Abhineet Kumar

PHI 333

2/9/16
Paper #1
Criticisms on Descartes Mind-Body Dualism

Introduction
I would like it to be clear before you proceed in reading this paper that as a lover of
philosophy, I cannot not love Ren Descartes. Hes given so much to discipline that I cannot
imagine it without him. And its precisely his method of doubting, doubting and doubting till the
truth finally prevails that can, without a doubt, be found inherent in my own methodology in this
paper. His rationality and intuition are both mind-bending and complex in the most brilliant of
ways and without his knowledge, much of the criticisms in this paper, I believe, would not have
had the inspiration they needed in order to be conceived. Nevertheless, this paper is, indeed, a
criticism of Descartes famous dualistic mind-body theory. He believes the two are separate, I
believe the two are separate, yet the philosopher in me cannot help but take the reasoning behind
this belief and discover every flaw within it. Why? Perhaps, then, the possibilities of there being
a mind and a body will be so narrowed down that only few remain. That is my hope in writing
this papercoming closer to a truth that aligns with my belief. Yet, it is very likely that I may
just as well reach a point where the possibilities are so narrowed that there is no more room for
my belief to have any reason for existence other than blind faith.
I will set out on this doubting mission by first criticizing the very foundation Descartes
mind-body dualism is built fromthat is, I will criticize the philosophers indubitable I think,
therefore I am claim by asserting that it is, indeed, dubitable, by virtue of the claims
presumption that it is I that is thinking. Next, Ill critique Descartes claim that all ideas he
believes to be clear and distinct are necessarily true by virtue of Gods existence and nondeceiving nature/perfection. More specifically, Ill critique his claim that because he can clearly
and distinctly conceive of himself as mind and body, it must be true that the two are separate. Ill
criticize this argument on two fronts 1) perhaps not all one believes to be clearly and distinctly
conceiving is being conceived clearly and distinctly and 2) Descartes proof for the existence of
God can be doubted. Afterwards, I will examine Descartes argument on the divisibility of
material entities and indivisibility of immaterial entities as his way of proving mind-body
dualism, but critique it based on the notion that, perhaps, what he believes to be immaterial (the
mind) is, as a matter of fact, divisible. And lastly, I will conclude the paper with some of
Elizabeth of Bohemias critiques on Descartes theory that the mind and body have the ability to
interact: that is, the idea that material and immaterial are two types of substances with which
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interaction is incompatible; and the idea that it is not illogical to critique mind-body dualism
based on body-body knowledge.
I Think, Therefore I Am
Everything Descartes argues for in the Meditations stems from a claim which he believes
to be the foundation of all knowledge: I think, therefore I am. It is this claim that leads
Descartes to the conclusion that what he is is a mind first, then a body. And while the claim may
seem indubitableconsidering its been arrived at through a process of rigorous doubtingit is,
indeed, flawed and, itself, doubtable as I will proceed to illustrate by suggesting the notion that
the thoughts I have, may simply be a deception themselves. I will do this as a way of refuting
the very foundation that Descartes mind-body distinction is built on. For if the foundation can be
questioned, so can the validity of the propositions that are derived from it.
Firstly, lets establish why it is that Descartes epistemological foundation, I think,
therefore I am, led the philosopher towards a belief in the mind-body distinction. To begin with,
Descartes arrives at the axiom through a method of doubting; he doubts the existence of
absolutely anything and everything: there is absolutely nothing in the world: no sky, no earth,
no minds, no bodies (64). This leaves him with the inevitable question: Is it then the case that I
too do not exist? Descartes then proceeds to prove his existence through the following assertion:
But there is some deceiver or other who is supremely powerful and supremely sly and who is
always deliberately deceiving me. Then too there is no doubt that I exist, if he is deceiving me
(64). In other words, Descartes claims that even if everything he is experiencing is merely a
deception forged by the hands of an evil genius, there is, nevertheless, an I that is being
deceived and this deception of the I implies the existence of an I. For one has to exist in
order to be deceived.
This leads Descartes to ask the following question: But what then am I? If hes doubted
everything and all thats left is an I, what is that I? Its not a body, for such a thing has
already been cast into doubt: I am not that concatenation of members we call the human body
(65). What about thinking, though? ...thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me.
But for how long? For as long as I am thinking I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking
thing; that is a mind Descartes claims (65). That is, the one thing he cannot deny or doubt,
besides the fact that he exists, is the fact that he is a thinking thing. For as soon as hes doubted
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that he thinks, there is, nevertheless, a thought that accompanies the very doubting. Thus,
Descartes comes to the conclusion that he is, first and foremost, a thinking thinga mindthat
exists. Thus, I think, therefore I am. And, thus, the inclination to separate the mind from the
body.
Now, it seems as though Descartes separation of the mind and body can only be made if
the claim, I think, therefore I am is true. For if he does not think, he, or the I that is hethe
mindwould not exist. And if the mind doesnt exist, we can certainly question the mind-body
distinction that is derived from its existence. So the question then is, is there a flaw in Descartes
foundational claim? Is there something about it that doesnt make sense so as to provide doubt
towards the notion that mind and body are two separate things? It seems like there is. While
Descartes claims that he is thinking, he has not yet doubted the possibility that it is, without a
doubt, him that is the one that is thinking. Philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche asserts that, When I
analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring
assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance,
that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an
activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an
'ego,' (Nietzsche 23). In other words, there is something linguistically presumptuous about
Descartes claim. Could it not be that the evil deceiver he speaks of is simply deceiving him into
believing that the thoughts he is having are his own? While such a scenario is unlikely, it is,
nevertheless, possible in the world of doubt that Descartes has created for himself. Considering
the thus established dubitable nature of the proposition that it is the I that is thinking, the
corollary that I is a thinking-thing, and not a body, is also dubitable. Thus, the mind-body
distinction is doubtable based on this flaw found in the very foundational notion it stems from.
Clear and Distinct Ideas
While Descartes argues that his ability to clearly and distinctly conceiveby virtue of
Gods perfectionof himself as mind and body makes it so that they are, indeed, separate,
perhaps not all one believes to be clearly and distinctly conceiving is truly being conceived
clearly and distinctly. Descartes explains that my ability clearly and distinctly to understand one
thing without another suffices to make me certain that the one thing is different from the other,
since they can be separated from each other, at least by God" (96). In other words, because he
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has the ability to clearly and distinctly understand individual things, he can also clearly and
distinctly understand when two things are separate from each other as opposed to being the same
thing. Furthermore, Descartes explains, what I have already taken for a rule, namely that the
things we very clearly and distinctly conceive are all true, is assured only for the reason that God
is or exists, and that he is a perfect being, and that all that is in us comes from him (21). Since
he believes in a God that is perfect and non-deceiving (for a deceiving God would be imperfect),
it cannot be that what he conceives of as clear and distinct is simply a deception; it must be true
because God would not make such obvious truths deceptions.
Thus, Descartes argues, I judge that obviously nothing else belongs to my nature or
essence except that I am a thinking thing. And although perhaps I have a body that is very
closely jointed to me, nevertheless, because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of
myself, insofar as I am merely a thinking thing and not an extended thing, and because on the
other hand I have a distinct idea of a body, insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a
thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it (96).
In other words, he can clearly and distinctly imagine a scenario in which his purely physical
body doesnt exist, but his mindthe purely immaterial thinking thingstill does and, as a result,
the two must be separate from each other. If, on the other hand, he was not two, but one thing, he
could not imagine such a scenario. After all, we cannot imagine a scenario in which something
purely physical, like a chair, exists and doesnt exist at the same time. Thus, the separation of the
mind and body cannot be denied by virtue of it being conceived of clearly and distinctly which,
in turn, cannot be challenged by virtue of Gods existence and non-deceiving/perfect nature.
There is a problem with this argument if we consider the possibility that what Descartes
believes to be clearly and distinctly conceiving is not actually being conceived clearly and
distinctly. In other words, just because Descartes can imagine his mind existing without his body
existingjust because he can imagine them as two separate entitiesdoesnt necessarily make it
true that they are, indeed, separate in reality. For while our imagination and intellect are certainly
capable of conceiving rational thoughts, they are equally incapable of realizing when what is
believed to be a rational thought is actually not. For example, lets consider the fictional
character Lois Lane of the Superman comic book series. It could be argued, without a doubt, that
Lois clearly and distinctly perceives Clark Kent and Superman as two different individuals early
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on in the series. At this point, there is nothing about the two that would suggest to her that they
are one and the same person. Yet, in reality, we all know that Clark Kent and Superman are,
indeed, the exact same person. It just happens to be that Lois does not know this truth; what she
believes to be true is actually a falsehood formed by a deception. Thus, it could also be argued
that Descartes is mistaken in the same way when he imagines the mind and body as two separate
entities. While he may argue that God would never allow such a mistake because of his nondeceiving nature, what I am suggesting is that it is not Gods perfection that is questioned by this
critique, it is Descartes imagination that is. Considering this, mind-body dualism can once again
be cast into doubt.
Does God Exist?
As mentioned earlier, the validity of Descartes clear and distinct thoughts depends on the
existence of God. If the existence of God can be doubted, then we have yet another reason to
doubt what Descartes conceives clearly and distinctlythat is, the separation of the mind and
body. First, I will outline how Descartes proves the existence of God.
In order to prove the existence of God, Descartes uses the principle of cause and effect
with a hint of what can be described as his own levels of reality principle: Now it is indeed
evident by the light of nature that there must be at least as much [reality] in the efficient and total
cause as there is in the effect of that same cause. Hence it follows that something cannot come
into being out of nothing, and also that what is more perfect (this is what contains in itself more
reality) cannot come into being from what is less perfect (73). Furthermore, Descartes adds,
For although the idea of substance is in me by virtue of the fact that I am a substance, that fact
is not sufficient to explain my having the idea of an infinite substance, since I am finite, unless
this idea proceeded from some substance which really was infinite. (76) In other words, what
Descartes is arguing is that he cannot doubt that a cause must have at least as much reality as its
effect. So for instance, a finite substance can cause a finite substance to exist, but it cannot cause
an infinite substance to exist. Descartes believes that if something has a property, the thing that
caused it to exist must also have that property. If something is hot, it must be because it was
heated by something else that was also hot.
Considering this, he concludes that if he has an idea of finite substance, it must have been
caused by something at least as real as finite substance. Descartes, himself, is finite substance,
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yet has an idea of infinite substance. How is this possible? According to his logic, there is no way
he could have conceived of such an idea himself. It must, therefore, be that God exists and
planted the idea of itself in Descartes mind. He could not have had the idea of perfection and
infinity if something perfect and infinite didnt exist in the first place.
There are multiple flaws in Descartes argument for the existence of God that we can use
to weaken the foundation on which his mind-body distinction is built. First of all, lets consider
the idea that something needs to have the same properties as the thing that caused it to exist. Is
this necessarily true? There are a number of things that can be thought of that dont follow this
logic. Lets take cake as an example of an effect. If we consider its causethat is, a combination
of ingredients such as eggs, milk, butter, salt, sugarit becomes clear that there is a disparity
between the properties of cake, itself, and its cause. For one, cake is solid, yet milk is liquid.
Such examples are abundant and prove that not everything that exists must be caused by
something with the same properties. Secondly, lets consider Descartes levels of reality
principle. According to him, it seems that infinite substance is more real that finite substance. But
what exactly does more real mean? Things dont exist more or less on a sliding scale. Either
something exists or doesnt! Such arguments can be made against Descartes proof of God,
thereby weakening his proof for mind-body dualism.
On the Divisibility of the Mind
Descartes also suggests that the mind and body must exist and be separate based on the
fact that material entities can be divided and immaterial entities cannot. He explains that, "For
when I consider the mind, that is, myself insofar as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot
distinguish any parts within me; rather, I understand myself to be manifestly one complete thing
(101). In other words, the mind, to him, is a single entity, indivisible unlike purely physical
things. He goes on to add, On the other hand, there is no corporeal or extended thing I can think
of that I may not in my thought easily divide into parts and in this way I understand that it [my
body] is divisible. This consideration alone would suffice to teach me that the mind is wholly
diverse from the body, had I not yet known it well enough in any other way (101). For while
ones brain, a material entity, could physically be divided through a lobotomy (in the sense that
a part of it is removed), one would still be able think and, thus, the thinking thingthe mind

would still exist undivided. Therefore, the mind must be something different from the body;
something different from all that is physical and divisible.
Lets take a step back and reconsider the lobotomy example as a way of criticizing this
theory. While it may be that the mind still exists after a lobotomy, there is something telling
about the fact that it exists in a weaker state. Some individuals will lose their ability to speak
after such a procedure; theyll lose their ability to reason. Such examples suggest that perhaps
what Descartes refers to as the mind is, as a matter of fact, divisible; that a part of its full
capability is diminished when a part of the brain is removed. But how can this be if it is quite
clear and distinct that nothing immaterial can be divided? Perhaps, then, the error is to assume
that the mind even exists in first place. Perhaps what Descartes believes to be the mind is simply
a function of our physical brains.
Elizabeth of Bohemia Interaction between the Material and Immaterial
Despite the fact that Descartes believes the mind and body are two distinct things with
different attributes, he also thinks they are very tightly connected. It is this tight connection
between the mind and bodyone that suggests an interaction between the twothat creates a
problem for Elizabeth, the princess of Bohemia. I will use this problem as a way of criticizing
Descartes mind-body dualism.
Descartes explains in the Sixth Meditation, By means of these sensations of pain,
hunger, thirst and so on, nature also teaches that I am present not merely to my body in the way a
sailor is present in a ship, but that I am most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with it,
so much so that I and the body constitute one single thing. For if this were not the case, then I,
who am only a thinking thing, would not sense pain when the body is injured; rather, I would
perceive the wound by means of the pure intellect.... (98). Considering this, Descartes suggests
that his mind and body must be connected and interactive because if they werent, the sensations
that allow him to be aware of his body would not allow him to be aware of his body; he would
simply intellectualize those sensations as opposed to feeling them.
Furthermore, Descartes goes on to add, my mind is not immediately affected by all
the parts of the body, but only by the brain, or perhaps even by just one small part of the brain
(101). On top of this, he also states, pain as if it is occurring in the footprovokes the mind
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to do its utmost to move away from the cause of the pain (102). This is a truly fascinating
statement as it suggests that that certain bodily eventsin particular, brain eventscause
sensations to occur in the mind. Additionally, it suggests that the mind is equally capable of
causing events to occur in the body. Through this logic, Descartes purports the controversial
notion that the mind interacts with the body. If this notion can be cast into doubt, there is more
reason to refute mind-body dualism.
In her correspondence with Descartes, Elizabeth of Bohemia explains a doubt inherent in
this very notion: I beseech you to tell me how the soul of a man (since it is but a thinking
substance) can determine the spirits of the body to produce voluntary actions contact seems to
me incompatible with an immaterial thing (Atherton 11-12). In other words, Bohemia is
questioning the nature of interaction between a mind and a body. She criticizes the idea that
something lacking extension, the mind, can affect something that is extended, such as the body;
how something immaterial can compel something material to move. Furthermore, she notes that
every determination of movement happens from an impulsion of the thing moved (Atherton
11). In other words, movement of a physical entity is inspired by the movement of another. In all
things conceivable, movement appears to require some form of contact. So if mind and body are
so radically different that one is immaterial and the other material, it seems illogical for the two
to be able to make any form of contact and, thus, interact.
Descartes responds to this criticism by appealing to the argument of primitive notions.
He explains that these primitive notionsthose of extension, thought and the union of the
mind and bodycannot be understood except through [themselves] (13). And when we wish
to explain some difficulty by means of a notion that does not pertain to it, we cannot fail to make
a mistake (13). What he means, essentially, is that we cannot come to understand the nature of x
by virtue of a primitive notion pertaining to y, and vice versa. In other words, we cannot come to
understand anything of the interaction between mind and body through our understanding of the
interaction between body and body. Descartes is arguing that what Elizabeth has done through
her interaction argument is applied material logic to immaterial logic and vice versa. To do so is,
to him, illogical.
Descartes makes an interesting counter-argument, but does it really make sense? After all,
since the souls being commingled with the body consists at least in part of the souls being
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causally connected with the body, it is hard to understand how one can conceive of the soul as
being united with the body without already being able to conceive of the souls being causally
connected with the body. Thus, its impossible not to explain the union of the mind and body
through logic that pertains to the material or immaterial alone. Ultimately, Elizabeth insists, I
admit it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the soul than the capacity of
moving a body and of being moved, to an immaterial being (Atherton 16). And once again, we
arrive at the notion that perhaps its simply easier and more logical to conceive of a material
mind than it is to imagine the interaction between the material and immaterial. It, thus, seems as
though the correspondence between Elizabeth and Descartes ends with the former with
somewhat of the upper-hand. Through her arguments, there is viable reason to doubt mind-body
dualism.
Spinoza on the Mind-Body Problem
Lastly, I would like to state Baruch Spinozas take on the mind-body problema
problem which he considers non-existent. In Ethics 2, he explains that, the mind is united to the
body because the body is the object of the mind (Spinoza). Furthermore, a mode of
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two different
ways (Spinoza). What he means to say is that because of the unity of Nature or Substancethat
everything is Nature or Substancethought and extension (material and immaterial) are just two
different ways of comprehending one and the same Nature or Substance. So when it comes to the
mind-body problem, the two are simply two different expressionsunder Thought and under
Extensionof one and the same thing: the person.
Conclusion
In thinking about where all of this philosophizing has lead me, it has become clear and distinct to
me that there is doubt in mind-body dualism. Its become clear to me through all the objections
Ive raised and included towards Descartes rather cogent arguments for mind-body dualism that
the very notion is so deeply flawed that either there is something about it we simply cannot
comprehend or put into words or that it is simply illogical; that as a result of our
intellectual/physical/spiritual/all too human limits, the ability to understand what it truly is that
we are is beyond our reach for the time being or forever. For now, however, it certainly seems to
me that we are not twoimmaterial and materialwe are simply one: material. That the
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problem with the mind-body problem is that it shouldnt be a problem to begin with because the
mind nothing but another way of describing what our brains do. And to consider mind-body
dualism as fact is to accept a myriad of logical fallacies and flaws.
Works Cited:

1. Descartes, Ren, and Donald Cress. Discourse on Method ; and Meditations on First
Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Publ, 1998. Print.
2. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. Beyond Good and Evil:
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. New York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
3. Atherton, Margaret. Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period. Indianapolis:
Hackett Pub., 1994. Print.

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