Digest - (5th Batch) Salonga vs. Hermoso

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1.
carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo
SALONGA vs HERMOSO
FACTS: During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against Rolando
Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a certificate of eligibility to
travel in favor of Salonga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.
HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did
not deny Salongas request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the
Right to Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the
erosion of human rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the
impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be
subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid such similar cases to face the Court which
needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.
G.R. No. L-53622
April 25, 1980
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,

vs.
CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL PROCESSING CENTER, and GENERAL
FABIAN VER, respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to this Tribunal by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first
case, Salonga v. Madella, 1 the case became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General,
in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter
of fact, had been granted. Nonetheless, a brief separate opinion was filed, concurring in the resolution,
and worded thus: Clearly this petition had assumed a moot and academic character. Its dismissal is
thus indicated. May I just add these few words as my response to the plea of petitioner in his
Manifestation and Reply dated October 28, 1978. This is how I would view the matter not only where
petitioner is concerned but in all other similar cases. Respondent Travel Processing Center should
discharge its injunction conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
the right to travel. One of the highlights of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila
World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was
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the lifting of the ban on international travel. There should be fidelity to such a pronouncement. It is
the experience of the undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United States as well
as in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present
emergency regime had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and the academe
in foreign lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law
Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with law
and that the Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the executive branch,
therefore, the Travel Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the impression be created that
such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more than munificent bequests in a
paupers will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified, the more so in the light of the Answer of Acting
Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his prayer in his Manifestation and
Reply that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition, Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad,
and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to
Travel, as mentioned in the Answer. 2
The present petition is likewise impressed with a moot and academic aspect. In the motion to dismiss
of the Solicitor General dated April 21, 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had
been granted petitioner. A xeroxed copy was enclosed. A resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in
order.
From the docket of this Court, it appears that other petitions of this character had been filed in the
past, namely, Santos v. The Special Committee on Travel Abroad, 3 Pimentel v. Travel Processing
Center, 4 and Gonzales v. Special Committee on Travel. 5 In the aforesaid cases, as in this and the
earlier Salonga petition, there was no occasion to pass on the merits of the controversy as the
certificates of eligibility to travel were granted. The necessity for any ruling was thus obviated.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court may be faced again with a situation
like the present which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel
Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens
desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or
annoyance. In the address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American
Newspaper Publishers Association last Tuesday April 22, 1980, emphasized anew the respect accorded
constitutional rights The freedom to travel is certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with
approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted was partial to the claims of
liberty. 6 Burdick 7 and Willis, 8 both of whom were equally convinced that there be no erosion to
human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received from President Marcos the accolade of his
approval. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel
Processing Center, the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without
saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to
facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in
any way responsible for any delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
2. SUBIDO vs OZAETA
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FACTS:
Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens
and registered with the RD. He was denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for
mandamus.
HELD:
Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person
seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records
contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.
G.R. No. L-1631
ABELARDO
February 27, 1948

SUBIDO,
Editor,
The
Manila
Post, petitioner,
vs.
ROMAN OZAETA, Secretary of Justice, and MARIANO VILLANUEVA, Register of Deeds
of City of Manila,respondents.
Abelardo
Subido
in
his
own
behalf.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for
respondents.
TUAZON, J.:
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus. The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily,
prays that an order issue "commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates
sold to aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the
Department of Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited
representatives (to) examine all records in the respondents' custody relative to the (said)
transactions."
The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of Deeds and later, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Justice. No request to inspect the records seems to have ever been made, but the Solicitor
General, answering for the respondents, gives to understand that not even this would the petitioner or
his representatives be allowed to do if they tried. As the petitioner appears not to insist on his request
for a list of sales of real estate to aliens, we shall confine our discussion to the second part of the
prayer; namely, that the petitioner be allowed to examine all the records in the respondents' custody
to gather the material he wants. In this connection, the Solicitor General contends that "the
examination or inspection of the records in the office of the register of deeds may be made only by
those having special interest therein and subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed
by the Chief of the Land Registration Office, and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled, to
safeguard the public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the records, that records
may not be disclosed for publication."
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Issue:
Doctrine and Held:
The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory
regulation in the Philippines. Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3300, provides that
"All records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the
public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office with the approval of the Secretary of Justice." The Chief of the General Land
Registration Office does not seem to have adopted any regulations in pursuance of this provision.
Nevertheless, we do not believe this omission relevant. The Register of Deeds has inherent power to
control his office and the records under his custody and has some discretion to exercise as to the
manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the records may exercise their rights.
(45 Am. Jur., 531.) The question at issue boils down to a determination of the scope of this discretion.
From the language of section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended, it is our opinion that the regulations
which the Register of Deeds, or the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or the Secretary of
Justice is empowered to promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination
to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the
duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the
right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured, and the like.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves
with the motives, reasons, and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature
and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.
Independently of statutes the petitioner, as editor of a newspaper, has the requisite interest in land
records even under the common law theory entitling him to the writ of mandamus. Newspapers have
a better-established right of access to records of titles by reason of their relations to the public than
abstracters or insurers of title. Whether by design or otherwise, newspapers perform a mission which
does not enter into the calculation of the business of abstracting titles conducted purely for private
gain. Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the public while abstracters do so for the
benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers of real estate only. It is through the medium of
newspapers that the public is informed of how public servants conduct their business. The public
through newspapers have the legitimate right to know the transaction in real estate which they
believe, correctly or erroneously, have been registered in violation of the constitution. The publication
of these matters is certainly not only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where, under the
constitution, the people should rule.
Upon the foregoing considerations, mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and the petition will be
granted commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to
examine, extract, abstract or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens
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subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible with his
decision, without costs.
3. CHAVEZ vs PCGG
Francisco Chavez vs PCGG et.al.,
G.R. No. 130716, December 09, 1998
Facts: Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or
agreements pertaining to the latters task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. The
respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he has asked the
respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.
Issue: Does the petitioner have the personality of legal standing to file the instant petition?
Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
government records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the
Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioners standing
i.e.
1.
ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHT
2. ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN

We rule that the petition at bar be allowed.
4. MARQUEZ vs DISIERTO
Marquez vs. Disierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union
Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
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Agreement
between
the
Public
Estates
Authority
and
AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her
breaking
any
law,
particularly
RA.
No.
1405.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is
allowed
as
an
exception
to
the
law
on
secrecy
of
bank
deposits
(R.A.
HELD:
No.1405).
No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case
5. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION vs DIONISIO

Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989
Facts: The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of
Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an
automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and
regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general
welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following
grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of the association;
the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of
contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary,
oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental
powers which should not be sanctioned.
Issue: Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues
Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a
registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the
subject parcel of land. The petitioners contention that he has no privity with the respondent
association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was
understood that he took the same free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the
certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent
association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts for the operation and
activities of the association. The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are
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intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the
petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed
according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot.
The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards,
cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all
residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the
particular community involved. The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not
contravene provisions of laws,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The
constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against

his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. The
petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his
will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply
with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing
of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.
6. REPUBLIC vs JUAN (full case)

G.R. No. L-24740 July 30, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO C. JUAN and ANA TANSECO JUAN, defendants-appellants.
Celestino C. Juan &, Associates for appellants.
Solicitor General's Office for the appellee.
MAKASIAR, J.:1wph1.t
Appeal by defendants-appellants from the decision dated September 28, 1964 of the Court of First
Instance of La Union in Civil Case No. 1835 for the expropriation of 338.7480 hectares of land owned
by spouses Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco as the site for the La Union Regional Agricultural
School, directing the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines tot.hqw
... pay the legal owners Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco the amount of
P190,000.00 which is the just and reasonable compensation that the Court rules in
this case in favor of the defendants; and it appearing that on May 7, 1963,
P100,000.00 had already been paid, it is therefore ordered that upon this decision
becoming final the balance of P90,000.00 plus interest of 6% from May 4, 1963 shall
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be paid to defendants Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco," aside from the costs of the
suit.
Defendants-appellants are the registered owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land located at Barrio
Sapilang, Bacnotan, La Union with an aggregate area of 3,387,480 square meters or 338.7480
hectares, more or less, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-420 issued on April 14, 1959
(pp, 9-14, 46-47, ROA; Vol. 1, rec.).
Pursuant to the authorization issued on March 15, 1963 by the President of the Philippines through
the Executive Secretary (p 15, ROA), the Solicitor General filed on April 8, 1963 the complaint for
expropriation of the aforesaid parcels of land to be used as the site of the La Union Agricultural
School, which was to be established by authority of Republic Act 2692 (pp. 9-20, 43 ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Before the institution of the expropriation proceedings Victor Luis, who was appointed principal of the
proposed school, recommended the property of defendants as the school site. Thereafter, together
with Mrs. Avelina L. Osias, he negotiated with the defendants for the purchase of their property (pp.
85-87, ROA, Vol. 1, rec.). On January 25, 1963, he wrote a letter to defendant Celestino Juan, thus:t.
hqw
... Feelers have come to you to inquire about the price that you would be willing to sell
your land. Mrs, Pacita Gonzales and the undersigned came to you personally and you
informed us verbally your least price of P170,000.00 which you explained to us is
very reasonable.
May I request your kindness to confirm the above price in writing, as your offer as the
selling price of your above-mentioned land in order that there will be an official
record or basis in negotiating with authorities concerned in the purchase of your land
as school site. (pp. 43-44, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Defendant Celestino Juan replied on January 28, 1963.t.hqw
... that the selling price of my land is P170,000.00 net to me exclusive of the amount
of my obligation to the China Banking Corporation where the property is mortgaged.
The condition of the sale is at least P90,000.00 down and the balance within a period
of one (1) year. Title to the property will be transferred to you immediately provided
that an annotation of the remaining balance of the price be accordingly made in the
new title.
I wish, however, to tell you that presently there are no less than 23 tenants in the land
and they are harvesting or about to harvest their tobacco crops. In justice to them,
they should be allowed to finish harvesting their crops before they are finally ejected.
It is with deep regret that I cannot part with the land at a lesser price. There are 3
parties at least aside from you who are interested to buy the land. One of them is
ready to sign the contract for a price of P200,000.00 payable in cash or at least a
period of ten (10) days. This party, through an understanding with a certain bank can
mortgage the property for P350,000.00. As you see, if the primary consideration is
money alone, then, if I am a smart, I should mortgage the land myself. It should be
noted, and I have all the records with me, that I have applied for a loan with the
Development Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P4,102,000.00 principally to
establish a dairy farm and mortgaging only as collateral the said land. From the
conversation with said bank, it seems to me that the same would be favorably
considered if not for P4,000,000.00 at least P1,000,000.00.
Kindly confirm your acceptance of the terms of this letter as I can hold the land for a
period of ten (10) days. (pp. 382-384, ROA).
After receipt of the aforequoted letter, Mr. Luis consulted his office in Manila (p. 86, ROA, Vol. I, rec.)
as well as the provincial officials of La Union and the municipal officials of Bacnotan (pp. 86,174,
ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
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In an order dated April 15, 1963, the trial court authorized the Government to enter and take
immediate possession of the property after depositing the amount of P90,793.70 with the provincial
treasurer of La Union as provisional value (p. 20, ROA, Vol. I, rec.),
Defendants on April 24, 1963 filed their "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Writ of
Possession" questioning among others, the propriety and correctness of Resolution No. 13, series of
1962, of the Provincial Appraisal Committee and pointing out that "the fair and reasonable market
value ... should be at least fifty centavos (P0.50) per square meter of P5,000.00 per hectare" and
prayed that the complaint for expropriation be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; to set aside the order
dated April 15, 1963 and instead order plaintiff to deposit the amount of P300,000.00 as provisional
value; and to set aside the writ of possession dated April 16, 1963 until the court has decided the issue
of jurisdiction and/or until plaintiff has deposited the amount of P300,000.00 as provisional value of
the property (pp. 22-32, ROA, Vol. I, rec.). On the same date, the lower court lifted the writ of
possession until further orders.
Acting on the aforesaid motion on April 26, 1963, the lower court found the expropriation proceedings
in order and the provisional value made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee inadequate and
ordered the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines to deposit the amount of P100,000.00 as provisional
value until the true valuation of the lots can be determined in accordance with law and further
directed "that for the best interest of the defendants whose improvements may be vandalized for lack
of protection, let the writ be effected without prejudice to the final determination of the true value of
the property to be determined in due course" and forthwith ordered the issuance of the writ of
possession after the deposit by plaintiff of the amount of P100,000.00 is made (p. 45, ROA, Vol. I,
rec.).
On May 4, 1963, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines took possession and occupied the lots under
expropriation (p. 86, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) and deposited on May 7, 1963 the amount of P100,000.00
which the appellants withdrew that same day.
On May 7, 1963, defendants filed two simultaneous pleadings: motion for reconsideration of the
provisional value on the ground that the value fixed by the court is still inadequate; and a motion to
dismiss which likewise embodied defendants' answer to the complaint for expropriation (pp. 46-66,
ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
In an order dated June 13, 1963, the court denied the motion to dismiss of defendants for lack of merit
(p. 66, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
In order dated January 8, 1964, the trial court directed the condemnation of the property, t.
hqw
it appearing that the plaintiff has already deposited the amount of P100,000.00 the
provisional value of the property sought to be condemned, which amount has
already been withdrawn by the defendants and the property accordingly turned
over to the Republic of the Philippines for the use of the La Union Agricultural
School, ..." (pp. 66-67, ROA, emphasis supplied).
and appointed as commissioners of appraisal (1) Atty. Rogelio Balagot, for the lower court and as
chairman; (2) Atty. Eufemio Molina, for the plaintiff; and (3) Atty. Pablito M. Rojas, for the
defendants (pp. 4, 67-68, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
For a period of three days, these commissioners in the presence of the parties, conducted an extensive
ocular inspection and physical investigation of the property, after which they held protracted hearings
until June 2, 1964, wherein both parties were given full opportunity to present their respective
positions with voluminous documentary and oral evidence (p. 4, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
On June 29, 1964, Atty. Eufemio Molina, commissioner for plaintiff, filed his report dated June 25,
1964 (pp. 69-78, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) recommendingt.hqw
... that the value of the land of defendants to be taken as the site of the La Union
Agricultural School at Sapilang, Bacnotan, La Union, be fixed at P135,000.00. which
amount is the meeting point between the government's offer of P100,000.00 and the
defendants' price of P170,000.00.
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Atty. Pablito M. Rojas, commissioner for the defendants, in his report of July 13, 1964,
recommendedt.hqw
... as the price of the land to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants the amount of
P1,407,856.00 the same to bear interest at the legal rate from the date of possession
by the plaintiff to the date the amount is actually paid.
Commissioner Rogelio F. Balagot for the court and chairman recommended:t.hqw
... that the just compensation to be paid the defendants landowners be the following:
Value of the Land......................................................................... P1,044,163.70
Value of Improvements.................................................................. 1,712.60
Total Amount................................................................ P1,045,876.30
That the balance of P945,876.30 (deducting P100,000.00, the amount paid as
provisional value) earn legal interest (6%) until fully paid.
Defendants-appellants filed their objection to the reports of Commissioners Rojas, Balagot and
Molina, claiming that the true value of the land is P1,736,208.32 or P1,693,740.00 (pp. 284, 374,
ROA, Vol. 1. rec.).
On September 4, 1964, defendants filed a petition entitled "Petition to Submit Case for Decision"
without any hearing on the reports (p. 378, ROA, Vol, I, rec.)
On September 28, 1964, the lower court rendered its decision (pp. 380- 426, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants on October 26, 1964 (pp. 426-508, ROA. Vol. I,
rec.), but the same was denied by the Court in an order dated May 10, 1965 (pp. 509-514, ROA. Vol. I,
rec.).
I
Under their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the propriety of the expropriation and
the manner in which it was conducted were in dispute throughout the proceedings in the trial court
and that they never waived their objections thereto; that the conditions precedent as provided for by
Executive Order No. 132, series of 1937, as amended, were not complied with, for no proper and valid
negotiation to purchase the lots or to have it donated to the Government was undertaken by the State
before the institution of the expropriation case in court; and that the resolution of the Appraisal
Committee which was the basis of the amount alleged in the complaint as the fair market value of the
lots to be expropriated was null and void, having been adopted contrary to legal requirements (pp. 2446, Appellants' Brief: p. 11. Vol. II. rec.). The same points were raised by the appellants in their motion
for reconsideration of the lower court's main decision and the trial court in its order of May 10, 1965
correctly overruled them, stating that:t.hqw
Movants start by bringing to the front the alleged lack of negotiations between
plaintiff and defendants for the acquisition of the 338 hectares belonging to the latter.
Non-compliance with Executive Order No. 132 is mentioned repeatedly by the
defendants as vitiating this case. It is even hinted that the best resolution for this case
would be to dismiss it because plaintiff failed to comply with said Executive Order
dictated in pre-war days. Plaintiff delivered to defendants through this Court
P100,000.00 as part of the fair and just compensation that the defendants are
entitled. On May 7, 1963, such amount was received by defendants and plaintiff
started developing the area and constructing the buildings needed for the La Union
Agricultural School. This school is now in operation; and it would certainly be the
most disturbing step for the regularity of the functions of the Government to dismiss
the case, compelling the plaintiff to remove all buildings in the land that once
belonged to the defendants and return the property to them. Besides, interpreting
with fair liberality the pre-war Executive Order No. 132, the court shall now state that
for the purpose of negotiations with the land owners the letter of January 5, 1963
received by the defendants and the latter's reply of January 28, 1963 are clear and
sufficient compliance with the tenor and spirit of said Executive Order. The court,
therefore, rejects any request that this case having been filed without sufficient
11 | P a g e
compliance with said administrative procedures the whole proceeding shall have to be
dismissed. This cannot be done." (pp. 511-512, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
To begin with, it must be emphasized that plaintiff-appellee in this instant case is the Republic of the
Philippines which is exercising its right of eminent domain inherent in it as a body sovereign. In the
exercise of his sovereign right the state is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by
the Constitution which are: first, the taking must be for a public use; secondly, the payment of just
compensation must be made; and thirdly, due process must be observed in the taking. Beyond these
conditions, the exercise by the State of its right of eminent domain is subject to no restraint. Section
64(h) of the Revised Administrative Code confers upon the Chief Executive the power to determine
when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines and to direct the Solicitor General to cause the filing of the appropriate
condemnation proceedings in court. By this grant, the executive authorities may then decide whether
the power will be invoked and to what extent (see pp. 87-89, Political Law of the Philippines, Ta;ada
and Carreon, 1962 ed., citing Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550).
Appellants in making their first assignment of error are under the wrong impression that the
provisions of Executive Order No. 132 are conditions precedent to the valid exercise of the State of its
right of eminent domain. As a whole, Executive Order No. 132 is purely an administrative procedure
confined within the executive department of the government designed merely to govern and regulate
the taking of private properties for public use which may either be by voluntary sale or by donation in
favor of the government. Nothing is provided in said executive order expressly or impliedly making
the procedures therein enumerated as conditions precedent to the valid exercise by the government of
the right of eminent domain by filing the proper action in court. As stated, Executive Order No. 132
was intended merely to govern the taking of private property short of judicial action either by
purchase or donation. Being so, the same cannot limit or circumscribe the sovereign and inherent
right of the State to expropriate private property through the Courts.
Moreover, there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of Executive Order No. 132;
because negotiations for the purchase of the parcels were conducted between Victor Luis, the principal
of the proposed agricultural school, and Mrs. Avelina L. Osias on one hand, and the defendantsappellants on the other, which did not result in a voluntary sale by the defendants-appellants for lack
of agreement on the just compensation for the parcels.
Paragraph (a) of Executive Order No. 132 provides that negotiations shall be conducted by the
"Director of Public works, city or district engineer, or other officials concerned ... The last term can
comprehend the principal of the proposed agricultural institution.
Furthermore, the unqualified withdrawal by appellant of the amount of P100,000.00 deposited in
court by the plaintiff as provisional value of the lots subject of expropriation, constituted recognition
on their part of the right of the government to expropriate the lots, (Republic v. Pasicolan, May 31,
1961, 2 SCRA 626).
If the unconditional withdrawal of the amount deposited as provisional value precludes the
defendants-appellants from questioning the right of the plaintiff to expropriate, it must necessarily
follow that said withdrawal also estops defendants-appellants from raising any objection to the
manner and propriety of the exercise by the plaintiff of the right of expropriation (18 American
Jurisprudence 634-635, Francisco's The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. IV-B, pp. 411412).
There can be no debate that due process was observed in the instant case. Likewise, education is
public use or public purpose. Republic Act No. 2692 expressly authorizes the establishment of the La
Union Regional Agricultural School within the Province of La Union and the acquisition of a suitable
site therefor. The inadvertent omission of the term Regional in the complaint for expropriation could
not nullify the expropriation of the lands of defendants-appellants. Such error in the complaint does
not amend the law and can easily be corrected without affecting the validity of the proceedings.
II
The valuation of the lots must be fair and just, not only to the owner but also to the taxpayers who are
to pay for it. Appellants are entitled to receive only the value of what they have been deprived of, and
no more; because to award them less, would be unjust to them, and to award them more, would be
unjust to the public (27 Am. Jur., 2nd s 266, footnote 17 pp. 52- 53).
12 | P a g e
The three commissioners appointed by the trial court to determine the fair market value of the lots did
not reach aconsensus as to the classification of the land, the allocation of areas as to each class, and
the fair market value of each class of land.
Commissioner Rogelio F. Balagot found and recommended as follows:
. Irrigated Riceland
70
P8,500.00
P595,000.00
2. Upland Rice
66
3,500.00
231,000.00
3. Orchard Land
52.0785
1,200.00
50,494.20
4. Pasture Land
90.6695
1,000.00
90,669.50
5. Forestland
70
1,000.00
77,000.00
TOTAL
338.7480 has.
1,044,163.70
and, after adding to the above amount the sum of P1,712.00, representing improvements, finally
recommended the amount of P1,045,876.30 less P100,000.00 earlier withdrawn by appellants, to
earn legal interest until fully paid (pp. 271-282, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) Commissioner Pablito M. Rojas
appraised the land as follows:
Commissioner Pablito M. Rojas appraised the land as follows:
Land Classification
Total
Market
Total
Hectares
Value sq. meter
Market Value
Irrigated Palay Land
65.0000
P1.00
P650,000.00
Upland Palay
66.0000
0.30
198,000.00
Orchard
38.0785
25
98,200.00
Pasture Land
95.6695
10
92,669.50
13 | P a g e
Forestry Compound
8.0000
30
95,000.00
Forest Land
65.0000
15
97,500.00
Barrio Compound
4.0000
.50
20,000.00
TOTAL
338.7480
1,171,369.50
and after considering some factors, like the fact that the lots are titled, said commissioner finally
recommended "the amount of P1,407,856.00, the same to bear interest at the legal rate from the date
of possession by the plaintiff to the date the amount is actually paid" (pp. 160-166, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Commissioner Eufemio Molina adopted the following classification and allocation:t.hqw
(a) With respect to Lot No. 1 (Exh. "B"), into t.hqw
1. Unirrigated riceland with an area of 120,000 sq. meters.
2. Upland rice with an area of 85,000 sq. meters.
3. Pasture land with area of 2,801,695 sq. meters.
(b) With respect to Lot No. 2 (Exh. 'B-l') , into-t.hqw
1. Unirrigated riceland with an area of 120,000 sq. meters,
2. Upland rice with an area of 85,000 sq. meters.
3. Pasture land with an area of 175,785 sq. meters.
and making a mass valuation of the entire two lots, recommended the amount of P135,000.00 by
taking into consideration the amount which to him is the price the government is willing to pay:
P100,000.00 (actually the provisional value deposited by the government to take possession of the
lots); P170,000.00 which according to him is the amount for which the defendants are willing to part
with their lots (actually P190,000.00 including the bank mortgage liability of the land) and also the
fact that the lots in question were acquired by tile defendants in 1957 for the amount of only
P50,000.00 fro 'm Felipe Nebrija and his children (pp, 71- 78, ROA, Vol. 1, rec.).
Before the filing of the complaint, a Provincial Appraisal Committee composed of Provincial Assessor
Ramon Zandueta as chairman, and as members, Provincial Highway District Engineer( Oscar Data
and Provincial Auditor Gabino Ferrer, was constituted. On November 16, 1962, this committee
conducted an ocular inspection of the property, and on the same day, submitted its Resolution No. 13,
Exhibit A, which classified defendant's property as follows:t.hqw
60 hectares riceland at P800.00 per hectare .I................. P48,000.00
278.7480 hectares pasture land at P150.00 per hectare ...41,812.20t.hqw
TOTAL................................................................ 189,812.20
14 | P a g e
(p. 135, ROA, Vol. I. rec.). The aforesaid resolution was rejected as having been done in haste (pp. 135136, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
According to Provincial Assessor Zandueta, the amount of P89,812.20 is the assessed value of the
property, which assessed value is the appraised value in expropriation cases (p. 141, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
La Union Agriculturist Pio A. Tadina was requested by Provincial Assessor Ramon Zandueta to
appraise the property. Pursuant to said request, Mr. Tadina went to the property thrice and thereafter
submitted his classification and valuation, as follows:
. 40 hectares riceland
P60,000.00
P200,000.00
2. 20 hectares riceland
20,000.00
60,000.00
3. 80 hectares pasture land
40,000.00
80,000.00
4. 120 hectares fruit trees
60,000.00
120,000.00
5. 72 hectares 2nd growth forest
78,000.00
156,000.00
TOTAL
P258,000.00
P616,000.00
(p. 145, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

When the complaint was filed, the improvements on the property consisted of the following:
20
mango (bearing) P30 ea.
P800.00
21 coconut (bearing) P5 ea.
105.00
4 coconut (non-bearing) P2 ea.
8.00
4 caimito (star apple) P8 ea.
32.00
2 Chesa P5 ea.
10.00
15 | P a g e
4 Kasuy P2 ea.
8.00
12 bamboos (heavy) P0.30 ea.
3.60
1 bamboo (light) P0.10 ea.
0.10
1 breadfruit P5 ea.
5.00
1 jackfruit P4 ea.
4.00
1 guayabano P1 ea.
1.00
6 orange (non-bearing) P1 ea.
6.00
TOTAL
P982.70
(pp. 16-17, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

Mr. Luis Victor, principal of the La Union Regional Agricultural School, testified that there were
around 30 fruit-bearing mango trees, once coconut fruit-bearing trees and banana plants (p. 139,
ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Both Attys. Pablito M. Rojas and Rogelio Balagot, commissioners representing respectively the
defendants-appellants and the trial court, agreed that the value of the improvements on the property
was then P1,712.60 (pp. 163, 280-281, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).t.hqw
... Starting from the town proper of Bacnotan, one can reach the property by passing
through the barrios of Cabaroan, Sayoan, Salincob, Casiaman and finally Sapilang.
The place is about 2.5 kilometers north of the Poblacion along the National Highway
up to the so-called Cabaroan junction. From this junction is about a 2-kilometer
feeder road going eastward. And from this lateral road is an unsurfaced road of
approximately 1.5 kilometers leading to the site of the Agricutural School. However,
before the school took possession of the land on May 4, 1963, the place was not
accessible at all by any motor vehicles, and that the only means was to hike over rice
paddies, trails and creeks.
Topographically, the property of defendant is situated on a high elevation. It consists
of mountains and hills forming a semi-circle, and sloping on the sides towards an
elongated portion or valley like depression which is level and developed into
ridefields. Because of its high elevation or location, the climate of the place is
healthful, temperate and especially invigorating when one is near or within the
vicinity of the waterfall or spring. The climate is of the kind which the Weather
Bureau would call the Type I climate; that is, the place has two distinct seasons, a dry
season from December to June, when there are light rains or no rains at all and wet
season, from June to December, when rains are abundant, heavy and frequent. The
soil to the place is good. It has a luxurient vegetation.
16 | P a g e
The property as per Original Certificate of Title No. 0-420 (Exh. '9-f') is divided into 2
lots; Lot No. 1 has an area of 3,006,695 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 33043 (Exh. 'b'); and Lot No. 2 which is under Tax Declaration No. 33043 (Exh.
'B-l') has an area of 380,785 square meters, making a total land area of 338,7480
hectares, with an assessed value of P42,120.00.
Aside from the waterfall or spring within the property, there are also fruit trees,
scattered bamboo groves, banana trees in patches, forest area, upland and pasture
land. The bamboo and banana lands, however, cannot properly be considered as such
because the land upon which they grow is not planted principally for such growth.
The improvements on the forestry area have been introduced by the government,
notably the Reforestation Administration of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. (Exh "D" and Exh. "I"). The other improvements on the land have
been itemized in the complaint filed before the Court. (pp. 69-71, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
The foregoing findings do not appear to be disputed.

Defendant-appellant Celestino Juan himself, stated in his letter of January 28, 1963 that his property
is worth P190,000.00 (including his bank loan), which he later increased to P300,000.00 in his
motion for reconsideration filed on April 24, 1963. It should be recalled that over three months earlier,
appellant Celestino Juan, in his letter dated January 2, 1963 to the Provincial Appraisal Committee,
evaluated his property at approximately P329,374.00, stating that he spent P15,000.00 for survey
P5,000.00 for registration and P20,000.00 for bulldozing and levelling; that 60 hectares are first
class which should be worth P3,000.00 per hectare; and that the remaining portion of 278.748
hectares should command at least P500.00 per hectare (pp. 35-37, ROA, Vol. I. rec.).
The last evaluation in the amount of P300,000.00 judicially given by the defendants-appellants is a
declaration and admission binding on them (Sec. 22, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), there being
no showing that they were laboring under an error of fact. No compelling reason has been advanced to
justify their being relieved from the binding effects of such admission. As We ruled in the Republic of
the Philippines versus Narciso [99 Phil. 1031 (1956)], "the owners' valuation of the property may not
be binding on the Government or the Court, but it should at least set a ceiling price for the
compensation to be awarded. Moreover, the prices to be considered are those at the beginning of the
expropriation, not the increased values brought about by the improvements and actuations of the
Government after occupying the premises" (Re-affirmed in R.P. v. PNB, April 12,1961, 1 SCRA 957963).
When the defendants-appellants withdrew in 1963 the P100,000.00 deposited by the government,
they already obtained a clear profit of P10,000.00 on their alleged investment of P90,000.00
consisting of P50,000.00, the price they allegedly paid for the property in 1957, and P40,000.00
allegedly representing expenses for levelling, surveying and securing their Torrens title of the property
from 1957 to 1959. The balance of P392,000.00 consisting of P200,000.00 and interest of
P192,000.00 at 6% annually for 16 years from May 4, 1963 to 1979 is all profit, even during times of
inflation. From 1957 until May 4, 1963, when the government took possession of the property, the
defendants-appellants paid realty taxes on the basis of their tax assessment of only P42,120.00
(P89,812.20 according to Provincial Assessor Zandueta [p. 141, ROA, Vol. I, rec.]). Atty. Pablito M.
Roxas and Atty. Rogelio Balago, appraisal commissioners respectively for appellants and the trial
court, conceded that the value of the improvements was only P1,712.00 in 1963. To give them more
than a million pesos about P1,111,360.00 on the basis of the appraisal of P616,000.00 by
provincial agriculturist Pio Tadina, including interest for 16 years at 6% per annum, would be to mulct
the tax-paying public, as the said amount is over ten times or over 1000% on their alleged original
investment of P90,000.00 from 1957, to 1959. Precisely, in their reply dated January 28, 1963, their
selling price was only P170,000.00 net to them, exclusive of their bank debt of P20,000.00.
The appraisal of Provincial Agriculturist Pio Tadina, Chief Agricultural Appraiser Rafael T. David of
the DBP, Commissioner Balagot and Commissioner Rojas, respectively, in the amount of
P616,000.000, P1,006,400.00, P1,044,163.70, and P1,171,369.50, is patently extravagant, considering
that the property was bough in 1957 (1956 as claimed by appellants [pp. 112, 126, Appellants' Brie]))
for P50,000.00 only and the value of the improvements did not exceed P1,712.60 as of May 4, 1963,
when the government took possession. It is doubtful that the property would increase in value over 6
times or over 10 times or by over 600% or over 1,000% in six years, from 1957 to 1963, with the
expenses for surviving, securing the Torrens title over and bulldozing said property amounting to not
more than P40,000.00, already included in the computation (p. 36, ROA, Vol.. I, rec.).
It should be emphasized that the property is about 6 kilometers from the poblaciosion of Bacnotan;
that on May 4, 1963, when the government took possession of the same, it was not accessible at all by
17 | P a g e
any motor vehicle and can only be reached by hiking through rice paddies, trails; and creeks; that it
was not fully developed: and that it was then assessed at P42,120.00 (P89,812.20 according to
Provincial Assessor Zandueta), although it has a waterfall or- spring,
According to Commissioner Molina, the property has 24 hectares of Unirrigated rice land and 17
hectares dedicated to upland rice with the greater portion of 297.748 hectares as pasture land (pp, 7172, ROA, Vol. I, rec.). Pio Tadina reported that 60 hectares are riceland, 80 hectares pasture land 120
hectares with fruit trees and 78 hectares second growth forest (p. 146, ROA, Vol. I. rec.). According to
Rafael 'I. David,, who was requested by appellant Juan to make an appraisal (p. 145, ROA, Vol. I. rec.),
70 hectares are riceland, 66 hectares for upland rice, 38.0785 hectares for orchard, 90.6695 hectares
pasture land, 5 hectares forestry compound, 65 hectares forest land and 4 hectares barrio compound
(p. 150, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Even under the classification of Commissioners Balagot and Rojas, as aforestated, about 50% of the
property is not improved by man nor dedicated to agriculture, for about 95 hectares are pasture land
and 70 hectares are forest land.
The sales of farm lots in the vicinity of the property in question from April, 1959 to May 14, 1962 (pp.
74-75, 152-153, 156-157, ROA, Vol. I, rec.), do not provide an adequate basis for appraisal of the
property of defendants-appellants; because such sales involved very small developed areas of less than
a hectare each, which small lots usually command better prices within the reach f the ordinary buyer.
The instant case involves the condemnation of over 338 hectares.
III
It is argued that appellants judicial admission of P300,000.00 as the provisional value of their lots,
should not bind them, because said admission refers only to the provisional value of the said lots and
not as an admission of the actual - fair and just - value of the lots. The provisional value fixed by the
Court pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is the provisional value that does not
bind the land-owners. But when the landowner himself fixes the provisional value, he should abide
thereby in obedience to the rule that admissions in pleadings bind the party making them.
Section 2 of Rule 67, New Rules of Court reads:t.hqw
Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with the National or Provincial Treasurer
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if
he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionality and
promptly ascertained and fixed by the Court having jurisdiction of the proceedings,
to be held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition o)f the court...
Rule 69, Section 3 of the Old Rules of Court under which the present case was filed contained a similar
provision. (See also Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus. 40 Phil. 550-556 [1919] and Manila Railroad Co.
v. Paredes (31 Phil. 118-142 [1915]).
For emphasis, We repeat that the price of P300,000.00 was the provisional value fixed not by the trial
court, but by the defendants-appellants as owners in their motion for reconsideration filed on April
24, 1963. The provisional value fixed by the trial court in its order of April 15, 1963, was only
P90,793.70, the reconsideration of which the owners sought from the trial court. In its order of April
26, 1963, the trial court fixed the provisional value of P100,000.00. The trial court, in its challenged
decision of September 28, 1964, finally fixed the value at P190,000.00, which is still more than double
the alleged capital investment of P90,000.00 allegedly paid by the owners for the purchase of the
property, levelling and expenses for survey and titling of the property from 1957 to 1959. In his own
letter of January 28, 1963, where he fixed his selling price at P170,000.00 net to him (plus
P20,000.00 bank mortgage on the property), defendant-appellant Celestino, Juan stated that the best
offer he had for the property was only P200,000.00.
While it may be true that the value provisionally fixed by the trial court "... does not necessarily
represent the true and correct value of the land ..." it is equally true that the said amount provisionally
fixed may yet turn out to be the true and correct value of the lots approximating the "just
compensation" requirement of the Constitution. In fact, the same may also turn out to be more than
the true and correct value of the property condemned by the government (see 27 AM JUR 2nd 111,
footnote 16).
18 | P a g e
Furthermore, it can be justifiably inferred that when appellants themselves proposed on April 24,
1963 the amount of P300,000.00 as the provisional value of their lots, they were referring actually to
the highest value their lots could command at that time, notwithstanding their very speculative and
extravagant claim in the same pleading (where they made the P300,000.00 proposal) that the "fair
market value of (the) property should at least be fifty centavos . . per square meter or P5,000.00 per
hectare.
Consider the following circumstances: t.hqw
1. In his reply dated January 28,1963 to the letter of Mr. Victor Luis, appellant Juan
stated that the selling price of his land was "P170,000.00 net to me exclusive of the
amount of my obligation to the China Banking Corporation where the property is
mortgaged", or P190,000.00 including the mortgaged debt of P20,000.00 (pp. 382384, ROA).
2. Appellants-spouses acquired the lots in 1956 (as claimed by appellants) or 1957 (as
stated in the decision of the trial court) from Felipe Nebrija and his children for only
P50,000.00.
3. The lots in question were taxed on the basis of an assessment of only P42,120.00.
4. In his letter dated January 2, 1963 to the Provincial Appraisal Committee,
appellant Celestino Juan evaluated his lots at approximately P319,374.00.
As a matter of fact, appellant should be bound by his P190,000.00 admission. In the light of the
above-mentioned circumstances, the said amount of P190,000.00 is already just and reasonable.
Appellants' claim that they were forced to make the P190,000.00 offer because they were then under a
pressing need for money to defray expenses in connection with certain criminal case involving
appellant Ana to settle said cases, can hardly invite belief; because (1) appellant Celestino Juan did not
aver this alleged urgent need for money in his letter of January 28, 1963, and (2) notwithstanding
appellant Juan's claim in that same letter of January 28, 1963 that an interested buyer of the said lots
was "ready to sign the contract for a price of P200,000.00 payable in cash or at least a period of ten
(10) days," appellant did not dispose of the same to said interested buyer, despite the lapse of ten days
during which he could have had the money from the receipt by Victor Luis of said letter.
Moreover, the same letter belies his alleged dire need for money to settle the alleged criminal cases
against his wife for he stated therein that he had then a pending DBP loan application for
P4,102,000.00 for a dairy farm, and that by reason of his connection with DBP officials, his
application would be favorably considered for P1,000,000.00 with the expropriated property as
collateral together with the dairy farm equipment, facilities and stock.
Being a lawyer, appellant Celestino Juan knew that the reputation of his wife and for that matter his
family would be better protected and preserved by her acquittal after trial than by settlement of the
case (see pp. 107-108, Appellants' brief). Compromise of a criminal case, other than a private offense,
does not remove the criminal liability and the concomitant stigma. Settlement of a criminal case,
unlike acquittal, will not stop the people from talking about the guilt of the accused therein.
Of course "judicial or non-judicial admissions made by condemnees as to the value of their properties
that are to be expropriated should not be deemed conclusive if such admitted value be unjust, because
the Constitution imperatively requires the payment of 'just compensation'". But in the instant case, it
could hardly be said that the amount of P300,000.00 is unjust to the appellants. The delay in the
payment is compensated by the liability for 6% .interest per annum, covering sixteen (16) years
from 1963 to 1979 on the balance of P200,000.00 (on May 7, 1963, appellants withdrew the
P100,000.00 deposit) amounting to P192,000.00. The total balance due appellants would be
P392,000.00. The total payment to them then would be P492,000.00. Beyond this price, the value
would be excessive and unjust to the State and the taxpayer (27 Am. Jur. 2d 52-53 266, footnote 17).
It must be pointed out that the most reliable pieces of evidence in the records relative to the just
compensation to be paid herein appellants are those hereinbefore enumerated, namely, appellants'
own evaluation in 1963, the acquisition cost the tax assessment. This is so because the Committee
failed to arrive at an acceptable valuation, not to mention the fact that the individual reports of the
commissioners of the Appraisal Committee did not undergo the indispensable requirement of hearing
before the trial court. It must be herein stressed that almost all the evidence enumerated earlier are in
the nature of admissions by the owner, which kind of evidence under existing jurisprudence occupies
a preferred position in the realm of proof of just compensation and valuation in eminent domain.
19 | P a g e
Even the purchase price of P50,000.00 paid in 1956 or 1957 by appellants for the lots sought to be
condemned in 1963 is generally held admissible as evidence of the lots' fair market value, unless such
purchase is too remote in point of time from the condemnation proceedings or more special
consideration induced the sale at less than the true market value (29-A C.J.S. 1203-04).
Similarly, the assessed valuation of land made by tax assessors when required by the law, and the
owner's own valuation may be considered together with other proofs in the determination of the just
value of the lots condemned (29-A C.J.S. 1201-1202).
As aforestated, appellants paid realty taxes on the property on the basis of an assessed valuation of
only P42,120.00, with improvements worth only P1,712.00. On January 28, 1963, appellants' offer
was P190,000.00, then P300,000.00 on April 24, 1963, as provisional value, after extravagantly
claiming that the property is worth the fantabulous price of at least P5,000.00 per hectare or a total of
P1,693,040.00. Not even the irrigated rice lands along the national highway in Nueva Ecija, the home
province of appellants, could command that price to P5,000.00 per hectare in 1963. And the lands in
the case at bar are in La Union, hilly, and away from the national highway without direct access to any
feeder road.
In our jurisdiction, the statement of the value of his property by the owner in the tax declaration shall,
since 1940 under C.A. No. 530, constitute prima facie evidence of the real value of the property in
expropriation proceedings by the Government and its instrumentalities.
In short, it could therefore be said taking into consideration the acquisition cost of P50,000.00 in
1956 or 1957 of the lots subject matter of the case, the alleged cost of P40,000.00 for levelling,
surveying and titling thereof from 1957 to 1959, the assessed value as well as the tax declarations of
the appellants with respect to these lots of only P42,120.00, the improvements worth P1,712.00 in
1963, and the several admissions or estimates made by the appellants with respect to the value of the
lots ranging from P190,000.00 to P319.374.00 to P300,000.00 to P1,693,040.00 (P5,000.00 per
hectare)that the amount of P300,000.00 is just to appellants, not to mention that in addition to said
amount a considerable interest of P192,000.00 for 16 years (1963-1979) would be paid on the unpaid
balance of P200,000.00 from May 4, 1963 by the Government, or a grand total of P492.000.00,
which is over five (5) times or over 500% their capital investment of P90,000.00 from 1956 to 1959.
Anything beyond this amount is grossly excessive and patently unjust to the government and the
taxpaying public (29 Am. Jur.2d 52-53 266, footnote 17).
It cannot be seriously claimed by appellants that the declarations of value of the lots in Exhibits B and
B-1 were not made by them (pp. 346-347, ROA), considering that said tax declarations were made
only after the title over the lots was obtained by appellants. Exhibits B and B-1 clearly indicate that
appellants and no one else made the said declarations (p. 182, ROA).
Likewise, the valuation of Agriculturist Tadina should not be accorded too much weight for the
following reasons: t.hqw
1. His valuation report is based purely on his own estimate and opinion: hence in his
letter to Atty. Ramon Zandueta which embodied his evaluation, he therein stated that
"... You will note hereunder the technical analysis of the undersigned with regards to
the area under consideration as a personal opinion ..."
2. The factors he considered in evaluating the lots in question could hardly justify this
valuation in the amount of P616,000.00. Hence: "The 80 hectares of pasture land if
properly grazed and managed is capable of maintaining no less than 400 heads of
cattle. The 120 hectares of fruit trees is suitably adapted to cacao, coffee, bananas,
mangoes. pineapple, citrus, avocado, rambutan, lanzones, The 78 second growth
forest if only planted to "alnos Mirando" a Japanese kind of forest tree will also
increase the volume of spring water for irrigation purposes ... The second growth
forest land has been evaluated higher than the pasture and fruit tree lands because
forest lands do not only conserve soil erosion and soil fertility but also provide organic
matter for the irrigated riceland. It will also conserve and promote the development of
spring besides the value of the, trees and other forest by-products which are now
available as sources of income (pp.39-42,ROA).
3. Tadina is not "an experienced and competent appraiser" in the field of eminent
domain or expropriation cases. When cross-examined by the Fiscal of the Province of
La Union, he declared that the appraisal he made for the property in Damortis, La
Union, and that in Aringay was only with respect to its adaptability and suitability for
20 | P a g e
agriculture and not for purposes of determining the fair and reasonable value (tsn,
pp. 505-506, pp. 201, 202, ROA; see also pp. 108-109. ROA). His appointment as
Chairman of the Appraisal Committee for public lands in La Union did not qualify
him as an "experienced and competent appraiser" in expropriation cases; because
lands involved therein are public lands and the appraisal or determination of the fair
market value of said lots are not for purposes of expropriation cases (p. 202, ROA).
Neither would his participation in the Poro Point expropriation add to his
qualifications as an appraiser in expropriation cases, because he was merely therein
consulted (p. 202. ROA).
4. His classifications were made by estimates and not by actual measurements (tsn, p.
514; p. 204, ROA).
That the land "had potential for conversion into subdivision" should not be considered in the
valuation of the lots in question; because (1) the records of the case do not show conclusive evidence
as to the subdivision potentiality of the lots; and (2) as held in Manila Electric Co. v. Tuason,
"agricultural land should be appraised as such and not as potential building site" (60 Phil. 663 [1934],
reiterated in the case of The Municipal Government of Sagay v. Jison, et al., 104 Phil. 1026, 1033
[1958]).
Republic vs. Castelvi lends no support to appellants' position; because in the Castelvi case, there was a
finding by this Court that "... the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production of
agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees
had actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential subdivisions even before the Republic
filed the complaint for eminent domain (p. 355, 58 SCRA).
As already noted above, the individual valuations made by the three commissioners are of little value,
if at all; because the same were irregularly prepared, not to mention the fact that the same were not
subjected to the indispensable hearing requirement before the trial court wherein the
commissioners could have been cross-examined on their respective reports, the bases thereof, how
they reached their conclusions, and their qualifications, and related matters-vital to the credibility, or
lack of it, of their valuations.
It is urged that, because the value of the peso at the time of the taking in 1963 by the government of
the lots of appellants and the value of the peso today when the just compensation to be awarded to
appellants is to be paid, are no longer the same, this factor should be considered in the determination
of the final award to be given; and that even if WE consider appellants as having judicially admitted
the amount of P300,000.00 as the price of their property, the doubling of this sum at this time is
justified.
Actually, under this proposition, the amount to be doubled shou1d only be the balance of
P200,000.00, for appellants had ,withdrawn and made use of the P100,000.00 deposited by the
government at the inception of this case.
It is of course true that the value of the peso in 1963 and at present is no longer the same. But this
does not justify US in considering that factor nor in doubling the amount judicially admitted by
appellants; because such contingency is already well-taken care of by the interest to be awarded to
appellants. For that is the true role or nature of interest in expropriation cases; because said interest is
not contractual in nature nor based on delict or quasi-delict, but one that "runs as a matter of law
and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position
as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking" (30 CJS 230). Stated otherwise: "Where the
payment of compensation does not accompany the taking of property for public use but is postponed
to a later date, the owner of the property is ordinarily entitled to the award of an additional sum which
will compensate for delay (cases cited) or which will, in other words, produce the full equivalent of the
value of the property paid contemporaneously with the taking" (29-A CJS 762). Under this view, the
interest awarded is deemed part of the just compensation required to be paid to the owner (27 Am.
Jur, 112). This appears to be prevailing view in the United States. As aptly and clearly explained in one
American case:t.hqw
Article 1 18 of the Constitution of the State of Oregon, provides in part as follow:
'Private Property shall not be taken for public use ... without just cornpansation.' The
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States contains substantially the
same provision, 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.' In construing this Identical language of the Federal Constitution the
Supreme Court of the United States holds as follows: lt is settled by the decision of
21 | P a g e
this court that just compensation is the value of the property taken at the time of the
taking (citing cases). And, if the taking precedes the payment of compensation, the
owner is entitled to such addition to the value at the time of the taking as will produce
the full equivalent of such value paid contemporaneously. Interest at a proper rate is
a good measure of the amount to be added'(numerous cases cited omitted). In these
cases and others, the proper rate of interest is held to be the legal rate of interest
prevailing in the jurisdiction where the land is located. The Supreme Court of West
Virginia holds on the authority of these decisions and also of Dohany vs. Rogers, 281,
U.S. 362, 50 SGt. 299. 74 L.Ed 904, 68 ALR434, that denial of the right of interest
would be a violation of the fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
Simons v. Dillon, 119 W. VA 284,193 S.E. 331, 113 A.L.R. 787. The following texts are
authority for the allowance of such interest as part of the damages sustained by the
owner of the land. Nichols on Eminent Domain 653, 216 (3d ed.); Lewis, Eminent
Domain (3d ed.) 1320, 742; 18 AM JUR., Eminent Domain, 272 [State vs. Deal,
233 P 2d 242, 251-252, emphasis supplied].
This view is also well-discussed by JAHR in his book, Eminent Domain Valuation and Procedure
(1953 ed.), Chapter XXVIII Payment of Compensation, pp. 286-301; and by ORGEL in his book,
Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Vol. I (1953 ed.) on the subject of interest as part of just
compensation and as a penalty for delay in payment (Sec. 5, pp. 19-33).
In this jurisdiction, a study of the cases decided by this Court with respect to the award of interest to
the condemnee where there is a gap of time between the taking and the payment, shows that We tend
to follow the view just discussed. The first case-it would appear-where the question of interest arose in
this jurisdiction was the Philippine Railway Co. vs. Solon, February 20, 1909, 13 Phil. 35-45. The two
issues taken there in connection with interest were: (1) From what time should interest be reckoned,
from time of the taking possession of the property by the government or from judgment of the trial
court; and (2) whether on appeal, appellant-condemnee is entitled to interest during the pendency of
the appeal. In disposing of the issues, the Court, relving heavily on American jurisprudence, appears
to treat interest as part of just compensation and as an additional amount sufficient to place the owner
"in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking." Thus, the Court
declared: t.hqw
It remains to consider what interest the defendant is entitled to from named date. It
appears from the record that thecompany opposed the confirmation of the award. Its
objections were so far successful that the court reduced the amount awarded by the
commissioners. The owner was compelled to appeal and in his appeal has been so
far successful as to reverse the action of the the court below.Under these
circumstances we think he is entitled to interest on the award until the final
determination of this proceeding. What the result would be if he had failed in his
appeal, we do not decide. The interest thus allowed will be interest upon the amount
awarded by the commissioners from the 2nd day of February, 1907, until
payment (13 Phil. 40-44, emphasis supplied).
The Solon case thereafter became the basis of award of interest on expropriation cases like Philippine
Railway v. Duran, 33 Phil. 159 [1916]; Manila Railroad Co. v. Alano, 36 Phil. 501 [1917]; Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 41 Phil. 177 [1920]; Alejo v. Provincial Government of Cavite, 54
Phil. 304 1930]; Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 470 [1938]; Republic v. Gonzales, 94 Phil. 957
[1954]; Republic v. Lara, 96 Phil. 172 [1954]; Phil. Executive Commission v. Estacio, 98 Phil. 219
[1956]; Republic of the Philippines v. Deleste, 46 al., 99 Phil. 1035 [1956]Republic v. Garcellano, 103
Phil. 237 [1958]; Yaptinchay, 108 Phil. 1053 [1960]; Republic v. Tayengco, 19 SCRA 900 [1967],and
many others, until the matter of payment of interest became an established part of every case where
taking and payment were not contemporaneously made.
And finally, We confirmed our adherence to the prevailing view in the United States when in the case
of Urtula vs. Republic, January 31, 1968, 222 SCRA 477, 480), We declared, through Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, that: t.hqw
... Said interest is not contractual, nor based on delict or quasi-delict, but one that
t.hqw
runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the
right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money
can accomplish, as of the date of the taking'" (C.J.S. 230; see also
Castelvi case, supra, and Republic v. Nable-Lichauco, 14 SCRA 682).
22 | P a g e
In this connection, it must be pointed out that the judicial notice taken by this Court in the Castelvi
case (supra, 363) "... of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since
the year 1959," was premised not on the par value of the peso to the dollar, but on the dollarpeso
exchange rates at the time of the taking of the lots and at the time of the payment thereof.
In the case of Manuel & Co. vs. CB (38 SCRA. 533-542 [1971]), We distinguished between par value of
the pesoand the dollar-peso exchange rate. The par value of the peso to the dollar-two pesos to one
dollar-is fixed by law and remains intact (see 48, R.A. 265, 1948; Sec. 6, CA No. 699, 1945). Hence,
while there was a change of the exchange rate, the par value of the peso as established by law remains
unchanged.
Such par value can only be altered by the President of the Philippines upon proposal of the Monetary
Board with five members concurring and approved by Congress (Sec. 49[3] RA No. 265).
On the other hand, the rate of exchange or exchange rate is the "price, or the indication of the price,
at which one can sell or buy with one's own domestic currency a foreign currency unit. Normally, the
rate is deterniined by the law of supply and demand for a particular currency" (38 SCRA 533-542).
It is submitted that the Castelvi doctrine on the value of our peso is of doubtful legality, considered in
the context of the Central Bank case, above discussed. In effect, the Castelvi ruling has devalued our
peso; a case of devaluation by judicial fiat.
In the light of the foregoing, the de facto devaluation of our peso should not be taken into account in
the final determination of the value of the lots, subject matter of the case.
In the 1970 case of Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon (33 SCRA 554-557 [1970]), WE ruled against appellants and
held that the decrease in the purchasing value of the Philippine peso provides no legal basis or
justification for completing their legitime with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in
cash, reasoning thus: t.hqw
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix
as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed
by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence,
there cannot be said to be any question-and none is presented-as to fairness of the
valuation thereof or that the legitimate of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso
has greatly declined since the testatrix death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis
of justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission
of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as
otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every
subsequent flucluation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the
oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the suin of P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, "does not in any way affect the
adjudication made to her in the projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of
making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on nonimpairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has
invariably been availed of and sanctioned see Articles 955, 1080 and 1104, Civil
Code). That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when
the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have received
them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and
when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of
pursuing the present appeal (emphasis supplied).
Additional distinction between the present case and the Castelvi case:
The proceedings before the commissioners and before the trial court in the Castelvi case were all in
accordance with the provisions of the rules, while this is not so in the present case; because the
23 | P a g e
commissioner's herein did not turn out a valid report, as the commissioners made their own and
separate reports and no consensus was reached by them on the classification of the lots, allocation of
areas to each class, and the fair market value of each class and the lots as a whole. Furtherinore, no
hearing on the reports of the commissioners was made by the trial court in the case at bar, because of
the motion of the herein appellants to submit the same without any (hearing).
The finding of the trial court, which was sustained by this Court, that the lots involved in the Castelvi
case were residential, was supported by and based on the factual findings of the commissioners, who
were unanimous thereon, and the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Pampanga (58 SCRA 356-359):
while in the present case no one among the commissioners classified the lots or any portion thereof as
residential or one with residential/subdivision potentiality. With respect to Provincial Board
Resolution No. 13 on the report of the Provincial Appraisal Committee of La Union, the same was
disregarded tor having been passed in haste.
In the present case, commissioner Balagot classified the two lots into irrigated riceland, upland
riceland, orchard land, pasture land and forest land, Commissioner Rojas similarly classified the lands
as above, but adding thereto forestry compound and barrio compound; while Commissioner Molina
classified the lots into unirrigated riceland, upland riceland and pasture land. It cannot be seriously
claimed that the lots involved in the present case is suitable as, or have potentials tor conversion into,
a residential subdivision simply because a 4-hectare area of the same was considered by a member of
the provincial appraisal committee as residential. In fact, said 4-hectare area was reflected in the
Provincial Appraisal Committee Report, Resolution 13 (Exh. A) as grazing land, not as a residential
one (see pp. 138, 173, ROA; pp. 67, 143, Appellants' Brief). Furthermore, none among the
commissioners believed the testimony of the said member on that point as no one among them
classified the lots or any portion thereof as residential. The fact that the tenants of appellants
previously occupied the said area and constructed houses thereon, does not convert the whole area or
the portion thus occupied into a residential one. The residential nature of the lot is not determined
alone by the presence or absence of houses thereon (Republic v. Garcia, 91 Phil. 46 [1952]). The
determination of the true nature of a lot must take into consideration, among other things,
the location topography, kind of soil fertility or productivity, and surroundings of the lot (Manila
Railroad Co. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326 [1919]; Republic v. Garcia, supra: Republic v. Lara, 50 O.G. 5778
[1954]). Indeed, the evidence relied upon by this Court in concluding that the lots involved in the
Castelvi case areresidential and not agricultural, shows that: t.hqw
... Castelvi broached the Idea of subdividing her land into residential lots as early as
July 11, 1965 in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(Exh. 5-Castelvi). As a matter of fact, the layout of the subdivision plan was
tentatively approved by the National Planning Commission on September 7,
1956. (Exh. 8-Castelvi). The land of Castelvi had not been devoted to agriculture
since 1974 when it was leased to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said land was
classified as residential, and taxes based on its classification as residential had been
paid since then (Exh. 13-Castelvi). The location of the Castelvi land justifies its
suitability fora residential subdivision. As found by the trial court, "It is at the left
side and the entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by roads(Exh.
13-Castelvi; paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castelvi), the poblacion (of
Floridablanca,) the municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are close by.
The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are also near (Tsn., Nov. 23, 1960, p. 68).
The land of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same condition
as the land of Castelvi. They are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along
the road. These lands arenear the barrio school house, the barrio Chapel, the
Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the Poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1, 3 and 4Toledo-Gozun). As a matter of fact, regarding Lot 1-B, it had already been surveyed
and subdivided, and its conversion into a residential subdivision was tentatively by
the National Planning Commission on July 8, 1959 Exhs. 5 and 6-Toledo-Gozun). As
early as June, 1958, no less than 32 men connected with the Philippine Air Force
among them commissioned, officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted
men had requested Mr. and Mrs. Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their
lands in question (Exhs, 8, 8-A to 8-ZZ-Toledo-Gozun)" (58 SCRA 357, emphasis
supplied).
In the present case, there is no evidence in the record warranting a conclusion that the parcels
involved have potentials for conversion into a residential subdivision. On the contrary, the location,
topography and the use to which the lots involved were, devoted at the time of the filing of
expropriation proceedings in the lower court, indicate that they have none. In his report,
Commissioner Molina described the location and topography of the lots as follows: t.hqw
24 | P a g e
... Starting from the town propwer of Bacnotan, one can reach the property by
passing through the barrios of Cabaroan, Sayoan, Salincob, Casianan and finally
Sapilang. The place is about 2.5 kilometers north of the the Poblacion along the
National Highway up to the so-called Cabaroan junction. From this junction is
about a 2-kilometer feeder road going eastward. And from this lateral road is an
unsurfaced road of approximately 1.5 kilometers leading to the site of the
Agricultural School. However, before the school took possession of the land on May
4, 1963, the place was not accessible at all by any motor vehicles, and that the only
means was to hike over paddies, trails and creeks.
Topographically, the property of defendants is situated on a high elevation. It
consists of mountains and hills forming a semi-circle, and sloping on the sides
towards an elongated portion of valley-like depression which is level and developed
into ricefields. Because of its high elevation or location, the climate of the place
ishealthful, temperate and especially invigorating when one is near or within the
vicinity of the waterfall or spring. The climate is of the kind which the Weather
Bureau would call the Type I climate; that is, the place has two distinct reasons, a dry
season from December to June, when there are light rains or no raisn at all, and wet
season, from June to December, when rains are abundant, heavy and frequent. The
soil of the place is good. It has a luxuriant vegetation (pp. 69-70, ROA, emphasis
supplied).
The presence of the houses of twenty-three (23) tenants in a 4-hectare area at the time the
government took possession of the lots herein involved, is not sufficient proof of that portion's
potentialitv for conversion into a residential subdivision, much less of the whole parcel of about 338
hectares. There was no evidence that the houses of the tenants were there constructed because of its
residential nature. In all likelihood, the tenants were forced by necessity to construct their Rouses
therein to be close to their respective tobacco farms. The fact that under the leasehold system of land
tenure, a tenant is allotted a portion for his dwelling does not render the entire landholding no longer
agricultural and thereby convert the same into a residential land.
WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY MODIFIED AND THE
PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY THE
DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS CELESTINO C. JUAN AND ANA TANSECO THE SUM OF TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, WITH INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE OF SIX
PERCENT (6%) PER ANNUM FROM MAY 1, 1963. NO COSTS.
7. GUIDO vs RURAL PROGRESS (full case)

G.R. No. L-2089
October 31, 1949
JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner,

vs.
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO AGUILAR, Manager, Rural
Progress Administration, respondent.
Guillermo B. Guevara for petitioner.
Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa
G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters,
situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street
running from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit:
25 | P a g e
(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or
corporate power in filling the expropriation complaint and has no authority to negotiate with
the RFC a loan of P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land.
(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the
purview of the provisions of Act 539.
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or
option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of
contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only
and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA.
We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case will make superfluous a
decision on the other questions raised.
Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows:
SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any
interest therein, through purchaser or farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such
conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who
will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the
Philippines.
SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of
the National Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of this
Act. For this purpose, the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public
corporation.
The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which, copied verbatim, is as follows:
The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands
to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their
location, nature and area? The answer is to be found in the explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel
Cuaderno, member of the Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the abovequoted provision. In this speech, which was entitled "Large Estates and Trust in Perpetuity" and is
transcribed in full in Aruego's "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution," Mr. Cuaderno said:
There has been an impairment of public tranquility, and to be sure a continuous of it, because
of the existence of these conflicts. In our folklore the oppression and exploitation of the
tenants are vividly referred to; their sufferings at the hand of the landlords are emotionally
pictured in our drama; and even in the native movies and talkies of today, this theme of
economic slavery has been touched upon. In official documents these same conflicts are
narrated and exhaustively explained as a threat to social order and stability.
But we should go to Rizal inspiration and illumination in this problem of this conflicts
between landlords and tenants. The national hero and his family were persecuted because of
these same conflicts in Calamba, and Rizal himself met a martyr's death because of his
exposal of the cause of the tenant class, because he would not close his eyes to oppression and
persecution with his own people as victims.lawphi1.nt
I ask you, gentlemen of the Convention, knowing this as you do and feeling deeply as you
must feel a regret over the immolation of the hero's life, would you not write in the
Constitution the provision on large estates and trust in perpetuity, so that you would be the
very instrument of Providence to complete the labors of Rizal to insure domestic tranquility
for the masses of our people?
26 | P a g e
If we are to be true to our trust, if it is our purpose in drafting our constitution to insure
domestic tranquility and to provide for the well-being of our people, we cannot, we must fail
to prohibit the ownership of large estates, to make it the duty of the government to break up
existing large estates, and to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through
expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the Constitutions of Mexico
and Jugoslavia.
No amendment was offered and there was no debate. According to Dean Aruego, Mr. Cuaderno's
resolution was readily and totally approved by the Convention. Mr. Cuaderno's speech therefore may
be taken as embodying the intention of the framers of the organic law, and Act No. 539 should be
construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the National Assembly
did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its powers.
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII
of the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act
would be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of
individual rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property of law. The
protection against deprivation of property without due process for public use without just
compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for private use relieves
the owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property
should not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the
Constitution) forbids necessary implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29
C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take
the property of and citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public
interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with very just
principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.)
Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a
declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state"
created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its
necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of
happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise
within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing
large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not
propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to
authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much
concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position
which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in
a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable
quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and
growth of a social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every
progressive and happy country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other
government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of
efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to
housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the
elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without
ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings
for the poor and the destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears
direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.
In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without
that provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire
large tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As
Mr. Aruego says "the primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts
as to the power of the government to expropriation the then existing landed estates to be distributed
27 | P a g e
at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it would seem such expropriation
necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein."
In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole
town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the
land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform
secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The
expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils
inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts are
not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go
far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public advantage, and to authorize the
exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the
interest involved are considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S., 823, 824. See also People of Puerto Rico vs.
Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 Fed. [2nd], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by
condemnation. The highest court of New York States has ruled that slum clearance and reaction of
houses for low-income families were public purposes for which New York City Housing authorities
could exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision was followed by similar ones in other
states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and
insanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemic, crime and waste, prevents the spread of
crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding
communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray vs. La Guardia, 52
N.E. [2nd], 884; General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N.W. [2ND], 919; Weizner vs.
Stichman, 64 N.Y.S. [2nd], 50.) But it will be noted that in all these case and others of similar nature
extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action
taken.
The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not
inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The
expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid
of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is
proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and
sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the
stipulated rent or leave the premises.
No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each
case has to be judge according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this
decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public
convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our
system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case
would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see
no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold
to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural
Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or
2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to
build thereon.
The petition is granted without special findings as to costs.
28 | P a g e
29 | P a g e
30 | P a g e
8. CITY OF MANILA vs CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA
City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)

expropriation of Chinese cemetery
Facts: The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the Chinese community as cemetery
for
the
purpose
of
extending
Rizal Avenuefor public use. The respondents contend that the land already acquires a quasi-public
character and many dead bodies are already buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of
taking the land for public purpose since such is under Torrens title and the expropriation will disturb
the resting place of the dead. The plaintiff contends that under the Charter of City of Manila, they may
condemn private lands for public purpose, such being an exclusive function of the legislature and the
only function of the court is to assess the value of the land expropriated.
Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of expropriation.
Held: The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the inquiry of
the existence of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public
purpose. The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, and (2) that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with
the law. There are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the
land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be public. The taking of land in the exercise of power
of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but the court is bound to interfere to
prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The
court ruled that the cemetery is a public property and it found no great necessity to allow the
expropriation of the land by the City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.
9. CABRERA vs COURT OF APPEALS

Cabrera vs. CA 163 SCRA 214
Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, and Felisa Gonzaga, Fernando Gonzaga, Aurora Gonzaga, et al.
163RA 214 June 30, 1988
31 | P a g e
Facts: The parcel of land in dispute was originally owned by Diego and Patricio Gonzaga, the
grandparents of the private respondents herein. In 1921, the tax declaration was in the name of the
spouses Gonzaga. In 1944 it was made in the name of their child Eliseo Gonzaga. In 1953, it was
changed again in the name of Joaquin Cabrera.
In 1970, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the
Court of First Instance. They claimed the property by right of succession. Petitioners claimed by virtue
of an alleged sale between them and Eliseo.
During the pendency of the complaint, private respondents request that the figures 1960 be
changed to 1969 was approved without opposition from Cabrera.
CFI decided in favor of private respondents herein. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
Note: A separate action for registration of the land instituted by Cabrera was pending when the case at
the CFI was being heard.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the complaint is barred by laches or prescription?
2. Whether the tax declarations serve as constructive notice because of their nature as public
instruments?
3. Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?
Held:
1. No. The amendment requested by private respondents was allowed without objection from the
petitioners. Moreover, this defense should have been pleaded before the amendment was made.
2. No. The Court said its strange doctrine that every one is deemed charged with knowledge of every
public document simply because it is public in nature. There is no jurisprudence to support the claim.
3. No. The action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of decree of
registration. There is no reason why one has to wait for the land to be registered before
filing such remedy.
Cabreras claim that respondents had no valid grounds to support the action for
reconveyance is untenable. The latter had established that the transfer of the land had
been made under fraudulent circumstances. They also proved that they didnt receive
notice of the registration proceedings and that no notice had been posted on the subject
land as required by law.
10. CO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
32 | P a g e
Go vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-68138
May 31, 1991
In quasi-delict cases, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen
or
could
have
reasonably
been
foreseen
by
the
defendant.
Facts:
Floverto Jazmin, a visitor residing at Maravilla St. Mangatarem, Pangasinan, is an American citizen
and a retiree of the United States Federal Government. Being a pensionado of the US Government, he
received annuity checks through Mangatarem Post Office and used to encash it at the Prudential Bank
Branch at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However, there was a time that he was not able to receive the
checks on time, thus prompted him to write a complaint due to the delay. Thereafter he received a
substitute
check
and
encashed
it
at
the
Prudential
Bank.
Meanwhile, Agustin Go in his capacity as the manager of the Solidbank (now Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation), allowed a person, in the name of Floverto Jasmin, to open a savings account
thereby depositing two US Treasury Checks. Deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank (First
National City Bank). Having no reply from the drawee bank, the Solidbank allowed the depositor to
withdraw
the
amount
indicated
in
the
checks.
A year later, the two dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation that there was an
alteration. With that, Jazmin received radio messages requiring him to appear before the Philippine
Constabulary regarding the complaint filed by Go against him for estafa. It was then found out that
the depositor who withdrew the amount from Solidbank was an impostor. Thus, Jazmin filed a case
against
Go
at
the
CFI
Pangasinan
for
moral
and
exemplary
damages.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants appealed to the IAC. Like the lower court,
IAC ruled in favor of the plaintiff but awarded nominal damages instead of moral and exemplary
damages.
Thus,
the
case
was
elevated
to
the
Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
Go
and
the
Solidbank
are
liable
for
nominal
damages.
nominal
damages.
Ruling:
Yes,
Under
Go
the
and
law,
the
Solidbank
quasi-delict
are
cases
solidarily
are
one
liable
of
the
for
sources
of
obligation.
In this case, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Go has the obligation to pay
nominal damages because of the Jazmins right being violated and invaded in the case of estafa
instituted at the Philippine Constabulary. Nominal damages are awarded instead of moral and
33 | P a g e
exemplary damages because Jazmin did not suffer any loss from the action made by the plaintiff and
such damages do not intend to indemnify any loss to the latter. In fact, he was still able to receive the
amount through the substitute check sent to him. Therefore, Jazmin is not entitled to moral damages
and as well as exemplary damages. In the same way, the bank is co-equally liable with Go because it
has been grossly negligent, through its employee, in handling the business transaction involved.

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1 | Page

G.R. No. L-53622

April 25, 1980

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,

February 27, 1948

Doctrine and Held:

The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory

ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHT

2. ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN

5. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION vs DIONISIO

The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following

morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against

6. REPUBLIC vs JUAN (full case)

Value sq. meter

Irrigated Palay Land

3. 80 hectares pasture land

4. 120 hectares fruit trees

5. 72 hectares 2nd growth forest

(p. 145, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

mango (bearing) P30 ea.

21 coconut (bearing) P5 ea.

4 coconut (non-bearing) P2 ea.

4 caimito (star apple) P8 ea.

12 bamboos (heavy) P0.30 ea.

1 bamboo (light) P0.10 ea.

6 orange (non-bearing) P1 ea.

(pp. 16-17, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

The foregoing findings do not appear to be disputed.

7. GUIDO vs RURAL PROGRESS (full case)

October 31, 1949

JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner,

8. CITY OF MANILA vs CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)

9. CABRERA vs COURT OF APPEALS

10. CO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Go vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

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