Introduction/General Consideration

Malaga vs. Penachos

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995

03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26
and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,
1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction
and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to
their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting
of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They
also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such
order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the

provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as

follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies
or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the
monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of
the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of
the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third,
heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or
transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the

prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba

October 30, 2011
112 SCRA 294
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would
be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for
the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is
a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where
the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the

hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore

from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

Powers of Administrative Agencies

Tio v Videogram
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

1. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram

operators adversely affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985,
took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in
the Official Gazette.

2. PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in effect amended

the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioner contended among others that
the tax provision of the decree is a rider.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision
included

RULING: PD 1987 is constitutional.

1. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive
enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered
in all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or
that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.

2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation
it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
decree.

3. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order
to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is
evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the
lawmaker in presenting the measure.

US vs Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved
Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor
General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed
the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The
said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on
the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said
EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed
the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged
of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order
issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as
a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii,
USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos
family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the
petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not
define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on
exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess
of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and

offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty
making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power
(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.

CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Topic: Commission on Human Rights (Art. XIII, Section 17)
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the
alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with
an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were
administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41,
P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the
suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a
case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the
meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases
filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work
orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking
teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation
of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court

of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have
shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de
Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the
municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal
corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal

waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore

Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish
cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen
operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other
aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those
declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle
their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2
of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal
waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws
creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de
Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute.The special law is to be taken as an exception
to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On
the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and
other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating &
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and
management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including
the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid

exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA
4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated thereinand the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP vs. NLRC

150 SCRA 565, G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987
Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by
herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary
of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been
appointed as clerk typist.
Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's
"General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the
same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the
Claims Department and his salary was increased.
In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was
increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred
to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the
Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work,
allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences.
Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter
Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an
appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution
dated November 15, 1985, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same
had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal on a technicality.
Held:

No. Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on
appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the
period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The record shows that
the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter
on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of
Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985.
Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission,
aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November
15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The
Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and
leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative
law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are
entitled to great respect Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC
Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and
can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the
private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who
should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance.
Perfection cannot after all be demanded.

QUASI LEGISLATIVE POWER