PHILIPPINE

LONG
DISTANCE
vs.
ANTONIO Q. TIAMSON, Respondent.

TELEPHONE

COMPANY,

INC.,

Petitioner,

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Being questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 16, 2004 in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 51855 and 52247, and the Resolution dated July 27, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On April 16, 1986, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) employed Antonio Q. Tiamson as a Radio Technician
II (JG4). He was assigned at the companys North Luzon Toll Network Division, Clark Transmission Maintenance Center (Clark-TMC) in
Pampanga. After the expiration of the probationary period, he was extended regular appointment for the same position.
In a Letter[2] dated July 29, 1994, Anthony Dy Dee, the President of the Angeles City Telephone System and Datelcom Corporation,
informed PLDT of his complaint against its employees assigned in Clark-TMC, stating therein that he suspected them to be in cohorts
with the local subscribers in effecting illegal overseas calls. Acting on the letter-complaint, PLDT immediately dispatched a team of
inspectors and investigators from its Quality Control and Inspection Department (QCID) and Security Division to conduct surveillance
operations in the area. On August 2, 1994, Vidal Busa, a radio technician, was caught in flagrante delicto while monitoring an illegally
connected overseas call using the radio facilities of the companys Clark-TMC Radio Room.[3]
The QCID, likewise, requested the Switching Network Division at PLDTs Sampaloc National Toll Center to print the CAMA[4] tape
recording of all long distance calls originating from the PLDT Clark Exchange Traffic
for the period of July 29 to August 2, 1994. The printout revealed that a total of 469 fraudulent overseas and local calls were connected
and completed at the PLDT Clark-TMC Radio Room for the said period. Three overseas calls to Saudi Arabia made on August 1, 1994
were imputed to Tiamson who appeared to be on duty from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.[5]
The QCID conducted its initial investigation on August 2, 1994, where Busa readily admitted his involvement in the illegal connection of
overseas calls. In his sworn statement, he specifically named Arnel Cayanan, his Shift Supervisor, Antonio Tiamson and Paul Cruzada,
both radio technicians, as the other employees actively engaged in the illegal practice. He stated that he knew about this because
whenever he would relieve them from their tour of duty, he would see that the circuit was engaged.[6]
On August 3, 1994, during a confrontation between Busa and Tiamson, the former reiterated his earlier statement that the latter was
involved in the illegal act of connecting overseas calls.[7] For his part, Tiamson admitted that he knew how to make an overseas call
using the companys radio equipment and that he learned how to do so through hands-on experimentation and intensive reading of
operating manuals. He, however, denied having actually made an illegal connection of overseas calls. He declared that he knew of the
wrongdoings of Busa and even disconnected the latters overseas telephone calls whenever he (Tiamson) was on duty. Tiamson
claimed that he failed to report the actuations of Busa because the latter was his supervisor and was afraid to antagonize him.[8]
On August 5, 1994, there was another confrontation proceeding between Busa, Tiamson, Cruzada and Cayanan. In their sworn
statements, Busa and Cruzada testified that, sometimes when they relieve Cayanan from his duty, they would discover an illegal
connection and an on-going conversation in the line.[9] Tiamson maintained that he disconnected the illegal calls of Busa, while
Cayanan implicated his subordinates.
The QCID recommended that administrative action for serious misconduct be instituted against the said employees. Consequently, the
company issued to Tiamson an Inter-Office Memorandum dated August 12, 1994, charging him with violation of the companys
disciplinary rules and regulations. He was, likewise, required to explain within 72 hours why he should not be dismissed, thus:
Investigation of the complaint indicated hereunder disclosed that:
1. Complainant Mr. Anthony Dy, President DATELCOM Corp.
2. The decrease of toll revenue for DATELCOM Angeles/Mabalacat Exchange due to fraudulent overseas call scam was complained
and notified by Mr. A. Dy to Mrs. B. G. Gendrano Clark Exchange Division Head on July 26, 1994.
3. The complainant requested assistance to NBI and PLDT QCI to apprehend the personnel responsible for the illegal connection.
4. A clue was provided by Mr. Anthony Dy that the illegal overseas call was coming from Clark-TMC through taped and equipment
monitoring.

5. In the QCI investigation, you were implicated by your fellow Radio Technician Mr. Vidal C. Busa as involved in the case. You admitted
you know how to operate the Lenkurt 26600 Signalling Test Set to initiate a call but denied doing it for personal gain or interest but you
failed to report the anomaly to your superior as one of your supervisors was involved in the fraudulent case.
The acts described above are in violation of the Companys rules and regulations and is punishable with dismissal from the service.
In view of the above, please explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt hereof why you should not be dismissed from the service for
the acts described above. You may elect to be heard if you so desire. [10]
Meanwhile, Tiamson was placed under preventive suspension on August 16, 1994.[11]
On August 18, 1994, Tiamson submitted his written explanation denying any participation in the illegal activities at PLDTs Clark-TMC.
He averred that Busas statement against him was malicious and untrue and that he was the one relieving Busa from his tour of duty
and not the other way around. He insisted that on August 1, 1994, his tour of duty was from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.[12]
PLDT found his explanation unsatisfactory and inadequate in substance. Thus, it issued an Inter-Office Memo[13] dated October 5,
1994, terminating Tiamsons employment effective October 7, 1994 on the ground of serious misconduct and/or fraud.
Tiamson filed a complaint against PLDT for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, damages and other monetary claims, docketed as
NLRC Case No. RAB-III-07-6414-95.
The Labor Arbiter resolved the case in favor of Tiamson:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent PLDT guilty of illegal dismissal and it is
hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages reckoned from the
date of his dismissal up to his actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the respondent, which as of this date is in the amount of
Three Hundred Seventy-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five and 32/100 (P372,825.32) Pesos.
Further, respondent is ordered to pay complainant attorneys fee in the amount of Thirty-Seven Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Two and
53/100 (P37,282.53) Pesos.
The claims for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Labor Arbiter declared that the complainant could not have made any illegal connection on August 1, 1994 from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00
a.m. because he was off-duty.
PLDT elevated the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 31, 1998, the NLRC ruled that while there
was just cause for Tiamsons dismissal, the penalty of dismissal was too harsh. Hence, the NLRC ordered that Tiamson be reinstated to
his former position without loss of seniority rights, but without backwages.[15]
Both parties moved to reconsider the decision, but the NLRC denied the motions for lack of merit.[16]

PLDT filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, assailing the NLRCs order of reinstatement despite a categorical finding that Tiamson
was guilty of illegal connection of overseas calls. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51855. Tiamson filed a similar petition,
assailing the deletion of the award of backwages and attorneys fees. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52247. The CA, thereafter,
ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
On April 16, 2004, the CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition by the PLDT under CA-G.R. SP No. 51855 is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED while the petition by
Antonio Tiamson under CA-G.R. SP No. 52247 is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED, and the Decision dated October 15, 1997 of
the Labor Arbiter which was set aside by the NLRC, is hereby REINSTATED in its fullness and without modifications.
SO ORDERED.[17]

The CA held that Busas sworn statement was not worthy of credence, a mere afterthought, the contents of which were seriously
flawed. The appellate court found it difficult to believe Busas assertion that, on several occasions when he came to relieve the
respondent, a circuit was in use which the latter would turn off before leaving. In this regard, the appellate court noted that Busas work
shift preceded that of the respondent, such that it would be impossible for him to see the respondent make an illegal connection.[18]
The CA likewise opined that the respondent was denied due process when he was not apprised of nor given the opportunity to confute
the charge that during his duty on August 1, 1994, three overseas calls to Saudi Arabia were recorded in the CAMA tape.[19]
The petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution[20] dated July 27, 2004.
The petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE ARBITER A QUO AS
SAID DECISION WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[21]
The petitioner submits that it has presented more than substantial evidence to prove that the respondent was involved in the illegal
connection of overseas calls. The petitioner avers that the CA erred in holding that Busas sworn statement was not credible. According
to the CA, it would have been impossible for Busa to see the respondent making an illegal connection since his tour of duty preceded
that of the respondent. The petitioner, however, asserts that there was a rotation of the employees tour of duty such that, at times, it
was Busa who would take over from the respondent; hence, Busa had the occasion to personally see the respondent connecting illegal
calls. In support of this, the petitioner proffers the copy of logbook entries from July 13 to August 3, 1994, which was attached to its
Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC. The logbook shows that on several occasions, it was Busa who took over from the
respondent.[22]
The petitioner further asserts that the respondent failed to show that Busa was actuated and impelled by improper motive and bad faith
in executing his sworn statement.[23] The records show that Busa, from the very start, had categorically and unequivocally named the
respondent as one of those engaged in the illegal connection of overseas calls.[24] Moreover, Busas sworn statement had been
corroborated by the printout of the CAMA tapes (which disclosed that during the respondents August 1, 1994 duty, three fraudulent
calls to Saudi Arabia were illegally made),[25] as well as Cayanans sworn statement implicating the respondent.[26]
The petitioner submits that the respondents offense was serious in character and merits the penalty of dismissal from employment. It
contends that the respondent was accorded the full measure of due process before he was dismissed: he was given a notice which
apprised him of the charge against him and required him to explain why he should not be dismissed, and later, a notice of termination.
The petitioner claims that the Labor Code simply requires that the employee be given a written notice containing a statement of the
causes of termination. It insists that the printout of the recording of the CAMA tapes showing that three illegal connections were made
on August 1, 1994 is a mere evidentiary matter that need not be mentioned in the notice.[27]
For his part, the respondent avers that Busas statement was uncorroborated and hearsay for lack of cross-examination. He insists that
Busa could not have seen him make illegal connections since the latters shift came before his.[28]
The petitioner replies that an affidavit may be admissible even if the witness is not presented during trial because technical rules are not
strictly followed in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[29]
The petition has no merit.
It is a settled rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.[30] Moreover, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
the Supreme Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts.[31] However, where there is divergence in the findings and
conclusions of the NLRC, on the one hand, from those of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, on the other, the Court is
constrained to examine the evidence.[32]
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause; failure to do so
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.[33] The employers case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not
on the weakness of the employees defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[34] Moreover, the quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an
employees dismissal is only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.[35]
In this case, the appellate court ruled for respondent Tiamson, ratiocinating as follows:
The issues posed by both parties involve the evaluation of the findings of facts by the agencies a quo. While the general rule is that
factual issues could not be properly raised and considered in a petition for certiorari, it however admits of this exception that a

disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the door to review thereof by the Supreme
Court (Asuncion vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 362 SCRA 56), including, of course, the Court of Appeals.
The crux of both petitions is whether the NLRC with its findings quoted below, was correct in setting aside the disposition of the Labor
Arbiter:
We disagree that respondent failed to present evidence linking complainant to the illegal connection scam. As pointed out by the
respondent, co-employee Busa and Cayanan in the course of their investigation implicated complainants participation in illegal
overseas connection. Complainant also failed to refute respondents evidence that on August 1, 1994, while he was on duty, three (3)
overseas calls to Saudi Arabia were recorded in cama tape (Annex 4, p. 30, records).
However, we consider the penalty of dismissal too harsh considering that respondent imposed a sixty (60)-day suspension on Paul
Cruzada, a co-employee of complainant who submitted (sic) culpability. For where a lesser punitive penalty would suffice, the supreme
penalty of dismissal should be visited (Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich, 58 SCRA 120). Under the circumstances, reinstatement but without
backwages is appropriate (pp. 39-40, Rollo)
Our review of the records reveals that among the three employees who issued sworn statements, namely, Busa, Cayanan and
Cruzada, it was only Busa who directly implicated Tiamson and it was done inexplicably only in his second sworn statement. It does not
inspire credence as it comes as an afterthought and the contents are seriously flawed on material points. Looming large is the claim of
Busa that on several occasions when he came to relieve Tiamson, he observed that his circuit was logged on and in use, and Tiamson
would then put it off before leaving. This is a canard because the shift of Busa was from 1:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. and of course ahead of
the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift of Tiamson who came in as his reliever. Their tours of duty was in the converse order of what Busa
claimed, and so he spoke with a forked tongue when he stated that Tiamson at the preceding shift had his circuit logged on and
switched this off when he left.
A no less important point is the undisputed fact that Tiamson was not given the opportunity to confute the charge that on August 1, 1994
while he was on duty, three (3) overseas calls to Saudi Arabia were recorded in the cama tape. This was not indicated in the
memorandum sent to him on August 12, 1994, the full text of which reads:
August 12, 1994
TO : MR. ANTONIO Q. TIAMSON Radio Tech II Clark TMC
FROM : Division Head, North Luzon Toll Network
SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
--------------------------------------------Investigation of the complaint indicated hereunder disclosed that:
1. Complainant Mr. Anthony Dy, President DATELCOM Corp.
2. The decrease of toll revenue for DATELCOM Angeles/Mabalacat Exchange due to fraudulent overseas call scam was complained
and notified by Mr. A. Dy to Mrs. H. G. Gendrano Clark Exchange Division Head on July 26, 1994.
3. The complainant requested assistance to NBI and PLDT QCI to apprehend the personnel responsible for the illegal connection.
4. A clue was provided by Mr. Anthony Dy that the illegal overseas call was coming from Clark-TMC through taped and equipment
monitoring.
5. In the QCI investigation, you were implicated by your fellow Radio Technician Mr. Vidal C. Busa as involved in the case. You admitted
you know how to operate the Lenkurt 26600 Signalling Test Set to initiate a call but denied doing it for personal gain or interest but you
failed to report the anomaly to your superior as one of your supervisors was involved in the fraudulent case.
The acts described above are in violation of the Companys rules and regulations and is punishable with dismissal from the service.
In view of the above, please explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt hereof why you should not be dismissed from the service for
the acts described above. You may elect to be heard if you so desire.
Please be informed also that you will be placed under preventive suspension which will take effect on August 16, 1994 pending
resolution of the case.

If no written explanation is received from you within the said period of 72 hours, this case will be decided on the basis of the evidence
on hand. (p. 227, Rollo)
(SGD.)
ARMANDO A. ABESAMIS
Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the same,
allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires (Concorde
Hotel vs. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 583; underlining supplied). Procedural due process requires that the employer serve the
employees to be dismissed two (2) written notices before the termination of their employment is effected: (a) the first, to apprise them of
the particular acts or omission for which their dismissal is sought; and (b) second, to inform them of the decision of the employer that
they are being dismissed (Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Faburada, 366 SCRA 693; underlining supplied). The Labor
Arbiter, therefore, was correct in ruling that Tiamson was indeed illegally dismissed from his employment.[36]
The petitioner maintains that contrary to the findings and conclusions of the appellate court, it has established through substantial
evidence that there was just cause for the respondents dismissal. To bolster such contention, the petitioner adduces the following
documentary evidences: (1) the sworn statements of Vidal Busa specifically implicating the respondent;
(2) the sworn statement of Arnel Cayanan; and (3) the printout of the CAMA tape, recording the unauthorized overseas calls originating
from Clark-TMC during the respondents tour of duty.
The respondent disputes the admissibility of Busas sworn statements for being hearsay since the latter was not presented for crossexamination. This argument, however, is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.[37]
The Court agrees with the contentions of the respondent and the findings and rulings of the CA.
The petitioner indeed failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the dismissal of the respondent was for a just cause. In his
first sworn statement, Busa implicated the respondent in the illegal connections of overseas calls in this manner:
T 25 - Bukod sa iyo, sinu-sino pa sa mga kasamahan mo ang tinuruan ni Mr. Cayanan ng sistemang ito?
S - Sina Antonio Tiamson at Paul Cruzada na pawang mga Radio Technicians din.
T 26 - Ang ibig mo sabihin, ginagawa din nina Mr. Tiamson at Cruzada
ang magpa-patch ng mga tawag sa abroad o overseas?
S - Opo.
T 27 - Paano mo naman nasisiguro ito?
S - Nakikita ko po.
T 28 - Paano mo naman nakita samantalang magka-iba ang tour of duty
ninyo?
S - Pag nag-relyebo kami ay naaabutan kong naka-engage ang circuit at pag tinanong ko ay sinasabi nga nilang may tawag sila at
kasalukuyang nag-uusap ang magkabilang parties.[38]
During the confrontation between Busa and the respondent, the former likewise made the following statements:
T 3 - Ayon sa iyo, ginagawa rin ni Mr. Tiamson ang magku-kunekta ng mga illegal na tawag overseas sa pamamagitan ng pag-gamit ng
inyong Radio Equipment. Tama ba ito?
S - Tama po, Sir.
T 4 - Paano mo nalaman na ginagawa rin ni Mr. Tiamson ito?

S - Dahil nakikita ko siyang nagkukunekta at ilang beses ko ring nadatnan kapag nag-relyebo kami na gumagana ang circuit na ang
ibig sabihin ay may nag-uusap. At bago siya aalis ay inilalagay niya sa normal position ang linyang ginamit niya.
T 5 - Kailan pa ito gingawa ni Mr. Tiamson kung natatandaan mo pa?
S - Sa natatandaan ko ginagawa niya ito magmula noong 1992 pa.
T 6 - Ayon pa rin sa iyo, alam din ni Mr. Tiamson na ginagawa rin ni Mr. Cayanan itong mga illegal activities na ito. Paano mo nasabi na
alam ni Mr. Tiamson itong ginagawa ni Mr. Cayanan
S - Kasi magkakasama kami at kaming apat lang nina Mr. Cayanan, Mr.Tiamson, Mr. Cruzada at ako ang nakaka-alam niyang
operation na iyan.[39]
On the other hand, during the confrontation among all four employees implicated in the matter, Cayanan testified that he was aware
that his "subordinates" were engaged in illegal activities. However, he failed to specifically mention who these subordinates were.[40]
Although admissible in evidence, affidavits being self-serving must be received with caution. This is because the adverse party is not
afforded any opportunity to test their veracity.[41] By themselves, generalized and pro forma affidavits cannot constitute relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate.[42] There must be some other relevant evidence to corroborate such
affidavits.
On this point, the petitioner submits that the printout of the CAMA tapes corroborated Busas sworn statement. A perusal of the printout,
however, shows that it is not authenticated by the proper officer of the company. Moreover, the name of the respondent and the other
annotations in the said printout are handwritten and unsigned.
The ruling in Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission[43] is instructive on how such document should be treated. In that case,
the employer submitted a handwritten listing and computer printouts to establish the charges against the employee. The handwritten
listing was not signed, and while there was a computer-generated listing, the entries of time and other annotations therein were also
handwritten and unsigned. The Court ruled that the handwritten listing and unsigned computer printouts were unauthenticated, hence,
unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence (of which the listing and printouts are of that nature) should be rejected as evidence without any
rational probative value even in administrative proceedings.[44]
Thus, in Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission,[45] the Court elucidated the extent of the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions:
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary
rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the
evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. [46]
The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have
nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.[47] Absent any
such proof of authenticity, the printout of the CAMA tape should be considered inadmissible, hence, without any probative weight.
To conclude, the petitioner has not established by substantial evidence that there was just cause for the respondents termination from
his employment. The sworn statements of Busa and Cayanan alone are not sufficient to establish that the respondent was guilty of
serious misconduct. In light of such finding, there is no need to delve into whether or not the respondent was afforded due process
when he was dismissed by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 16,
2004, and its Resolution dated July 27, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 51855 and 52247 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the National
Power Corporation seeking to set aside the Order 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 19 dated 16 November
2004, denying admission and excluding from the records plaintiffs (herein petitioner) Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its submarkings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q"
and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co.,
allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April
1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged
damages caused on petitioners power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as
additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc.
filed a Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai
Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24 January
2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February
2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai
Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records
petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and
its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. According to the court a
quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that
the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never
produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered
are equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines
Objections and Motion to Strike). But as rightly pointed out in defendant Wallems Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies
do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written
expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such
electronic evidence must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do.
Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid)
was not executed, much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their being not properly identified by any
competent witness, the loss of the principals thereof was not established by any competent proof.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its submarkings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R" are hereby DENIED admission
and excluded from the records. However, these excluded evidence should be attached to the records of this case to enable the
appellate court to pass upon them should an appeal be taken from the decision on the merits to be rendered upon the termination of
the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also DENIED admission for lack of proper identification since the witness who brought these
pictures expressly admitted that he was not present when the photos were taken and had not knowledge when the same where taken.3
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals maintaining that public respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings,
"I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its
sub-markings, "R", and "S" and its sub-markings.

On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari, the pertinent portions of which
elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand, together with the rules and jurisprudence which are applicable in the
premises, we have come up with a finding that the petition for certiorari filed in this case is not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by the petitioner that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed orders in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. As what our jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x.
In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary by the totality of the record on hand is that the respondent judge acted
correctly and within the pale of his sound discretion in issuing the assailed order, dated November 16, 2004, in Civil Case No. CEB18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioners documentary evidence which were denied admission by the respondent judge were not
properly identified by any competent witness. As pointed out by the respondent Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the
petition filed in this case which reproduces some excerpts of the testimonies in the court a quo of Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr.
Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling, the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the
preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence denied admission by respondent judge x x x. In other words, there was
lack of proper identification of said pieces of documentary evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the respondent
judge is that said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents or papers. There is no gainsaying
the fact that the respondent judge acted within the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said documentary evidence.
Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when the subject of inquiry are the
contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases
specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original
documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions. As aptly pointed out by the respondent judge in the order issued by him
on November 16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are equivalent to the original documents that it
sought to offer in evidence, based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence which were in force and effect since August 1, 2001. However,
such a contention is devoid of merit. The pieces of documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were
denied admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The informations therein were not received, retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner has not adequately
established that its documentary evidence were electronic evidence. it has not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic
documents, assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying admission of
the aforementioned documentary evidence of petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the respondent judge committed an error in denying the aforementioned
documentary evidence of the petitioner, still the petition for certiorari filed in this case must fail. Such error would at most be only an
error of law and not an error of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of the Philippines said that certiorari
will not lie in case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by respondent judge in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention that the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before
the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary
evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h),
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced

electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act
No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we
shall enumerate the following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioners power barges 207 and 209 prepared by
Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished by Rex Joel C.
Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary
Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by petitioner which was manually
signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by Mr. Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received, and other
handwritten notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual typewriter, signed
manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and maintenance agreement between petitioner
and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations and every page containing three unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C. Malaluan, manually
signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date it was received. The sub-markings also contain manual
signatures and/or handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and manually signed by
Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures and/or handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and by the Notary
Public, with other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public, together with other
handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.5 It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document.6
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. 7 However, what differentiates an electronic

document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as
the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the
imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed
in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits "A",
"C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O",
"P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate
the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of
discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent
proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. 8 But the modern justification for the rule has expanded
from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. 9 The importance of the precise terms of
writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of
inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. 11 The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to
prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can
be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; 12 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown
that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. 13 However, in the
case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was
made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the
court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given by the trial court for it to present
the originals of the photocopies it presented yet comes before us now praying that it be allowed to present the originals of the exhibits
that were denied admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had petitioner
presented the originals of the documents to the court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least
laid the predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not have unnecessarily been brought before the
appellate court and finally to this Court for adjudication. Had it not been for petitioners intransigence, the merits of petitioners complaint
for damages would have been decided upon by the trial court long ago. As aptly articulated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has only
itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence and consequently, the denial
of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence in case the same has been lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE
DELILAH
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS,
vs.
CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

Complainant,*

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA) stands charged with the following
offenses:
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;
2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
3. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction, under Section 22, paragraphs (p), (t) and (u), Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law.1
The Facts
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 163.2 On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423.
Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail.
Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.
Laguas bond was approved in a Resolution3 dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order
of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M.
Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondents unusual interest in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been
making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially
told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. 4 Atty. Madarang then directed the typing
of the Order of Release Upon Bond,5 and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service.6 At around 4:00
p.m., the respondent then went to Atty. Madarangs office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the
said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.7
On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case.
The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m.8
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Laguas relative. It
was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Laguas provisional liberty. The caller also told
Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal
case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent.
Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Laguas relative.
What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarangs Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:
4. That upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, I learned that Rhodora Valdez is the incumbent
Process Server of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig City, from which the original case against accused-appellant Lagua originated. Disguising
myself as accused-appellant Laguas relative, I dialed [Branch] 163, RTC, Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora Valdez did not report for work
that day, according to Baby (also known as Ester), her officemate (who) answered my call. She added that Rhodora Valdez has been
waiting for us (Laguas relatives) to call. Her exact words were these: "Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang siyang nilakad. Pero kahapon pa
nya hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh. Kailangan kasing i-en banc sa Court of Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua."
5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to inquire if it was usual/normal for her to text her
process servers on the field for an update of their deliveries, to which she answered in the affirmative. While she was in the office, she
texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he was on his way back to Quezon City. That was before 4 p.m., adding that his
deliveries were ok.
6. That I got Saluds mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I
represented myself as Arlyn, Laguas relative. Most of his text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one text

message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6th Division and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in
the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:
1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. Nov. 2003, 15:36:15
2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:14:47
3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:40:21
4. TAWAG K S AKIN 639204439082 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47
5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO 639204439082-7 Nov 2003 19:44:52
6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05
7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam kahit cino. Lito 6391844701117 Nov. 2003 19:54:20
8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:37:57
9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:56:31
10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:52:58
11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 20:57:10
12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:02:41
13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan 639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28
14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo 639184470111, 7 Nov 2003 21:07:23
15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19
16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003 21:13:05
17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52
18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003 21:54:24
19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32
20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa kanya. Ok naman 639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13
21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO 639204439082 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16
22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO 639204439082 10 Nov 2003 15:12:14
23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO. 639204439082 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03
7. That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely did not answer him. Why did he need to
call me up?
8. That I personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was delivered and when accused appellant
Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M.
of November 7, 2003.
9. That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as Laguas relative,
Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how much more we had to pay for Laguas release. She refused to entertain me because
according to her, "Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para magkita tayo. Pero
lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud." Then, she [hung] up.

10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation,
we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his
counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly Laguas
relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he
gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of
Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the office of accused-appellants counsel. Because of this information
from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of Service, Annex "C".
11. That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a word,
he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, "Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak."9
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or
receiving money for Laguas release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release
intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. 10 Justice Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty.
Tessie L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office which has nothing to do with cases.
Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003, containing, among others, the
following allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders to unauthorized persons and "complete strangers" who promised to "take care thereof" ("siya na raw
ang bahala") constitutes not only neglect of duty but also conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Staying for the whole
day within the vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons to the point of failing to fulfill his other duties for the day constitutes inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties. On the other hand, the use of my name and that of our Division Clerk of Court to
illegally solicit financial or material benefit from parties with pending cases before this Court is illegal per se.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to an administrative investigation and disciplinary
action.11
Attached to the complaint were the following documents to support the charges:
ANNEX "A" - Record of the cases received by Salud on November 6, 2003 for delivery/service the following day, November 7, 2003.
Please note that in each of the 3 cases assigned to him, there are several parties/counsels to be served.
ANNEX "B" - Certificate of Service signed by Salud, attested by the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section and Division Clerk of Court Ma.
Ramona L. Ledesma, showing that the parties/counsel in SP-67586 were served only on November 10, 2003 (not on November 7,
2003).
ANNEX "C" - Certificate of Service for CR-27423, and corresponding Delivery Receipts.
"C-1" - Delivery Receipts for Defense Counsel Salvador Quimpo signed by someone whose signature was identified by Salud [as] "Art"
a cousin of appellant Melchor Lagua.
"C-2" - Delivery Receipt for the accused-appellant, received by the same "Art" and not served thru the Director of Prisons.
"C-3" - Delivery Receipt for the OSG, showing that it was delivered/received by the said office on November 10, 2003, not on November
7, 2003.
"C-4" - Delivery Receipt for the Director of Prisons showing receipt on November 7, 2003.
ANNEX "D" - Record of Resolutions in 3 other cases (SP-80241, SP-65404 and SP-77957) received for service by Salud on November
10, 2003. The resolutions/processes in these 3 cases were delivered/served to the parties/counsel on November 10, 2003 together with
undelivered resolutions left unserved/undelivered on November 7, 2003.
ANNEX "E" - Certification signed by Salud showing service to parties/counsel in SP-65404 (received by Salud on November 10, 2003)
on November 10, 2003 (same date)
ANNEX "F", "F-1" & "F-2" - Delivery Receipts for parties/counsel in SP-65404, showing service/delivery on November 10, 2003 in
contrast to his minimal delivery/services on November 7, 2003 only in Muntinlupa.
ANNEX "G" - Copy of the resolution dated November 6, 2003 of the 6th Division approving the appellants bond and directing the
issuance of an order of release.

ANNEX "H" - Copy of the Order of Release upon Bond, which Salud was supposed to deliver, among others on November 7, 2003 to
the defense counsel, the appellant and the OSG.12
In his counter-affidavit,13 the respondent vehemently denied the charges. He never demanded money from Laguas relative; his name
had been used by someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact that he immediately released the CA
order in question was clear proof that he had no financial interest in the transaction. His version of the events that occurred that day is
as follows:
4.1 That on November 6, 2003 at around 1:38 p.m. the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section gave me an assignment to deliver the Writ of
Habeas Corpus (hearing on November 26, 2003 at RTC, Zamboanga) for CA-G.R. SP No. 80238 for delivery to NBI, PAO, Quezon
City, Muntinlupa;
4.2 That I delivered a copy of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to [the National] Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
4.3 That while I was at the NBI, I received a text message from my boss, requesting me to return to the office immediately because
there is another notice of resolution coming from Atty. Ledesma which I have to serve to Quezon City and Las Pias;
4.4 In compliance with the request, I returned to the Office and arrived at around 3:15 p.m.;
4.5 That when I received the resolution, I read the same and found out that the hearing is still scheduled on December 10, 2003 at
10:30 a.m.;
4.6 That when I was about to leave to deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Notice of Hearing to the PAO, Quezon City, my
officemate Jun Vicencio told me to wait because Irma, the staff of Atty. Madarang requested me to standby because I need to deliver
the Order of Release to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa;
4.7 That because of the request I waited until 4:00 p.m.;
4.8 That because its already late, I decided to go to Atty. Madarangs office to inquire about the Order of Release which I need to deliver
to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa;
4.9 That Atty. Madarang told me to wait a little while because the order is about to be finished. So I waited.
4.10 That Atty. Madarang gave to me the Order of Release at 4:15 p.m.
4.11 That because I am aware that I may not reach [the] New Bilibid Prison on time, I told Atty. Madarang that I can deliver it on
November 7, 2003, early in the morning. She agreed and told me "THANK YOU" Ikaw na ang bahala;
4.12 That I informed my boss about the Order of Release that was assigned to me and she had it listed in our logbook. I asked my boss
[Cecil Secarro] if I can deliver the Notice of Hearing for SP 67586 and the others on Monday if I cannot finish delivering them on
November 7, 2003. She agreed but told me to be sure that the Order of Release will be served first and the others be served not later
than Monday, November 10, 2003. Thereafter, I went home.
4.13 That on November 7, 2003, I went straight to [the] New Bilibid Prison and arrived there before 8:00 [a.m.] Unfortunately, all the
staff wearing white uniforms and the security guards were falling in line in front of the building of the New Bilibid Prison. So I could not
enter the administration office.
4.14 That while I was standing in front of the building where the administrative office is located, a certain ART approached me and
asked me if I am the personnel of the Court of Appeals who will deliver the Order of Release.
4.15 That I said yes, and he told me his name and said that he is a relative of MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) and is connected with the
office of Atty. [Quimpo].
4.16 That at around 9:30 [a.m.] I was able to enter the administrative offices but because there was no staff inside I went to the
documentation office. The staff in the documentation office told me to submit the Order of Release to the administrative office. He said
that they will prepare the documents of MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) but also told me that the prisoner might be released on Monday
yet because the signatories are busy attending the ongoing 98 anniversary celebration;
4.17 That I returned to the administrative office and was able to find Mr. JUANITO TORRES, Administrative Officer III, who received the
copy for the Director but refused to receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA. He told me to wait for his staff to receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA;
4.18 That because the staff were not around, I went to the canteen to buy softdrinks to quench my thirst;

4.19 That Mr. ART followed me in the canteen and told me to assist in the release of Mr. LAGUA because there were no personnel
attending to the Order of Release;
4.20 That since my boss told me to insure the release of the prisoner, I waited for my staff to arrive who will attend to the matter;
4.21 That I delivered the copy of Mr. LAGUA to the staff. But ART told them he can receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA because he is his
relative so, the staff told me to give the copy to ART.
4.22 That I gave the copy of the Order of Release for the accused to ART. ART also told me that he is authorized to receive the copy for
Atty. Quimpo because he is also the representative of the law office. Hence, I also gave the copy for Atty. Quimpo to ART;
4.23 That I was able to finish my duty at the New Bilibid Prison at around 2:30 [p.m.] and I proceeded to Purok I, 6A Bayanan,
Muntinlupa to serve the Writ of Habeas Corpus in CA-G.R. SP No. 80238;
4.24 That because of [sic] the address of the addressee was incomplete, I found a hard time locating the address of the addressee and
when I found Purok I, 6A, the persons thereat do not know JOEL DE LA PAZ. I asked for their help but nobody in the place knew JOEL
DE LA PAZ;
4.25 That I left Muntinlupa late in the afternoon and due to the lack of time I decided to deliver the other documents on the next working
day which is Monday, November 10, 2003;
4.26 That I delivered the other documents on Monday, November 10, 2003, without any problem;
4.27 That I was surprised when Atty. Madarang later on accused me that I used her name and the name of Justice Magtolis to demand
money from Mr. LAGUAS relative.14
Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia 15 referred the matter to Atty. Elisa B. PilarLongalong, Assistant Clerk of Court, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigation
The requisite hearings were held from December 12, 2003 to August 4, 2004.
Atty. Madarang affirmed the contents of her Affidavit 16 dated December 8, 2003. She testified that the respondent later came to her
office along with Ms. Secarro. Amidst his cries, he pleaded, "Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak." She replied, "Wait,
wala ka namang kasalanan sa akin. Ikaw ang nagpasimuno ng lahat ng ito." The respondent repeated, "Boss, patawad po alang alang
sa aking mga anak," and Atty. Madarang answered, "Okey lang, pinatawad na kita. Hindi naman ako galit sa iyo."17
Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the alleged relative of Lagua. She narrated
that she gave the name "Arlyn" to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed
Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible, to see it through a possible pay-off where a National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them. However, the entrapment did not materialize. The respondent
thereafter came to her office, where he was asked why he was unable to serve all the other papers and documents that day. 18 He also
admitted that he served a copy of the resolution to the wrong person (Baluran). Justice Magtolis also stated that she threatened to
transfer the respondent, and that the latter vehemently objected, pleaded, and cried saying, "Huwag naman pong pa-transfer." When
asked why, the respondent said that he has children in school and something like, "Dyan po ako kumikita."19
Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three counts of estafa who served time at the Correctional Institute for Women in
Batangas City. She testified that the respondent was introduced to her in December 1998 by a certain Crisanta Gamil. 20 Gamil was also
detained at the correctional facility; the respondent had worked on her appeal bond papers and asked for P20,000.00 to facilitate the
issuance of the appeal bond.21 The payment was made right in front of her, and the respondent issued a receipt. 22 The witness also
testified that Gamil told her, "O, at least dyan mo ipalakad ang papel mo. Okay yan, sigurado."23 The respondent visited her in May
1999, as she had asked him to fix her appeal bond. During the visit, the respondent took the pertinent documents from her. 24 The
witness also stated that she gave the respondent a partial payment of P7,000.0025 on May 16, 1999 and he issued a receipt. 26 They
then proceeded to the Documents Section where they secured copies of the court decision, certificate of manifestation and her picture.
She made the last payment of P13,000.00 in June 13, 1999, and also issued a receipt. The respondent was also asking for an
additional payment of P15,000.00, which she was unable to give.
Flores narrated that she introduced another detainee to the respondent, Dalawangbayan, whom the latter was also able to "help". She
stated that according to Dalawangbayan, the respondent asked for P200,000.00. She further testified that she knew the respondent as
Joselito M. Salud, and not Cielito Salud.27 After the incident, she wrote a letter to Associate Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. to ask for
assistance regarding her appeal bond.

Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Laguas counsel, testified that it was Engineer Art Baluran who hired him as counsel of the said accused. He
stated that he gave an oral authorization to Baluran to get the CA resolutions or orders; Baluran was the one who furnished him a copy
of the resolution.28 He called Mr. Baluran to say that an order for Laguas release had already been issued by the appellate court. The
witness stated, however, that he had never seen the respondent before.29
The respondent testified that he has been a CA employee since 1991. He admitted that he knew Flores, and met her in January 1999
when he brought Gamils order of release in the Batangas City Jail. He claimed that he was waiting for the relatives of Gamil as they
were the ones who would pay for his fare home, and while waiting, he talked to the jailguard/warden. Flores then approached him and
asked him if he was from the CA. When the respondent answered in the affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her
neighbor in Bian, Laguna.
The respondent admitted that he was in the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City on May 16, 1999, as he was then
visiting Vilma Dalawangbayan. He also saw Flores. 30 When asked why he visited Dalawangbayan, the respondent replied that Flores
had written a letter to him (which he dubbed as "maintrigang sulat")31 addressed "Lito Salud, Mailing Section, Court of Appeals." In the
said letter, Flores asked him to help Dalawangbayan, just like he had helped Gamil. The respondent then showed the letter to then
Chief of Office Prudencio B. Aguilar, who told him, "Puntahan mo yan, Lito at maintriga yang sulat na yan, baka tayo mapahamak
dyan."32 Thus, he went to the Correctional Institute in Mandaluyong City to "sort things out" with Dalawangbayan and Gamil. The
respondent, however, stated that he could not find the letter anywhere and had already been lost.33
During his May 16, 1999 visit to the correctional facility, Flores approached him in the visiting hall, and said suddenly, " Sandali lang,
Kuya," then left. He then talked to Dalawangbayan about the "controversial" letter, explaining that his job in the Court of Appeals was
only to remand the records and deliver the Orders for release, just like what he did in Gamils case. 34 He again visited Dalawangbayan
on June 13, 199935 as evidenced by the entries in the visitors logbook. He was no longer able to speak to Flores, but made five other
such visits to Dalawangbayan in the correctional facility.
The Findings of the Investigating Officer
In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong found that the respondent was guilty as charged, and made the following
recommendation:
In view of all the foregoing, there is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged. He is liable for inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of his official duties and for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he
admittedly served the copies of the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case intended for detained appellant and his counsel
on Mr. Baluran whom he admitted to have met only on that day, against the rules and normal office procedure on personal service. His
long stay in the Bureau of Prisons also caused the delay in the service of other court processes assigned to him for service on that day.
He is also liable for having financial or material interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the
order of release and actual release of Lagua to the point of staying almost the whole day in the Bureau of Prisons and the aborted
"deal" as can be concluded from the phone call of Melissa Melchor to Atty. Madarang and subsequent exchange of text messages with
Atty. Madarang disguising as Laguas relative.
RECOMMENDATION:
1. Rule IV, Section 52 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, S. 1999, issued pursuant to Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the penalty for the first offense of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for directly or indirectly having financial and material interest
in any official transaction is suspension for a period of 6 months, 1 day to 1 year. Pursuant to Section 55 of the same Memorandum
Circular, if the respondent is found guilty of 2 or more charges, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Section 54-c of the same Memorandum Circular
provides that the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present. Since
in this case, the penalty is the same for all 3 offenses, the maximum of the penalty for the first offense which is suspension for 1 year
[may be] imposed on the respondent.
2. Considering that the prescribed penalty for the offense exceeds one month suspension, the case may now be referred to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action, pursuant to Circular No. 30-91 of the Office of the Court Administrator.36
The Ruling of the Court
On the charge of inefficiency, the respondent is clearly administratively liable. After serving Laguas copy of the resolution and order of
release to the prison Director, he should have immediately returned to his station or served the other resolutions and documents for
personal service. As an officer of the court, the respondent plays an essential part in the administration of justice. He is required to live
up to the stringent standards of his office, and his conduct must, at all times, be above reproach and suspicion. He must steer clear of
any act which would tend to undermine his integrity, or erode somehow the peoples faith and trust in the courts. 37 As the respondent
himself admitted, he stayed on until 2:30 p.m. without any valid reason, despite the fact that he knew he still had to serve several orders
and resolutions. As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, "inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties" is
classified as a grave offense, and is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year.38

Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial
evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him must be competent and derived from
direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails
to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.39 However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required.40 The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great
weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.41
To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its entirety and
not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received
must be considered.42 Thus, while it is true that there is no direct evidence that the respondent received any money to "facilitate" the
release of detained Lagua, the following circumstances must be taken as contrary to the respondents plea of innocence:
First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text messages in Atty. Madarangs cellphone: "bkit, C rhodora
to"; "CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO"; and "SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI." The respondents testimony on the
matter is as follows:
Q: In the hearing of December 2, 2003, in the TSN on page 32 onwards
ATTY. ROSERO:
Is that the testimony of Atty. Madarang, Justice?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Oo. I will just refer to your admission through your counsel that Cellphone No. 6392044390[8]2 is yours. You admitted that?
ATTY. ROSERO:
I think we made an admission as to that matter, Justice. Well just check the affidavit of Atty. Madarang.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Here, admitted. Basahin mo.
ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, Justice, admitted but not the cellphone number
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Sige, ulitin natin, 6392044390[9]2.
ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, admitted. That is his cellphone.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
This cellphone is yours.
Q: Do you also admit that you called Atty. Madarang several times on November 7, 2003?
ATTY. ROSERO:
November 7 is a Friday. Tumawag ka daw several times kay Atty. Madarang, November 7?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Texted, Im sorry I will correct that, texted.

A: Nauna po siyang magtext sa akin, Justice, hindi po ako nagtext sa kanya. Nagtext po siya sa akin sumagot po ako sa kanya.
Q: There was an exchange several times?
A: Nuong pong text niya sa akin hindi po several times dahil kung makita nyo po dyan.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Let me see the affidavit of Atty. Madarang. After this question, may I ask for a continuance?
ATTY. ROSERO:
No objection, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
All these text messages were checked by us with your counsel in the cellphone of Atty. Madarang which were preserved until we
allowed her to erase these. There are exchanges here: 6392044390[8]2, November 7. When she texted she answered, "Bkit c Rhodora
2" and then second was, "Cnong kamaganak anong pangalan mo?" This is addressed to you, this is your telephone?
A: Opo.
Q: But the one who answered is Rhodora?
A: Ako po yun.
Q: Ikaw ang sumasagot. Why did you say that you are Rhodora?
A: Justice, nung ma-receive ko po yong text niya apat na beses ko pong na-receive ang text ni Arlene.
INVESTIGATOR:
Who is Arlene?
A: Atty. Madarang. Arlene, sa text po niya sa akin, "Sir Lito, kamaganak po ito ni Mr. Lagua. Magkano pa po ba ang kakulangang pera
para ibigay ko sa inyo. Si Rhodora ba kasama?" Hindi ko po sinagot yon. Pangalawa, yun din po ang message nya. Ano ito? Sa akin
pong kuan, sa pag-iisip ko lang po, bakit dahil si Mr. Art Baluran kamag-anak na, ano ito? Text pa ulit pa sya ng pangatlo. Nang-iintriga
na to. Pang-apat, intriga to. Text ko nga rin to, lokohan lang tayo. "Bkit si Rhodora to" yun po ang sagot ko sa kanya.
Q: So at that time you already knew about Rhodora?
A: Hindi po, dun, duon po sa text niya nakalagay po dun eh, "Si Rhodora kasama ba"? So ikinuan ko po na si Rhodora to, dun po sa
text nya.
Q: Nakipaglokohan ka?
A: Sa text niya nakalagay dun na "Si Rhodora ba kasama" kaya po ako nakipaglokohan dun.43
As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the respondents claim of "joking around" ("nakipaglokohan") with an unknown sender of a
text message by replying thereto is contrary to a normal persons reaction. This is made even more apparent by the fact that the
respondent even admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked why, gave a vague answer, and, when further
questioned, even broke down in tears.44
The respondents claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is
unavailing. Text messages have been classified as "ephemeral electronic communication" under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence,45 and "shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof." Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his
counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.46 In that case, the Court, in finding the
respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a
million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the
cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent
may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the
veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Second. The respondents testimony during the hearings held before Investigating Officer Atty. Longalong is replete with inconsistencies
and "loopholes." He claimed that he made inquiries from other CA staff and learned that there was indeed a deal between someone in
the criminal section and a certain Rhodora of the RTC, Pasig. He further claimed that the said parties wanted to get back at him for
"immediately serving" the release order which prevented them from demanding the balance of the deal from Laguas relative. However,
this bare claim was not corroborated by any witness. Moreover, the respondent alleged that two anonymous callers claimed to know
something about the case against him; when asked about it, he stated that he no longer exerted efforts to find out who they were as
they did not give out their names:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: On page 5 of your affidavit, you said in paragraph 8 "That I made some inquiry and some personnel of the Court of Appeals told me
that there is indeed a deal between a staff in the Criminal Section and Rhodora of RTC, Pasig. Can you tell us who is this staff?
A: Ah dito po Justice, hindi po siya nagpakilala, sa telephono po.
INVESTIGATOR:
Sino siya?
A: Hindi po siya yong tawag po niya sa akin sa telepono nang malaman po dito sa CA na ako ay kinasuhan ninyo tumawag po siya
sa Personnel.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Who is siya?
A: Ay hindi po siya nagpakilala.
INVESTIGATOR:
Lalaki o babae?
A: Una po babae tapos yong pangalawa po lalaki.
INVESTIGATOR:
Sinong kinakausap?
A: Ako po.
INVESTIGATOR:
Hinahanap ka?

A: Hinahanap po nila ako.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: What did he tell you? He, lalaki, ano?
A: Sa babae muna po?
Q: Oo, babaet lalake ba?
A: Opo.
Q: Who was the first caller, the lady or the gentleman?
A: Babae po.
Q: Were you the one who answered the phone?
A: Hindi po.
INVESTIGATOR:
Hinahanap daw siya.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Hinahanap ka, okay, when you answered the phone, what did you say?
A: Ang sabi ko po sa kanya, "pupuwede mo ba akong matulungan sa paggawa ng affidavit dahil kinasuhan nga ako ni Justice
Magtolis."

Q: But you do not know who you were talking to?

A: Tinanong ko nga po kung sino siya eh tumutulong lang daw siya sa akin dahil ang naririnig niyang tsismis din dyan eh baka po si
Rhodora ang may ka-kuan sa Criminal.
Q: Saan yong ka-kuan?
A: Ang may kausap sa Criminal.
Q: Who said "na baka si Rhodora ang may kausap sa Criminal"?
A: Yon pong kausap ko sa kabilang linya.
Q: The name you do not know?
A: Eh tinanong ko naman po kung sino siya ayaw naman po niyang magpakilala. Matutulungan mo ba ako, ibinaba na po ang telepono.
INVESTIGATOR:
Anonymous caller.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
You are very fond of answering calls. You dont even know the name.
Q: That anonymous caller told you that there must be some deals between Rhodora and someone from the Criminal Section?

A: Yun din daw po ang naririnig niyang tsismis dyan sa labas.

Q: Tsismis, that was that the caller told you?
A: Opo.
Q: And she wanted to help you?
A: Kaya po sinabi din sa akin na tsismis eh hindi pa po pwedeng
Q: What did you answer her?
INVESTIGATOR:
Anong sagot mo raw?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Anong sagot niya sa tulungan kasi nakakarinig siyang tsismis?
INVESTIGATOR:
Q Ano ang sagot mo?
A: Eh iyon nga ang gusto kong malaman, ang katotohanan. Baka naman pupuwede mo akong matulungan. Sino ba to?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Di ba she was the one who offered to help?
A: Ay ayaw daw po naman niyang masabit po ang pangalan niya.
Q: But she was the one who called you?
A: Opo.
Q: Okay. How did your talk end with this girl or lady?
A: Nung pagsalita ko nga pong baka pupuwede akong tulungan, wala na.
Q: How about the man, the gentleman or the boy who called?
A: Same kuan din po ang kanilang kuan e.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Dont use kuan.
ATTY. ROSERO:
Sige, Lito, ipaliwanag mo.
A: Same kuento rin po, sinabi niya na ganuon din po na narinig din po niya sa labas.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Alright, you were not the one who answered the call?
A: Hindi po.

Q: Somebody called you that theres a phone call?

A: Opo.
Q: When you answered, what was your first word?
A: Hello!
Q: What was the answer at the other end of the line?
A: Hello rin po.
Q: What next?
A: Alam mo, ang sabi po niya sa akin ganito po
Q: Who was the first one who said something other than hello?
A: Siya po ang nauna.
Q: What did she say, the exact words?
A: Exact words, sa naalala kong sinabi niya "Alam mo, Mr. Salud," Salud po ang kuan niya sa akin, "narinig ko sa labas, istoryahan
dyan sa labas na baka si Rhodora ang may ka-kuan dito sa Criminal." Ang sabi ko po sa kanya "Iyan din ang itinawag sa akin kahapon.
Eh dalawa na kayo eh baka naman pupuwede nyo akong matulungan. Puede ko bang malaman ang pangalan mo?" Ganun din po,
ayaw na pong magsalita ibinaba na [ang] telepono.
Q: Do you know Rhodora?
A: Hindi po.
Q: You never met her?
A: Hindi po.
Q: You never talked to her?
A: Nung pong ipinakiusap nyo sa akin sa telepono po nung tayo poy
Q: After the conversation with the lady and that gentleman who called you to offer some help and afterwards did not help at all, what
happened?
A: Wala na po.
Q: Did you not check with Rhodora, "What is this they are talking about that it might be between you and someone in the Criminal
Section?" You never asked her that?
A: Hindi ko na rin po
Q: You did not. But I thought you wanted help from those people who can help you?
A: Eh hindi na nga po sila nagbanggit po ng pangalan dahil po sabi ng unang babae ayaw nga rin po niyang sumabit sa kaso.47
This respondents actuation on this matter, if at all true, is again contrary to the normal reaction of one who has been administratively
charged, and wants to clear his name of any wrongdoing.
The respondent also admitted visiting an inmate (Vilma Dalawangbayan) at the correctional facility eight times for no apparent reason.
This admission lends some credence to the testimony of Flores, that she was the one who introduced him to Dalawangbayan, the
person he was visiting. When asked why he frequently visited, he stated that he found her beautiful ("Maganda po siya, Justice"), and

was on the verge of courting her ("Para na nga po akong nanliligaw"). The Court believes that this allegation was concocted by the
respondent as a mere afterthought, to cover up for his misdeeds.
The Investigating Officer also found that the respondent was "high-strung" during his testimony, and this finding must be accorded
respect. Indeed, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it is primarily lodged in the investigating judge.
The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and
criminal cases where preponderance of evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt, respectively, are required, applies a fortiori in
administrative cases where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. The investigating judge is in a better position to
pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified, and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying.48 Thus, the following findings of Atty. Longalong are well taken:
However, respondent denied receiving P20,000 from Gamil and P15,000 from Flores and signing "LM Salud" on Flores notebooks
(Exhibits E-1 and F-1) but admitted visiting Vilma at the Correctional Institute for Women 8 times from May to August 1999.
Respondents denial here appears self-serving and incredible considering his admission of going to the Correctional Institute for
Women several times for no valid official reason. Moreover, although Flores is a convict for estafa, her
testimony on the matter was more consistent and credible. Likewise, respondent admitted seeing Flores at the Correctional Institute for
Women and that Flores mailed her letter to him on May 16, 1999 which he called "maintriga." He also admitted that he told Flores to
seek the help of Justice Vasquez on her case. The foregoing, plus the fact that Flores eventually wrote Justice Vasquez, confirms the
truth of Flores testimony on the matter.
With the aforecited admissions by respondent, the substantial evidence presented by the complainant and her witnesses with their
positive and forthright testimonies deserve more credence than respondents self-serving denial and inconsistent and vague testimony.
Even the demeanor of complainant and her witnesses give credence to their testimonies than the nervous and [high-strung] demeanor
of respondent during his testimony. Moreover, complainant and her witnesses, including the superiors of respondent, have no reason or
motive whatsoever to testify falsely against him. Respondents defense of denial is inherently a weak defense. It is well settled that
denial, to be believed, must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability, otherwise the denial is purely self-serving and with nil
evidentiary value (People of the Philippines v. Arlee, 323 SCRA 201). Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive
declarations (People of the Philippines vs. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652).
Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high respect, a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and
justice solemnly dispensed with. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. The conduct and behavior
required of every court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must, at all times, be characterized by, among other things, propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial service. 49 Public service requires the utmost integrity
and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.50
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he actually extorted money to "facilitate" the issuance of the appeal bond and release
order which he himself served, the surrounding circumstances, as well as the inconsistencies in his testimony, point towards
administrative culpability. The respondents actuations fall short of the standard required of a public servant. He is guilty of gross or
grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior,51 while "gross," has been defined as "out of all measure; beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." 52 Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave
misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first offense, as it is classified as a grave offense. However,
considering that the respondent has not been previously charged nor administratively sanctioned, the Court finds that a penalty of
suspension for one year and six months will serve the purpose of disciplining the respondent.
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge or justice, are involved in the
dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon them as part of the Judiciary. They serve
as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
peoples confidence in it.53 Thus, any conduct which tends to diminish the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency and gross misconduct. He is
SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year and Six (6) Months, effective immediately. He is further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to
the date of his receipt of this Decision to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The Office of the Court Administrator is also DIRECTED to conduct a discreet investigation on the possible involvement of Rhodora
Valdez (Utility Worker), and other personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163.
SO ORDERED.
EMMANUEL
B.
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.

AZNAR,

Petitioner,

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62554 dated January
30, 2004 which set aside the November 25, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 10, Cebu City and reinstated the
Decision of RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City dated May 29, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-16474; and the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman 2 in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing
number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their
two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with
the intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.3
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994,
Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination.4
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not
honored.5 And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets
to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in
cash.6 He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers
trying to use blacklisted cards.7 Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.8
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC
Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife
and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. 9 He further claimed
that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful
blacklisting of his card.10 To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ONLINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of
one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi)11 which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.12
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznars card. It also contended that under the terms and conditions governing the
issuance and use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate, and that
its liability for any action or incident which may be brought against it in relation to the issuance and use of its credit cards is limited to
P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven whichever is lesser.13
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznars card, Citibanks Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning
Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznars trip.14
On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznars complaint
for lack of merit.15 The trial court held that as between the computer print-out 16 presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins17 presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank.18
The trial court also held that even if it was shown that Aznars credit card was dishonored by a merchant establishment, Citibank was
not shown to have acted with malice or bad faith when the same was dishonored.19
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he himself
is a holder of a Citibank credit card. 20 The case was re-raffled21 and on November 25, 1998, the RTC, this time through Judge Jesus S.
De la Pea of Branch 10 of Cebu City, issued an Order granting Aznars motion for reconsideration, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The DECISION dated May 29, 1998 is hereby reconsidered, and
consequently, the defendant is hereby condemned liable to pay the following sums of money:
a) P10,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
d) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.22

Judge De la Pea ruled that: it is improbable that a man of Aznars stature would fabricate Exh. "G" or the computer print-out which
shows that Aznars Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over the limit; Exh. "G" was printed out by Nubi in the
ordinary or regular course of business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign
country and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card
facilities which readily print out bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznars
Mastercard; no rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank to prove that Aznars Mastercard was not dishonored, as all it proved was
that said credit card was not included in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the additional deposit of P485,000.00 from
Aznar, there was an implied novation and Citibank was obligated to increase Aznars credit limit and ensure that Aznar will not
encounter any embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard; Citibanks failure to comply with its obligation constitutes gross
negligence as it caused Aznar inconvenience, mental anguish and social humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of the credit card limiting
the liability of the bank to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a contract of adhesion which must be
interpreted against Citibank.23
Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against Judge De la Pea for grave misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming among others that said judge rendered his decision without having read the
transcripts. The administrative case was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal filed by Citibank with the
CA.24lawphi1.net
On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibanks appeal thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu
City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16474, is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial
Region, Branch 20, Cebu City in this case is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.25
The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same when it was
dishonored in certain establishments; such dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted by Citibank; Exh. "G" is an
electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence 26 or under Section
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 27 by anyone who saw the document executed or written; Aznar, however, failed to prove the
authenticity of Exh. "G", thus it must be excluded; the unrefuted testimony of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan
Agency and certain establishments abroad is not sufficient to justify the award of damages in his favor, absent any showing that
Citibank had anything to do with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control over the actions of its merchant affiliates, thus it
should not be held liable for the dishonor of Aznars credit card by said establishments.28
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26, 2004.29
Parenthetically, the administrative case against Judge De la Pea was activated and on April 29, 2005, the Courts Third Division 30
found respondent judge guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and ordered his suspension for six months. The Court held
that Judge De la Pea erred in basing his Order on a manifestation submitted by Aznar to support his Motion for Reconsideration, when
no copy of such manifestation was served on the adverse party and it was filed beyond office hours. The Court also noted that Judge
De la Pea made an egregiously large award of damages in favor of Aznar which opened himself to suspicion.31
Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review alleging that: the CA erroneously made its own factual finding that his
Mastercard was not blacklisted when the matter of blacklisting was already a non-issue in the November 25, 1998 Order of the RTC;
the RTC found that Aznars Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over the credit limit; this factual finding is
supported by Exh. "G" and by his (Aznars) testimony; the issue of dishonor on the ground of DECL OVERLIMIT, although not alleged
in the complaint, was tried with the implied consent of the parties and should be treated as if raised in the pleadings pursuant to Section
5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; 32 Exh. "G" cannot be excluded as it qualifies as an electronic evidence following the Rules on
Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule; Exh. "G" has remained
complete and unaltered, apart from the signature of Nubi, thus the same is reliable for the purpose for which it was generated; the RTC
judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the issuance of the computer print-out as Aznar saw that it was signed by Nubi; said
testimony constitutes the "other evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the print-out to the satisfaction of the judge" which is
required under the Rules on Electronic Evidence; the trial court was also correct in finding that Citibank was grossly negligent in failing
to credit the additional deposit and make the necessary entries in its systems to prevent Aznar from encountering any embarrassing
situation with the use of his Mastercard.33
Citibank, in its Comment, contends that: Aznar never had personal knowledge that his credit card was blacklisted as he only presumed
such fact; the issue of dishonor on the ground that the card was declared over the limit was also never tried with the implied consent of
both parties; Aznars self-serving testimony is not sufficient to prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. "G"; Aznar did not declare that it
was Nubi who printed the document and that said document was printed in his presence as he merely said that the print-out was
provided him; there is also no annotation on Exh. "G" to establish that it was Nubi who printed the same; assuming further that Exh. "G"
is admissible and Aznars credit card was dishonored, Citibank still cannot be held liable for damages as it only shows that Aznars
credit card was dishonored for having been declared over the limit; Aznars cause of action against Citibank hinged on the alleged
blacklisting of his card which purportedly caused its dishonor; dishonor alone, however, is not sufficient to award Aznar damages as he
must prove that the dishonor was caused by a grossly negligent act of Citibank; the award of damages in favor of Aznar was based on

Article 117034 of the Civil Code, i.e., there was fraud, negligence or delay in the performance of its obligation; there was no proof,
however that Citibank committed fraud or delay or that it contravened its obligations towards Aznar; the terms and conditions of the
credit card cannot be considered as a contract of adhesion since Aznar was entirely free to reject the card if he did not want the
conditions stipulated therein; a person whose stature is such that he is expected to be more prudent with respect to his transactions
cannot later on be heard to complain for being ignorant or having been forced into merely consenting to the contract.35
In his Reply, Aznar contended that to a layman, the term "blacklisting" is synonymous with the words "hot list" or "declared overlimit";
and whether his card was blacklisted or declared over the limit, the same was dishonored due to the fault or gross negligence of
Citibank.36
Aznar also filed a Memorandum raising as issues the following:
I. Whether or not the augmentation deposit in the amount of P485,000.00 of the Petitioner constitutes relative extinctive
novation;
II. Whether or not the purchases made by Petitioner were beyond his credit limit;
III. Whether or not the issues of dishonor by reason of overlimit was tried with the consent of the parties;
IV. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" is an electronic document."
V. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" constitutes electronic evidence;
VI. Whether or not the agreement between the parties is a contract of adhesion;
VII. Whether or not the Respondent is negligent in not crediting the deposits of the Respondent.37
Aznar further averred in his Memorandum that Citibank assured him that with the use of his Mastercard, he would never be turned
down by any merchant store, and that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Exh. "G" is admissible in evidence.38
Citibank also filed a Memorandum reiterating its earlier arguments.39
Stripped to its essentials, the only question that needs to be answered is: whether Aznar has established his claim against Citibank.
The answer is no.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance of evidence. The
party that alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it.40
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in several
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was humiliated when its
staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a blacklisted card.
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank
blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the "hot list."41
Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and only presumed
such fact from the dishonor of his card.
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be authentic".
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A. Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchants store, I do not know, they called up somebody for
verification then later they told me that "your card is being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not know whom they
called up; where they verified. So, when it is denied thats presumed to be blacklisted.
Q. So the word that was used was denied?
A. Denied.

Q. And after you were told that your card was denied you presumed that it was blacklisted?
A. Definitely.
Q. So your statement that your card was allegedly blacklisted is only your presumption drawn from the fact, from your allegations, that it
was denied at the merchandise store?
A. Yes, sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The dishonor of Aznars Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank, especially
in view of Aznars own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted
and honored.43
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to
Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out
appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due
execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that
whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either
by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to
provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out. Indeed, all he
was able to allege in his testimony are the following:
Q I show to you a Computer Print Out captioned as On Line Authorization Activity Report where it is shown that the Preferred Master
Card Number 5423392007867012 was denied as per notation on the margin of this Computer Print Out, is this the document
evidencing the dishonor of your Preferred Master Card?
xxxx
A Yes sir, after that Ingtan incident, I went straight to the Service Agency there and on the left hand side you will be able to see the
name of the person in-charged [sic] there certifying that really my card is being blacklisted and there is the signature there of the
agency.
ATTY. NAVARRO:
The witness, your honor, is pointing to the signature over the handwritten name of Victrina Elnado Nubi which I pray, your honor, that
the Computer Print Out be marked as our Exhibit "G" and the remarks at the left hand bottom portion of Victorina Elnado Nubi with her
signature thereon be encircled and be marked as our Exhibit "G-1".
xxxx
Q Mr. Aznar, where did you secure this Computer Print Out marked as Exhibit "G"?
A This is provided by that Agency, your honor. They were the ones who provided me with this. So what the lady did, she gave me the
Statement and I requested her to sign to show proof that my Preferred Master Card has been rejected.44 (Emphasis supplied).
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in
this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the
burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law
for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G"
to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznars testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him
the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said printouts integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face
that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency;
Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan
Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-out.45
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said information could be
relied upon as true. In fact, Aznar to repeat, testified as follows:
ATTY. NERI
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be authentic"
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchants store, I do not know, they called up somebody for
verification then later they told me that "your card is being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not know whom they
called up; where they verified. So, when it is denied thats presumed to be blacklisted.46 (Emphasis supplied)
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to entries in the course of business, to support Exh.
"G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.47
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on the computer print-out the name of a certain
"Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the words " Sorry for
the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the
information stated in the print-out and was the one who printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario
even suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the
provision above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario or
Nubi make the entries, or whether the entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.
And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was denied because it was
already over the limit. There is no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross negligence on the part of
Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the limit.

The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10" opposite petitioner's account number, which data,
petitioner did not clarify.48 As plaintiff in this case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he did not actually incur the said amount which
is above his credit limit. As it is, the Court cannot see how Exh. "G" could help petitioner's claim for damages.
The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card through fraud or gross negligence is likewise effectively negated by the
evidence of Citibank which was correctly upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card Department of defendant Bank, presented documents known as Warning
Cancellation Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24, and 31, 1994 (Exhibits 3, 3-1 to 3-38, 4, 4-1 to 4-38 5, 5-1 to 5-39 and 6, 6-1 to 639), for August 7, 1994 (Exhibit[s] 7, 7-1 to 7-37), for August 8, 1994 (Exhibit[s] 8, 8-1 to 8-20) which show that plaintiffs Citibank
preferred mastercard was not placed in a hot list or was not blacklisted.
The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) (Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and their submarkings) which covered the period of four (4)
days in July 1994 (from July 10, 17, 24 and 31, 1994), and two (2) days in August 1994, (August 7 and 8, 1994), when plaintiff traveled
in the aforementioned Asian countries showed that said Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed in a hot list or the same
was blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled by the defendant bank were all contained, reported
and listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and released on a regular basis.
These three hundred (300) Warning Cancellation Bulletins pieces of documentary proofs, all in all, adduced by defendant pointed to the
fact that said plaintiffs credit car (sic) was not among those found in said bulletins as having been cancelled for the period for which the
said bulletins had been issued.
Between said computer print out (Exhibit G) and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits 3 to 8 and their submarkings) the latter
documents adduced by defendant are entitled to greater weight than that said computer print out presented by plaintiff that bears on the
issue of whether the plaintiffs preferred master card was actually placed in the hot list or blacklisted for the following reasons:
The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly
established and identified by defendants own witness, Dennis Flores, one of the banks officers, who is the head of its credit card
department, and, therefore, competent to testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the defendant bank showing that
plaintiffs preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Banks hot list. But on the other hand, plaintiffs computer
print out (Exhibit G) was never authenticated or its due execution had never been duly established. Thus, between a set of duly
authenticated commercial documents, the Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits 3 to 8 and their submarkings), presented by
defendants (sic) and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiffs computer print out (Exhibit G), the former deserves greater
evidentiary weight supporting the findings of this Court that plaintiffs preferred master card (Exhibit 1) had never been blacklisted at all
or placed in a so-called hot list by defendant.49
Petitioner next argues that with the additional deposit he made in his account which was accepted by Citibank, there was an implied
novation and Citibank was under the obligation to increase his credit limit and make the necessary entries in its computerized systems
in order that petitioner may not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use of his credit card. Again, the Court finds that
petitioner's argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
Citibank never denied that it received petitioners additional deposit. 50 It even claimed that petitioner was able to purchase plane tickets
from Cebu to Kuala Lumpur in the amount of P237,170.00, which amount was beyond his P150,000.00 limit, because it was able to
credit petitioners additional deposit to his account. Flores of Citibank testified:
COURT:
Q When was this ticket purchased, after the account was augmented
or before?
A After the account was augmented, Your Honor, because there is no way we can approve a P250,000.00 purchase with a P150,000.00
credit limit.51
xxx
ATTY. NERI:
For the record, your honor, the deposit of P450,000.00 was made as per exhibit of the plaintiff on June 28. The purchase of the tickets
amount to P237,000.00 was approved and debited on the account of Mr. Aznar on July 20, your honor. The deposit was made about a
month before the purchase of the tickets as per documentary exhibits, your honor.
COURT:

So, Atty. Navarro, what do you say to that explanation?

ATTY. NAVARRO [counsel of petitioner]:
That is correct, your honor, that is borne out by the records, your honor. (Emphasis supplied)
COURT: (to witness)
Q So, I think Atty. Navarro is only after whether a credit line could be extended?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Even if there is no augmenting?
A No, sir, it is not possible. So, the only way the P237,000.00 transaction could be approved was by way of advance payment which
actually happened in this case because there is no way that the P237,000.00 can be approved with the P150,000.00 credit limit.52
(Emphasis supplied)
The allegations of blacklisting not having been proved, is Citibank liable for damages for the dishonor of Aznars Mastercard?
Again, the answer is no.
Citibank, in its attempt to evade liability, invokes paragraphs 7 and 15 of the terms and conditions governing the issuance of its
Mastercard which read:
7. MERCHANT AFFILIATES. [Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored by any merchant affiliate for any reason.
Furthermore, [the cardholder] will not hold [Citibank] responsible for any defective product or service purchased through the Card.
xxxx
15. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. In any action arising from this agreement or any incident thereto which [the cardholder] or any other
party may file against [Citibank], [Citibanks] liability shall not exceed One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] or the actual damages proven,
whichever is lesser.53
On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of Citibanks Mastercard constitute a contract of adhesion. It is
settled that contracts between cardholders and the credit card companies are contracts of adhesion, so-called, because their terms are
prepared by only one party while the other merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.54
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that "[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored by any
merchant affiliate for any reason x x x". While it is true that Citibank may have no control of all the actions of its merchant affiliates, and
should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is dishonored by any
merchant affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the statement vague and as the said terms and conditions constitute a contract
of adhesion, any ambiguity in its provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the contract,55 in this case Citibank.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions which limits its liability to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven,
whichever is lesser.
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being unconscionable as it precludes payment of a larger amount even though
damage may be clearly proven. This Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the terms of a contract if the attendant
facts and circumstances show that they should be ignored for being obviously too one-sided.56
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still cannot award damages in favor of
petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.57
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other
party. It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the

defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 221958 and 222059 of the Civil Code.60
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or
is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be
wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.61
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by
Ingtan Agency, especially when the agencys personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court
cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would
make it answerable for said suffering.
As the Court pronounced in BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,62
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit
card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury to those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.63
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

MCC
INDUSTRIAL
vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.

SALES

CORPORATION,

petitioner,

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 and its
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing
and wholesaling stainless steel products.3 One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong),4 an international trading
company5 with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. 6 The two corporations
conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.7 Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the
faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.8
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter9 addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the President10 of
Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel
under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the
conforme portion of the letter.11
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO40112 containing the terms and conditions of the
transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature 13 of Chan. As stated in the pro forma
invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of
Ssangyong.14 Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron
and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea15 and paid the same in full.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into two, 16 one for 110MT covered by Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-117 and another for 110MT covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2,18 both dated April 17, 2000.

On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready
to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the L/C be facilitated. 19 Chan affixed
his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong.20
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office informed Sanyo Seiki, thru Chan, that it was able to secure a US$30/MT
price adjustment on the contracted price of US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and that the goods were to be shipped in
two tranches, the first 100MT on that day and the second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000. Ssangyong reiterated its request for the
facilitation of the L/C's opening.21
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on June 26, 2000, to the Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki that it was looking
forward to receiving the L/C details and a cable copy thereof that day. 22 Ssangyong sent a separate letter of the same date to Sanyo
Seiki requesting for the opening of the L/C covering payment of the first 100MT not later than June 28, 2000. 23 Similar letters were
transmitted by Ssangyong Manila Office on June 27, 2000. 24 On June 28, 2000, Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating
that its principal in Korea was already in a difficult situation25 because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC to open the L/C's.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by fax, a letter signed by Chan, requesting an extension of time to open the L/C
because MCC's credit line with the bank had been fully availed of in connection with another transaction, and MCC was waiting for an
additional credit line.26 On the same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting that it be informed of the date when the L/C would be opened,
preferably at the earliest possible time, since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was having problems and Ssangyong was incurring
warehousing costs.27 To maintain their good business relationship and to support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong offered
to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO, another US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered. This was
intimated in Ssangyong's June 30, 2000 letter to MCC. 28 On July 6, 2000, another follow-up letter 29 for the opening of the L/C was sent
by Ssangyong to MCC.
However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit. 30 Consequently, on August 15, 2000, Ssangyong, through
counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold MCC
liable for damages for breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of warehouse expenses, related interests and charges.31
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-POSTS080-233 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by Ssangyong and sent
via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and
ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As
can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the conformity
signature of MCC Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil
under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2.34 The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC.35
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in
Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC
lost a lot of money due to a recent strike.36
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand letter37 to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of
US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to
cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference, warehousing expenses, interests and charges
as of August 15, 2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests
and charges.38
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo
Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, 39 Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached
their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence 40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies
of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling
that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order 41 and their admissibility finds
support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial
and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for
purposes of a prima facie case.42
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 43 on March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that when
plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860 per MT, the contract was
perfected. The subject transaction was evidenced by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were

later amended only in terms of reduction of volume as well as the price per MT, following Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1
and ST2-POSTS080-2. The RTC, however, excluded Sanyo Seiki from liability for lack of competent evidence. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants MCC Industrial Sales Corporation
and Gregory Chan, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally the following:
1) Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the outstanding principal claim plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from March 30, 2001.
2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus P2,000.00 per counsel's appearance in court, the same being deemed just
and equitable considering that by reason of defendants' breach of their obligation under the subject contract, plaintiff was
constrained to litigate to enforce its rights and recover for the damages it sustained, and therefore had to engage the services
of a lawyer.
3) Costs of suit.
No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.44
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of record, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of Appeal. 45 On June 8,
2004, the law office of Castillo Zamora & Poblador entered its appearance as their collaborating counsel.
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005,46 MCC and Chan raised before the CA the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACT
WITH APPELLEE
A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS AGREED TO
PURCHASE 200 METRIC TONS OF STEEL PRODUCTS FROM APPELLEE, INSTEAD OF ONLY 100 METRIC
TONS.
1. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE PRO FORMA
INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2- POSTS0401-1 AND ST2-POSTS0401-2.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO APPELLEE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GREGORY CHAN JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH APPELLANT MCC.47
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision 48 affirming the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability. The
appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and
"F") were admissible in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders. 49 The dispositive portion of the
appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest, attorney's fees and costs ordered by the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.
(2) Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from any liability.
SO ORDERED.50
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCC's and Chan's principal counsel, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on September 14, 2005. 51
Their collaborating counsel, Castillo Zamora & Poblador,52 likewise, received a copy of the CA decision on September 19, 2005.53
On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf of MCC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. 54 Ssangyong
opposed the motion contending that the decision of the CA had become final and executory on account of the failure of MCC to file the

said motion within the reglementary period. The appellate court resolved, on November 22, 2005, to deny the motion on its merits, 55
without, however, ruling on the procedural issue raised.
Aggrieved, MCC filed a petition for review on certiorari56 before this Court, imputing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL QUESTION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND
SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY
REVERSING THE COURT A QUO'S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 02-124 CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF THE PRO-FORMA
INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2-POSTSO401-1 AND ST2-POSTSO401-2, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE SAME WERE MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT, EVEN ASSUMING
PETITIONER BREACHED THE SUPPOSED CONTRACT, THE FACT IS THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE
THAT IT SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT THEREOF.
III. THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF US$93,493.87 IS SIMPLY UNCONSCIONABLE AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT LEAST REDUCED, IF NOT DELETED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.57
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the petition, raising the following arguments: that the CA decision dated 15 August
2005 is already final and executory, because MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days
from receipt of a copy thereof, and that, in any case, it was a pro forma motion; that MCC breached the contract for the purchase of the
steel products when it failed to open the required letter of credit; that the printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or telecopy
transmissions were properly admitted by the trial court because they are considered original documents under R.A. No. 8792; and that
MCC is liable for actual damages and attorney's fees because of its breach, thus, compelling Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve are the following:
I Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory;
II Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such;
III Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in the affirmative, whether MCC breached
the said contract; and
IV Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in favor of Ssangyong is proper and justified.
-IIt cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we held that receipt of a copy of the decision by one of several counsels on
record is notice to all, and the period to appeal commences on such date even if the other counsel has not yet received a copy of the
decision. In this case, when Atty. Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14, 2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days
within which to file a motion for reconsideration conformably with Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45. The period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when Castillo
Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to collaborating counsel.
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed both MCC's and
Chan's Brief and Reply Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels was for the collaborating, not the principal,
counsel to file the appeal brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed
the motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from
September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not find it
necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court assiduously reviewed the records and found that strong concerns of substantial
justice warrant the relaxation of this rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and Development Corporation,59 we ruled that:
In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction. In addition to
the basic merits of the main case, such a petition usually embodies justifying circumstance which warrants our heeding to the
petitioner's cry for justice in spite of the earlier negligence of counsel. As we held in Obut v. Court of Appeals:

[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket
for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one
subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is
to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty, honor or property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not override or frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the perfection of the
appeal, as in this case, does not warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal. In Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, we gave due course to the petitioner's appeal despite the late filing of its brief in the appellate court because
such appeal involved public interest. We stated in the said case that the Court may exempt a particular case from a strict
application of the rules of procedure where the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in
the appellate court's failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., we also held that there is more
leeway to exempt a case from the strictness of procedural rules when the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over
the appealed case. We emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict
and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the rule's primary objective of
enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the
other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.60
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration of justice, not to
shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their
judicial discretion. Technicalities must take a backseat to substantive rights. After all, it is circumspect leniency in this respect that will
give the parties the fullest opportunity to ventilate the merits of their respective causes, rather than have them lose life, liberty, honor or
property on sheer technicalities.61
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the alleged pro forma nature of MCC's motion for reconsideration, ostensibly because
it merely restated the arguments previously raised and passed upon by the CA.
In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments in a motion for reconsideration does not per se result in a
pro forma motion. In Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,62 we held that a motion for reconsideration may not be
necessarily pro forma even if it reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise
the same arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous. Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if the
arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
- II The second issue poses a novel question that the Court welcomes. It provides the occasion for this Court to pronounce a definitive
interpretation of the equally innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis--vis the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or
"electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the
photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are
indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this
Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there is a
need to make its own findings in order to support its conclusions.63
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely
admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic
document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax
transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:
Admissibility
Invoices;
by Appellants

of
Breach

Pro
of

Forma
Contract

Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with Reference Nos. ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218, Records), appellants argue that the said
documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best evidence rule.
The argument is untenable.
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence, although they are mere
electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents under the
New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout or output,
readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term 'electronic document' may be used interchangeably with 'electronic data message'.
An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as
it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC)
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. 65 The
Rules on Electronic Evidence66 regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. 67 An electronic
document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or
other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.68
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792, 69 which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then Secretaries of the
Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means,
but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. Throughout these Rules, the
term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic document."
xxxx
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced

electronically. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably
with "electronic data message."
The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of
"electronic data message" is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),70 from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. 71 While Congress deleted
this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is
significant and pivotal, as discussed hereunder.
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document" was the result of the Senate of
the Philippines' adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase "electronic data message" and the House of Representative's employment,
in House Bill 9971, of the term "electronic document." 72 In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working
group of the Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each one. 73 Be that as it
may, there is a slight difference between the two terms. While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent, stored or
transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation,74 unlike an electronic document.
Evident from the law, however, is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxxx
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data
message or electronic document?
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the
impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic
means. The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further
supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document from one place to another via a fax machine.75
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that
Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin and the
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade relations. The generally
accepted principles of international law and convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be considered.
Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL's
definition of "data message":
"Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means including, but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.76
is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data message."
However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data message." This
legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term's "international origin" has bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make
an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.77 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in
a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which
are sought to be attained by the enactment.78

Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the principal author of Senate Bill 1902 (the predecessor of R.A. No. 8792),
sponsored the bill on second reading, he proposed to adopt the term "data message" as formulated and defined in the UNCITRAL
Model Law.79 During the period of amendments, however, the term evolved into "electronic data message," and the phrase "but not
limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was deleted.
Furthermore, the term "electronic data message," though maintaining its description under the UNCITRAL Model Law, except for the
aforesaid deleted phrase, conveyed a different meaning, as revealed in the following proceedings:
xxxx
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a copy together with the explanation of this proposed amendment.
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please be allowed to go back to Section 5; the Definition of Terms. In light of
the acceptance by the good Senator of my proposed amendments, it will then become necessary to add certain terms in our
list of terms to be defined. I would like to add a definition on what is "data," what is "electronic record" and what is an
"electronic record system."
If the gentleman will give me permission, I will proceed with the proposed amendment on Definition of Terms, Section 5.
Senator Magsaysay. Please go ahead, Senator Santiago.
Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the Declaration of Policy, Section 5, Definition of Terms.
At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms that have to be defined since these are arranged alphabetically, Mr.
President, I would like to insert the term DATA and its definition. So, the amendment will read: "DATA" MEANS
REPRESENTATION, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.
The explanation is this: This definition of "data" or "data" as it is now fashionably pronounced in America - - the definition of
"data" ensures that our bill applies to any form of information in an electronic record, whether these are figures, facts or ideas.
So again, the proposed amendment is this: "DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATIONS, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION OR
CONCEPTS.
Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the definition of "Data Message" which encompasses electronic records,
electronic writings and electronic documents?
Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent with each other. These are compatible. When we define "data," we are
simply reinforcing the definition of what is a data message.
Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Thank you. The next term is "ELECTRONIC RECORD." The proposed amendment is as follows:
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" MEANS DATA THAT IS RECORDED OR STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR BY A COMPUTER
SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE, THAT CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED BY A PERSON OR A COMPUTER SYSTEM
OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT INCLUDES A DISPLAY, PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT OF THAT DATA.
The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The term "ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the scope of our bill. The
record is the data. The record may be on any medium. It is electronic because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer
system or a similar device.
The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it would
not apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce .
It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations since the information is not recorded. It would apply to voice
mail since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise, video records are not covered.
Though when the video is transferred to a website, it would be covered because of the involvement of the computer. Music
recorded by a computer system on a compact disc would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. A computer or a similar device has to be involved in its
creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. Although
things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this bill, these may well be admissible
under other rules of law. This provision focuses on replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of systems instead
of that of individual records and using standards to show systems reliability.

Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as printouts are themselves electronic records being just
the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record subject to the
usual rules about copies, but the original printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this bill.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose computer origin is never again called on are treated as
paper records. In that case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the record is irrelevant to its reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my memory does not fail me, earlier, the lady Senator accepted that we use the term
"Data Message" rather than "ELECTRONIC RECORD" in being consistent with the UNCITRAL term of "Data Message." So
with the new amendment of defining "ELECTRONIC RECORD," will this affect her accepting of the use of "Data Message"
instead of "ELECTRONIC RECORD"?
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you for reminding me. The term I would like to insert is ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE in lieu of "ELECTRONIC RECORD."
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in effect, amending the term of the definition of "Data Message" on page 2A, line 31, to
which we have no objection.
Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all the amendments that I desire to, including the amendment on the effect
of error or change. I will provide the language of the amendment together with the explanation supporting that amendment to
the distinguished sponsor and then he can feel free to take it up in any session without any further intervention.
Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr. President, I understand from the proponent of these amendments that these are
based on the Canadian E-commerce Law of 1998. Is that not right?
Senator Santiago. That is correct.80
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data message," it was consonant with the explanation of
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United
Nations model law on electronic commerce." In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after the E-Commerce Law of Canada,
Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term "electronic data message." This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL
Model Law's terminology of "data message," has assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the term "electronic record" in
the law of Canada. It accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase " but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the
term "electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago's explanation
during the Senate deliberations:
"Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The record may be any medium. It is "electronic" because
it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is intended to apply, for example, to data on
magnetic strips on cards, or in smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-generated
faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone
conversations, since the information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the information has been recorded in
or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise video records are not covered, though when the video is transferred to a Web
site it would be, because of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would
be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A computer or similar device has to be involved in its
creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. Although
things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this Act, they may well be admissible
under other rules of law. This Act focuses on replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of
that of individual records, and using standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as printouts, are themselves electronic records, being
just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject
to the usual rules about copies, but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records, and whose computer origin is never again called on, are treated as
paper records. See subsection 4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system that produced the record is relevant to
its reliability.81

There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data message," it intended the same meaning as the
term "electronic record" in the Canada law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes,
except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the
"functional equivalent approach"82 that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless
and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.
A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by Alexander Bain, 83 is a device that can send or receive pictures and text over a
telephone line. It works by digitizing an imagedividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is either on or off, depending on whether it is
black or white. Electronically, each dot is represented by a bit that has a value of either 0 (off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine
translates a picture into a series of zeros and ones (called a bit map) that can be transmitted like normal computer data. On the
receiving side, a fax machine reads the incoming data, translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and reprints the picture. 84 A fax
machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner
converts the content of a physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a phone line, and the printer at
the other end makes a duplicate of the original document. 85 Thus, in Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,86 where we explained the unacceptability of
filing pleadings through fax machines, we ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is
equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.87
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through
a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended
virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents.88 Further, in
a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the
same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. 89 Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as
aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have
different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology90 when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a
newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data
message."
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data
message," without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the
exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature.91 Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuancean administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.92 Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board Task Force on the Measurement of E-Commerce, 93 on November 22, 2006,
recommended a working definition of "electronic commerce," as "[a]ny commercial transaction conducted through electronic, optical
and similar medium, mode, instrumentality and technology. The transaction includes the sale or purchase of goods and services,
between individuals, households, businesses and governments conducted over computer-mediated networks through the Internet,
mobile phones, electronic data interchange (EDI) and other channels through open and closed networks." The Task Force's proposed
definition is similar to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) broad definition as it covers transactions
made over any network, and, in addition, it adopted the following provisions of the OECD definition: (1) for transactions, it covers sale or
purchase of goods and services; (2) for channel/network, it considers any computer-mediated network and NOT limited to Internet
alone; (3) it excludes transactions received/placed using fax, telephone or non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments done online or
offline; and (5) it considers delivery made online (like downloading of purchased books, music or software programs) or offline
(deliveries of goods).94
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as

electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic
evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case,
therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of
the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
- III Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has proven by
preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale.
In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that the claimant proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract,
(2) the breach thereof by the other contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit
onus probandi. The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a proposition affirmatively.95 In other words, a plaintiff in a civil
action must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it.96
In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent,97 which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the
thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. 98 They are, moreover,
obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. 99 Sale,
being a consensual contract, follows the general rule that it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to
the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.100
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the
price, (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.101
In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the parties, respondent Ssangyong formally offered in
evidence the testimonies of its witnesses and the following exhibits:

Exhibit

Description

Purpose

Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 with To show that defendants contracted with plaintiff fo
Contract No. ST2-POSTS0401-1, photocopy
delivery of 110 MT of stainless steel from Korea payab
way of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of plaintiff, am
other conditions.

E-1

Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 with

Contract No. ST2-POSTS0401, contained in
facsimile/thermal paper faxed by defendants to
plaintiff showing the printed transmission details
on the upper portion of said paper as coming
from defendant MCC on 26 Apr 00 08:41AM

To show that defendants sent their confirmation of th

delivery to it of the specified stainless steel products
defendants' payment thereof by way of an irrevocable let
credit in favor of plaintiff, among other conditions.

E-2

Conforme signature of Mr. Gregory Chan,

contained in facsimile/thermal paper faxed by
defendants to plaintiff showing the printed
transmission details on the upper portion of said
paper as coming from defendant MCC on 26 Apr
00 08:41AM

To show that defendants sent their confirmation of th

delivery to it of the total of 220MT specified stainless
products, (ii) defendants' payment thereof by way o
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of plaintiff, among
conditions.

Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 with To show that defendants contracted with plaintiff for deliv
Contract No. ST2-POSTSO401-2, photocopy
another 110 MT of stainless steel from Korea payable by
of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of plaintiff, a

other conditions.

Letter to defendant SANYO SEIKE dated 20 June To prove that defendants were informed of the date o
2000, contained in facsimile/thermal paper
opening and defendant's conforme/approval thereof.

G-1

Signature of defendant Gregory Chan, contained

in facsimile/thermal paper.

Letter to defendants dated 22 June 2000, original To prove that defendants were informed of the successful
adjustments secured by plaintiff in favor of former and
advised of the schedules of its L/C opening.

Letter to defendants dated 26 June 2000, original To prove that plaintiff repeatedly requested defendants fo
agreed opening of the Letters of Credit, defendants' failur
refusal to comply with their obligations and the problem
plaintiff is incurring by reason of defendants' failure and re
Letter to defendants dated 26 June 2000, original to open the L/Cs.

Letter to defendants dated 27 June 2000, original

Facsimile message to defendants dated 28 June

2000, photocopy

Letter from defendants dated 29 June 2000,

contained in facsimile/thermal paper faxed by
defendants to plaintiff showing the printed
transmission details on the upper portion of said
paper as coming from defendant MCC on 29
June 00 11:12 AM

M-1

Signature of defendant Gregory Chan, contained

in facsimile/thermal paper faxed by defendants to
plaintiff showing the printed transmission details
on the upper portion of said paper as coming
from defendant MCC on June 00 11:12 AM

Letter to defendants dated 29 June 2000, original

Letter to defendants dated 30 June 2000, To prove that plaintiff reiterated its request for defendan
photocopy
L/C opening after the latter's request for extension of time
granted, defendants' failure and refusal to comply ther
extension of time notwithstanding.

Letter to defendants dated 06 July 2000, original

To prove that defendants admit of their liabilities to plaintif

they requested for "more extension" of time for the open
the Letter of Credit, and begging for favorable understa
and consideration.

Demand letter to defendants dated 15 Aug 2000, To prove that plaintiff was constrained to engaged service
original
lawyer for collection efforts.

Demand letter to defendants dated 23 Aug 2000, To prove that defendants opened the first L/C in fav
original
plaintiff, requested for further postponement of the fina
and for minimal amounts, were urged to open the final L
time, and were informed that failure to comply will cance
contract.

Demand letter to defendants dated 11 Sept 2000, To show defendants' refusal and failure to open the fina
original
on time, the cancellation of the contract as a consequ
thereof, and final demand upon defendants to rem
obligations.

Letter from plaintiff SSANGYONG to defendant To prove that there was a perfected sale and purc
SANYO SEIKI dated 13 April 2000, with fax back agreement between the parties for 220 metric tons of
from defendants SANYO SEIKI/MCC to plaintiff products at the price of US$1,860/ton.
SSANGYONG, contained in facsimile/thermal
paper with back-up photocopy

W-1

Conforme signature of defendant Gregory Chan, To prove that defendants, acting through Gregory C
contained in facsimile/thermal paper with back-up agreed to the sale and purchase of 220 metric tons of
photocopy
products at the price of US$1,860/ton.

W-2

Name of
Corporation

Pro forma Invoice dated 16 August 2000, To prove that defendant MCC agreed to adjust and spl
photocopy
confirmed purchase order into 2 shipments at 100 metric
each at the discounted price of US$1,700/ton.

X-1

Notation "1/2", photocopy

To prove that the present Pro forma Invoice was the firs
pro forma invoices.

X-2

Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080-1, photocopy

To prove that the present Pro forma Invoice was the firs
pro forma invoices.

X-3

Conforme signature of defendant Gregory Chan, To prove that defendant MCC, acting through Gregory C
photocopy
agreed to the sale and purchase of the balance of 100 m
tons at the discounted price of US$1,700/ton, apart from
other order and shipment of 100 metric tons which
delivered by plaintiff SSANGYONG and paid for by defe
MCC.

sender

MCC

Industrial

Sales To prove that defendants sent their conformity to the sale

purchase agreement by facsimile transmission.

DD

Letter from defendant MCC to plaintiff

SSANGYONG dated 22 August 2000, contained
in facsimile/thermal paper with back-up
photocopy

To prove that there was a perfected sale and purc

agreement between plaintiff SSANGYONG and defe
MCC for the balance of 100 metric tons, apart from the
order and shipment of 100 metric tons which was deliver
plaintiff SSANGYONG and paid for by defendant MCC.

DD-1

Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080-1, contained in To prove that there was a perfected sale and purc
facsimile/thermal paper with back-up photocopy
agreement between plaintiff SSANGYONG and defe
MCC for the balance of 100 metric tons, apart from the
order and shipment of 100 metric tons which was deliver
plaintiff SSANGYONG and paid for by defendant MCC.

DD-2

Signature of defendant Gregory Chan, contained To prove that defendant MCC, acting through Gregory C
in facsimile/thermal paper with back-up agreed to the sale and purchase of the balance of 100 m
photocopy
tons, apart from the other order and shipment of 100 m
tons which was delivered by plaintiff Ssangyong and pa
by defendant MCC.102

Significantly, among these documentary evidence presented by respondent, MCC, in its petition before this Court, assails the
admissibility only of Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"). After sifting through the
records, the Court found that these invoices are mere photocopies of their original fax transmittals. Ssangyong avers that these
documents were prepared after MCC asked for the splitting of the original order into two, so that the latter can apply for an L/C with
greater facility. It, however, failed to explain why the originals of these documents were not presented.
To determine whether these documents are admissible in evidence, we apply the ordinary Rules on Evidence, for as discussed above
we cannot apply the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance with Rule
130, Section 5, which states, "[w]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated." Furthermore, the
offeror of secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof, namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b)
the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the
original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the
proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is
required than where the document is only collaterally involved.103
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove the existence of the original fax transmissions of Exhibits E and F, and
likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be admitted in evidence and
accorded probative weight.
It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected contract. It also
introduced in evidence a variety of other documents, as enumerated above, together with the testimonies of its witnesses. Notable
among them are Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 which were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax
to MCC. As already mentioned, these invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier invoices such that the quantity was now officially
100MT per invoice and the price reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the
court bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit "X"), however, is a mere photocopy of its original. But then again, petitioner MCC
does not assail the admissibility of this document in the instant petition. Verily, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.104 Issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits "1-A" and "2-C"), which was certified by PCIBank as a true copy of its
original,105 it was, in fact, petitioner MCC which introduced this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC paid for the order stated in this
invoice. Its admissibility, therefore, is not open to question.
These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2), along with the other unchallenged documentary
evidence of respondent Ssangyong, preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was perfected by the parties.

This Court also finds merit in the following observations of the trial court:
Defendants presented Letter of Credit (Exhibits "1", "1-A" to "1-R") referring to Pro Forma Invoice for Contract No.
ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of US$170,000.00, and which bears the signature of Gregory Chan, General Manager of
MCC. Plaintiff, on the other hand, presented Pro Forma Invoice referring to Contract No. ST2-POSTS080-1, in the amount of
US$170,000.00, which likewise bears the signature of Gregory Chan, MCC. Plaintiff accounted for the notation "1/2" on the
right upper portion of the Invoice, that is, that it was the first of two (2) pro forma invoices covering the subject contract
between plaintiff and the defendants. Defendants, on the other hand, failed to account for the notation "2/2" in its Pro Forma
Invoice (Exhibit "1-A"). Observably further, both Pro Forma Invoices bear the same date and details, which logically mean that
they both apply to one and the same transaction.106
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of both parties, started with the petitioner and the respondent agreeing on
the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked
for several extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery dates, and discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties slightly
varied the terms of their contract, without necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into
two deliveries, and the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed to open an
L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of both parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale, even if the
writings of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were not as explicit in establishing a contract. 107 Appropriate conduct by
the parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while there may be instances where the exchange of correspondence does
not disclose the exact point at which the deal was closed, the actions of the parties may indicate that a binding obligation has been
undertaken.108
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of the
transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its contractual obligation. It is a
well-entrenched rule that the failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the contract between buyer and seller.
Indeed, where the buyer fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated, the seller or exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach.
Damages for failure to open a commercial credit may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller would reasonably
have made had the transaction been carried out.109
- IV This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. 110 In Villafuerte v. Court of
Appeals,111 we explained that:
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They
arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a
party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. It is hornbook doctrine that
to be able to recover actual damages, the claimant bears the onus of presenting before the court actual proof of the damages
alleged to have been suffered, thus:
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making
an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.112
In the instant case, the trial court awarded to respondent Ssangyong US$93,493.87 as actual damages. On appeal, the same was
affirmed by the appellate court. Noticeably, however, the trial and the appellate courts, in making the said award, relied on the following
documents submitted in evidence by the respondent: (1) Exhibit "U," the Statement of Account dated March 30, 2001; (2) Exhibit "U-1,"
the details of the said Statement of Account); (3) Exhibit "V," the contract of the alleged resale of the goods to a Korean corporation;
and (4) Exhibit "V-1," the authentication of the resale contract from the Korean Embassy and certification from the Philippine Consular
Office.
The statement of account and the details of the losses sustained by respondent due to the said breach are, at best, self-serving. It was
respondent Ssangyong itself which prepared the said documents. The items therein are not even substantiated by official receipts. In
the absence of corroborative evidence, the said statement of account is not sufficient basis to award actual damages. The court cannot
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on competent proof that
the claimant had suffered, and on evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113
Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication certificates, Exhibits "V" and "V-1," allegedly evidencing the resale at a loss of the
stainless steel subject of the parties' breached contract, fail to convince this Court of the veracity of its contents. The steel items

indicated in the sales contract114 with a Korean corporation are different in all respects from the items ordered by petitioner MCC, even
in size and quantity. We observed the following discrepancies:
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "V":

COMMODITY:
Stainless
SPEC: SUS304 NO. 1

Steel

HR

Sheet

SIZE/Q'TY:

2.8MM X 1,219MM X C

8.193MT

3.0MM X 1,219MM X C

7.736MT

3.0MM X 1,219MM X C

7.885MT

3.0MM X 1,219MM X C

8.629MT

4.0MM X 1,219MM X C

7.307MT

4.0MM X 1,219MM X C

7.247MT

4.5MM X 1,219MM X C

8.450MT

4.5MM X 1,219MM X C

8.870MT

5.0MM X 1,219MM X C

8.391MT

6.0MM X 1,219MM X C

6.589MT

6.0MM X 1,219MM X C

7.878MT

6.0MM X 1,219MM X C

8.397MT

TOTAL:

95.562MT115

in

Coil,

Slit

Edge

List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "X" (the invoice that was not paid):

DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304

SIZE AND QUANTITY:

2.6 MM X 4' X C

10.0MT

3.0 MM X 4' X C

25.0MT

4.0 MM X 4' X C

15.0MT

4.5 MM X 4' X C

15.0MT

5.0 MM X 4' X C

10.0MT

6.0 MM X 4' X C

25.0MT

TOTAL:

100MT116

From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that Ssangyong did not adequately prove that the items resold at a loss
were the same items ordered by the petitioner. Therefore, as the claim for actual damages was not proven, the Court cannot sanction
the award.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its contractual obligation and obstinately refused to pay despite
repeated demands from respondent. Petitioner even asked for several extensions of time for it to make good its obligation. But in spite
of respondent's continuous accommodation, petitioner completely reneged on its contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity,
MCC must be held liable for nominal damages. "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must
be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract
and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.'" 117 Accordingly, the Court awards nominal
damages of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well settled that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not every winning party
is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney's fees. The party must show that he falls under one of the instances enumerated in Article
2208 of the Civil Code.118 In the instant case, however, the Court finds the award of attorney's fees proper, considering that petitioner
MCC's unjustified refusal to pay has compelled respondent Ssangyong to litigate and to incur expenses to protect its rights.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 82983 is MODIFIED in that the award of actual damages is DELETED. However, petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent
NOMINAL DAMAGES in the amount of P200,000.00, and the ATTORNEY'S FEES as awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.

PACIFICO
B.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ARCEO,

JR.,

petitioner,

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision 1 and March 27, 2000 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial courts judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the amount of P100,000.00.
Several weeks thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in favor
of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizals
house located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately
because [petitioner] promised [] that he would replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times.
When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed [Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient
funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out that
[petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from
receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. As a
consequence, [Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and
submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. After due
investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question and the
return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992.
[Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip.3
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, on April 28, 1999, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to present the
dishonored check during the trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor of the check because it was
presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement
was not complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five banking days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts that
he had already paid his obligation to Cenizal.
Petitioners contentions have no merit.
Significance
For Presentment of the Check

of

the

90-day

Period

Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was presented to the drawee bank only on December 5, 1991
or 120 days from the date thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this was beyond the 90-day period provided under the law in
connection with the presentment of the check. We disagree.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of
not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf
of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
In Wong v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the
check. According to current banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six months.
Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizals presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was still within the allowable period.
Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the
check.
Applicability
Best Evidence Rule

of

the

Petitioners insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong.
Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However,
the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of
the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.5
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. 6 Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of
issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the
check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his
complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of
BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the
documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately
establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during
the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for payment to the
drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Presence
Elements of the Offense

of

the

Based on the allegations in the information, 7 petitioner was charged for violating the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the
offense are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;
2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.8
All these elements are present in this case.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no. 163255 postdated August 4, 1991 in the amount of
P150,000 in consideration of a loan which he obtained from Cenizal. When the check was deposited, it was dishonored by the drawee
bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. There was sufficient evidence on record that petitioner knew of the insufficiency
of his funds in the drawee bank at the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this was why, on maturity date, he requested the payee
not to encash it with the promise that he would replace it with cash. He made this request and assurance seven times but repeatedly
failed to make good on his promises despite the repeated accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.
Notice
And Payment of the Obligation

of

Dishonor

to

Petitioner

The trial court found that, contrary to petitioners claim, Cenizals counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the checks dishonor and
demanded payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand for payment, petitioner still failed to
pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor within which to pay the
amount of the check.9 While petitioner may have been given only three days to pay the value of the check, the trial court found that the
amount due thereon remained unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor. This negated his claim that
he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioners claim of payment was nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to support it. If indeed there
was payment, petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check back in the ordinary course of business. 10 Instead, the check
remained in the possession of the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioners obligation when the check became due as well
as when the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the appellate court. This Court has no
reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are not
to be disturbed.11
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THE
CONSOLIDATED
BANK
AND
TRUST
CORPORATION
(SOLIDBANK),
vs.
DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES,1 AND SPOUSE, Respondents.

Petitioners,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, "The Consolidated
Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse" promulgated on 25
November 1999 and of the Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Said
decision and resolution affirmed the order dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint3 for recovery of sum of money against respondents, impleading
the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a
domestic banking and trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the
promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest
pegged at 23% per annum. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the
full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it
made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed
to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes "A," "B,"
and "C," respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent
respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which was opposed by the defendants
upon the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of petitioners complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a manifestation attaching thereto its answer to petitioners
complaint which states the following:
2- That it denies generally and specifically the allegations contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters therein alleged, the truth being those alleged in the Special and
Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow contained;

3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first special and affirmative defense, defendant herein states that the promissory note in
question is void for want of valid consideration and/or there was no valuable consideration involved as defendant herein did not receive
any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second special affirmative defense, defendant herein alleges that no demand has ever
been sent to nor received by herein defendant and if ever demands were made, denies any liability as averred therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third special and affirmative defense, defendant herein avers that the complaint states no
cause of action and has no basis either in fact or in law;
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., one of the defendants in this case.
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused the preparation of the above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of my own knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO4
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together with his answer wherein he likewise renounced any liability
on the promissory note, thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with a qualification in paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been separated
from his wife and the system governing their property relations is that of complete separation of property and not that of conjugal
partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief and as to the truth of the matter therein averred, the truth being those alleged in the Special And
Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow pleaded;

SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack of valid consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and execution of the questioned promissory note, still, defendant herein cannot be
bound personally and individually to the said obligations as banking procedures requires, it being a standard operating procedure of all
known banking institution, that to hold a borrower jointly and severally liable in his official as well as personal capacity, the borrower
must sign a Suretyship Agreement or at least, a continuing guarranty with that of the corporation he represent(s) but which in this case
is wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any way, redound/inure to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gain, as there is
no conjugal partnership of gain to speak with, defendant having long been separated from his wife and their property relation is
governed by the system of complete separation of property, and more importantly, he has never signed the said promissory note in his
personal and individual capacity as such;

VERIFICATION
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and declare that:
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-entitled case;

I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer upon facts and figures supplied by me to my retained counsel; have read each
and every allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same are true and correct of my own knowledge and information.
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
Affiant5
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default and admitted their respective
answers.6
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of
its Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and
due to respondents failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter to
respondents; that as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporations controller, wrote a letter to
petitioner requesting for some consideration because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then buffeting their business operation;
that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being
applied as partial payment to their companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents obligation
again became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter which, unfortunately, was unheeded by
respondents. Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note
attached to the complaint as Exhibit 7 petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit 8 Tolentinos letter to petitioner
dated 10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit 9 and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents marked as Exhibit 10
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit "A" could no longer be
found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as
Exhibit "E."
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their
respective answers to conform with this new evidence.11
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration12 of the trial courts order admitting
into evidence petitioners Exhibit "E." Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit "E" should not have been admitted as it was
immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit "E" was not
properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of
which was Exhibit "E." Further, as there were markings in Exhibit "A" which were not contained in Exhibit "E," the latter could not
possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit "A." Lastly, respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing
on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit "E" was not the original of Exhibit "A" which was the foundation of the complaint and
upon which respondent corporation based its own answer.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider order admitting as evidence Exhibit "E" 13 which, other than
insisting that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were not established as far as he was concerned, essentially
raised the same arguments contained in respondent corporations manifestation with motion for reconsideration referred to above.
On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents motions for reconsideration. 14 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of
this order which was denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.15
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits
"A" and "E," petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged indebtedness.16
On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion 17 praying that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit himself
from this case maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December
1985 thereby depriving it the opportunity of presenting proof that the original of Exhibit "A" was delivered to respondents as early as 02
April 1983. Such haste on the part of the presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness. This motion
to inhibit was denied by the trial court on 06 August 1987.18
In an order dated 28 December 1987,19 the case before the trial court was dismissed, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. and Narciso O. Morales and spouse, is hereby
DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiff.
The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision now before us. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28, 1987
dismissing plaintiff-appellant['s] complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the plaintiff-appellant.20

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 December 1999 which was denied for lack of merit in a resolution of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000.21
Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now seeks redress from this Court imputing the following errors on the Court of
Appeals:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE FACTS
CLEARLY POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION
OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND
ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF EXHIBIT A (XEROX COPY OF THE
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS,
THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE
INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
HIS PERCEIVED AND MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE GRAVE
PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK.22
The petition is meritorious.
In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that contrary to petitioners stance, respondents were able to generally
and specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, thus:
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied generally
and specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses
herein states that he (MORALES) never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his personal and/or individual
capacity. Moreover, what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny generally and
specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for
specific denial.23
We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to
the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with
an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.24
In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,25 this Court held that
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan
documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his "denial under oath," stating
that the "promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not
bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses
Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,26 the
Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as
to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof,
since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.27

In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations
in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes,
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the "best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as
the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery
of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein)."28
The "best evidence rule" is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The "best evidence rule," according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith,
Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the usages of trade and that "the best proof that the nature of
the thing will afford is only required." 29 Over the years, the phrase was used to describe rules which were already existing such as the
rule that the terms of a document must be proved by the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about the
document; it was also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court and not subject to the
rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate the group of rules by which testimony of particular classes
of witnesses was preferred to that of others.30
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, "the only actual rule that the best evidence phrase denotes today is the
rule requiring the production of the original writing"31 the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3)
as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case
of attempts at describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of written
copies or of recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing
is justified.32
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the "best evidence rule," we declare
that this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the
promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear
enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of
consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity.
These contentions clearly do not question the "precise wording" 33 of the promissory note which should have paved the way for the
application of the "best evidence rule." It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this
point.
Besides, the "best evidence rule" as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts
of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by
petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the
original of Exhibit "A" was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the "best
evidence rule."
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case,
there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner
failed to present the original of said note.34

Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a
complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant. 35 In the case of Asia Banking Corporation
v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.,36 this Court held that
Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration the documents attached to the complaint
as a part thereof, without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the answer of the defendants there was
no denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and due
execution of these documents must, in that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of
expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the
introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties.37
Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of the court a quo should have inhibited himself from this case, we resolve this
issue against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing proof to show
that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be
presumed particularly if weighed against a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to
person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 38 There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial
source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.39
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of bias and prejudice, we affirm the Court
of Appeals holding that there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states the rule on the effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence. It
reads:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have
the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action. Caution,
however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for
the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce
evidence. If the defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal,
judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to present evidence. 40 The reviewing court cannot
remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.41
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are obligated to petitioner in the amount of One Million Pesos,
this being the amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per
annum on the loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed to pay
attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both these amounts
bearing a 1% interest per month until paid. Costs against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision dated 25 November 1999 as well as its Resolution of 11 May 2000,
affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated 28 December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum, penalty charge of 3% interest per
annum, and 10% of the amount due as attorneys fees together with a 1% interest per month until fully paid. The sum of P220,020.00
which was the value of the postdated check given
by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should be deducted from the amount due from respondents.
SO ORDERED.

CONCEPCION
CHUA
vs.
SUY BEN CHUA and FELISA CHUA, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

GAW,

petitioner,

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution 2
denying the motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Complaint for
Sum of Money in favor of the plaintiff.
The antecedents are as follows:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises 3 namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill
Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua;
Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his
seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.4
On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of
a Co-Heir5 (Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof
will pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60,
will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each.6 In said document,
Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their coheir, Chua Sioc Huan.
In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them
P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable
within six (6) months without interest.7 On June 7, 1988, respondent issued in their favor China Banking Corporation Check No.
2408108 for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couples house in Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check.
On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a
consideration of P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.9
Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the designated period. Respondent sent
the couple a demand letter,10 dated March 25, 1991, requesting them to settle their obligation with the warning that he will be
constrained to take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so.
Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the RTC. The complaint
alleged that on June 7, 1988, he extended a loan to the spouses Gaw for P200,000.00, payable within six months without interest, but
despite several demands, the couple failed to pay their obligation.11
In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioners
share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her familys businesses. According to the spouses, when they transferred residence to
Marilao, Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for an accounting, and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills
Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They claimed that respondent persuaded petitioner to
temporarily forego her demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure
that she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.12
In his Reply, respondent averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an accounting of Capitol Sawmills Corporation,
Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right whatsoever in these
businesses that would entitle them to an accounting thereof. Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted by
them as a loan and not as their share in Hagonoy Lumber.13
With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that petitioner,
as one of the compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself. They
claimed that, despite repeated demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to
deliver her share therein. They then prayed that respondent make an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver to
petitioner her one-sixth (1/6) share thereof, which was estimated to be worth not less than P500,000.00.14
In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, became the sole owner of Hagonoy
Lumber when the heirs executed the Deed of Partition on December 8, 1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber
when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.15
Defendants, in their reply,16 countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were
not true and valid agreements and do not express the real intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper
arrangements which were prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and binding
agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs.17
During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination,
respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese
citizens. He narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu Pieng,

and that his father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According to respondent, when he was in high school,
it was his father who managed the business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, managed
Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high
school, but he stopped when he got married and found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is
operating.18
On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to
the other stockholders on January 1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of
Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua
Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990. 19
On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he
received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a
separate receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela. Although he maintains
several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from
any of them. He kept the amount in the house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market. 20
On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to cardio vascular and respiratory failure.21
On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgement ordering defendant Concepcion Chua Gaw
to pay the [respondent] the following:
1. P200,000.00 representing the principal obligation with legal interest from judicial demand or the institution of the complaint
on November 19, 1991;
2. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
3. Costs of suit.
The defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed for being devoid of merit.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC held that respondent is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. It noted that respondent personally
issued Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her husband upon their request to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court
concluded that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the respondent from his own funds and not remunerations for services
rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor petitioners advance share in the profits of their parents businesses.
The trial court further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of
ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was never impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the
originals of the documents, petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged her
signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not
been put in issue, the non-presentation of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its
contents. Also, the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately, petitioner failed to establish her right to
demand an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the delivery of her 1/6 share therein.
As for petitioners claim that an accounting be done on Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood Industries, the trial court held
that respondent is under no obligation to make such an accounting since he is not charged with operating these enterprises.23
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1) when it considered the amount of P200,000.00 as a loan
obligation and not Concepcions share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the defendant,
plaintiffs testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and (3)
when it considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the owner of
Hagonoy Lumber.24
On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. 25 The appellate court found baseless the petitioners argument that the
RTC should not have included respondents testimony as part of petitioners evidence. The CA noted that the petitioner went on a
fishing expedition, the taking of respondents testimony having taken up a total of eleven hearings, and upon failing to obtain favorable
information from the respondent, she now disclaims the same. Moreover, the CA held that the petitioner failed to show that the inclusion
of respondents testimony in the statement of facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims. In fact,
the CA noted that the facts testified to by respondent were deducible from the totality of the evidence presented.

The CA likewise found untenable petitioners claim that Exhibits "H" (Deed of Sale) and Exhibit "I" (Deed of Partition) were merely
temporary paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was uncorroborated
she should have presented the other heirs to attest to the truth of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted the due execution of the
said documents. Since petitioner did not dispute the due execution and existence of Exhibits "H" and "I", there was no need to produce
the originals of the documents in accordance with the best evidence rule.26
On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.27
Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following errors:
I. THAT ON THE PRELIMINARY IMPORTANT RELATED ISSUE, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN
COMMITTED IN THE APPLICATION AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE ON EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE PARTY
OR HOSTILE WITNESS UNDER SECTION 10 (d) AND (e) OF RULE 132, CAUSING SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE LOWER
COURTS APPEALED DECISIONS OBJECTIVITY, ANNEX "C".
II. THAT ON THE IMPORTANT LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING CLAIMS OF
RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED UNDER THE
LOWER COURTS DECISION ANNEX "C" AND THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX "A") AND THE
RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX "B") IN DEVIATING FROM AND DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ENJOINING COURTS NOT TO OVERLOOK OR MISINTERPRET IMPORTANT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND WHICH ARE OF GREAT
WEIGHT AND VALUE, WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE RESULT OF THE CASE AND ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND
OBJECTIVE DECISION. (Citations omitted)
III. THAT FINALLY, AS TO THE OTHER LEGAL IMPORTANT ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP OF THE
"Hagonoy Lumber" FAMILY BUSINESS, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED ON THE
REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE "BEST EVIDENCE RULE" UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.28
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents testimony as adverse witness
during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited
during cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. She contends that the examination of respondent
as adverse witness did not make him her witness and she is not bound by his testimony, particularly during cross-examination by his
own counsel.29 In particular, the petitioner avers that the following testimony of the respondent as adverse witness should not be
considered as her evidence:
(11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became owner of the "HAGONOY LUMBER" business when he bought the same from
Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990 (EXH.H);
(11.b) That the "HAGONOY LUMBER," on the other hand, was acquired by the sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of
Extrajudicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a Co-Heir (EXH. I);
(11.c) That the 3 lots on which the "HAGONOY LUMBER" business is located were acquired by Lu Pieng from the Santos
family under the Deed of Absolute Sale (EXH. J); that Lu Pieng sold the Lots to Chua Suy Lu in 1976 (EXHS. K, L, & M.); that
Chua Siok Huan eventually became owner of the 3 Lots; and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan sold them to RESPONDENT-Appellee
(EXHS. Q and P); that after he acquired the 3 Lots, he has not sold them to anyone and he is the owner of the lots.30
We do not agree that petitioners case was prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents testimony during cross-examination
as her evidence.
If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondents testimony as adverse witness during crossexamination by his own counsel, it constitute a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.
In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the other is only significant in determining
whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the
burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is
that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely
matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence presented by
both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.31

That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be bound by the formers testimony. The
fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party
may impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, 32 except by evidence of his bad
character.33 Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the witness
veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.34
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only in the sense that he may contradict
him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. 35 A rule that provides that the party
calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight,
but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. 36 This, the petitioner failed
to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber
became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property
to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the
transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did
not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a
claim over the business.
Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented. 37 All the parties to the case,
therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. 38 As already mentioned, in arriving
at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this
light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded
the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper
weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.
Significantly, the RTCs finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her husband as a loan is supported by the
evidence on record. Hence, we do not agree with the petitioners contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight
and value in arriving at its decision. The RTC merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be more credible than the selfserving and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court are
accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court. Only errors of law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.39 A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record. 40 There is no reason to
apply the exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court.
These findings are buttressed by the evidence on record. Moreover, the issues and errors alleged in this petition are substantially the
very same questions of fact raised by petitioner in the appellate court.
On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. 41 A
check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a loan transaction. 42 It is pure naivet to insist that an entrepreneur who has
several sources of income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any reason to borrow any amount.
The petitioners allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. It is true
that Hagonoy Lumber was originally owned by the parents of petitioner and respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs
freely renounced and waived in favor of their sister Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein, as shown by the
Deed of Partition which the petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor of
Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when the respondent delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua Sioc Huan
was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and respondent no longer had any interest in the business
enterprise; neither had a right to demand a share in the profits of the business. Respondent became the sole owner of Hagonoy
Lumber only after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on August 1, 1990. So, when the respondent delivered to the petitioner the
P200,000.00 check on June 7, 1988, it could not have been given as an advance on petitioners share in the business, because at that
moment in time both of them had no participation, interest or share in Hagonoy Lumber. Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was
an advance on the petitioners share in the profits of the business, it was highly unlikely that the respondent would deliver a check
drawn against his personal, and not against the business enterprises account.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The
notarization of a private document converts it into a public document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.43 It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. 44 A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due execution,
and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given
full force and effect absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects
recognized by law.45 A public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is, generally, evidence of the
facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner.46

Petitioner, however, maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in
violation of the best evidence rule. In addition, petitioner insists that the Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations
between a true seller and buyer.
The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,47 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or
exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original. 48 Moreover, production
of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.49
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either
deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due
execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.50 As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its
genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules. 51 The petitioner merely
claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.52 Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges
that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best
evidence of the intention of the parties.53 The parties intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the
unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract. 54 Thus, when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.55
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated
May 23, 2003 and Resolution dated December 2, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SALUN-AT
MARQUEZ
and
NESTOR
DELA
CRUZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO
ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express
the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and
subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a
contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,2 as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, the instant petition for
review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,]
Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.4
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn,
contained the following dispositive portion:
Accordingly, judgment is rendered:

1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096
(formerly TCT No. 43258);
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz
respectively, as they are disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property;
3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary, herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez
under reasonable terms and conditions;
4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per
hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents] plus such accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly
accounted for with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby
instructed to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts and;
5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until otherwise modified or dissolved by the
appellate body.
SO ORDERED.5
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is
located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi
Fernandez (Nemi)6 (who is the husband7 of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners
Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).8
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to
pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the
Murong property. It contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the
northwest by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination 0131 E. Points
referred to are marked on plan H-176292. Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March 1913. Note: All corners are
Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.9
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W., 1150.21 m. from BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of 2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the
northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land; and on the northwest by Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination
0 deg. 31E., points referred to are marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in
accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913

and approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I.
Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.10
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag Townsite, K-27," without any reference to either Barangay Lantap
or Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale 11 described the property sold
as follows:
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of land, situated in the
Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and more particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and
SW by Public Land; and on the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearing true.
Declination 013 B. Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292.
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple in accordance with the Land Registration Act, its
title thereto being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the
title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that
respondents took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued to be the tenants
of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi
(husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap
property -- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994.12
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20 13 and 2114 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, 15 executed separate Deeds of
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described
the subject thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title
corresponding to the Lantap property).16
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez 17 and Dela Cruz18 on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated
that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong. 19 The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds
of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and almost seven years after the
execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint 20 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in
favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was
based on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the
1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096,
which pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer21 and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that
they have always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong property, bought the same
from RBBI upon the honest belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the
Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap
property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied
committing a grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with
the rural banking rules and regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision23
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096
appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of
sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to
the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular
description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere
typographical error.

Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they
were disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to
execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong property is to remain as the tenants thereof
after the execution of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision24
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs
issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR
field personnel were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners,
the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents admission that
petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their
allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the
Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with
their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of the Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs issued to appellants as they are by operation of
law qualified beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with the CARP
program implementation; and finally, the Board declares that all controverted claims to or against the subject landholding must be
completely and finally laid to rest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed decision is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby
rendered, declaring:
1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-tillers over the Murong property and therefore
they are the qualified beneficiaries thereof;
2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez
and Nestor Dela Cruz respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and
legal;
3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold contract with bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over
the Lantap property, [the latter] being the subject matter of the buy back arrangement entered into between [respondents] and
Rural Bank of Bayombong, Incorporated, and other incidental matters are deemed resolved.
SO ORDERED.25
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the
petitioners were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers indicated in their respective deeds of
conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the
property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs
say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property.
Respondents added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to their
lack of qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of
Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of
Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property that the
respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs
is the Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to
be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the
subject property since the same particularly describes the properties metes and bounds.

Both the RBBI26 and petitioners27 filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were separately denied.28
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this Court. 29 RBBI raised
the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean hands because they misled RBBI to believe
at the time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free from any liability to the parties as
it did not enrich itself at anyones expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the
petition for lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.30
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.31 Entry of judgment was made in that case on December 15, 2004.32
On July 27, 2005,33 petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari, which assailed the same CA Decision
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond the province of Rule 45.34
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of their evidence (as to the
contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal
question that is within the Courts authority to review.35
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule that a petition for review should raise
only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are "(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings,
the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record."36
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the
facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the disparate
rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.
First
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal

Issue

Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition

for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the appellate courts decision in favor of the
respondents.37

We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to convincingly demonstrate
the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in the appellate courts decision but
simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the
properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with
clean hands.
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It is the appellants responsibility to
point out the perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the "clean hands"
doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not
swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and
necessarily mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants inadequate discussion,
ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who were not parties to RBBIs appeal,
especially because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and effectively present their arguments. A party
cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just because another party had already appealed ahead of him, 38 or just
because the other partys separate appeal had already been dismissed.39
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of
petitioners prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already
divested itself of its title to the two properties involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. 40 Thus, when the vendor
(in this case RBBI) has already transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment
which may be rendered against the vendor.41
Second
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?

Issue

Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best
evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered
by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the property repurchased by the respondents was the Murong property.
Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property
then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the
Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the
parties that was not adequately expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be
applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected
tampering with the document.42
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of
the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the
petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in
Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties.
As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of
the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true
intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to "Barangay Murong" was a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners
claim that the reference to "Barangay Murong" reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error.
This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the
true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on
the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was
the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.43

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the
terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to
look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to
the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties
to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically
provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule
may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question,
and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.44
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836
(Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being located in "Barangay Murong." Even the respondents Deed of
Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), but RBBI contended that
the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true
intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties respective parol evidence, in
order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties
that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, 45 not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To
hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it
was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those whose language he is to interpret.1wphi1
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents,
while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties.
Third issue
Determining
the
regarding the subjects of their contracts

intention

of

the

parties

We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property, and not the
Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that could show
that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the Murong property.
As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any

objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the
respondents.
Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property, there is one other circumstance that
convinces us that what respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is
the farmer actually tilling the Lantap property, without turning over the supposed landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that
the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses
Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their
obligations as supposed tenants of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory propounded by
the respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was the Murong
property, and not the Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already the tenant-farmers of the
Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong property and no other was
the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs,
petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying and tilling it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently,
after the petitioners completed their payment of the total purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) officials conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, did not reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong property and were the
qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the land in
Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong property, undisturbed by anyone for several long years,
until respondents started the controversy in 1997.
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position that the subject of their contract
(VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no contrary evidence of the parties actuations to
indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap
property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched
considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular
barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the
detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true
intention by asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract. 46 A cause of action for the reformation of a
contract only arises when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the
parties.47 It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners)
never had any dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong property
(and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that the issue
became relevant for the first time.
All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT
No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling against RBBI should not be executed as such execution would be
inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the CAs decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the
dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the
execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the
DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is
directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to death by the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch 109, in Criminal Case
No. 01-1311, for rape committed against six-year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the eldest among the six children of Conrado and Metchie Bertiz. 3 She was six years
and nine months old when the rape was committed on August 7, 2001.
On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in Manlunas St., Lagoon Area, Villamor Airbase, PasayCity, taking care of
her younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene, while her father was out. On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant went to
the victim's house and asked her to lie down on her father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her clothes and his own
clothes, then forced her to lie down on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain
which startled the appellant who sprayed her with tear gas and left.4
Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what had happened. She immediately reported the incident to
the barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital for medical examination. She also sought
assistance from the police at the 521st Air Police Squadron who, after gathering information from the victim, arrested the appellant at
his house.5 Alpha Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at CampCrame the following day,6 and on August 10, 2001, to the
Child Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH7 for further medical examinations, which both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations,
respectively, on the victim's genitalia.8
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape before the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay City, Metro , Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, GENARO CAYABYAB Y FERNANDEZ, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously by means of force
and intimidation have carnal knowledge of ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y JONGCO, a minor six (6) years of age, against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that on August 7, 2001, he was plying his normal route inside the Villamor
Airbase as a tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. 10 After returning the tricycle to its owner Roberto Gabo at the corner of 14th
and 15th Sts., Villamor Airbase, he reached home at around 7:30 p.m and went to sleep after eating dinner. 11 At around 9:30 p.m., he
woke up to urinate at the back of their house when three (3) policemen arrested and mauled him. 12 At the headquarters, he was forced
to admit the rape13 while the victim's father asked for money in exchange for his release, which he refused.14
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent with the medical
findings of the doctors from the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH. Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim. Finally, it appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of minority and imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez
beyond reasonable doubt for rape as defined and penalized under Article 335, paragraph 3 and 4 as the victim herein is only six (6)
years old and hereby sentence accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez to DEATH and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php
75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.15
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo16 modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals,17 which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED in toto, and accordingly certifies the case and
elevate the entire records to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to Rule124, Section 13[a] of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
SO ORDERED.18
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court. There is no doubt that appellant raped Alpha Jane on August 7, 2001 inside their house at Villamor Airbase, PasayCity.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence 19 which appellate courts can rely on because

of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and crossexamination by counsel.
On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the incident and positively identified appellant as her assailant, thus:
Fiscal Barrera:
Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were you?
A. I was inside our house.
Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about you mother and father where were they on that date and time?
A. My mother bought gas while my father was 'naglalakad ng spray gun for painting.
Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. while your mother bought gas and your father was walking with his
spray gun used for painting?
A. My brothers and sisters.
Q. While in your house on said date and time do you know of any unusual incident that happened to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to you?
A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what happened next?
A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.
Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?
A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two.
Q. After that what else happened?
A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.
Q. Did you follow him?
A. No, sir, I did not follow.
Q. And so what else happened?
A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he removed my shorts and panty.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty, what happened?
A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.
Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?
A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.

Fiscal Barrera:
What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis to your private part?
A. I shouted, sir.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your vagina and you shouted, what happened?
A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me.
Q. Then what happened?
A. 'Tinergas niya ako.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?
A. I run away.
Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you report it to your mother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your house and removed your shorts and panty and thereafter inserted his penis inside
your vagina on August 7, 2001 can you point at him if you see him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is he inside the courtroom?
Interpreter:
Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Genaro Cayabyab.20
Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the victim's father, Alpha Jane remained steadfast and
consistent that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the medico-legal
experts from the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH, to wit:
ANO-GENITAL
EXAMINATION
Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5 oclock, Type of Hymen: Anullar
...
IMPRESSIONS
Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma.
(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records)
Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5 oclock and laceration at 5 oclock are synonymous (TSN,
November 20, 2001, p. 6). Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior injury to the victim's hymen which might have been caused
by the insertion of a blunt object such as an erected penis which was compatible with the victim's claim that she had been raped (TSN,
November 20, 2001, pp. 6-7).21

The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.

Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7) years old', is a dastardly and repulsive crime which merit no less than the
penalty of death pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. This special qualifying circumstance of age must be specifically
pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of death cannot be imposed.
In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of conflicting pronouncements concerning the appreciation of minority, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were a number of cases where no birth certificate was presented where the
Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved.23 On the other hand, there were also several cases where we ruled that the
age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended
party to prove her age.24 Thus, in order to remove any confusion, we set in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as
an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show
the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if
clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the
victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.25
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their
absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified
true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient
under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's
mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as the baptismal certificate of the victim was presented to prove
her age. The trial court based its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when she was raped on the Medico-Legal Report, and the fact that
the defense did not contest her age and questioned her qualification to testify because of her tender age. It was however noted that the
Medico-Legal Report never mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother was presented to establish Lizette's age. The
Court found that there was uncertainty as to the victim's exact age, hence, it required that corroborative evidence, such as her birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying
circumstance of 'below seven (7) years old is appreciated.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years old at the time she was raped,
based not only on the testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth
certificate. It is well to note that the defense did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the
same 'as to fact of birth.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that
the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority, for
said photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly,
therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its
contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.27
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having
failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence,
and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.28
In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on November 26, 1994, when
the rape incident happened on August 7, 2001.
Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence that if
the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty by applicable amendatory laws, the accused
should be ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages is distinct from exemplary
damages, hence must be awarded separately. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such award.29 However, the award of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.30 As regards exemplary damages, we held in People v. Catubig31 that the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Conformably, we award the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, as affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00258, finding appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and imposing the penalty of DEATH33 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to
pay the victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

MANILA
MINING
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUEL TAN, doing business under the name and style of MANILA MANDARIN MARKETING, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution 2 dated February 24,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84385. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the Decision 3 dated October 27, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Manila, in Civil Case No. 01-101786.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical
materials.

From August 19 to November 26, 1997, Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan
valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum,
and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorneys fees equal to 25% of the claim.4
MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of
P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices.5
On September 3, 2001, Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC.6
After Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence. 7 On December 18, 2003, the RTC issued an Order,
denying the demurrer and directing MMC to present evidence.8
MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office
procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence
of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMCs representatives.9
On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMCs account. De los Santos testified that he
delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMCs accounting department. As proof, he showed three customers
acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:
I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period and the amount stated below, together
with the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing
acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.10
On October 27, 2004, the RTC ruled for Tan. Its ruling stated as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, ordering the
defendant to pay the principal amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTYFOUR PESOS (P1,883,244.00), with interest thereon at the rate of eighteen [percent] (18%) per annum starting after thirty (30) days
from each date of delivery of the merchandise sold until finality hereof, and thereafter, at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
and the further sum equal to [twenty five percent] (25%) of the principal amount as liquidated damages.
SO ORDERED.11
On November 30, 2004, MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 2005.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated December
20, 2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the RTC dated October 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this petition, which raises as sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PAY HAD ALREADY LEGALLY ACCRUED CONSIDERING THAT
RESPONDENT HAS NOT FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE PREREQUISITES FOR PAYMENT IMPOSED UNDER PETITIONERS
PURCHASE ORDERS, THERE BEING NO PROOF THAT RESPONDENT HAD ACTUALLY DONE SO.13
Simply stated, we are now called upon to address the question of whether MMC should pay for the electrical materials despite its
allegation that Tan failed to comply with certain requisites for payment.
Petitioner contends that respondents claim for payment was premature inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were
not sent to its accounting department. Consequently, Tans claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of
the goods did not automatically give rise to its obligation to pay. It relies on Article 1545 of the Civil Code to justify its refusal to pay:
ART. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may
refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.
Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial. MMC claims that the unauthenticated
photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule,14 which requires the production of the original

writing in court. It adds that by Tans failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under
Section 3(e),15 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
In its Memorandum dated February 20, 2007, 16 petitioner refutes any liability altogether, denying that it consented to the sale. MMC
maintains that the unmarked documents indicated a mere offer to sell, which it did not act upon. MMC also charges Tan with laches for
filing his claim nearly four years after the transaction.
In his Memorandum dated January 30, 2007, 17 respondent Tan counters that the petition presents a factual issue which has already
been settled by the Court of Appeals. He stresses that findings of fact by the appellate court are conclusive on the Supreme Court and
only questions of law may be entertained by it.
After serious consideration, we are in agreement that the petition lacks merit.
Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power to review. This Courts jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing
errors of law that may have been committed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are accorded not only
respect but even finality, and are binding on this Court. Barring a showing that the findings complained of were devoid of support, they
must stand. For this Court is not expected or required to examine or refute anew the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is admittedly in a better
position to assess their credibility.18 We cannot weigh again the merits of their testimonies.
Having thoroughly reviewed the records of this case, we find no persuasive much less compelling reason to overturn the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and appellate court. We hereby sustain their findings and conclusions.
Worth stressing, Article 1475 of the Civil Code provides the manner by which a contract of sale is perfected:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price.1avvphi1
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of
contracts.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied the electrical materials to MMC. 19 Hence, petitioner
cannot evade its obligation to pay by claiming lack of consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of
the transactions.
As regards respondents failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best evidence rule applies only if the
contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary
evidence may be introduced in proof.20 MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that
Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of the documents were
admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between the parties.
Neither is there merit to petitioners contention that respondent was guilty of delay in filing the collection case. A careful examination of
the records shows that Tan brought suit against MMC less than a year after the latter stopped making partial payments. Tan is,
therefore, not guilty of laches.
Laches is the neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
adverse party, operates as bar in a court of equity.21 Here, Tan had no reason to go to court while MMC was paying its obligation, even
if partially, under the contracts of sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 20, 2005 and Resolution dated February 24,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84385 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
NISSAN
NORTH
EDSA
operating
under
the
name
MOTOR
CARRIAGE,
vs.
UNITED PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

INC.,

Petitioner,

The Case
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
80580. The challenged decision affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 200, Las Pias City, in Civil
Case No. LP-02-0265 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 79, Las Pias City, in Civil Case No.
4542.
The Facts
Respondent United Philippine Scout Veterans Detective and Protective Agency (United) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of providing security services.4 In 1993, it entered into a contract for security services with petitioner 5 Nissan North Edsa
(Nissan), and beginning 23 April 1993, it was able to post 18 security guards within Nissans compound located in EDSA Balintawak,
Quezon City.6
In the morning of 31 January 1996, Nissan informed United, through the latters General Manager, Mr. Ricarte Galope (Galope), that its
services were being terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day.7 Galope personally pleaded with the personnel manager of Nissan to
reconsider its decision.8 When Nissan failed to act on this verbal request, Galope wrote a Letter 9 dated 5 February 1996, addressed to
Nissans general manager, formally seeking a reconsideration of its action. As this was likewise ignored, Uniteds President and
Chairman of the Board wrote a Letter 10 dated 27 February 1996, addressed to Nissans President and General Manager, demanding
payment of the amount equivalent to thirty (30) days of service in view of Nissans act of terminating Uniteds services without observing
the required 30-day prior written notice as stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.
As a result of Nissans continued failure to comply with Uniteds demands, the latter filed a case for Sum of Money with damages before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City.
In its Answer, Nissan maintained that the above-mentioned paragraph 17 of the service contract expressly confers upon either party the
power to terminate the contract, without the necessity of a prior written notice, in cases of violations of the provisions thereof. 11 Nissan
alleged that United violated the terms of their contract, thereby allowing Nissan to unilaterally terminate the services of United without
prior notice.12
It appears that on 3 November 1995, Uniteds night supervisor and night security guard did not report for duty. 13 This incident was the
subject of a Memorandum issued by Nissans security officer to Uniteds officer-in-charge stationed at its security detachment. 14 Then,
on 16 January 1996, at noontime, the security supervisor assigned at Nissans premises abandoned his post. 15 Although the general
manager of United directed the immediate replacement of its security supervisor,16 Nissan nevertheless claimed that its premises had
been exposed to threats in security, which allegedly constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of the service contract.17
On 6 April 2001, Nissans counsel withdrew his appearance in the case with Nissans conformity. Despite the directive of the trial court
for Nissan to hire another lawyer, no new counsel was engaged by it. Accordingly, the case was submitted for decision on the basis of
the evidence adduced by respondent United.18
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its Decision dated 31 July 2002, the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of herein respondent United. The trial court pronounced
that Nissan has not adduced any evidence to substantiate its claim that the terms of their contract were violated by United; and that
absent any showing that violations were committed, the 30-day prior written notice should have been observed.19
It thus rendered judgment as follows:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff as follows:
1. The sum of P108,651.00 plus legal interest from February 1, 1996 until fully paid as actual damages;
2. The sum of P20,000.000 as exemplary damages;
3. The sum of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and other litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of suit.20
Nissan appealed to the Regional Trial Court, questioning the award of actual and exemplary damages, as well as the directive to pay
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. It alleged that there was no evidence to support the award of actual damages, as the service
contract, upon which the amount of the award was based, was never presented nor offered as evidence in the trial. 21 Furthermore, no
evidence was adduced to show bad faith on the part of Nissan in unilaterally terminating the contract, making the award of exemplary
damages improper.22

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated 10 June 2003, the Regional Trial Court declared the appeal without merit as "there appears no cogent reason to
reverse the findings and rulings of the lower court."23 It denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Trial Court but the same was denied in an Order 24 dated 15
October 2003.
Nissan further went on an appeal to the Court of Appeals, citing the same assignment of errors it presented before the Regional Trial
Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The 14 February 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision dated 10 June 2003 and the 15 October 2003 Order of
the Regional Trial Court, with the modification that the award for exemplary damages was deleted. The Court of Appeals held that the
breach of contract was not done by Nissan in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.25
Nissan sought reconsideration of the decision affirming the judgment of the lower court but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution26 promulgated on 24 August 2007.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Petitioner Nissan insists that no judgment can properly be rendered against it, as respondent United failed, during the trial of the case,
to offer in evidence the service contract upon which it based its claim for sum of money and damages. As a result, the decisions of the
lower courts were mere postulations.27 Nissan asserts that the resolution of this case calls for the application of the best evidence rule.28
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit. We thus sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Nissans reliance on the best evidence rule is misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of
evidence to prove a disputed fact.29 However, the same applies only when the contents of a document are the subject of the inquiry.30 In
this case, the contents of the service contract between Nissan and United have not been put in issue. Neither United nor Nissan
disputes the contents of the service contract; as in fact, both parties quoted and relied on the same provision of the contract (paragraph
17) to support their respective claims and defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no application here.
The real issue in this case is whether or not Nissan committed a breach of contract, thereby entitling United to damages in the amount
equivalent to 30 days service.
We rule in the affirmative.
At the heart of the controversy is paragraph 17 of the service contract, which reads:
However, violations committed by either party on the provisions of this Contract shall be sufficient ground for the termination of this
contract, without the necessity of prior notice, otherwise a thirty (30) days prior written notice shall be observed. 31
Nissan argues that the failure of Uniteds security guards to report for duty on two occasions, without justifiable cause, constitutes a
violation of the provisions of the service contract, sufficient to entitle Nissan to terminate the same without the necessity of a 30-day
prior notice.
We hold otherwise.
As the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City stated in its decision, Nissan did not adduce any evidence to substantiate its claim that
the terms of the contract were violated by United.1avvphi1
What Nissan failed to do is to point out or indicate the specific provisions of the service contract which were violated by United as a
result of the latters lapses in security. In so failing, Nissans act of unilaterally terminating the contract constitutes a breach thereof,
entitling United to collect actual damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 14 February 2007 and the Resolution dated 24 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80580 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ARMANDO PADILLA y NICOLAS, Appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00571 which affirmed, with
modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 166-M-96, 2 finding
appellant Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of Death. The CA found appellant guilty of Qualified Rape and likewise imposed on him the penalty of Death. It reduced the
awards for civil indemnity from P100,000.00 to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. In addition, the
CA awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Consistent with the Court's decision in People v. Cabalquinto,3 the real name of the rape victim in this case is withheld and, instead,
fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to establish or
compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
The facts of the case, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:
Around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1994, AAA was inside their house located at Marilao, Bulacan. 4 With her were her
father, herein appellant, her two older brothers and her sister BBB.5 She was then staying in one of the rooms because she was
suffering from asthma and was taking medicine through the help of her sister, BBB. 6 On the other hand, her brothers were already
asleep in another room.7 After AAA took her medicine, appellant told BBB to sleep outside the room where AAA was staying. 8 When
BBB went outside, appellant turned off the light and proceeded to their kitchen. 9 Thereafter, appellant returned to the room where AAA
was staying.10 He then took off AAA's clothes and also removed his. 11 He went on top of AAA and tried to insert his penis into her
vagina.12 AAA resisted but appellant held her hands and boxed her left thigh twice. 13 She was then rendered weak enabling appellant to
successfully insert his organ inside her vagina. 14 AAA felt pain, after which her vagina bled. 15 While appellant's penis was inside her
vagina, he made push and pull movements. 16 She pleaded with appellant to stop but to no avail. 17 It was in the course of her struggle
against appellant's advances that she called on her sister for help. 18 Thereafter, she felt something come out of his penis. 19 Appellant
withdrew his penis from her vagina but remained on top of her and even began touching her breast. 20 It was during that compromising
position that BBB entered the room and saw them. 21 Appellant immediately gathered his clothes and went to the comfort room. 22
Thereafter, AAA cried while BBB handed her clothes to her.23 They then slept beside each other.24
AAA did not complain nor tell her brothers about her ordeal because she was afraid as she was threatened by appellant that he will hurt
them and burn their house if she relates the incident to them. 25 It was only in October 1995 that she was able to tell her aunt about her
experience in the hands of appellant.26 Subsequently, her aunt accompanied her to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) where they filed a complaint against appellant.27
On February 1, 1996, an Information 28 was filed against appellant charging him before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of
statutory rape, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Marilao, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs
have carnal knowledge of said AAA, a minor who is 11 years old, against her will.
All contrary to law with an aggravating circumstance that the accused is the legitimate father of AAA. 29
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.30 Pre-trial conference followed.31 Thereafter, trial ensued.
On November 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision,32 the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Armando Padilla y Nicolas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory
Rape described and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 7659 otherwise referred to as the Death
Penalty Law, and hereby sentences him the capital penalty of DEATH.

The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party AAA damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and to pay exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to deter other sex perverts from sexually assaulting hapless and innocent girls especially their
kin.
In passing, Justice Vicente Abad Santos once remarked there should be a special place in hell for child molesters. The accused
deserves a deeper pit because the child he molested was his own daughter. More than anyone else, it was he to whom the child would
have looked up for
the protection of her chastity. He cynically betrayed that faith with his unnatural lechery.
SO ORDERED.33
In an Order34 dated November 6, 2001, the RTC directed the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court and likewise
ordered the commitment of the accused to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
Pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in People v. Mateo,35 which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.36
After a review of the case, the CA affirmed, with modification, the decision of the RTC convicting the appellant. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment dated November 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 15 in Criminal Case No. 166-M-96 finding Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty of Qualified Rape and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.37
The case was then elevated to this Court for review.
In a Resolution38 dated July 19, 2005, the parties were required to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire. However, both parties manifested that they are not filing their supplemental briefs as their positions in the present case had
been thoroughly expounded in their respective appeal briefs which were forwarded to the CA. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for deliberation.
Appellant assigned the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
APPLYING THE PRUNA GUIDELINES, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY PROVE THE MINORITY OF THE COMPLAINANT
AND HER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ACCUSED.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT FOR QUALIFIED RAPE.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.39
As to the first assigned error, appellant avers that the death penalty may not be imposed because the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship were not properly alleged and proved by the prosecution.
The Court agrees in part.
The first issue is whether or not the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged by the prosecution.
It is clear from the Information that AAA was alleged to be a minor who was aged eleven (11) at the time of the commission of the crime
and that the accused is her father. Contrary to the prosecution's asseveration, it does not matter that the private complainant's
relationship with the accused was denominated as an "aggravating circumstance" and not as a "special qualifying circumstance."

The Court has repeatedly held, even after the amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, 40 that qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. 41 The
Court has repeatedly qualified cases of rape where the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically alleged in
the Information even without the use of the descriptive words "qualifying" or "qualified by." 42 In the instant case, the fact that AAA's
relationship with appellant was described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying" does not take the Information out of the purview of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC ), as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659), 43 which was the
prevailing law at the time of the commission of the offense. Article 335 does not use the words "qualifying" or "aggravating" in
enumerating the circumstances that qualify rape so as to make it a heinous crime punishable by death. It merely refers to the
enumerated circumstances as "attendant circumstances." The specific allegation of the attendant circumstances in the Information,
coupled with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections 8 44 and 945 of
Rule 110, are sufficient to warn appellant that the crime charged is qualified rape punishable by death.
In the present case, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically alleged in the Information. These
allegations are sufficient to qualify the offense of rape.
The next question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove appellant's relationship with AAA as well as the latter's
minority.
As to AAAs relationship with appellant, the Court agrees that the prosecution was able to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The
Information alleged that appellant is the father of AAA. Appellant, in turn, admitted during trial that AAA is her daughter. 46 Under
prevailing jurisprudence, admission in open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove
relationship with the victim.47
However, with respect to AAA's minority, the settled rule is that there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other
than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by appellant. 48 The victim's original or duly certified birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age. 49 In the instant case, aside from the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with appellant's absence of denial, no independent substantial evidence was presented
to prove the age of AAA. Neither was it shown by the prosecution that the said documents had been lost, destroyed, unavailable or
were otherwise totally absent.
Anent appellants failure to object to the testimony of AAA, regarding her age, the Court has held that the failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding the rape victims age shall not be taken against him. 50 Even the appellant's implied
admission of the victim's age, in the absence of any supporting independent evidence, may not be considered sufficient to prove her
age. In People v. Biong,51 the appellant testified as to the exact date when her daughter, the complainant, was born. However, the Court
held that appellant's testimony falls short of the quantum of proof required to establish her age. As the qualifying circumstance of
minority alters the nature of the crime of rape and increases the penalty thereof, it must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as
the crime itself.52 In the present case, the Court agrees with appellant that the prosecution failed to discharge this burden.
Coming to the second assigned error, appellant questions the credibility of the victim, AAA, arguing that his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent should take precedence over the unfounded claim of AAA that he raped her.
It is settled that to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.53
Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim's testimony.54 The settled rule is that
the trial courts conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times
even finality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower court overlooked or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.55
Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a much
better position to decide the question of credibility.56 Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the
appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.57 No such facts or circumstances exist in the present case.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA are in agreement that AAAs account of her ordeal in the hands of her father was categorical and
straightforward.
Appellant contends that AAA had a grudge against him and, aside from that, she was influenced and even instigated by her aunt, Elena
Manahan, to file the complaint against appellant because of the bitterness that Elena feels towards him. According to the appellant, this
bitterness was brought about by a misunderstanding between him and Elena involving money entrusted to the latter by his wife which
was supposed to be used for the construction of apartments. 58 However, appellant's claim deserves scant consideration. The Court
finds it incredible for private complainant to trump up a charge of rape against appellant on the simple reason that she has a grudge

against the latter or that she was influenced by her aunt who harbors resentment against him. No woman would cry rape, allow an
examination of
her private parts, subject herself to humiliation, go through the rigors of public trial and taint her good name if her claim were not true. 59
Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motive on the part of the victim would not destroy the credibility reposed upon her by the RTC and the
CA because, as the Court has held, a rape victims testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having
raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.601avvphi1
Moreover, appellant's rape of private complainant was corroborated by no less than the latter's sister who is also a daughter of
appellant. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.61
In addition, AAAs subsequent acts of disclosing and complaining about her molestation to her aunt and the authorities and taking
immediate steps to subject herself to medical examination represent conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical and probable
testimony that she was in fact raped by appellant. They represent strong and compelling factors that enhance complainants credibility
as a witness.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial. Categorical and consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense
of denial.62 In the present case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify falsely against the
appellant or to implicate him falsely in the commission of the crime; hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. Accordingly, appellant's weak defense of denial cannot prosper.
The prevailing law at the time the crime was committed in 1994 was still Article 335 of the RPC as amended by Section 11 of RA 7659,
the first paragraph of which provides as follows:
When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
Paragraph 7(1) of the same Article further provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
The elements of statutory rape, of which appellant was charged are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2)
that the woman is below 12 years of age.63
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the age of AAA, much less the allegation that she was under the age of twelve when
she was raped. Thus, the Court cannot hold appellant liable for statutory rape. However, since the prosecution was able to establish,
without any objection from the defense, that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA with the use of force, he can be convicted of simple
rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. Appellant may not be convicted of rape in its qualified form, as to impose upon him the
penalty of death, considering that, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship was proven, the prosecution failed to establish
AAA's minority by independent proof.
With respect to the last assigned error, the Court agrees with the CA in awarding civil indemnity as well as moral and exemplary
damages to AAA. However, since the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity must be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00

in line with prevailing jurisprudence.64 Moreover, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or
generic, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.65
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00571 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Armando Padilla is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Simple Rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the
private complainant AAA the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and the increased
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERT
REMIENDO
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SIBLAWAN,

Petitioner,

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated November 16, 2007 and the
Resolution3 dated October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29316 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert
Remiendo y Siblawan."
The case arose from the filing of two criminal informations, both dated March 10, 2008, against petitioner Robert Remiendo y Siblawan
(Remiendo), that read
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999
That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000
That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled "not guilty" to both charges. After pretrial, a joint trial ensued before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. Both the prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence, summarized by the CA in
its Decision, to wit:
The prosecution presented the following version of facts:
The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986. At the time of the commission of the offense, she was a minor below 12 years
of age. She knew accused-appellant Robert Remiendo as he was residing near the house where her family used to stay. Sometime in
March 1997, she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant inside said house. On that day, her parents and brother left for work
after breakfast, and she was left alone in the house. Accused-appellant came in, pushed her into the room, and threatened to kill her if
she reported what happened. He undressed himself and the complainant. The latter was standing and refused to remove her panty but
she obliged when accused-appellant insisted. Then he made her lie on the bed and placed his penis in her vagina. The complainant
struggled, moved, and pushed accused-appellant. She felt pain when accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried
until accused-appellant left, but she did not shout because accused-appellant warned her not to, or else he would kick her. She put on
her clothes after accused-appellant left. Her parents arrived in the afternoon but she did not tell them what happened to her because
her mother might whip her.
Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually assaulted by accused-appellant, which took place in the house of the latter. At that
time, she was on her way to see her mother at her workplace after she had lunch. When she passed by the house of accused-

appellant, the latter pulled her into his house and brought her into his room. She cried and shouted but accused-appellant told her to
keep quiet. She struggled but was helpless because accused-appellant was stronger. They were alone in the room. Accused-appellant
removed his clothes and told her to remove her panty. Afraid, she removed her panty and was made to lie on the bed. Accusedappellant inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. She kept on moving but she could not push away accused-appellant. She
moved her shoulders and pushed accused-appellant with both hands but he was stronger. Afterwards, accused-appellant moved away
and threatened to kill her if she told anyone what happened. She responded that she would not tell anyone. Later, she executed a
sworn statement and identified accused-appellant as the person who raped her.
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera Administrative Region, physically
examined the complainant on 2 January 1998. Said medico-legal officer testified that [AAA] was thirteen (13) years old and a Grade III
pupil at Badiwan Tuba, Benguet at the time of the examination. She was four feet and eleven inches (411") tall, weighed 78 pounds,
fairly nourished, and fairly developed. She was conscious, coherent, and cooperative. She was ambulatory and had no extra-genital
injuries. Upon examination of her genital area, he found old lacerations of the hymen at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock positions, which meant
that her hymen was altered by a hard rigid instrument. The lacerations were done more than three (3) months prior to the examination.
To determine the approximate size of the object that the hymenal opening could accommodate, he inserted a test tube. The 2.5centimeter diameter of said tube was admitted with ease by the hymenal orifice. He noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the ridges
inside were smothered. The complainant told him that accused-appellant raped her. He presented a written report of his findings.
On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy conducted an examination of the mental condition of the complainant. The latter was
also scheduled for psychological examination to be conducted by Elma Buadken. The result of the examination showed that [AAA] is
suffering from psychosis and organicity. She has a below average intelligence quotient of 88, but not on the level of mental retardation.
She can perform simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her studies, she can hardly comprehend what is being taught to her. Having
psychosis means that her brain is afflicted with a disease. Her medical history showed that she suffered head and body injuries brought
about by being sideswiped by a motor vehicle sometime in 1996. She was confined in the hospital for twelve (12) days. Said injuries
substantially contributed to her present condition. Organicity, on the other hand, means that the complainant suffers from a cloud of
memory, upward rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the extremities, loss of consciousness, and epileptic seizures. Her psychosis
occurs after seizure. She is not, however, insane. During a seizure, she does not know what is going on, but afterwards she returns to
her level of consciousness. With regular medication, her seizures will be greatly minimized. During her interview, the complainant had a
seizure and the psychiatrist had to wait until her consciousness level returned. The complainant then revealed that accused-appellant
and a certain Reynoso Cera raped her. The psychiatrist opined that during the rape, she did not have a seizure because if she had, she
would not have remembered what had happened. The fact that she was able to narrate what happened and who raped her suggested
that she was on her conscious level at such time. A written report of the foregoing findings was submitted in court.
The defense presented the following version of facts:
Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that she was a friend, playmate, and neighbor of the complainant. She testified that
she and [AAA] played together and talked about their "crushes." The complainant told Lea Chiwayan that she had a crush on accusedappellant. Sometime in April or May 1997, the complainant said that her brother had molested her, and that he and his father had
sexual intercourse with her in their house in Poyopoy, Tuba. Sometime in August 1997, the complainant confided that Reynoso Cera
raped her in his house. She told Lea Chiwayan that she did not feel anything because she was used to having sexual intercourse with
brother and father. One Saturday afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the complainant were playing when they saw accused-appellant going
to the basketball court near the church. They followed him and watched a basketball game. After the game, Lea Chiwayan went home
with the others while the complainant stayed behind. A few seconds after they left, the complainant ran after them and told them that
something happened between her and accused-appellant. She said that accused-appellant pulled her towards the back of the church
and had sexual intercourse with her. The complainant later took back what she said because she was only joking. She then asked Lea
Chiwayan not to tell the accused-appellant. However, Lea Chiwayan told accused-appellant what the complainant told them. Accusedappellant confronted the complainant. He flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked her. He said, "what are you saying, why did I
do that, if I like and I do it, Ill not do it with you, you should be ashamed of yourself." He then borrowed the vehicle of a certain Junie,
started the engine, and stepped on the gas such that the fumes from the exhaust pipe were directed at the complainant. Later, Lea
Chiwayan learned that [AAA] filed a case against accused-appellant.
Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the school year 1997-1998, testified that the latter was unruly and a liar. The
complainant would pick fights and steal money from her classmates. However, the witness admitted that there was no written record in
school that she reprimanded complainant for her behavior. She knew that the complainant had an accident before.
Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-appellant was one of his drivers. He described accused-appellant as a
hardworking and industrious person. When he learned that Robert Remiendo was accused of rape, he was outraged because he knew
the daily activities of accused-appellant. The latter could not have done such act under his strict supervision.
Accused-appellant testified that he knew the complainant, as she was a townmate of his mother. In September 1996, he and his
parents were then residing in Badiwan. When the complainant figured in an accident at that time, he was the one who informed her
parents. The first time he saw the complainant was during the time when he was doing some repairs on his jitney. He saw the
complainant and her playmates go inside the jitney. He told them to alight from the vehicle. Sometime in June 1997, he again saw the
complainant and her sister playing inside the jitney. He told them to alight as they were disturbing him. On the day he was playing
basketball at the church grounds in Badiwan, Lea and Emma Chiwayan approached him and asked him if it was true that he raped
[AAA]. He asked where the latter was and went to see her. Out of anger, he borrowed the vehicle of Junie, started the engine, directed
the exhaust pipe at the complainant, and revved the engine so the smoke would go straight to her. He slapped her and said "if I would

like someone, it would not be you because there are a lot of girls better than you." During the Christmas party in Badiwan, he again saw
the complainant roaming around the dance area. He told her to get out as she irritated the people dancing. The complainant said
nothing and left the dance floor. Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and smiling. He learned that he was charged with two (2)
counts of rape when he received a subpoena issued by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in January 1998.61avvph!1
In its Joint Judgment7 dated October 27, 2004, the RTC found Remiendo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory
rape. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape as charged in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999 and in the Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 98-CR-3000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum for each count of rape.
He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity, the sum of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) by way of moral damages, and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of
exemplary damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province is directed to
immediately transfer the said accused, Robert Remiendo, to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila
after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC, modifying only the civil
liability imposed upon Remiendo. The fallo of the CA Decision reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment dated 27 October 2004 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the civil liability of accused-appellant. He
is ordered to pay the complainant, for each count of rape, the sum of (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007 Decision, but the CA denied the motion in its October 3, 2008 Resolution;
hence, this petition alleging that
(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO CONVICTING
PETITIONER OF STATUTORY RAPE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PETITIONER THE BENEFIT ACCORDED TO HIM BY
REPUBLIC ACT 9344 KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 INCREASING THE AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.10
Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape despite the purported absence of competent proof that AAA was below 12 years
old at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes. According to him, the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA offered by the prosecution
during its formal offer of exhibits was not admitted by the RTC in its Order 11 dated September 14, 1999 because "it was neither
identified by any witness, nor marked as exhibit during the trial though reserved for marking during the pretrial." He further posits that,
on the basis of the testimonies of the defense witnesses and the Elementary School Permanent Record, 12 AAA was more than 12 years
old in March and May 1997.
Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age, Remiendo then questions her credibility as a witness, claiming that she was
smiling during her testimony; and that her failure to flee from the situation, even taking off her panties herself, belies her charges of
statutory rape against him.
We disagree.
As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. Its two
elements are: (1) that the accused has carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual
congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape.13

As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim, the Court, in People v. Pruna,14 laid down the following guidelines:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives
concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.15
In this case, the prosecution offered in evidence a certified true copy of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth 16 as part of the testimonies of AAA
and her mother that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. It was reserved for marking as part of the exhibits for the prosecution, as
shown in the Pretrial Order17 dated November 16, 1998. During the trial, in order to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties agreed to
stipulate on the testimony of AAAs mother, specifically on the following facts:
1. That she is [BBB], the natural mother of [AAA], the victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 98-CR-2999 and 98-CR3000;
2. That on January 5, 1998[,] she executed an affidavit-complaint for and on behalf of her daughter which she subscribed
before NBI agent Atty. Dave Alunan; and
3. That the subject matter of her sworn statement against Reynoso Cera and Robert Remiendo is the alleged statutory rape
against [AAA].18
And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the statement that AAA was born on February 21, 1986.19
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). As such, it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child, 20 and it
does not need authentication. It can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, despite the September 14,
1999 Order, the RTC correctly appreciated the same in its Joint Judgment.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the Certificate of Live Birth was not appreciated by the RTC, the prosecution was able to establish
that AAA was below 12 years old during the two occasions of rape per the guidelines laid down in Pruna. It is significant to note that
both AAA and BBB testified that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. This fact was neither denied nor objected to by the defense. The
argument of Remiendo that the prosecution admitted in the course of trial that AAAs birthday was February 21, 1984 cannot stand. As
quoted by Remiendo in his petition
Court:
Anyway, it is stated in that document that the birth date of [AAA] was February 21, 1983. Do you agree that that is an entry there?

Pros. Suanding:
Yes, your honor. We agree, your honor.21
This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on the birth date of AAA. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case and it dispenses with proof with respect to the matter or fact
admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 22 In
this case, what was only admitted was that the entry of AAAs date of birth appearing in her school record is February 21, 1983. There
was no such admission that the said date was the correct birthday of AAA. And as between the school record and the testimonies of
AAA and her mother BBB, the latter must prevail.
As to the credibility of AAA as a witness, jurisprudence instructs us that the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.23
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, inasmuch as no young woman, especially of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being the subject
of a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.24
What is more, AAAs testimony of rape was corroborated by the NBI medico-legal examination showing healed lacerations on her
hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the consistent and forthright
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential
requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the rape
victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.25 In this case, Remiendo failed to convince us to rule otherwise.
Remiendo also posits that he should benefit from the mandate of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 9344 reads
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall be likewise exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to
an intervention program, unless he/she acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.26
Remiendo argues that the prosecution failed to establish that he acted with discernment in the commission of the crimes charged.
Thus, he claims that he should be exempt from criminal liability.
We differ. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to
prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during
the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and
shrewdness.27
Culled from the records of this case, it is manifest that Remiendo acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between right and
wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts against AAA. During the rape that occurred in March 1997, Remiendo
waited for AAA to be left alone at her house before he came, and, while doing his dastardly act, threatened to kick her should she shout
for help. In May 1997, Remiendo again ravished AAA in the room of his house when the latter passed by and, thereafter, threatened to
kill her if she told anybody about what had just happened. Per his own testimony, he knew that committing rape was wrong because he
claimed to have been enraged when he was asked by AAAs playmates if he indeed raped AAA, to the point of slapping her and revving
up the engine of a jitney and directing the smoke from the exhaust pipe towards her.

Remiendo, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, 28 and having acted with discernment, but having already
reached 21 years of age at the time of the imposition of his sentence by the trial court, his claim for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 is
rendered moot and academic in view of Section 4029 thereof which provides
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution
of judgment.
If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.30
Remiendo was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint Judgment was promulgated on October 27, 2004. Thus, at the time of the
imposition of his sentence, Remiendo was already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a child for the purposes of the
application of R.A. No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

XERXES
A.
vs.
SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR, Respondents.

ABADIANO,

Petitioner,

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 14, 2002 and its Resolution 2 dated November 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental 3 declaring respondents as the owners of the
property in question.
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession 4 of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents
against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.
Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461
issued on November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT
No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of
Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq m denominated as Lot
No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Baares; (2) 10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano
(grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando Baares. The
partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta
with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III."5
On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of
Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition.6
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over
Lot No. 1318, still in the name of Inocentes Baares and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the reconstituted title were the
Agreement of Partition and the Deed of Confirmation.7
On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Baares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back of OCT No.
RO-8211 (20461).8
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Baares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte
petition praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of
Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new
certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211

(20461) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David
Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros
Occidental.9
Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale of the portion pertaining to Ramon and
David Abadiano ever took place.10
On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on
behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C 11 to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly
evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and
bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano
in a document dated September 30, 1939.12
They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C. 13 On December 29, 1961, the heirs of Victor Garde sold their
rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C 14 to Jose Garde, who immediately took possession thereof. Jose Garde continuously planted
sugarcane on the land until he sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979.15
After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the land. Sometime in March 1982, after respondent
Jesus Martir harvested the sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon) allegedly
entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and refused to vacate despite demands to do so. The following
year, defendants Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C. 16
Further, the defendants also entered the property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B, 17 which by then had been acquired
by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father, Amando Baares.18
Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before the
then CFI of Negros Occidental.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,19 defendants denied that the subject property was ever sold by Ramon and David Abadiano, and
that, consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and
Affirmative Defenses, that the subject land still belonged to the estate of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never alienated. They
alleged further that the act of spouses Martir in planting sugarcane on the land was without Robertos consent; that Roberto had
demanded that the spouses Martir pay him reasonable rental for the land but that they had persistently refused to do so; and that
sometime in March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an agreement whereby the defendant continued to cultivate the
remaining stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the harvest of said sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed any objection thereto.
Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold
their share of the property to Victor Garde.20
After trial, the court issued a Decision21 dated June 23, 1995, ruling in favor of the spouses Martir, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus and
Lolita Martir as the true and legitimate owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre denominated as Lots 1318-B and
1318-C and ordering:
(1) That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor Xerxes Abadiano shall surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-31862 to the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental who is directed to partially cancel said title and issue new Certificate
of Title corresponding to Lots 1318-B and 1318-C in the names of the spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir;
(2) That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the plaintiffs the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos
representing the value of the sugarcanes of plaintiffs which defendants harvested and milled with SONEDCO and;
(3) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.22
The trial court rejected therein defendants contention that the Compra Y Venta was null and void because the co-owner, David
Abadiano, did not sign the same. It held that the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that the sale by a co-owner of the entire property
without the consent of the other co-owners was not null and void but that only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, making
the buyer a co-owner. The trial court also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not annotated either on the OCT or on the
reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale was not vitiated. The registration or annotation is required only to make the sale valid as to
third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that the Compra Y Venta was valid between the parties, Ramon Abadiano and Victor
Garde.

The trial court also brushed aside the defendants contention that the Compra Y Venta contained the same notarial inscription as the
Deed of Partition. It said that assuming this to be true, this may be considered an error which did not nullify the Compra Y Venta; at
most, the document would be non-registrable but still valid.
On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by David Abadiano was for the Deed of Partition and not for the Compra Y
Venta, the trial court agreed. It, however, interpreted the same to mean that David Abadiano must not have authorized his brother to sell
his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David Abadiano continued to be one of the registered owners of the property and his
heirs stepped into his shoes upon his death.
However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs (respondents) claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the court found that defendants and
intervenor, and their deceased parents, had not been in possession of their share in the property. It held that the defendants and
intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail of the many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish their right over Lot
No. 1318-C.
Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed in a Resolution dated February 11, 1997 due to
defendants failure to pay the required docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless, the records were retained for the appeal of Xerxes
Abadiano, intervenor in the trial court.
On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC in toto.23
Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the following arguments:
A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR OMISSION OF THE
FACTS, IN DISREGARDING THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ("COMPRA Y
VENTA") IS A SPURIOUS DOCUMENT
B
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES OVER REGISTERED
LAND24
The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA erred in ruling for the respondents. Accordingly, we reverse
the assailed Decision and Resolution.
It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of
respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. Further, it is not the
Courts function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented. The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing only errors of
law. Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule shall not be disturbed.25
However, this Court has consistently recognized the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.26
In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence
of evidence which is contradicted by the records.
In appreciating the alleged Compra Y Venta presented by respondents, the trial court concluded that "[t]he parties have no quarrel on
the existence of a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as representative of David
Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in favor of Victor Garde."27
The trial court erred in its conclusion.
Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants repudiation of the existence of the sale in their Answer with Counterclaim. They
stated:

2. That defendants admit plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been no particular designation of lot number (sic)
for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No. 1318 but specifically deny under oath the other allegations thereof the truth being that
the property referred to here as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners thereof as shown by the TCT No.
31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso;
3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 28 and
therefore specifically deny the same under oath the truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David Abadiano had not sold the
land at bar to anyone and that consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from the former; x x x. 29
(emphasis supplied).
Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. He alleged that the lot "had never been sold or
alienated and the same still remains intact as the property of the Intervenor and his co-owners by operation of law." 30
This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the trial, thus:
Q: During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has ever sold to any party his share on Lot No. 1318?
A: He has not sold his share.31
These statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the document. While it is true that this Court had previously ruled that
mere denials would not have sufficed to impeach the document, in this case, there was an effective specific denial as contemplated by
law in accordance with our ruling that defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the
statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it
seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.32
It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then make so sweeping a conclusion in the face of such opposition.
In light of this challenge to the very existence of the Compra Y Venta, the trial court should have first resolved the issue of the
documents authenticity and due execution before deciding on its validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even discuss this issue.
We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the case to the trial court for the determination of the purported
Compra Y Ventas authenticity and due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very issue here and now in order to put an end to this
protracted litigation.
There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of land in dispute. It is also a fact that the purported
Compra Y Venta was not annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced, even though the
deed was allegedly executed in 1922.
Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y
Venta, we find it necessary to repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the documents due
execution and authenticity, before determining its validity.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of
said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was
refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the
Register of Deeds or that respondents due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.

The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.33
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of the
exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine
its validity based on such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the
Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on
the same day, and both documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, "Assuming this to be true, same could be considered an error which did not nullify, (sic) the
Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta. At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but valid document."34
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.35
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the
same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of
regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be
proved.36
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of
evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.
Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in the negative.
Under the Property Registration Decree, 37 no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession.38 Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedings.
Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once
their title is registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system.39
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, 40 the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the
possession of his registered property by reason of laches.41
Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is
based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a
valid claim.42
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.43
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of
condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position
of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons
may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own
neglect.44
Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.45
Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not support such finding.
Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be
theirs, especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father had told
him that his (the fathers) inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, Amando Baares who knew likewise that the property was
theirs.

Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified:

Q: Before Amando Baares died, did you know that your father is a part owner of Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did you not complain to Amando Baares that your father is a pert owner of that lot?
A: No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and when he dies, the property will go back to us.46
And herein petitioner testified:
Atty. Garaygay
Q: Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed belonging (sic) to your father?
A: The uncle of my father, Amando Baares, Sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, before and after the war and during the lifetime of Amando Baares, he was the one in possession of Lot No.
1318?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot under the possession of Amando Baares was it under lease?
A: As far as I can remember, my father told me that his inheritance was with Amando Baares, his uncle.47
From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear that they were unaware of any of respondents
actions in relation to the property until the death of their grandfather, Amando Baares. When they did find out that respondents were
occupying the land, they immediately took action to occupy what they believed was still rightfully theirs.
On this point, petitioner testified, thus:
Q: When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your inheritance from your late father?
A: It was shortly after the death of Amando Baares.
Q: Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B?
A: I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to take action to possess the land which was then occupied before by our (sic) great
uncle, Amando Baares.
Q: When was that, in what year, because we do not know when did your uncle (sic) die?
A: It was after the death of Amando Baares sometime in 1973 or 1974.
Q: Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to claim the inheritance?
A: Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we understand that our late parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously tried to
take action shortly after his death, so as not to antagonize our relatives.
Q: What did you do in order to claim your inheritance?
A: Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to go to Bacolod City to seek
the intercession of the Philippine Constabulary Commander in order to thresh out the matter in a way that there will be no hostility or
adverse reaction.
Q: What other reactions did you take, if any?

A: Well, I told my brother that they have a confrontation in the Office of the PACLAP known as the Presidential Action Commission on
Land Problems.
Q: Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what other action did you personally take as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B?
A: After that confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land in question to farm it because it belongs to us.
Q: With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any, did you undertake?
A: Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and after it was approved by the Court, it was annotated at the back of
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 and we were given a co-owners copy of the said title by the Register of Deeds.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over Lot 1318-B?
A: That was on July 17, 1976.
Q: Was that before or after the plaintiffs have filed this present case?
A: That was almost 6 or 7 years before this present case was filed.48
On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Atty. Garaygay
Q: Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318. Prior to the death of your father, who was in possession of Lot
No. 1318?
Witness
A: What I know is it was Amando Baares.
Q: You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was Amando Baares who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And until when did you know that Amando Baares has been in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A: Up to 1976 when he died.
Q: After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot?
A: I made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and when I went to the said lot, it was vacant.
Q: When was that?
A: In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.49
That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Baares to try and occupy the land is understandable. They had to be
careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the family. Furthermore, they knew that their parents revered Amando. 50
The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as would amount to laches, thus:
in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between the
parties is an important circumstance for consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so strictly regarded as where the
parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are
connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.51
In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the petitioner.

When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no annotation therein was made of the Compra Y Venta
or of the Deed of Sale between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation by David
Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo Baares were annotated therein. 52 Neither does the Deed of Sale of Demetrios
share in favor of Leopoldo, executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone other than the parties to the Deed of
Partition.53
Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962 pursuant to an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was issued
in the names of Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even at the time of the issuance of said TCT,
there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor Garde, which according to respondents took place in 1922.
If respondents contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued in April 1962 in the name of Ramon and David Abadiano,
but in the name of Victor Garde or Jose Garde who by then had supposedly acquired the property by virtue of the Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Sale executed on December 29, 1961. 54 As it is, neither respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest
participated in any of the proceedings for the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT. The petitioners testimony on the
matter is revealing:
Q: Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings of the reconstitution of title of Lot 1318 or any evidence as to
the participation of the plaintiffs in this Reconstitution Petition?
A: Based on the existing records, they did not participate.
Q: How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (sic) did the plaintiffs participate therein?
A: They did not also.
Q: How about in the issuance of the new Transfer Certificate of Title, did the plaintiffs participate therein?
A: No, sir.55
Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to Victor Garde was annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On
the other hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after Amandos death to assert their
rights over the property.56
In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority to
act, sue, and/or represent them in any suit or action for recovery of possession or of whatever kind or nature. 57 For their part, the heirs
of Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to their predecessor.58
Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare assertions to support their claim that they indeed had
possession of the land through their predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to overcome the testimony that it was Amando
Baares and not Victor Garde who had possession of the property during the formers lifetime, or that after Amandos death, the lot
remained unoccupied.
In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is
most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale
for almost 60 years, have themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their name or even only to
have the sale annotated on the title of the property.
Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that respondents be made to pay actual damages of not less that
P30,000.00 plus rentals on the property from the time of the latters occupation, moral damages amounting to P100,000.00, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
The record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals on the subject property from the time of Amando Baares
death in 1976 until the time of the trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until 1985 was P3,000.00 per hectare, while
from 1985 until the time of his testimony in 1994, the rental rate was P5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule that the actual damages that
may be awarded shall be based only on these rates.59
Considering, however, that petitioners co-heirs (defendants Roberto Abandiano, et al.) were able to enter the property and harvest the
sugarcane therein in 1981 and, thereafter, the land remained unoccupied, the rent must be reckoned only from the time respondents
actually occupied the land until March 1981.1avvphi1
The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing that the claiming party actually experienced emotional and
mental sufferings.60 In this case, we find that petitioners testimony that he suffered from sleepless nights from worrying about this case

and considering the great distance he had to travel from his home in Tacloban to see the case through are enough bases to award him
moral damages. With the award of moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in order.61
Attorneys fees are recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, or when the court deems it just and equitable. The grant of
attorneys fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court. 62 Given the circumstances of this
case, we grant the prayer for attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51679 are reversed and set aside. A new one is entered:
(1) reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 1331;
(2) declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners of Lot No. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan Cadastre, Negros Occidental; and
(3) ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the rate of P3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time
of actual occupation of the land in 1976 until March 1981, moral damages in the amount of P100,00.00, exemplary damages
in the amount of P30,000.00, and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of
attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce
it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's
mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in the morning of September
1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed her clothes and
asked her to lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to
herself as her father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on her side facing him and to place her
thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused tremendous pain. 6 As in the first incident,
complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled and
kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his
room, appellant immediately asked her to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant down on the sofa then placed himself
on top of her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon learning of the abuses done by the
appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint. 9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory
examined complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and begot
three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in several companies abroad 11 but admitted that he
was in the Philippines in September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant because he was always in
the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas.12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were other people
in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant, then she would not have accompanied him to the Paraaque Police Station and
Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque,
where they applied for membership at the Video City Club. 13 He also maintained that the fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state
did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with
another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the obscene details of her harrowing
experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless she herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape
understandable due to the fear complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded the
Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she
signed the same. Besides, she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime
of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on
December 29, 1995, he is imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional medium to 10
years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257
convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of qualified rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim
MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral
damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective
15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS
BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED. 17
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported them to the authorities when she
accompanied him to Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the opportunity to
do so. He also argues that had the trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination
by counsel.18 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.19
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the
humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to
tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the complainant who was only 12 years old
when she narrated to the court the violations of her person as follows:
For rape committed in September 1993:
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
A: September 1993.
COURT:
No specific date?
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
A: 10 years old, Maam.

Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything happened?
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?
RECORD: The witness is crying.
A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.
Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?
A: No, Maam.
Q: Why not?
A: Because I was afraid of my father.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father?
A: Because he might hurt me.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred?
A: There is, Maam.
Q: When was it?
A: After a few days after the first incident.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
A: He removed his clothes.
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?
A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his side.
Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any?
A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21
For rape committed on December 29, 1995:
Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was, Maam.
Q: What is that incident?
A: I was raped by my father on that day.

Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?
A: I was then sitting at our dining set.
Q: What about your father, what he doing?
A: He was cooking.
Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?
A: He told me to approach him.
Q: After you approached him, what happened next?
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
Q: What happened after you embraced him?
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?
A: He held my breast.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: He kept kissing my breast.
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?
A: Many times.
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?
A: He put my shorts down.
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?
A: He also put down my panty.
Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
A: He held my organ.
ATTY. MALLARES:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When you say organ', what do you mean?
A: Pekpek.
COURT: Proceed.

ANSWER:
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?
A: We were in our sala on the sofa.
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?
A: Me and my father.
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened?
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.
Q: What were you wearing at that time?
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
A: He raised them.
Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?
A: Shorts and T-shirt.
Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of me.
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23
The trial court believed the complainant and held that:
The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and
complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial
and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a girl who is only
twelve (12) years old would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.24

We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the
authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats of
physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions
brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what should otherwise be a positive
attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even years,
after the commission of the offense.25
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions
were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence she kept about her
ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear posed by her own father against her.
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that
the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested by
the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private
parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case.26
Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her
signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases. 28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to dismiss
the cases, as it is still within its discretion whether or not to proceed with the prosecution, 29 considering that the compromise agreement
and the affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. 30
By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private
complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed
and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never retracted her allegation that she was raped by
her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she
had decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to consent to annul his marriage;
allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his children to his wife. Rather than contradict, this
affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant raped her on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent.1wphi1 If the woman is under 12
years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the
absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years
of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force, violence,
intimidation or threat.32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering
moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is
sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. 33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his
moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of
rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the
crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce
it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's
mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the

commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. 35 What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made
by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. 36 The acts or omissions complained
of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the
elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of
Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in
September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to
R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when
committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was
committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the
appellant himself; they were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible
to prove the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The admission of this secondary
evidence is one of the exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Further, we
held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. The
presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to note that
appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and
the other party is bound thereby.39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the
trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.00 40 and P75,000.0041 as civil
indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in
line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for rape. 43 On
the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying.44

Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the
Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in
rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua
and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of
75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is
however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts
or omissions constituting the offense.
SO ORDERED.

JOHNSON
LEE,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE MARKETING, INC., respondents.

petitioner,

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI) was incorporated on January 27, 1978 with funds provided by the Uy Family. It had an authorized
capital stock of P3 million divided into 30,000 shares with a par value of P100 per share. The original incorporators, with their
corresponding number of shares and the amounts thereof, are as follows:
Johnson Lee

600

P 60,000.00

Lok Chun Suen

1,200

120,000.00

Charles O. Sy

1,800

180,000.00

Eugenio Flores, Jr.

2,100

210,000.00

Arsenio Yang, Jr.

300

30,000.00

T O TAL

6,000
=====

P600,000.00
===========

There were two stock dividend declarations, one on June 7, 1980 in the amount of P60,000.00 and another on May 2, 1981 for
P40,000.00. On May 15, 1986 Eugenio Flores, Jr. assigned/divested himself of his shares in favor of Sonny Moreno, 1,050
shares; Arsenio Yang, Jr., 700 shares and Charles O. Sy, 700 shares.1
On June 11, 1987, the NMI sold and delivered to the Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMCI), in Victorias, Negros Occidental, 77,500
pieces of empty white bags for the price of P565,750.00. NMI issued Charge Invoice No. 08092 dated June 11, 1987 to VMCI covering
said sale. On June 18, 1987, VMCI purchased 100,000 pieces of empty white bags from NMI for P730,000.00 for which NMI issued
Charge Invoice No. 0810.3 On June 25, 1987, VMCI again purchased 28,000 pieces of empty white bags from NMI for the price of
P204,400.00 and the latter issued Charge Invoice No. 08114 dated June 25, 1987. In payment of said purchases from NMI, VMCI drew
and issued two Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Checks: Check No. 068706 dated August 3, 1987 in the amount of P565,750.005
and Check No. 068993 dated August 19, 1987 in the amount of P934,400.00.6 Both checks were payable to the order of NMI.
On October 13, 1987, stockholders owning two-thirds (2/3) of the subscribed capital stock of NMI voted to call a stockholders meeting.
One of the items in the agenda was the dissolution of the corporation.
Pursuant thereto, a special stockholders meeting was held on October 24, 1987 in Bacolod City. The following stockholders, who were
also directors, were present and voted to dissolve the corporation:

Name of Stockholders

Number of Shares

Arsenio Yang, Jr.

1,050

Charles Sy

2,800

Lok Chun Suen

1,400

Total

5,250

<="" td="" width="10">

Accordingly, notices were again sent to all stockholders of record, all of whom properly acknowledged the said notices, that a meeting
was to be held on November 30, 1987 to consider the dissolution of the corporation. Again the stockholders who attended the October
24, 1987 meeting were present. Upon motion duly seconded, the dissolution was approved. Per Resolution of the Board of Directors,
the law firm of Reyes, Treyes & Fudolin Law Office was appointed as trustee to collect all the receivables of the corporation.
At the time of the approval of the dissolution of the corporation on November 30, 1987, the shares of each stockholder were as follows:
Name of Stockholders
Johnson
Lee,
600
(June
7,
1980
(May 2, 1981 stock dividend) ---------

Total as of Nov. 30.

stock

(subscription);
dividend);

700 shares

Lok
Chun
Suen,
1,200
(June
7,
1980
stock
(May 2, 1981 stock dividend) ---------Charles
O.
Sy,
(June
7,
1980
(May
2,
1981
(acquisition from Eugenio Flores ----------

60
40

(subscription);
dividend);

120
80
1,400 shares

1800
stock
stock

(subscription);
dividend);
dividend);

180
120
700
2,800 shares

Arsenio
Yang,
Jr.,
300
(subscription);
(June
7,
1980
stock
dividend);
(May
2,
1981
stock
dividend);
(acquisition from Eugenio Flores) --------

30

Sonny
Moreno,
From Eugenio Flores) -----------------------

(acquisition

Total ----------------------------------

1,050

20
700
1,050 shares

1,050 shares
7,000 shares

Pursuant to Section 11 of the Corporation Code, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the dissolution of the corporation
on March 1, 1988 subject to compliance of the requirements, such as the sending of notices to stockholders and publication thereof in a
newspaper of general circulation, among others.
On March 22, 1988, Johnson Lee, Sonny Moreno, Leoncio Tan and Nicanor Martin filed a petition with the Securities and Investigation
Clearing Department (SICD) of the Commission praying, among other things, for the annulment or nullification of the Certification of
Filing of Resolution of Voluntary Dissolution of NMI for being contrary to law and its by-laws.
In the meantime, the trustee wrote the petitioner, Johnson Lee, on March 8, 1988 requesting him to turn over to it the P1,500,150.00 he
received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI. However, he failed to do so.7
A verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa was filed against the petitioner and Sonny Moreno with the City Prosecutors Office.
Appended to the complaint were photocopies of Charge Invoice Nos. 0809, 0810, and 0811, issued by NMI to VMCI.
During the requisite preliminary investigation, the petitioner and Moreno submitted their counter-affidavits. The counter-affidavit of the
petitioner consisted of five pages.8 After the investigation, two (2) Amended Informations were filed against the petitioner and Moreno,
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental. Except as to the particulars of the checks, the accusatory portions of the two
Informations are identical, thus:

That sometime in the month of August 1987, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, Johnson Lee, being then the President and Sonny Moreno, the General Manager of Neugene
Marketing, Inc., with the duty and responsibility to collect, turn over and deliver their collections to the herein offended party,
Neugene Marketing, Inc., a corporation organized and existing by and under the laws of the Philippines, represented herein by
its Trustees, Roger Reyes, Ernesto Treyes, and Eutiquio Fudolin, the said accused conspiring, confederating, and acting in
concert far from complying with the aforementioned obligation having collected the amount of P565,750.00 covered by BPI
Check No. 068766 (sic) dated August 3, 1987 as payment of Victorias Milling Company, a customer of the herein offended
party, with intent of gain, and with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence failed and refused to deliver the aforementioned
amount to the herein offended party, up to the present, in spite of proper demands, but instead, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously convert[ed] and/or misappropriated the same to their personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the herein offended party in the aforementioned amount of FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY (P565,750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
Act contrary to law.9
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011.
During the trial, the original copies of Charge Invoice Nos. 0809, 0810 and 0811, and of BPI Check Nos. 068766 and 068993 were not
in the custody of the prosecution.
To prove the loss, destruction or non-availability of the original copies of the charge invoices and checks, as well as the authenticity and
due execution thereof, the prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores, who testified that she saw the two checks in the office of the
petitioner at the Singson Building, Plaza Moraga, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sometime in 1987, she went to the office of the VMCI and inquired
if it still had copies of the two checks and the clerk thereat informed her that it would be difficult to locate the checks as they were stored
in the bodega, where many other checks were kept. 10 Flores also testified that the signatures at the dorsal portion of the checks were
those of the petitioner, the President of NMI, with whom she had been working, and that he indorsed and deposited the same on
September 4, 1987 with the Solidbank, instead of the BPI Plaza Cervantes branch in Manila, the official depository bank of NMI.
According to Flores, she was able to secure microfilm copies of the checks from Solidbank, and was sure that the copies of the checks
and invoices were faithful reproductions of the original copies thereof.11
Testifying for the prosecution in obedience to a subpoena issued by the court, Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI,
declared that the records section of VMCI, which had custody of all checks and other corporate records, was near her office. She
testified that the checks, including their other records, were lost during the flood in 1985. 12 She also testified on the Certification 13 issued
by Carolina Diaz, the Comptroller of VMCI, confirming the loss of the two checks. She, however, admitted that she did not see the
original copies of the checks14 and that she was not a signatory thereto.15
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered in evidence the counter-affidavit of the petitioner during the preliminary investigation, as
well as the charge invoices and checks, viz.
"G"

NMI Charge Invoice No. 0809 dated June 11, 1987

To prove that Victorias Milling Co., Inc. (VMC) ordered 77,500 piec
bags from NMI on June 11, 1987 and that these bags were delivere

"H"

NMI Charge Invoice No. 0810 dated June 18, 1987

To prove that VMC ordered 100,000 pieces of empty bags from N

18, 1987 and that these bags were delivered to VMC.

"I"

NMI Charge Invoice No. 0811 dated June25, 1987

To prove that VMC ordered 28,000 pieces of empty bags from NMI
1987 and that these bags were delivered to VMC.

"J"

Demand letter dated March 8, 1988 signed by Atty.

Roger Z. Reyes

To prove that in 1988, NMI made a demand upon the accused for
of the amount of P1,500,150.00 representing VMCs payment for the
the empty bags mentioned in Exhibits "G," "H" and "I."

"J-1"

Signature appearing above the typewritten name "Roger

Z. Reyes" duly identified by the prosecution witness, Mrs.
Ban Hua Flores as the signature of Atty. Roger Z. Reyes

To prove the genuineness, authenticity and due execution of Exhibit

"K"

Bank of the Philippine Village Extension Check No.

068706 dated August3, 1987 P565,750.00

To prove that VMC made a check payable to Islands (BPI) Legaspi

amount of P565,750, as payment to NMI for the delivery of the
mentioned in Exhibits "G," "H" and in the amount of "I."

"K1"

Signature found on the dorsal side of Exhibit "K" which

Mrs. Flores identified as the signature of accused
Johnson Lee.

To prove that the accused Lee received and was in possession of

and that he indorsed and deposited the same.

"K2"

Rubberstamp showing the name of "Solidbank" side of

Exhibit "K"

To prove that Exhibit "K" was deposited by accused Lee in the Solid
is not appearing on the dorsal the official depository bank of NMI
NMI depository bank being the BPI Plaza Cervantes Branch.

"L"

BPI Legaspi Village Extension Check No. 068993 dated

Aug. 19, 1987 amount of P934,400.00

To prove that VMC made a check payable to NMI in the amount o

as payment to NMI for the delivery of the empty bags in the m
Exhibits "G, "H" and "I."

"L-1"

Signature found on the dorsal side of Exhibit "L" which

Mrs. Flores identified as the signature of accused Lee

To prove that the accused Lee received and was in possession o

and that he indorsed and deposited the same.

"L-2"

Rubberstamp showing the name

appearing on dorsal side of Exh. "L"

To prove that Exhibit "L" was deposited by accused Lee in the Solid
is not the official depository bank of NMI, the official NMI depository
the BPI Plaza Cervantes Branch.16

of

"Solidbank"

The prosecution also offered in evidence the counter-affidavit of the petitioner during the preliminary investigation, as follows:
"O"

Counter-Affidavit dated September 9, 1988 signed and

submitted by Johnson Lee

"O1"

Signature found on page 5 of Exhibit "O" execution and

authenticity of Exhibit "O", name "Johnson Lee"

"O2"

Paragraph 6 of Exhibit "O" found on page 2 thereof.17

To prove that the proceeds of Exhibit "K" and "L" in the total
P1,500.150 are in the possession and control of the accused an
refused to in B.C.-I.S. No. 88-347, deliver the same to NMI despit
of 5 pages demand

To prove the genuineness, due above the typewritten which b

accused also admitted.

Same purpose as in Exhibit "O".

The accused objected to the admission of the photocopies of the checks and charge invoices on the ground that the best evidence
were the original copies thereof. On April 12, 2002, the trial court issued an Order admitting the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as
well as the photocopies of the checks and charge invoices, on the ground that the prosecution had adduced preponderant evidence
that the original copies of the said charges and checks were lost, destroyed or non-available. 18 The accused filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity and due execution of the offered documents, a
prerequisite to the admission thereof as secondary evidence. They also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence. The
trial court denied both motions.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed with the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleged that Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in admitting in evidence the
Peoples documentary evidence, consisting of mere unauthenticated photocopies, in flagrant violation of the Best Evidence
Rule (Sec. 3, 4, 5 and 6, Rule 130), despite the repeated vehement objections of the petitioner, thereby wantonly refusing to
exclude such clearly inadmissible evidence, which actuation as embodied in his two (2) assailed Orders, is capricious,
whimsical and patently erroneous, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, and the remedy of ordinary appeal would not afford petitioner adequate and
expeditious relief, for while available eventually, such remedy is cumbersome for it requires petitioner to undergo a useless
and time-consuming trial, and thus becomes an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; hence, the imperative necessity for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring respondent judge to refrain from further
proceeding with Crim. Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 until the Petition shall have been disposed of, otherwise, failure of justice
is sure to ensue.19
On March 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit.20
The Court of Appeals ruled that the charge invoices and the checks were not the best evidence to prove receipt by the accused of the
amounts allegedly misappropriated; hence, the best evidence rule does not apply. It also held that even if the contents of the checks
were the subject of inquiry, based on the proofs adduced by the prosecution, such checks are admissible in evidence. The Court of

Appeals declared that, in any event, the prosecution proved the loss or destruction or non-availability of the checks and charge
invoices. The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision suffered the same fate.
The petitioner then sought relief from this Court, in a petition for review on certiorari, and raises the following issues:
1. CAN (sic) PRIVATE DOCUMENT OFFERED AS AUTHENTIC BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE WITHOUT PROOF
OF ITS DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY?
2. CAN SECONDARY EVIDENCE BE ADMITTED WITHOUT PROOF OF ITS LOSS OR UNAVAILABILITY AND
EXECUTION OF THE ORIGINAL?
3. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE ORIGINAL OF
A DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, CONSISTING OF PRIVATE INSTRUMENTS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE, INASMUCH AS RECEIPT BY THE PETITIONER OF THE AMOUNT ALLEGEDLY
MISAPPROPRIATED MAY BE PROVED BY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL OF THE SAID PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS?
4. IS THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FACT OF LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF THE
CHECKS AND THE CHARGE INVOICES HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY OTHER EVIDENCE, DEVOID OF
SUPPORT BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND IS, THEREFORE, A BARE CONCLUSION OR A FINDING
BASED ON SURMISE AND CONJECTURES?
5. IS ANOTHER FINDING, IN THE FORM OF ASSUMPTION, OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT SINCE THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION ARE OFFICERS WITH AUTHORITY TO KEEP THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENTS, THEY NECESSARILY TOOK AND CONDUCTED A THOROUGH SEARCH FOR THE MISSING
DOCUMENTS, A MERE CONJECTURE OR SURMISE OR A FINDING GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON
SPECULATION?
6. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATE THE DICTUM OF THE COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL
JUDGE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR INHIBITION GROUNDED ON ITS DISPLAY OF UNDUE
INTERESTS AND WHEN A MEMBER THEREOF HAS SEEN IT FIT AND APPROPRIATE TO RECUSE HERSELF? 21
The petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove the loss, destruction or non-availability of the original copies of the checks and
charge invoices; that diligent efforts were undertaken to locate the original copies of the checks and invoices; and that said efforts were
futile. He asserts that the witness competent to prove the loss or destruction of the original of the checks would be the records
custodian of VMCI. Bayaban was not a competent witness thereon, considering that she merely testified that the clerk of the VMCI
failed to locate the original copies of the checks because the latter was lazy to search for the same. The petitioner posits that the
prosecution failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the charge invoices and the two checks through the testimonies of
Flores and Bayaban. He contends that Bayaban even admitted that she was not privy to and had no knowledge of the execution of the
said checks and of the signatories of the checks. The petitioner further avers that, although the appellate court held that the
photocopies of the checks were admissible in evidence based on other proofs adduced by the prosecution, it failed to specify the other
proofs adverted to by it.
In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that through the testimony of Bayaban, the due execution and
authenticity of the checks were proved by the prosecution as well as the admissions of the petitioner in his counter-affidavit during the
preliminary investigation. It further averred that through the testimonies of Bayaban and Flores, it proved, with reasonable certainty, the
loss or destruction of the original copies of the checks and the charge invoices.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the petition at bar is the proper remedy of the petitioner; and (b) whether or
not the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in admitting in evidence the
photocopies of the checks and charge invoices in lieu of the original copies thereof.
The Ruling of the Court
In People v. Court of Appeals,22 we held that for a petition for certiorari or prohibition to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate,
plainly and distinctly, all the facts essential to establish a right to a writ. 23 The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to
show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate 24 and that (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and, (c) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.25
The trial court acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of
discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to

be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.26 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court. 27 A petition for
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and the availability of the right to appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.28
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to
stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are
to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. 29 An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.30 Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors made by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law thereon. 31 As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.32
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for
estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary
evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said
evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 33 Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence
must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to
adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.
In the final analysis, the threshold issue in this case is whether or not the prosecution adduced evidence, testimonial and documentary,
to prove the predication to the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices 34 and of the checks.35 The petitioner posits that the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden, in contrast to the claim of the prosecution that it succeeded in doing so. In resolving the
petition at bar, the court will have to delve into and calibrate the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties in the
trial court, which the court is proscribed to do under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was the ruling of the Court in Johnson Lee v.
People:36
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that
the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon
this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject
of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.
We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting the
issuance of a writ of certiorari. The petitioners present factual contentions to absolve them from the criminal charge of estafa.
The criminal cases concern corporate funds petitioners allegedly received as payment for plastic bought by Victorias Milling
Corporation from NMI. They refused to turn over the money to the trustee after NMIs dissolution on the ground that they were
keeping the money for the protection of the corporation itself. Thus, the elements of misappropriation and damage are absent.
They argue that there is no proof that, as officers of the corporation, they converted the said amount for their own personal
benefit. They likewise claim that they already turned the money over to the majority stockholder of the defunct corporation.
Clearly, the said allegations are defenses that must be presented as evidence in the hearing of the criminal cases. They are
inappropriate for consideration in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court inasmuch as they do not affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court hearing the said criminal cases but instead are defenses that might absolve them from criminal
liability. A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent court acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which can
be reviewed or corrected on appeal.
Moreover, the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was premature for the reason that there were other plain and
adequate remedies at law available to the petitioners. Under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the accused can move to quash the information on the ground that the facts do not constitute an offense. There is
no showing that the petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, ever filed motions to quash the subject informations or
that the same were denied. It cannot then be said that the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition.
But it must be stressed that, even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not have automatically given
rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that, where a motion to quash is denied, the
remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if,
after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And, even in the

exceptional case where such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed to give the trial court an opportunity to correct its error. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration was filed and
denied, the remedy under Rule 65 would still be unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1
thereof. The petition before the Court of Appeals, subject of this appeal, did not allege any of such grounds.
Furthermore, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before this Court only allows
questions of law. Inasmuch as petitioners defenses alleging circumstances that negate misappropriation definitely require
appreciation of facts, i.e., testimonial and documentary evidence, this Court cannot assess the merit of the said claims.37
Moreover, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Court unless the petitioner is able to establish that the
findings of facts of the appellate court are not supported by or are contrary to the evidence; or if the appellate court ignored,
misconstrued or misinterpreted vital facts and circumstances, which, if considered, could change or even reverse the outcome of the
case. In this, the petitioner failed.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was
designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the
originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings
occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility
of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.38
The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the issues such as the nature, appearance or condition of physical objects or to
evidence relating to a matter which does not come from the foundation of the cause of action or defense; or when a party uses a
document to prove the existence of an independent fact, as to which the writing is merely collated or incidental.39
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents;40 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places. 41 It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more
strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved.42
If the document is one in which other persons are also interested, and which has been placed in the hands of a custodian for
safekeeping, the custodian must be required to make a search and the fruitlessness of such search must be shown, before secondary
evidence can be admitted.43 The certificate of the custody of the document is incompetent to prove the loss or destruction thereof. Such
fact must be proved by some person who has knowledge of such loss.44
The proponent is also burdened to prove the due execution or existence of the original as provided in Rule 130, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Court:
When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses
in the order stated.
Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure on how the authenticity and due execution of a
private document which is offered as authentic may be proved:

Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document must be positive. He must state that the document
was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto. 45 The admission of that party against whom the
document is offered, of the authenticity and due execution thereof, is admissible in evidence to prove the existence,
authenticity and due execution of such document.
In this case, there is no dispute that the original copies of the checks were returned to VMCI after the same were negotiated and
honored by the drawee bank. The originals of the charge invoices were kept by VMCI. There is also no dispute that the prosecution
offered the photocopies of the invoices in evidence to prove the contents thereof, namely that: (a) VMCI purchased 203,500 empty
bags from NMI for the total price of P1,500,150.00; (b) VMCI received the said goods in good order and condition; and (c) NMI charged
VMCI for the purchase price of said goods. The prosecution offered the checks to prove the contents thereof as well as the following:
(a) VMCI drew and delivered the checks to the NMI; (b) the said checks were endorsed by the petitioner; and (c) the said checks were
deposited by the petitioner with the Solidbank which was not the official depository of NMI. Thus, the prosecution was burdened to
prove the loss, destruction or its inability to produce in court without bad faith on its part of the original copies of the said invoices and
checks without bad faith on its part.
We agree with the petitioner that the Certification signed by Carolina Diaz was inadmissible in evidence against him because of the
failure of the prosecution to present her as witness and to testify on said certification.
However, the records show that, in obedience to the subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum issued by the trial court directing the
VMCI to produce the originals of the checks and the charge invoices, Bayaban, the Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, testified that
all its records, including the charge invoices and checks, were destroyed seven years ago in a flash flood which occurred on November
28, 1995, and that such loss/destruction was known to all the employees of VMCI, including herself:
FISCAL ESQUILLA:
Q Please inform this Honorable Court how were you able to appear this afternoon in connection with this case?

A The Legal Department, through the instruction of our Chief Operating Officer, inquired from our Accounting through our
comptroller, Carolina S. Diaz to produce the original copies of the two (2) checks which was mentioned in the subpoena issued
by Prosecutor Esquilla. And then, through my direct Boss, the Chief Accountant, Mrs. Melanie Roa, instructed me to look into
the two (2) checks. And since the record is under my Department, I immediately asked my subordinate to look for it. And, in
fact, she was also under my supervision when we looked for the document. And I have already knowledge during the
November 28, 1995 due to flash flood, we lost our records. And in fact, we have declaration to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). And we also exhausted some means to look for the documents, but we really cannot produce the original copies of the
checks, even the Xerox, no more copies of the checks as requested.

Q Madam Witness, when you said that you instructed your subordinate to look for the record, specifically, the records being
asked in the subpoena, the original copies of the checks, these two (2) checks, will you please inform this Honorable Court
where these records in 1995 including these checks, of course, have been kept by your office?
A It is kept at the Records Section Office just near my table. It is just over there. It is just over there. The distance is very near.
We have the vault power cards and all old records were kept are downstairs and the new ones are kept upstairs. So, we dont
anticipate the flood and because that was the first time that we were hit by that flash flood.

Q So, you want to impress this Honorable Court that those records which were kept downstairs your office were carried or
destroyed by this flash flood which occurred in 1995 is that correct or is that what you mean?
A Yes, Your Honor.


Q And can you say that if these two (2) checks, subject of this case now, were there downstairs and was destroyed by the
1995 flash flood, can you say that before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Aside from these checks downstairs which were destroyed by this flash flood, what were the other records that were kept
there that were lost also?
A All our Bank Vouchers, some of our General Ledgers. Actually, I cannot memorize it, but in our declaration to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) we have listings of those documents which were damaged by flash flood.

Q Alright, Madam Witness. So, when this subpoena/subpoena (sic) duces tecum was received by Victorias Milling Company,
addressed to the Chief Operating Officer, do I get from you that this was referred to the Legal Affairs of VICMICO?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Slowly, the stenographer may not be able to catch up with you.
FISCAL ESQUILLA:
I see. Sorry, Your Honor. And from the Legal Affairs, where did it proceed, this subpoena or this was referred to by the Legal
Affairs to whom?
WITNESS:
A To Mrs. Carolina Diaz, the Comptroller.
FISCAL ESQUILLA:
Q You mentioned that she is your immediate Boss?
A I have also, next to her, Mrs. Melanie Roa, and I am next to her.
Q And you are holding office there at VICMICO together with the Comptroller, Carolina Diaz?
A We are in the same building.
Q And does she has a cubicle of her own?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And your table up to her cubicle, how far is your table from her cubicle?
A They are very near. I can see from my place her office and I can see anytime she went in and out of the room. Maybe from
here up to that next room.
COURT:
About 25 to 30 meters, more or less.
FISCAL ESQUILLA:

Q And, Madam Witness, may I know from you that who requested you to testify because this Certification bears the signature
of Mrs. Diaz?

A Ah, Mrs. Diaz, in fact, ah there is a Memo from the Legal Affairs that we will submit the Certification to the Honorable Court
and the Memo was addressed to Mrs. Diaz. And there was a note from Mrs. Diaz to my direct Boss, the Chief Accountant, and
then I was tasked by my immediate Boss to attend to this.
Q How were you able to secure a Certification?
A A Certification was issued also upon our recommendation to the Chief Accountant that we cannot produce anymore the
original copies of the said document.
Q Who gave you that Certification so that you can bring that today in Court?
A Marie Melanie G. Roa.
Q Do you have with you now the Certification?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And you are showing the original copy of the Certification?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I show to you the Certification dated December 6, 2001 issued by Carolina Diaz, Comptroller. Do you know whose signature
is this?
A That is the signature of Mrs. Carolina S. Diaz.
Q How do you know that this is her signature?
A Im very much familiar with her signature because in our day to day undertakings in the office, I can see this in the checks
she signed, and in the Office Memorandum. And, in fact, I also prepare some of the communications for her signature.
Q For the record, Madam Witness, will you please read the first paragraph of that Certification issued by Carolina Diaz?
A "Victorias Milling Co., Inc. Certification. This is to certify that Victorias Milling Co., Inc. no longer have the original copies of
the BPI, Legaspi Village, Extension Office, Legaspi St., Makati, Metro Manila, Check No. 068766 dated August 3, 1987 and
Check No. 068993 dated August 19, 1987 as the same were destroyed by flash flood that hit the province of Negros
Occidental particularly the City of Victorias on November 28, 1995."
FISCAL ESQUILLA:
Your Honor, may I request that this Certification be marked as our Exhibit "X" temporarily.
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL ESQUILLA:
And then the signature as identified by this witness, of her immediate Boss, be encircled and marked as Exhibit "X-1."
COURT:
Mark it.
COURT INTERPRETER:

Your last Exhibit is Exhibit "Y."

FISCAL ESQUILLA:
I will change my Exhibit from Exhibit "X" and "X-1" to "Z" and "Z-1." No further, Your Honor.
COURT:
Do you want to cross?
ATTY. MAGDAMIT:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Alright, cross for the accused Moreno. We will give the Manila lawyer the first shot.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE
WITNESS MERLITA T. BAYABAN
CONDUCTED BY ATTY. SIMEON M.
MAGDAMIT.

ATTY. MAGDAMIT
Q Madam Witness, when you received the subpoena, it contained a photocopy of the checks that were being requested, is
that correct?
(At this juncture, there is no answer from the witness)
ATTY. MAGDAMIT: (Follow-up question)
Q Did it already contain a copy of the photocopy?
A Ah. Attached to the subpoena.
Q Have you seen this photocopy when you received the subpoena? You did not see?
A Ah, actually, the subpoena was directed to the Legal.
Q You did not see. You did not see the photocopy?
May I know the point of Compaero, Your Honor.
WITNESS: (Answers before Atty. Magdamit)
A I remember it was presented to me by Mrs. Diaz.
ATTY. MAGDAMIT
Q Mrs. Diaz. So, let me just clear this up. The subpoena did not immediately go to the Legal, it was presented to you by Mrs.
Diaz?
A No, it was presented by the Legal to our Comptroller. Then . . .

...
COURT:
Q And then to?
A And then to me.
Q There is an initial, "MGR." Do you know who is that?
A That is Mrs. Melanie G. Roa, our Chief Accountant.
Q And from then, when it reached you, you were the ones who sorted through the files, were you the one?
A Ah, my subordinate.
Q Ah, you were not the one?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Now, but you were certain I withdraw that question. When you received the subpoena with the attached document, were
you already aware that the records, the original, were destroyed or you were not yet aware?
A Very much aware that the records were destroyed by the flash flood because it was not only in that case that we were
tasked to look for the documents. There were also Examiners from the Bureau of Internal Revenue who asked for the
documents prior to 1995 and thats our reason, we cannot produce the documents.
Q Now, wait. Were you the only one who was aware that this file was destroyed or was it a matter that was known in your
company?
A It was known to everybody.
Q It was known?
A Yeah.
Q So, can you conclude that just upon receiving the subpoena and looking at the photocopy of the checks, you would
immediately know that this was among the files that was destroyed by the flood?
A Yes, because of the date, 1995.
Q So, despite that knowledge, it still went through the process and you still looked for it, is that correct?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, despite of your knowledge that it was destroyed, you still looked for it?
A Yeah, we still looked for it because there might be some files to prove that it was really our check issuance. So even our
files, even our Bank Recon, we cannot produce it.46
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, the prosecution adduced preponderant evidence to prove the existence, the due execution and
the authenticity of the said checks and charge invoices consisting of the admission of no less than the petitioner in his counter-affidavit.
The petitioner admitted therein that he received the total amount of P1,500,150.00 from VMCI in full payment of the delivery and sale of
the empty bags by NMI to VMCI and that the said amount was in the custody of the said corporation, thus:
6. That the collection by the Corporation of the amount of P1,500,150.00 is a valid act of the corporation; that it is the full and
complete and just payment for the three deliveries of plastic materials by the Neugene Marketing, Inc to Victorias Milling
Company on June 11, 1987, June 18, 1987 and June 25, 1987 when I was and I am still the President and Mr. Sonny Moreno,
General Manager of the Neugene Marketing, Inc. and that the said Victorias Milling Company paid in full and payments were
made to the Corporation and it is only a legitimate act of the Neugene Marketing, Inc. in the regular course of business to
receive payment for the obligations of its customers to the Corporation;

7. That with respect to the demand letter addressed to me to turn over aforesaid P1,500,150.00, the said amount is money of
the Neugene Marketing, Inc. and the corporation is the legitimate possessor thereof and that Reyes, Treyes, and Fudolin Law
Firm has no right or authority to make the demand letter; and that it is the corporation that holds the money and that
personally, neither I nor Sonny Moreno can just take the money to give to Reyes, Treyes and Fudolin Law Firm which cannot
be trusted and which is an unauthorized entity to receive, hold and possess said funds or to file this case;
8. That the amount of P1,500,150.00 the corporate funds of the Neugene Marketing, Inc. unless authorized by the members of
the Board of Directors, neither I nor Sonny Moreno can dispose of the said sum of money and it is the corporation that is
holding the said amount and holding it to answer for corporation expenses on its business operations and to answer for
obligations to its creditors including the claims of Sonny Moreno and myself for unpaid compensation, salaries, fringe benefits,
allowances and shares in the profits of the Corporation; and that therefore, it is beyond our authority or power to refuse the
turn over or to turn over the aforesaid amount; and that if there is evidence of the malicious and criminal intent to appropriate
the same for personal benefit that is more applicable to Reyes, Treyes and Fudolin who apparently without any legal authority
and illegally posing as a trustee when as a matter of fact, they have never been appointed or designated a[s] trustee by the
Neugene Marketing, Inc.; and therefore, complainants should be the one held criminally responsible for the illegal "dissolution"
of the Neugene Marketing, Inc., and for which they will be charged with the corresponding action for falsification and perjury for
having been able to secure a Certification of Dissolution from the Securities and Exchange Commission by means of false
pretenses and representations;47
It bears stressing that the counter-affidavit of the petitioner was adduced in evidence by the prosecution precisely to prove the
existence, authenticity and due execution of the original of the said charge invoices and checks and the trial court admitted the same
for the said purpose.
By his counter-affidavit, the petitioner, in effect, admitted the allegations of the affidavit-complaint of the trustee of NMI:
a. Sometime on June 11, 1987, June 18, 1987 and June 25, 1987, respectively, NEUGENE MARKETING, INC. made three (3)
deliveries of plastic materials to Victorias Milling Company, Victorias, Negros Occidental totalling P1,500,150.00 covered by
Charge invoices
b. Aforesaid charge invoices were subsequently paid by Victorias Milling Company in full and payments delivered to Johnson
Lee and/or Sonny Moreno, as President and General Manager of Neugene Marketing, Inc.
c. As Trustee of Neugene Marketing, Inc., the Reyes, Treyes & Fudolin Law Firm sent a demand letter addressed to Johnson
Lee to turn over aforesaid P1,500,150.00.
d. As of the date of this Affidavit-Complaint, Johnson Lee and/or Sonny Moreno have failed to deliver aforesaid sum to the
herein trustee contrary to law.
4. Johnson Lee and/or Sonny Moreno have no authority whatsoever to withhold aforesaid sum of P1,500,150.00 and their
refusal to turn over aforesaid amount is evidence of a malicious and criminal intent to appropriate the same for their own
personal benefit.48
With the admissions of the petitioner in his counter-affidavit, the prosecution even no longer needed to adduce evidence aliunde to
prove the existence, due execution and the authenticity of the charge invoices and the checks.
All told then, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the predicates to the admission of the photocopies of
the charge invoices and checks.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

MARINA
LLEMOS,
PEDRO
LLEMOS,
FELISA
LLEMOS
and
VIRGINIA
M.
JIMENEZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO LLEMOS, ROMY LLEMOS, MERCEDES LLEMOS, EUSEBIA LL. FERNANDEZ, JULIANA LL. CARAMAT, FORTUNATA
LLEMOS, ALIPIO LLEMOS, AMELIA LL. ABRIGO, PERFECTO LLEMOS, ALIPIA LL. CARAMAT, JOVITA LL. LACA, GENEROSA
LLEMOS ABRIGO, ROSALINA LL. CRUZ, ARTURO LLEMOS, TEODORA LLEMOS, RODOLFO LLEMOS, PET LLEMOS and
ROSARIO LLEMOS, Respondents.
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision 1 dated September
19, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53112, which reversed the Decision dated February 29, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, of Dagupan City (RTC).
The case originated from a Complaint filed by the respondents, the compulsory heirs of the late Saturnina Salvatin (Saturnina). The
Complaint sought to declare the nullity of the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners on the ground that their predecessor-ininterest, the late Felipe Llemos (Felipe), acquired the property described therein through a forged deed of sale.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Respondents] and [petitioners] are the heirs of the late Saturnina Salvatin Llemos, being their grandmother. The late Saturnina Salvatin
Llemos had four (4) children, namely: Adriano Llemos, Santiago Llemos, Domingo Llemos, who were the predecessors-in-interest of
[respondents], and Felipe Llemos, who was the predecessor-in-interest of herein [petitioners].
During her lifetime, the late Saturnina Salvatin Llemos acquired a parcel of land described as Lot No. 2059, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 38564, which all the parties presently occupy.
xxxx
On November 5, 1964, the Register of Deeds of Dagupan, Pangasinan, cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 38564 (Exhibit "B")
and issued a new one, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15632 (Exhibit "D") in the name of Felipe Llemos, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale thumb marked by Saturnina Salvatin Llemos conveying said property to Felipe Llemos, herein [petitioners] predecessor-ininterest, for a consideration of P200.00 (Exhibit "C").
Sometime in 1991, Jovita Llemos Laca, one of the [respondents], decided to improve her residential house on said parcel of land.
Hence, she borrowed the title of the property from one of the [petitioners], Felisa Llemos, for purposes of securing a building permit. It
was on such instance that [respondents] discovered that the title of the property was already in the name of herein [petitioners].
On August 10, 1992, [respondents] filed the instant action for Declaration of Nullity of said Transfer Certificate [of] Title No. 15632 and
for damages. The complaint, was amended on October 24, 1995 to include additional plaintiffs who are likewise heirs of Saturnina
Salvatin Llemos.
In their Answer, [petitioners] alleged that the late Saturnina Salvatin Llemos conveyed to their father, the late Felipe Llemos, the subject
parcel of land, thus, said property is their inheritance from their father.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties failed to settle their differences. Hence, trial proceeded.
x x x x2
On February 29, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, then the defendants. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiffs.
There is no pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.3
The RTC held that although respondent Eusebia Ll. Fernandez (Eusebia) testified that Saturnina was her grandmother and that she
died in 1938, Eusebia did not testify on the fact of death of Saturnina from personal knowledge; that the respondents cause of action
heavily rests on the Certificate of Death4 only and no other evidence; that since at the time Saturnina died, there was already an
existing public registry by virtue of Act 3753, hence, no other entity, not even the Catholic Church, had the authority to issue a certificate
regarding the fact of death which can qualify as a public document; that, for these reasons, the Certificate of Death is a private
document and must be authenticated to be admissible as evidence; that respondents failed to notarize or otherwise authenticate the
same and, hence, the facts stated therein are hearsay; and finally, since the deed in question was registered as early as 1964, more
than 20 years had already lapsed, hence, the respondents cause of action had already prescribed at the time of the filing of their
Complaint on August 10, 1992.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC in its Decision dated September 19, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 29, 1996 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City,
Branch 41, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "3") is hereby declared NULL and VOID;
2. The parties are declared co-owners of the subject parcel of land owned by the late Saturnina Salvatin Llemos, as previously
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 38564;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15632 is ordered cancelled;
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA held that the entries in the Registry Book of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral in Dagupan City may be considered as entries
made in the course of business under then Section 37 of Rule 130, 6 which is an exception to the hearsay rule; that Saturnina passed
away on March 12, 1938 as stated by the Book of the Dead of the Catholic Church; that, for this reason, the Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly executed on November 5, 1964 is invalid, as there could not possibly be a meeting of the minds between a dead person
and a living one; that all the parties in the instant suit are presently occupying the property in question; and finally, that the petitioners
cannot invoke the indefeasibility of title since it may still be attacked even beyond the one year period reckoned from the date of its
issuance on the ground of fraud.
On appeal to this Court, the petitioners raise the following issues:
WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACTION HAD PRESCRIBED OR THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES. 7
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE CERTIFICATE OF DEATH ISSUED BY THE
CHURCH WHEN THE REGISTER WAS NEVER PRESENTED NOR THE CLERK WHO PREPARED THE SAME WAS PRESENTED
FOR ITS AUTHENTICATION.8
The issue on prescription deserves scant consideration. The Court has recently affirmed the rule that an action for annulment of title or
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. 9 It is not disputed
that respondents (plaintiffs), including petitioners (defendants), presently occupy the property in question.
Nor can laches be invoked against respondents. In Agra v. Philippine National Bank,10 the Court held that prescription is different from
laches, as the latter is principally a question of equity and each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.
In the present case, evidence shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "C") dated November 5, 1964, conveying the subject
property to Felipe, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, was thumbmarked by Saturnina, by virtue of which, the Register of Deeds of
Dagupan, Pangasinan cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 38564 (Exhibit "B") and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
15632 (Exhibit "D") on November 5, 1964 in the name of Felipe.
Petitioners insist that respondents are guilty of laches considering that the latter filed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the TCT
only on August 10, 1992 or almost 28 years after the TCT was issued to the former on November 5, 1964. On the other hand,
respondents claim that when the Deed of Absolute Sale, on which basis the TCT was issued, was purportedly thumbmarked by
Saturnina on November 5, 1964, the latter had been dead since 1938; that therefore fraud attended the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale; that the TCTs in the names of petitioners are null and void; and that they discovered the fact of fraud only in 1991.
It is a well-settled doctrine that laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application
be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.11
However, in order that respondents complaint may prosper, the burden of proof is on them to show by preponderance of evidence that
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale was fraudulent and, consequently, the issuance of the TCT, a nullity.
Respondents rely principally on the Certificate of Death 12 issued by Rev. Fr. Camilo V. Natividad on January 29, 1991, attesting that
"Salvatin Salvatin", widow of Andres Llemos died on the 12th day of March 1938 and was buried in the Roman Catholic Cemetery of
the parish of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral, Dagupan City. The Certificate further attests that it is a true copy of the original records
as it appears in the Register of Dead of said Parish, Book No. 20, Folio No. 91.
It is well-settled that Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No.
6813 and the passage of Act No. 19014 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. 15 They are
private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence.16

Respondents failed to establish the due execution and authenticity of the Certificate of Death in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
As aptly pointed out by the RTC, respondents failed to present a witness to prove the due execution and authenticity of the Certificate
of Death.
Nonetheless, the CA considered the entry in the Registry Book of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral as to the date of death as admissible
in evidence on the ground that it is an entry in the course of official business which is an exception to the hearsay rule, citing Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 37. Entries in the course of business. - Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.17
The CA committed a reversible error in considering said evidence.
Unfortunately, respondents did not submit as evidence the Register of Dead, Book No. 20 of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral and they
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 130, to wit:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. 18
Under Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court, the original document must be produced and no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxx
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
None of the exceptions are attendant in the present case. The Register of Dead is in the custody of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral but
respondents failed to show that it presented the Certificate of Death because the Register of Dead cannot be produced in court. There
is no showing that the Register of Dead consists of numerous documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from it is only the general result of the whole. Further, respondents failed to present an authentic
document that recites the contents of the Register of Dead. As earlier held, the Certificate of Death is a private document and not a
public document; and respondents failed to prove its authenticity by their failure to present any witness to testify on the due execution
and genuineness of the signature of Fr. Natividad, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132.
Moreover, the Court notes the absence of evidence showing that "Salvatin Salvatin" mentioned in the Certificate of Death is the same
"Saturnina Salvatin" referred to by them as their predecessor-in-interest; and that Father Natividad has personal knowledge of the date
of death of "Salvatin Salvatin". The CA merely relied on the Register of Dead of the parish which, as earlier pointed out, was not
presented in court.

On the other hand, petitioners presented the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1964, marked as Exhibit "3". It is a
notarized document which, as correctly found by the RTC, had been
[E]xecuted with all the formalities of law and ratified by a notary public who attested that the vendor Saturnina Salvatin appeared before
him and acknowledged her deed to be her free act and deed. It was executed in the presence of two witnesses. Maria Llemos Jimenez
likewise testified that the deed was properly executed for valuable consideration at the time.19
A notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized
documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.20
As found earlier, respondents failed to establish the date of death of their predecessor-in-interest which could have proven that the
thumbmark of Saturnina in the Deed of Absolute Sale was fraudulently affixed because she had died before the deed of sale was
purportedly executed by her.
In fine, respondents failed to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim that petitioners predecessor-in-interest obtained his
title through fraud.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint of respondents is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS as successor-in-interest of FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
SMP, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated August 16, 2006
and the Resolution2 dated November 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86055.
The facts of the case, as culled by the CA from the Decision 3 dated June 6, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 92, Quezon
City, in Civil Case No. Q-97-30372, entitled "SMP, Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, et al.," are as follows:
Sometime in January 1995, Maria Teresa Michaela Ong, as Sales Executive of SMP, Inc. undertook the acceptance and servicing of a
purchase order of CLOTHESPAK MANUFACTURING PHILS. (Clothespak) for 4,000 bags or sacks of General purpose (GPS)
polystyrene products. The ordered products were delivered, for which delivery receipts were issued. The total selling price of the
products amounted to U.S. $118,500.00. As payment, Clothespak issued postdated checks in favor of plaintiff SMP and delivered the
same to Maria Teresa Michaela Ong. When the same were deposited by SMP Inc. on their maturity dates, the drawee bank dishonored
and returned said checks for the reason "Account Closed."
In the meantime, a case was filed by herein defendant Far East Bank and Trust Company against Clothespak for a recovery of sum of
money with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment. The Pasig Court granted and issued the writ dated March 14, 1995 in favor
of the plaintiff bank. Real and personal properties of the defendants were levied and attached.
Thereafter, on March 28, 1995, SMP, Inc. filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim in that Civil Case No. 65006, claiming ownership of the
4,000 bags of General Purpose (GPS) polystyrene products taken at Clothespak factory worth P3,096,405.00. With the filing by Far
East Bank of the indemnity bond, the goods claimed were not released and the Pasig Court directed SMP, Inc. to ventilate its claim of
ownership in a vindicatory action under Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Meanwhile, Far East Bank obtained a
favorable judgment against Clothespak. It has become final and executory which led to the implementation and enforcement of said
decision against Clothespaks properties inclusive of the goods earlier attached. Hence, the instant case is filed by SMP, Inc. to recover
from the attaching bank the value of the goods it claims ownership and for damages.1avvphi1
SMP, Inc. alleges that there was wrongful attachment of the goods for ownership of the same was never transferred to Clothespak. The
former anchors its claim of ownership over the goods by virtue of the Provisional Receipt No. 4476 issued by Sales Executive Maria
Teresa Michaela Ong to Clothespak with the words, "Materials belong to SMP Inc. until your checks clear." She testified during the trial
that the above words were in her own handwriting. The said receipt was allegedly issued to Alex Tan of Clothespak after the checks,

payment for the goods, were issued to her. It is asserted that despite receipt by Clothespak of the goods, ownership remained with
SMP, Inc. until the postdated checks it issued were cleared.
Defendant bank, however, claims that the said provisional receipt was falsified to negate the terms of the Sales Invoices. The phrase,
"materials belong to SMP, Inc. until your checks clear," was only an insertion of plaintiffs representative in her own handwriting. It did
not bear the conformity of Clothespak. Further, defendant bank assails the admissibility of the receipt for it is a mere triplicate copy; the
original and duplicate copies were not presented in court, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. Neither was there secondary evidence
presented to conform to the rule.
Defendant asserted that the buyer Clothespak had already acquired ownership over the goods at the time of attachment. As the
delivery receipts clearly showed that the goods had already been delivered and received by the buyer subject to the terms and
conditions of the sales invoices where it was provided that the sales is (sic) "F.O.B." with the loss and/or damage to the goods in transit
being for the buyers account. As provided by law, the ownership of the thing is acquired by the vendee from the moment of delivery in
any of the ways therein specified or in any manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred to the vendee, and the
thing sold is considered delivered when placed in the control and possession of the said vendee.
The main issue presented is whether at the time of the attachment, plaintiff still owned the goods levied upon, or ownership thereof had
already passed to Clothespak Manufacturing. After carefully studying the different contentions of both parties and the pieces of
evidence they have submitted, the Courts (sic) finds in favor of the plaintiff. 4
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Far East Bank and Trust Company (now
Bank of the Philippine Islands), ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Forty
One Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P2,963,041.53) as actual damages, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision in a Decision 6 dated August 16, 2006. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the CA denied the same in a Resolution7 dated November 15, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submitted this sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS A WRONGFUL
ATTACHMENT THUS AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO THAT THE GOODS ATTACHED WERE STILL OWNED
BY SMP, INC., NOT [BY] CLOTHESPACK, WHEN THEY WERE ATTACHED.8
We find the petition bereft of merit.
A distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale is helpful in order to determine the true intention of the parties. In a
contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract to sell, ownership
is, by agreement, reserved for the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. 9 In a contract of
sale, non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. In a contract to sell, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In
a contract of sale, the vendor loses and cannot recover ownership of the thing sold until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved
and set aside. In a contract to sell, the title remains with the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract. 10 In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring an obligatory force.11
In the instant case, ownership of the general purpose polystyrene products was retained by SMP, Incorporated (SMP) until after the
checks given as payment by Clothespak Manufacturing Philippines (Clothespak) cleared. This was evidenced by a provisional receipt
issued by SMP to Clothespak. The agreement between SMP and Clothespak involved a contract to sell defined under Article 1478 of
the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the stipulation that the loss or destruction of the products during transit is on the account of Clothespak, as buyer of
the products, is of no moment. This does not alter the nature of the contract as a contract to sell. The free on board stipulation on the
contract can coexist with the contract to sell. Otherwise stated, the provisions or stipulations in the contract -- for the reservation of the
ownership of a thing until full payment of the purchase price and for the loss or destruction of the thing would be on account of the
buyer -- are valid and can exist in conjunction with the other.

In order to discredit the claim of ownership by SMP, petitioner questions the admissibility of the receipt presented by the former, wherein
the ownership was reserved for the buyer until after full payment of the purchase price. Petitioner claims that the same was
inadmissible in evidence and was in contravention of the best evidence rule. We beg to disagree.
The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are
certain recognized exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.12
However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, the receipt presented by SMP is deemed as an original, considering
that the triplicate copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other copies of the same receipt involving the
same transaction. Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the
transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 16, 2006 and the
Resolution dated November 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86055 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
JOSE LUBIS MASONGSONG and JUANITO LUBIS MASONGSONG, Respondent.

Petitioners,

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75826 which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 12, granting the petition in LRC Case No. 2001-0677.
The Antecedents
On December 28, 2001, Jose Lubis Masongsong and his brother, Juanito Lubis Masongsong, filed a petition in the RTC of Lipa City, for
the declaration of nullity of Decree No. 639024 purportedly issued in favor of Serapio 3 Lubis on June 21, 1937 in LRC Cadastral Record
No. 1296, and that the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) be ordered to issue a new decree in favor of the
petitioners.
The petitioners alleged that Serapio Lubis was the owner of a parcel of land located in Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy,
Batangas. A cadastral survey was later conducted in Lipa and Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, Cad. 218 Lipa Cadastre, where the property
of Serapio Lubis, with an area of 6,146.85 square meters, was identified as Lot No. 8500. The lot was the subject of Cadastral Case
No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296, and after due proceedings, a decision directing the issuance of a decree over the lot was rendered
in favor of Serapio Lubis. Conformably, Decree No. 639024 was issued on June 21, 1937. Serapio Lubis died intestate on December
12, 1940, and was survived by his two daughters, Angela Lubis Masongsong and Gregoria Lubis-Dimaculangan. The latter died on April
26, 1977, survived by her heirs Corazon Dimaculangan Vda. de Bariuan and Milagros Dimaculangan-Lescano; Angela Lubis
Masongsong, likewise, died intestate on October 29, 1989, survived by her children, namely, Alberto, Nicanor, Jose and Juanito, all
surnamed Masongsong, and Arsenia Masongsong-Reyes and Lourdes Masongsong-Aranda. Thereafter, the heirs of Angela
Masongsong and Gregoria Dimaculangan agreed to adjudicate the aforesaid lot unto themselves, and caused the property to be resurveyed. The plan4 was prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gregorio T. Pesigan on August 15, 1998. The petitioners then discovered that
the Bureau of Lands had no existing or salvaged records of Decree No. 639024. Thus, on December 31, 1999, the heirs of Angela
Masongsong and Gregoria Dimaculangan executed a deed entitled "Pagbabahaging Labas sa Hukuman na May Bilihang Ganap O

Lubusan"5 over the property. The property had been declared for taxation purposes, the latest of which was in 1993, under Tax
Declaration No. 008-00006 in the name of Serapio Lubis.6
The petitioners also indicated the names and addresses of the adjoining lot owners as "Placida and Baldomero Lubis, Marlene Nuestro
and Salud Liac, c/o Gregorio Landicho, at Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas." They averred that, to the best of their
knowledge, the property had not been mortgaged nor encumbered, and that no other person had any interest thereon. They asserted
that despite earnest efforts, Decree No. 639024 could no longer be located, and is as such presumed to have been lost or destroyed
during World War II.7
The following were appended to the petition: the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Serapio Lubis, Angela Masongsong
and Gregoria Dimaculangan executed by the petitioners and the heirs of Angela Masongsong and Gregoria Lubis-Dimaculangan on
December 31, 1999; and a Certification dated July 13, 2000 issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 639024 issued on June 21,
1937 covering Lot No. 8500 of the Cadastral Survey of Lipa and Mataasnakahoy, Batangas under Cad. Case No. 24, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 1296 is not among its salvaged records.
On January 4, 2002, the trial court issued an Order 8 giving due course to the petition and setting the hearing at 8:30 a.m. of February 4,
2002, where all persons interested could appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted. The court also directed that
copies of the petition and its annexes and the aforesaid order be served on the Register of Deeds of Batangas, and the City Prosecutor
of Lipa City, and that it be posted in at least three (3) conspicuous places, namely, at the Lipa City public market, Lipa City Hall and at
Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) did not file any written opposition to the petition.
During the hearing of the petition, petitioner Juanito Lubis Masongsong testified and declared that petitioner Jose Masongsong had
taken possession and cultivated the property since 1970.9 He also stated that the heirs of Serapio Lubis, Angela Masongsong and
Gregoria Dimaculangan had settled and adjudicated the estate of the deceased unto themselves on December 31, 1999.10
The petitioners adduced in evidence a technical description of the property duly certified and found correct by the Regional Technical
Director of the Bureau of Lands on August 13, 1998;11 tax declarations covering the property in the name of Serapio Lubis, from 1968 to
1994;12 a Certification from the LRA dated May 29, 1998, stating that after due verification of the record book of cadastral lots in its
custody, it was found that Decree No. 639024 was issued on June 21, 1937 covering Lot No. 8500 of the Cadastral Survey of Lipa and
Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, based on a decision in Cad. Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296; 13 a Certification by the Register of
Deeds of Batangas stating that there was no existing or salvaged record of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 8500 of the Lipa City
Cadastre covered by Decree No. 639024, Cad. Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296 in the name of Serapio Lubis; 14 and a
certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region IV, that per its records, Lot No. 8500 located
in Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, is not covered by any kind of public land application or patent;15 and a certified true
copy of page 88, Cadastral Decree Book, Cadastral Decree Section, LRC, showing that Decree No. 639024 covering Lot No. 8500
based on the decision, Cadastral Case No. 79-1 was issued on June 21, 1937.16
The OSG did not adduce any evidence against the petition.
On May 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision17 granting the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The lost text of Decree No. 639024 issued on June 21, 1937 in the name of Serapio Lubis is
cancelled and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, upon payment of the prescribed fees due thereon, is hereby ordered
to issue a new decree in lieu thereof which shall bear a memorandum that it was issued in lieu of the lost or destroyed decree, but shall
in all respect be entitled to like faith and credit as the original decree. Also, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas,
Batangas City is hereby ordered to cause the registration of the same in the name of Serapio Lubis.
SO ORDERED.18
The OSG appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a new decree,
since the petitioners failed to adduce in evidence a copy of the decree purportedly issued in the name of Serapio Lubis, or at least a
certified copy of the decision of the court granting the decree. It further alleged that there was no showing in the RTC that the owners of
the adjoining lots, namely, Placida Lubis, Baldomero Lubis, Marlene Nuesto and Salud Liac, all of Barangay Calingatan,
Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, were served with copies of the petition, the order of the court setting the case for hearing and the notice of
hearing issued by the court.
On March 15, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC and dismissing the appeal of the OSG.19
In due course, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a petition for review of the decision, alleging that:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE IN EVIDENCE
THE ASSAILED DECREE OR AT LEAST THE DECISION RELEVANT THERETO, WAS ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED BY
RESPONDENTS, AS WELL AS IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE CERTIFICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONCERNED,
NAMELY, THE LRA AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SUBJECT DECREE WAS PRESUMABLY LOST
OR DESTROYED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE ADJOINING LOT OWNERS AND
RESPONDENTS CO-OWNERS NEED NOT BE NOTIFIED OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT A QUO.20
On the first ground, the OSG avers that the respondents failed to prove that Decree No. 639024 in favor of Serapio Lubis ever existed;
it behooved the respondents, as petitioners in the RTC, to adduce as evidence the decree of the court in Cadastral Case No. 24, LRC
Cad. Record No. 1296, or in the absence thereof, any credible explanation why they failed to present such decree; and there is no
competent and credible evidence that such decree had been lost or destroyed during the Second World War. Moreover, while the
Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, failed to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition, the respondents, as petitioners in
the RTC, were burdened to prove the allegations of their petition and should have relied on the strength of their evidence.
The assailed ruling of the CA reads:
In [view] of the facts and circumstances in this case reveals that appellee could not have possibly produced Decree No. 639024 issued
by the government in favor of Serapio pursuant to a decision rendered by the court relative thereto, for the simple reason that the same
was lost or destroyed due to the devastation of the second World War. Contrary to appellants claim, the failure to produce the assailed
decree or decision relevant thereto was well-explained by the appellee. As a matter of fact, they presented the certifications of the
proper government agency to assert that the decree was lost or destroyed. As certified by Alberto Lingayo, Acting Chief of the Ordinary
and Cadastral Decree Division of the LRA, a decree was issued for the subject lot pursuant to a court decision thereon. Although
Salvador Oriel, the Chief of the Docket Division of the said office attested that there is no salvaged decree on file involving the disputed
lot, he stated that the decree was presumed to have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the World War. Also, the nonexistence of a copy of the decree in the files of the LRA or the Register of Deeds does not imply that a decree had never been issued or
recorded. Thus, the trial court did not err in giving weight to these certifications and in granting the petition on the basis thereof. In the
issuance of these certifications, it is presumed, in the absence of contradictory evidence, that an official duty has been regularly
performed. Since the decree in the name of appellees predecessor was issued on June 21, 1937, the court decision granting the same
could have, likewise, been issued around the same time. As such, it can also be presumed that the decision was lost or destroyed due
to the war. Besides, it is too late in the day to ask for such decision, when the appellant oppositor in the instant petition, could have
asked the same during the trial at the court below. With the loss or destruction of these documents, this Court is, likewise, bent on
relying on the certifications issued by the LRA.21

The contention of the petitioner is correct.

The respondents, as the petitioners in the RTC, were burdened to prove the following: that the court had rendered the decision in LRC
Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296 covering Lot 8500 in favor of Serapio Lubis, and that as such, Decree No. 639024 was issued
on June 21, 1937 in favor of Serapio Lubis. The respondents were burdened to adduce in evidence the original, or even a certified copy
directing the issuance of a decree to prove its contents. As provided for in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, secondary
evidence may be adduced in such a case, viz.:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or recorded in a public office.
Furthermore, Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that:
Section 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,

may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
The offeror is not obliged to prove the loss or destruction of the original document beyond all possibility, as it is enough to prove a
reasonable probability of such loss.22 This may be done by a bona fide and diligent search, fruitlessly made in places where it is likely to
be found.23 Destruction signifies that the original no longer exists, while a loss signifies merely that it cannot be discovered.24 The term
execution, on the other hand, means the accomplishment of a thing; the completion of an act or instrument; the fulfillment of an
undertaking.25
The respondents adduced preponderant evidence to prove the existence of Decree No. 639024 covering Lot No. 8500 issued on June
21, 1937, and Lot No. 8434, Cad. 218 Lipa Cadastre with an area of 6,146.85 square meters located in Barangay Calingatan,
Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, originally surveyed from February 1925 to September 1930. 26 A copy of the decree was filed with the Land
Registration Commission (now the LRA), as evidenced by Record Book of Decrees, 27 but the same was not found in the LRA Vault
Section, Docket Division. The respondents failed to adduce evidence that the decision of the court and the decree were in favor of
Serapio Lubis, and failed to present a certified copy of the LRA decision in LRC Case No. 24.
The respondents even failed to adduce in evidence the original or certified true copy of the courts decision in favor of Serapio Lubis.
They could have secured a copy of the decision from the court or from the LRA, but failed to do so. There is even no showing that the
court records in LRC Case No. 24 and the copy of the decision transmitted to the Land Registration Commission (now the LRA) were
missing, lost or destroyed.
The Court notes that the respondents failed to adduce proof that from 1937 until 1968, Serapio Lubis, or after his death, his heirs, ever
declared the property for taxation purposes under his/their names and paid the realty taxes therefor. There is even no evidence that
Serapio, or his heirs after his death, ever took possession of the property from 1937. Inexplicably, it was only in 1968, long after
Serapios death, that the property was declared for taxation purposes under his name. Moreover, Jose Masongsong took possession
and cultivated the property only in 1970.
The Court agrees with the petitioner that Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has no application in this case, as such provision
applies only when the owners duplicate certificate of title is lost or stolen:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due
notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying
for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of fact of such loss or destruction
may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of
a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but
shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes
of this decree.
Clearly, this provision does not apply to the loss or destruction of a decree based on a decision of the land registration court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition of the respondents in the court a quo is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

NORMALLAH
A.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

PACASUM,

Petitioner,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483
promulgated on 7 August 2007 which found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, and its Resolution 2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.

On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents, defined and punished under
paragraph 1 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Cotabato City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance 3 submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of claiming her salary
for the months of August and September 2000.4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be given the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during
a preliminary investigation in order that her right to due process would not be violated. 5 Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for preliminary investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was
not deprived of the opportunity to be heard before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on preliminary
investigation.7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was
held and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order.9 The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and agreed that
the issues to be resolved were as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, falsified her Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the Office
of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the
Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes of claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in order to commit the crime charged.10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K. Pangilan,11 former Human Resource Management Officer V of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, ARMM; 12
and Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government employee and formerly a Human Resource Management
Officer V of the ARMM which position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As such, one of her duties was to receive applications
for clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance was a requirement to be submitted to
the Office of the Regional Director by retiring employees, employees leaving the country or those applying for leave in excess of thirty
days. The person applying for clearance shall get a copy of the employees clearance and shall accomplish the same by having the
different division heads sign it.
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner Norma Pacasum to be the former Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000, petitioner submitted the original of an Employees Clearance
to her office in compliance with the memorandum 14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and
employees to clear themselves of property and money accountabilities before their salaries for August and September 2000 would be
paid. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said
document was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-law, and that the latters signature was very familiar to her. Mrs.
Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the original Employees Clearance with the intention of sending the same to her daughter-in-law for
the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of her name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no
messenger available, she instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office was only a walking
distance away, came and inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same. After she denied that she signed the clearance, and
while they were conversing, the bearer of the Employees Clearance took said document and left.
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the original of the Employee Clearance, but said that the latter
was a niece and staff member of the petitioner. She said that all the signatures 16 appearing in the Employees Clearance were all
genuine except for Lauras signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose signature was allegedly imitated. Laura testified that
presently she was holding the position of Human Resource Management Officer II of the Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said
position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued memorandum receipts (MR)
to employees who were issued government property, and received surrendered office properties from officers and employees of the
DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she was their Regional Secretary of the DOT - ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris17 Batuampar, an officemate and niece of petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with
the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all property accountabilities. She

refused to sign the clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office properties issued to her. A few days
later, she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the latters office and inspect the Employees Clearance submitted by the
representative of petitioner. She went to her mother-in-laws office and was shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing
the same, she denied the signature18 appearing on top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the representative of petitioner,
took the Employees Clearance and left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the instant case. She issued a certification 20
with a memorandum receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by petitioner. The certification attested she did not sign petitioners
Employees Clearance because all the office properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned to the Supply Officer of
the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as Supply Officer, petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City, testified that she had been
a telegraph operator for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City. She
received two telegrams23 for transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and the other to Marie Cris
Batuampar. Upon receiving said documents, she transmitted the documents through telegram. The telegram addressed to petitioner
was received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted
to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005.24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered 25 its documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to which the accused filed her objections. 26 The trial
court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August 2005.27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took the stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional
Secretary of the DOT of the ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov.
Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31 August 2000 in view of
the impending expiration of the Governors extended term. At first, she said the memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet
secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash advances were
required to get an Employees Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She then instructed her staff to work on her salary.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if the signature of Laura
Pangilan therein had been imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not
cause Lauras signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000 sometime in said month, because ARMM
Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance before she could get her salary because she was
re-appointed.28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees Clearance. 29 When she first saw the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance, the signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again
after this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner said it was not she who
placed or caused Lauras purported signature to be affixed there.
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her, because she had no cash advances and she could receive
her salary even without clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier, Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and found that
she had no cash advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her salary. However, she was informed
by her staff that her salary could not be released because the Office of the Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her
clearance, the purpose of which was for the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She was able to get
all the needed signatures except for Lauras signature. With the refusal of Laura to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio
and explained the situation.
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering her to submit to the Office of
the Special Prosecutor the original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August
2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she believed that an Employees Clearance was necessary,
and for this reason she had this document prepared by her staff. She said her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of
Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the document twice. 31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by
Gov. Misuari because the same was the product of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He
explained that this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added that an Employees Clearance was not a
requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in the memorandum, because what was required for the
purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.

On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary exhibits 32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5, with sub-markings. The
prosecution objected to the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court admitted all the defense exhibits.33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged in the information. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A. Pacasum GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged in the Information and, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF
prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof and
to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) with costs against the accused.34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the Employees Clearance of
petitioner to have been falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on petitioners defense denying she was the one who actually
falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the alleged falsification,
because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance and the one who submitted the said
clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The trial court found said denial unsubstantiated and ruled that while
there was no direct evidence to show that petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there were
circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the
subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added that considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and
profited from the use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author of the falsification. Despite full
opportunity, she was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to show that it was another person who falsified/forged the signature of
Laura Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the
same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioners contention that she did not stand to benefit from the falsification of her
Employees Clearance and from the submission thereof to the Office of the Regional Governor, because she allegedly had no existing
cash advances. She claimed that an Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the months of August
and September 2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the presumption that he who benefits from the
falsification is presumed to be the author thereof does not apply to her. The lower court explained that the aforementioned
memorandum applied to petitioner, she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said memorandum to petitioner
was even admitted by her when she, in compliance therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to work for her Employees
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash
advances did not exempt her from the coverage of the memorandum, because she must show she had no cash advances and the only
way to do this was by obtaining a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative value in proving its contents and was inadmissible
because the original thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the presentation and
admission of secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to prove the contents thereof, because
despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution to petitioner and her assistant secretary to produce the original of her
Employees Clearance, they ignored the notice and refused to present the original of said document.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Sandiganbayan 35 to which the prosecution filed a
Comment/Opposition.36 Subsequent thereto, petitioner filed a Supplement to Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be granted in order that the testimony of
Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its Opposition.38
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit; and the
motion for new trial, because the evidence sought to be presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
was required to file its Comment on the petition. 41 After two motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which were granted by
this Court, the OSP filed its Comment dated 18 February 2008.42 Petitioner was required43 to file a Reply to the Comment, which she did
on 5 June 2008.44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5
November 2008.45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in:

I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence must be deemed the author thereof, when the evidence
on record does not support, but even contradicts, such a conclusion.
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was required under the Misuari Memorandum to submit
her Employees Clearance to clear herself of these, when there is no evidence to that effect and the prosecution even admitted
so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the allegedly forged Employees Clearance, in favor of the
innocence of the Accused.
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional evidence on her behalf, thus denying her due process.46
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not required to file an Employees Clearance to
draw her salary, since what was required under said memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She further contends that since
she was not required to file said Employees Clearance because she had no cash advances, the signature in her Employees Clearance
was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was required was a Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid memorandum, what was required before she could draw her
salaries was a Credit Notice from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The full text of the Memorandum 47 form the Regional
Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of the undersigned, it is hereby directed that all outstanding cash
advances be liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all ARMM officials/employees with unliquidated cash
advance shall be withheld until they have settled their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is issued to them by the
Commission on Audit.
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by the drastic cut of our budget, memorandum dated December
01, 1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for financial assistance is hereby suspended effective immediately.
4. For strict compliance.
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from officers/employees who had unliquidated cash advances was the
corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had settled their accounts. There was indeed no mention of any Employees
Clearance therein. Up to this point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in her
Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is
the main issue in this case for falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was effective only starting 1 September 2000 and not before. In
the case at bar, the information charges petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her Employees
Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice requirement was
therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioners Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2)
Who imitated or caused the imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioners Employees Clearance was not
hers. The same was an imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima
facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome.48

Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She adds that Atty. Randolph C.
Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the ARMM, told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not need an Employees
Clearance because she was re-appointed.49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not only for compliance with the
Misuari memorandum but, more importantly, because her term of office was about to end, since her position was coterminous with the
term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her salary for August, 2000, 51 an
Employees Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her secretary that she did not need an
Employee Clearance to get her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re-appointment," when she was working for
her Employees Clearance at around August 2000, improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov. Alvarez, 53 whom she
claims re-appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had her
Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her statement that she did not need an Employees Clearance
because she was re-appointed does not inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had in his position a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. He argues
that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made use of or uttered the Employees
Clearance, because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused it to be submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor. To support such claim, she said there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the
Regional Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the "falsification" of a public document. The act
of "using" falsified documents is not necessarily included in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified documents is
punished under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees Clearance was
consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a public document, it is immaterial
whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. 54 It
is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the falsification was made
and whether the offender profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that the same was circulated to the
different division heads for their signatures is already considered use of falsified documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of
the stamp mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not received by the Office of the
Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional
Governor - ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she
had no knowledge about the falsification because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees
Clearance.
Petitioners denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion.57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person whom she instructed to work for her
Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this person in order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that
the defense never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order, because the defense
never listed her as a witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help her cause after she has been convicted is already too late
in the day, and Ms. Batuampars testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as to merit
the granting of her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will
not exonerate her. We have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the
means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on circumstantial evidence
consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged the signature of Laura Pangilan in the Employees
Clearance in question, the Court nevertheless finds the following circumstances, obtaining in the records, to establish/indicate that she
was the one who committed the forgery or who asked somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura Pangilan
in her Employees Clearance, to wit
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her Employees Clearance in compliance with the
Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of Laura Pangilan was affixed on her

clearance are strong evidence that the accused herself either falsified the said signature or caused the same to be
falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance of the accused is possession by the accused
herself because the former was only acting upon the instructions and in behalf of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her
salary for the months of August and September 2000 is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to commit the
falsification by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the falsification as she admitted that she was able to
collect her salary for the month of August 2000 after her falsified Employees Clearance was submitted and approved by the
ORG-ARMM and therefore, she alone could have the motive for making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man would say that the accused a Regional Secretary of
DOT-ARMM had no knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule, well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his possession or control a falsified document and who makes use of the same, the
presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger or the one who caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of
falsification. Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held that
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and
profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the
forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754;
People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and profited in the use of the falsified
Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is inevitable that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full
opportunity, she was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged or falsified the
signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she alone, had the reason or motive to commit the forgery or
falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner, convince us to apply the rule that in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger and,
therefore, guilty of falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A prima facie case of falsification
having been established, petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This, she failed to
do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans when they failed to report the alleged
falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her
salaries.
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high
respect if not conclusive effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as it is in the best
position to observe the witnesses demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart from such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of petitioners Employees Clearance was supposed
to have been obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted the authenticity and probative value of the
photocopy of the Employees Clearance.
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence if
the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary
evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or
devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should
not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the
original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible
evidence and barren of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing may be
admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails

to produce it after reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the document is in the custody or control of the adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce
the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice
to the said party to produce the document which may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court
in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time
to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce
it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of her assistant secretary, [Marie Cris]
Batuampar. So the prosecution in its effort to produce the original copy of the said Employees Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant
Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA Telegraph Office at
Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to
submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before June 8, 2005, the original of the Employees Clearance in the name of
Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her August and September 2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary.
Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did
not appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of the said Employees Clearance,
much less offered to produce the same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees Clearance as evidenced by the photocopy thereof,
and despite the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her assistant secretary to produce the original of said
employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the presentation and admission of the
photocopy of the original copy of the questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was
justified.65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a
criminal case for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of said document via secondary evidence
or substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the best or primary evidence the original of the document is not available for
any of the causes mentioned in Section 3,66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time to present evidence, allowing her
only two hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure to present another important witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio.
Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The Sandiganbayan outlined the
proceedings of the case as follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial hearing for the reception of defense evidence was
scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its Order
of September 16, 2005, cancelled the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day
workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing on November 23 and 24, 2005,
both at 8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the November 23, 2005
hearing despite due notice, the Court cancelled the November 23 and 24 hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and 14, 2006
both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the same time directed the said defense counsel to show cause in writing within five (5) days from
receipt of the Order why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to appear despite due notice. In compliance with this
Order,1awphi1 Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which were both Noted by
the Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her continued failure to get a substitute counsel considering
that her counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the case since January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March
13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and designated Atty. Conrado Rosario
of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the accused upon receipt of the order to immediately confer with said
counsel for purposes of preparing for her defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasums letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail on March 16, 2006) requesting extension of time to
engage the services of counsel is merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and
said accused would have more than ample time to engage the services of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any excuse from the
accused on said settings that she failed to engage the services of counsel or that her counsel needs more time to prepare will be
unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its Order of March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as a
counsel de oficio to represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter to confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in preparing for
her defense.

On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the accused, that since he was appointed counsel de
oficio, the accused has not communicated with him and therefore he was not ready to present any evidence for the accused, the Court
cancelled the hearing in order to give the defense another opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4, 2006, the following
day as previously scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the case on the ground that she just hired a new counsel
who thereafter arrived and entered his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino
St., Diliman, Quezon City. With the appearance of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged as counsel de oficio
of the accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence on October 9 and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 oclock in
the morning. For repeated failure of the accused to acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby
cancelled and she is ordered to personally appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of Appearance, Motion For Postponement of
October 9 and 10 Hearings stating therein that since his service as new counsel was just engaged by the accused, and that the
accused herself cannot also attend the said hearing because she is undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance of
Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9, 2006, the Court issued the
following, which reads
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006 Hearing filed by accused Normallah L.
Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to be without merit, as this case has been set for hearing several
times and the accused has been given the last chance to present evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for postponement.
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in todays hearing despite the Order of the Court dated July 4,
2006, canceling her waiver of appearance, and ordering her to personally appear before this Court, as prayed for by the prosecution,
let a Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her provisional liberty is ordered
confiscated in favor of the government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from notice to explain in writing why final judgment shall
not be rendered against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to present its evidence today and tomorrow, the last
chance for it to present its evidence, the Court is constraint to consider the accuseds right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order dated October 25, 2006, and Motion to
Set Hearing For Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006.
At the hearing of accuseds motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads
"When the Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest was called for hearing this morning, only
Attorneys Bantuas M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.
In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration . It must be
stressed that the primordial reason for the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the
previous hearing in violation of the Courts Order for her to personally appear in the hearings of this case and for her indifference to the
directives of the Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no alternative but to deny the Motion.
Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought the assurance of the accused (and she promised) to
appear before this Court if the motion will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused the favor to appear before it. The accused is
reminded/advised that the issuance of the warrant of arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear before the Court or be arrested
and brought to the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.

Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecutions Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the Matter
of Accuseds Right to Present Defense Evidence) of the accused dated November 21, 2006, and the prosecutions Opposition thereto,
the Court issued the following Order, which reads
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecutions November 7, 2006 Memorandum
(And For a Second Look on the Matter of Accuseds Right to Present Defense Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiffs
Opposition thereto dated November 28, 2006.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an additional bond of P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid
opposition of the prosecution, in the interest of justice, the Court is inclined to reconsider and give favorable action to the motion and
grant the accused another and last opportunity to present here evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the accuseds last chance to present and/or complete the
presentation of her evidence on February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in
Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court gave her ample opportunity to present her
evidence.67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the trial court was lenient with the petitioner. The failure of the
defense to present Atty. Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we quote
a portion of the hearing when petitioner was testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got together with the other members of the cabinet of Gov.
Misuari, but he lives in Davao, sir.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this case?
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.
CHAIRMAN
Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already gave you enough opportunity to present your side,
right? You should not be telling the Court that only after this hearing, you will start looking (for) people who will, definitely, clear your
name. You should be doing that months ago, correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors.68
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to
be convicted of falsification under said paragraph, the followings elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an
employee, or a notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by counterfeiting or
imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that petitioner was a public officer, being then the
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a
public document) for the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. Such being a requirement, and she being
a public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for her position and employment in
the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of public document, the offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody of the document which he falsified.69 It being her duty to prepare and submit
said document, she clearly took advantage of her position when she falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.lawphil.net
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the

commission of the felony, the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the range of eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7 August 2007 and its
resolution dated 22 October 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
EL
GOBIERNO
DE
ENEMESIA
ACASO,
SEVERIANA GACHO, respondent.

THE

PHILIPPINES,
LAS
et

ISLAS
al.,

petitioner,
FILIPINAS,
contra
reclamantes,

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 29, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56966 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City2 granting
reconstitution of title for Lot No. 1499 in the name of Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi.
On June 21, 1995, respondent Severiana Gacho3 filed a petition for reconstitution of lost certificate of title before the RTC, Lapu-Lapu
City. Her petition alleged the following:
1. That Petitioner Severiana Gacho, is single, Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of Pleasant Homes, Labangon, Cebu City;
2. That she is the owner, by purchase, of a portion of Lot No. 1499 of the Opon Cadastre, situated in Barangay Babag,
Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) described and bounded as follows -NW., by a provincial Road; by Lot 1492, owned by Filomena Palugot,
NE., by Lot 1492, owned by Melecio Tumulak;
SE., by Lot 1500, owned by Laureano Tumulak;
AREA 5,409 square meters, more or less;
All adjacent owners are residents of Barangay Babag, Lapu-Lapu City, with no house numbers.
3. That the said Lot No. 1499, above-described, was owned by Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, both now
deceased, which was adjudged to them by virtue of a decision, dated March 31, 1929, rendered in the above-entitled
registration case, copy of which decision is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A";
4. That pursuant to the said decision (Annex "A"), Decree 365835 was issued to said Lot 1499, in the name of said Tirso
Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, but which decree was not salvaged from the last World War, but its existence appears
in Cadastral Records, a copy of a page therein is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B";
5. That pursuant to said Decree No. 565855, (sic) an Original Certificate of Title has been issued to Lot No. 1499 in the name
of said Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi;
6. That the owners duplicate copy of the said Original Certificate of Title issued to Lot No. 1499, has been lost during the last
World War; and its copy on file in the office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, was also either lost or destroyed
during the said last World War, as shown in a certificate issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, copy of which is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "C";
7. That no co-owners copy of said certificate of title lost has been issued to a co-owner, mortgagee, or lessee;

8. That no deed or any kind of involuntary document affecting said Lot No. 1499 has ever been registered, or pending
registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City;
9. That the land Lot No. 1499 is not or has never been the subject of any Court litigation;
10. That your Petitioner, having purchased a portion of said Lot No. 1499 is initiating this Petition for reconstitution for the
reason that she wants her portion to be issued a certificate of title in her name, but could not do so, if the lost original
certificate of title which was lost during the last World War, be reconstituted first; . . .
11. That attached hereto is the approved plan of the land, consisting of a tracing cloth plan, hereto attached marked as Annex
"D", blue print plan, as Annex "D-1", and its approved technical description marked as Annex "E", as additional basis for the
reconstitution of the said lost certificate of title of Lot No. 1499; and deed of conveyance in favor of petitioner marked as Annex
"F".4
In an Order dated September 6, 1995, the trial court set the initial hearing of the petition on February 12, 1996. 5 Notices of hearing were
published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette 6 and also posted7 in conspicuous places in the Provincial Capitol Building of
Cebu City, the Lapu-Lapu City Hall and the barangay where the property was situated, and the Lapu-Lapu Public Market. The Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City,8 the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority,9 the Director of the Bureau of Lands, 10 and the Office
of the Solicitor General11 in Manila were also furnished copies of the notice of hearing.
After the jurisdictional facts had been established, the Branch Clerk of Court was commissioned to receive the evidence for the
respondent.12
Respondent, in an ex-parte hearing, testified that she had purchased a portion of Lot No. 1499 from Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak
Perez , the legal heirs of the late Concepcion Tumulak, as evidenced by a Deed of Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs with Sale
executed on February 12, 1979; that Concepcion Tumulak was the only daughter of Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, both
deceased, the decreed owners of the lot by virtue of a decision dated March 31, 1929; that Lot No. 1499 was issued Decree No.
365835, the existence of which appeared in the cadastral record; that she acquired an area of 901 square meters from the 5,000 sq.
meters of Lot No. 1499 and is in possession of the same; that there was no adverse claimant on the portion she purchased and the lot
had not been the subject of any court litigation; that she has no knowledge that a co-owners copy of the certificate of title had been
issued to any co-owner, mortgagee or lessee nor that any document voluntarily issued to Lot No. 1499 had been presented for
registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City: that the owners duplicate copy of the title was lost as evidenced by
an affidavit of Conchita Oyao.13
Respondent Gacho offered as bases for reconstitution the following documents:
(i) Xerox copy of the Decision dated March 31, 1929 in Exp. Cad. No. 17, Record No. 946 (Exhibit "I").
(ii) Index of decrees, (Exhibit "J").
(iii) Deed of Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs with Sale dated February 12, 1979 (Exhibit "K").
(iv) Affidavit of Conchita Oyao dated February 22, 1996 (Exhibit "L").
(v) Certification from the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City, dated June 9, 1995 (Exhibit "M").
(vi) Sketch plan of Lot No. 1499 (Exhibit "N").
(vii) Certified Xerox copy of the technical description of Lot No. 1499 (Exhibit "N-1").
On January 13, 1997, the Land Registration Authority submitted a Report 14 signed by Benjamin M. Bustos, its Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division, as follows:
REPORT
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority and to the Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
(1) The present petition seeks the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (N.A.), allegedly lost or destroyed and
supposedly covering Lot 1499, Opon Cadastre, situated at the Municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu.

(2) From Book 38 of the "Record Book of Cadastral Lots", on file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it appears that
Decree No. 365835 was issued for Lot 1499 on October 28, 1929 in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Cad. Record No. 946,
copy of said decree, however, is no longer available in this Authority.
(3) The plan and technical description of Lot 1499, Opon Cadastre were verified correct by this Authority to represent the
aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-16366 pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 26.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the property in question is respectfully submitted for consideration in the resolution of
the instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26
to grant the same, the plan and technical description having been approved, may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical
description on the reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that in case the petition is granted, the reconstituted title being an
original certificate should be made subject to a first lien in favor of the National Government to guarantee the payment of the special
taxes assessed pursuant to Section 18 of Act 2259, as amended, and to a lien in favor of E. Bunagan Surveying Co. to guarantee the
payment of the costs of cadastral survey and monumenting pursuant to Act 3327, as amended, unless the same has previously been
cancelled; and provided, further that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds
concerned.
On March 11, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision as follows:
After a thorough examination of all the evidence, the Court is of the belief that the allegations in the petition have been sufficiently
established and that therefore the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the Court hereby grants the petition and renders judgment directing the Register of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 1499 in the name of Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, which reconstituted
title must conform strictly with the technical description of the lot (Exhibit "N-2").
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its notice of appeal with the trial court and the records were
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its appellants brief, petitioner alleged that the trial court erred:
In granting the petition for reconstitution on the basis of index of decree, sketch plan, certification, among other documents, which
documents are non-acceptable and insufficient bases for reconstitution under RA 26.16
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court. It disposed petitioner
Republics appeal in this wise:
The appeal lacks merit.
Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26, the following are the acceptable sources for reconstitution of an original certificate of title:
Sec. 2. Original Certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate
of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original has been registered;
and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.

Appellant contends that the enumerated documents acceptable as evidence of ownership are either issued by or registered in the
Registry of Deeds, and thus should only be the ones to be considered as official sources recognizing ownership of an applicant in a
reconstitution case, but that they are not among those presented herein. However appellant neglected to mention that petitioner had
presented the Decision of the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de la Prov. de Cebu in EXP Cat. No. 17 entitled "El Gobierno De Las Islas
Filipinas, peticionario contra Enemesia Acaso et al., reclamantes", Record, No. 946 dated March 31, 1929, a certified copy of which had
been admitted in evidence as Exh. "I", found on p. 4 of the Record stating Lote No. 1499, -- a favor de Tirso Tumulak, casado con
Engracia Pongasi, as well as the Cadastral Record which contains the annotation for Decree No. 365835 for Lot No. 1499 marked
Exhibit "J" and "J-1" found on page 5 of the Record. The authenticity and due execution of the foregoing documents marked Exhibit "I"
and "J" have not been questioned, hence deemed admitted.
There is sufficient evidence showing how ownership had been transferred over Lot No. 1499 as afore-stated; Concepcion Tumulak was
the uncontested only heir of Tirso Tumulak. In a Deed of Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs with Sale (Exhibit "K", Record, p. 10)
Aguinaldo and Restituto Perez, heirs to the intestate estate of Concepcion Tumulak, sold the 901 square meters of Lot No. 1499 to the
petitioner Severiana Gacho. It is clear that petitioner was able to show valid title over the property in question (Esso Standard Eastern
Lab. vs. Lim, 123 SCRA 465).
There is ample basis therefore to sustain reconstitution ordered by the court a quo considering that it was also shown by a certification
of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City that the Original Certificate of Title of Lot No. 1499 had been lost or destroyed during the
last Global War (Exhibit "M", Record, p. 6).17
Hence, the instant petition for review wherein petitioner Republic raises the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMNG THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO WHICH GRANTED
RECONSTITUTION ON THE BASES ALONE OF A XEROX COPY OF A PAPER CAPTIONED "DECISION" (BUT WHICH DOES NOT
APPEAR TO BE ONE), AN ENTRY IN THE INDEX OF DECREES, SKETCH PLAN, CERTIFICATIONS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
AND DEED OF SALE, WHICH DOCUMENTS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE SOURCES FOR RECONSTITUTION UNDER RA 26.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO GRANTING
RECONSTITUTION OF AN ALLEGEDLY LOST CERTIFICATE OF TITLE DESPITE THE DEARTH OF EVIDENCE ON THE
PREVIOUS ISSUANCE OF SAID CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.
Respondent Gacho submitted her Comment and petitioner filed a Reply. Parties filed their respective memoranda.
In its Memorandum, petitioner contends that no decree of registration was ever presented by respondent that can support her claim that
since a decree was already issued for Lot No. 1499, there was already a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; that the decision
dated March 31, 1929, on which the Court of Appeals based its assailed decision, was unsigned and contained no discussion or
reference as to matters of what transpired therein except the phrase "Lote No. 1499. A favor de Tirso Tumulak, casado con Engrasia
Pongasi" which cannot be considered a valid judgment under Section 1, Rule 36 18 of the Rules of Court from which a valid decree can
emanate; that the decision is inadmissible since only a geodetic engineer certified as to its authenticity in violation of Section 7, Rule
13019 of the Rules on Evidence; that the entry in the index of decree is not the authenticated copy of the decree of registration referred
to in Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26 and the name of Tirso Tumulak from whom respondent traced her ownership did not appear on the
said index; and that these documents together with the other documents which respondent presented in the trial court, do not qualify as
sources for reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles.
We agree.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 2620 quoted in the Court of Appeals decision enumerates the sources as bases of reconstitution of the original
certificate of title. To reiterate, they are as follows:
Sec. 2. Original Certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate
of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original has been registered;
and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
The Court of Appeals relied on a one page, two-liner Decision dated March 31, 1929 as well as the index of decree which contained the
annotation for Decree No. 365835 for Lot No. 1499 in affirming the decision of the trial court granting respondents petition for
reconstitution. These documents would naturally not fall under Sec 2(a) to (e) of R.A. No. 26 but may be considered under Sec 2(f) of
R.A. No. 26, as any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title. However, we find that they are not enough bases for reconstitution of lost original certificate of title.
The entire text of the 1929 decision attached to the petition for reconstitution is reproduced, in verbatim as follows:
ESTADOS
ISLAS
EN
EL
PROV. DE CEBU

UNIDOS
JUZGADO

DE
DE

PRIMERA

INSTANCIA

DE

20.0
Sala Auxiliar
EL
GOBIERNO
FILIPINAS,
Peticionario,

AMERICA
FILIPINAS
LA

Distrito

DE

LAS
Record

ISLAS

EXP.
No.

CAD.

No.

17
946

et

al.,

- contra ENEMESIA
Reclamantes.

ACASO,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
Lote No. 1499. A favor de Tirso Tumulak, casado con Engrasia Pongasi.
xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
ASI
Cebu, Cebu, 31 de Marzo de 1929.
(Fdo.)
Juez Auxiliar del 20.0 Distrito

SE

GUILLERMO

ORDENA.

F.

PABLO

A certified true copy:

Cebu City, April 19, 1995
BENITO
Geodetic Engineer

F.

BUNAGAN

Significantly, only a certain Geodetic Engineer certified that the copy of the decision attached to the petition was a true copy of the
same. It was not established that the Geodetic Engineer is the public officer who is in custody thereof. Section 7, Rule 130, Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
Thus, in the absence of proof that the Geodetic Engineer is a public officer in custody thereof, such piece of evidence has no probative
value.
We also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree No. 365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for reconstitution.
We noticed that the name of the applicant as well as the date of the issuance of such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835
existed in the Record Book of Cadastral Lots in the Land Registration Authority as stated in the Report submitted by it, however, the
same report did not state the number of the original certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration of heirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak Perez and
respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also mention the number of the original certificate of title but only Tax Declaration No. 00393.
As we held in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,21 the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the
number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition.
Respondent Gacho argues that contrary to petitioners claim that there is no certificate of title to be reconstituted, it had been shown
that the 1929 decision adjudicated Lot No. 1499 to Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi which was the foundation of the
issuance of the decree and consequently the issuance of the original certificate of title. We are not persuaded. As we have discussed
above, we cannot give any probative value to the 1929 decision which cannot be considered as a valid source for reconstitution.
Respondent Gacho also submitted the plan, the technical description of Lot No. 1499 as well as the certification from the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Dioscoro Y. Sanchez, Jr., stating that the Original Certificate of Title of Lot No. 1499 of Opon Cadastre as per
records on file has been lost or destroyed during the last Global War. However, these are not the documents referred to under Section
2(f) of R.A. No. 26 but are mere additional documents that will accompany the petition to be forwarded to the Land Registration
Authority. In Heirs of Felicidad Dizon vs. Discaya,22 we held:
We now tackle the theory that the "other documents" mentioned in Section 3(f) of RA 26 refer to those enumerated in paragraph 5 of
LRC Circular No. 35 dated June 13, 1983, to wit:
5. In case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2 (f) and 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26 in
relation to section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of the petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be accompanied by the
following:
(a) A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth, with two (2) print copies thereof, prepared by the government
agency which issued the certified technical description, or by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer who shall certify thereon that
he prepared the same on the basis of a duly certified technical description. Where the plan as submitted is certified by the
government agency which issued the same, it is sufficient that the technical description be prepared by a duly licensed
Geodetic Engineer on the basis of said certified plan.
(b) The original, two (2) duplicate copies, and a xerox copy of the original of the technical description of the parcel of land
covered by the certificate of title, duly certified by the authorized officer of the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration
Commission who issued the technical description.
(c) A signed copy of the certification of the Register of Deeds concerned that the original of the certificate of title on file in the
Registry was either lost or destroyed, indicating the name of the registered owner, if known from the other records on file in
said office."
Petitioners maintain that since they submitted before the lower court Exhibits "N" 5 , "S" 6 and "S-1" 7 , and "T" 8 , consisting of the
certification from the register of Deeds, technical descriptions, and tracing cloth plan, respectively, their petition for reconstitution should
have been granted by the lower court.
Untenable is petitioners' contention. Paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 specifically states that "[i]n case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in sections 2(f) and 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26, in relation to section 12 thereof, the signed
duplicate copy of the petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be accompanied by the following: . . ." From the foregoing, it is
clear that subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 are merely additional documents that must accompany
the petition to be forwarded to the Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority). There is nothing in LRC Circular
No. 35 to support petitioners' stance that the documents therein enumerated are those referred to in Section 3(f) of RA 26.
It has been held by the Court that when Section 2(f) of Republic Act No. 26 speaks of "any other document," the same must refer to
similar documents previously enumerated therein 9 , that is, those mentioned in Sections 2(a), (b), (c), and (d). Having failed to provide

a sufficient and proper basis for reconstitution, petitioners cannot assail the respondent court for dismissing their petition for
reconstitution.23 (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the affidavit of a certain Conchita Oyao, an alleged neighbor of the Tumulaks, attesting to the fact that there existed an
original certificate of title, the number of which she did not mention, issued to Lot 1499 as she personally saw the owners duplicate
copy during the lifetime of the registered owners, does not help the case of respondent Gacho. In the first place, said affidavit is
inadmissible in evidence under the hearsay rule 24 since Oyao was not presented in court to testify on such alleged loss of the original
certificate of title. Secondly, even if we were to consider the contents of the affidavit, the same do not likewise help respondents case.
While Oyao attested to the fact of the loss of such title by Aguinaldo Tumulak Perez during the Japanese invasion, respondent,
however, failed to show why Oyao was the one who attested to the fact of loss and not Aguinaldo who was allegedly in possession of
the owners duplicate copy at the time it was lost. It is also noted that Aguinaldo or his brother Restituto did not bother to reconstitute
the title after it was lost during the Japanese invasion.
In fine, we are not convinced that respondent Gacho had adduced competent evidence to warrant reconstitution of allegedly lost
original certificate of title since she had not proven the existence of the same. The courts must be cautious and careful in granting
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. 25 It is the duty of the trial court to scrutinize and verify carefully all supporting
documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact, circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence and
loss of the title should be examined.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000, affirming the
RTC order granting respondents petition for reconstitution, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is entered denying the
petition for reconstitution.
SO ORDERED.

COMPAIA
MARITIMA,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION, SALVADOR T. LLUCH, MARIANO LL. BADELLES, individually and in their capacities as President
and Vice-President, respectively of the Allied Free Workers Union, NICANOR HALEBAS and LAURENTINO LL. BADELLES,
individually and officers of Allied Free Workers Union, defendants-appellants.
Halibas, Badelles, Padilla & Sepulveda and Vicente A. Rafael & Associates for defendants-appellants.
Rufino J. Abadies, Francisco Obach & Jesus Quijano for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
Antecedents. - Since the onset in 1954 of litigation between the parties herein, this is the fifth case between them that has been
elevated to this Court. The incidents preceding the instant appeal are as follows:
On August 11, 1952 the Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union
agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees. vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one
month counted from August 12, 1952.
It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render proper
service. The contract could be renewed by agreement of the parties (Exh. J).
At the time the contract was entered into, the union had just been organized. Its primordial desire was to find work for its members. The
union agreed to the stipulation that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the loading,
unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the
cargoes" as "has been the practice in the port of Iligan City" (Par. 2 of Exh. J).
The union found out later that that stipulation was oppressive and that the company was unduly favored by that arrangement.
Under the contract, the work of the union consisted of arrastre and stevedoring service. Arrastre, a Spanish word which refers to
hauling of cargo, comprehends the handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the
ship's tackle. The service is usually performed by longshoremen.

On the other hand, stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds
of the vessel.
The shippers and consignees paid the union oth for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring service. They claimed
that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the
cargo was at the shipowner's expense (Exh. 1).
On the other hand, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the contract (Exh. J) explicitly provided that the
compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees, as was the alleged practice in
Iligan City, and that the shipowner would not be liable for the payment of such services.
Thus, the issue of whether the company should pay for the stevedoring service became a sore point of contention between the parties.
The union members labored under the impression that they were not being compensated for their stevedoring service as distinguished
from arrastre service.
Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract (Exh. J) was disadvantageous to the union, it did not terminate the contract because its
members were in dire need of work and work, which was not adequately compensated, was preferable to having no work at all (204,
214-5, 226-7 tsn May 20, 1960).
Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said contract was verbally renewed. The company allowed the union to continue
performing arrastre and stevedoring work.
On July 23, 1954 the union sent a letter to the company requesting that it be recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit to load and
unload the cargo of its vessels at Iligan City. The company ignored that demand. So, the union filed on August 6, 1954 in the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition praying that it be certified as the sole collective bargaining unit.
Despite that certification case, the company on August 24, 1954 served a written notice on the union that, in accordance with payment
of the 1952 contract, the same would be terminated on August 31, 1954. Because of that notice, the union on August 26, 1954 filed in
the CIR charges of unfair labor practice against the company.
On August 31, 1954 the company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. On the
following day, September 1, the union members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing
arrastre and stevedoring work. The picket lasted for nine days.
On September 8, 1954 the company sued the union and its officers in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for the rescission of the
aforementioned 1952 contract, to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of
damages.
On the following day, September 9, the lower court issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction after the company had posted a bond
in the sum of P20,000. A few hours lateron that same day the union was allowed to file a counterbond. The injunction was lifted. The
union members resumed their arrastre and stevedoring work.
Later, the union assailed in a prohibition action in this Court the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the action for damages, and
injunction.
A majority of this Court held that the lower court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and to take cognizance of the damage suit filed
by the company but that the injunction was void because it was issued ex parte and the procedure laid down in section 9(d) of Republic
Act No. 875 was not followed by the trial court (Allied Free Workers Union vs. Judge Apostol, 102 Phil. 292, 298).
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated December 5, 1960, amended on January 11, 1961, (1) declaring the arrastre and
stevedoring contract terminated on August $1, 1954; (2) dismissing the union's counterclaim; (3) ordering the union and its officers to
pay solidarily to the company P520,000 as damages, with six percent interest per annum from September 9, 1954, when the complaint.
was filed; (4) permanently enjoining the union from performing any arrastre and stevedoring work for the company at Iligan City, and (5)
requiring the union to post a supersedeas bond in the sum of P520,000 to stay execution.
The union filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, the company filed a motion for the execution pending appeal of the
money judgment. It filed another motion for the immediate issuance of a writ of injunction. That second motion was filed in the municipal
court of Iligan City in view of the absence of the District Judge.
The municipal court issued the writ of injunction. However, this Court set it aside because it was not an interlocutory order and no
special reasons were adduced to justify its issuance (Allied Free Workers Union vs. Judge Estipona, 113 Phil. 748).

The union on January 6, 1961 had perfected an appeal from the lower court's original decision. It did not appeal from the amended
decision. On March 24, 1962 the lower court issued an order declaring its amended decision final and executory in view of the union's
failure to appeal therefrom. The court directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of execution. That order was assailed by the union in a
certiorari action filed in this Court. A preliminary injunction was issued by this Court to restrain the execution of the judgment.
On May 16, 1962 this Court dissolved the injunction at the instance of the company which had filed a counterbond. Thereupon, the 225
members of the union yielded their ten-year old jobs to the new set of workers contracted by the company.
The certiorari incident was decided on June 30, 1966. This Court noted that the lower court amended its decision for the purpose of
correcting certain errors and omissions which were not substantial in character and that its amended decision was served upon the
parties after the union had perfected its appeal from the original decision.
Under those circumstances, this Court held that the union's appeal should be given due coarse, subject to the amendment of its record
on appeal. This Court reserved to the members of the union the right to secure restitution under sections 2 and 5, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court (Allied Free Workers Union vs. Estipona, L-19651, June 30, 1966,17 SCRA 513, 64 O.G. 2701).
Pursuant to that reservation, the union on December 16, 1966 filed a motion for restitution, praying that its 225 members be restored to
their jobs and that the company be ordered to pay P 1,620,000 as damages, consisting of the lost earnings during the four-years period
from May 8, 1962 to May 8, 1966.
On the other hand, the company in its motion of January 18, 1967 reiterated its 1960 motion for the execution of the lower court's
judgment as to the damages, of P520,000 and the permanent injunction.
Later, the company called the lower court's attention to this Court's decision dated January 31, 1967. In that decision, this Court
affirmed the CIR's decision holding that the company did not commit any unfair labor practice and reversed the CIR's directive that a
certification election be held to determine whether the union should be the exonemtod bargaining unit. This Court held that the union
could not act as a collective bargaining unit because the union was an independent contractor and its members were not employees of
the company (Allied Free Workers Union vs. Compaia Maritima, L-22951-2 and L-22971, 19 SCRA 258).
The lower court in its order of April 25, 1967 (1) denied the union's motion for restitution and to stay execution of its amended decision
on January 11, 1961 and (2) required the union to file a supersedeas bond in the sum of P100,000 within thirty days from notice. The
bond was reduced to P50,000 in the lower court's order of August 16, 1967. The union posted the bond on August 24,1967.
The lower court approved the union's amended record on appeal in its order of October 6, 1967.
The union appealed directly to this Court because the amount involved exceeds P200,000. The appeal was perfected before Republic
Act No. 5440 took effect on September 9,1968.
Other proceedings. - The company in its original complaint prayed that the union and its officials be ordered to pay actual damages,
amounting to P15,000 for the union's failure to load and unload cargo in and from the consignees. vessels from September 1 to 8,
1954; P50,000 as damages, due to the union's inefficiency in performing arrastre and stevedoring work "during the latter part of the
existence" of the contract; P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages, (not supported by any allegation in the body of the complaint)
and P5,000 as attorney's Considering (10-12, Record on Appeal).
On September 15, 1954 the company added a fourth cause ofaction to its complaint. It alleged that by reason of the acts of harassment
and obstruction perpetrated by the union in the loading and unloading ofcargo the company suffered additional damage in the form of
lost and unrealized freight and passenger charges in the amount of P10,000 for September 9 and 10, 1954 (66, Record on Appeal).
On November 2, 1954 the company attached to its motion for the revival of the injunction against the union an auditor's report dated
September 15, 1954 wherein it was indicated that the company lost freight revenues amounting to P178,579.20 during the period from
January 1 to September 7, 1954 (121-143, Record on Appeal).
On November 27, 1954 the company filed another motion for the restoration of the injunction. In support of that motion the company
attached a trip operation report showing the unloaded cargoes on the consignees. vessels, when they docked at Iligan City on
September 14, 19, 22 and 26 and October 3 and 5, 1954, as well as the delays in their departure (157-162, Record on Appeal).
On March 5, 1955 the company added a fifth cause ofaction too its complaint. It alleged that during the period from September 12 to
December 28, 1954 it lost freight charges on unloaded cargoes in the sum of P62,680.12, as shown in a detailed statement, and that it
incurred an estimated amount of P20,000 for overhead expenses. for the delay in the dismissal of its vessels attributable to the union's
unsatisfactory stevedoring and arrastre work (225-229, 237-8, Record on Appeal).
Also on March 5, 1955 the union answered the original and supplemental complaints. It denied that its members had rendered
inefficient service. It averred that the termination of the contract was prompted by the consignees. desire to give the work to the Iligan

Stevedoring Association which the company had allegedly organized and subsidized. The union filed a counterclaim for P200,000 as
compensation for its services to the company and P500,000 as other damages, (239-252, Record on Appeal).
On March 9, 1960 the company filed a third supplemental complaint, It alleged that the continuation of the stevedoring and arrastre
work by the union for the company from 1955 to date had caused losses to the company at the rate of P25,000 annually in the form of
lost freight on shutout cargoes and the expenses. for the equipment used to assist the union members in performing their work (320-3,
Record on Appeal).
Plaintiff company's evidence. - Jose C. Teves, the consignees. branch manager at Iligan City, testified that on August 24, 1954 he
terminated the arrastre and stevedoring contract with the union (Exh. J) upon instruction of the head office. The contract was terminated
in order to avoid further losses to the company caused by the union's inefficient service (85-86 tsn March 11, 1960).
After the termination of the contract, the members of the union allegedly harassed the company with the help of goons. The cargoes
could not be unloaded in spite of the fact that the company had sought the protection of the law-enforcing authorities (88). The
consignees. last recourse was to go to court. (89).
The company supposedly suffered losses as a result of the union's inefficient service since September 1, 1954 (91). Teves hired
auditors to ascertain the losses suffered by the company during the period from January 1 to September 11, 1954.
The trial court awarded actual damages, amounting to P450,000 on the basis of the auditor's reports, Exhibits A to I. It did not carefully
examine the said exhibits. Contrary to the trial court's impression, Exhibits B, C and D are not auditors' reports.
The trial court did not bother to make a breakdown of the alleged damages, totalling P450,000. The reports of the two hired
accountants, Demetrio S. Jayme and M. J. Siojo, show the following alleged damages, in the aggregate amount of P349,245.37 (not
P412,663.17, as erroneously added by the consignees. counsel, 161,163-4 tsn March 11, 1960):
TABULATION OF ALLEGED
DAMAGES CLAIMED BY COMPAIA MARITIMA

(1) Freight for 74,751 bags of fertilizer

allegedly booked for shipment in the

company's vessels but loaded in other vessels

during the period from Jan. 1 to August 31,

1954, Statement A in Exh. A, CPA Jayme's

report.........................................................

(2) Lost freight on other shutout cargoes

P29,900.40

for January 1 to August 31, 1954, Statement A

in Exh. A, of CPA Jayme .........................

4,339.64

(3) Lost freight on shutout cargoes for

September 2 to 7, 1954 booked for shipment in

M. V. Mindoro, Panay and Masterhead Knot,

Statement B in Exh. A, CPA Jayme's report...

6,167.16

(4) Losses sustained in voyages of M.V.

Panay and Mindoro in four voyages from

September 4 to 11, 1954, with estimates,

Statement B, Exh. A...............................

3,764.50

(5) Other estimated losses for the said

voyages of M.V. Panay and Mindoro for the

same period, based on interviews of parties at

the wharf, Statement B, Exh. A...............

10,000.00

(6) Additional subsistence expenses. for the

M.V. Mindoro and Panay due to the delays in

their dismissal from January 1 to August 31,

1954 as certified by the pursers of the two

vessels, Statement C, Exh. A.....................

4,407.50

(7) Estimated loss in freight and passenger

revenue for the period from January 1 to

August 31, 1954, based on 1953 freight revenue

for the same period Statement D, Exh. A.....

100,000.00

(8) Estimated loss in passenger fares for

the period from September to December 31,

1954, Statement D, Exh. A.......................

20,000.00

(9) Lost freight charges from September

12 to December 28, 1954, as certified by the

chief clerk of the consignees. Iligan office. Exh.

B.............................................................

62,680.12

(10) Estimated overhead expenses for

delay of vessels in port, Exh. B.................

20,000.00

(11) Forklift operating expenses. for 1955,

consisting of salaries and maintenance

expenses, Exh. E- 1....................................

5,677.54

(12) Lost freight revenue for 1955, Exh. E-

2...............................................................

17,838.78

(13) Forklift operating expenses. for 1956,

Exh. F- 1...................................................

3,520.90

(14) Lost freight revenue for 1956, Exh. F-2

3,849.56

(15) Forklift operating expenses. for 1957,

Exh. G- 1...................................................

8,259.08

(16) Lost freight revenue for 1957, Exh. G-

2....................................................................

14,538.10

(17) Forklift operating expenses. for 1958,

Exh. H-1...................................................

7,503.45

(18) Lost freight revenue for 1958, Exh. H-

2.............................................................

10,193.46

(19) Forklift operating expenses. for 1959,

Exh. I-1....................................................

8,745.35

(20) Lost freight revenue for 1959, Exh. I-2

7,959.83

T OT A L -

P349,245.37

We tabulated the alleged damages, to show that the trial court's award to the company of P450,000 as damages, is not supported by
the evidence. On the other hand, the statement of the consignees. counsel that the damages, totalled P412,663.17 (162- 164 tsn
March 11, 1960) is wrong.
Teves, the consignees. branch manager, submitted a statement (Exh. K) showing the alleged cost of three forklifts, 200 pieces of pallet
boards, 530 pieces of wire rope slings and two pieces of tarpaulins in the total sum of P27,215. In that statement, he claims that the
damages, to the company by reason of the depreciation of the said items of equipment amounted to P38,835 or more than the cost
thereof.
The company's counsel, in his summary of the damages, ignored the alleged damages, of P38,835 indicated by Teves in Exhibit K. The
consignees. counsel relied oth on the auditors' reports, Exhibits A and E to I and on Exhibit B, the chief clerk's statement. As already
noted, those documents show that the total damages, claimed by the company amounted to P349,245.37.
The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have been the sales invoices instead of the oral testimony of Teves. He did
not produce the sales invoices.
Teves further testified that Salvador T. Lluch was the president of the union; Nicanor Halibas, the treasurer; Mariano Badelles, the
general manager, and Luarentino Badelles, a vice president.
Appellants' statement of facts. - To sustain their appeal, the appellants made the following exceedingly short and deficient recital of the
facts:
Sometime in the month of August, 1954, defendant, Allied Free Workers Union filed an unfair labor practice case
against defendant (should be plaintiff) and its branch manager, Mr. Jose Teves, with the Court of Industrial Relations,
Manila, and docketed as Case No. 426-UPL: defendant union also filed a petition for certification election docketed as
Case No, 175-MC against plaintiff; defendant union also filed a notice of strike dated August 27, 1954; the Secretary
of Labor wired the public defender, Iligan City, on August 27, 1954 (see annexes 1-4, motion to dismiss, Record on
Appeal, pp. 54-65).
To counteract these legitimate moves of labor, plaintiff filed the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 577 in the Court
of First Instance of Lanao (now Lanao del Norte) for damages, and/or resolution of contract with writ of preliminary
injunction, On a decision adverse to their interests, defendants take this appeal.
On the question of jurisdiction taken before this Honorable Tribunal in G.R. No. L-8876, it was held:
... for the instant case merely refers to the recovery of damages, occasioned by the picketing undertaken by the
members of the union and the rescission of the arrastre and stevedoring contract previously entered into between the
parties.
The appellants did not discuss their oral and documentary evidence. *
First assignment of error. - The appellants contend that the trial court erred in awarding to the company actual damages, amounting to
P450,000, moral damages, of P50,000 and attorney's Considering of P20,000, and in holding that the four officers of the union are
solidarily liable for the said damages.
Appellants' counsel assailed the award of actual damages, on the ground that the auditors' reports, on which they were based, were
hearsay.
After analyzing the nature of the damages, awarded, how the same were computed, and the trustworthiness of the company's
evidence, we find the first assignment of error meritorious.
We have already stress that, on the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of
simple addition, does not reach the sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants' reports and in
the statement made by the consignees. chief clerk (who did not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were
based, was not duly established (U. S. vs. Razon and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856, 861; 29 Am Jur 2nd 529).

It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that
the company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination (29 Am Jur 2nd 517-8; 32A C.J.S. 111).
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as
proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like" (Anno 52 ALR 1266).
That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or
impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court (29 Am Jur
2nd 529).
A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports reveals their lack of probative value. The propriety of allowing the different items of
damages, is discussed below.
Unrealized freight and passenger revenue for 1954 ascertained by Accountant Demetrio S. Jayme. - In his report (Exh. A, pp. 134 to
147, Record on Appeal), Jayme used the pronouns "we" and "our" and made reference to the examination made by the "auditors" and
his accounting office.
He did not disclose the names of other "auditors" who assisted him in making the examination of the consignees. records.
He gave the impression that he was an independent accountant hired by the company to make a "special investigation" of the
consignees. losses for the period from January 1 to September 7, 1954.
The truth is that Jayme was a "personal friend" of Teves, the consignees. branch manager at Iligan City. Teves was the consignees.
principal witness in this case. He verified the complaint. herein. He signed for the company the stevedoring and arrastre contract which
he later rescinded. In fact, Teves intervened in the drafting of the contract. It was his Idea that the company should not pay the arrastre
and stevedoring Considering and that those charges should be borne by the shippers and consignees.
Jayme was not only the friend of Teves but was also his co-employee. Jayme was the consignees. branch manager at Ozamis City and
later at Cagayan de Oro City (217-8 tsn May 20, 1960; Exh. 12). He suppressed that fact in his report of examination. Apparently, the
practice of accounting was his sideline or he practised accounting and, as the saying goes, he moonlighted as the consignees. branch
manager. Obviously, Jayme would be biased for the company. He violated a rule of the accountants' code of ethics by not disclosing in
his report of examination that he was an employee of the company (84 tsn June 2, 1960).
Accountant Jayme allegedly found from the consignees. records at Iligan City that its freight and passenger revenue for the eightmonth period from January 1 to August 31, 1953 amounted to P373,333.14 and that for the same period in 1954, that revenue
amounted to P470,716.29, or an increase of P97,383.12 (Statement D of Exh. A, 145, Record on Appeal).
Jayme interpreted those figures as signifying that the company would have realized more revenue if the union had rendered better
service. He reasoned out that there was a big volume of business in Iligan City due to the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant, Iligan Steel Mill
and NPC Hydroelectric Plant. He imagined that the consignees. freight revenue during the first eight months of 1954 could have
amounted to at least P600,000 and that since it actually realized oth P 470,716.29, its loss of freight revenue for that period could be
"conservatively" estimated at least P100,000 (item 7 of the tabulation of damages).
He stated that he attached to his report on the comparative statement of gross revenue a certificate of the captain of the vessel Panay
showing the delays in its dismissal in Iligan City as indicated in its logbook. No such document was attached to Jayme's report.
And from the fact that the total fares received by the company during the eight-month period were reduced in the sum of P3,951.58
(Jayme fixed the reduction at the round figure of P4,000), he calculated that the company suffered a loss of at least P20,000 in
passenger revenue up to December 31, 1954 (Item 8 of the tabulation of damages).
Jayme also included in his report (a) damages, amounting to P10,000 as his estimate of losses supposedly "based on interviews with
disinterested parties at the wharf and city proper customers"; (b) damages, amounting to P3,764.50 allegedly suffered in the operation
of the vessels Mindoro and Panay from September 4 to 11, 1954, consisting of extra meals, expenses. for unloading cargo, estimated
loss in passage revenue for four voyages, and estimated loss from 14 re-routed freights to competing vessels" (consisting of rice, corn
and bananas), and (e) the sum of P4,407.50 as alleged additional subsistence incurred for the crew of the Panay and Mindoro from
January 1 to August 31, 1954 (items 4, 5 and 6 of the tabulation of damages). The records of the purser and chief steward were
allegedly examined in ascertaining those damages.
It would not be proper to allow Jayme's estimates as recoverable damages. They are not supported by reliable evidence. They can
hardly be sanctioned by the "generally accepted auditing standards" alluded to in Jayme's report. The pertinent records of the company
should have been produced in court. The purser and steward did not testify.
The rule is that the auditor's summary should not include his conclusions or inferences (29 Am Jur 2d 519). His opinion is not evidence.

The trial court unreservedly gave credence to the conjectures of Jayme. Obviously, his inflated guesses are inherently speculative and
devoid of probative value. Furthermore, his estimate of the unrealized freight revenue for January 1 to August 31, 1954 overlapped with
his computation of the lost freight for the unloaded 74,751 bags of fertilizer and other cargoes covering the same period (Statement A of
Exh. A).
The foregoing discussion shows Jayme's unreliable modus operandi in ascertaining the 1954 losses which the company claimed to
have suffered in consequence of the union's alleged inefficiency or poor service. It is noteworthy that those losses were not averred
with particularity and certitude in the consignees. complaint.
The same observations apply with equal cogency to the damages, amounting to P40,407.20 as lost freight revenue also for the year
1954 (items 1 to 3 of the tabulation of damages) which were computed by Accountant Jayme.
Those items refer to (1) the sum of P29,900.40 as lost freight revenue on 74,751 bags of fertilizer, already mentioned, which were
booked for shipment in the consignees. vessels from January 1 to August 31, 1954 but which were allegedly loaded in other vessels;
(2) P4,339.64 as unrealized freight revenue for other cargoes booked in the consignees. vessels but not loaded therein during the
same eight-month period, and (3) P6,167,16 as unrealized freight revenue on shutout cargoes not loaded in the consignees. vessels
during the six-day period from September 2 to 7, 1954.
Jayme allegedly based his computations on the records of the company which were not produced in court. The union objected to
Jayme's report as inadmissible under the hearsay rule or as not being the best evidence.
Even if the presentation of the records themselves as exhibits should have been dispensed with, yet the complaint to show good faith
and fair dealing, could have brought the records in court (manifests, bills of lading, receipts for the freights, if any, etc.) and enabled the
court and the union's counsel and its expert accountant to verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries.
Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company was not able to collect the stipulated freight on the
alleged shutout cargoes should have been proforma. in evidence as supporting papers for Jayme's report. No such exhibits were
presented.
The flaw or error in relying merely on Jayme's summaries is that, as pointed out by witness Mariano LL. Badelles, cargoes might be
shutout due to causes other than the supposed inefficiency of the union. He testified that cargoes were shutout deliberately by the
company because they could not be loaded in one vessel (for example, 50,000 bags of fertilizer), or a shipper had no allotment, or
because the company did not want to load cargoes like bananas (189-194 tsn May 20, 1960). Jayme's summaries did not take into
account the probability that a part of the cargo booked in the consignees. vessel for a certain date might not have been loaded on that
date but was loaded in another vessel of the company which docked at the port a few days later, In that case, there would be no loss of
freight revenue. The mere shutting out of cargo in a particular voyage did not ipso facto produce loss of freight revenue.
Our conclusion is that an injustice would be perpetrated if the damages, aggregating P178,579 computed and estimated in the report of
Jayme, a biased witness, should be accepted at their face value.
Damages computed by Salvador M. Magante. - The company also claims as damages, for the period from September 12 to December
28, 1954 lost freight charges on shutout cargoes in the sum of P62,680.12, and the sum of P20,000 as "overhead expenses. for delay
of vessels in port", as set forth by Salvador M. Magante, the consignees. chief clerk at Iligan City, in his statement, Exhibit B (items 9
and 10 of the tabulation of damages).
Magante did not testify on his statement. Instead, accountant Jayme, substituting for Magante, testified on that statement. Jayme said
that he verified the consignees. records on which Magante based his statement. Jayme assured the court that the figures in Magante's
statement were supported by the consignees. records.
But as to the damages, of P20,000, Jayme said that he could not certify as to their company, because he had not finished his
investigation (33 tsn March 9, 1955). In spite of that admission, the trial court allowed that item of damages.
The trial court erred in allowing the damages, totalling P82,680.12 because Magante's statement, Exhibit B, is hearsay. Magante should
have been proforma. as a witness. Jayme was not competent to take his place since the statement was prepared by Magante, not by
Jayme. More appropriate still, the documents and records on which the statement was based should have been proforma. as evidence
or at least brought to the court for examination by the union's counsel and its accountant. The trial court required the production of the
manifests supporting Magante's statement (85-86 tsn march 9, 1955). Only one such manifest, Exhibit C, was produced. The
nonproduction of the other records was not explained.
Lost freight revenue and operating expenses for the forklifts. - The company claimed as damages, the sum of P87,986.05 (P151,403.85
as erroneously computed by the consignees. counsel, 163 tsn March 11, 1950) consisting of supposed unrealized freight charges for
shutout or unloaded cargoes for the year 1955 to 1959 (Exh. E to I, Items 11 to 20 of the tabulation of damages).

The claim is covered by the company's third supplemental complaint dated March 9, 1960 wherein it was alleged that due to the acts of
the union and its officers the company had suffered damages, of not less than P25,000 annually since 1955 (320-3, Record on Appeal).
That supplemental complaint was hurriedly filed during the trial as directed by the trial court.
The said damages, were computed in the reports of Miguel J. Siojo, an accountant who, for two days and nights, March 8 to 10, 1960,
or shortly before and during the trial, allegedly examined the consignees. record at Iligan City, such as its cash book, cash vouchers,
reports to the head office, shipping manifests, and liquidation reports. Those records were not produced in court. Their nonproduction
was not explained. If the accountant was able to summarize the contents of those records in two days, they could not have been very
voluminous. They should have been offered in evidence.
The alleged expenses. in the operation of the forklifts consisted of (a) the wates of the operators hired by the company and (b) the cost
of gasoline and oil and expenses. for repair.
The company's theory is that under the 1952 contract (Exh. J) the union was obligated to provide for forklifts in the loading and
unloading of cargo. Inasmuch as the union allegedly did not have forklifts, the complaint to expedite the arrastre and stevedoring work,
purchase forklifts, hired laborers to operate the same, and paid for the maintenance expenses. The company treated those expenses
as losses or damages.
Those alleged damages, amounting to P87,986.05 are in the same category as the depreciation allowances amounting to P38,835
which the company claimed for the forklifts, pallet boards, tarpaulins and wire rope slings that it purchased for oth P27,215, We have
stated that the consignees. counsel ignored that depreciation in his recapitulation of the damages, claimed by the plaintiff.
The union contends that Siojo's reports (Exh. E to I) were inadmissible evidence because they were hearsay, meaning that the original
documents, on which the reports were based, were not presented in evidence and, therefore, appellants' counsel and the court itself
were not able to gauge the correctness of the figures or data contained in the said reports. The person who had personal knowledge of
the operating expenses. was not examined in court.
We are of the opinion that, to avoid fraud or fabrication, the documents evidencing the alleged expenses. should have been proforma.
in evidence. Siojo's reports were not the best evidence on the said operating expenses. The explanation of Badelles with respect to
shutout cargoes and our observations on Jayme's summaries are applicable to accountant Siojo's reports.
A more substantial ground for rejecting Siojo's reports is that the said expenses, if really incurred, cannot be properly treated as darn
ages to the company.
The union's witness, Mariano LI. Badelles, testified that the consignees. forklifts were not used exclusively on the wharf. They were
used in the fertilizer and carbide plants. Sometimes, the union supplied the driver and the gasoline for the operation of the forklifts (174177 tsn May 20, 1960).
Moreover, as stated earlier, the company was not paying the union a single centavo for arrastre and stevedoring work. The shippers
and consignees paid for the arrastre service rendered by the union. The union did not receive any compensation for stevedoring work.
The company complained that the union had been rendering unsatisfactory arrastre and stevedoring services. That grievance was
controverted by the union.
The use of the forklifts, tarpaulins pallet boards and wire rope slings immeasurably benefitted the company. It is not proper nor just that
the consignees. investment in those pieces of equipment should be considered damages, just because it was able to bind the union to
a one-sided contract which exempted it from the payment of arrastre and stevedoring Considering and which impliedly obligated the
union to purchase the said equipment.
If the service rendered by the union members was unsatisfactory, it must be because the poor stevedores were underfed and
underpaid. They were underfed and underpaid because the company was astute enough to insure that it would obtain stevedoring
service without paying for it.
If to improve the arrastre and stevedoring service, the company had to incur expenses. for the purchase of forklifts, pallet boards,
tarpaulins and wire rope slings and for the operation of the forklifts, the union should not be required to reimburse the company for
those expenses. The company should bear those expenses. because the same redounded to its benefit.
The trial court erred in ordering the union and its officials to pay the amount of the said expenses. as damages, to the company.
Moral damages and attorney's fees. - Considering that the consignees. claim for moral damages, was based on the same facts on
which it predicated its claim for actual deduction which we have found to be groundless, it follows that the company, a juridical person,
is not entitled to moral damages.

Anyway, the company did not plead and prove moral damages. It merely claimed moral damages, in the prayer of its complaint. That is
not sufficient (Darang vs. Ty Belizar, L-19487, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 214, 222).
Under the facts of this case, we do not find any justification for awarding attorney's Considering to the company. Hence, the trial court's
award of P20,000 as attorney's Considering is set aside.
Appellants' first assignment of error, although not properly argued by their counsel, should be sustained.
Other assignments of error. - The union and its officers contend that the lower court erred in dismissing their counterclaims. Their
counsel did not even bother to state in their brief the amount of the counterclaims.
The union filed counterclaims for P200,000 as compensation for stevedoring services from August, 1952 to March 4, 1955; P500,000
as deduction P10,000 as attorney's Considering and P5,000 as premium on the counterbond (251-2, Record on Appeal). In their
supplemental counterclaim, they demanded P500,000 as stevedoring charges for the period from March 4, 1955 to March 4, 1960 and
additional damages, of P10,000 (308-10, Record on Appeal). The trial court dismissed the said counterclaims.
The appellants in their three-sentence argument in support of their counterclaims alleged that the company's bill of lading provided that
the unloading of the cargoes was at the consignees. expense (Exh. 1); that the company had not paid the sum of P500,000 as
compensation for the stevedoring services rendered by the laborers up to 1960, and that the stipulation in the arrastre contract, "that
the Compaia Maritima shall not be liable for the payment of the services rendered by the Allied Free Workers Union for the loading
and deliveries of cargoes as same is payable by the owners and consignees of cargoes, as it has been the practice in the port of Iligan
City" (Exh. J, pp. 14, 334, 359, 500 Record on Appeal), was 'non- operative" and void, "being contrary to morals and public policy".
That superficial argument is not well-taken. The printed stipulation in the bill of lading was superseded by the contractual stipulation.
The contract was prepared by the union officials. As already noted, it was stipulated in the contract that the stevedoring and arrastre
charges should be paid by the shippers and consignees in consonance with the practice in Iligan City. That stipulation was binding and
enforceable.
The supposed illegality of that stipulation was not squarely raised by the union and its officials in their answer. They merely averred that
the contract did not express the true agreement of the parties. They did not sue for reformation of the instrument evidencing the
contract. The lower court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaims.
The other two errors assigned by the appellants, namely, that the lower court erred in issuing a permanent injunction against them and
in executing its decision pending appeal, are devoid of merit.
The appellants invoke section 9(d) of the Magna Carta of Labor regarding the issuance of injunctions. That section has no application to
this case because it was definitively ruled by this Court in the certification and unfair labor practice cases that there is no employeremployee relationship between the company and the stevedores. (They work under the cabo system).
The lower court did not execute the money aspect of its judgment. It merely required the defendants to file a supersedeas bond of
P50,000.
As to the injunction, it should be recalled that it was this Court which, in its resolution of May 16, 1962 in the execution and appeal
incident (L-19651, 17 SCRA 513), allowed the company to terminate the stevedoring and arrastre work of the union and to use another
union to perform that work.
The company had the contractual right to terminate the 1952 contract (Taylor vs. Uy Teng Piao, 43 Phil. 873). The lower court did not
err in sustaining the consignees. rescission of the contract and in enjoining the union from performing arrastre and stevedoring work.
WHEREFORE, that portion of the trial court's judgment declaring the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated, permanently
enjoining the union and its officials from performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the vessels of the Compaia Maritima, and
dismissing defendants' counterclaim is affirmed.
The lower court's award of damages, is reversed and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
a