you some other.
And that I happen to be of the sort such as to have been given to the city by the god, you
might discern from this: For it doesn't {31b} seem like a human thing for me to have been
inattentive to all of my own things and to hold out in being inattentive to my familial things for
so many years now, while always transacting what's yours, going to each one in private, just as a
father or elder brother, persuading you to attend to virtue. And if I enjoyed something from
those things and received a wage from exhorting those things, I would have some account for
them; but you now surely see even for yourselves that my arraigners, though in all the other

134
Given the analogy between sleeping and lack of knowledge, suggested here and developed more fully
in the Republic (476d, 520c, 534c), it is safe to infer that Socrates does regard himself as conferring a
kind of knowledge on ("wakening") his interlocutors. In persuading (Defense Speech 30e, 31b) and
reproving (30e) and counseling (31c, 33d) them, he thereby teaches them. What precisely he regards
himself as teaching – what kind of knowledge it is – is unclear from this passage alone. He may have in
mind only the "human wisdom"— the awareness of the limits of one's knowledge—which he discussed
earlier (20d-23b). However, his references to justice in the immediately following passage (31e-31a, 32a,
32e) suggest that his counsel (which is private not public) involves identifying what is just, rather than
simply a general exhortation to pursue knowledge or even virtue. See Senn 2013.
135
Contrast 39c-d.
136
as one would a gadfly.

119
things they arraign so shamelessly, were not in this able to be entirely shameless by holding forth
{31c} a testifier to say that I at any time either exacted, or petitioned for, any wage. For I
suppose that I'm holding forth a sufficient testifier to say that I speak true things: my poverty.
Probably it may, then, seem out of place that I, going around, counsel about those things
in private and am a busybody,137 but in public I don't dare to come up to the multitude138 of yours
and counsel the city.139 But what's responsible140 for that is something you have heard me speak
of many times in many places: that for me something godly and {31d} divine comes to be,
which surely141 Meletus, satirizing it, even wrote about in his indictment. And for me this is a
thing that began from childhood: some voice that comes to be, which, when it comes to be,
always turns me away from that which I'm going to do, but never turns me toward anything.142
That is the thing that makes doing the political things contrary to me; and making it contrary
seems to me entirely beautiful.143 For be well aware, men of Athens, that if I had long ago put
my hand to doing the political practices, I would long ago have been destroyed and {31e} would
have benefited neither you nor myself in any way. And don't be aggravated by my saying the
true things: For there isn't any human who will be safe who is genuinely contrary to you or any
other multitude and restrains many unjust and unlawful things from coming to be in the city.
{32a} Rather, it's necessary that the one who really battles144 for what's just—if he is going to be
safe even for a little time—do so privately, but not do so publicly.145

137
cf. "transacting what's yours" (31b3).
138
sc., the Assembly.
139
Callicles makes this criticism of Socrates at Gorgias 485e-486a. Cf. Greater Hippias 281c and
Thucydides 2.40.2. This is related to the usual criticism of men who continued in adulthood to occupy
themselves with philosophy: Philosophy was considered fine for young people to study, but adults who
participated much in it were regarded as wasting their time and shirking real responsibility (Republic
487c-d, 497e-498a; Euthydemus 304e-305a; Gorgias 484c-486d; Menexenus 234a-b).
140
This seems to contradict his earlier claim that he doesn't attend to the affairs of the city because his
service to the god does not allow him the time (23b-c; cf. 36d).
141
See note 26 above. We are not, on the basis of this passage, to assume that Socrates' divine "voice"
was explicitly mentioned in Meletus' sworn statement to the court; since Socrates did not speak of the
divine voice at all in his response to Meletus' claim that Socrates acknowledged "novel divine things," it
should rather be assumed that Meletus did not explicitly mention it (Burnet 1924 pp. 127-128).
142
Cf. 40a ff. See my note 7 on Euthyphro 3b.
143
As the divine "voice" never explained itself, Socrates gives his own interpretation of the rationale
behind avoiding politics. (It could be that "to me" should be italicized instead of "beautiful".)
144
Cf. Gorgias 503a8-9, 513d2-5, 521a2-4.
145
Cf. Republic 496c-d. The Greek words corresponding to "privately" and "publicly" were, as Burnet
notes, "commonly used in connexion with trades and professions, especially medicine, to distinguish what
we call 'private practice' from state service" (Burnet 1924 p. 129).

120
 But I will hold forth for you great marks of those things, not statements, but—what you
esteem—deeds. Hear, then, the things that have come about for me in order that you may see
that not only would I give way to not even one persom against what's just because I feared death,
but also that I even would be destroyed from not giving way. And I will say to you things vulgar
and characteristic of judicial affairs; but they are true. For I, men of Athens, have never {32b}
yet had any rulership in the city; but I was a Councilor,146 and our tribe Antiochis happened to be
presiding147 when you148 wished149 to judge collectively—and unlawfully, as it seemed to you all
at a later time—the ten generals who had not taken the men away from the naval battle.150 At the
time I alone of the Presidents was contrary to your doing something against the laws, and voted
contrary to it. And though the rhetoricians were ready to show me up151 and lead me away, and
though you were exhorting and shouting, {32c} I supposed that there was a need that I risk
being with the law and what's just rather than, frightened of imprisonment or death, being with
you when the things wished were unjust. And those things were when the city was still a
democracy.

146
The Council itself was a "rulership"; but technically the position of an individual Councilor was not
considered one (Burnet 1924 p. 130). Burnet warns against identifying this incident with the one referred
to at Gorgias 473e, where Socrates specifically claims to have been "supervisor" of the Council (Burnet
1924 p. 133). As Burnet points out, it is only in Xenophon's Memorabilia (1.1.18, 4.4..2, and not in his
Apology or Hellenica) that Socrates is said to have been "supervisor" of the Council in the case of the
generals from the battle at Arginusae.
147
A committee known as the "Presidents" determined the Council's agenda. The Council consisted of
ten groups, each of fifty men, corresponding to the ten tribes of Athens; each of these groups served as
Presidents for a tenth of the year, the order being determined by lot. (OCD4 pp. 1231-1232)
148
sc., the people of Athens—as represented by the Adjudicators. See note 118 above.
149
I follow de Strycker and Slings in preferring the manuscript that has eboulesthe ("wished") instead of
ebouleusasthe ("made a resolution as Council"). As de Strycker and Slings explain (pp. 161-163, 344-
345), it's clear that what Socrates is describing is an Assembly meeting, not a Council meeting (pace
Burnet 1924 pp. 131-132). As one of the Presidents of the Council, Socrates had voted against allowing
the Assembly to decide on the generals' collective guilt. See notes 90 and 91 above.
150
Because of bad weather, the generals lost twenty-five ships and had failed to rescue the crews of the
waterlogged ships, in the battle at Arginusae in 406 BCE (OCD4 p. 148; Howatson p. 52). It was against
Athenian law to try them all at once, rather than individually. Despite Socrates' opposition, the generals
ultimately were tried collectively and sentenced to death; six of them were executed (OCD4 p. 1463).
151
Cf. Xenophon Hellenica 1.7.14. The word is endeiknunai whose general sense is to show. In Athenian
legal jargon it had a more specific meaning: It was used of "the procedure adopted in the case of those
who exercised public functions when in debt to the treasury, and was probably extended by a legal fiction
so that it could be used to deal with officials acting contrary to rule" (Burnet 1924 p. 134). So in this
context, endeiknunai may mean to inform against Socrates as being such an official. Cf. Socrates' use of
the same word, without this legal sense, at 29d6.

121
 And again, when the oligarchy was generated, the Thirty, having sent for me—one of
five—into the Rotunda,152 ordered us to bring Leon153 from Salamis in order that he might be put
to death. (Those men were actually ordering many others to do many such things too, wishing to
fill as many people as possible full of things they were responsible for.) Yet at the time I again,
not {32d} in statement, but in deed, showed that to death—if it were not too wild to say so—I
attend not even in any way whatsoever; whereas, to not producing anything unjust or impious—I
do attend entirely to that. For that rulership,154 though it was so strong, did not stun me so as to
produce anything unjust. Rather, when we went out of the Rotunda, the four others155 went to
Salamis and brought Leon, whereas I, going away, went to my house. And I probably would
have been put to death because of those things if the rulership had not been quickly undone.
{32e} And of those things there will be many testifiers for you.
Do you suppose, therefore, that I would have gotten through these years if I had been
doing the public things and, doing them as is "worthy of a good man", had aided the just
things156 and had—just as one "ought"—made that be of the most importance? Far from it, men
of Athens! For no {33a} other human would have either. Rather, throughout all my life if I
anywhere did anything in public, I would appear to be of this sort (even in private, this same
sort): I have never yet acceded in any way to anyone against what's just—not to any other and
not to any of those who surely people who asperse me assert are my disciples.157
But I have never yet been a teacher of anyone. But if anyone whether younger or elder158
has an appetite for hearing me when I'm speaking and transacting my own things,159 I have never

152
This was the office of the Presidents, where they also ate every day at public expense (OCD4 p. 1232).
The Thirty Tyrants occupied it during their reign.
153
Leon was an Athenian general who had democratic sympathies.
154
sc., the Thirty.
155
Meletus was one of these if he is the same Meletus who had helped indict Andocides (Burnet 1924 pp.
9-10, 137; see note 77 above). Assuming he was, Burnet offers an explanation of why Socrates did not
mention Meletus here: "…Meletus has been completely disposed of by this time [in the speech], and it is
much more effective to ignore him than to make a small personal point against him. The grave
seriousness of this part of the speech would be impaired by anything of the kind. Socrates could not
stoop to comparisons between his own conduct and that of a Meletus" (p. 137).
156
sc., publicly. Cf. 31e2 ff.
157
E.g., Critias (c. 460-403 BCE) and Alcibiades (c. 452-404). Critias was a prominent member of the
Thirty. Alcibiades was an influential Athenian politician and general who became a traitor during the
Peloponnesian War. The two men had been well-known associates of Socrates, even as Plato himself
depicts them in (e.g.) the Charmides and the Symposium. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.12ff.
158
Cf. 30a and note 131 above.
159
The Greek is ta emautou prattontos. Since my translation seems directly to contradict the "always

122
yet begrudged anyone; nor is it the case {33b} that, whereas I discuss when I receive money, I
don't discuss when I don't receive money. Rather, I hold forth myself for both a wealthy person
and a poor one similarly to ask160 and (if anyone wishes) to hear the things I would say by
answering.161 And whether any of those people becomes useful or not, I would not justly be held
as the one responsible; I never promised any learning to any of them, nor did I teach any of them.
But if anyone asserts that from me he ever learned anything or heard in private anything that all
the others didn't too, be well aware that he is not saying true things.
But because of what exactly, then, are some gratified {33c} by spending much time with
me? You have heard, men of Athens; I told162 you the entire truth: because they are gratified by
hearing people examined who suppose they are wise but are not; for it is not unpleasant.
And I have, as I assert, been ordered by the god to do that, from divinations and from
things in sleep163 and by every manner by which any godly dispensation ever ordered a human to
do even anything whatsoever. Those things, men of Athens, are true and would be easily refuted

transacting (prattein) what's yours" of 31b (cf. 31c5), Socrates may here simply mean instead doing the
practices that are mine (a la "practice (pragma)" at 20c5), i.e., discussing and examining. Then again, it is
just as likely that Socrates is playing on the ambiguity, since he is here trying to convince the judges that
he is simply a private man, not a professional teacher.
160
This was significantly different from, e.g., Gorgias' (Meno 70c) and Hippias' (Hippias Minor 364d)
offers, since the poor would not have been given the privilege of questioning Gorgias or Hippias. It may
be passages such as this (and Defense Speech 17c, 30a, and Euthyphro 3d) which have made some
scholars (e.g., Vlastos 1991 pp. 18, 48, 110, 177 and 1994 p. 103) conclude that Socrates was a
"populist", a "street philosopher", not wishing to "confine…inquiry to a tiny elite". But there are plenty
of indications that suggest Socrates in fact had a marked preference for discussing with the elite,
particularly educated gentlemen (cf. Protagoras 347c-e), those reputed for wisdom (Defense Speech 23b,
Hippias Minor 369d-e, Protagoras 348d-e,` Gorgias 448d, Meno 89e), and wealthy young adolescents
who had philosophical potential (Charmides 153d, Laches 180c, Lysis 203b-204b, Theaetetus 143d). Cf.
note 9 above. At Theaetetus 150b he even makes a point of saying that he discusses with men rather than
with women (but contrast Defense Speech 41c and my note 233 below).
161
The sentence is often mistranslated and consequently misinterpreted (e.g., Brickhouse and Smith 1994
pp. 7-8). See Burnet for a corrective (1924 pp. 138-139; also Thompson p. 61, Smyth p. 446, and de
Strycker and Slings p. 349). My translation is meant to reflect the ambiguity of Plato's Greek: it's not
clear whether Plato meant the "answering" to be Socrates' or else his interlocutor's—whether "the things I
have to say" are Socrates' answers to his interlocutor's questions or else his own questions put to the
interlocutor. On Socrates' willingness to speak his own mind, and not only to question, see Euthyphro 3c-
d, 12a-c; Ion 532d; Protagoras 338c-d, 347b, 348a; Gorgias 462b, 467c, 470b-c, 504c, 506a ff.; Meno 75b
ff., 81a ff; Republic 337c, 348a-b. Evidently a popular opinion of Socrates was that he questioned and
refuted others but refused to answer himself (see Meno 79e-80a; Republic 336c, 337a, e; Theaetetus
150c; Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.36, 4.4.9; Aristotle Sophistical Refutations 183b7-8). In the present
passage Socrates seems intent on correcting the popular impression. See Senn 2013.
162
At 23c.
163
Cf. Phaedo 60e-61a.

123
if untrue. For164 if {33d} indeed I ruin some of the young and have ruined others then certainly
if some of them who have become elder had recognized that when they were young I ever
counseled anything bad, then they ought now, coming up here, to arraign me and avenge
themselves upon me. And if they weren't willing, then some of the family of those ones—fathers
and brothers and other relatives—ought now, if their families had been affected by me in some
bad way, to remember and to avenge themselves. But, in any case, many of them,165 I see, are
present here: First there is this man here Crito (of the same age and {33e} and of the same
deme166 as me), father of Critobulus167 here; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of
Aeschines168 here; and moreover there is this man Antiphon here the Cephisean, father of
Epigenes.169 Then there are those others whose brothers have been spending time in this way:170
Theosdotides' son Nicostratus, brother of Theodotus (and Theodotus has met his end, so at least
this man may not entreat him);171 and the son of Demodocus,172 Paralius here, whose {34a}
brother was Theages;173 and the son of Ariston, Adeimantus174 here, whose brother is this man
Plato here; and Aeantodorus whose brother is Apollodorus175 here. And I'm able to speak to you
of many others, some of whom Meletus ought most of all to have held forth in his own statement
as testifiers. But if at the time it was unnoticed by him, let him hold them forth—I make way for
him—and let him speak if he has any of that sort. But you will find, you men, that—entirely

164
This seems to be Socrates' real defense against the charge that he ruins the young—as compared to the
"rhetorical" defenses he offers at 24d-27e.
165
sc., relatives of Socrates' young followers.
166
A deme was a township within the city of Athens. See note 90 above.
167
For Crito and Critobulus, see Crito (passim), Phaedo 59b, and Euthydemus 271b, 306d; cf. Xenophon's
Memorabilia 1.3, 1.8, 1.10.
168
Like Plato, a writer of Socratic dialogues, of which only fragments exist. See also Phaedo 59b. He is
not to be confused with the renowned Athenian orator of later years.
169
See Phaedo 59b; and Xenophon's Memorabilia 3.12. Antiphon the Cephisean is not to be confused
with Antiphon the Sophist from Memorabilia 1.6.
170
sc., with me.
171
I.e., so Theodotus cannot entreat Nisostratus not to testify against Socrates.
172
See Theages 127e ff. (Theages is a spurious Platonic dialogue.)
173
See Republic 496b-c and Theages (passim). He was dead, possibly from the life-long illness referred
to in the Republic.
174
See Republic (passim).
175
Narrator in Plato's Symposium. See also Phaedo 59a, 117d; and Xenophon's Memorabilia 3.11.17,
Apology 28. Of the others mentioned (except, of course, Plato), nothing but what is said in the text is
known. Critobulus, Aeschines, Epigenes, and Apollodorus are mentioned in Phaedo 59a as being with
Socrates at his death. All of these young men were presumably wealthy enough to spend their days with
Socrates (cf. Defense Speech 23d); later, we are informed that three of them—Apollodorus, Critobulus,
and Plato—offer up their own money to encourage Socrates to propose for himself a higher fine (38b).

124
contrary to that—all are ready to aid me, "the one who ruins them," "the one who produces bad
things for their families," as Meletus and {34b} Anytus assert. For while the ones who "have
been ruined" might themselves probably have some account for aiding me, what account do the
non-ruined ones—who are now elder men, relatives of those who "have been ruined"176—have
for aiding me other than the correct and just one: that they are, along with Meletus, quite aware
of his falsifying and are, along with me, quite aware of my being truthful?
All right, then, you men. The things I would have to say in my defense are almost those
and perhaps other things of that sort. But perhaps someone {34c} of you may be irritated when
he remembers to himself that, when he competed in a competition that was even less than this
competition here, he made requests of and supplicated the Adjudicators with many tears, making
his children and others of his family and many friends come up, in order that he might be most
pitied; whereas I then will do none of those things, and especially when I'm risking, as I might
seem, the utmost risk. Perhaps, then, discerning those things, someone might be rather self-
willed toward me and, being made irate by {34d} those things themselves, might put down his
vote with ire. If indeed someone of you were thus disposed—for I, at least, don't deem anyone
is; rather, therefore, if anyone were, then it would seem to me to be decent to speak to that one,
saying, "Certainly, best man, there is some family of me too; for—even in this very saying of
Homer's177—I was begot neither 'from oak nor from rock' but from humans." So there is a
family of me too, and sons, men of Athens—three: one is already a lad, while two are
children.178 But nonetheless I will not, by making any of them come up here, request that you
vote against the charge. Why exactly, then, will I do none of those things? Not because I am
self-willed, men of Athens, {34e} nor because I disesteem you. Rather, whether or not I am
boldly disposed toward death belongs to another discussion; but anyway, in relation to the
reputation of me and you and the whole city, it doesn't seem to me to be beautiful for me to do
any of those things, both because I am so aged and because I have this name: Whether a true

176
Elsewhere too (e.g., Laches 181c, 200c; Republic 328d) Plato represents fathers as enthusiastically
inviting Socrates to interact with their sons.
177
Odyssey 19.163; also Iliad 22.126.
178
The lad was Lamprocles; the other two, Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Burnet 1924 p. 145), the
younger of which is described as being small enough for Xanthippe to hold in her arms at Phaedo 60a2.
(In Athens at the time, a "child" is generally anyone younger than fifteen, and a "lad" is anyone older than
fourteen but not yet eighteen.) They are also mentioned in Phaedo 116b1, with Xanthippe their mother.
According to Aristotle, Socrates' children were "fatuous" and "torpid" (Rhetoric 1390b30-32); we know
nothing else of them.

125
thing or a falsehood, it has anyway been at least opined179 {35a} that this Socrates is in some
way different from180 the many of humans. If, then, the ones of you who are opined to be
different—whether in wisdom or in manliness or in any other virtue whatsoever—were to be of
that sort,181 it would be shameful. Some of just this sort I have seen many times—though they
are opined to be something—working in wondrous ways when they are being judged, as though
they supposed they would be affected in some fearsome way if they were to be put to death, just
as though they would be deathless if you were not to have them killed. They seem to me to
fasten shame around the city, so that even some one {35b} of the foreigners would conceive
that the Athenians who are different in virtue—whom they themselves distinguish182 from
themselves to be in the rulerships and the other esteemed offices—are no different from women.
For, men of Athens, you who are opined to be something—even in any way whatsoever—ought
not to do those things; nor, if we183 do, ought you to permit it. Rather, you ought to show this
thing alone: that you vote much more against the one who brings in those pitiable dramas and
who makes the city be laughed at, than the one who conducts himself in quietness.
But, separate from the reputation,184 you men, it seems to me to be just, not {35c} to
make requests of the Adjudicator or to escape conviction by making requests, but to teach and
persuade. For the Adjudicator has taken his seat not for this—for gratuitously handing out the
things that are just—but for judging them; and he has sworn, not to gratify any ones who might
seem good to him, but to adjudicate according to the laws. Therefore, we185 ought not to
habituate you to make false oaths, nor ought you to be habituated so; for neither of us would be
reverent in doing so.
Don't, then, men of Athens, deem that there is a need for me to do toward you things that
{35d} I regard not to be beautiful or just or pious—and in any case especially, by Zeus, when
I'm being indicted for irreverence by this man Meletus here. For, plainly, if by making requests I
persuaded you and was forceful with186 the things you've sworn, I would be teaching you not to

179
or "resolved". This, we know, is false modesty: Socrates has already demonstrated (20d ff., 29b) the
precise way in which he thinks he really is better than everyone else.
180
sc., by being superior to. Cf. 35b. In English too, we describe certain people as "distinguished".
181
sc., were to do any of those things.
182
sc., by electing.
183
sc., who are (opined to be) different/superior
184
sc., of me and of Athens.
185
This is the same "we" as in 35b5.
186
I.e., overpowered.

126
regard gods as existing and by speaking my defense I would simply be arraigning myself, saying
that I don't acknowledge gods. But it is far from standing thus; for I acknowledge them, men of
Athens, as none of my arraigners does, and I turn it over to you and the god187 to judge me in
whatever way is going to be best for me and for you.188 {35e}
* * *
Not being irritated, men of Athens, at this {36a} outcome—at your having voted against
me—is for me contributed to by many things, and especially by the fact that it is not
unanticipated that this outcome has come to be for me. Rather, I wonder much more at the
numerical outcome of the votes of each side; for I was supposing that the outcome would be not
by so few, but by many. But, as it now is, it seems like, if only thirty of the votes had fallen
otherwise I would have escaped conviction.189 Well, actually, it seems to me that I have escaped
Meletus even as it now is; and not only have I escaped him, but this is clear to all: that if Anytus
and Lycon hadn't come up here to arraign me, he would {36b} have incurred a thousand-
drachma obligation, for not receiving the fifth part of the votes.190
But anyway, the man makes death be his estimation of the sentence for me.191 All right.
But what then shall I make for you as a counterestimate, men of Athens? Is it clear that I shall
make the worthy one? What, then? What am I worthy of being subjected to or of paying
because throughout my life I wouldn't conduct myself in quietness but have been inattentive to

187
See note 25 above.
188
Socrates' "defense" ends here. "When the speeches of the parties were over, the [Adjudicators] heard
no impartial summing-up and had no opportunity for discussion, but voted at once. ...The majority
decided the verdict. A tie meant acquittal. There was no appeal from the [Adjudicators'] verdict."
(OCD4 p. 804). What follows, in the text, is Socrates' sentencing proposal, which in real time would have
been preceded by the prosecution's proposal (see note 191 below).
189
This means the vote was 280 to 220, if there were 500 judges (see note 2 above).
190
In any trial where the prosecution received less than a fifth of the votes, the plaintiff was fined for
wasting the court's time (Burnet 1924 p. 152). "The fifth part" of the votes was thus the necessary bare
minimum. Socrates seems to be assuming (perhaps whimsically) that each prosecutor was responsible for
winning a third of the votes against Socrates; Meletus would thus have won ninety-three and a third votes,
less than one fifth of the total (presumed) five hundred.
191
Socrates' was "a case in which no penalty was prescribed by law, and it was left to the court…['to
estimate what the convicted ought to be subject to or to pay']. In such cases, since the court had to choose
between the alternative penalties proposed by the prosecution and the defense, and could not itself
propose a different one, it was in the interest of the prosecution to propose a rather more severe penalty
than it really desired to inflict, while it was in the interest of the defense to propose an alternative
sufficiently heavy to make it possible for the court to accept it" (Burnet 1924 pp. 149-50). Anytus
probably had Meletus propose the death-penalty only so Socrates would make exile—the next most
serious sentence—be his counter-proposal (p. 150). The legal term for proposing a penalty for the
convicted was "to estimate...."

127
the things the many are attentive to—money-making, familial management, generalships, public
announcements,192 and other rulerships, and caucuses and factions that come to be in the city—,
regarding {36c} myself really to be too decent to save myself by going after those things? I
didn't go in for those things by going through which I wasn't going to be any benefit either to you
or to myself. But I went in for those things by going in for which I was, for each one in private,
going to produce well what I assert is the greatest good work: putting my hand to persuading
each of you not to attend to any of his own things193 before he attended to himself in order that
he might be as good and mindful as possible,194 and not to attend to the things195 of the city
before he attended to the city itself, and to attend to the {36d} other things thus in the same
manner. What, therefore, am I worthy of being subjected to, being of that sort? Something
good, men of Athens, if at least there is a need to make an estimation that's in truth according to
my worthiness—and in addition to that, a good of the sort which would be becoming for me.
What then is becoming for a poor man, producing good, who needs to lead a life of leisure for
the purpose of exhorting you? There is not, men of Athens, anything which is so becoming for
the man of that sort as to be fed in the Presidents' Hall.196 At least it's much more becoming than
if anyone of you has been victorious at the Olympics on a horse or on a two-horsed chariot or
with a team of horses; for he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you be happy;197 and
he {36e} is in need of no nourishment,198 whereas I am in need of it. If, therefore, there is a
need for me to make, according to what's {37a} just, an estimation of my worthiness, I estimate
that it's this: feeding in the Presidents' Hall.

192
Or, rather, the positions of those who address the Assembly.
193
sc., his body and his external belongings and affairs (e.g., familial affairs: see 23b-c, 31b), as opposed
to his soul (i.e., "himself").
194
The exact same phrase is found at Phaedo 107d.
195
E.g., wealth and reputation.
196
Where the Presidents dined before the Rotunda was built (see note 147 above). It was Athens' main
public building, housing the community hearth (a perpetual fire consecrated to the goddess Hestia), and
containing magisterial offices (Howatson pp. 277, 471). Victorious athletes, distinguished generals (e.g.,
Cleon), and representatives of certain special families ate there at public expense; the court therefore
would have thought Socrates' proposal absurd, if they did not actually take offense to it (37a).
197
This passage is strikingly similar to the sentiments expressed in one of the philosopher Xenophanes'
(BCE c.565-c.470) elegies, wherein Xenophanes characterizes his own "wisdom" as much more valuable
to the city than the athlete's physical strength (DK 21B2; cf. de Strycker and Slings p. 189). Socrates'
words are surely meant to recall it. In Thucydides (6.16), Alcibiades claims that his victory in the
Olympic chariot races of 416 BCE made Athens seem more powerful than it really was.
198
The "victor" in horse-racing was the wealthy owner of the horses, not the one who drove them.

128
 Probably, then, I may nearly seem to you to be speaking again in a self-willed way when
I say those things, just as when I spoke199 about lamentation and entreaty. But that is not so, men
of Athens; but it's rather of this sort: that I am not voluntarily unjust to any human. (But I'm not
persuading you of that; for we have discussed with each other for only a little time. For, as I
suppose, if there were a law for you, just as there is for other humans too,200 to judge concerning
death not in one day only but in many, {37b} then you would have been persuaded. But, as it
now is, it isn't easy in a little time to undo for myself great aspersion.) Being persuaded, then,
that I'm unjust to no one, I'm far from being about to be unjust to myself and being about to say
against myself that I myself am worthy of something bad and making for myself some estimation
of that sort. What for?201 Is it because I fear lest I be subjected to that which Meletus has made
as his estimation of the sentence for me, concerning which I assert I'm not aware of whether it is
good or bad? Instead of that, then, am I to choose things that I'm well aware are in some way
bad, making this my estimation?: To be imprisoned? And what need is there for me {37c} to
live in prison, being enslaved by the rulership that has been set up there: the Eleven?202 Money,
rather? And to be imprisoned until I pay it off? But for me that is the very same thing as what I
was just now speaking of; for there's no money for me from which to pay it off. But, then, shall I
make exile be my estimation of my sentence? For perhaps you'd make that your estimation of
the sentence for me. Much friendship-for-soul203 would indeed possess me, men of Athens, if I
were to be so unreasoning as not to be capable of reasoning that whereas you who are fellow-
citizens of mine have not been the sort to bear my ways of spending time and {37d} my
statements (they have rather become so heavy and grudgeworthy to you that you are searching to
be released from them now)—But then will others bear them easily? Far from it, men of
Athens!204 It would then be a beautiful life to live for me, a human so aged, going out
exchanging one city for another and being driven out of one city after another! For I'm well

199
at 34c ff.
200
E.g., in Spartan courts (Burnet 1924 p. 157). Athens' having recently been defeated by Sparta in the
Peloponnesian War, this reference may have offended the court, and would have reminded them of
Socrates' general admiration of Spartan law (cf. Crito 52e).
201
sc., For what reason would I choose as my sentence something bad for me?
202
Public officials appointed by lot who took care of the prison and executions (OCD4 p. 500).
203
In Greek, the expression "friendship-for-soul" is pejorative; it means something like cherishing life too
much (cf. Gorgias 512e). In some contexts, psuchē—usually translated "soul"—simply means life (e.g.,
Gorgias 511d).
204
Cf. Meno 80b.

129
aware that, wherever I go, the young will listen to my speaking just as they do here. And if I
drive those away, they on their own will have me driven out, having persuaded their elders;
{37e} whereas, if I don't drive them away, the fathers and family of those ones will do so for the
sake of those ones themselves.205
Probably, then, someone might say, "But it isn't possible, Socrates, after having went
away from us, to live while being silent and conducting yourself in quietness?" That, then, is
hardest of all to persuade some of you of. For if I say that that would be disobeying the god and
because of that I'm incapable {38a} of conducting myself in quietness, you wouldn't be
persuaded by me because I'm "dissembling."206 If, on the other hand, I say that this actually
happens to be the greatest good207 for a human—to make statements each day about virtue and
about the other things concerning which you hear me discussing and examining myself and
others—and that the life without examination208 is not livable for a human, then you will be still
less persuaded by my saying those things.
But though those things stand thus as I assert, you men, it's not easy to persuade you.
And simultaneously I've not been in the habit of deeming myself {38b} worthy of anything bad.
For if there were money for me, I would have made my estimation of my sentence be as much
money as I was in a position to pay; for I would be injured in no way. But as it now is, there's no
money for me, unless you then wished to make your estimation of my sentence be to pay as

205
As Burnet notes here, "It is in no way inconsistent with the fact that many Athenian fathers were ready
to give evidence in favour of Socrates (34a7) to say that the elders of another city would resent his talking
to their sons" (1924 p. 159). Cf. Meno 80b. Given the relatively radical democracy of Athens, and the
power wielded by those with rhetorical skills, aristocratic Athenian fathers had political motivations for
wanting their sons to associate with Socrates, just as they wanted them to associate with Sophists (see my
note on Meno 91b). In other political environments, Socrates would likely be considered a nuisance or
actually destructive, as of course he ultimately was considered even in Athens.
206
The word is eironeuesthai and it means to speak or act as though one's abilities or responsibilities are
less than what they are (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1108a21-23, 1127a22-23, 1127b22-26);
Demosthenes represents this disposition as characteristic of the Athenians and what could lead to their
being conquered by Philip II (First Philippic 7 and 37; cf. Burnet 1911 pp. lv-lvi). (The English word
"ironic" came from this Greek word, but has since taken on somewhat different connotations from the
Greek. See Vlastos 1991 and Senn 2013.) Those who were frustrated by Socrates' usual manner of
representing his intentions and abilities characterized this manner as "dissemblance" (see Republic 337a,
Symposium 216e, 218d). Those who didn't believe Socrates' claims of ignorance included not only his
adversaries, but also his associates (see, e.g., Laches 200e, Charmides 165b, Meno 71b-c, Republic 354b-
c).
207
Cf. Gorgias 500c2-4.
208
As de Strycker and Slings point out (p. 375), Socrates' Greek refers to not only a life that is not
examined (as most translators render it), but also a life that is not an examining life.

130
much as I'd be capable of. And perhaps I would be capable of paying you, I daresay, a mina of
silver.209 That much, therefore, is my estimation of my sentence.
But, men of Athens, Plato here and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus are exhorting
me to make my estimation be thirty minas,210 and they pledge it. My estimation, therefore, is
that much. And these pledgers will for you be worth the silver.211 {38c}
* * *
It's for the sake of not much time, men of Athens, that you'll have, from the ones who
wish to rail at the city, the name and responsibility for having had Socrates killed, "a wise man"
(for they who wish to reprove you will assert indeed that I am wise, even if I'm not). If at least
you had abided for a little time, this would have come to be for you spontaneously; for you
surely see my age: that I'm already far into my life and am near death.
And I say that {38d} not to all of you, but to the ones who voted against me, for my
death. And I say also this to those same men: Perhaps you suppose, men of Athens, that I was
convicted by being unprovided with statements of the sort by which I would have persuaded
you—if I had supposed there were a need to do and say all things so as to escape the sentence.
Far from it. Rather, I have been convicted by being unprovided, not indeed with statements, but
with daring and with shamelessness and by not being willing to say to you things the sort of
which it would have been most pleasant for you to hear: my wailing and anguishing, and doing
and saying many other things {38e} unworthy of me (as I assert), such as you indeed have even
been in the habit of hearing from the others. Rather, at the time I didn't suppose that there was,
because of the risk, a need to do anything illiberal.212 Nor do I now repent having spoken my

209
Xenophon in his Oeconomicus (2.3) has Socrates estimate his total finances at five minas. However,
the Oeconomicus is not widely considered a good source of historical truth.
210
A fairly substantial amount. Fifty minas, e.g., was considered "a large sum to pay for a house"
(Howatson p. 74).
211
Thus ends Socrates' sentencing proposal. The judges voted immediately on which of the two proposed
penalties should be imposed, the prosecutors' proposal or the defendant's. In Socrates' case, a majority
voted for Meletus' proposal; Plato does not make clear how big a majority. Diogenes Laertius (2.42)
claims that eighty more judges voted for Socrates' death than for his guilt; assuming that there were five
hundred judges (see note 2 above), the vote would then have been three hundred and sixty to one hundred
and forty. Since Diogenes' is the only such report that has come down to us, it is tempting to rely upon it;
but we should also be wary of accepting it, since he is by no means always reliable and specifically since
his report of the trial conflicts with Plato's in other respects. In particular, Diogenes reports that Socrates'
counterestimate involving being fed in the Presidents' Hall was Socrates' final assessment of the sentence
he deserved. See Brickhouse and Smith 1989 pp. 230ff.
212
I.e., unworthy of a free man.

131
defense thus; rather, I choose much more to have died having spoken my defense in that way
than to live having done so in the other way. For neither in a judicial case nor in war is there any
need either for me or for another {39a} to devise this: to do everything in order to escape death.
For even in battles it many times becomes clear that one would escape at least being put to death,
by letting go of one's arms and turning to one's pursuers for the purpose of supplication. And
there are many other devices, in each risky case, for escaping death, if one dares to do and say
everything. But this perhaps isn't hard, you men: escaping death. Rather, it is much {39b}
harder to escape defectiveness; for it runs more quickly than death. And now I, being slow and
elderly, have been caught by the slower one; whereas my arraigners, being fearsome and sharp,
have been caught by the quick one: defectiveness. And now I go away from you, having
incurred a sentence of death; but those men have, by the truth, incurred213 fault and injustice.
And I abide by the estimation of my sentence, and they abide by theirs. There was, I daresay,
probably a need that these things stand thus, and I suppose that they are melodious.214 {39c}
And, after that, then, I have an appetite for giving oracles to you, you men who have
voted against me. I too am now at that time at which most humans who give oracles are: when
they are going to die.215 For I assert, you men who have decided to have me killed, that there
will come to you, straightaway after my death, a vengeance much more harsh, by Zeus, than such
vengeance you took upon me when you had me killed. For, as it now is, you have done this
because you suppose that you will be released from giving in to an interrogation concerning your
life. But, as I assert, it will come about for you much contrary to that: {39d} there will be
plenty who will interrogate you216—ones whom, as it now is, I have been holding back; but you
didn't sense them. And they will be harsher inasmuch as they are younger and you will be
irritated more. For if you suppose that by having humans killed you will hold off anyone's
reproving you because you aren't living correctly, then you aren't thinking beautifully. For that
release is neither capable of occurring nor beautiful. But this release is most beautiful and
easiest: not restraining others but preparing yourself in order that you will be as good as
possible. Well then, having divined those things for you who have voted against me, I release
myself from you. {39e}

213
Or: been found guilty of.
214
Cf. 41d.
215
J. Adam compares Iliad 16.851ff. and 22.358ff. (1916 p. 113).
216
Contrast 30e-31a.

132
 But during the time in which the rulers of the Judiciary217 are conducting business and
I'm not yet going to where, when I've gone, there is a need that I die, I would with pleasure
discuss, with the ones who voted against the charge, this affair that has come to be. Rather abide
with me, you men, for that much time; for nothing restrains our discussing218 with each other
{40a} for as long as we can. For to you I'm willing to show, as to friends, what exactly the thing
that has now come about for me means. For something wonderful has come to be for me, men of
the Judiciary (indeed when I call you "Adjudicators," I do so correctly):219 for the divinatory
thing220 which for me is habitual was at all prior times very frequent, being contrary even in
entirely small things if I was going to act in some way not correct. But now these things, which
you see even for yourselves, have come about for me: things indeed that one might at least
suppose to be, and that are acknowledged as being, the utmost {40b} of bad things. But the
sign of the god was contrary to me neither when I went in the morning from my house, nor when
I came up here before the Judiciary, nor when I was going to say something anywhere in my
statement. And yet many times in other statements it held me back during my speaking. But
now, concerning this affair, it has been contrary to me in no way either in any deed or in any
statement. What, then, do I conceive is responsible? I will tell you. For this which has come
about for me is, I daresay, good, and it is not possible that {40c} we—however many suppose
that to have died is bad—are conceiving correctly. For me a great mark of that has come to be:
for it is not possible that the habitual sign would not have been contrary to me if I were not going
to do something good.

217
sc., the "Eleven" and a magistrate called the "king". (The "king" was actually a magistrate who was in
charge mainly of the religious duties formerly taken care of by the kings of Athens' ancient monarchy; in
particular, the "king" was concerned with any court case about impiety). They had to discuss, among
themselves first and then with the judges, what was to be done with Socrates until the time of his
execution; so Socrates has some time still to speak—at least to his friends—before this was decided.
218
The Greek is diamuthologesai. "There is no suggestion of 'myth' in the word. The Ionic sense of
[muthos] (= Att[ic] [logoi]) has survived in the compound, which means little more than [dialechthēnai
(sc., discuss)]" (Burnet 1924 p. 165). But cf. Phaedo 61e2, 70b6.
219
Socrates throughout has avoided addressing the judges as a whole with the usual form of address—
"men of the Judiciary" or "Adjudicators" (cf. Meletus at 26d and Gorgias 522c)—implying that only those
who voted in his favor are genuine Adjudicators (cf. 41a).
220
I.e., the divine voice mentioned at 31c-d. (I follow Schleiermacher in rejecting hē tou daimoniou; see
Burnet 1924 p. 165.) Mantikē, "divinatory", here is feminine because it refers to the phōnē, "voice", of
31d; so mantikē need not be understood to mean "the divinatory art/skill", as some would have it. The
phrase hē eiōthuia moi mantikē is comparable to to eiōthos sēmeion to daimonion at Euthydemus 272e
and to to eiōthos sēmeion moi gignesthai at Phaedrus 242b—another reason to read mantikē here as
"divinatory [voice]" rather than "divinatory art/skill".

133
 And let us understand things in this way: that there is much anticipation for its being
good; for to have died is one of two things: either221 it's being nothing, as it were, and the one
who has died doesn't have any sensation222 of anything either, or—according to the things that

221
Socrates offers two alternatives as to the nature of the afterlife. In spite of this, there is good reason to
believe that he embraced the second of the two (cf. de Strycker and Slings pp. 229ff., and Burnet 1914 p.
182 and 1924 pp. 166ff.): not only does he here devote twice as much time to discussing it, but in the
Crito 54b-c (though supposedly speaking on behalf of the Laws of Athens) Socrates reveals his belief that
we have further conscious experiences after death involving encounters with other individuals. (This is
consistent with the interpretation Socrates gives to his dream at Crito 44b: that his death will be a kind of
final homecoming.) Furthermore, in describing the second alternative, Socrates in the present passage
uses the same language as he is made to use in the Phaedo when he reports what the "sayings of long ago"
(63c, 67c, 69c, 70c) say of death: it is not to be feared as the greatest evil as the many do (68d); there is
good hope that it is rather the greatest good (63e-64a; cf. 63c, 67b-c, 114c); it involves a "migration"
(117c) or a "going abroad" (61e; cf. 67b); it involves Adjudicators passing judgment on how one had
acted during life (107d-e, 113d-114c); it involves being with worthwhile individuals who have died (63b-
c, 69e). In the Phaedo, it is clear that Socrates accepts the basic outlines of such sayings, though he seems
to allow (as he does in the present passage) the possibility that "there is nothing" for the one who has died
(91b-c).
222
Cf. Menexenus 248b7.

134
are said223—it happens to be some alteration and migration224 of the soul from this place to
another place. And if, then, it is sensing nothing but is like {40d} sleep when while one
slumbers one sees neither dream nor anything, then death would be a wonderful gain. For I
would suppose that if there were a need for one to pick out that night in which one was so
dormant that one was not even aware of a dream, and if, having put the other nights and days of
one's life side by side against that night, there were a need, after having considered them, to say
how many days and nights one had lived in one's life better and more pleasantly than that night,
then I would suppose that any private225 person—no, rather, the Great King226— {40e} would

223
"the things that are said" (here and at 40e and 41c) seems to be Socrates' way of referring to the
"Sacred Sayings" of Orphism (Burnet 1911 p. 38; cf. Meno 81a-b; Phaedo 63c6, 67c5, 70c5), a religious
movement Socrates seems to have been interested in and sympathetic to, but not wholly devoted to.
In any case, Socrates cannot be referring to popular sayings or beliefs about what happens after
death, contrary to what some commentators assume (e.g., de Strycker and Slings p. 385 and Stokes 1997
pp. 31, 189; Stokes' non-literal translation obscures the point: instead of "the things that are said", he has
"what people say"). Most of Socrates' contemporaries probably did believe that there was some form of
existence after death; but it would be confined to a Homeric Hades or to the tomb itself, or both (OCD2 p.
23; Garland 2001 pp. 76, 119). In none of these alternatives would one retain the "whole" self or even
any particularly valuable part of it; no one considered good the prospect of existing in a Homeric Hades
(see Republic 386b-387a and the references there to Homer; cf. OCD4 p. 417). The souls residing in
Homer's Hades did not retain full consciousness or the intellectual capacities of their former selves
(Garland 2001 pp. 1-2; cf. Meno 100a). Evidently such a fate was accepted not only by Homer but by the
"ordinary Greek" (Garland 2001 p. 12; Mikalson p. 191; Burnet 1911 pp. xlviii-l; see also the references
in McPherran 1996 p. 258 n. 35). Plato and Aristotle confirm that the most popular conception of death
was rather more like the first alternative Socrates mentions ("being nothing"): see Phaedo 70a-b, 77b,
80d8-e1; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1115a26-27, Rhetoric 1380b25-29. Evidently, the reason most
ancient Greeks feared death as the greatest of bad things (Defense Speech 29a-b, 40a-b, Phaedo 68d) was
because they believed it was the end of personally meaningful existence.
In fact, the original and everyday meaning of the word that Socrates uses for soul (psuchē) was life
or breath, something that one loses at death, rather than something that is a part of one's self and that
survives bodily death. Even according to the Homeric view, only a select few (great heroes and great
sinners) survived death in a personally meaningful way, and they did this only by actually retaining their
bodies (Burnet 1924 p. 167; Burnet 1911 p. 26; Garland 2001 pp. 60-61; Burkert p. 198). Socrates'
views about the psuchē were unconventional and would have struck the average Athenian as incredible if
not impious (cf. even his own followers' reactions to them in Phaedo 70a-b and Republic 608d). In
ordinary Greek parlance, the words "god" and "deathless/immortal" were practically synonymous; this
was implied by the basic principle of Greek religion that gods and humans are essentially distinct; to
assert that an ordinary person enjoyed a meaningful existence after death—let alone "deathlessness"
(Defense Speech 41c)—was to deny the very basis of popular Greek religion (Rohde, quoted in Burnet
1911 p. lii).
224
Literally, "change of abode/residence". Burnet (1924 p. 167) remarks that the term "seems to have
been technical in this connexion among the Orphics and Pythagoreans."
225
sc., ordinary.
226
of Persia. Proverbially a very well-off man (cf. Euthydemus 274a, Gorgias 470e, Meno 78d).

135
find them easy to count against the other days and nights. If, then, death is a thing of that sort, at
least I say it's a gain; for even all of time thus appears indeed to be nothing more than one night.
But if on the other hand death is like having gone abroad from this place to another place,
and the things that are said are true—that, therefore, all who have died are there—, then would
there be any greater good than that, men of the Judiciary? For if, having {41a} arrived in
Hades, having been released from these here who assert they are Adjudicators, one finds the true
Adjudicators who are also said to adjudicate there—Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus and
Triptolemus227 and however many other of the demigods who had been just in their own life—,
would this going abroad be paltry? Or, again, how much would any of you give to be with
Orpheus228 and Musaeus229 and Hesiod and Homer? For I am willing to die many times if those
things are true; {41b} for spending time there would be wonderful for me myself at least, when

227
These are judges of the dead according to Orphism only (Burnet 1924 p. 168). Cf. Gorgias 523e ff.
Socrates seems to accept the idea that the judges in Hades will judge the dead based on their conduct
while alive (cf. Crito 54b-c; Phaedo 107d-e, 113d-114c; Republic 614c-616a; Theaetetus 177a; cf. Laws
870d-e). According to popular Greek religion, humans generally were not after death judged on how they
lived, though divine punishment (particularly for unjust behavior regarding the gods) was thought to be
meted out during one's life or to one's descendants (Burnet 1924 p. 168, Garland 2001 pp. 60ff.; see note
240 below). In Homer (Odyssey 11.568-571) Minos judges the dead for their postmortem conduct
(OCD4 p. 417; Garland 2001 p. 60). On the Homeric view, a few—those who perform very great deeds,
either good or evil, in life—are rewarded or punished for those deeds after death, but this fate is confined
to extreme cases (Garland 2001 pp. 60-61), not something that an ordinary person could expect to face.
In fact, the belief in judgment after death for conduct while alive is apparently so contrary to generally
accepted Greek opinion that at Republic 330d-e the phenomenon is said only to occur in "stories" and
something that is popularly "laughed at" (cf. Gorgias 523a1-2, 527a5-6; Seventh Letter 335a-b). On the
absence of postmortem punishment in popular Greek belief, see Mikalson pp. 191-193; Garland 2001 pp.
17-18, 52, 66; Garland 2013 pp. 198-199. All of these are further reasons against interpreting "the things
that are said" as a reference to popular opinion. Also, Dodds' suggestion (pp. 373-374) that there are in
our text indications of Eleusinian doctrine is doubtful, because it seems that, according to that doctrine,
one could, regardless of one's other conduct, escape sanction in the hereafter simply by participating in
the appropriate initiation/purification rituals in this life (Parker p. 503; Garland 2001 pp. 61-62). Besides,
the afterlife that Socrates is here describing conflicts with Eleusinian doctrine in another crucial respect:
"…the concept of immorality is never mentioned in connection with Eleusis. Death [according to
Eleusinian doctrine] remains a reality…" (Burkert p. 289); "…the initiated of Eleusis were at best a class
of privileged shades" (Burnet 1911 p. xlix).
228
A pre-Homeric poet of ancient Greek legend who was considered the founding theologian of Orphism.
229
A mythical singer said to be related to Orpheus (Protagoras 316d, Republic 364e; Aristophanes Frogs
1032).

136
I would happen upon Palamedes230 and Ajax231 the son of Telamon and any other of the ones of
long ago who has died because of an unjust judgment, laying my experiences side by side against
the ones of those. I suppose, it would not be unpleasant. And surely the greatest thing would be
examining and asking the ones there—just as I pass time with the ones here—as to which of
them is wise and who supposes that he is but is not. And how much, men of the Judiciary, would
anyone give to examine the one who led against {41c} Troy the manifold army, or Odysseus, or
Sisyphus,232 or ten thousand other ones one might speak of, both men and women,233 whom it
would be an overwhelming234 amount235 of happiness to discuss with and be with236 and to
examine?237 In any case, the ones there certainly don't have anyone killed for that. For the ones
there are happier in other ways than the ones here, and they are now deathless238 for the rest of
time, at least if the things that are said are true.

230
He was framed by Odysseus, and subsequently stoned, for attempting to betray the Greek armies to the
Trojans. He was "begrudged because of his wisdom" (Xenophon Memorabilia 4.2.33). In the Republic
(522d), Socrates accounts him a wiser general than Agamemnon, because the former was supposed to
have discovered counting. In the Phaedrus, Socrates refers to the philosopher Zeno of Elea as "the Eleatic
Palamedes" (261d).
231
After Achilles' death, the Greek leaders voted to award his armor to Odysseus rather than Ajax who
famously went mad with resentment and committed suicide. See Odyssey 11.545 ff. and Sophocles'
Ajax.
232
Legendary men popularly opined to be wise or crafty. The leader of the Greeks' army against Troy
was Agamemnon.
233
This is an indication that his views about women and their potential for philosophy are the same as
those expressed in the Meno and Republic. The intellectual equality of men and women is genuine
Socratic doctrine, despite occasionally chauvinistic overtone (e.g. Defense Speech 35b). In Plato's
Menexenus, Socrates claims that Pericles' mistress Aspasia taught both him and Pericles rhetoric (235e);
and in Plato's Symposium, he claims that the priestess Diotima taught him the "art of love" (201d). In
Aeschines' dialogue the Aspasia (now extant only in fragments), Socrates tries to convince the
disbelieving Callias that a woman could be competent to educate a man.
234
Cf. Protagoras 344c, where this term is used to describe a calamity that renders one "helpless" or
"without resource". Cf. de Strycker and Slings pp. 393-394.
235
See Smyth p. 318 and de Strycker and Slings pp. 393-394.
236
He suggests here that he expects to learn from them. See note 35 above.
237
Again, the picture of Hades that Socrates paints is not the Homeric Hades; for there the dead are
mindless spirits, not genuinely potential interlocutors. See note 223 above. We do find at Odyssey
24.15ff. a scene where dead souls speak intelligibly among themselves. But no reader who has got so far
into Homer can accept it as anything but fanciful; everywhere else Homer describes the dead as
"mindless" and lacking "discernment" (Iliad 23.104; Odyssey 10.493-495, 11.476), and even immediately
preceding Odyssey 24.15 the dead are like "gibbering" bats (24.5, 24.9; cf. Iliad 23.101). Indeed, the
conversation at Odyssey 24.15ff. is reminiscent of fables wherein animals "speak" with each other, hardly
something readers are expected to, or do, take literally.
238
Socrates may simply mean that, having already died, the dead are thereby no longer subject to dying.
But, to the typical Greek ear, "deathless" would have seemed an unusual and even paradoxical way of
expressing the point, since in ordinary Greek "deathless" implied divinity: the dead could hardly be

137
 But you too, men of the Judiciary, ought to have good anticipation239 about your death
and to think on this one thing—a true thing—: that {41d} there is for a good man nothing
bad—neither when he's living nor even when he's come to an end; nor are his troubles240
unattended to by the gods. Nor have the things of mine, which have now come to be, come to be
spontaneously; rather, this is clear to me: that it was better for me to have died now and to have
been released from troubles.241 And because of that, the sign did not turn me away from
anything, and at least I am not at all harsh toward the ones who voted against me and toward my
arraigners. And yet they voted against me and arraigned me not with this thought; rather, {41e}
they suppose that they are injuring me. Reproaching them about that is worthy.
Yet I request of them this much: avenge yourselves, you men, upon my sons when they
reach adulthood, paining them in those same ways in which I pained you if they seem to you to
attend to money or any other thing before virtue; and if they opine that they are something when
they are nothing, reprove them, just as I did you, for not attending to the things there's a need to

deathless, as the gods were! See my note 223 above. However, if Socrates is describing Orphic doctrine,
the terminology is perfectly apt (cf. Meno 81a-c and my note 63 on Meno 81b).
239
He speaks similarly of this hope in the Phaedo: "…It appears likely to me that a man who has really
spent his life in philosophy is going to be confident in being put to death and is going to have good
anticipation that he will get the greatest goods there when he has come to an end" (63e-64a; cf. 63c, 67b-
c, 68a, 114c). Cf. Republic 331a. Burnet (1924 p. 170) suggests that "anticipation/hope (elpis)" in these
contexts is an Orphic term.
240
The Greek word is the same as one I've translated elsewhere as "practices"; but it seems in this context
to mean, as it sometimes does, troubles, though it could more generally mean matters. Cf. Republic 613a-
b, Phaedo 62b. In interpreting the meaning of Socrates' claim here, it must be kept in mind that the gods
of traditional Greek religion paid little attention to the affairs of ordinary humans except insofar as the
gods themselves were affected (Martin pp. 159-160, Garland 2013 p. 209). Cf. my note on Euthyphro 4d.
241
This expression is potentially confusing; if Socrates had said it at his trial, it may have confused even
Xenophon (or his source), who takes it to mean the physical troubles of old age (Memorabilia 4.8.1, .8;
Apology 6). Since nowhere else in Plato does Socrates seem truly concerned about the "troubles of old
age" (except, much more abstractly, at Republic 328d ff.), and since this sort of concern does not in any
case seem to be consistent with what we know about the man's overall concerns (Defense Speech 30b)
and about his physical constitution, it's not likely that this is what he here is referring to. Nor is this a
reference to the toils (22a) of his mission (as some—Burnet 1924 p. 171 and Brickhouse and Smith 1994
pp. 202-203 n. 46—have suggested), since Socrates plans (41b-c) to continue his search after death if he
can. Socrates here probably rather refers to the "release from human evils" (Phaedo 84b3, 81a; cf.
Theaetetus 176a) which require the "troubling (pragmateia)" (Phaedo 67b10; Theaetetus 174b) a
philosopher must undergo to pursue knowledge in spite of the body (compare ascholias at Phaedo 66b8
and more generally 81a, 82e-83d; cf. Gorgias 493e3-4, and "toils" at Republic 619d). (The phrase occurs
in a similar context at Republic 406e.) Such a reference would be especially apt if Socrates accepts the
Orphic view of afterlife described at Defense Speech 40e-41c: Orphic doctrine promised "release" from
the "dire cycle" of bodily reincarnations to those who had lived Orphically "pure" lives (see my note 63
on Meno 81b).

138
attend to and for supposing that they are worth something when they are {42a} worth
nothing.242 And if you do those things, I myself and my sons will have been subjected to just
things by you.
But anyway, now is the hour to go away, for me to be put to death, and for you to live.
And which of us is going to do better is unclear to everyone except the god.243

242
sc., in relation to wisdom. Cf. 23b.
243
See note 25 above. This agnosticism seems starkly disingenuous given the optimism he has just
alleged concerning his own "good" (or "not bad") fate in contrast to his claim that those who voted
against him "live incorrectly" in general (39d) and in particular will suffer the penalties of having done
him injustice (30c-d, 39b), in addition to being deprived of the "great benefit" provided by Socratic
examination and exhortation (30d-e, 36c). Such disingenuousness, we may infer, is characteristically
Socratic (cf. my note 15 on Meno 71a).

139
 The Crito
(translation and annotation by Scott J. Senn, 20 December 2020)

{43a} SOCRATES: Why have you arrived1 at this hour, Crito?2 Or isn't it still early?
CRITO: Well, actually, it is entirely.
SOCRATES: What's the hour, at the latest?
CRITO: Just before dawn.
SOCRATES: I wonder how it was that the prison's guard was willing to hear you!
CRITO: He's now used to me, Socrates, because of my coming here many times, and also he has
been done a good deed by me.3
SOCRATES: And have you come just now, or long ago?
CRITO: Fairly long ago. {43b}
SOCRATES: How is it that you didn't awaken me then, but sat beside me in silence?
CRITO: No, by Zeus, Socrates, I myself would not willingly be in so much sleeplessness and
pain either; but I also have since long ago been wondering—at you, because I sensed how
pleasantly you were slumbering. And I kept from awakening you purposefully: in order that
you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible.
And indeed many times before, during your entire life, I have deemed you happy because
of your manner; and I very much deem you happy most of all in the accident that has now
presented itself—so easily and mildly do you bear it.
SOCRATES: For, being of such an age, it would be immodest, Crito, to be irritated if there is
now a need to die. {43c}
1
sc., in the prison in which Socrates was held until his execution. In the Phaedo (59d) we learn that it
was near the same place of Socrates' trial. We also learn there that, while imprisoned, his friends came to
visit him daily; but since the prison "did not open early", they usually had to wait until well after dawn to
see him.
2
Crito was a businessman who seems to have gotten wealthy from running a farm (Euthydemus 304c,
291e; Xenophon Memorabilia 2.9.2-.4). He came from the same deme as Socrates and was
approximately of the same age (Defense Speech 33d-e, Crito 49a). The two were evidently very close,
lifelong friends. Along with Plato, Apollodorus, and Crito's son Critobulus, he was one of Socrates'
sureties for the fine that the philosopher finally proposed as his penalty (Defense Speech 38b). It seems
that Crito had offered the court, on Socrates' behalf, bail until the death sentence could be fulfilled
(Phaedo 115d; Burnet 1924 p. 172). Crito's offer was evidently rejected. Athenian court officials must
have deemed Socrates a considerable flight risk.
3
Crito presumably bribed the jailer.

140
CRITO: Even other people of such an age, Socrates, are caught in accidents of this sort, but their
age in no way undoes their being irritated at their present fortune.
SOCRATES: Those things are so. But why have you arrived so early?
CRITO: A report, Socrates, that's hard to bear, not (as it appears to me) for you; but for me and
all your associates, it is both hard and heavy. I, as it seems to me, may be bearing it most heavily
of all.
SOCRATES: What is this report? Or has the vessel arrived from Delos, at the {43d} arrival of
which there is a need for me to die?4
CRITO: It has indeed by no means arrived. But, it seems to me, it will come today, according to
the things some people who have come from Sunium5—and left that place—report. It's clear,
therefore, from those things that it will come today, and there will indeed tomorrow be a
necessity, Socrates, for your life to come to an end.
SOCRATES: But, Crito, let that be with good fortune, if that is friendly to the gods. I don't,
however, suppose that it will come today. {44a}
CRITO: Whence do you mark that?
SOCRATES: I'll tell you. For there is a need that I be put to death on, certainly, the day after
the day on which the vessel comes.
CRITO: Indeed, the ones6 who are chiefs of these things of course at least assert so.
SOCRATES: Well, then, I suppose that it will come not on the coming day,7 but on the next.
And I mark it from something in my sleep which I saw a little earlier this night. And I daresay
you have kept from awakening me at the opportune time.
CRITO: And what exactly was the thing in your sleep?
SOCRATES: It seemed to me that some beautiful and {44b} well-formed woman, who had on
white garb and was coming toward me, called to me and said, "Socrates, may you arrive at
loamy Phthia on the third day."8

4
It was Athenian law that no one was to be executed during the Delian religious festival, which
culminated with the arrival of the vessel from Delos; see Phaedo 58a-c. According to Xenophon
(Memorabilia 4.8.2), Socrates spent thirty days in the prison after his conviction.
5
From this high promontory in southern Attica, incoming ships could be seen well before they arrived at
Athens.
6
sc., "the Eleven". See Defense Speech 37c.
7
sc., the day presently dawning.
8
The same words Achilles uses in the Iliad (9.363) to mean that he will (Poseidon willing) arrive home
within three days. (Socrates quotes the passage in Hippias Minor 370c.) Socrates evidently believes that

141
CRITO: An out of place thing to have in your sleep, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Well, actually, it's obvious, at least as it seems to me, Crito.
CRITO: Too much so, it seems like.9 But, divine10 Socrates, still even now be persuaded by me
and save yourself, because for me, if you are put to death, there won't be just one accident;
rather, separate from being deprived of an associate of the sort such as I will in no way ever find
again, I will moreover, to many people who aren't plainly aware about me and you, seem {44c}
to be inattentive because I am "such a person as to save" you if I were "willing to spend money."
And of course what reputation would be more shameful than this: to seem to make money be
more important than friends? For the many will not be persuaded that, while you yourself were
not willing to go away from here, we had a spiritedness for it.
SOCRATES: But why, blessed11 Crito, are we being so attentive to the opinion of the many?
For the most decent ones, whom it is more worthy to be mindful of, will regard things as having
been so transacted just as they were transacted. {44d}
CRITO: But you surely see that it is a necessity, Socrates, to attend to even the opinion of the
many. And the things now present make it, of themselves, clear that the many are the sort to
produce not the smallest of the bad things but almost the greatest, if anyone is aspersed before
them.
SOCRATES: It'd be a benefit, Crito, if only the many were the sort to produce the greatest bad
things, so that they would also be the sort to produce the greatest goods, and things would stand
beautifully then. But as it now is, they are the sort to produce neither. For they are capable
neither of making one mindful nor of making one unmindful; rather, they make one be that

he will die "on the third day", counting the present day as the first. The passage also implies that Socrates
considers death a kind of homecoming. This cheery picture did not agree with the typical Athenian view
about death; it was generally feared as the greatest of evils (Defense Speech 29a-b, 40a-b; Phaedo 68d),
being the end of personally meaningful existence (Phaedo 77b, 80d8-e1). See my note 223 on Defense
Speech 40c. J. Adam may be right in saying that Socrates here associates "Phthia" with the word
"phthisis" which meant ruination (1893 p. 27); accordingly, the woman in white was promising Socrates a
"fertile death" on the third day.
9
In spite of this, it's not clear that Crito appreciates what Socrates takes to be the dream's meaning. See
46a and note 21 below.
10
See my note on Meno 92c.
11
As Denyer explains, in Platonic dialogues "this form of address standardly insinuates that the bliss of
the addressee rests on ignorance or error" (p. 191; Denyer compares passages such as Gorgias 512d,
Protagoras 309c.).

142
which they happen12 to make one be—whatever it might be.13 {44e}
CRITO: Let those things, then, stand thus. But, Socrates, tell me this: You aren't precautious
concerning me and your other associates lest, if you were to go out from here, the sycophants14
would hold forth troubles for us because we "stole" you from here, and we would be necessitated
either to forfeit even all our substance or much money or even to be subjected to some other
thing besides those things? For if anything {45a} of that sort frightens you, let it go. For
certainly we who will save you will be being just to risk that risk and, if there were a need, to
risk something still greater than that. But be persuaded by me and don't do otherwise.
SOCRATES: I actually am precautious about those things, Crito, and about many other things.
CRITO: Again, don't let those things frighten you. For it's not even much silver that some are
willing to receive to save you and lead you out of here. And then don't you see how easily
defrayed these sycophants are, and that there would be no need for them of much {45b} silver?
And to you belongs my money, which, I'm supposing, is sufficient. And then, even if, because
you are in some way concerned for me, you don't suppose there's a need to spend mine, these
foreigners here are ready to spend theirs. And one even has brought sufficient silver for this
thing itself: Simmias the Thebian. And Cebes and very many others are ready too.15 So, just as
I am stating, don't because of being frightened by those things weary of saving yourself, nor let
what you stated before the Judiciary be a handicap to you: that if you went away you would not
lay hold of in what way you'd use {45c} yourself.16 For in many places, wherever else you
might arrive, they'll admire you. And if you wished to go to Thessaly, there are there host-
friends17 of mine who will make much of you and will hold forth to you security, so that none of
the people in Thessaly will pain you.

12
I.e., haphazardly.
13
On the translation, cf. J. Adam 1893 p. 32. The idea is that the many have no real power to bring about
what they desire (see Penner).
14
"In Athens there were, for most offences, no public prosecutors, but anyone…who wished was allowed
to prosecute in a public action. Some individuals made a habit of bringing prosecutions, either to gain the
financial rewards given to successful prosecutors…, or to gain money by blackmailing a man who was
willing to pay to avoid prosecution, or to earn payment from someone who had reasons for wanting a man
to be prosecuted, or to make a political or oratorical reputation" (OCD4 p. 1416). Sycophants used
unscrupulous tactics to make those they accused look bad; they would often misrepresent a person's
actions or statements by using rhetorical tricks or outright misinformation.
15
Simmias and Cebes were young followers of Socrates. They are his chief interlocutors in the Phaedo.
16
Cf. Defense Speech 37c-38a.
17
J. Adam notes, "Crito's connection to Thessaly is significant as to his political sympathies: in so far as
he felt any interest in politics, he favoured the...oligarchical party" (1893 p. 35). On the concept of "host-

143
 And, moreover, Socrates, you don't even seem to me to be handling things justly: to have
given yourself up when you can be saved; and what's coming to be for you, you're hastening in
the sort of ways in which even your enemies would hasten and have hastened it when they
wished to ruin you. And besides those things, you to at least me seem to have given up your own
sons too, {45d} whom you can nurture and educate;18 you will have gone, leaving them behind;
and for your part, they will fare in any way they happen to. And they will likely happen to
become such people the sort of which it is habitual for orphans to become in orphanhood.19 For
one ought either not to make children or else to endure nurturing and education with them; but
you seem to me to choose the easiest things. But you ought to choose those things that a good
and manly man would choose, at least since you actually have been asserting that, throughout
your entire life, you attend to virtue.
How I am {45e} ashamed, on behalf both of you and of us your associates, lest it seem
that all that has been done concerning you has been done by some unmanliness of ours: how the
entering of that judicial case came to the Judiciary when it was possible not to have come;20 and
how the conducting itself of the judicial case came to be; and now in the end—as it were, the
laughable thing of the affair—, this seems to have, by some badness or unmanliness of ours,
escaped {46a} us: in that we didn't save you nor did you save yourself, when it was possible
and capable of occurring if there had been in us any even small benefit.
See, then, Socrates, whether those things are not simultaneously bad and shameful for
you and for us. Rather, take counsel with yourself— But it's rather not even the hour to take
counsel; but it is the hour to have taken counsel. And there is one counsel: For there is a need
that all these things be done on the coming night.21 And if we abide further, then these things

friends", see my note 53 on Meno 78d.

18
Though Socrates is seventy at the time of this dialogue, two of his sons were still children and one was
still a "lad" (Defense Speech 34d; cf. Phaedo 60a2).
19
Alcibiades, adopted by the influential statesman Pericles, was perhaps Athens' most famous orphan. He
was also Socrates' most famous young admirer; and, though extraordinarily popular in certain circles, he
was arrogant and self-willed and treacherous, not generally considered an exemplar of virtue, and
certainly did not end up faring well; he was slain at the hands of his political enemies. It should be noted
that Socrates did leave behind a wife, so his sons were not without any parents. But the loss of a father
was particularly difficult given the male-dominated nature of Athenian and most other ancient Greek
societies. See my note 178 on Defense Speech 34d.
20
Cf. Defense Speech 29c.
21
"Crito still thinks, in spite of the dream, that the ship will arrive to-day…" (Burnet 1924 p. 187).

144
will be incapable of occurring and will not still be possible. But in every manner, Socrates, be
persuaded by me and do nothing otherwise. {46b}
SOCRATES: Friend Crito,22 your spiritedness is worth much if it is on the side of some sort of
correctness. But if not, then the greater it is, the harder it is. We ought, therefore, to consider
whether we must do these things or not, as I—not now for the first time, but actually always—
am the sort of person such as to be persuaded by none of my things23 other than the statement24
that to me, when I reason,25 appears best. The statements, then, which I was stating before, I'm
not capable of now throwing out just because this fortune has come to be for me. Rather, they
appear to me almost similar to how they appeared then; {46c} and I regard as elder and esteem
the same things that I did even before. If at the present time we have no better statements to state
than them, then be well aware that I will not accede to you, not even if the capability of the many
scares us—just as if we were children—with more bogeys26 than the ones now present: prison
and sending death upon me and taking away money.
How, then, might we consider the statements in the most measured way? Might we
resume first with that statement that you stated, concerning opinions?
Was it, or wasn't it beautifully {46d} stated at each time27 that there is a need to discern
some of the opinions but not others? Or was it beautifully stated before that there was a need for
me to be put to death;28 whereas now, then, has it become clear that it was stated for nothing—
for the sake of merely stating—and was truly kidding and babble? And I at least have an
appetite, Crito, for considering in common with you whether it will appear the same or somehow
otherwise to me when I'm disposed in this way, and whether we will let it go or be persuaded by
it. And it was anyway stated, I suppose, each time in this way, just as I was just now stating, by

22
As Burnet notes, when the vocative is out in front, it is emotional; here it "expresses remonstrance"
(1924 p. 19).
23
"The soul, with its thoughts and feelings, as well as the body and its appurtenances, are all included in a
man's 'belongings' " (Burnet 1924 p.188; cf. 47c6). "My things" probably also includes Socrates' family
and friends (cf. Meno 92b and J. Adam 1893 p. 40), especially since Crito has just told Socrates, "…Be
persuaded by me and do nothing otherwise" (46a). The possessive is a typical Greek way of refer to
personal and/or familial affairs; cf. Defense Speech 23b, 31b, 36c, Crito 54b.
24
Socrates here means especially a statement that expresses a rule or principle of conduct (cf. Burnet
1924 p. 188), and in particular a principle that is the conclusion of a reasoned argument.
25
or: "when I come to a conclusion by a process of reasoning". The sentence is not always accurately
translated. See Senn 2012.
26
cf. Gorgias 473c-d, Phaedo 77e.
27
in past conversations.
28
Defense Speech 39b. At Defense Speech 40b-c, he had said that his death will be "good" (cf. 41d).

145
ones who supposed they were stating something: that {46e} there is a need to make much of
some of the opining which the humans opine, but not of others. Before the gods, Crito, does that
seem to you to be beautifully stated? For you—inasmuch as it belongs to a human at least—are
exempt from "going {47a} to be put to death tomorrow",29 and the present accident would not
delude you. Consider, then: doesn't it seem to you to be sufficiently stated, that one ought to
esteem not all the opinions of humans, but that one ought to esteem some and not to esteem
some? What do you assert? Aren't those things beautifully stated?
CRITO: Beautifully.
SOCRATES: Therefore, one ought to esteem the useful30 opinions, and not the defective ones?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the ones of the mindful people are useful; whereas the ones of the unmindful
are defective.
CRITO: And how could they not?
SOCRATES: Come, then. How, on the other hand, were things of this sort stated?:31 Does
{47b} a man who does gymnastics,32 and who makes that his practice, discern the
commendation and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one alone who happens to be a
healer or trainer?
CRITO: Of one alone.
SOCRATES: Therefore, he ought to be frightened of the blames and to embrace the
commendations of that one, but not those of the many.33
CRITO: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then he must act and must do gymnastics and at least must eat and drink, in that
way itself which the one person—the supervisor34 and expert—opines as best, rather than the
way which all the others together opine as best.
CRITO: Those things are so. {47c}

29
The phrase is how Crito would describe Socrates (46a). Cf. Burnet 1924 p. 191.
30
"Useful" may be an over-translation. The term often simply means good.
31
in past conversations.
32
"Gymnastics" refers literally to any physical exercise or training done, as was customary for ancient
Greeks, while naked.
33
Cf. Defense Speech 25b.
34
See my note 37 on Defense Speech 20a.

146
SOCRATES: All right. And if he disobeys the one person and disesteems his opinion and his
commendations, while esteeming those of the many who are experts of nothing,35 then will
nothing bad affect him?
CRITO: For how could it not?
SOCRATES: And what is that bad thing? And to which of the things36 of the one who disobeys
does it extend?
CRITO: It's clear that it extends to the body; for it destroys that.
SOCRATES: You speak beautifully. Therefore, Crito,—so that we may not go through them
all—is it thus with the other things too? And also, then, concerning the just and unjust things,
and shameful and beautiful things, and good and bad things,37 about which we're now taking
counsel, {47d} is there a need that we follow the opinion of the many and be frightened by it, or
that of some one person, if there is someone who is an expert, before whom—rather than all the
others together—there is a need to be ashamed and frightened? If we don't go with him, we will
ruin and debase that which we said38 becomes better by the just39 and is destroyed by the unjust.
Or is that nothing?
CRITO: I at least suppose we will, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Come, then. If by not obeying40 the opinion of the experts we destroy the thing
that becomes better by the healthy41 and is ruined by the sickening, then {47e} is there a livable
life for us, when it has been ruined? And that thing is certainly a body. Or isn't it?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Therefore, is there a livable life for us with a faulty and ruined body?
CRITO: In no way.

35
Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.9.
36
See note 23 above.
37
This appears to be a list of three different pairs of contraries (cf. Euthyphro 7d, Gorgias 459d); but for
Socrates "just", "beautiful", and "good" are co-referential. See the Defense Speech, where "unjust"
(28b8-9, 29b6) = "shameful" (28c3, d9-10; cf. 29b7) = "bad" (28d7; cf. 29b7); compare the use of
"beautiful", "beneficial", and "just" at 31d-32a. Cf. Hippias Minor 376a-b, where the terms seem to be
used interchangeably. See also the Gorgias, where "beautiful"="good" (463d, 474c-d), and
"just"="beautiful" (476b, e).
38
in past conversations.
39
sc., just action. Cf. Republic 444c-e.
40
The Greek word is the same as the one I translate elsewhere as "being persuaded by".
41
sc., healthy action.

147
SOCRATES: But is there a livable life for us with that thing ruined which the unjust debases
and the just helps? Or do we regard as more paltry than the body that thing—whichever {48a}
of our things it is to which unjustness and justness pertain?42
CRITO: In no way
SOCRATES: Rather, it's more estimable?
CRITO: Much more.
SOCRATES: Then, best man, we must be so mindful not at all of what the many will say of us,
but of what the expert concerning the just and unjust things—what the one person and the truth
itself—will say.43 So, first, you are not in this way making a correct introduction: when you
make your introduction the claim that there is a need for us to be mindful of the opinion of the
many about the just and beautiful and good things and their contraries.
"But nonetheless," someone might assert, "the many are the sort to have us killed." {48b}
CRITO: Those things too are indeed clear. For one might assert it, Socrates. You state true
things.
SOCRATES: But, you wonderful man, this statement44 that we have gone over45 still seems to at
least me to be similar to how it seemed before too. But consider, moreover, whether this too
abides for us or not: that not living but living well must be made most of.
CRITO: But it does abide.
SOCRATES: And that living well and beautifully and justly are the same46—Does it abide or
does it not abide?
CRITO: It abides.
SOCRATES: Therefore, from the things that were stated similarly,47 this must be considered:
whether it is just for me to try to go out of here {48c} when the Athenians are not letting me go,
42
It is, of course, the soul that Socrates refers to here (cf. Republic 445a-b). Cf. Defense Speech, where
Socrates implies that the unjust condemnation of him injures (only) his accusers themselves (30c-d), i.e.
makes them "defective", "faulty", and "unjust" (39a-b). Everywhere in Plato, Socrates identifies the soul
and the "self". However, there is some evidence (as here and at Symposium 218a3) for thinking that
Socrates and his associates weren't sure that "soul" was the appropriate term for this. In a couple
instances, the word "thought (dianoia)" is preferred instead of "soul (psuchē)" (Gorgias 514a, Laches
157c-d).
43
Cf. Laches 184d-e.
44
sc., the one concerning living versus living well.
45
sc., in past conversations. Cf. Defense Speech 28b-c.
46
This isn't a new point; the equivalence of "good", "beautiful", and "just" has been assumed since 47c.
Cf. 49a5-7.
47
sc., agreed on.

148
or whether it's not just. And if it appears just, then let us try; but if not, let us let it be. And the
considerations that you are stating concerning spending money and reputation and nurture of
children—Those truly, I surmise , Crito, are things considered by ones who easily have people
killed and who, with no discernment, would bring them back to life if it were possible for them:48
Those are the many. And since the discussion bears this out, I surmise there's nothing that must
be considered other than the very thing we were just now stating: whether we will do just things
by defraying money and {48d} gratitudes to those who will lead me out of here, or whether
we—both the ones who themselves lead out and the ones who let themselves be led out—will in
truth do injustice by doing all those things. And if we appear unjust if we produce those things,
then I surmise there may be a need to take into account49 neither whether there's a need to be put
to death if we abide and conduct ourselves in quietness, nor whether there's a need to be
subjected to any other thing whatsoever, before taking into account doing injustice.
CRITO: You seem to me to be speaking beautifully, Socrates; but see what we are to perform.
SOCRATES: Let us, good man, consider in common. And if you are able somehow to {48e}
speak contrary to what I'm stating,50 speak contrary to it and I will be persuaded by you. But if
not, stop then, blessed man, stating many times to me the same statement: that I ought to go
away from here against the Athenians' volition. Because I make much of acting when I have
persuaded you, but not of acting against your volition. But see now whether the beginning of our
consideration is for you {49a} stated sufficiently, and try to answer what is asked in the way
that you most suppose that it is.
CRITO: But I will try.
SOCRATES: Do we assert that injustice must in no manner be voluntarily done, or that injustice
must in some manner be done but must in another manner not be done?51 Or is doing injustice in
no way good or beautiful, even as has been stated similarly by us many times in former time?52
Or have all those former things that were stated similarly by us been poured out during these few
days; and therefore, Crito, though since long ago we, men so aged, discuss with each other in
48
This appears to be a reference to the Athenians' rash execution of the generals from the battle at
Arginusae, which the Athenians later regretted (Defense Speech 32b-c). It is perhaps also Plato's way of
suggesting that the Athenians did or will regret the execution of Socrates too.
49
sc., consideration. Cf. Defense Speech 28c.
50
sc., prove that what I'm stating is false. Cf. 49e2.
51
The prohibition against injustice follows from the point at 47d and 47e6-48a7: We mustn't do injustice
because it harms our own soul, so (49b) it is "bad and shameful for the one who does injustice".
52
See, e.g., Republic 335b ff.

149
seriousness, was it unnoticed by us {49b} that we ourselves differ in no way from children? Or
does it, more than everything, stand thus just as it was stated by us then: whether the many
assert it or not, and whether there is a need for us to be subjected to still harsher things than these
things here or even to milder things, doesn't at least doing injustice happen to be in every manner
bad and shameful for the one who does injustice? Do we assert it or not?
CRITO: We assert it.
SOCRATES: Then there is a need to do injustice in no way.
CRITO: Surely not.
SOCRATES: Then there is a need even for one who is done injustice not to do injustice in
return (as the many suppose there is), since there is a need to do injustice in no way. {49c}
CRITO: It appears not.
SOCRATES: And what, then? Is there a need to produce bad things,53 Crito, or not?
CRITO: There is certainly a need not to, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what? For one who is badly subjected to produce bad things in return is just,
as the many assert, or not just?
CRITO: In no way just.
SOCRATES: For certainly to act badly toward humans54 differs in no way from doing
injustice.55
CRITO: You state true things.
SOCRATES: Then there is a need not to do injustice in return and a need to act badly toward no

53
Colloquially at least this expression seems to have been synonymous with "doing injustice" (cf. Hippias
Minor 371e9-a1, 375d, 376a). "Injurious" and "producing ill/bad" (kakourgos) seem to be used
synonymously at Defense Speech 25c-d and Laches 192d.
54
The expression may simply mean to treat humans badly—sc., to subject humans to things that are bad
for them. (The passive of this expression is "to be badly subjected/treated"; see, e.g., 49d). According to
Burnet 1924 p. 199, it is synonymous here with "to produce bad things" at 49c2 (compare 50a1-2 with
54c4-5). (In Republic book 1 (e.g. 332d, 335a), the expression is used synonymously with "to injure" (cf.
Republic 379b). Cf. Gorgias 507b. At Hippias Minor 372d5 "to injure" seems to fall under "to do
injustice.")
55
Although the two expressions ("act badly toward" and "do injustice toward") were often used
synonymously in ordinary ancient Greek (Pendrick p. 371), Socrates' claim here is clearly meant to be
informative, not tautological. Still, his claim does not necessarily mean that the two kinds of act are one
and the same (but cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 1368b6). Socrates could simply mean that acting badly toward
humans is not "other than"—i.e., is a proper part of—doing injustice. A similar proposition—that it is
unjust to injure others—is defended at Republic 335.

150
humans,56 whatever one might be subjected to by them. And see to it, {49d} Crito, that, if you
state these things similarly, you aren't stating them similarly against your opinion. For I am
aware that these things seem and will seem so to some few people. For those, therefore, to
whom it has seemed thus and to whom it has not, there is no common counsel; rather, it is
necessary that these people despise each other when they see each other's counsels. Therefore,
then, consider very well whether you too have this in common with me and whether along with
me it seems so to you and whether we are to begin to take counsel from here: that one is never
correct to do injustice or to do injustice in return, or for one who is badly subjected to indemnify
himself by doing badly in return. Or do you stand off from, and not have in common with me,
{49e} this beginning?57 For both long ago and still now it seems so to me; but if to you it has
seemed to be in some other way, state it and teach me. But if you abide by the things from
before, hear what is after58 this beginning.
CRITO: But I do abide by them and it seems so to me along with you. But speak.
SOCRATES: Again, I state, then, what is after that. —But, rather, I ask: Must the things one
may have agreed on with someone, provided they're things that are just,59 be done, or must they
be beguiled?
CRITO: They must be done.
SOCRATES: Descry, then, what's from those things. If we go away from here, not {50a}
having persuaded the city beforehand,60 then do we act badly toward some61—and those toward
which there is a need to do so least—or not? And do we then abide by the things we agreed on,
provided they're just things, or not?
CRITO: I'm not able, Socrates, to answer to the thing you ask; for I don't understand.

56
See note 54 above.
57
Since Socrates presents no argument for the idea that it is always unjust—i.e., bad for one—to injure
another, and since he suggests that this is a "beginning"—a first principle—about which there is bound to
be a clash of fundamental intuitions with anyone who disagrees, he may mean that there is no argument
for it: Between those who disagree about it, "there is no common counsel." Compare John Stuart Mill's
claim that "to be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles..." (Utilitarianism, chap.
4). Cf. Euthyphro 7b-e.
58
I.e., what follows from.
59
The assumption is that one is not bound by an agreement if it requires that one do injustice (cf.
Republic 331c ff.).
60
sc., of what is by nature just (51c; cf. 51e7).
61
See note 54 above.

151
SOCRATES: Rather, consider it in this way: if, when we were going to abscond (or in whatever
way there is a need to name this) from here, the laws and the community of the city, having
come and stood before62 us, asked: "Tell me, Socrates, what do you mean to do? By this {50b}
deed you're putting your hand to,63 are you thinking of anything other than, for your part,64
destroying us—the laws—and the entire city? Or does it seem to you possible that that city still
be and not be overturned, in which adjudications that have come to be are strong in no way, but
come to be without achievement and are ruined by private people?"65 What shall we say, Crito,
to those things and other things of that sort? For someone—especially a rhetorician66—would
have many things to say on behalf of this law—if it's destroyed—which orders that the things
that were adjudicated in the judicial cases be achieved. {50c} Or shall we say to them, "The city
did us injustice and did not correctly judge what's just"? Shall we say those things, or what?
CRITO: Those things, by Zeus, Socrates.67
SOCRATES: Then what if the laws were to say, "Socrates, were those things68 too agreed on
by us and you, or was it agreed that you abide by the adjudications that the city would
adjudicate?" If, then, we wonder at them who are speaking, they probably might say, "Socrates,
don't wonder at the things that are said, but answer, since you have even been in the habit of
using asking and answering. Come, then. {50d} You are putting your hand to destroying us,
when you indict us and the city with—what? First, didn't we generate you, and didn't your father
apprehend your mother and begot you through us? Assert, therefore, whether you are somehow
reproaching those of us laws that are about marriages, because they aren't beautifully disposed."
"I'm not reproaching them," I would assert.

62
In Greek, dreams and visions were spoken of as "standing before" those who experienced them.
According to Burnet, Socrates' personification of the laws here "fulfills the same function as the myths of
the more elaborate dialogues [of Plato]" (1924 p. 200).
63
The use of the word epicheireis here does not necessarily indicate that if Socrates escapes, he will try to
destroy the laws but possibly not succeed. It need only reflect the fact that we are to imagine that the
Laws are speaking to Socrates when he is "about/going (mellousin)" to perform the act in question (50a6).
64
sc., inasmuch as you are capable. (Cf. 51a5)
65
I.e., people in a private, rather than public, capacity.
66
"This refers to the practice of appointing public advocates…to defend laws which it was proposed to
abrogate" (Burnet 1924 p. 201).
67
Crito already expressed this opinion at 45c.
68
sc., the opportunity to denounce and disobey any court ruling.

152
 "Rather, the ones that are about the nurture and education of the one who's generated—by
which you too were educated? Or didn't the laws69 among us that were ordered for that purpose
order beautifully when they directed your father {50e} to educate you in music and
gymnastics?"
"Beautifully," I would assert.
"All right. And since you were generated and nurtured and educated, would you be able
to say first that you—yourself and your progenitors—aren't ours, both generated from us and our
slave? And if those things stand thus, do you suppose that what's just for you and what's just for
us are on an equal footing; and whatever things we might put our hand to doing to you, do you
suppose it is just for you to do those things in return? Or whereas, with regard to your father
(and your master, if there happens to be one for you), what's just for you and what's just for him
were not on an equal footing, so that those things you were subjected to it wasn't just also to do
in return, {51a} nor was it just when you heard yourself spoken badly of to speak contrary, nor
to hit in return when you were hit, nor to do many other things of that sort; but then, with regard
to your fatherland and the laws, you can do in return those things you are subjected to, so that if
we put our hand to destroying you, regarding it as just, then you too will, inasmuch as you are
capable, put your hand to destroying us the laws and the fatherland in return, and you who 'in
truth attend to virtue' will assert that in doing those things you do just things? Or are you so wise
that it has been unnoticed by you that fatherland is more estimable than mother and father and all
the other progenitors, and {51b} more revered and more hallowed and is rated more greatly,70
both among gods and among humans who have discernment; and that there is a need to revere
and give way to and fawn on fatherland more than father when it is hard on one, and either to
persuade it71 or to do the things it might exhort, and to be subjected while conducting oneself in
quietness if it orders one to be subjected to something, whether to be hit or to be imprisoned; that

69
The Greek word translated as "law" sometimes simply means what is customarily or conventionally
accepted; it can refer equally to an unwritten rule of convention and to a more formally legislated rule.
The reference here is probably not to codified laws (cf. Burnet 1924 p. 202); rather, it was traditionally
expected that a man of means would provide his children with this kind of basic education. Evidently
Socrates' family was not poor; for the poor lacked not only the money but also the leisure for such things.
In fact, the reference here to an early education suggests that Socrates was born into the social elite, to
whom such education was usually confined (OCD4 p. 487).
70
In Greek, "rated more greatly" is en meizoni moira. Moira, in other contexts (e.g. Meno 99e), I
translate as "dispensation". In this expression here, however, it means rather due respect; so "en meizoni
moira" means something like [held] in greater respect.
71
sc., of what the just is by nature (51c; cf. 51e7).

153
if it leads one to war where one will be wounded or put to death, those things must be done; and
that what's just stands thus; and that one must not give way and one must not make way and one
must not leave behind the order;72 but that in war and before the Judiciary and everywhere, the
things that the city and the fatherland exhort must be done, or {51c} there's a need to persuade it
of what the just is by nature; and that it is not pious to be forceful with73 either mother or father,
and it is still much less pious to be forceful with the fatherland than with those."
What shall we assert to those things, Crito? That the laws speak true things, or not?
CRITO: It seems so to me at least.
SOCRATES: "Well then, Socrates," the laws might probably assert, "consider whether, if these
things we say are true, you are putting your hand to performing on us things not just, which you
are now putting your hand to. For though we generated, nourished, and educated you, giving
{51d} to you and all the other citizens part of all the beautiful things that were possible for us to
give, nonetheless we announce beforehand—by having made an authorization for any Athenian
who wishes—that when he has been accepted74 and has seen the practices in the city and us the
laws, if we aren't appeasing, he is authorized, having apprehended his things, to go away
wherever he might wish. And, if anyone of you wishes to go to a colony75 if we and the city are
not appeasing, and even if he wishes to migrate {51e} (going somewhere else), none of us laws
is an impediment nor denounces going to that place where one might wish when one has one's
things. But any of you who might abide, having seen the manner in which we adjudicate judicial
cases and in which we manage the family of the city in other things— We assert that that person
has already agreed with us in deed to do those things that we exhort, and when he doesn't obey
we assert that he does injustice in three ways, because he does not obey us who are his genitors

72
See my note 123 on Defense Speech 29a. The principle described in the present passage certainly
sounds similar to the one described at Defense Speech 28d. However, recall that Socrates there had also
formulated the principle in these terms: "…To do injustice and to disobey someone—both god and
human—who's better is bad and shameful…" (29b). And, as we have just seen, Socrates believes that, in
any matter, it is only the knowledgeable who should be listened to (Crito 47a-48a). So Socrates accepts
the principle expressed here at Crito 51b only if he believes that the father and the fatherland in question
give the orders knowledgeably and wisely. In other words, Socrates himself does not accept a purely
authoritarian principle of obedience; authority is legitimate if and only if it's based on knowledge and
wisdom.
73
I.e., against the volition of (cf. 48e, 52c).
74
At eighteen, Athenians were "enrolled in the register of their deme" (Burnet 1924 p. 203).
75
Athens had many throughout the ancient Greek world, particularly earlier during Socrates' lifetime,
when the Athenian empire was at the height of its power.

154
and because he doesn't obey us who nurtured him and because, though he has agreed that he will
obey us, he neither obeys us nor persuades us if we are doing something not beautifully. Though
we have {52a} put forth an alternative and do not wildly order him to do the things we exhort,
but permit one of two things—to persuade us or to do them—, he does neither of those things.
"We assert, then, that you too, Socrates, will be liable to be held responsible for such
things, if you do the things you mean to do, and you not least of Athenians, but most of all."
If, then, I would say, "Because of what exactly?", perhaps they might justly fasten upon
me, saying that most of all Athenians I happen to have agreed to that agreement. {52b} For they
might say, "Socrates, to us there are great marks of those things: that both we and the city
appeased you. For you would not ever have, of all the other Athenians, stayed at home in it to a
divergent degree if it had not appeased you to a divergent degree. And you have never yet gone
from the city to a spectacle,76 except once to the Isthmus,77 nor have you gone anywhere else
unless having soldiered somewhere, nor have you ever yet gone abroad elsewhere as the other
humans do, nor did an appetite take hold of you to be aware of another city and other laws;
rather, we {52c} and our city were sufficient for you. So vehemently did you choose and agree
to be a citizen under us, that among other things you even made children in it, as though the city
was appeasing to you. Still further, during the judicial case itself you could have made your
estimation of the sentence be exile if you wished, and the very thing you are now putting your
hand to against the city's volition you could then have done in accordance with its volition. But
you were then beautifying78 yourself because you were 'not irritated' if there were a need for you
to have died; rather, you were choosing, as you asserted, death before exile.79 But now you
aren't ashamed before those statements, nor do you respect us the laws, since you are putting
your hand to {52d} ruining us. You are doing just the things the paltriest slave would do, since
you're putting your hand to absconding from the covenants and the agreements according to
which you made a covenant to be a citizen for us.

76
I.e., as Burnet notes, " 'to see the sights', a thing of which the Greeks were passionately fond" (1924 p.
205). Burnet refers us to Republic 579b.
77
sc. of Corinth—the one separating the Peloponnesian peninsula from the mainland, on which Athens is
located. Socrates is possibly referring to an attendance at the Isthmian athletic games.
78
sc., preening.
79
Defense Speech 37b-38a.

155
 "Now then, first answer us this thing itself: whether we are saying true things, or things
not true, when we assert that you have agreed in deed (but not in statement) to be a citizen under
us."
What shall we assert in relation to those things, Crito? Anything other than: "We agree"?
CRITO: It's a necessity, Socrates.
SOCRATES: "Then are you doing," they would assert, "anything other than going against the
covenants {52e} and agreements to us ourselves, having agreed not by necessity, nor having
been beguiled, nor having been necessitated to take counsel in a little time, but in seventy years,
in which you could have gone away if we were not appeasing and if the agreements didn't appear
to you to be just? But you decided on neither Lacedaemon nor Crete—which you actually all the
time assert {53a} to have good laws80—nor any other of the Greek cities nor any of the
barbarian ones. Rather, you have went abroad from the city less than the lame and the blind and
the other disabled. The city appeased you thus divergently from how it appeased the other
Athenians. It's clear that we the laws did too; for whom would a city appease without laws? But
will you now actually abide by the things that were agreed to? You will, if you obey us at least,
Socrates, and will not be at least laughable by going out of the city.
"For consider, now, if you go against those things and err in any of those ways, what
good you will produce for yourself or for associates {53b} of yours. For it's something almost
clear that your associates will at least risk being exiled themselves and being deprived of the city
and risk destroying their substance. Whereas you yourself—if you were to go to any of the
nearest cities, to Thebes or to Megara81 (for both have good laws)—you first will have come as a
hostile, Socrates, to their polity, and however many of them who are concerned for their cities
will look askance at you, regarding you as a ruiner of their laws; and you will confirm the
Adjudicators in their opinion, so that {53c} they will seem to have adjudicated the judicial case
correctly. For anyone who is a ruiner of laws would certainly seem vehemently to be a ruiner of
young people and of humans lacking discernment. Therefore, will you flee the cities that have
good laws and the most composed men? And having done that, will living then be worthwhile
for you? Or will you be near those people and be shameless, discussing with them? Discussing

80
E.g., at Defense Speech 37a-b. Cf. Aristophanes Birds 1281. In the Republic (544c), this is said to be
the view of "the many". The word for "have good laws" may simply mean to be well-governed (Vlastos
1994 p. 92 n. 13). Lacedaemon was the official name of the city of Sparta.
81
Cf. Phaedo 98e-99a.

156
what statements? The very ones that you do here?: that virtue and justness—and the things
customarily acknowledged and the laws82—are of the most worth to humans? And don't you
suppose that act of Socrates would appear to be unshapely? {53d} One ought at least to suppose
so.
"Rather, will you take off from those places and come to Crito's host-friends in Thessaly?
For indeed there there is the most disorderliness and unrestraint, and probably they would be
pleased to hear from you how laughably you absconded from the prison, putting around yourself
some outfit, having apprehended a leather outfit (or another one just such as the ones who
abscond are in the habit of outfitting themselves in), and swapping your own shape for another.
Is there no one who will say that you, an old man—when there is little time left in your life
{53e} (as is likely)—dared so greedily to have an appetite to live83 that you went against the
greatest laws? Perhaps not, if you don't pain anyone. But if you do, you will hear, Socrates,
many things unworthy of yourself; you will indeed live kowtowing and being a slave to all
humans. What exactly will you do in Thessaly other than be regaled, just as though you had
gone abroad to Thessaly for dinner? And where will those statements {54a} concerning
justness and the rest of virtue be for us?
"Rather, then, do you wish to live for the sake of your children in order that you might
nurture and educate them? What then? Will you nurture and educate them, having led them to
Thessaly, making them foreigners, in order that they might enjoy that too? Or if you don't do
that, and if they are nurtured here, will they be better nurtured and educated because you live
though you are not with them, since your associates will attend to them for you? Will they
attend to them if you go abroad to Thessaly, whereas they will not attend to them if you go
abroad to Hades? If in fact there is anything beneficial {54b} about them who assert to you that
they are your associates, one ought to suppose so.
"But, Socrates, obeying us your nurturers, make neither children nor living nor any other
thing be of more importance than what's just, in order that when you go to Hades you may have
all these things to say in your defense to the ones who rule there.84 For if you do those things, it

82
Since adherence to law and custom was "a thoroughly commonplace conception of justice" (Pendrick p.
321), it's understandable that the personified Laws and "the community of the city" would make that
identification. But the identification is made by Socrates himself nowhere explicitly in Plato.
83
Compare Defense Speech 37c-d.
84
See Defense Speech 41a.

157
does not here appear either better or more just or more pious either for you or for any other of
yours, nor will it be better there for you when you arrive. But as it now is, you go away85 having
been done injustice, {54c} if you go away, not by us the laws but by humans. But if you go
outside86 so shamefully doing injustice in return and producing bad things in return, going
against your own agreements and covenants to us and producing bad things for those for whom
there is a need to do so least—yourself and friends and fatherland and us—then we will be harsh
with you while you live, and our brothers there, the laws in Hades, will not accept you
favorably,87 being aware that you put your hand to destroying us, {54d} for your part. Rather,
don't let Crito persuade you to do the things he says, rather than the things we say."
Be well aware, my friend, comrade Crito, that I seem to hear those things, just as the ones
who are Corybantized88 seem to hear the auloses,89 and the sound itself of those statements
buzzes in me and makes me not capable of hearing the others.90 But be well aware that, as much
at least as91 these things now seem to me, if you speak against them, you will speak in vain.
Nonetheless, of course, if you suppose you will do something more, speak.
CRITO: But, Socrates, I have nothing to say. {54e}
SOCRATES: Well then, let it be, Crito, and let us act in this way, since in this way the god92 is
leading.

85
sc., to Hades.
86
sc., of Athens.
87
Socrates seems to accept the idea that the judges in Hades will judge the dead based on their conduct
while alive (cf. my note 227 on Defense Speech 41a). He thus seems to be assuming a view about the
afterlife that diverges from the conventional one.
88
"The reference is specially to the homeopathic treatment of nervous and hysterical patients by wild pipe
[aulos] and drum music. The patients were thus excited to the pitch of exhaustion, which was followed
by a sleep from which they awoke purged and cured" (Burnet 1924 p. 211). Cf. Ion 533e-534a, 536c; see
also Euthydemus 277d6 ff., Symposium 215e, Laws 790d-e. Originally, "Corybantes" referred in cult
mythology to "nature spirits" who danced protectively around the newborn Zeus or, alternatively,
Dionysus (OCD4 p. 387). The term was also used of votaries who danced in ritual frenzy to aulos and
drum music: members of religious cults devoted to Dionysus or to Cybele.
89
sc., even after they have stopped playing. The aulos was a popular reed wind-instrument similar to the
clarinet or oboe known for its acutely intoxicating effect.
90
Alcibiades in the Symposium similarly describes the "enchanting" effects of convincing
arguments/words (215b-e). Cf. Meno 80a-b.
91
Or: so much do
92
This cannot (pace J. Adam 1893 pp. xvi, 80) be a reference to Socrates' divine sign. Socrates never
refers to the latter as a "god"—or even, for that matter, as a "divinity"; it is an impersonal "thing" (Burnet
1924 p. 16). Furthermore, the divine sign never "leads", but only "turns away", "holds back", or
"restrains" (Defense Speech 31d, Phaedrus 242c). It is not clear which "god" Socrates refers to in the
present passage. But given how usual it was for ancient Greeks to refer thus indefinitely to whichever

158
god happened to be relevant in the given context, we need not assume that Socrates himself had a specific
god in mind. Nor generally do references in ancient Greek to "the god" themselves imply monotheism.
See my note on Defense Speech 19a.

159
 ENGLISH-GREEK GLOSSARY

account = logos (see p. 18 n. 38) disciple = mathētēs

acknowledge = nomizein (see p. 97 n. 22) discussion = logos (see p. 18 n. 38)
adjudicator = dikastēs dissemble = eironeuesthai (see p. 130 n.
affected, to be = paschein 206)
anticipation = elpis divine = daimonion (see p. 114 n. 108)
appear = phainein diviner = mantis
appetite = epithumia education = paideia
argument = logos (see p. 18 n. 38) end = telos
aspect = idea (see p. 74 n. 26) enemy = echthros
assistance = hupēresia error = hamartēma
art = technē (see p. 52 n. 133) esteem = timē
attention = meletē examination = exetasis
aware, to be = eidenai expert = epaion
awe = aidōs false = pseudēs
bad = kakos familial = oikeios (see p. 105 n. 72)
beautiful = kalos (see p. 12 n. 17) faulty = mochthēros
beautiful-and-good = kalos kagathos (see fearsome = deinos
p. 56 n. 148) foreigner = xenos
become = gignesthai form = eidos (see p. 14 n. 26)
beginning = archē fortune = tuchē
beneficial = ōphelimos foulness = miasma
blessed = makarios friend = philos
business = ascholia generated, to be = gignesthai
capability = dunamis god = theos
child = pais good = agathos
citizen = politēs gratification = charis
city = polis gratitude = charis
come to be = gignesthai guest-friend = xenos (see p. 25 n. 53)
common = koinos habit = ethos
composed = kosmos happen = tugchanein (see p. 12 n. 16)
comrade = hetairos happiness = eudaimonia (see p. 48 n. 125)
consider = skopein hate, to = misein
correct = orthos help, to = oninenai
counsel = boulē host-friend = xenos (see p. 25 n. 53)
council = boulē human = anthrōpos
craftsperson = dēmiourgos (see p. 104 n. ill = kakos
65) indictment = graphē
daresay, I = kinduneuei (see p. 12 n. 14) injury = blabē
deathless = athanatos (see p. 135 n. 223) interrogate = elegchein
debase = lōbasthai kid, to = paizein
decent = epieikēs judge, to = krinein
deed = ergon (see p. 13 n. 24) judicial case = dikē
deem (worthy) = axioun Judiciary = dikastērion
defective = ponēros (see p. 61 n. 163) justice = dikē
discernment = nous justness = dikaiosunē (see p. 15 n. 28)

160
knowledge = epistēmē recognize = gignōskein
law = nomos (see p. 153 n. 69) remember = memnēsthai
learn = manthanein remember, be made to = anamimnēiskesthai
learning = mathēsis reputation = doxa
leisure = scholē responsible = aitios
liberal = eleutherios restrain = kolazein (see p. 74 n. 24)
liberated = eleutheros reverent = eusebēs (see p. 74 n. 25)
likely = eikos risk, to = kinduneuein
lover = erastēs ruin, to = phtheirein
magnificence = megaloprepeia (see p. 17 rulership = archē (see p. 16 n. 32)
n. 36) search, to = zētein
manage a family = oikein seem = dokein
man = anēr sensation = aisthēsis
manliness = andreia (see p. 17 n. 35) serious = spoudaios
manner = tropos service = latreia
many = polloi (see p. 60 n. 160) shade = skia
mindfulness = phronēsis (see p. 48 n. 124) shameful = aischros
ministering = therapeia sophist = sophistēs (see p. 53 n. 136)
multitude = plēthos soul = psuchē (see p. 27 n. 58)
nature = phusis sound-mindedness = sōphrosunē (see p.
necessity = anagkē 16 n. 30)
need, there is a = dei (see p. 13 n. 21) spiritedness = prothumia
novel = kainos statement = logos (see p. 18 n. 38)
obey = peithesthai subjected, to be = pathein
opinion = doxa substance = ousia (see p. 14 n. 26)
order = taxis superior = kreittōn
ought = chrē suppose = oiesthai
outrageousness = hubris taught = didaktos (see p. 10 n. 4)
paltry = phaulos thought = dianoia
persuade = peithein trouble = pragma
persuaded, to be = peithesthai true = alēthēs
philosopher = philosophos (see p. 106 n. trust, to = pisteusai
76) understand = manthanein
pious = hosios (see p. 72 n. 21) unprovided, being = aporia (see p. 13 n.
political = politicos 23)
polity = politeia unrestrained = akolastos (see p. 16 n. 30)
practice = pragma useful = chrēsimos (see p. 110 n. 93)
private = idios virtue = aretē (see p. 10 n. 3)
produce, to = ergazein (see p. 13 n. 24) voluntarily = hekōn
profit, to = lusitelein willing, to be = ethelein
provide = porizein wish, to = boulesthai
public = dēmosios wisdom = sophia (see p. 96 n. 17)
reasoning = logismos work = ergon (see p. 13 n. 24)
release = apallagē worthy = axios
refute = elegchein wretched = athlios
regard, to = hegeisthai

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 GREEK-ENGLISH GLOSSARY

agathos = good eidos = form (see p. 14 n. 26)

aidōs = awe eikos = likely
aischros = shameful eironeuesthai = dissemble (see p. 130 n.
aisthēsis = sensation 206)
aitios = responsible elegchein = to interrogate/refute
akolastos = unrestrained (see p. 16 n. 30) eleutherios = liberal
alēthēs = true eleutheros = liberated
anagkē = necessity elpis = anticipation
anamimnēiskesthai = to be made to epaion = expert
remember epieikēs = decent
andreia = manliness (see p. 17 n. 35) epistēmē = knowledge
anēr = man epithumia = appetite
anthrōpos = human ergazein = to produce/work
apallagē = release erastēs = lover
aporia = being unprovided ergon = deed/work (see p. 13 n. 24)
archē = beginning/rulership ethelein = to be willing
aretē = virtue (see p. 10 n. 3) ethos = habit
ascholia = business eudaimonia = happiness (see p. 48 n. 125)
athanatos = deathless (see p. 135 n. 223) eusebēs = reverent (p. 74 n. 25)
athlios = wretched exetasis = examination
axios = worthy gignesthai = to become; come to be; be
axioun = to deem (worthy) generated
blabē = injury gignōskein = to recognize
boulē = council/counsel graphē = indictment
boulesthai = to wish hamartēma = error
charis = gratification/gratitude hegeisthai = to regard
chrē = ought hekōn = voluntary
chrēsimos = useful (see p. 110 n. 93) hetairos = comrade
daimonion = divine (see p. 114 n. 108) hosios = pious (see p. 72 n. 21)
dei = there is a need (see p. 13 n. 21) hubris = outrageousness
deinos = fearsome hupēresia = assistance
dēmiourgos = craftsperson (see p. 104 n. idea = aspect (see p. 74 n. 26)
65) idios = private
dēmosios = public kainos = novel
dianoia = thought kakos = bad/ill
didaktos = taught (see p. 10 n. 4) kalos = beautiful (see p. 12 n. 17)
dikaiosunē = justness (see p. 15 n. 28) kalos kagathos = beautiful-and-good (see
dikastērion = Judiciary p. 56 n. 148)
dikastēs = adjudicator kinduneuei = I daresay (see p. 12 n. 14)
dikē = judicial case; justice kinduneuein = to risk
dokein = to seem kindunos = risk
doxa = opinion/reputation koinos = common
dunamis = capability kolazein = to restrain (see p. 74 n. 24)
echthros = enemy kosmos = composed
eidenai = to be aware kreittōn = superior

162
krinein = to judge philos = friend
latreia = service philosophos = philosopher (see p. 106 n.
logismos = reasoning 76)
logos =account/argument/discussion/ phronēsis = mindfulness (see p. 48 n. 124)
statement (see p. 18 n. 38) phtheirein = to ruin
lōbasthai = debase phusis = nature
lusitelein = to profit plēthos = multitude
makarios = blessed polis = city
manthanein = to learn/understand politeia = polity
mantis = diviner politēs = citizen
mathēsis = learning politikos = political; citizen's
mathētēs = disciple polloi = many (see p. 60 n. 160)
megaloprepeia = magnificence (p. 17 n. ponēros = defective (see p. 61 n. 163)
36) porizein = to provide
meletē = attention pragma = practice/trouble
memnēsthai = to remember prothumia = spiritedness
miasma = foulness pseudēs = false
misein = to hate psuchē = soul (see p. 27 n. 58)
mochthēros = faulty scholē = leisure
nomizein = acknowledge (see p. 97 n. 22) skia = shade
nomos = law (see p. 153 n. 69) skopein = consider
nous = discernment sophia = wisdom (see p. 96 n. 17)
oiesthai = to suppose sophistēs = sophist (see p. 53 n. 136)
oikein = to manage a family sōphrosunē = sound-mindedness (see p.
oikeios = familial (see p. 105 n. 72) 16 n. 30)
oninenai = to help spoudaios = serious
ōphelimos = beneficial taxis = order
orthos = correct technē = art (see p. 52 n. 133)
ousia = substance (see p. 14 n. 26) telos = end
paidia = education theos = god
pais = child therapeia = ministering
paizein = to kid timē = esteem
paschein = to be affected tropos = manner
pathein = to be subjected to tuchē = fortune
peithein = to persuade tugchanein = to happen (see p. 12 n. 16)
peithesthai = to obey; to be persuaded xenos = foreigner/guest-friend/host-
pisteusai = to trust friend (see p. 25 n. 53)
phainein = to appear zētein = to search
phaulos = paltry

163