Test Case 1 - Wheelsets

Research Programme
Management
Supply chain safety management - test case 1:
wheelsets
R&D Programme:
report commentary
Supply chain safety management – test case 1: wheelsets
Research aims
This project was required to identify
potential supply contracts covering
wheelset purchase and sample the existing
elements in the supply chain to cover a
representative cross section of suppliers
and products within the supply chain.
Research findings
The findings from the research revealed
considerable shortcomings in the supply
chain. However, it did identify some areas
defined as ‘quick wins’, where a fast
benefit response can be made at a low
cost. The research did not delve into the
contractual side of wheelset procurement
as anticipated; however the report is
regarded as a useful reference for
stakeholder consideration.
Next steps
The Research and Development team are
currently undertaking a major consultation
with stakeholders to determine the
priorities for research in the 2004/05
financial year. Through this process, and
reflecting stakeholder views, a decision will
be taken as to what direction follow-on
work is undertaken.
Contact
Richard Wheldon
Head of Management Research
Research and Development Programme
Rail Safety and Standards Board
richard.wheldon@rssb.co.uk
Page 1 of 1
RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD
Safety Critical SCSM Wheelset Procurement Test Case
Final Report
Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB)
Safety Critical Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM)

Wheelsets Procurement Test Case
Final Report
JOB NUMBER: 5014014 DOCUMENT REF: 5014014/doc/04
Issue 0 Draft Issue to RSSB P Waite S Clark I Shannon 20/06/03
Issue 1 First Issue P Waite S Clark I Shannon 10/07/03
Originated Reviewed Authorised Date
Revision Purpose
Description
© Copyright 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board

This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internal
circulation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accurately
and not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyright
of Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any
other use of the material please apply to RSSB's Head of Research and Development for
permission. Any additional queries can be directed to research@rssb.co.uk. This publication can
be accessed via the RSSB website
www.rssb.co.uk
Final Report
Contents
Section Page
Executive Summary 3
1. Introduction 5
2. Scope and Purpose 7
3. Status 8
4. Wheelsets 9
4.1 Types 9
4.2 Characteristics 9
4.3 Standards 10
5. Supply Chain 18
5.1 Generic Model 18
5.2 Wheelsets 19
5.3 Supply Chain Members 19
6. Existing Accreditation Schemes 23

6.1 Background to Existing Accreditation Schemes 23
6.2 Railway Group Standards 23
6.3 Link-Up 24
7. Failure Data Review 26

7.1 Background to Failure Review 26
7.2 Wheel Failures 27
7.3 Axle Failures 28
7.4 Bearing Failures 30
7.5 Conclusions from Failure Review 30
8. Test Case Selection 36

8.1 Test Case 1 –First Great Western Class 180 (New Build) 37
8.2 Test Case 2a – EWS Class 47 Locomotive (Overhaul) 37
8.3 Test Case 2b – Plasser 07 Tamper (Overhaul of Maintenance Machine) 37
8.4 Test Case 3 – Connex Class 465/0 & 1 EMUs (Replacement) 37
9. Supplier Questionnaires 45
10. Findings 47
10.1 Overall 47
10.2 Train Operation 48
10.3 Train Ownership 50
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10.4 Train and Bogie Manufacture 52

10.5 Train Overhaul and Maintenance 52
10.6 Wheelset Agent 53
10.7 Wheel and Axle Manufacture 53
10.8 Standards 54
10.9 Engineering Acceptance 55
11. Conclusions and Recommendations 57

12. References 62
12.1 General 62
12.2 Railway Group Standards 62
12.3 Other Standards 62
13. Glossary of Abbreviations 63

Appendix A Supply Chain Lifecycle
Appendix B Generic Question Set
Appendix C Generic Question Set Mapping to SCSM Baseline Assessment Criteria
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Executive Summary
The Rail Safety & Standards Board (RSSB) has initiated a programme of work aimed
at creating and deploying an improved method of working for the accreditation of
suppliers of safety critical products and services. Atkins were commissioned to
undertake one of the supporting work packages to this programme providing ‘test
case’ research into the existing supply chain and procurement processes involved in
the supply of Railway Wheelsets.
This report is the final overall study report which describes the work undertaken and
presents the results and conclusions from the research. The report provides an
overview of the different types of wheelsets and their key characteristics in so far as
these affect procurement processes and supply chain controls. A model of the
activities and processes involved in the supply chain for wheelsets for use on
Network Rail Controlled Infrastructure (NRCI) is also developed.
The research also includes a review of existing accreditation schemes associated

with the supply of wheelsets and a review of failure data over the last 25 years.
A justification is given for the selection of a small number of sample supply chains on
which to base the study. These were chosen to provide a diverse selection of supply
routes and ensure as broad a perspective as possible is provided of the entire supply
chain. A supplier questionnaire was developed in order to elicit information on the
supplier safety management processes currently in place in each sample supply
chain and responses from representatives from the members of each supply chain
have been used to draw conclusions and support recommendations for possible
improvements.
A total of 23 individual recommendations have been made. The principal issues

identified as requiring improvement relate to:
• The majority of influence in the risk associated with wheelsets rests with the
authors of the relevant standards and the design authority.
• The key supply chain issue is whether the product producers in the supply chain
can provide wheelsets in accordance with the specifications and standards
consistently.
• Problems during manufacture are still resulting in occasional wheelset failures.
• There is a need for more effective auditing of suppliers of wheelsets.
• Supplier audits should be co-ordinated to ensure capability to meet all RGS

requirements can be demonstrated by all parties from steel makers to wheelset
overhaulers.
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Overall the strengths of the wheelset supply chain are the high level of safety
awareness amongst all parties interviewed, the introduction of a more formalised
way of setting supplier approval criteria in GM/RT2470 and the improvement made
in wheelset standards over the years demonstrated by the low number of generic
failure modes encountered. The weaknesses of the wheelset supply chain are the
lack of co-ordination currently displayed in setting up safety critical supplier
accreditation procedures, the level of interpretation required in setting up suitable
audit teams under GM/RT2470 and the lack of information flow from operators
down to the supply base to enable suppliers to better understand the risks they can
import to train operation.
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1. Introduction
In his report into the Ladbroke Grove Rail Accident, Lord Cullen recommended that:
“Suppliers of products or services of a safety critical kind for use on, or regard to, the
railways in Great Britain should be required to hold an accreditation as a condition of
being able to engage in that activity. But the features of such a system require further
study”.
In response to this recommendation the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB)
has initiated a programme of work aimed at creating and deploying an improved
method of working for the accreditation of suppliers of safety critical products and
services. The programme of work to develop the new method of working is known as
the Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM) Programme (Reference 1).
One of the supporting work packages to the SCSM Programme provides ‘test case’
research into the existing supply chain and procurement processes involved in the
supply of Railway Wheelsets (Reference 2). Atkins were commissioned in February
2003 to undertake this package of work and this report is the final study report which
describes the work undertaken and presents the results and conclusions.
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The report comprises a summary and 13 main sections as follows:
Executive Summary Overall summary of project objectives,

findings and recommendations.
Section 1 Introduction This section.
Section 2 Scope and Purpose A summary of the remit for this test case
research.
Section 3 Status A statement on behalf of RSSB.
Section 4 Wheelsets Summary technical description of

wheelsets.
Section 5 Supply Chain A description of the overall breadth and

depth of the supply chain for wheelsets
identifying the principal supply chain
members.
Section 6 Existing Accreditation A review of existing schemes for the

Schemes accreditation of members of the wheelset
supply chain.
Section 7 Failure Data Review A review of historical failure records for

wheelsets.
Section 8 Test Case Selection A justification for the selection of the

chosen test case supply chains as being
representative samples.
Section 9 Data Collection A description of the approach adopted to

Methodology elicit the information from industry to
support this study.
Section 10 Findings An extraction of the key findings from the

test case research.
Section 11 Conclusions and Conclusions and recommendations

Recommendations arising from the findings.
Section 12 References Key documents referenced in this report.
Section 13 Glossary of Abbreviations Glossary of abbreviations.
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2. Scope and Purpose

The scope of this test case research was to provide a review of the supply chain
processes and accreditations currently in place for a representative sample of
wheelsets currently in use on UK National Railways, i.e. on Network Rail Controlled
Infrastructure (NRCI). This included:
• Reviewing how responsibilities for safety are handled and what checks and
controls are in place;
• Considering the information flow through the supply chain to support safety
activities;
• Analysing the safety culture prevalent in the supply chain;
• Analysing failure / incident reporting and learning;
• Identifying best practice;
• Suggesting any quick win solutions.
The purpose of the work was to identify, through the choice of a number of selected
test cases, a map of the flow of procurement through the supply chain from initial
procurer through to all subcontractors. The investigation then considered safety and
technical requirement specification and technical information flow from purchaser to
supplier and vice-versa.
In addition to capturing current practice in the supply of wheel sets, the work also
aims to provide advice and assistance to develop and build upon good practice within
this particular domain of product procurement.
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3. Status
This report was commissioned by the RSSB (formerly Railway Safety) as part of their
Research Programme, and produced by Atkins. Any findings, conclusions and
recommendations contained in the report are those of Atkins.
RSSB, on behalf of the rail industry, will consider any such conclusions and
recommendations, and what action needs to be taken as a result. A formal response
will then be issued by RSSB as necessary.
This report is strictly confidential and is not for copying and/or further distribution
without permission from RSSB.
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4. Wheelsets
4.1 Types
A wheelset is defined in the relevant British Standard (BS5892) as “a complete unit

comprising an axle, two wheels together with any gear wheels, brake discs etc. but
without axlebox bearings and their end caps, spacers, seals and other associated
fittings”. Figure 4-1 shows a simplified wheelset construction. Traditionally within the
rail industry the wheelset has been considered to be the unsprung parts of a train,
that is the parts between the rail and the first stage of suspension. This could
include, in addition to the items defined above, such components as axle bearings,
axlebox, seals, axle end equipment for wheel slip protection (WSP) or speed signal,
earth return equipment which can be mounted on axle end or on the axle body, and
part of the transmission equipment such as motor suspension tube in the case of
axle hung nose suspended motors.
There are many different types of railway wheelset operating on NRCI. Prior to
privatisation it was possible to interrogate the RAVERS database using a “Ferrit”
report to identify the catalogue number and some details of each type including the
class of vehicles to which the wheelsets were fitted. During privatisation the data
contained in such databases was segregated so that one train operator could not
establish the wheelsets that were being operated by another train operator without
obtaining prior permission. As a result it is not possible to run such a report without
obtaining the permission of some 30 train operators. According to the RAVERS Help
Desk running such a report now, even with the train operators permission, would not
be straightforward as the data segregation may require a series of some 30 reports
to be generated. Table 4-1 shows an example of the data that can be extracted from
the RAVERS database for some rolling stock that was operating in 1989 and is
thought to be still operational today.
As it is not possible to obtain a complete list of the wheelset types in operation within
the timescale for this report a more qualitative approach has been adopted. Since
the study is about Supply Chain Safety Management, a list of the technical
differences between the wheelset types known to be operating on NRCI has been
compiled. To this list has been added comments regarding the significance of these
differences in terms of the effect they have on the risk control measures required to
ensure satisfactory performance in service, see Table 4-2.
4.2 Characteristics
Wheelsets can be characterised by the functions they perform. These include:
• Supporting the static weight of the vehicles.
• Providing dynamic isolation of the vehicles from the track.
• Providing guidance for the train along the track.
• Providing a force path for the train’s traction and braking systems.
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• Providing a return to earth for the train’s electrical systems.
• Supporting other equipment, e.g. WSP and speed sensing equipment.
Safety can be compromised when one of these functions is not performed correctly.
This can arise from a number of different root causes. As part of this study we have
also looked at historical failure data for wheelsets to identify, in as much detail as
records permit, the root causes of known wheelset failures on the UK Main Line
railway (see Section 7).
4.3 Standards
Wheelsets used exclusively on NRCI must comply with the Railway Group Standards
(RGS) in order for the trains to be given Route Acceptance to operate. The only
exception to this is that ‘high speed’ trains that must comply with the Technical
Standards for Interoperability (TSIs) and Notified National Standards. At present
most of the standards relevant to wheelsets are Notified National Standards and a
separate project is being undertaken to resolve the potential conflicts that can arise in
the standards as a result. Internationally registered vehicles used outside the UK for
prescribed periods need to comply with the relevant RIV (Regulations concerning the
reciprocal use of wagons in international traffic) or RIC (Regulations governing the
reciprocal use of carriages and brake vans in international traffic) regulations and
appropriate technical standards and as such do not need to comply with the RGS.
This investigation has been scoped on the basis of considering those vehicles
operating exclusively on NRCI and therefore governed by the RGS as this covers the
vast majority of wheelsets currently operating on these routes.
Table 4-3 lists the RGS and typical associated standards or specifications concerned
directly with the life cycle processes concerned with wheelsets. The associated
standards and specifications are ‘typical’ as RGS do not prescribe particular
associated standards and therefore they are contract specific. However, many of
these associated documents are referred to in RGS as examples of good practice.
The standards applicable to wheelsets under all types of rolling stock, excluding
road/rail vehicles, on track machines and ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for
shared running on NRCI’, are governed by the same suite of RGS. In the case of the
exceptions there are simplified means of complying with RGS stated in the relevant
RGS, also listed in Table 4-3. As the number of wheelsets fitted to locomotives,
coaches, multiple units and wagons are far larger than those fitted to road/rail
vehicles, on track machines and ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles for shared
running on NRCI’, the study concentrated most effort on the supply chains for the
former groups, although some investigation was undertaken on an example of the
latter group.
In the case of locomotives, coaches, multiple units and wagons, the standards
control to some level the process activities throughout the life cycle of a wheelset
from specification, through manufacture, assembly and transportation to operation,
repair and overhaul, see Appendix A. It should be noted that these processes were
formally laid out during the early 1990s during the lead up to rail privatisation and
whilst some of these standards simply formalised existing practice within British Rail
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the opportunity was taken to introduce some improvements in safety assurance (for
example the independent scrutiny of Maintenance Plans and the setting down of
Wheelset and Axle Bearing Maintenance and Overhaul Policies by train operators).
This is explained in more detail in Section 5.1 of this report.
On 7 December 2002 GM/RT2470 was brought into force. This standard lays down
the method by which RSSB will approve suppliers of wheelsets. Prior to the
introduction of this standard a list of approved wheelset manufacturers and
assemblers existed in GM/RM2525 INF, however the process of approval was not
clearly defined and there appears to have been no automatic mechanism for the
removal of the approval (see Section 6.2). The list of approved suppliers was
inherited by Railway Safety (now RSSB) from Railtrack.
A meeting was held in May 2003 chaired by RSSB with the intention of agreeing to
certain interpretations of GM/RT2470. It is understood that this will be contained in a
“Guidance Note” that will be issued in early 2004. It is disappointing that the delay in
issuing this note will reduce the available time for companies to undertake the Entry
Audits specified to be complete by December of next year. Furthermore it is
understood that RSSB do not intend to formally accredit teams of auditors and
provide a register of approved auditors. Companies requiring audit will therefore
have to search for audit teams to commission and then approach RSSB to establish
if the team selected in each case will be acceptable to them to avoid obtaining a
recommendation based upon audit that is later rejected by RSSB on the grounds of
lack of relevant knowledge and experience of the audit team. Whilst this can be seen
as a means of expanding the potential audit team it could be more effectively
achieved by an accreditation process that accepted applications from teams
nominated by any interested party.
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Table 4-1 : Example of Wheelset Type Data Extracted from RAVERS
Journal Bearing Wheel Brakes Wheelset Wheel Bogie Type Cat No

Diameter Type Type Type Dia
120 Roller Solid Tread Final Drive 800 14X 015/074216
820/129102
Roller Solid Tread Trailer 800 14X 820/129202
Roller Solid Discs Trailer 840 BX1, BT13, T3 097/007164
839/326502
880/502001
Roller Solid Discs Motored 840 BX1 880/501901
Roller Solid Tread Final Drive 840 BX8P, BP38, 015/078062
P3-10 015/078063
015/070373
015/070374
015/070375
015/070376
Roller Solid Tread Trailer 840 BX8T, BT38 015/070371
015/070372
Discs Final Drive 840 BP62
Discs Trailer 840 BT52
Roller Solid Discs Trailer 914 BT10 063/009107
800/593101
800/593102
130 Discs (Axle Final Drive 840 P4-4A
Mounted)
Discs (Axle Trailer 840 T4-4A
Mounted)
Discs (Axle Trailer 920 BT41, BT46
Mounted)
140 Roller Solid Discs Motored 925 BP20, P7-4 097/006474
097/007164
839/306101
Roller Solid Discs Motored 925 BP27
Roller Solid Tread Motored 925 BP27, P7 097/007127
097/008360
098/009544
880/500001
Roller Solid Tread Motored 1120 CP3 071/003867
071/004652
071/004653
Roller Solid Discs Motored 1020 B4
Roller Solid Discs Trailer 1020 B4
Roller Tyred Tread Motored 40" Mk6
Roller Dis cs Motored 40" P7-3 839/374501
150 Roller Solid Discs Motored 1020 BP10
Roller Solid Tread Motored 1120 CP3 071/003866
071/004650
071/004651
Roller Solid Tread Motored 1120 CP19
Roller Solid Tread Motored 1070 CP20
Roller Solid Tread Motored 1150 BP9 090/002183
090/010685
090/010686
Roller Solid Tread Motored 1000 BP52 090/011238
090/011702
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Journal Bearing Wheel Brakes Wheelset Wheel Bogie Type Cat No

Diameter Type Type Type Dia
Roller Solid Tread Motored 42" CP6 090/055035
4.875" Roller Tyred Tread Trailer - Pulley 914 B5 018/000021
018/016649
018/034136
018/034138
4.625" Roller Tyred Tread Trailer - Pulley 42" Commonwealth 018/007787
018/034116
018/034120
Roller Tyred Tread Motored 42" Mk4, Mk6 018/001879
018/001880
Roller Tyred Tread Motored 40" Mk4, Mk6 018/001908
018/001909
018/001913
4.5" Roller Tyred Tread Trailer - Pulley 914 B4 018/034135
018/011625
Plain Tyred Tread Trailer - Pulley 914 B4 018/034137
Plain Tyred Discs Trailer - Pulley 914 B4 018/011052
Roller Tyred Discs Trailer - Pulley 914 B4 018/001464
018/011053
Plain Tyred Tread Trailer - Pulley 40" B4
6.5" Roller Resilient Tread Motored 1155 BP9 090/008628
090/010687
090/010688
090/010887
090/010888
090/010889
120 Plain Tyred Discs Wagon 724 None
Plain Solid Tread Wagon 953 None
Plain Solid Discs Wagon 953 None
Plain Solid Single Disc Wagon 953 None
Plain Solid None Wagon 953 None
140 Plain Solid Tread Wagon 953 None
150 Plain Solid Tread Wagon 953 None
Note to Table 4-1 : Journal and wheel diameters are in millimetres unless otherwise stated.
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Table 4-2 : Potential Differences in Wheelsets Leading to Different Risk

Control Measures in Supply Chain
Factor Options Comments
Vehicle Type Locomotive/Multiple Application could affect risks to wheelset but not the general vehicle
Unit/Coach/Wagon/ type except the acceptance process for plant is different to that for the
Plant other vehicle types.
Axleload Affects the applied stress and therefore the probability of failure but
not a supply chain issue unless design specification is incorrect.
Speed Various relating to Affects the applied stress and therefore the probability and
maximum operational consequence of failure. Is a supply chain issue currently as the
speed. specification for NDT and wheel dimensional checks is dependent
upon this parameter.
Track Quality Inter City/Suburban/ Affects the applied stress and therefore the probability of failure.
Non Passenger Potential supply chain issue if a vehicle transfers application following
design although the load cases used in design should cope with track
quality normally experienced on NRCI.
Payload Passenger/Freight Wagons carrying corrosive chemicals require special attention during
maintenance. Vehicles running in crush laden condition for most of
their operational mileage would need to be tested more frequently.
Axle Hollow or solid axles This increases the applied stress, however more sensitive in service
NDT is possible from the axle bore. Does introduce some additional
operations during manufacture and corrosion protection is an issue for
the bore in addition to external surfaces.
Wheels (1) Press or Shrink fitted Provided the requirements of the standards are observed either
wheels method should prove satisfactory. In both cases auditable records of
the assembly have to be retained and prescribed branding of
components assures trace ability. Most wheelsets in the UK are
shrink fitted and most in Europe are press fitted. Press fitting
increases the chance of damaging the wheelseat. Not considered
essential to include examples of each type of fitment in this
investigation.
Wheels (2) Tyred, Monobloc or Resilient wheels are only used on a few wheelsets; mainly if not
resilient wheels exclusively class 86 locomotives. Tyred wheels are more common
although usually only on rolling stock more than 30 years old. Tyred
wheels introduce different requirements for manufacture and
maintenance and additional failure modes.
Wheels (3) Curly/Straight Webs Important issue during design but not considered critical in the
selection of samples for this investigation.
Wheels (4) Rolled and Forged or Apart from an isolated example of freight wheels, manufacture for the
Cast UK is by rolling and forging. This is an important issue for Supply
Chain Safety Assurance but as the numbers are small in the UK it is
not considered critical in the selection of samples for this
investigation.
Brake Type Tread, wheel cheek or Important issue during design but not considered critical in the
axle mounted disc selection of samples for this investigation.
braking
Bearing Type Plain/roller/cartridge Bearing failures can trigger axle failure. Bearing failures most
frequently arise through poor fitment or maintenance and there are a
number of standards produced to try to mitigate these risks.
Transmission Flexible drive/Quill Transmission type affects the potential failure modes and the nature
drive/ Suspension of the fitting and maintenance work required.
Tube/None
Bogie Frame Bearings Important issue during design. Assembly is complicated by the need
inboard/outboard of to ensure bearing inner race is secured during wheel fitment.
wheels
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Table 4-3 : Railway Group and Associated Standards governing Wheelset Processes
Standard Title
British Standards
BASS 502 Code of Practice for BS5892 Wheelsets
BS5892 Pt 1 Specification for Axles
BS5892 Pt 2 Specification for Forged & Rolled Centres
BS5892 Pt 3 Specification for Monobloc Wheels
BS5892 Pt 4 Specification for Forged & Rolled Tyres
BS5892 Pt 5 Specification for Steel Bars for Retaining Rings
BS5892 Pt 6 Specification for Wheelsets
Railway Group Standards
GE/RT8250 Safety Performance Monitoring & Defect Reporting of Railway Vehicles, Plant &
Machinery
GH/RT4000 Drugs & Alcohol
GH/RT4004 Changes in Working Hours
GM/RC2516 Code of Practice for Training Personnel Undertaking Bearing Overhaul
GM/RT1300 Engineering Acceptance of Road-Rail Vehicles and Associated Equipment
GM/RT2000 Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
GM/RT2001 Design Scrutiny for the Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
GM/RT2004 Requirements for Rail Vehicle Maintenance
GM/RT2005 Certification processes for NDT Operatives, Equipment and Facilities used for
Inspecting T&RS
GM/RT2020 Policy for the Engineering of Wheelsets used on Railtrack Lines
GM/RT2023 Wheelset Manufacture
GM/RT2025 Branding of Wheels, Tyres and Axles
GM/RT2026 Wheelsets: In Service Safety and Maintenance Attention
GM/RT2027 Wheelsets: Off Vehicle Repair and Overhaul
GM/RT2028 Wheelset Design
GM/RT2030 Axle Bearing Maintenance
GM/RT2243 Parameters for Hot Axlebox Detection Equipment
GM/RT2402 Engineering Acceptance of Rail Mounted Maintenance Machines
GM/RT2450 Qualification of Suppliers Safety Critical Engineering Products and Services
GM/RT2451 Magnetic Particle Inspection
GM/RT2452 Acceptance of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles for Shared Running on
Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure
GM/RT2466 Railway Wheelsets (From 2 August 2003)
GM/RT2470 Wheelset Supplier Qualification
GM/TT0083 Wheelset Records
GM/TT0089 Geometric Interfaces between Wheelsets and Track
GM/TT0120 Wheelset Testing
GO/RC3560 Code of Practice: Competence Assessment
GO/RT3260 Competence Management for Safety Critical Work
Typical Maintenance Standards
COS UA 003 SKF SBU Cylindrical Roller Bearing Unit Overhaul
IB/CEPS 1002 Repair/Overhaul of SKF Spherical Roller Bearings
IB/CEPS 1003 Repair/Overhaul of Timken Taper Roller Bearings
IB/CEPS 1017 Repair/Overhaul of Timken SP Cartridge Bearings
IB/CEPS 1039 Repair/Overhaul of Timken AP & SP Cartridge Bearings incorporating Rubber Seals
IB/COS UA 002 Repair/Overhaul of SKF MBU & TBU Cartridge Bearings
IB/MT280 Regulations for NDT of Axles
IB/TS0648 Related Information for Wheelset Overhaul and Repair
IB/TS0692 x Code of Practice: Repair/Overhaul of Spherical and Taper Roller Bearings
IB/TS0801 Identification & Labelling of Bearings (Draft Only)
IB/TS258 Fastening of Axle End Caps
MT288 Wheel Tread Standards and Gauging
MT300 Handling, Storage and Transportation of Wheelsets
SMG010 Code of Practice: Recording & Tracking Wheelsets in RAVERS
TG/RM0007 RAVERS - NDT Reporting Task Guide
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Standard Title
TL/TS0171 Specification for the NDT of New Axles
TN/TS0574 Wheelset Repair Specification
WOSS 612/10 Wheelset Overhaul Procedures
WOSS 612/13 Assembly of Brake Disc
WOSS 612/27 Wheelset Overhaul for BT13, BX1, T3-7 Bogies
WOSS 612/5 Assembly of Brake Discs
WOSS200/1 Inspection of Spur Gears for Mechanical Transmissions
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Figure 4-1 : Simplified Wheelset Construction
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5. Supply Chain
5.1 Generic Model
Within the rail industry a generic model of a Supply Chain for rolling stock would start
with the train operator who makes use of the train but, except for the Freight
business, hardly ever purchases it. This is undertaken by Rolling Stock Leasing
Companies or other Financial Institutions who provide the finance to have the trains
manufactured. The train manufacturer will then usually control the technical
requirements for the equipment including bogies and wheelsets although sometimes
this will lead to one or more levels of sub-contract. The train manufacturer will
usually provide the necessary maintenance documents to form that part of the
Maintenance Plan concerned with the train and in some cases will also take full
responsibility for the Maintenance including the supply of competent staff and depot
and equipment facilities.
The Engineering Acceptance process is the means by which the Design,

Construction and Maintenance Plans are scrutinised supported by any routine and
type testing as appropriate to ensure that the requirements of the relevant Standards
are met throughout the life of the vehicles. As such this process is a major building
block for the safety assurance of rolling stock. It feeds into the Route Acceptance
Safety Case process which considers the interaction of the train with the
infrastructure and considers hazards that rem ain potentially uncontrolled by the
current standards. Vehicles that have been procured under the Engineering
Acceptance process will therefore have detailed Maintenance Plans that will have
been independently scrutinised against the requirements of the Railway Group and
associated Standards.
Vehicles that were procured prior to the establishment of the Engineering

Acceptance process will have been procured by or designed by British Railways
Board. In the case of these vehicles the Maintenance Plans will have been
developed by the British Railways Board and will not have been subject to
independent scrutiny. As the maintenance plans contain the documentation that
forms the technical specification for the supply of replacement components,
overhauled components etc. the completeness and accuracy of these documents is
important to the safe operation of the trains. As it is unclear what impact the
standards have had on the quality of the technical documentation relating to the
supply of wheelsets, taking a wheelset supply sample from the time when British Rail
was responsible for the design and from the time when a full independent scrutiny
has been carried out is considered a critical factor.
It is estimated that around 75% of vehicles currently in service on NRCI would be to a

British Rail design or to a rolling stock company design that pre-dates RGS. The
remaining 25% are likely to have been procured against the RGS requirements. In
theory all wheelsets should now be maintained against a Maintenance Plan that has
been scrutinised against RGS requirements, however many of the 75% of the
population that predate RGS will have been accepted on the basis that the
maintenance plans in existence in 1994 were deemed compliant rather than being
developed and undergoing an independent scrutiny against the RGS requirements.
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5.2 Wheelsets
In terms of wheelsets there are perceived to be three circumstances under which

they may be supplied, these are:
New build relating to where wheelsets are being supplied to new trains
Overhaul replacing existing wheelsets during routine bogie overhaul with

replacement new, overhauled or repaired wheelsets.
Replace out of course replacement of wheelsets with replacement new,

overhauled or repaired wheelsets due to failures or defects being
observed during inspection.
Each type of supply will involve a different route through the supply chain however,
the working parameters and controls should remain fundamentally the same.
The key activities that are included within each of these supply chain types comprise:
Requirements the ability to specify the characteristics and performance of the

components, sub assembly or overall installation
Design the ability to meet the requirements by way of appropriate design

incorporating appropriate standards
Procure the ability to commercially specify the requirements and design

features as well as source appropriate qualified supply routes
Manufacture the ability to make the product in accordance with the procurement
specification and demonstrate that the requirements are met by
appropriate testing
Install the adoption of appropriate procedures and guidelines to install new

or replaced products.
Maintain the application of routine servicing and repair logistics as per the
designed requirements and specifications, including overhaul activity
The interaction between these key activities should be supported by a full and
auditable work process and change management system.
5.3 Supply Chain Members
The route through the supply chain is dependent upon whether the wheelsets are
being procured at new build, overhaul or out of course replacement. Figure 5-1
shows the typical supply chain routes for wheelsets. The number of participants
involved in the supply chain can vary from two, in the case of a train operator trading
with large companies like Bombardier and Alstom to about six in the case of a train
operator, vehicle owner, vehicle manufacturer/overhauler, bogie supplier, wheelset
supplier and wheelset component suppliers. In some cases a wheelset component
manufacturer may sub-contract one or more of the processes shown in the lower 5
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boxes of Figure 5-1. An increase in the number of participants in the supply chain
may increase the chance of mis-interpretation of the requirements or may reduce the
chance of the specification being correctly revised in reaction to new information
about a product’s performance. However, the regulated way in which the
Maintenance Plans are developed, involving scrutiny by a Vehicle Acceptance Body
(VAB) supported by a Conformance Certification Body (CCB) in the case of RGS or a
Notified Body (NoBo) in the case of the TSIs means that essential requirements for
safety should be well documented and therefore easily transmitted to parties down
the supply chain. The length of the supply chain should therefore not be a critical
factor in the decision of which samples to include in the investigation.
As stated earlier RGS require that wheelset suppliers should be approved by Railway
Safety (now RSSB) and as Train Operators are bound by the RGS no supply chain
should involve a wheelset assembler of axle/wheel supplier that is not approved.
The branding of each wheelset includes a requirement to add an assemblers and
manufacturers code, supplied by RSSB upon their approval, for traceability. Table 5-
1 lists the companies currently approved by RSSB and identifies those known to
have received an audit against GM/RT2470. By 31 December 2004 only companies
that have undergone an Entry Audit as defined in GM/RT2470 and been found to
meet the requirements of the Standard will be retained on the approved list. By
considering companies that have been found to conform to this Standard as well as
those yet to do so it may be possible to infer if some specific improvements in Safety
Assurance at this point in the supply chain may follow. An interesting observation is
that class 66 wheelsets were supplied by the Griffin Wheel Company in the USA
who, despite being a well respected supplier of railway wheelsets, does not appear
on the current list of approved suppliers provided by RSSB.
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Figure 5-1 : Wheelset Supply Chain
Train Operating Company
Overhaul New Build Wheelset

Maintenance
Rolling Stock
Owner
ROSCO/Railpart Wheelset Other Wheelset
Change at Depot Attention
Rolling Stock
Manufacturer
Wheelset/Vehicle/ Bogie Railpart

Bogie Overhauler Manufacturer
Wheelset Wheelset VAB/ CCB

Mounted Equipment Assembler or NoBo
Axle Bearings
Axlebox Supplier Axle Wheel
Axlebox Seals Supplier Supplier
Suspension Tubes
Gearwheels
Final Drive
Tyres
Earth Return Equipment Non-Destructive
WSP Equipment
Testing
Speed Sensor Equipment
Machining
Heat
Treatment
Forging
Steel
Making
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Table 5-1 : Approved Wheelset Suppliers
Date of Audited to
Company Name Code Type Audit date
accreditation GM/RT2470
Alstom Transport (Renovation) M3 A
Alstom Transport (Renovation) SC A

Alstom Transport (Renovation) SE A
Alstom, Le Creusot LCR A 25/02/1998

Bochumer Verein Verkehrstechnik GmbH BV 25/11/1998 B
Bombardier Transportation - Crewe M6 A

Bombardier Transportation Ltd - Services M1 A
Bonatrans a.s. ZB B Undergoing

CAF SLO 08/03/2000 A 01/08/1999
Cockerill Forges & Ringmill (Belgium) CFR M 28/07/1998

Construcciones Auxilliar Ferrocarriles SA CAF 29/05/1996 B
Firth Rixson Rings limited SP M

Geismar (UK) Ltd. CG A
Hunslet Barclay ltd AB A Undergoing

Huta L W LP 18/10/2002 M Yes, Draft 2a 02/09/2002
LH Group Services LH 24/10/2001 A Yes, Draft 1 23/07/2001

Lucchini SpA, Ferroviaria LU B
Lucchini Sweden AB S M
Lucchini UK ltd, Wheel Systems Division TB B

Matisa Materiel Industriel SA CM A
MWL Brasil Rodas & Eixos MW M
(formerly Maresa, Brasil)
Nexus TWM 11/03/2002 A Yes, Draft 14/01/2002
Nizhnedneprosky Tube Rolling Plant (NTRP) KLW 25/06/2001 M 16/01/2001

Plasser & Theurer PT 14/06/2001 A
Radsatzfabrik Ilsenburg GmbH RI 08/05/2001 M 01/08/2000

Ringrollers RR M
SC SMRA SA, Romania IOB 09/05/2001 B 03/04/2001
Schmiedestrucke Hus Sachsen PSW 20/07/2001 M 29/01/2001

SWASAP SW M
Valdunes FY B
Valdunes UV A
Wabtec Rail Limited E6 A

Code = Unique Company Identifier
Type = A (Assembler only), M (Manufacturer only), B (Both an assembler and manufacturer)
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6. Existing Accreditation Schemes

This section considers existing accreditation schemes in the rail industry that are
relevant to the supply of wheelsets. It also includes some history to help explain how
the accreditation of wheesets has developed over time.
6.1 Background to Existing Accreditation Schemes
Prior to rail privatisation in 1994, wheelsets were in general specified and procured
by the British Railways Board (BRB). The various manufacturers were subject to an
inspection regime managed by the BRB’s Director of Mechanical & Electrical
Engineering’s Quality Assurance Inspectorate. Depending upon the criticality of the
component being manufactured, it was given a QA rating between 1 and 5 and this
also defined the level and frequency of inspection given and requirements for
Certificates of Conformity and/or test results. Following satisfactory inspections,
manufacturers and assemblers were listed in MT/240 ‘Branding of Wheels, Tyres and
Axles’. This list was kept up to date using amendment sheets.
6.2 Railway Group Standards
With the advent of rail privatisation, Railway Group Standards (RGS) were introduced
covering a wide variety of safety related subjects in the railway industry.
One of the earliest standards produced was GM/RT2450 (Qualification of Suppliers

of Safety Critical Engineering Products and Services).
This standard (which remains in force today) covers all such ‘safety critical’ products
and services as defined in other standards such as GO/RT3260 (Competence
Management Systems).
Some wheelset manufacturers have been audited against the requirements of

GM/RT2450, either by
• the train manufacturer procuring wheelsets for new build,
• a train operator fulfilling his Safety Case obligations, or
• by the manufacturer himself wishing to get ‘approved’ in the UK.
Certificates showing the results of these audits exist in some cases, but not all.
Some suppliers have also been audited against the requirements of GO/RT3260 to
demonstrate that they have a robust and auditable Competence Management
System for any staff deemed to be ‘safety critical’. This has itself presented problems
since many non UK based suppliers do not recognise the term ‘safety critical’ as
defined by various standards in operation in this country.
The RSSB (formerly Railway Safety) and previously Railtrack (until 7 December
2002) owned document GM/RM2525INF which listed all the suppliers of wheelsets
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that were known to have supplied wheelsets to the UK railway industry. The exact
criteria by which these manufacturers were ‘approved’ have become somewhat
unclear over time, but is thought to be a mixture of
• ‘grandfather rights’,
• approval to GM/RT2450, or
• a train manufacturers own supplier approval process.
Since 7 December 2002, GM/RM2525INF has been withdrawn and the suppliers
formerly in it are now on an RSSB database. All these suppliers have until 31
December 2004 to be approved to the requirements of the new standard GM/RT2470
(Wheelset Supplier Qualification).
To date, only one supplier is known to have received a letter from Railway Safety
(now RSSB) providing qualification to the new standard, although 2 or 3 others have
been audited against draft versions (virtually as pilot schemes ).
The new standard defines more closely the requirements for qualification of both the
wheelset supplier and the audit team undertaking the approval process. The audit
regime will run on a 6 year cycle, commencing with an entry audit followed by two bi-
annual surveillance audits and then repeating the cycle.
The nature of the accreditation regime under the new standard was the subject of a
workshop run by RSSB on May 14th 2003. It was noted that the 2 or 3 suppliers that
were audited against draft issues of GM/RT2470 including the one in possession of a
letter from RSSB are NOT deemed to be compliant to the final issue. In other words,
RSSB are starting with a level playing field and ALL suppliers will have to begin with
the entry audit as defined in the standard.
GM/RT2470 audits will be done by whosoever the wheelset supplier chooses, but the
audit team must be "approved" by RSSB, who will also approve the submitted audit
reports. Quite how the "approval" of auditors will work is unclear, because RSSB will
NOT formally accredit audit teams nor will they keep a database of them. The current
plan is that the Curricula Vitae of the audit team will be included in each audit report
and RSSB will use this information to judge whether the audit team is suitable to
have undertaken the audit. However, is should be noted that this is RSSB's currently
proposed methodology.
6.3 Link-Up
Review of the Link-Up scheme is covered elsewhere in the work packages within the
SCSM Programme and has been covered in summary in the Atkins Test Case for
Track Circuits (Reference 3).
The Link-Up supplier approval process has also been used by some suppliers of
wheelsets and related components to gain approval in the UK rail industry, although
the Link-Up approval processes and associated Proof audit protocols are far less well
developed for Traction and Rolling Stock products and services than they are for
infrastructure related products and services.
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It is interesting to note that, of the 32 suppliers of wheelsets (not related components)

currently listed on RSSBs database, only 6 are currently registered with Link Up and
“Qualified via Audit”. There are no suppliers who are on RSSBs database who are
also on the Link Up list but having qualified without any form of audit. There are
however some companies who are Link-up qualified without audit but none of these
are in the RSSB approved list.
More significantly, RSSB do not recognise Link-Up approval as a valid qualification

for continued inclusion on their wheelset supplier database, and will rely on the
outcomes of audits undertaken against the requirements of the new standard
GM/RT2470 instead. This stance is perhaps peculiar to wheelsets which are
recognised as being extremely safety critical, with minimal recovery available for
failure and involving complex manufacturing issues.
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7. Failure Data Review

Atkins commissioned Serco Railtest Ltd to undertake a review of wheelset failures
arising over the last twenty years in order to establish the primary nature of failures
that are currently occurring in service and hence whether any of the failures could be
avoided by improvements in the supply chain. This will complement the test case
research by providing a bottom-up approach to identify issues that might otherwise
be missed by the top-down selective samples chosen for the test cases.
The failures being reviewed are those investigated by the British Rail (BR) Materials
Engineering Group prior to privatisation and those investigated by Serco Railtest Ltd
since privatisation. As such, this may not cover all the failures occurring over the
analysis period. However, it is likely to cover the majority of relevant failures.
In order to draw meaningful conclusions, it is important to view the failure records in

the context of the development of wheelset design and production processes over
the analysis period. A brief background to the failure review has therefore also been
given.
7.1 Background to Failure Review
Around 20 years ago BRB decided that it would supersede the BR wheel, axle and
wheelset standards and in future would order all new wheelsets and their component
parts against the then new British Standard, BS 5892, or equivalent standards. It was
also decided that new vehicles would use only monobloc wheels and that the
preferred grade for these wheels would be R8T fitted to grade A1T steel axles.
Generally speaking these rules still apply, although minor quantities of other grades
of wheels and axle steel have entered service. Wheel centres and tyres are still in
use on some older vehicles, but their number continues to decrease.
In terms of the mechanical properties of the wheelset components these changes

had little effect. BS 5892 represented what was known to work best on the British &
Continental Networks and the most proven BR grades were included in it. The
methods of manufacture and shaping remained the same, but changes were made to
the chemical composition of the steels to improve toughness and to decrease their
propensity to form martensite during wheel slip. Steel making was undergoing rapid
changes at the time BS 5892 was produced and steel for wheels and axles was
specified to be produced by what was considered the best modern practice.
The advances in steel production allowed low hydrogen steels to be made relatively
simply and cheaply on a mass production basis. Low hydrogen levels allow the
production of clean steels with very low sulphur and phosphorus levels which
possess better fracture toughness, fatigue properties, ductility and resistance to
Rolling Contact Fatigue (RCF). It is worth noting that these advances in steel making
have not been restricted to what might be loosely termed the ‘highly industrialized
countries’; the less developed countries have also adopted them and in conjunction
with low labour cost their products are very competitive in quality and price.
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After a wheel failure on a High Speed Train (HST) in 1993, recommendations were
made by Intercity to BR Group Standards that relevant wheelset standards should be
amended to include the requirement that all new wheels on vehicles which operate at
110 mph and above shall:
• be manufactured from vacuum degassed steel, and
• have their rims non-destructively tested for internal defects during

manufacture.
The defect acceptance criteria to be used were to be specified with regard to vehicle
maximum speed, axle load and the presence or otherwise of tread brakes. RGS
GM/RT2023 (Wheelset Manufacture) mandates these requirements for new wheels
for speeds in excess of 110mph.
7.2 Wheel Failures
Table 7-1 presents many of the failures of monobloc wheels that have occurred in
service over the last twenty years or so. It is not comprehensive but includes most of
the failures that have arisen as a result of either manufacturing based or assembly
problems.
For wheels produced to BS 5892 requirements, analysing the causes of wheel

failures indicates that poorly produced holes in wheel webs for balance weights and
cheek discs have acted as stress raisers from which fatigue cracks have originated.
One poor and highly stressed (tread braked) design of monobloc wheel has failed
from laps and small areas of residual ‘as forged surface’ in the wheel web as well as
from balance weight holes.
A batch of ‘soft’ wheels was produced and suffered from excessive rim deformation.
Two casts of tyres, and one cast of wheels, suffered hydrogen (shatter) cracking.
At least ten monobloc wheels have suffered what is often termed ‘shattered rims’;
these are failures caused by RCF initiating at defects/inclusions about 12 to 15mm
below the tread running surface and causing the rim to collapse and eventually the
detachment of a section of rim.
If the failure causes are traced back to wheel or wheelset production it is clear that
those initiated by drilled holes are related to the assembly of the wheelset and the
remainder are related to wheel manufacture.
However, the RCF and hydrogen failures initiated from defects that originated from
the steel making process. The inclusions could not actually be detected by Non-
Destructive Testing (NDT) techniques until the wheels had been forged and heat-
treated and the hydrogen may not produce any cracks until the wheels (or tyres)
have been in service for some time. The result of this is that only about 80% of such
cases could be expected to be detected one month after manufacture. Such cases
make the traceability of wheels back to cast vital in managing safety once
discovered. BS 5892 requires that wheels, axles and tyres should have traceability
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back to their steel cast throughout their manufacturing process and that they should
be stamped with their cast number. UK railway documentation mandates that for
wheels and tyres their traceability to steel cast and date of manufacture is maintained
when they are assembled.
The actual forging and rolling of wheels gives rise to very few defects leading to
wheel service failures.
No wheel manufactured since the issue of GM/RT2023 has failed by fatigue cracking
initiating from normal inclusions in the rim, i.e. inclusions of alloying elements as
opposed to slag. However, two that had been ultrasonically tested failed from slag
inclusions in the rim.
7.3 Axle Failures
All axles for use on Railtrack lines must undergo Ultrasonic Axle Testing (UAT) for
opacity before they are assembled into wheelsets. When fully assembled, the
wheelset (axle) should then again be ultrasonically tested. This testing regime is
intended first to prove that an axle is of a quality that can be tested by ultrasonic
techniques and finally that the assembled wheelset produces an ultrasonic trac e
pattern that agrees with that in the approved ultrasonic procedure for that type of
wheelset.
It is the experience of Serco Railtest that this is not always correctly understood by
axle, wheelset or vehicle manufactures and is certainly not always considered by
Vehicle Acceptance Bodies (VABs). This has resulted in opaque A1N axles entering
service and many assembled wheelsets only found to produce abnormal trace
patterns when they receive their first in service UAT. It is believed that the problem
does not exist with wheelset assemblers who are well established in the UK market
as they know that this is a requirement. However, foreign vehicle manufacturers with
little or no UK experience have problems because it is not a requirement for other
railways in Europe. European administrations use only A1N axles, hence the vehicle
builders may assume that the UK does. Similarly for UAT, it is not normally required
in Europe.
With the exception of hot box / bearing failures that sometimes fracture axle journals
(see Section 7.4), axle failures are all caused by fatigue and in the vast majority of
cases the fatigue crack originates at corrosion pits in the surface of the axle body.
Many axles exhibit corrosion on their surface, sometimes caused by poor quality
protective paint coatings and sometimes due to in service damage to otherwise
sound coatings. Invariably any corrosion that forms develops corrosion pits and it is
from these pits, acting as stress raisers, that fatigue cracks initiate and propagate.
The choice of protective coating is generally not specified and this general lack of
control from when an axle is new extends to each time it undergoes off-vehicle
maintenance. The most common protective paint system is still based on the old BR
Specification that required one layer of green undercoat and one layer of black gloss
finish. Both coats were with oil-based paints and a minimum specific coating
thickness was specified for brush and spray applications.
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The present axle population already contains many corroded axles; hence the
application of improved protective coatings would not bring instant improvements to
axle failure rates. In the long term it offers a far greater chance of reducing the failure
rate, possibly scrapping rate as well, than do improved NDT techniques; it is better to
prevent cracks than to rely on testing to find them. There is little evidence to suggest
that there are any significant problems relating to axle production or to axle steel
production.
Experience has shown that the fatigue cracks do not usually initiate in the areas that
visually appear to have suffered the most severe corrosion. Fatigue cracks most
often initiate from areas of relatively light corrosion, even though these areas are
adjacent to much larger areas of heavy corrosion. One possible reason for this may
be that the older and larger the pit, the smoother their internal profile and the less its
stress raising capability. However, to become a large corrosion pit clearly involves
passing through the small corrosion pit stage at some time.
It is therefore possible that only a small proportion of corrosion pits have an acuity
sufficient to give rise to fatigue cracks. Unfortunately without being able to define the
type of corrosion pit that poses the greatest risk, it is impossible to define an
acceptable level of corrosion on an axle body. If no corrosion was allowed a very
large number of axles would be rendered scrap.
Freight vehicles that carry corrosive loads, particularly salt and potash, have axles at
even greater risk of corrosion. Three such axles have failed in the last twenty years.
Salt is particularly corrosive and its action actually favours corrosion pitting. These
features have been known for a long time and the time between UAT reduced on
wagons carrying corrosive commodities to ensure that cracked axles will be detected
before the axle fractures. When this policy is operated correctly it appears to work.
However, in the past, this system broke down when operators reduced the frequency
of UAT immediately the vehicle stopped carrying corrosive loads. This is not
acceptable practice and UAT frequency should not be relaxed until after the wheelset
has been fully overhauled, preferably utilizing grit blasting to remove all paint and
corrodent, followed by magnetic particle inspection to detect even small cracks.
Hydrogen in axle steel can also give rise to numerous small internal cracks that could
be propagated to failure by fatigue. However, hydrogen has not been responsible for
an axle failure in service for many years and this may be attributable to the
requirement that all new axles be ultrasonically tested for opaqueness and also
routinely tested in service by ultrasonic procedures that are capable of detecting
hydrogen cracks. Ultrasonic testing is the only NDT method in use that will detect
internal defects in axles.
Traceability requirements for axles in wheelsets differ from those of wheels. BS 5892
has always required that wheels, axles and tyres should have traceability back to
their steel cast throughout their manufacturing process and that they should be
stamped with their cast number. However, GK/RC2566 does not require that axles
retain their cast number and date of manufacture when assembled into wheelsets;
this is only transferred to the records for finished axles and can, and does
sometimes, get lost as the wheelset is passed around a succession of assemblers.
The cast number and date of manufacture are very important if an axle failure is
attributable to manufacturing defects and in the past were branded on the axle end.
Moreover, although cast numbers and date of manufacture are not branded on the
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axle end, geometry code and inspectors stamps are, even though these details are
less important in understanding the root cause of defects found in service.
7.4 Bearing Failures
There have been a number of ‘axle failures’ caused by either plain or roller bearing
failures generating very high temperatures and the very significantly
weakened/softened journal simply twisting off; these have been considered as
bearing failures and not axle failures.
Plain bearing failures could also give rise to copper penetration in axle journals and
this weakened the structure of the steel and initiated fatigue cracks. Very few plain
bearings exist and at least one operator with a few remaining in service scraps any
axle on which the plain bearing fails and there is reason to believe that copper
penetration may have occurred.
7.5 Conclusions from Failure Review
Axles fail by fatigue and in the majority of cases axle body corrosion acts as a stress
raiser that facilitates the initiation of fatigue cracks. Either reducing the incidence of
corrosion on axles or improving the sensitivity of axle crack detecting methods, would
be expected to reduce the number of axles failing. Applying improved paint systems
to axles would reduce the incidence of corrosion, although for many old axles,
corrosion damage would already be present and the improved paint system would
only be able to prevent or at least slow the rate of further corrosion. If improving the
method of crack detection is the chosen route, great care needs to be taken to not
only increase test sensitivity, but to also decrease the possibility errors in testing by
automating the NDT testing technique.
Wheels also usually fail by a fatigue mechanism, but the factors that affect fatigue
crack initiation are more varied than for axles, and corrosion pitting is not a problem.
Rolling contact fatigue can cause wheel rim failures if the rim contains large
inclusions, although it is difficult to define large with actual dimensions; greater than
1mm might suffice at present. Wheels are tested at manufacture for rim inclusions
and any wheel failure arising from inclusions in the rim is entirely attributable to the
wheel manufacturer. This is the only significant manufacturing problem causing
wheelset component failures in service.
Poorly drilled or chamfered holes in wheel webs are another major cause of wheel
failures and this type of failure is usually attributable to the wheelset assembler.
However if the wheels are purchased from the manufacturer in the finish machined
condition it is possible that the manufacturer is responsible for the problem. These
are all features that can be picked up at audit, particularly so if the auditors are
familiar with the problems that cause wheelset failures.
The mandatory documents controlling the sourcing, maintenance and testing of

wheelsets have been refined over the years and are reasonably sound documents,
but in respect of the supply of wheelsets on new vehicles it appears that they are not
always applied. Considering that wheelsets are a safety critical item it might be
expected that Vehicle Acceptance Bodies would require evidence that wheelsets
conformed to Group Standard requirements. The number of new vehicles entering
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service with wheelsets that do not conform to mandatory standards clearly indicates
that this is not so. These non-conformances are only discovered when problems are
experienced with the wheelsets and invariably the vehicles continue in service with
non-conforming wheelsets whose continued safety is hopefully maintained by
expensive, non-standard and unproven testing regimes.
The failure data review indicates that during wheel manufacturers quality audits,
particular attention should be paid to the quality of the steel. Every audit team should
include an auditor with in depth knowledge of modern steel making to audit the
production of wheel steel, whether the steel is sourced in house or externally. It may
be unwise to rely on wheel manufacturers own audits of their steel supplier.
Wheelset assemblers also require careful auditing, but it is also necessary that
assemblers from management level to machinists understand the necessity of
following procedures and the service problems that result from not doing so.
At present it is difficult to obtain up to date information regarding Network Rail

approved suppliers of wheelset components and wheelset assemblers. A Web site
might be an ideal means of supplying this information and it is suggested that for
wheel, tyre and axle manufacturers, their approved steel suppliers should be
included in this list.
Over recent years there have been changes of ownership of component

manufacturers and changes forced on manufacturers because of suppliers, in
particular steel producers, closing down. There does not appear to be any clear
indication of what, if any, action is required in regard to auditing these changes.
In BRB days it was relatively easy to obtain data on wheelset failure figures. Now that
the owners of failed components are free to have failure analysis carried out at a
number of independent laboratories it is more difficult to obtain data. All these failures
will in future have to be both investigated and reported on; again listing on a web site
would allow those needing, or interested in, to obtain this data, witness trends etc. If
this were the case then problems occurring in the supply chain could be more readily
identified.
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Table 7-1 In-Service Wheel Failures
Date Vehicle Type Location Wheel Grade Report File No. Wheelset Comments
/ No. Life (yrs)
Class 156 BR 108 grade C 3.0 Fatigue from

manufacturing
Defect in web
BBA 900094 York BR 108 grade C TMT172-093-004 14.8 Fatigue from
cheek disc
Bolt holes
Thermal
HAA 354908 Fatigue
1985/5 Class 56 BR 108 TMT171-093-004 Chamfer

several Grade B Cracks
1985/5 Class 56 BR 108 TMT171-093-004 6 Chamfer
56108 Grade B Cracks
1985/11 BSGL 8150 Motherwell BR 108 grade C TMT172-093-004 11.0 Failed from
BSGL 8169 11.0 cheek disc
Bolt holes
1986/3 BRT 8060 Gloucester TMT172-093-004 Fatigue from
Rail Car bolt hole
Services
1986/4 HAA 355738 Barry BR 108 grade B TMT172-093-004 15.8 Thermal
Wagon fatigue in web
Shop
1986/11 90168 Fenny BR 108 grade C TMT172-093-004 15.9 Fatigue from
Compton chamfer crack
1986/12 Class 56 Toton BR 108 TMT171-093-004 Chamfer
Grade B Cracks
1987/5 Cement TMT171-093-004 Fatigue from a
Wagon Bolt Hole
APCM 9385
1988/1 MK3 HST BR 108 grade D TMT173-093-004 5.4 Fatigue at bolt
12008 hole
1988/3 Mk3 Wembley BR 108 grade D TMT173-093-004 6.0 Fatigue from
SLE10708 bolt hole
1988/5 BT10 axle Laira Depot BS 5892 grade TMT778-093-004 Hydrogen.
62329 R8T cast no.W8339
1988/8 PAA Wagons Motherwell BR108 grade C TMT172-093-004 14.2 Fatigue from
corroded
cheek disc
bolt holes
1988/9 HAA 351757 Ferry Bridge BR 108 grade B TMT172-093-004 18.1 Thermal
fatigue in web
1988/10 Wheelset Ilford Depot TMT173-093-004 Fatigue from
52819 Tyre Turning manufacturing
Defect in rim
1989/5 HAA 351879 Cathays BR 108 grade B TMT172-093-004 Thermal

HAA 355766 Cardiff Fatigue in web
1989/6 BT10 10533 BS 5892 grade TMT173-093-004 8.0 Fatigue from
BT10 10610 R8T 5.0 cheek disc
bolt holes
1989/10 Stone Wagon Maidenhead BR 108 grade C 221 TMT 19.1 Fatigue
PRr27008 initiating from
Cast no.
stamped in
web
1990/6 HAA 355923 BR 108 grade B TMT172-093-004 Thermal
HAA 357734 fatigue in web
HAA 351689
1990/7 100T Iron Immingham BR 108 grade C 311 TMT 18.7 Fatigue
OreBSSC originating
26019 from
Cast no.
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Date Vehicle Type Location Wheel Grade Report File No. Wheelset Comments
/ No. Life (yrs)
stamped in
web
1991/2 Class 58 Shirebrook BS 5892 grade TMT 171-093-004 Fatigue
58043 R8E initiating from
Chamfer crack.
1991/2 HST PC BS 5892 TMT778-093-004 2 Rim Cracking
43187 Grade R8T From
Inclusions
1992/4 Iron Ore BS 5892 TMT020-20-002 4 Rim Cracking
Tippler Grade R8T From
BSSC 26036 Inclusions &
pipe
1992/6 Class 90 BS 5892 TMT180-093-004 1 Rim Cracking
Grade R8T From
Inclusions
1993/2 HST PC BS 5892 TMT778-092-004 2 Rim Cracking
43076 Grade R8T From
Inclusions
1994/3 Class 319 BS 5892 TMT176-093-004 7 Rim Cracking

Grade R8T From Slag
Inclusions
1994/6 Class 91 BS 5892 EL8(596/94/DW) 1 Rim Cracking
GradeR8T From
Inclusions
1995/10 HST PC BS 5892 H2 3459/95(DW) 1 Rim Cracking
Grade R8T From
Inclusions
1998/4 Tyres from BS 5892 EM/3(I520/98) Rim Cracking
Cast Nos. 227 Grade R8T caused by
& 228 High Hydrogen
Content
1999/4 Tyre From BS 5892 EM/2(I580/99) Rim Cracking
Cast No. Grade R8T From Large
389891 Slag Inclusions
1999/7 TB Wheel BS 5892 EM/2(I631/99) Foreign Body
Grade R8T Rolled Into
Tread
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Table 7-2 In-Service Axle Failures
Date Vehicle Type / Location Failure Position Report File No. Wheelset Comments
No. Life (yrs)
DMU / Carlton body MM49/3, 6/9/60 3.5 Fatigue crack

1960/8 Sc51113 13mm in from
wheelseat
DMU / 79968 Methil Adjacent to MM49/2, 27/7/61 6.25 Crack 1.5mm in
1961/8 wheelseats from both
wheelseats
EMU / E65681 Liverpool Wheelseat W/12/9/3 Fretting
1963/12 Street corrosion
DMU / Cowlairs body MM15/513, 10.75 Crack initiated
1965/11 Sc79104 15/2/66 by thermal
damage from
drive oil seal
Cl 52 loco / Oxford No. 2 groove TDE171-363-412 Three fatigue
1975/2 501023 stress relief (ESB) cracks initiated
groove in stress relief
groove, no
mech.
Damage.
45t acid tank / Insch body R&DD 178-263- Scored by
1976/3 PR58908 2(RJA) faulty brake
rigging
/ DB993006 Healey Mills mid-span 29
1977
wagon / HAA Drax Journal shoulder 2.5 Crack initiated
1977 358737 at large internal
defect
Cl 311 / Queens T72 transition Sc.R.Met.No.605, 20.5 Crack left in
1981/10 Park 10/81 when reprofiled
to T72
wagon / UCV Bridgewater As forged body QDL/9.4/JDH Cracked from
1982/5 B743210 hot stamping
mark
Cl108 DMU / Longsight Adjacent to TM MF 72 Cracked from
1982/11 M51910 wheelseat machining
mark
wagon / TSV Great wheelseat 15 Fretting
1983/2 FF47388 Coates corrosion/fatigu
e 2 to 3mm in
Cl114 DMU / Trowel Adjacent to QDY 12/2/2/3 & 17.75 Cracked from
1983/6 E53063 Wheelseat QAH 106/5(PGF) area of
corrosion
Cl114 DMU / Elsham Adjacent to TM MF 72 13.5 Cracked from
1983/12 E53024 wheelseat area of
corrosion
Wagon / PGA Hungerford body R & RRP IP 1636, 12.75 Fatigue from
1984/1 TAMC 14667 22/6/84 corrosion
Dept. wagon / Bow journal 172-83-4 SJH 28 Journal surface
1984/8 ZCV Somerset not to
DB726494 specification,
plain bearing to
roller
conversion
Mk3 coach / Ashton body DL 613/48 & TMT- 10 Cracked from
1985/3 12033 173-93-4-L/SW) corrosion
pitting
wagon / OOV Meheniot wheelseat TMT 172-93-4SJH 26 2 to 3mm within
1985/6 B743400 wheelseat
Miniflat wagon Symington
1986/1 / MCV 556438
wagon / JUA Goring body M/Met/4 Crack initiated
1986/6 PR26478 from corrosion
pits
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Date Vehicle Type / Location Failure Position Report File No. Wheelset Comments
No. Life (yrs)
Track Machine Dundee wheelseat

1986/9 / ZW DX68036
Cl87 loco. / Carlisle body 023/TMT & BASS 11.5 Cracked from
1987/4 87017 1407 score close to
earth return
Hopper wagon Hampstead body CAPSIS 706163 13.2 Corrosion
1987/4 / JUA
PR26517
Cl107 DMU / Glasgow 20mm from TMT 177-093-004 Crack from
1987/6 52012 works wheelseat transformation
products
formed at
pressing on
Freightliner / Norton body 172-83-7(DW) & 19.75 Fatigue from
1988/8 FGA 601608 Bridge 050-TMT pitting caused
by salt
Hopper wagon Wolvercot body 195-TMT 15 Fatigue from
1989/3 / PGA corrosion pits
BRT14630
Alumina Woodhorn body 172-093-004 18 Fatigue from
1989/11 wagon / PAO junc heavy
ALCN12018 corrosion
Mk3 coach / Greenhill body 278-TMT 10.5 Fatigue from
1990/3 12097 corrosion
pitting
Cl56 loco. / Thonaby journal 308-TMT 13 Fatigue due to
1990/5 56125 incorrect
labyrinth
rotating on the
axle
Tank wagon / Trent Sth. body 312-TMT 21.75 Fatigue from
1990/6 TEB junc. corrosion pits
BRT84014
Cl87 loco. / Crewe Body (cracked) 172-093-004 Torsional
1991/6 87017 Works fatigue from
score
Mk2B coach / Etches Park body TMT223-361-004- Fatigue from
1992/3 5437 DW filliform
corrosion
LTF25 / body 92/679/IRG Fretting fatigue
1993/12 under inboard
bearing
LTF25 bogie Hungerford Journal; Fretting on
1994/9 hop. / ARC inside bearing
17930 journal
Tank Wagon / Rickerscote body RR-STR-96-041 26 Fatigue from
1996/3 STS53241 corrosion
pitting
wagon / Westbury body HSE Damaged
1996/11 SMR/235/260 fracture face,
undecided
MK3 coach / Newton journal D2(I462/97/DW) Fretting
1997/2 42078 Abbott Corrosion/fatig
ue
Salt Hopper / Shields body Fatigue from
1998/1 PR8269 junction corrosion
pitting
Iron ore tippler Margam body Fatigue from
1998/10 / BSSW 26632 corrosion
pitting
MGR coal Bennerley body F/2(W120/DW) Fatigue from
2002/6 hopper / HFA Junction corrosion pits
354312
Cl319 / 63058 Luton body EM/2(W134/DW/0 16 Cracked from
2002/7 2) martensite on
earth return
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8. Test Case Selection

Critical factors in selecting specific test case supply chains were considered to be:
• Ensuring the differences in the supply chain from new build, wheelset
change at overhaul and wheelset change during out of course
replacement are all represented.
• Including a range of wheelsets containing technical differences that

have been associated with wheelset failures or lead to different risk
control measures.
• Including wheelsets for which the maintenance documentation has

been generated before and after the requirement for scrutiny against
RGS.
• Including wheelset suppliers who have and have not yet demonstrated
conformance against GM/RT2470.
• Some investigation into a supply chain connected with one of road/rail

vehicles, on track machines or ‘trains and light rail or metro vehicles
for shared running on NRCI’.
• Selecting an example of an extended supply chain.
• Selecting supply chains in which the major players are likely to co-
operate.
As the supply chain starts with the train operator we started with a short list of five
train operators who operate rolling stock that between them meets the above criteria.
From these five we refined the test cases by making initial contact and considering
some initial information against the above criteria.
We approached four of the train operators:
• First Great Western who operate class 180 (new build) and HST's (ex
BR vehicles owned by a Leasing Company).
• EWS who operate a variety of Freight Locomotives and Wagons

including both new build and ex BR.
• Connex who operate mainly Electric Multiple Units both new build and
ex BR.
• Jarvis who operate Rail Maintenance Machines.
The fifth train operator, Virgin, were not approached. The interest in this case was
the class 220 Diesel Multiple Units with inboard axle bearings. This is a new feature
(based upon experience over the last 20 years) for passenger vehicles on NRCI
which would make this fleet a good example for new build. However, it was felt that
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due to the relatively low mileage accumulated to date the chances of obtaining any
service feedback from the supply chain would be limited in this case.
The following specific test cases were therefore selected to investigate to what extent
the idealised processes and information flows described in Section 5.1 above are
present in the real world. They were chosen in order to encompass as much of the
supply chain diversity described in Section 5.2 above as possible. The key
considerations involved in the selection of these particular test cases is shown in
Table 8-1.
An additional ‘overhaul’ test case (Case 2b) was included to cover the circumstance
for rail maintenance machines where they are not subject to the ‘full’ engineering
acceptance process (they have their own specific ‘slimmed down’ standards).
8.1 Test Case 1 –First Great Western Class 180 (New Build)
The First Great Western Class 180 is a typical modern inter city diesel multiple unit
(DMU). It has mechanical drive to an axle hung final drive gearbox with monobloc
wheels and cartridge bearings. It is a recent new build unit built by Alstom. The
supply chain is summarised in Table 8.2. This also provides an example of a
wheelset introduced after the requirement for independent scrutiny against RGS was
introduced following privatisation.
8.2 Test Case 2a – EWS Class 47 Locomotive (Overhaul)
The EWS Class 47 Locomotive has been in service for many years and although is
primarily a freight locomotive, has also operated some passenger duties. The
transmission is representative of many pre 1990 vehicles (including EMU’s) when dc
traction motors were used. It has axle hung motors with suspension tubes, tyred
wheels and non-cartridge roller bearings. The supply chain is summarised in Table
8.3. This also provides an example of a wheelset introduced prior to a requirement
for independent scrutiny against RGS was introduced following privatisation.
8.3 Test Case 2b – Plasser 07 Tamper (Overhaul of Maintenance Machine)
This is a Rail Maintenance Machine that has been in service for many years. This
test case has been included since maintenance machines are not subject to the full
engineering acceptance process that applies to passenger and freight vehicles and
hence potentially useful data relating to this issue may be uncovered. The supply
chain is summarised in Table 8.4.
8.4 Test Case 3 – Connex Class 465/0 & 1 EMUs (Replacement)
The Class 465 EMU is a typical modern EMU operating suburban passenger
services. There should be considerable experience of both overhaul and out of
course wheelset replacement for these units. They incorporate both trailer and
powered wheelsets with axle hung final drive gearbox, monobloc wheels, tread
brakes and roller bearings. They were introduced during the transition to independent
scrutiny against RGS around the time of railway privatisation. The supply chain is
summarised in Table 8.5.
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Table 8-1 : Matrix of Critical Factors with Supply Chains
Operator Critical Factors in selection of Test Case Overall Comment

Ensuring the Including a range of Including Including Some Selecting an
differences in the wheelsets containing wheelsets for wheelset investigation into extended
supply chain from technical differences which the suppliers who a supply chain supply chain
new build, wheelset that have been maintenance have and have connected with and supply
change at overhaul associated with documentation not yet one of road/rail chains in
and wheelset wheelset failures or has been demonstrated vehicles, on track which the
change during out lead to different risk generated conformance machines or major players
of course control measures. before and after against ‘trains and light are likely to
replacement are all the requirement GM/RT2470. rail or metro co-operate.
represented. for scrutiny vehicles for
against RGS. shared running
on NRCI’.
First Great Western Mature Inter City Motored and trailer Before Bombardier N/A Train Operator Substitute sample should EWS
HST application with both wheelsets. Wheel willing. Class 47 prove difficult.
overhaul and out of cheek mounted brake
course wheelset discs motored axles
replacement supplemented with
tread brake. Flexible
drive to gearwheel on
axle. Cartridge
bearings.
First Great Western Inter City application Diesel Multiple unit After Alstom Le Creusot N/A Train Operator Typical modern diesel multiple
Class 180 involving recent New with mechanical drive (New) Alstom UK willing. unit example. Involves one of the
Build to axle hung final drive (overhaul) Involves at 2 largest suppliers to the UK
gearbox with monobloc least 3 rolling stock market. Also
wheels and cartridge companies. provides an example of a
bearings. wheelset introduced with
Independent Scrutiny against
RGS. Chosen for New Build
Test Case.
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on NRCI’.
Virgin Class 220 Inter City application Bearings inboard of After Lucchini Italy N/A ? Some examples of difficulty could
involving recent New wheels with every (New) Bombardier be explored covering the risks
Build other axle driven by (overhaul) associated with assembling
final drive gearbox inboard axle bearings.
mounted on axle.
Wheel cheek mounted
brake discs. Hollow
axles.
EWS Class 47 Mature application of Axle hung motors with Before Wabtec (overhaul) N/A Train Operator Transmission is representative of
a Freight locomotive, suspension tubes and & Bombardier willing. many vehicles, including EMU's
some of which have tyred wheels. Non Crewe (spare pre 1990 when dc traction motors
operated passenger cartridge roller wheelsets) were used. Also provides an
duties. Involving bearings. example of a wheels et introduced
overhaul and out of before Independent Scrutiny
course replacement. against RGS. This provides a
more suitable option than HST
when combined with class 465/0
& 1. Chosen for the Overhaul
Test Case.
EWS Class 66 or Freight application After Griffin (66) & N/A Train Operator Considered but FGW Class 180
67 involving recent New Wabtec (67) willing. preferred for new build to avoid
Build. over emphasis on Freight
Vehicles across the test cases .
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on NRCI’.
Connex Class Mature suburban Motored and trailer During Bombardier Crewe N/A Train Operator Typical modern electric multiple
465/0 or /1 application with both wheelsets. Wheel (Wheelsets) & & Owner unit example. Involves one of the
overhaul and out of cheek mounted brake Bombardier Chart willing. 2 largest suppliers to the UK
cours e wheelset discs , motored axles Leacon to Involves at rolling stock market. Also
replacement. supplemented with Bombardier Derby least 3 provides an example of a
dynamic brake. for overhaul companies. wheelset introduced during the
Flexible drive to transition from BR control to a
gearwheel on axle. process regulated by RGS.
Cartridge bearings. Chosen for the Out of Course
Typical of modern Replacement Test Case.
EMU's post 1990.
Jarvis Plasser 07 Mature Rail Trailer & power Before LH Group Yes Train Operator Some useful information could be
Tamper Maintenance Machine wheelsets with axle (assembly) various & Wheelset obtained on the control of supply
application with both hung final drive component Overhauler of wheelsets for a vehicle not
overhaul and out of gearbox, monobloc suppliers willing. subject to the 'full' Engineering
course wheelset wheels, tread brakes & Acceptance process. Chosen as
replacement roller bearings. additional Overhaul test case
as potentially useful data
available.
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Table 8-2 : Test Case 1 (FGW Class 180) Supply Chain
Position In Supply Chain Company
Train Operator First Great Western (FGW)
Train Owner Angel Trains
Train Manufacture Alstom
Engineering Acceptance Correl Rail
Bogie Manufacture Alstom Le Creusot
Wheelset Manufacture Bonatrans
Wheelset Steel Maker Trinecki
Wheelset Standards RSSB (Formerly Railway Safety)
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Table 8-3 : Test Case 2a (EWS Class 47) Supply Chain
Train Owner and Operator English Welsh and Scottish (EWS)
Train Overhauler Bombardier Crewe
Wheel Manufacture Lucchini UK
Wheel Steel Maker Lucchini Italy
Axle Manufacture Firth Rixson
Axle Steel Maker Corus
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Table 8-4 : Test Case 2b (Plasser 07 Tamper) Supply Chain
Train Owner and Operator Jarvis
Train Overhauler LH Group Services
Wheelset Agent Railway Wheelset & Brake Ltd
Wheel Maker (inc. Steel) MWL
Axle Maker Swasap
Axle Steel Maker Iscor
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Table 8-5 : Test Case 3 (Connex Class 465) Supply Chain
Train Operator Connex
Train Owner HSBC Rail
Wheelset Agent Railpart
Train Maintainer Bombardier Chart Leacon
Wheelset Bombardier Crewe

Assembler/Overhauler
Wheel Manufacture Lucchini UK
Wheel Steel Maker Lucchini Italy
Axle Manufacture Firth Rixson
Axle Steel Maker Corus
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9. Supplier Questionnaires
In order to provide a robust and consistent approach to the information gathering
from the members of the supply chains, a generic question set was developed to be
used as an interview protocol. What was needed was a framework of questions
constructed from best practice with regard to the development and supply of products
or services.
The framework developed in the SCSM programme baseline assessment criteria

report (Reference 4) was reviewed but was found to be primarily focussed on the
provision of accreditation schemes rather than products or services themselves,
which is the primary focus of this test case research. To fulfil the aims of this test
case research we therefore turned to BS EN ISO9001:2000 as the most appropriate,
internationally recognised, assurance standard for the development and provision of
products and services.
The development process for this questionnaire therefore involved a review of the
benchmark criteria and BS EN ISO9001:2000. This process was also supplemented
by a review of HSE HSG(65) (Reference 5) in light of comments received on our
proposed approach when presented at the fourth SCSM Workshop. It also
incorporated the results of internal Atkins reviews involving personnel with
commercial experience in supply chain management and technical experience from
across the supply chain.
Each stage of the supply lifecycle (See Appendix A) was considered separately and
appropriate specific questions developed under each of the headings contained
within ISO9001:2000. The complete set of questions was then distilled down to a
generic set of key questions or issues to be explored in detail during the supplier
interviews. Each question may have differing levels of applicability to particular
members of the supply chain, but by approaching the exercise in this way, the
number of questions generated can be realistically addressed during a single
interview and the risk of missing important information through pre-selection of
questions by the interviewer is also minimised.
The generic question set is given in Appendix B. This was cross checked against the
relevant sections in the SCSM programme baseline assessment criteria report
(Reference 4) in order to ensure that all relevant issues from that document had been
captured. The results of this cross check are given in Appendix C and it was
concluded that the generic question set is generally sufficiently comprehensive but
there is no direct mapping for ‘safety culture’. This runs through many of the
questions but it was felt that the scope of generic questions 13 or 39 could be
expanded during interview to cover this issue as necessary.
The data gathering approach was to send the generic questionnaire to interviewees
ahead of the interview together with a short briefing note and a copy of the open
letter from Matt Walter of the then Railway Safety dated 23 January 2003 explaining
the background to the study.
All suppliers were given follow up telephone calls or visits as necessary in order to
collect the required information. Of the 24 different companies identified in the test
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case supply chains shown in Tables 8-2 to 8-5, 15 detailed responses were obtained.
Responses from the remaining 9 companies could not be secured despite substantial
efforts and follow-up.
Each response was reviewed and the key findings are recorded in the following
section under each of the activity headings.
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10. Findings
This section describes the findings of the test case review. The key findings arising
from the responses have been summarised in the following sub sections.
Overall generic findings are summarised initially, and then the more detailed findings
associated with each position within the supply chain (as defined in Appendix A and
given Tables 8-2 to 8-5 for each test case) are detailed in separate sub sections.
These findings draw upon the responses from the respondents having this position
within each test case where relevant and available. Within these sub sections, a
general overview is provided which is then followed by a series of specific summary
findings. Where the findings result in recommendations the recommendations have
been numbered sequentially and indicated in the text thus - ‘R1, R2 etc’.
10.1 Overall
Wheelsets for use on Network Rail Controlled infrastructure are closely controlled in
technical terms by the Railway Group Standards (RGS) and through them the British
Standard BS5892. The design authority for the wheelsets will specify the geometric
requirements and through the standards the material chemical composition, steel
making process, heat treatment and test requirements. The majority of influence in
the risk associated with wheelsets therefore lies with the authors of the standards
and the design authority. Beyond this the issue is whether the product producers in
the supply chain can provide wheelsets in accordance with the specifications and
standards consistently. It follows from this that if the RGS for wheelsets were to be
changed to make them less prescriptive and provide more opportunity for innovation
this would lead to the introduction of considerable risk as wheelset suppliers may
then take on the role of Design Authority which, in the main, they are currently not
doing.
All respondents had a strong sense of the need for safety in the design and
manufacture of railway wheelsets as there are many single point failure modes that
could lead to multi-fatality accidents. All treated wheelsets and their components as
‘safety critical’. Whilst suppliers outside the UK are not always familiar with the UK
definition of ‘safety critical’ they take steps to adequately control wheelset supply
related processes and the staff involved.
Those in the supply chain responsible for specifying the requirements for wheelsets
when new and the replacement of wheelsets rely heavily on the relevant standards to
ensure the products supplied are likely to perform safely and reliably and that
suitable levels of trace ability are established. The findings of the Failure Data review
support the supposition that the standards have been developed over many years to
ensure steady improvements in safety and reliability whilst eliminating service
problems of a generic nature. An example of this is the new standard GM/RT2466
which requires the use of non destructive testing on all wheel rims once the standard
is implemented in August 2003.
There is a need for improved auditing. Problems during manufacture are still
resulting in occasional wheelset failures. These problems do not appear to be
directly associated with relationships in the supply chain but are associated with
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occasional lapses in the processes undertaken within particular supply chain

members. No evidence was found to suggest that any one supplier is more prone to
such lapses than another and this illustrates the need for high levels of vigilance
amongst the staff involved in the supply of wheelsets. It is therefore considered
necessary for improved auditing to ensure such high levels of vigilance. (R1)
Auditing of wheelset suppliers should be done against the requirements of all

relevant Railway Group Standards and should be applied principally to the suppliers
of overhaul, assembly and manufacture of wheelsets including the steel makers as
all of these activities are currently the source of failures. (R2)
GM/RT2470 has only recently been implemented and the first round of Entry Audits
of wheelset assemblers and manufacturers must be complete by 31 December 2004.
This standard requires some degree of interpretation and with careful direction,
possibly through the publication of a supplementary guidance note, some additional
focus could be applied to the level of scrutiny required in each relevant area including
overhaul activities. (R3) Supplementary details required in this standard include:
• Control of processes during steel making,
• Control of processes during wheelset overhaul,
• Analysis of failures and non conformities in production that are

precursors to failure, identification of corrective and preventive actions
and a recognition of the potential risks the supplier can import to the
railway infrastructure if appropriate checks on products, equipment
and staff competence are not controlled.
• Audit Team competence.
Wheelset suppliers are rarely provided with feedback in terms of the failure modes
that can occur on the operating railway as a result of wheelset induced problems and
this would enable the assessment of risk and safety awareness of staff to be
enhanced (R4).
10.2 Train Operation
The train operators are responsible for the safe operation of the trains. In this
context the train operators have approved Maintenance Plans containing the
technical requirements for light and heavy maintenance including the technical
requirements for the replacement (as required) of all spares. Generally the train
operators are responsible for the light maintenance of trains which may include, in
the case of wheelsets, removal and refitting when necessary and the non-destructive
testing of axles in service at prescribed intervals. Heavy maintenance is usually the
responsibility of the train owner, although sometimes it is the responsibility of the
train operator and for some recent builds it is the responsibility of the rolling stock
manufacturer. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the train operator to ensure the
correct maintenance is undertaken at the correct intervals using competent staff and
using the correct tools and equipment regardless of the complexity of the supply
chain. In the case of the train operators interviewed in connection with this study this
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responsibility was well understood although the different operators had executed this
responsibility in slightly different ways.
All operators considered wheelsets to be safety critical and therefore applied the
requirements of GM/RT2450 when selecting suppliers, including any parties between
themselves and the wheelset manufacturer or assembler. One operator had set up
their own Engineering Standard for Safety Critical Goods and Services (Connex EDS
2000), one had been involved in the introduction of an ATOC Code of Practice
(ACOP/EC/01003) and another had set up a supplier approval process within their
procurement manual. In principle EDS 2000 contains more detail relevant to Connex
but it appears to comply with the broader requirements of ACOP/EC/01003 and both
of the aforementioned documents appear to meet the higher level requirements of
GM/RT2450. The fact that these alternative procedures have been developed
demonstrates that the RGS provides only high level guidance and is not in itself a
working accreditation system.
In the case of wheelsets, train operators generally welcomed the introduction of

GM/RT2470 as it should provide a means by which evidence would be made
available to demonstrate that potential suppliers had met the minimum requirements
of the standards to the satisfaction of recognised audit teams. The expectation of
different train operators regarding whether this aspiration would be met was variable
and whilst some would accept RSSB approval as sufficient to satisfy them that the
selection of an approved company should satisfy their obligations under GM/RT2450
others considered that the relationship between GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 was
unclear and would lead them to require formal approval under their own supplier
approval systems which would be likely to require more audits rather than fewer in
depth audits. GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 require re-issue to ensure the way they
are intended to work together is better understood. (R5)
There was a general view, particularly amongst the technical staff that Link Up
approval was meaningless as the requirements to achieve this status were unclear.
Many respondents considered the audit protocol did not probe in sufficient detail to
differentiate suppliers with robust QMSs and Competence Management Systems
from those with less capability. As a result only some operators demand Link Up
approval as part of the contract for supply of safety critical products and services.
(R6)
Train operators all have wheelset and axle bearing policy statements that cover their
implementation of the various RGS requirements. Through these policies systems
have been set up to ensure staff classified as safety critical receive appropriate
training and competence assessment. At the level where staff interface directly with
the wheelsets and wheelset components formal competence assessment appears to
be working however at the technologist level, where service problems are initially
handled formal standards of competence are less clear. The engineering
responsibility is held formally by a Professional Head of Engineering within each train
operating company. Management, through the Professional Head, look for an
appropriate blend of training, educational attainment and monitor performance
through annual review and in some cases through more frequent one to one
sessions. A more formal process of assessing the competence of staff involved in
the initial diagnosis of problems and supporting the acceptance of engineering
change should be considered. (R7)
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There appear to be significant differences in the control exerted by the operators over
other parties in the supply chain. In at least one case suppliers are assessed against
their ability to deliver within a carefully defined scope. This had resulted, for
example, in a supplier being classified as a procurement and logistics supplier but
not a supplier of safety critical products. The result of this was that the train operator
had insisted on approving the supplier to the train operators supplier by way of joint
audit under the train operators supplier approval process. This level of control is
recommended as best practice and there may be financial gains to the industry as a
whole if train operators were to jointly develop schemes to a level of detail greater
than is currently the case. (R8) This may be encouraged by a revision to the
standard GM/RT2450 to either prescribe accreditation processes in more detail or to
include an appropriate example of good practice. (R9)
All train operators have formal procedures covering Engineering Change control.
These allied to formal document control procedures ensure that no engineering
change to product, processes involving product or concessions to specification or
standards are approved without seeking and obtaining the necessary scrutiny and
acceptance. If mandatory requirements of standards could be affected by a
proposed change this involves independent acceptance bodies otherwise risks are
assessed by suitably qualified staff, although the level of competence assessment of
such staff is unclear. (R7)
In the case of wheelsets, train operators were aware of the traceability requirements
specified in Railway Group Standards and these were applied. As such suitable
wheelset records are retained by operators who are reliant upon the supply chain to
provide them. Traceability is therefore possible back to individual axle and wheel
casts and back to individual components in other wheelset items. Reference was
made to the use of National Incident Room reports and the monthly inter operator
meetings, for example the Train Safety Review Group in the case of former Network
South East operators who make use of these to learning through feedback beyond
their own experience. All operators interviewed had formal procedures in place for
the feedback of service problems to the supplier, irrespective of warranty rights.
10.3 Train Ownership
The train owners are responsible for the provision of safe trains. In this context the
train owners are constrained by the details of the lease agreement with the
respective train operators. The passenger railway and freight railway were arranged
differently at privatisation and subsequent re-negotiation of lease agreements and
the procurement of new trains have increased the number of variations in the scope
of contractual responsibility of the train owners. In most cases in the passenger
railway they are responsible for the procurement of heavy maintenance services
although in an increasing number of new builds this is the responsibility of the train
manufacturer. In any event the technical content of the design and the specification
of maintenance work required to ensure the trains continue to operate in accordance
with the requirements of the standards must be included in the train operators
maintenance plan. The activities that the train owner can influence that affect risk to
train operation are therefore:
• Content of the initial procurement/design specification.
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• Content of the maintenance specifications.
• Engineering change to the products or processes used in their

production during their service life.
• Selection of suppliers of the trains and subsequent spares.
The rolling stock owners interviewed in this study both have formal Quality
Management Systems. (QMS). These systems include procedures to control the
aforementioned risks. One of the train operators had conducted their own supplier
approval audit on both of these owners in order to establish if they could be approved
as suppliers of safety critical products and services under their own standard. In one
case the owner had sufficient checks in place to meet the operators own
requirements but in the other case this was found not to be so. As a result the train
operator approved one to source heavy overhaul services and in the other case
constrained the owner to procure such services only from a company approved for
that scope by the train operator themselves until the owner could demonstrate that
systems and competent staff are in place to meet the operators requirements. Such
level of control does not appear to be consistent amongst train operators at present.
(R8) (R9).
At least one rolling stock owner has a formal safety management system
incorporated within the formal QMS but neither has been independently accredited
against a recognised national or international standard. Consideration should be
given to the need for such independent accreditation for all suppliers of safety critical
goods and services as this is likely to provide a more consistent level of support from
such systems. (R10)
Train owners have formal Engineering Change control procedures that require
reference back to train operators and independent Vehicle Acceptance Bodies
(VABs) depending upon whether the change affects an area covered by mandatory
requirements of standards. Reviews are conducted on changes to standards and the
potential for their impact on the requirements of procurement or maintenance of the
trains and their components. Engineering change is controlled whether triggered by
a change to standards, feedback from operators, through a request to modify
components or processes by suppliers or due to internal initiatives to improve
performance, reliability or cost effectiveness. Through these processes the train
owner can effectively control of the Design Authority although in the case of a train
operator applying aforementioned best practice in identifying a clear scope for their
suppliers when approved it should be clear whether the train owner has the freedom
to do this in isolation. In the case of wheelsets, almost any change to design will be
in an area affected by mandatory RGS requirements and therefore a VAB and the
process of Engineering Acceptance which will formally involve the train operator.
The passenger rolling stock owners (RoSCos) have been reviewing the quality and
accuracy of the data called up in the overhaul specifications as there have been
consistent problems found during contract review with conflicting requirements being
specified to suppliers. This has been particularly found to be so with some of the
older rolling stock where data has been transferred from one document to another
and some initiatives, for example reducing minimum scrapping diameter, have been
investigated and accepted for specific applications. Some of these documents also
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reflect outdated contract responsibilities that can lead to some confusion with
suppliers. These initiatives should be encouraged. (R11)
10.4 Train and Bogie Manufacture
The Design Authority in all cases in this study was either the British Railways Board
or the Bogie Manufacturer. Often the train and bogie manufacturer are the same
company although often geographically separated. There are a few ‘novel’ wheelset
designs that have been patented by wheelset manufacturers but none of these apply
to the test cases selected and no cases of such wheelsets are known by Atkins to be
operating on Network Rail controlled infrastructure.
The train manufacturer is therefore responsible for specifying to the bogie

manufacturer the performance requirements and interfaces for the bogie. The
principal agent in the control of risk arising from new wheelset designs is therefore
the bogie manufacturer. Under the requirements of RGS any new design must be
independently scrutinised by a VAB and in practice this process appears to be
working sufficiently to mitigate wheelset failures through design. There have
however been instances of non conformance found that suggest there is some room
for improvement. Examples of this are the production of axles in A1N condition
rather than A1T condition that makes the ultrasonic testing by far end scan difficult
and in some cases impossible. This in itself is not a significant safety risk provided
upon discovery they are removed from service before their next due test. However
this demonstrates that axles have not been produced in accordance with the
standards and in some cases could not have received the test on assembly that the
standard requires. This issue is discussed further in section 10.9 below.
10.5 Train Overhaul and Maintenance
Significant risks can be introduced during overhaul and maintenance activities either
through assembly being undertaken incorrectly or through essential activities not
being done. Whilst overhaul and maintenance is often undertaken by different
suppliers in the supply chain the nature of the risks arising are similar and the
controls in place are essentially the same. In the case of wheelsets, maintenance
generally involves wheelset replacement and axle testing in service. Overhaul
involves principally stripping wheelsets back to component parts, inspection, renewal
as necessary followed by MPI of axles, re-building, painting and final testing once
assembled. Occasional problems occur in the overhaul process. These are not
associated with any fundamental shortcoming in the supply chain but are associated
with occasional failure in process within the activity of one or another of the supply
chain members. Examples of such failure include setting wheels the incorrect
distance apart on an axle, despatch of an assembled wheelset to a train operator
without an axle end cap fitted and the fitting of an incorrect axle bearing type to a
wheelset for a particular class of vehicle. As these lapses in performance are not
associated with failures in communication between supply chain members but rather
failure in each case to apply processes correctly that were already set up it is
recommended that wheelset supplier approval procedures should be extended to
cover wheelset overhaul activity in addition to wheelset manufacture and assembly.
(R2)
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10.6 Wheelset Agent
In the test cases considered in this study this category applies to:
• Railway Wheelset and Brake (RW&B) who are the sole agent of MWL
(Brazil) for the supply of wheels to the UK and the sole agent of
Swasap (South Africa) for the supply of axles to the UK.
• Railpart who are approved by Connex to supply logistical and

materials management services but not to supply safety critical
products without Connex being involved in the supplier approval
process further down the supply chain.
It is necessary to clearly distinguish between the role of the supply agent in these two
cases. In the first case the agent may be supplying a service to the manufacturer
overseas and in so doing may influence the level of technical risk involved in the
supply. For example if the agent were to take on the role of obtaining and reviewing
for impact changes to Railway Group Standards the agent should be considered as
part of the suppliers organisation and the scope of approval would have to be based
upon the supply being provided through that route. (R12)
If the role of the agent is transparent in technical terms and is only supplying a
support service to the manufacturer then the role of the agent is not relevant to the
approval. In the case of RW&B there has been a long term partnership between the
companies and the agent does not tender for the supply of wheels and axles. RW&B
do influence risk but only in terms of the storage and transportation of the wheels and
axles from port to customer, wheelset assembler or overhauler. In order to fulfil this
role safely RW&B have a QMS in accordance with ISO9000 which is independently
verified by an IRQA registered auditor. In the case of Railpart and the class 465
wheelset overhaul service the action of Connex has rendered Railpart’s activity as
one of materials management and therefore their activity should not introduce any
safety risk associated with the product and therefore their role in supply chain safety
management terms is transparent.
10.7 Wheel and Axle Manufacture
The failure data analysis shows that most risk is introduced into wheelsets through
the manufacture of wheels. Whilst it is also possible to introduce risk through the
manufacture of axles this risk appears to have been more successfully mitigated.
As has been explained in Section 6 of this report there have been wheelset supplier
approval systems in place for many years although these processes were not well
documented. In addition the wheelset standards have also been developed at a
detailed level with the result that the manufacturers have only had an influence on
the consistency of supply rather than the intrinsic safety and reliability of the products
they produce. The result of these two controls is a very low rate of failure of
wheelsets on the UK main line railways. That is not to say that the industry can
afford to be complacent and all supply respondents involved in this study welcomed
the introduction of GM/RT2470 provided it is applied equitably to all suppliers.
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As with the wheelset overhaulers, the manufacturers appear to have the necessary
systems and procedures in place to provide the services in accordance with RGS
and BS requirements. That said, in some cases competence is not assessed against
formal standards in the way GO/RT3260 implies. In such cases the levels of
competence are not necessarily inadequate but the work has not been broken into
steps for which formal competence standards exist and the assessment made on
that basis. Often the whole operation is considered and the needs of the operator
undertaking that operation by an experienced supervisor rather than a qualified
assessor. It has not been possible within the scope of this study to differentiate
between the effectiveness of such different approaches. As this study was based
upon the co-operation of the relevant parties and was not in the form of an audit it
was not feasible to test the claims of the companies involved. Nevertheless as all
manufacturers will have to undergo an Entry Audit under GM/RT2470 within the next
18 months there will be an opportunity to establish if these companies do have all the
systems in place and working to a satisfactory level.
The failure data obtained and presented in section 7 of this report suggests that there
are no pockets of poor performance in the supply chain but rather there are isolated
cases of supply chain members failing to carry out the processes in place correctly.
Examples of this are the inclusion of slag in wheel rims that give rise to cracks and
ultimately loss of sections of wheel rim. Auditing of wheelset suppliers should be
done against the requirements of all relevant Railway Group Standards and should
be applied principally to the suppliers of overhaul, assembly and manufacture of
wheelsets including the steel makers. (R2)
Wheelset suppliers are not provided with feedback in terms of the failure modes that
can occur on the operating railway as a result of wheelset induced problems. On the
basis of the information obtained in this study wheelset suppliers are provided with
feedback when they supply individual wheelsets that are found not to comply to
specification either through inspection or as a result of failure, however they do not
receive information relating to other wheelset failure modes and their potential
consequences on the operating railway. Such information would benefit
manufacturers as it would enable the assessment of risk and safety awareness of
staff to be enhanced. (R4)
There is evidence that at least some manufacturers have developed Competence

Management systems that fully comply with the requirements of GO/RT3260.
10.8 Standards
Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) manage the following activities that are
relevant to this project:
• Development, Issue and Maintenance of Railway Group Standards.
• Management of non-compliance to Railway Group Standards.
• Audit of Railway Group to Railway Group Standards and Safety Case.
• Agent for change and improved safety performance.
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A Standards Controller is responsible for the overall output and groups of individuals
are formed to produce the standards. Staff may be brought into that team to provide
required expertise or the standard production may be contracted out to another
company.
Railway Group Standards (RGS) are, by their nature, high level standards, however
in the case of wheelsets some degree of prescription is included to ensure
compatibility between trains and infrastructure and to mitigate risks that have arisen
in the past and which have been referred to in section 7 of this report.
During the review of this part of the supply chain the following issues were noted
which could give rise to improvement.
On rolling stock the railway group standards that apply are, except for those applied
retrospectively, those applying at the time of the contract. When scrutinising design
and changes to design it is therefore necessary to make reference to old versions of
the standards to distinguish between the requirements that apply to unchanged items
and to ensure appropriate conformance is demonstrated for the change in question.
For this reason controls should be in place to permit access to former standards
whilst identifying the status of these documents accordingly. (R13)
The writers of Railway Group Standards have little feedback from end users, nor do
they see the effects of implementation. It is recognised that practical sampling and
feedback collection are expensive to perform but with standards there are huge
downstream costs of ‘getting it wrong’. This end user feedback is lacking and is
essential to continued improvement in the field of standards production. (R14)
A generic engineering competence is required for those involved in the production of

standards which is not easy to define in a competence standard and to assess
against the requirement. Individuals have specific skill areas and will find the
necessary input from others if required. The Subject Committee process assists with
robust review to ensure that the standard is accurate. It si not easy to see how
defined competence standards could be produced to cover the technical
requirements of standards; however a general one to ensure correct style, format
and methods of collecting information could be produced. (R15)
There are no targets or KPIs in existence which relate to ensuring that the standards
perform the required function. There is a Group Standard on change of standards
which encourages continuous improvement. A large number of these change
requests are generated internally and it is not known what number come from the
persons working to the standards. (R16)
The scope of the standard is defined by the team responsible for the generation of
the standard. There is no formal plan or definition of standards and how they should
fit together, the piecemeal development of standards does not encourage ‘neat’ fitting
together at the interfaces although the drafting groups try to identify the boundaries
and take account of other surrounding standards. (R17) (R18)
10.9 Engineering Acceptance
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The process of Engineering Acceptance and the lower level conformance certification
is controlled by Railway Group standards and bodies are accredited by RSSB to
carry out this activity. In order to achieve accreditation companies have to have
systems and procedures in place to carry out the necessary work and have
competent staff (signatories) to ensure the work is done to an acceptable standard by
competent personnel. RSSB carry out audits which in addition to ensuring that VABs
and CCBs are able to demonstrate conformance to their own systems provides a
form of clearing house where standards require some degree of interpretation. As
VABs and CCBs have to compete for work in the open market the audit process is
essential to prevent the gradual erosion of quality in this work by inappropriate
competition.
Problems highlighted in section 7 of this report regarding wheelsets that have not
been produced in accordance with the standards suggest that the effectiveness of
the construction conformance process requires improvement. Examples of these
problems include axles heat treated to a condition not accepted in Railway Group
Standards, wheelsets that have not received the test on assembly that the standard
required, wheels that have been produced with levels of hardness below the
requirements of the standards and wheels that have not been branded in accordance
with the requirements of the standards.
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11. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions have been drawn against each of the findings described in Section 10
above and these are given in Table 11-1. Arising from these conclusions, where
appropriate, recommendations for improvements have also been made. The
recommendations include a section reference number in parentheses which enables
traceability back to the report section containing the relevant finding(s).
‘Quick Wins’, which are defined as recommendations that could be implemented in a

short timescale and at a low cost in order to gain a fast benefit response, are shown
in italicised bold text. The recommendations R1, R2, R3, R5, R8, R9 and R12 are
those considered to provide the highest safety benefit and are shown with a shaded
reference number in Table 11-1.
Table 11-1 : Conclusions and Recommendations
Ref Conclusions Recommendations
R1 Problems during manufacture are There is a need for improved

still resulting in occasional wheelset auditing and clear competence
failures. requirements for audit teams should
be specified (10.1).
R2 The suppliers of overhaul, assembly Auditing of wheelset suppliers

and manufacture of wheelsets should be done against the
including the steel makers should be requirements of all relevant Railway
audited regularly as all of these Group Standards and should be
activities are currently the source of applied principally to the suppliers of
failures. overhaul, assembly and manufacture
of wheelsets including the steel
makers (10.1, 10.5, 10.7).
R3 GM/RT2470 has only recently been With careful direction, possibly

implemented and the first round of through the publication of a
Entry Audits of wheelset assemblers supplementary guidance note, some
and manufacturers must be additional focus could be applied to
complete by 31 December 2004. the level of scrutiny required in each
This standard requires some degree relevant area including overhaul
of interpretation. activities (10.1).
R4 Wheelset suppliers are rarely Providing feedback would enable the

provided with feedback in terms of assessment of risk and safety
the failure modes that can occur on awareness of staff to be enhanced
the operating railway as a result of (10.1, 10.7).
wheelset induced problems.
R5 The relationship between GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 require

GM/RT2450 and GM/RT2470 is re-issue to ensure the way they are
unclear and may lead train operators intended to work together is better
to require formal approval of
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suppliers under their own supplier understood (10.2).

approval systems which would be
likely to require more audits rather
than fewer in depth audits.
R6 There was a general view, particularly Significant work would be required to

amongst some Train Operators that improve this system before it could be
Link Up approval was meaningless as considered a credible means of supplier
the requirements to achieve this status accreditation. Link Up in its current
were unclear. Many respondents, form should not be considered as an
including suppliers, considered the alternative accreditation for wheelset
audit protocol did not probe in sufficient suppliers to the system specified in
detail to differentiate suppliers with GM/RT2470 (10.2).
robust QMSs and Competence
Management Systems from those with
less capability.
R7 At the level where staff interface directly A more formal process of assessing the
with the wheelsets and wheelset competence of staff involved in the
components formal competence initial diagnosis of problems and
asses sment appears to be working supporting the acceptance of
however at the technologist level, engineering change should be
where service problems are initially considered (10.2).
handled formal standards of
competence are less clear.
R8 There appear to be significant There may be financial gains to the

differences in the control exerted by the industry as a whole if train operators
operators over other parties in the were to jointly develop schemes to a
supply chain. level of detail greater than is currently
the case. The way in which Connex
EDS 2000 is being applied was
considered an example of best practice
within the context of this study (10.2,
10.3).
R9 Conclusion as for Recommendation This may be encouraged by a

R8 above. revision to the standard GM/RT2450
to either prescribe accreditation
processes in more detail or to
include an appropriate example of
good practice (10.2, 10.3).
R10 At least one rolling stock owner has a Consideration should be given to the
formal safety management system need for such independent
incorporated within the formal QMS but accreditation for all suppliers of safety
neither has been independently critical goods and services as this is
accredited against a recognised likely to provide a more consistent level
national or international standard. of support from such systems (10.3).
R11 The passenger rolling stock owners Initiatives to improve the quality and
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(RoSCos) have been reviewing the accuracy of specifications should be

quality and accuracy of the data called encouraged (10.3).
up in the overhaul specifications as
there have been consistent problems
found during contract review.
R12 Supply agents are used in some It is necessary to clearly identify the
instances in the supply of wheelsets role of the agent and whether this
to train operators. role could introduce risk into the
products or service provided. In
cases where the agent can introduce
risk the agent should be considered
as part of the supplier’s organisation
and the scope of approval should be
based upon the supply being
provided through that route (10.6).
R13 When scrutinising design and changes RSSB need to include controls in RGS
to design it is therefore necessary to to mandate retention and traceability in
make reference to old versions of the the technical standards relating to the
standards to distinguish between the design installation and testing of
requirements that apply to unchanged equipment at the time of commissioning
items and to ensure appropriate to permit modifications and review to be
conformance is demonstrated for the accurately carried out. Furthermore,
change in question. RGS should also mandate that each
technical standard should be clear in
terms of the scope of the standard. i.e.
to be retrospectively applied or for new
works only (10.8). This will allow the
standards in force at the time that
ageing equipment was first introduced
to be readily identified and sourced.
R14 The writers of some Railway Group RSSB should develop a method to
Standards have little feedback from end ensure that appropriate end user
users, nor do they see the effects of feedback is collected and incorporated
implementation. in the appropriate standards in all cases
(10.8).
R15 A generic engineering competence is RSSB should develop a competence

required for those involved in the system at an appropriate level to
production of standards which is not ensure that personnel developing
easy to define in a competence standards can demonstrate suitable
standard and to assess against the competence (10.8).
requirement.
R16 There are no targets or KPIs in RSSB should encourage feedback from
existence which relate to ensuring that end users, see (R13), and define
the standards perform the required suitable measures to show that the
function. standards are fit for purpose in their
operating environment and continue to
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be so (10.8).
R17 The scope of the standard is defined by RSSB should develop, for each supply
the team responsible for the generation chain activity to be managed by a
of the standard. There is no formal plan standard, a life cycle map showing the
or definition of standards and how they scope, processes, materials, resources,
should fit together, the piecemeal information and interfaces involved
development of standards does not (10.8).
encourage ‘neat’ fitting together at the
interfaces although the drafting groups
try to identify the boundaries and take
account of other surrounding standards.
R18 Conclusion as for Recommendation RSSB should consider the bigger

R17 above. picture analysis and define a standards
strategy to ensure better ‘fitting
together’ and coverage of activity areas.
Sometimes small scale amendments
lead towards a degrading of the
standard quality and a more holistic
review should be performed (10.8).
Overall the strengths of the wheelset supply chain are the high level of safety
awareness amongst all parties interviewed, the introduction of a more formalised way
of setting supplier approval criteria in GM/RT2470 and the improvement made in
wheelset standards over the years demonstrated by the low number of generic failure
modes encountered. The weaknesses of the wheelset supply chain are the lack of
co-ordination currently displayed in setting up safety critical supplier accreditation
procedures, the level of interpretation required in setting up suitable audit teams
under GM/RT2470 and the lack of information flow from operators down to the supply
base to enable suppliers to better understand the risks they can import to train
operation. It is accepted that in a supply chain involving private companies that
commercial considerations may exclude the possibility of unconstrained sharing of
details surrounding failures and precursors to failure when discovered, however more
could be done.
In addition, the failure data review by Serco Railtest, described in Section 7, gave
rise to the following specific recommendations:
R19 Vehicle Acceptance Bodies should put more effort into obtaining evidence that
the wheelsets conformed to Group Standard requirements, particularly in the
area of non destructive testing requirements, based upon the experience of
some recent new builds.
R20 Wheelset manufacture audit teams should include an auditor with in depth
knowledge of modern steel making to audit the production of wheel steel,
whether the steel is sourced in house or externally. It may be unwise to rely
on wheel manufacturers own audits of their steel supplier.
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R21 At present it is difficult to obtain up to date information regarding Network Rail

approved suppliers of wheelset components and wheelset assemblers. A
Web site might be an ideal means of supplying this information and it is
suggested that for wheel, tyre and axle manufacturers, their approved steel
suppliers should be included in this list.
R22 Now that the owners of failed components are free to have failure analysis
carried out at a number of independent laboratories it is more difficult to obtain
data. All these failures will in future have to be both investigated and reported
on; again listing on a web site would allow those needing, or interested in, to
obtain this data, witness trends etc. If this were the case then problems
occurring in the supply chain could be more readily identified.
R23 Wheelset Standards under the control of RSSB should specify that axles
retain their cast number and date of manufacture when assembled into
wheelsets.
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12. References
12.1 General
1. Supply Chain Safety Management SCSM, Supplementary Information for SCSM
ITTs, S.P1195.2.1, Issue 0.3, 02/08/02.
2. Detailed Requirements - Wheelset Procurement Test Case Workpackage for
SCSM Programme Phase 1, Issue 0.4.
3. Safety Critical Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM) Track Circuit
Procurement Test Case, Final Report, 5014016/doc/04
4. Supply Chain Safety Management Baseline Assessment Criteria, S.P1195.3.4,
Issue 1.0, 18/12/02.
5. HSG 65, Successful Health and Safety Management, Health and Safety
Executive.
12.2 Railway Group Standards

GM/RT 2450 Qualification of Suppliers of Safety Critical Engineering
Products and Services.
GM/RM2525INF Wheelsets Manual Information Section
GM/RT2470 Wheelset Supplier Qualification.
GO/RT3260 Competence Management Systems.
GM/RT023 Wheelset Manufacture
12.3 Other Standards
BS 5892 Part 1 Specification for Axles
BS 5892 Part 2 Specification for Forged and Rolled Centres
BS 5892 Part 3 Specification for Monobloc Wheels
BS 5892 Part 4 Specification for Forged & Rolled Tyres
BS 5892 Part 5 Specification for Steel Bars for Retaining Rings
BS 5892 Part 6 Specification for Wheelsets
BS EN ISO9001:2000 Quality Management Systems Requirements
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13. Glossary of Abbreviations
BR British Rail
BRB British Railways Board
BS British Standard
CCB Conformance Certification Body
DMU Diesel Multiple Unit
EMU Electrical Multiple Unit
EWS English Welsh and Scottish
FGW First Great Western
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HST High Speed Train
KPI Key Performance Indicator
NDT Non Destructive Testing
NoBo Notified Body
NRCI Network Rail Controlled Infrastructure
QMS Quality Management System
RCF Rolling Contact Fatigue
RGS Railway Group Standards
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board
RW&B Railway Wheelset and Brake Ltd.
SCSM Supply Chain Safety Management
TSI Technical Standards for Interoperability
UAT Ultrasonic Axle Test
VAB Vehicle Acceptance Body
WSP Wheel Slip Protection
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Appendix A - Supply Chain Lifecycle
Train Operator
Wheelset Policy
Procurement Specification
Design Specification
Conformance Check for

Vehicle Design
Component Design
Manufacturer/ Assemble
including Identification and
Production of Wheelset
Records

Component Testing Vehicle Construction
Installation into
Bogie/Vehicle
Repair Overhaul including

Assembly and Repair
Maintenance Plan Including
Wheelset Policy
Replacement Components
(As Required)
Service Experience leads

to Failures and/or Need for
Modification
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Appendix B - Generic Question Set
Quality Management System (QMS)
1 What is your company’s role in the supply chain for wheelsets?
2 Which other companies interface directly with you in the supply chain?
3 Does your company recognise the term ‘Safety Critical’ in relation to the products
supplied by you or to you by your suppliers?
4 What is the nature of your companies QMS, is it accredited and if so by whom?
5 Do you have any Quality Procedures that apply specifically to the supply of
wheelsets?
6 What document control procedures do you have in place?
7 What procedures that control product version or modification state do you have in
place?
8 What records do you maintain to demonstrate conformance with specification

and / or ensure traceability of supply?
Management Responsibility
9 Do members of your staff have written job descriptions containing a definition of

their roles and responsibilities and are organisational charts available to indicate
lines of reporting? Do you have a specific supply chain manager?
10 Do you hold contract reviews with your suppliers or customers? Are records kept
of these reviews and are any actions arising followed up?
11 Has your company been subject to commercial takeover in the recent past and if
so, what specific arrangements were put in place to protect the integrity of your
position in the supply chain for wheelsets?
12 Do you have a specific procurement strategy for sourcing your supplies and has
this been subject to any form of risk assessment (e.g. large single source
framework agreements or competitive tender amongst variety of suppliers)?
13 Do you monitor and review your quality systems internally and if so in what way
and how often?
Resource Management
14 Do you have a formal staff appraisal system and how are individual training
needs identified?
5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 65 10/07/03

Final Report
15 How do you assess staff competencies and how is this process managed?
16 How do you ensure the plant, equipment and tools you use are sufficient to
ensure the wheelsets you operate/supply will conform to necessary standards?
Product Realisation
17 Which standards or regulations relating to the supply of wheelsets do you

consider apply to your activities (regardless of what your contractual
requirements might specify)?
18 What consideration is given by your Company of the through-life costs of the

wheelsets related products you supply?
19 Do you have performance or reliability targets for your products or the raw
materials supplied to you and if so how are they monitored? Also, do these reflect
a regime of continuous improvement?
20 What processes are in place to manage customer feedback either from your
customers or to your suppliers?
21 Where you are involved in design, how are functional requirements defined and
verified?
22 Where you are involved in design, how are interfaces and any potential product
constraints identified?
23 Where you are involved in design, what is the scope of your responsibility e.g. do
you also have an input to the specification of the maintenance regime or
manufacturing or test requirements?
24 What product reviews are undertaken to ensure that specifications and standards
remain valid?
25 How are specifications and standards (or changes to specifications and

standards) validated to ensure the resulting wheelsets perform as required? How
do you determine which standards are applicable to your wheelsets/products?
26 Do you have an approved list of suppliers and if so on what basis is this

managed and who has responsibility for the process? Do you rank approved
suppliers? Do you require suppliers to hold accreditations of any kind?
27 How are alternative bids ranked against each other when you tender for products
or services?
28 Do you specify the use of specific sub-contractors or suppliers further down the
supply chain when letting supply contracts?
29 Do you involve subsidiaries of your company in the supply chain and if so how is
their performance measured against potential alternative suppliers?
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Final Report
30 How do you verify that your suppliers supply you with products that conform to
relevant standards and specifications and is this recorded?
31 How are service and maintenance requirements defined and what steps are
taken to ensure that any necessary or critical requirements are promulgated
through the supply chain?
32 What product identification systems do you have such as part numbers, serial
numbers, modification states; and how are these recorded?
33 What level of traceability do you have of the source of materials used in your
products?
34 What standards do you have for the packaging and transportation of your
products or raw materials and how do you ensure that these have been complied
with?
35 How are calibration and monitoring of your production equipment and tools
managed?
Measurement, Analysis and Improvement
36 What happens to any non-conforming products either supplied to you or by you?

Do you operate a concessions system?
37 Do you investigate root causes of non-conforming product and how is this

managed?
38 What management processes do you have in place for implementing corrective

action?
39 Do you operate a suggestions scheme and how are suggestions for improvement
handled?
40 Do you undertake any form of analysis of predicted and /or actual product
performance?
41 Are there any specific supply chain issues or concerns that you currently have?
42 Have you made any changes to your procurement strategy or supply chain
recently and if so why?
43 What changes would you make to your procurement strategy or supply chain if
you could and why?
44 To what extent do you feel information is being adequately communicated up and

down the supply chain (e.g. specifications, failure information, operational
experiences)?
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Final Report
Appendix C - Generic Question Set Mapping to

SCSM Baseline Assessment
Criteria
5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 68 10/07/03

Final Report
C) HOW ARE THE SCHEME/PRACTICE COMPETENCES AUTHORISED AND ASSURED
Baseline Assessment Criteria Test Case Generic Question Set

No. Question No. Question
23 How are the competences of people 15 How do you assess staff competencies and how
and systems defined and checked. is this process managed?
24 Is the scheme/practice comp etence 15 How do you assess staff competencies and how
based on the organisation or an is this process managed?
individual within the organisation
25 How is training including induction 14 Do you have a formal staff appraisal system
provided and how are individual training needs
identified?
26 What audit/assessment processes assure 3 Does your company recognise the term ‘Safety
the scheme/practice. Are there different Critical’ in relation to the products supplied by
levels of audit for differing levels of safety you or to you by your suppliers?
criticality. 5 Do you have any Quality Procedures that apply
specifically to the supply of wheelsets?
27 What levels of independence are 4 What is the nature of your companies QMS, is it
specified for audits accredited and if so by whom?
28 How is use of the scheme/ practice 13 Do you monitor and review your quality systems
enforced and conformance achieved internally and if so in what way and how often?
and maintained
29 How is the scheme /practice assessed as - There is no specific ‘scheme’ under review in
fit for purpose the test cases, therefore this question is not
really relevant.
D) HOW IS CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE IMPROVEMENT WITHIN THE

SCHEME/PRACTICE HANDLED

30 What change control requirements within 6 What document control procedures do you
the scheme/practice are necessary and have in place?
how are they to be managed 7 What procedures that control product version
or modification state do you have in place?
32 What product identification systems do you
have such as part numbers, serial numbers,
modification states; and how are these
recorded?
31 Are lessons learnt feed back into the 20 What processes are in place to manage
scheme/practice. How are customer feedback either from your customers
improvements incorporated. or to your suppliers?
37 Do you investigate root causes of non-
conforming product and how is this managed?
38 What management processes do you have in
place for implementing corrective action?
39 Do you operate a suggestions scheme and how
are suggestions for improvement handled?
32 How is the scheme/practice process 24 What product reviews are undertaken to ensure
challenged on an ongoing basis to that specifications and standards remain valid?
ensure excellence in the market place
33 How long has the scheme/practice been 42 Have you made any changes to your
in use. Have changes occurred during its procurement strategy or supply chain recently
life. and if so why?
34 Have changes occurred during its life. 42 Have you made any changes to your
procurement strategy or supply chain recently
and if so why?
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Final Report
E) WHAT MECHANISMS EXIST FOR TRACEABILTY AND ALLOW LEARNING (FAILURES AND
SUCCESSES) THROUGH FEEDBACK

35 Who maintains and how are traceability 31 How are service and maintenance requirements
logs organised by the supplier and by the defined and what steps are taken to ensure that
customer after delivery of the any necessary or critical requirements are
product/service promulgated through the supply chain?
32 What product identification systems do you have
such as part numbers, serial numbers, modification
states; and how are these recorded?
33 What level of traceability do you have of the
source of materials used in your products?
36 How are failures and near misses within 37 Do you investigate root causes of non-conforming
the scheme/practice and of the product and how is this managed?
product/service managed and/or 38 What management processes do you have in
registered place for implementing corrective action?
37 How are operational and maintenance 20 What processes are in place to manage customer
issues fed back to the product/service feedback either from your customers or to your
provider, in particular after the warranty suppliers?
period has expired 31 How are service and maintenance requirements
defined and what steps are taken to ensure that
any necessary or critical requirements are
promulgated through the supply chain?
44 To what extent do you feel information is being
adequately communicated up and down the
supply chain (e.g. specifications, failure
information, operational experiences)?
38 Does the scheme/practice have a 38 What management processes do you have in
process to inform all users that a place for implementing corrective action?
functional update is necessary following
an incident or perturbation with the
product or service
G) HOW DOES THE SCHEME/PRACTICE RELATE TO THE COMPANY ORGANISATION AND THE
CULTURE WITHIN THE ORGANISATION

44 Is an organisational safety culture - No direct mapping for safety culture. This runs
(cognitive, reliance, open, blame-free, through many of the questions but the scope of 13 or
etc) required for the scheme/practice 39 could be expanded to cover this issue.
45 Does the scheme/practice support a 10 Do you hold contract reviews with your suppliers or
supplier organisation’s safety culture customers? Are records kept of these reviews and
are any actions arising followed up?
46 What aspects of the company and 9 Do members of your staff have written job
project organisation ensure the descriptions containing a definition of their roles and
product/service safety critical responsibilities and are organisational charts
requirements are met available to indicate lines of reporting? Do you have
a specific supply chain manager?
47 Are the activities for the management of 4 What is the nature of your companies QMS, is it
safety defined accredited and if so by whom?
5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 70 10/07/03

Rail Safety and Standards Board Evergreen House 160 Euston Road London NW1 2DX
Reception Telephone +44 (0)20 7904 7777 Facsimile +44 (0)20 7904 7791
www.rssb.co.uk
Rail Safety & Standards Board Registered Office: Evergreen House 160 Euston Road London NW1 2DX. Registered in England and Wales No. 04655675.
Rail Safety & Standards Board is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee.

Test Case 1 - Wheelsets

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Research Programme

Supply chain safety management – test case 1: wheelsets

Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB)

Safety Critical Supply Chain Safety Management (SCSM)

JOB NUMBER: 5014014 DOCUMENT REF: 5014014/doc/04

Issue 0 Draft Issue to RSSB P Waite S Clark I Shannon 20/06/03

Issue 1 First Issue P Waite S Clark I Shannon 10/07/03

Originated Reviewed Authorised Date

© Copyright 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board

6. Existing Accreditation Schemes 23

7. Failure Data Review 26

8. Test Case Selection 36

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 1 10/07/03

10.4 Train and Bogie Manufacture 52

11. Conclusions and Recommendations 57

13. Glossary of Abbreviations 63

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 2 10/07/03

The research also includes a review of existing accreditation schemes associated

A total of 23 individual recommendations have been made. The principal issues

• Problems during manufacture are still resulting in occasional wheelset failures.

• There is a need for more effective auditing of suppliers of wheelsets.

• Supplier audits should be co-ordinated to ensure capability to meet all RGS

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5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 4 10/07/03

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 5 10/07/03

The report comprises a summary and 13 main sections as follows:

Executive Summary Overall summary of project objectives,

Section 1 Introduction This section.

Section 3 Status A statement on behalf of RSSB.

Section 4 Wheelsets Summary technical description of

Section 5 Supply Chain A description of the overall breadth and

Section 6 Existing Accreditation A review of existing schemes for the

Section 7 Failure Data Review A review of historical failure records for

Section 8 Test Case Selection A justification for the selection of the

Section 9 Data Collection A description of the approach adopted to

Section 10 Findings An extraction of the key findings from the

Section 11 Conclusions and Conclusions and recommendations

Section 12 References Key documents referenced in this report.

Section 13 Glossary of Abbreviations Glossary of abbreviations.

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 6 10/07/03

2. Scope and Purpose

• Analysing the safety culture prevalent in the supply chain;

• Analysing failure / incident reporting and learning;

• Identifying best practice;

• Suggesting any quick win solutions.

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 7 10/07/03

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 8 10/07/03

A wheelset is defined in the relevant British Standard (BS5892) as “a complete unit

Wheelsets can be characterised by the functions they perform. These include:

• Supporting the static weight of the vehicles.

• Providing dynamic isolation of the vehicles from the track.

• Providing guidance for the train along the track.

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 9 10/07/03

• Providing a return to earth for the train’s electrical systems.

• Supporting other equipment, e.g. WSP and speed sensing equipment.

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 10 10/07/03

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 11 10/07/03

Table 4-1 : Example of Wheelset Type Data Extracted from RAVERS

Journal Bearing Wheel Brakes Wheelset Wheel Bogie Type Cat No

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 12 10/07/03

Journal Bearing Wheel Brakes Wheelset Wheel Bogie Type Cat No

5014014/doc/04 Issue 1 13 10/07/03

Table 4-2 : Potential Differences in Wheelsets Leading to Different Risk