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Contents
Acknowledgments v
Abbreviations vi
Key Messages
vii
1 Droughts, Storms, Floods, and Changing Water Supplies
18
24
33
33
34
35
References 36
Boxes
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.1
3.1
3.2
3
4
7
11
20
22
iii
27
31
Figures
B1.2 Many of the Cleanest Energy Sources Are Highly Water-Intensive
B2.1 Global Water Withdrawals
2.1 Climate-Related Impacts on Gdp in 2050
4
11
13
Maps
K.1 The Estimated Effects of Water Scarcity on GDP in Year 2050,
Under Two Policy Regimes
1.1 The Spatial Distribution in Runoff Will Become More
Uneven to 2050
3.1 Yearly Urban Flood Damage by 2080, Billion USD
4.1 The Worlds Largest River Basins and the Populations They Support
4.2 Change in Seasonal Variability of Flows, 2010 to 2040
iv
ix
2
19
25
26
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared by a World Bank team led by Richard Damania and
comprising Stephane Dahan, Lia Nitake, and Jason Russ. Bruce Ross-Larson
was the principal editor. The report has benefited greatly from the strategic
guidance and general direction of Junaid Ahmad (Senior Director, World
Bank). The advice of Laura Tuck (Vice President, Sustainable Development
Practice Group, World Bank) is also gratefully acknowledged.
The report draws on background papers and notes prepared by the following: Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) modelling and analysis was
provided by a team comprising Leon Clarke (JGCRI, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory and University of Maryland),Kelly Gustafson, (Dept. of
Geographical Sciences, University of Maryland),Mohamad Hejazi (JGCRI,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and University of Maryland), Sonny
Kim (JGCRI, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and University of
Maryland), Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm (ESSIC, University of Maryland)
and Raul Muoz-Castillo (Dept. of Geographical Sciences, University of
Maryland); Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling and analysis
was undertaken by Roberto Roson (CaFoscari University/Bocconi
University); A survey on the economics of water and climate change was
undertaken by Anil Markandya (Basque Centre for Climate Change);
Research on transboundary cooperation was provided by Anjali Basnet
(World Bank) and Jacqueline Tront (World Bank); An in-depth view of transboundary cooperation in the Niger River Basin was provided by Johan
Grijsen. A survey of urban water management and climate change was provided by Bernard Barraqu (CNRS-CIRED) and Bruno Tassin (Ecole
Nationale des Ponts et Chausses); Research on urban water management
and climate change was undertaken by Meleesa Naughton (World Bank).
Christina Leb,Diego Juan Rodriguez, and Marcus Wijnen all from the World
Bank provided expert advice and inputs.
Incisive and helpful peer reviewer comments were received from: Marianne
Fay (Chief Economist, World Bank), Nathan Lee Engle (Climate Change
Specialist, World Bank), Sanjay Pahuja (Lead Water Resources Specialist),
Claudia Sadoff (Lead Water Economist, World Bank), Vijay Jagannathan
(World Resources Institute), Betsy Otto (World Resources Institute), Dominic
Waughray (World Economic Forum) and Louise Whiting (WaterAid).
Invaluable feedback was also received from: Jennifer Sara (Director, World
Bank), Dina Umali-Deininger (Practice Manager, World Bank) and MarieChantal Uwanyiligira (Practice Manager, World Bank).
Abbreviations
GDP
IPCC
PPP
RCP
SSP
vi
Key Messages
Most of the impacts of climate change will be channeled primarily through
the water cycle, with consequences that could be large and uneven across
the globe. Water fuels the most vital sectors of the economy, including agriculture, energy, and burgeoning cities. Hence growth and development are
surprisingly thirsty businesses. Climate change, through its impact on water
availability and floods could significantly impede growth prospects. There is
little scientific dispute that many of the key climate risks are channeled
through risks to water resources. Clean energy is often more water-intensive
than more polluting alternatives, so achieving global mitigation goals will
require prudent water management policy.
This is why smart water policy is fundamental to smart climate change
policy. Building climate resilient economies that can develop and grow in an
ever warmer world will necessitate better water allocationutilizing scarce
water for higher value uses. It will also call for better water proofing of the
economy to enhance resilience, in the more vulnerable sectors of the economy, especially for agriculture and in the burgeoning cities where large numbers of people and higher value assets are exposed to increasing climate risks
such as floods, water shortages and storm surges.
This report highlights these and other major water-related challenges and
the economic consequences that the world will face with climate change. The
focus is on two issues cities where much of the future population growth is
expected to occur and managing water resources in transboundary basins
that account for about 60 percent of the worlds freshwater supplies. The
report shows that:
vii
creates waves of migration that are difficult to absorb, and can lead to
increased tensions and, in some cases, conflict.
Bad water-management policies can exacerbate the effects of climate
change on water, while good policies can neutralize them. In many
water-scarce regions, water is currently being allocated to lower-value
uses. Changing the incentives through policies that allocate water efficiently can redirect it toward higher-value sectors, thus making better use
of diminishing supplies and promoting economic growth.
The urban space, where most people and assets reside, is highly vulnerable to water stresses and extreme events. Urbanization is occurring
at unprecedented rates, especially in developing countries, and municipal
governments must make the right investments to avoid disasters. Rising
sea levels and storm surges will put large populations at risk, while also
contaminating coastal aquifers and threatening water suppliesif no
action is taken. The required responses are commonly acknowledged but
infrequently enforced. They call for climate- resilient and protective
infrastructure, a wider water resource perspective that includes non
-structural measures such as early warning systems, and incentives to
ensure that land-use regulations are enforced.
Climate change will make managing transboundary river basins more
difficult, but also more important. Nearly 40 percent of the worlds people are served by transboundary river basins. Managing these basins is
already difficult, with neighboring countries competing for access to the
water they provide. The greater variability that climate change brings
increases the need for transboundary collaboration, but the resulting
uncertainty about likely outcomes also renders cooperation more difficult. Institutions that build consensus and investments in information
and infrastructure can build trust and convert climate risks to material
rewards.
viii
key Map 1 The Estimated Effects of Water Scarcity on GDP in Year 2050, Under Two
Policy Regimes
Business
as usual
Efficient
water policies
+6%
+2%
+1%
1%
2%
6%
greater resilience to climate shocks. Market-based solutions may be effective in some contexts, with strong safeguards for the poor and for the
environment.
Close the considerable infrastructure deficit in developing economies
and cities to build adaptive capacity and enhance resilience. Resilience
is a public good and the path to it requires not just funds but also the
capacity, knowledge, and resources to prepare the right kinds of projects.
This calls for a catalyzing fund, such as a project preparation facility.
ix
Section 1
Map 1.1 The Spatial Distribution in Runoff Will Become More Uneven to 2050
Below 200
200 to 100
100 to 0
0 to 100
100 to 200
Above 200
No data
Dry condenser
0.8
0.6
Hybrid
Dry condenser cooling
Blowdown
recycling
Natural gas:
closed loop
Open loop
0.4
Coal:
closed loop
Evaporation
Inlet cooling
recapture
High temperature
0.2
Photovoltaic
Dry condenser Open loop
Wind
0
1.E-06
Geothermal
1.E-05
1.E-04
Gen IV
Dry condenser 1.E-03
Pond
Hydroelectric
1.E-02
Coal
Natural gas
PV
Solar thermal
Renewable sources
Nuclear
Geothermal
Wind
Hydroelectric
Impacts on Groundwater
The planets aquifers are a vast natural reservoir, containing about 30 percent
of the available freshwater. In contrast, rivers and lakes account for a meager
0.4 percent.18 Groundwater storage provides a natural buffer against climate
variability; it is thus vital not only for the economy but for a countrys
sustainability.
Climate change is expected to affect groundwater reservoirs, directly
through changes in recharge patterns, and indirectly through increased
demand, especially from irrigation, which today takes 67 percent of global
groundwater withdrawals.19 Groundwater recharge varies considerably,
depending on prevailing climatic conditions. In general, in regions where
total runoff is expected to decline (see map 1.1), groundwater resources will
also decrease.20 Similarly, reduced surface water flows in regions that suffer
from changes in snowmelt may be exacerbated by falling groundwater levels
due to a shorter recharge season.
Climate change also brings risks to the quality of water in aquifers. Regions
with higher temperatures may suffer from greater groundwater salinity as
more water evaporates before it can reach deeper levels. Rising sea levels push
seawater inland, and coastal aquifers shrink as rising demand drops groundwater tables. Although difficult to quantify, these trends suggest that groundwater reservoirs will be under the most pressure in regions with declining
runoff, where they will be needed the most.
The increased variability that comes with climate change will inevitably
raise reliance on underground freshwater supplies. If protected and managed
along with surface water, groundwater can do much in adapting to climate
change. Its widespread availability and typically large volumesand thus long
retention time and slow responsemake it more naturally buffered against
seasonal and inter-year variations in rainfall and temperature. Unlike surface
storage, aquifers lose negligible amounts of water through evaporation and
transpiration.
An Uncertain Future
There is considerable uncertainty about long-term climate projections. Global
circulation models have not been designed to project changes in the hydrological cycle, which is treated as just one element of a larger climate system.
And this imprecision is compounded when models are extended to finer spatial scales. Forecasts and projections of extreme events are even more challenging, reflecting the statistical complexities of projecting extreme events
and the limitations of the data.
Even so, there is broad agreement on the overall global trends across models. The primary challenge for decision makers is to plan for a more uncertain
and hazardous future, where general trends are known with greater certainty
than the precise nature and timing of the changes. Such circumstances put a
high premium on adaptable and flexible approaches that can respond to new
information and changing circumstances (box 1.3).
6
Notes
1. World Economic Forum 2015.
2. The Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) is used as a tool that can track
results from multiple GCMs. See World Bank 2015a for details.
3. Runoff is that part of the water cycle that flows over land as surface water instead
of being absorbed into groundwater or evaporating. The flow is usually attributable to rainfall or snowmelt.
4. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2018.
5. IPCC 2007.
6. Townsend 2015.
7. Klytchnikova, Sadler, Townsend et al. 2015.
8. Townsend 2015.
9. High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) 2015.
10. International Energy Agency (IEA) 2012.
11. See http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/ghg-chinese-power-sector-issuebrief_1.pdf
for information on Chinas power sector.
12. IPCC 2014.
13. Arndt et al. 2010.
14. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2012.
The Critical Face of Climate ChangeWater
Planting rice
Thomas Sennett/World Bank. Permission required for reuse.
Section 2
A Brake on Prosperity
and Progress?
Growing Populations, Growing Economies,
and Growing Water Needs
In 50 years there may be two billion more people on this planet, and the
worlds population will exceed nine billion. And as countries grow more
prosperous, their thirst for water rises. In many basins, especially in arid
parts of the world, water is already over-allocated and the basins are effectively closed to new users. Even where large water-storage facilities have
been built, demand is so great that storage seldom reaches the desired
capacity. Climate change is set to compound such challenges, intensifying
extremes and accentuating scarcity when runoff declines. So it is no surprise that there are growing concerns about waters availability in the
future.
The problem is not the adequacy of available waterit is the distribution
and stewardship of water. Much of the worlds water is used inefficiently by
industry, agriculture, and cities; and much of it is wasted without economic
The Critical Face of Climate ChangeWater
benefit, often with negative environmental impacts. The world uses only
about 10 percent of its freshwater and groundwater, and climate change is not
expected to alter global supplies. Instead, the challenges are regional and economic, with growing scarcity in some regions of the world and growing excess
in others.
Water scarcity has commonly been seen as a technical issue. If water is in
short supply in one region, the obvious solution is to obtain it from another
where it is more abundant. But what is obvious may not always be prudent,
and such supply-side solutions face economic and ecological limits. Water
has a low value-to-bulk ratio, which makes its transport across vast distances
expensive and economically wasteful. So with climate change increasing the
hydrological challenges, water management will require greater care and
efficiency, recognizing not only the local needs for water but also its multiple
valuesas an economic resource, a human right, and the lifeblood of
ecosystems.
7,000
20
2005
1
20 0
1
20 5
2020
2
20 5
3
20 0
3
20 5
2040
4
20 5
5
20 0
2055
6
20 0
6
20 5
7
20 0
75
2
Global water withdrawal (billion m
08 3/yr)
20 0
2085
9
20
20 0
0
9
20 5
21 5
1
00
20 0
15
20
2
20 0
2
20 5
2030
3
20 5
4
20 0
2045
50
20
5
20 5
2060
6
20 5
7
20 0
7
35
2
Global water withdrawal (billion m0 /yr)
Global water withdrawal (billion m3/yr)
2080
8
20 5
9
20
20 0
0
9
20 5
21 5
1
00
20 0
2015
2
20 0
2
20 5
2030
3
20 5
4
20 0
2045
5
20 0
5
20 5
2060
6
20 5
7
20 0
2075
8
20 0
8
20 5
2090
9
21 5
00
7,000
6,000
SSP5
5,000
4,000
4,000
3,000
3,000
2,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
SSP3
6,000
5,000
7,000
SSP2
6,000
5,000
Municipal
4,000
Primary energy
3,000
Manufacturing
Electricity
2,000
Livestock
1,000
Irrigation
6,000
7,000
SSP1
SSP4
6,000
5,000
5,000
4,000
4,000
3,000
3,000
2,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
20
0
20 5
1
20 0
2015
2
20 0
2
20 5
3
20 0
3
20 5
4
20 0
2045
5
20 0
5
20 5
6
20 0
6
20 5
7
20 0
2075
8
20 0
8
20 5
2090
9
21 5
00
7,000
20
0
20 5
1
20 0
2015
2
20 0
2
20 5
2030
3
20 5
4
20 0
2045
5
20 0
5
20 5
6
20 0
6
20 5
7
20 0
2075
8
20 0
2085
9
20 0
9
21 5
00
Socioeconomic
challenges for mitigation
billion m 3/year
Socioeconomic challenges
for adaptation
Source: ONeill and others 2015.
11
under current regimes. In this scenario, water allocation does not respond
to the growing shortages and changing comparative advantage of different
sectors across the globe. The resulting changes in GDP are shown in the
lower bounds of figure 2.1, which presents the worst projected outcome of
SSP1 and SSP3.3
The economic consequences are highly unequal with the worst effects in
the driest regions. The expected global damages are small relative to the
expected global GDP in 2050: about 0.37 (SSP1) to 0.49 (SSP3) percent of
global GDP in that year. But the global loss is a highly misleading estimate
because, as the lower bounds of figure 1 illustrate, significant variations exist
between regions. Western Europe and North America, where much global
GDP is produced, experience negligible damages in most scenarios. The bulk
of losses are in the Middle East, the Sahel, and Central and East Asia, and the
magnitude of losses is largely driven by the level of the water deficit. In the
most arid regions, the projected percentage losses are large and imply that
baseline growth projections cannot be met.
12
10
5
0
3.32
0
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.82
1.46
0.38
1.98
6.02
10.72
11.7
15
0.49
7.05
7.08
10
0.09
14
North
America
Western
Europe
Middle
East
Sahel
Central
Africa
Central
Asia
East
Asia
Southeast
Asia
World
Other impacts are less visible, such as changes in trade patterns that cloud
economic prospects in subtle ways.4 The projections suggest that trade
becomes distorted when countries in arid areas continue to produce water-
intensive goods at ever-increasing financial and social cost, contrary to their
natural comparative advantage.
But there is a silver lining. When governments respond to water shortages
by boosting efficiency and allocating water to more highly-valued uses, losses
decline dramatically and may even vanish. This is illustrated in the upper
bounds of changes in figure 2.1 (note that the larger value between SSP1 and
SSP3 is displayed). The overarching message is that theoutcomes are driven
by policy decisions, suggesting that prudent water-management policies can
do much to secure growth, making people richer and thus more resilient to
climate stresses. This often, but not n
ecessarily, requires using market forces
and prices to guide water allocation decisions.
The implication is that the benefits to managing water resources as a valuable economic resource are considerable. Water pricing can do much in this
regard. Even if only a part of water use is allocated based on a price that brings
supply and demand into balance, many of the problems of climate and
socio-economic scarcity can be resolved.
Water that is provided free promotes and condones overuse and waste.
Countries that price water more cheaply also consume it more freely.
Often, the most inefficient users of water are found in countries with the
highest levels of water stress, where incentives are also lacking for prudent
water use. More efficient water pricing, coupled with policies that safeguard the most marginal members of society, can therefore ensure that
sufficient water is conserved and guarantee enough water to meet basic
needs. As the Australian experience has demonstrated, market-based solutions, when complemented with policies that secure needed allocations for
the environment, can do much to assure greater efficiency of water use,
higher levels of equity in its allocation, and long-term sustainability of the
resource base.
The Critical Face of Climate ChangeWater
13
common today than Malthusian resource conflicts. This is not to deny that
water scarcity could act as a conflict risk multiplier in some cases. But more
typically when disputes arise, they are mediated in ways that facilitate peaceful resolution.
While resource wars between countries may be uncommon today, tensions
over water resources within countries are much more widespread. Episodes of
drought and floods are often followed by spikes in violence, civil war, and
regime change in developing countries. The strongest evidence is from Sub
Saharan Africa where civil wars tend to erupt following periods of low rainfall9. In rural Brazil land invasions are more common during drier years with
more intense conflict in areas where land ownership is more unequal.10 In
India property related violence increases by about 4 percent when there is
below average rainfall and communal riots become more frequent following
episodes of floods.11
There are sound economic reasons to expect rainfall anomalies to cascade
into violence. Droughts and floods typically generate poverty and accentuate
deprivation especially in countries where agriculture remains an important
source of employment. Poverty in turn alters the calculus of participating in
conflict. Combatants have less to lose when customary sources of livelihood
have been dwindled by droughts or floods, and they have more to gain by
participating in violence that might beget a better future. The conflict vulnerability of a country to rainfall shocks typically depends upon the rainfall sensitivity of its income and its ability to provide protection and alternative
sources of employment.
Rainfall shocks ignite conflicts in other ways too. Evidence from Africa
suggests that by straining government budgets, their capacity and popularity
decline, making regime change more likely.12 Migration within and between
countries, which tends to increase in areas facing water shocks, remains a
potent and widely documented source of friction between locals and new
arrivals across much of the world. In some cases this has the potential to erupt
in conflict.
The increases in water variability and expanding water deficits that are predicted to occur due to climate change have the potential to increase the propensity for conflict. Building resilience to the more extreme precipitation
events of climate change will become a more urgent priority especially in
rainfall vulnerable areas.
15
resolved. Today, the marginal value of water for different uses varies greatly
because the prices paid by industry, agriculture, and residential users are often
unrelated. For example, in Arizona, water prices vary from $27 an acre-foot for
agriculture to $3,200 an acre-foot for urban usesso there is much suppressed
demand in the cities.13 While some of the gap could be explained by the difference in the nature and quality of the product delivered, most of it is a function
of institutions that do not allocate water on the basis of economic criteria.
The gains from addressing scarcity through markets, prices, or other economic instruments would be immediate. But the task will not be easy. The
past weighs heavily on the present, and those who benefit from current systems naturally resist change. That calls for raising awareness about the costs
and benefits and about transparent and equitable systems for compensation.
A fundamental rethinking of water rights and appropriate governance
mechanisms is also needed. The focus could be on how water rights could be
used not as a declaration of inviolate ownership, but as a flexible instrument
to resolve water conflicts at the community, basin, regional, national, and
global levels, while still protecting the needs of the poor. Adequate management and regulationparticularly of common groundwater aquifersis
essential to ensure that there is a mechanism for efficient allocation across
water sources and uses. In this context, the emergence of sophisticated technologies to monitor, measure, and disclose water performance using objective metrics is an opportunity not yet realized.
Notes
1. Details are in World Bank 2015a.
2. ONeill et al. 2015.
3. In general the differences in outcomes between the two SSPs are negligible, with
the lower bound representing SSP1 in most but not all cases, as climate impacts
differ across regions (see World Bank 2015a for the full set of figures).
4. These are discussed in the technical volume that accompanies World Bank 2015a.
5. World Bank 2015a.
6. EM-DAT database.
7. Hsiang and Jina 2014.
8. Inter alia Bai, Ying, and James Kai-sing Kung 2011 and Chaney 2013.
9. Miguel et. al. 2004.
10. Hidalgo et. Al. 2010.
11. Inter alia Sarsons2015 and Blakeslee, David, and Ram Fishman2013.
12. Brckner, and Ciccone 2011.
13. Olmstead 2013.
14. Grafton and Kompas 2007; OECD 2013.
17
Section 3
Changing Cities
and Changing Climate
As the world continues to urbanize and the demand for water in cities increases,
urban residentsparticularly the urban poorbecome more vulnerable to
the effects of climate change. One in four cities worldwide already experiences
water insecurity.1 Climate change adds to demographic and supply-chain pressures on cities, leading to fears of a perfect storm in which water shortages
combine with periodic climate disasters to produce major social and economic
disruptions.2 The social and economic consequences of climate shocks on cities can be particularly devastating in low- and middle-income countries.3 The
annual global costs of adaptation for 201050 are estimated to range between
$71.2 billion and $81.5 billion, depending on the climate scenario, and urban
areas could bear more than 80 percent of these costs.4
In cities, as elsewhere, the effects of climate change are mediated largely
through water. The increasingly common pattern of fixed water supplies and
rising demands is gripping cities across the world. Flooding events can
18
degrade the quality of surface and groundwater, cause the loss of human lives
and property, and disrupt the urban economy. Heat waves and variable precipitation reduce the availability and quality of water while increasing
demand. Rising seas reduce groundwater availability due to salt-water intrusion and can permanently damage urban infrastructure.5
19
Droughts may reduce the availability of water for municipal and industrial
use, energy (due to cooling water restrictions), and food (resulting in reduced
crop yields). They may also contribute to heightened urban migration patterns and localized conflicts over scarce water. In California, the average
annual cost of urban water scarcity (in forgone benefits) is $1.6 billion a year.12
availability and competition with other uses will reduce municipal water consumption per capita between 31 percent and 66 percent compared with the
situation in 2015 under the SSP3 scenario (or 15 percent and 47 percent
under SSP1).15
21
Notes
1. McDonald, R. I., K. Weber, J. Padowski, et al. 2014.
2. Beddington 2015; US Department of Defense 2014.
3. Revi, Satterthwaite, Aragon-Durand, et al. 2014.
4. World Bank 2010a.
5. IPCC 2007.
22
23
Section 4
Map 4.1 The Worlds Largest River Basins and the Populations They Support
Enhanced Resilience
Basin-wide coordination is more effective in promoting resilience than a patchwork of unilateral policies. Since climate impacts are typically shared within a
river basin, there are economies of scale in building regional approaches to
resilience. A large dam, for instance, is considerably cheaper to construct and
operate than several smaller dams of the same total capacity. Transboundary
cooperation enables countries to evaluate tradeoffs and optimize benefits, allowing for better storage, regulation, and allocation of water resources to adjust to
climate shocks. Regional collaboration allows countries to choose the best location for the desired infrastructure. This might include large dams for water storage or transport and delivery infrastructure such as canals, dikes, and inter-basin
transfer schemes, which are essential to adapting to variable water flows. Also
possible are cost-sharing arrangements for large and expensive water infrastructure, allowing countries with greater solvency to finance these structures.2
The Critical Face of Climate ChangeWater
25
27
29
Aligning Incentives
Building consensus when gains are unequal is a challenging task. Water allocation is an intrinsically competitive process that requires some parties to
relinquish rights and resources to others, in return for some compensation.
Because the incentives to participate differ, they will need to be realigned to
make participation sufficiently attractive. Self-enforcing agreements that
yield reciprocal benefits can take a variety of forms. In some cases, direct
financial transfers such as loans or payments for service may be appropriate.
The IndiaBhutan hydropower arrangement is an example of a lower riparian
country financing upstream infrastructure.
In other cases, benefit-sharing agreements have distributed the gains
from water use along a river basin according to an agreed formula that
makes participation attractive. For such an approach to be credible, the
benefits need to be predictable, observable, and verifiable. That is why
mostagreements have involved benefit sharing from energy projects rather
than the more elusive gains from irrigation or industrialization. Such an
agreement for the Zambezi River Basin could increase energy supply by 23
percent over uncoordinated, standalone operations. Mitigation benefits
would come from greater reliance on clean energy, and adaptation benefits
across the basin would come from greater energy security in a region
dependent on hydropower.7 A similar approach is used in the design of
the Rusumo Falls hydropower project, where Burundi, Rwanda, and
Tanzania share benefits through power transfers to leverage complicated
agreements.
Connecting international agreements in ways that reinforce each other
issue linkageis a less common way of ensuring compliance. For instance,
linking an agreement on water with another on trade or transport can alter
the incentives to cooperate. A potential loss on one agreement can be compensated for by a gain in the other, and a breach of one agreement can lead to
the dissolution of the other. The incentives to cooperate can thus be reinforced through judicious combinations.
The cooperative management of basin-wide water resources will be central
to resilience efforts. Coordinated reservoir operations will help to minimize
the impact of both droughts and floods, and treaty revisions will further
ensure that agreements are robust to periods of extreme water flows. Accessible
and reliable information allows for more informed planning and makes coordinated investments into the protection of river banks, deltas, and water quality more likely.
Indeed, climate change necessitates transboundary cooperation, and
whilethis is no easy task, it presents an opportunity to create a more climate-
resilient future. In some river basins, this is already taking place. The Niger
River Basin serves as a noteworthy example of advanced transboundary
cooperation successfully developing information, infrastructure, and institutions under a cooperative management framework to boost climate resilience
among the riparian countries (box 4.2).
30
31
Notes
1. UN Water 2008.
2. Foster and Briceno-Garmendia 2010.
3. Karki et al. 2011.
4. Politics also plays a role, and in some cases it is the downstream riparian whose
actions can hinder water management and climate resilience efforts across the
basin.
5. Colley and Gleick 2011.
6. Zawahri 2009.
7. World Bank 2010b.
8. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and
Nigeria.
9. United Nations Development Programme 2013; BRL Ingenierie, 2007.
10. World Bank 2015.
32
Section 5
intensive, too. And as water scarcity increases, ever more energy is needed for
its extraction, treatment, and conveyance. Water security is thus pivotal to
climate security.
Compounding these environmental issues is a changing human landscape.
As populations continue to increase and economic growth pulls more of the
world out of poverty, the world becomes ever thirstier. Nearly a quarter of
humanity already resides in water-scarce countries, and if the status quo endures
and climate models prove correct, water scarcity will proliferate to regions
where it currently does not exist, and greatly worsen in regions where it does.
Economic growth is a surprisingly thirsty business. Diminishing water supplies can slow growth and cloud economic prospects. Under a business-as-
usual water allocation policy, the greatest adverse impacts occur in the regions
with highest water deficits.
Unprecedented rates of urbanization, expanding slums, and inadequate
investments have accentuated climate vulnerabilities in cities. The number of
urban dwellers facing seasonal water shortages may reach nearly two billion by
2050, with per capita municipal water availability declining by up to two-thirds
in the worst-affected regions. At the same time, costs from extreme hydrological events may multiply. Additional urban flooding damage from climate
change alone could approach as much as $1.8 trillion by 2080. Sea-level rise
and storm surges will put large populations at risk while also contaminating
coastal aquifers and threatening water supplies, if no action is taken.
33
Finally, the management of transboundary river basins, an already challengingtask, will become ever more difficult. Transboundary river basins support
nearly 40 percent of the worlds people, and proper management is vital to
meeting the water needs of the future. Rainfall and runoff variability are all but
certain to increase due to climate change, and with that will come uncertain
river-flow variation. Unless agreements can be reached that are fair, efficient,
credible, and enforceable, water security will be largely dictated by the whim of
neighbors that share the resource, potentially putting development at risk.
35
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