IV. Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs.

City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 CASE DIGEST

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with
the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax
issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on
certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable
and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on
its face. .As such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command
of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent
upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
Raymond Sangalang at 11:00 AM No comments:
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III. Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST
Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to
the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas
bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
II. US vs TURIBIO GR NO L-5060 January 26 1910 CASE DIGEST
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the
province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act
prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for
human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of
large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal
treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter
house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking
of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without
providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise
of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter
of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any
place without the permit provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent
of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of
the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will
defeat the purpose of the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the
invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court
think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of
the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper
exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that
wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these
animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production of
crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise of police power
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power
of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public
purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties
for the protection of general welfare and public interest.
I. CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST
FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92),
LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR
SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS
ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.
ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO
HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE
APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND
INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN
STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID
THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO
CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND
THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE
PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE
FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE
ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASIJUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
NOTICE AND HEARING

THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON

THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO
NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY
THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT
V. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc.,
called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom
for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with
the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through
with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were
eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality
of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity
and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.
VII. PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

68 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a

Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin
or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the
Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged
and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted
his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others,
that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an
attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race
and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have
the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial,
not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or
parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior
or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of
the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality
in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there
can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
VIII. Ormoc Sugar Co. vs Treasurer of Ormoc
Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law
Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any
and all productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City
a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and other foreign
countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case
seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enacted, the company

was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be
in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.
IX. People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
mandate of the people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
X. Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except
those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical
assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious
orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or
engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the
violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or
both.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

Held: The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by
exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is
unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among
aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or
executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide
the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted powers. ]