LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

I. Torrens System

Thus, where innocent third parties relying on the

correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights. He is protected.

2. Nature of Proceedings

A. Concept and Background

1. Purpose
Republic v. Umali
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it
was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair
to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could even be more
numerous and complex than they are now and possibly more
abrasive if not even violent.

Laburada v. LRA
Court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of
land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is void. This is so, because when
once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the
land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole
world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a
subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud nor within the statutory
period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person.
Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of
the first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing
notice to the world that said property is already registered in his
name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the
land he applied for is already covered by a title so he has no right
whatsoever.
In other words, the first proceedings are in rem which binds
the second proceedings.

Pino v. CA

Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. De Castro

The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid

possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face
of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.

A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings,

requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the State, who have rights to or interests in the property.
Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through
publication of the application for registration and service of notice
to affected parties.
Consequently, when respondents De Castro filed their own
application for registration of the same parcel of land in the

Tagaytay CFI branch, strictly speaking, it could no longer entertain

the application for registration as the res involved had been
constructively seized by the Cavite CFI branch. Be that as it may,
the Court is not persuaded that the registration proceedings
instituted by private respondents should be nullified by reason of
the fact that the Cavite City branch of the same court was already
proceeding with another registration case for the same piece of land.

Since the subject lands are alienable and disposable lands of

the public domain, the applicants may acquire title thereto only
under the PLA.

In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are

obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their
objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first
acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where
more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person
holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person
who relies on a subsequent certificate. It should be stressed that said
rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of
filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even though
an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have
priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is
being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance
and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.

(Note: Substantial requirements for public lands are in

the PLA but the procedural requirements are in the PRD.)

(Note: De Castro application filed in 1967 but entry of

decree 1968, CFI tagaytay; While Lopez application earlier filed in
1956 but entry of decree only on 1979, CFI Cavite.)
3. In Relation to the Public Land Act
Republic v. Herbieto
The CA overlooked the difference between the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the PRD, there
already exists a title which is confirmed by the Court; while under
the PLA, the presumption always is that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only a
claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or
continous, open and notorious possession [since June 12, 1945 or
earlier].

Applicants could not acquire land through adverse

possession since the land was only classified as alienable in 1963
AND their possession only started in 1950.

Civil Code provisions on prescription, which is subject to

confirmation under the PRD, in general applies to all types of land.
However, excluded therefrom are lands of the public domain which
are covered by the PLA [special law v. general law]
Secretary of DENR v. Yap
CA 141, PLA, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned
lands which reverted to the State.
PD 1529, PRD, governs the registration of lands under the
Torrens System as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.
Boracay Island is land of the public domain, considered as
Reserved Forest Land. Only part of it is alienable and disposable
agricultural land as recently reclassified as such by President GMA.
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under PLA: (1) OCEN possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945 and (2) Classification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
B. Certificate of Title

P.D. 1529. SECTION 39.

Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title.
After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the
court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of
title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment,
certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of
title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered,
nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be
prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the
corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a
true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by
the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The
original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner
and shall be sent, together with the owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register of
Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book.

Reyes v. Raval Reyes

The registered owner of the land has a more preferential
right to the possession of the owners duplicate than one whose
name does not appear in the certificate of title and yet has to
establish his right to the possession thereto.
National Grains v. IAC
Persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the
face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to
indiciate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the Torrens upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto.
Cajuyon v. Batuyong

Petitioners are not builders in good faith. Good faith

consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. In the instant
case, when the verification survey report came to petitioners
knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a
professionals field confirmation of petitioners encroachment of
respondents titled property.
It is doctrinal in land registration that the possession of
titled property adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted
with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the
disputed lot despite knowledge of respondents ownership put
petitioners in bad faith.
Spouses Valenzuela v. Spouses Mano
A person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or
oversight land owned by another, does not become owner of such
land by virtue of the certificate alone. The Torrens System is
intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the
certificate of registration but it not intended to perpetrate fraud
against the real owner of the land. The certificate of title cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner.
Title to the property merely confirms and registers
ownership.
2. Indefeasibility
After the lapse of one year from the entry of the decree of registration, said the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.
(Sec 32, P.D. 1529)
Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio Labanon
The principle of indefeasibility does not totally deprive a
party of any remedy to recover the property fraudulently registered
in the name of another. Section 32, PD1529 merely precludes the
reopening of the registration proceedings for titles covered by the

Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the
reconveyance of the property to its rightful owner.

title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged

innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

The remedy of the land owner whose property has been

wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is, after one
year form the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages.

Caraan v. CA

An unrepudiated express trust, as proved by the Deed of

Assignment and the Affidavit, does not prescribe.
De Guzman v. Agbagala
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of
the action is to nullify the title and thus challenge the judgment
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when
the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made an incident thereof.
Here, attack was indirect because the principal relief was to
declare the donation and transfers void.
However, the principle of indefeasibility does not apply
when the patent and title based thereon are void. An action to
declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is
susceptible to direct, as well as collateral, attack.
Here, the Director of Lands did not have the jurisdiction to
issue the free patent since the land was private. Hence, the patent
and the title issued thereon are void.
Lepanto Consolidated v. Dumyung
A certificate of title is void when it covers property of the
public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any

A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible

title to the property in favor of the registered owner.
In an action for recovery of possession, the defense of the
possessor that the plaintiffs certificate of title is void is a collateral
attack which is prohibited under PD 1529.
Thus, the defense of prescription of Caraan cannot stand
against the Certificate of Title of Cosme because under section 47,
PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Republic v. Guerrero
A petition for review of the decree of registration must be
filed within one year from the date of entry of the decree. And in
case of public lands, the one-year period commences from the date
of issuance of the patent by the Government.
Here, the sales patent was issued on 1982 and this action to
amend the certificate was filed only in 1989. Moreover, an
administrative claim, although filed within the 1-year prescriptive
period, does not serve to toll the 1-year period.
A petition for review of the decree of registration refers to a
review of the decree of registration in the Regular Courts and not in
the Bureau of Lands.
3. Prescription
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Sec. 47, P.D. 1529)

Javier v. Concepcion
The defense of prescription of the cause of action for
recovery of possession by the registered owner is without merit. The
established rule is that one cannot acquire title to a registered land
by prescription or adverse possession.
Laches is likewise not available because there are no
intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or
prejudiced by a decision ordering the return of the lots. Hence, the
equitable defense of laches will not apply against the registered
owners.
4. Collateral Attack
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Sec.
48, P.D. 1529)

Madrid v. Bonifacio
Accion Publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de
posesion, is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiry of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession
of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to
recover possession only, and not ownership. However, where the
question of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issue
to determine who has the better right of possession. Such
determination is merely provisional and not conclusive on the
question of ownership.
Here, both parties claim ownership of the property.
Petitioners through oral sale and respondents as represented by a
TCT in their names.

More weight is given to the TCT because it is evidence of

indefeasible title to property. The title holder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership, including possession.
The petitioner-defendants attack on the validity of
respondent-plaintiffs title, by claiming that fraud attended its
acquisition, is a [prohibited] collateral attack on the title. It is an
attack incidental to the quest to defend their possession of the
properties in an accion publiciana not in a direct action whose main
objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.
Halili v. CIR
Here, the union seeks to recover the property from the
buyer of the land [MMPCI]. The objective of such claim is to
nullify the title of the buyer to the property, which thereby
challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under
the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. A Torrens Title
cannot be collaterally attacked. Hence, whether or not petitioners
have the right to claim ownership of the property is beyond the
province of the instant proceeding.
Here, the action came from the NLRC.
4. Right of Possession Arising From Title
Carbonilla v. Abiera
The registered owner is entitled to possession. However, the
owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, the
registered owner must resort to the proper judicial remedy.
Here, the petitioner-registered owner opted to file an
ejectment case. Ejectment cases [forcible entry and unlawful
detainer] are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious
means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. The only question that the courts resolve is who

is entitled to possession de facto and not to possession de jure. It

does not even matter if a party has title to the property. An
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who
has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key
jurisdictional facts must be pleaded and proved.
Here, petitioners failed to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance.
Petitioners must file either an action reivindicatoria, a suit
to recover ownership to property or file an accion publiciana, a
plenary action to recover based on the better right to possess.

II. Regalian Doctrine

A. Concept and Effects
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. (Sec. 2, Article XII,
Constitution)
Aranda v. Republic (August 24, 2011)
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation

or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports

of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government
that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
Chavez v. PEA
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
private parties could reclaim from the sea only with proper
permission from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed
land only if not otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority. This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the
sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of
public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or
withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed
land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State.
Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission
from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land
which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it
replaced. Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted
the time-honored principle of land ownership that all lands that
were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain.
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read
together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public
lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public
domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the
government can alienate them.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but
also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and
forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential
act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can
be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public
domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the

commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged

areas are, under the Constitution, waters x x x owned by the State,
forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable.
Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged
areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the
Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may
alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural
lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
2. Native Title and Time Immemorial Possession
Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as
far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest; (Sec. 3(l), IPRA)
Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory
can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the
concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by
operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance
with their customs and traditions. (Sec. 3(p), IPRA)
III. Citizenship Requirement
A. Individuals
1. Filipino Citizens
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares of the alienable lands of the public domain,
by purchase, homestead, or grant. (Sec. 3, Article XII, Constitution)
Citizens may acquire private lands. (As much as they can?)

2. Former Natural-Born Citizens

A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Sec. 8,
Article XII, Constitution)
Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the
legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the
case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him
for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same,
the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land
for business or other purposes which when added to those already owned by him
shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be
situated in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided,
That the total land area thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) hectares in the
case of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes. A transferee who
has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land area
and vice versa. (Section 10, Foreign Investments Act)
3. Aliens
Alien Individuals may be transferees of private lands only in cases of hereditary
succession. (Sec. 7, Article XII, Constitution)
PBCom v. Lui She
Taken singly, the lease contracts show nothing that is necessarily
illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern
to subvert by indirection the Constitutional prohibition of Alien
ownership of land. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable
period is valid. So is the option giving an alien the right to buy real
property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

But if an alien is given not only a lease, but also an option to buy, a
piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
otherwise dispose of his property, this is to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it
rights the sum total of which make up ownership.
Court held all lease contracts void because of the intent surrounding
the execution.
Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez
The device [testamentary succession] of a usufruct to an
alien who is not a legal heir does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary. It is not prohibited by the Constitution because it is
the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by
the Constitution.
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession
otherwise any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by
paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of
a piece of land.
Cheesman v. IAC
Constitution prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Cheesman was charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over
the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire
a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was void.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property.

To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of

the Constitution. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord to the alien husband a substantial interest and right
over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right which the Constitution does
not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her
own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this
stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it
were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the
property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an
event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used
for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or
expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would
be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise
Muller v. Muller
(Note: academic in cheesman was realized here]
Mr. Muller was aware of the Constitutional prohibition
when he purchased the property. He declared the property in the
name of Mrs. Muller because of said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
There was no implied trust created. Save for hereditary
succession, an aliens disqualification is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. Mr. Muller cannot seek
reimbursement of the funds he used to purchase the property on the

ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly

bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Ting Ho v. Teng Gui
The subject lot does not form part of the Estate of the
deceased alien who was absolutely prohibited from owning land. By
virtue of the miscellaneous sales patent and the corresponding OCT
issued in his name Teng Gui is considered the owner of the land.
Moreover, the prohibition against an alien owning lands of
the public domain is absolute and not even an implied trust can be
permitted to arise on equity considerations.
However, the properties erected on the land owned by Teng
Gui form part of the estate of respondents deceased father.
(Note: ownership over
building/improvement.)

the

land

separated

from

the

B. Corporations
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
(Sec. 3, Article XII, Constitution)
Corporations or associations whether citizens or of citizens and aliens may not
own, but may only hold by lease lands of the public domain. (DOJ Opinion, 1973)
However, only corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital stock of
which is owned by Filipinos, and the remainder by foreigners, may own private
lands.
RD v. Ung Siu Temple
The fact that the religious corporation has no capital stock
does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is
admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of

the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or associations

allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources
shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution
demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao v. LRC
Bishops or archbishops of corporation soles are merely
administrators of the church properties that to their possession, and
which they hold in trust for the church. Moreover, upon the death of
the administrator, the properties pass on to his successor in office
and not to his legal heirs.
The framers of the Constitution did not have in mind the
religious corporation when they provided for the 60% capital
requirement. Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended
for corporation sole, it is obvious that the corporation sole could not
be regulated or restricted by said provision.
Being mere administrator of the temporalities or properties
titled in his name, the constitutional provision requiring 60%
Filipino ownership is not applicable. The said constitutional
provision is limited by its terms to ownership alone and does not
extend to control unless the control over the property affected has
been devised to circumvent the real purpose of the Constitution.
Even if the question of nationality be considered, the 60%
constitutional requirement is fully met considering that the
constituents of the Corporation Sole is composed of an
overwhelming majority of Filipinos. It is the nationality of the
constituents and not that of the administrator that should be taken
into consideration.
J.G. Summit v. CA
A mutual agreement of right of first refusal between two
parties in JVA, one party being the Filipino owning 60% and the
other the alien owning 40%, does not constitute a violation of the

Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino

corporations.
It can be said that if the foreign shareholdings of a
landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign
stockholders ownership of the shares which is adversely affected
but the capacity of the corporation to own land that is the
corporation becomes disqualified to own land.
No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a
landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed
foreign equity in the Constitution. What the law disqualifies is the
corporation owning land this is the effect of more than 40%
foreign equity.
The constitutional prohibition applies only to LAND. It
does not extend to real property as defined under Article 415 of the
civil code.
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if
wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987
Constitution continues the prohibition and only allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain through
lease.
This case is different from Director of Lands v. IAC [146
SCRA 509 (19860], because the corporation in that case acquired
the land when it was already private land. The OCEN possession of
alienable land for the period prescribed by law ipso jure
transformed the land from public land to private land.

The Director of Lands doctrine is not applicable to this case

because it has not been proven that when TAN acquired the
property, its predecessors had already satisfied the PLA of OCEN
and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Therefore, when TAN acquired the property it was still
public land.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to
file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation
must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested
right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his
OCEN and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for at
least 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Moreover, the length of possession of the Corporation
cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 year acquisitive
prescriptive period.
RA 9176 extended the period for filing judicial applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until December
31, 2020.
C. Condominiums
1. Condominium Corporation Owns the Land
Transfers to aliens of a condominium unit may be made only up to the point where
the concomitant transfer of membership or stockholding in the condominium
corporation would not cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed 40% of
its entire capital stock. (Sec 5, Condominium Act)
2. Corporation Leases the Land
Any corporation which is owned 100% by a foreign firm may establish a
"condominium corporation" under R.A. No. 4726 and set up a condominium project
on land leased for a period not to exceed (50) years. (DOJ Opinion 1973)
Foreign Investors may lease private lands for a period not exceeding fifty (50) years,
renewable once for a period of not more than twenty- five (25) years, provided that

the the leased area shall be used solely for the purpose of the investment, and
provided further that the leased premises shall comprise such area as may
reasonably be required for the purpose of the investment subject however to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and the Local Government Code. (Sec. 4,
Investors Lease Act)
3. Land is Co-owned by the Unit Owners
Where the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of
separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed
or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens, or corporations at least 60% of
the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of hereditary
succession. (Sec. 5, Condominium Act)
Only citizens of the Philippines, as individuals, may acquire both private lands and
lands of the public domain. Therefore, there can be no joint ownership of such lands
between Filipinos and foreign investors as individuals.

IV. Original Registration

A. Possession
Applicants who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These persons shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Sec. 14(1), P.D.
1529 and Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141)
Republic v. Hanover
An applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under PD 1529, sec 14(1) in relation to CA 141, sec 48(b) must
prove that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain AND that they have been in OCEN possession
and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Here, the applicant is not entitled to registration because it

had not proven possession since 1945, but had only proven such
since 1965.
Martinez v. CA
When the conditions under 48(b) of CA 141 are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law,
a right to a grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land, therefore ceases to be of the public domain, and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens Title.
Aranda v. Republic (Aug 2011)
The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides
for original registration of land in an ordinary registration
proceeding. Under Section 14(1) thereof, a petition may be granted
upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property
in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic***
Applicants under 14(1) of PD 1529 in relation to sec 48(b)
of CA 141 acquire ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession. It is sufficient
that the land be declared alienable and disposable at the time of the
filing for the application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
and the land need not be alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession.
B. Prescription

Applicants who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code. (Sec. 14(2), P.D. 1529) Possession has to be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (Article 1118, NCC).
Ownership is acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith. (Article 1137, NCC)

(approval of the IPRA) shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title (Sec. 48(c), C.A. 141 and Sec. 12, IPRA).

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic***

The option to register granted under the IPRA must be exercised within twenty (20)
years from October 29, 1997. (Sec. 12, IPRA)

Said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and

actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes,
Lands of the Public Domain are outside the commerce of man and consequently including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby
cannot be acquired through prescription.
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

Under 14(2) of PD 1529, applicants acquire ownership of

the lands through prescription in the Civil Code. However, the
applicants may only acquire patrimonial lands of the public domain,
which only become such after they have been declared alienable
and disposable and there must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Only when the land has
become patrimonial property can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

D. Registration Process and Requirements

1. Jurisdiction
The RTC of the province or city where the land is situated shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands. An
application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s
provided they are situated within the same province or city. (Sec. 17 and 18, P.D.
1529).

The MTC exercises delegated jurisdiction only over original cadastral or land
registration cases where either the subject matter is an uncontested lot or if contested
1. Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application the value of the lot should not exceed P100,000.00. (Sec. 34, B.P. 129). Matters
subsequent to the original registration by the MTC are to be determined by RTC.
jointly.
(OCA Circular No. 38-97)
2. If the applicant is not a resident of the Philippines, he shall file with his
2. Evidence
application an instrument in due form appointing an agent upon whom service shall
be made.
The applicant shall file together with the application all original muniments
of
titles
or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Land
3. Applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect through possession shall not
Registration
Authority. (Sec. 17, P.D. 1529)
extend beyond December 31, 2020.
Other Notes:

C. Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples

Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years prior to October 29, 1997

Republic v. Guinto-Aldana
Section 17 denotes that it is imperative in an application for
original registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside
from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a
copy of the duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be

registered. The survey plan is indispensible as it provides a

reference on the exact identity of the land.
The submission of a duly executed blueprint of the survey
plan and a duly executed technical description of the property,
operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement of
ascertaining the identity of the lots.
Submission of the original tracing cloth plan is no longer
mandatory in original registration of title.
Director of Lands v. Rivas
The Spanish titles informacion possessoria and
composicion gratuita can no longer be used as bases for application
for registration because PD 892 discontinued their use as titles of
ownership.
Evangelista v. Santiago
Petitioners failed to establish legal or equitable title to the
land. Spanish titles can no longer be presented as proof of
ownership whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action
to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Republic v. Feliciano
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion
possessoria held by respondent had been converted into a record of
ownership. Such title, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie
evidence of possession.
Director of Lands v. CA

The classification, delimitation and survey of lands of the

public domain are vested in the President upon
recommendation of the Secretary of the DENR. (Sec. 6, C.A.
141) The assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes
is vested in the Secretary of the DENR.

Court erred in disregarding the certification of the Bureau

of Foresty that the land became alienable and disposable only in
1961.
Tottoc v. IAC
The mere classification or certification made by the Bureau
of Forestry that a part of the public domain is timberland is not
controlling in all cases especially when no actual verification was
made prior to the issuance of the certification. As opposed to onthe-spot relocation surveys.
De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel
Tax declarations are not proofs of ownership. It is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership or an indicium of possession in
the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.
Vda. De Raz v. CA
Tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership unless they are supported by other effective proof.
A belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the
applicant had no real claim of ownership of the subject land prior to
the declaration and where there are serious discrepancies in the tax
declarations, as in this case, registration should be denied.
Republic v. Guinto-Aldana
In relation to PD 1529, Section 14(1) - The law speaks of
possession and occupation. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the
law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words OCEN, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of

acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally

exercise over his own property.
Tax declarations are a good indication of possession in the
concept of an owner. These documents at least constitute proof that
the holder has a claim of title over the property. And a tax
declaration also announces his adverse claim over the land
South City Homes v. Republic
Tacking of possession is allowed only when there is privity
of contract or relationship between the previous and present
possessor. In the absence of such privity, the possession of the new
occupant should be counted only from the time it actually began
and cannot be lengthened by tacking it to the possession of the
former possessors.

Possession coupled with a tax declaration is a weighty

evidence of ownership and is certainly more weighty and
preponderant than a mere tax declaration alone.
3. Publication, Mailing, Posting
The notice of initial hearing shall be published once in the Official Gazette and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
The notice of initial hearing shall also be posted in a conspicuous place on each
parcel of land included in the application and also in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the municipal building of the municipality or city. (Sec. 24)
Republic v. Herbieto

South City cannot and could not tack the possession of his
predecessors to its own for the simple reason that the lands sold to it
did not include the unregistered land. Hence there was no privity
with regard to the unregistered land.

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not

affect the jurisdiction of the courts to hear and proceed with the
application for registration of the two respondents who applied for
registration on two separate lands.

The Court also mentioned that the manner of possession of

the predecessors of South City was insufficient to claim title to the
land because it was not exclusive but shared by the neighbors.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the

newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at
all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect, the MTC
failed to constructively seize the lands and acquire jurisdiction over
the applications for registration. Therefore, the orders of the court
were void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

Palali v. Awisan
A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and
through his predecessors, enjoys the presumption of ownership.
Respondent failed to prove possession of the property, her
claim rests merely on her tax declaration. But tax declarations, by
themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real
property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession,
the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. Respondents tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as
basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession of the subject
property since before the war.

4. Opposition and Default

The opposition shall state all the objections to the application and shall set
forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy
desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some other duly authorized
person. (Sec. 25)
If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court shall,
upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to
be recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. Where an appearance has

been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered against persons Upon receipt of the order, the LRC shall cause to be prepared the decree of
who did not appear and answer. (Sec. 26)
registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original
certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration.
Heirs of Lopez v. Enriquez
The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in
Failure to move to lift the default order does not give a
party standing in the case. As long as the court does not life the
order of general default, petitioners have no legal standing to file
the motion to declare void the decrees of registration issued to the
applicant.

the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title
shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the
owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where
the property is situated for entry in his registration book. (Sec. 39, P.D. 1529)
E. Remedies

Movants as mere interested parties, under sec 22 of PD

1529 are persons to whom the property subject of registration had
been transferred to.

1. New Trial/ Reconsideration

Movants as intervenors-oppositors who seek to question the

application for registration must move to lift the general order of
default.

3. Appeal

Vergel v. CA
In order to have the general order of default lifted, the
movant as intervenor-oppositor must show that his failure to timely
file an opposition is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect.
There must be an express finding of fact of the FAME by
the trial court or court of appeals. Failure to read the publication in
the official gazette or in the newspaper may in itself not be
considered as excusable neglect.

2. Petition for Relief from Judgment

4. Petition for Review of the Decree of Registration

Only a person, including the government and its branches, deprived of land, any
estate or interest therein by such decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, may
file in the proper RTC a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such
decree of registration.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

In no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent

purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent
5. Decree and Title
phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
Within fifteen days from entry of judgment, the court shall issue an order directing mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529)
the LRC to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title.
Baldoz v. Papa

A final decree of registration issued pursuant to registration

proceedings is reviewable only within one year from the entry of
the decree of registration and upon the ground of actual fraud.
Further, any petition to set aside the decree of registration
and reopen the registration proceedings must be filed in the form of
a motion in the same registration proceeding where the decree was
issued, and not in the form of a separate action like the present.
Crisolo v. CA
An oppositor who abandoned his opposition during the land
registration proceedings is not entitled to a reopening of the
proceedings by virtue of a petition for review of the decree of
registration. Such remedy is available only to persons who were
fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard.
Moreover, there must be actual or extrinsic fraud and not
intrinsic fraud to entitle one to reopen the proceedings.
Cal v. Zosa
Fraud may be actual or constructive. Actual or positive
fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive
fraud is construed as fraud because of its detrimental effect upon
public interests and public confidence, even though the act is not
done with actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon
other persons.
Fraud may also either be extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is
regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue
involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the
fraud could have been litigated therein. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the

controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the

transaction.
For fraud to justify a petition for review, it must be extrinsic
or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered.
The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court. The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of
the court.
However, a petition for review cannot be based on alleged
fraud that goes into the merits of the case and is intrinsic and not
collateral, and has been controverted and decided.
Fil-Estate Management v. Trono
An application for registration of a parcel of land already
covered by a Torrens Title is actually a collateral attack against the
Title not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title.
A Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on
the validity of title can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for the purpose.
It is too late to question petitioners titles considering that
the Certificates of Title issued have become incontrovertible after
the lapse of one year from the decree of registration.
5. Action for Reconveyance
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. (Article 1456, NCC)

Lopez v. CA

There are two kinds of implied trusts: resulting trusts and

constructive trusts.
A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by
the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of
their transaction but not expressed in the deed itself. Resulting trusts
are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and
not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are
presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.
A constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing a
direct intention to create a trust, by operation of law in order to
satisfy the demands of justice and to prevent unjust enrichment. It is
raised by equity in respect of property, which has been acquired by
fraud or where although acquired without fraud, it is against equity
that it should be retained by the person holding it.
Salao v. Salao
Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or
which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties.
A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised
or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted
sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always
to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which
is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in
the deed or instrument of conveyance.
A constructive trust is a trust raised by construction of law
or by operation of law. In a more restricted sense, a constructive
trust is a trust not created by any words, either expressly or
impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It
does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law.

No resulting trust was created in this case because there was

never any intention to create one. Neither was there a constructive
trust because the registration of the land was not procured through
fraud or mistake.
Marcopper Mining v. Garcia
There is nothing to support Marcoppers contention that an
implied or constructive trust was created in its favor. An implied or
constructive trust presupposes the existence of a defrauded party
who is the rightful owner of the disputed property. Here, aside from
the fact that petitioners predecessor never applied for a free patent,
it does not allege any relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, with the
respondent to justify the creation of a trust.
Municipality of Victorias v. CA
When respondent obtained a new TCT in her name, she had
no legal right to do so of the disputed portion of land because she
did not own such property since it had been previously sold by her
grandmother to the Municipality.
Thus, where the land is decreed in the name of a person
through fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of law
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons
from whom the property comes. The beneficiary shall have the right
to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
Torrens Title and the trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound
to execute a deed of reconveyance.
Esconde v. Barlongay
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him.

An action for reconveyance does not seek to reopen the

proceedings and set aside the decree of registration, but only to
show that the registered owner is not the real owner thereof.
Reconveyance here is not the proper remedy because there
was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of the title, nor in the
proceedings. Petitioner was had knowledge of the proceedings but
opted not to participate therein.

of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the

decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name,
to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.
An action for reconveyance does not prescribe when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.

Alamarza v. Arguelles

Khemani v. Heirs of Trinidad

The remedy of the landowner whose property has been

wrongfully or erroneously registered in the anothers name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, is not to set aside the decree,
but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice
for reconveyance of the property or if the property had passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

Action for reconveyance applies to a patent issued by the

Director of Lands, approved by Secretary of Natural Resources, and
signed by the President. The date of issuance of the patent
corresponds to the date of entry of the decree of registration in
ordinary cases.

Joaquin v. Cojuangco

An action for reconveyance based on a void contract does

not prescribe. However, if the court finds that the contract is merely
voidable, then the action is subject to prescription.

It seems that the action is for reconveyance, on the theory

that the original registered owners were administrators of the lands
and hence held them in a fiduciary capacity. And assuming this was
the case, the disabilities imposed by such relationship did not
extend to the transferees of said administrators, who acquired the
land for value and claimed adverse title in themselves.
The action for reconveyance on the theory of trust might
prosper against the trustees and provided they still hold the
property, but not as against third persons who do not occupy the
same fiduciary position.
Naval v. CA
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title, the
registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered
property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that
reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings

Bautista-Borja v. Bautista

Labiste v. Labiste

Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the

parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.
Prescription will only run from the time the express trust is
repudiated. For acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the
beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of
property held in trust it must be shown that:
1. The trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust
2. Such positive acts have been made known to the cesui que
trust
3. The evidence is clear and conclusive.

A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held in

trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration. The rule requires a repudiation to be duly
communicated to the beneficiary.
The only act that can be construed as repudiation is the
petition for reconstitution of title.
Santo v. Heirs of Lustre
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the
certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale
is virtually an action for the declaration of its [deed of sale] nullity,
which does not prescribe.
Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud
becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And
in such case, the prescriptive period applies only when there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property.
Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property,
prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an
action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
Rementizo v Heirs of Pelagia
The right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not
absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription of a period
of 10 years [obligation created by law]. And the 10 year period is
reckoned from the date of issuance of the Certificate of Title.
The title to the land was registered in 1987 and the
complaint was filed only in 1998 hence the action is barred by
prescription.

In some cases the Court had used as starting point the date
of the actual discovery of the fraud, instead of the date of issuance
of the certificate of title. In those cases, however, there were evident
bad faith, misrepresentation, and fraudulent machinations employed
by the registered owners in securing titles over the disputed lots.
Prescription of Action for Reconveyance:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Four years from knowledge if registration through fraud.

Ten years from issuance of title if registration through mistake.
Imprescriptible if trustee is in possession (Quieting of Title)
Imprescriptible if registration based on an express trust unless
repudiated.
6. Action for Damages

When the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible, the person aggrieved by such decree of registration may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible
for the fraud.
Pino v. CA
Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor
when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on
what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to
excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate.
If an action for reconveyance cannot reach an innocent
purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused the fraud or were
instrumental in depriving him of the property. And such action
prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over
the property.
7. Action against the Assurance Fund
8. Quieting of Title

Realty Sales v. IAC

The action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of
an action to remove clouds from title to real property. By asserting
its own title to the property in question and asking that Carpos title
be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-party
complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to
remove clouds from its own title.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are
they, strictly, in personam, but being against the person in respect of
the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The
judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
Mamadsual v. Moson
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if plaintiffs are in
possession of the property.
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title. It is not necessary that the plaintiff be the registered
owner of the property in question. One who has an equitable right
or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet title under
the law. Thus title can connote acquisitive prescription by
possession in the concept of an owner.
Previously, the Court considered the action to be one for
quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual
possession since time immemorial of the property in question by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while
defendants secured a certificate of title through fraud,
misrepresentation, and deceit.
Faja v. CA
The counterclaim of Faja for reconveyance of the property
has not prescribed. An action to quiet title to property in the
possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. Here, since Faja claims in

her answer with counterclaim that she with her predecessors had
been in possession for more than 30 years, her action for
reconveyance in effects seeks to quiet her title to property, hence
imprescriptible.
One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who
is in possession.
Court held here that the right to quiet title, seek
reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering the property
accrues only when the possessor is made aware of the adverse claim
and only then does the prescriptive period begin to run.
The existence of a Certificate of title is not conclusive on
the question of ownership of the land in controversy, because the
validity of such a certificate is put in issue by allegations of fraud
and misrepresentation.
Rumarate v. Hernandez
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensible
requisites must concur, namely: 1. The plaintiff has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and 2. The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Title to property is that upon which ownership is based. It is
the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest,
by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a right
to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.

Considering that Rumarate was in possession, the action to

quiet title cannot prescribe.

grantee does not, by virtue of the certificate of title alone, become

the owner of the land illegally registered.

Notwithstanding that the land should be awarded to

Rumarate, their title is imperfect and is still subject to the filing of
the proper application for confirmation of title. Its premature to
issue a certificate of title in the name of Rumarate.

The patent or title issued is void since the officer who

issued it had no authority to do so.

Caero v. UP
The petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed because
he was never [or was not able to show] in possession over the
disputed lot. On the other hand, UP was able to prove possession
through the buildings and structures which it controls and
maintains.
9. Cancellation involving Double Title
Pajomayo v. Manipon
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two
certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same
parcel of land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as
between the original parties, and in case of successive registration
where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person
holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against
the person who relies on the second certificate.
Here, Pajomayo OCT was issued in 1931 and Manipon
OCT only in 1957, hence Pajomayo OCT, and TCT thereafter
prevails.
10. Action for Reversion
Republic v. CA
If a person is able to register land which cannot be
registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands
did not have jurisdiction over the land because it is timber land, the

Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be

ordered cancelled and the cancellation may be pursued through an
ordinary action therefore. The action cannot be barred by prior
judgment of the land registration court since the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Even granting that the Director of Lands was negligent in
failing to oppose the registration, it is a well-settled rule that the
Republic is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of
its officials or agents.
Consequently, the State may still seek cancellation of the title issued
as such has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be
invoked against the State.

F. Cadastral Registration
1. Nature and Purpose
Republic vs. Vera
A Cadastral proceeding is in rem. Parties are precluded
from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final
judgment.
One of the main purposes of a cadastral proceeding is to
settle titles to lands. Anyone claiming ownership of any land so
affected should lay claim. Failure to do so authorizes the court to
declare the land public.
Heirs of Luzuriaga vs. Republic

Publication is a condition sine qua non for the RTC acting

as a cadastral court to acquire jurisdiction. Due publication is
required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and
identity of the property to be surveyed.
And any additional territory or change in the area cannot be
included by amendment without new publication.
But where the identity of the land and area of the claimed
property is not the subject of the amendment but other collateral
matters, new publication is not needed.
Veranga vs. Republic
No publication, then the decision is void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
2. Jurisdiction
Duran vs. Olivia
A piece of land, registered through a homestead patent
under the land registration act cannot be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding and any title issued thereon is null and void.
Cadastral court has no jurisdiction over registered land.
Manotok Realty vs. CLT Realty

name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title already

issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to
impair his substantial rights.
3. When Filed?
When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines public interest so requires
that title to any unregistered lands be settled and adjudicated, he may order the
Director of Lands to cause to be made a cadastral survey of the lands. (Sec. 35(a),
P.D. 1529)
When the lands have been surveyed or plotted, the Director of Lands, represented by
the SolGen, shall institute original registration proceedings by filing the necessary
petition in the RTC of the place where the land is situated against the holders,
claimants, possessors, or occupants of such lands or any part thereof, stating in
substance that public interest requires that the title to such lands be settled and
adjudicated and praying that such titles be so settled and adjudicated. (Sec. 36, P.D.
1529)
4. Judgment and Decree
All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in
favor of the persons entitled to the lands or to parts thereof and such decrees shall be
the basis for issuance of original certificates of title in favor of said persons and
shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for
registration of land under ordinary land registration proceedings. (Sec. 38, P.D.
1529)

Jurisdiction of Cadastral Court is limited to:

1. Technical errors in the description of the lands provided they do
not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner and
cannot operate to deprive the registered owner of his title.
2. Determine between 2 parties who has a better right over the
property or which of the conflicting titles should prevail
3. Upon request of the registered owner, the cadastral court can
issue new title.
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the
registration of land, already issued in the name of a person, in the

V. Subsequent Registration
A. Nature and Effects
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration
shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where
the land lies. (Sec. 51)

Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or

entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering. (Sec. 52)
Primary Entry Book. Each RD shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon
payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all
instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book
the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they
were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it
refers, shall bear the same date. (Sec. 56)
Carry-Over. If, at the time of any transfer, subsisting encumbrances or annotations
appear in the registration book, they shall be carried over and stated in the new
certificate or certificates, except so far as they may be simultaneously released or
discharged. (Sec. 59)
Campillo v. CA
A sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private
transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally
effective against third persons only from the date of its registration.
Under the Torrens System, registration is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
A bona fide purchaser for value of such property at an
auction sale acquires good title as against a prior transferee of same
property if such prior transfer was unrecorded at the time of the
auction sale.
Heirs of Marasigan v. IAC
A prior deed of sale registered only after the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens will not defeat the right of the plaintiff, who
caused the annotation of the annotation of the notice, who
subsequently obtains a favorable judgment.

The first buyer who is late in registering the sale is bound

by the outcome of the litigation since registration is operative act
which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Prior to the
registration of the sale, it did not bind third persons.
Garcia v. CA
The general rule is that in case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,
whether the land comprised in the later certificate be wholly, or only
in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. And in successive
registration, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest.
The maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who
is first in time is preferred in rights) is followed in land registration
matters.
In cases of involuntary registration, an entry in the day
book [primary entry book] is a sufficient notice to all persons even
if the owners duplicate certificate of title is not presented.
In case of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner
and the holder of the certificate of title, the moment he presents a
notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day
book and at the same time the owners duplicate certificate of title is
presented or surrendered, and pays the fees.
Mingoa v. Land Registration Administrator
The date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp or
registry receipt, of an instrument to the RD for purposes of
registration should be considered the date of filing and receipt
thereof by the RD. It is this date that should be entered in the
primary entry book of the RD, which shall be regarded as the date
of its registration.
Rodriguez v. CA

The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage is a

voluntary instrument and as such registration is the operative act to
convey and affect the land.
Section 55 of PD 1529 requires the presentation of the
owners duplicate certificate of title for the registration of any deed
or voluntary instrument.
The reason for requiring the production of the owners
duplicate is that, being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to
be presumed that he is interested in registering the instrument and
would willingly surrender his duplicate in order to accomplish such
registration.
However, where the owner refuses to surrender the
duplicate, the grantee may file an adverse claim in the RD.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
the law, and serves notice and warning to third parties.
Here, no effort was made to secure the duplicate from the
mortgagee who was in possession of the TCT. And moreover since
the instrument is a registerable instrument and no justifiable reason
was shown why the deed could not be registered, the remedy of
adverse claim cannot substitute for registration.
B. Voluntary Dealings
No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the
owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases
expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.
(Sec. 53)
C. Involuntary Dealings
1. Attachments
2. Suits, Judgments, Decrees

3. Foreclosure
4. Adverse Claim
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement under
oath setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner,
the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. Before or after the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim
may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by
filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Sec. 70)
Arrazola v. Bernas
An adverse claimant must be one who claims any right or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent ot the original registration. That interest is registerable
as an adverse claim if no other provision is made for its registration.
The claim of a person that she has hereditary rights in the
land fraudulently registered in her sisters name because the land
belonged to their mother, whose estate is pending settlement in a
special proceeding, is a registerable as an adverse claim. And even
though the will is yet pending probate.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title to
the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the

controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction

regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Alfredo v. Borras
When ownership or title passes to the buyer, the seller
ceases to have any title to transfer to any third person. If the seller
sells the same land to another, the second buyer who has actual or
constructive knowledge of the prior sale cannot be a registrant in
Good Faith. Such second buyer in BF cannot defeat the first buyers
title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may
seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
Here, the adverse claim on the land was registered on Feb 8.
And the sale, as shown on the deeds of sale, was dated Feb 22.
Hence the 2nd buyers are charged with constructive notice of the
adverse claim and the defect in the title of the sellers.
Leonardo v. Maravilla
An adverse claim does toll the running of the prescriptive
period to demand for specific performance based on a contract of
sale.
The procedure for registration of voluntary instruments is
provided for by law. But where the vendor refuses to deliver to the
vendee the owners duplicate certificate of title, which title must be
presented in order that the deed of conveyance may be registered
and the corresponding TCT may be issued, the vendee may file an
adverse claim.
The adverse claim here was ineffective because for an
adverse claim to be valid it must be shown that a demand was made
on the vendor and that he refused to surrender the owners duplicate
certificate of title.
Sajonas v. CA

The cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to

render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain
annotated and continue as a lien on the property.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the
validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the
adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue
where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or
revoked, all for the purpose of determine the existence of any
encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in
line with the effect that no second adverse claim shall be registered
by the same claimant after cancellation.
Ching v. Enrile
An adverse claim remains effective even after the lapse of
the 30-day period as long as it isnt cancelled.
Where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest,
which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same
land, his knowledge of that prior interest has the effect of
registration as to him.
Here, petitioners adverse claim is annotated at the back of
the title coupled with the fact that they are in possession of the
disputed property. These circumstances should have put Enrile on
guard and required him to ascertain the property being offered to
hem has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior
innocent buyers.
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put
a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor.
Moreover, regardless of the non-registration of the deed of
sale and the 30-day effectivity of the adverse claim, Enrile was
constructively notified of the prior sale because the adverse claim

was readily perceivable as an annotation on the dorsal part on

Memorandum of Encumbrances.
5. Lis Pendens
VI. Non-Registrable Properties
A. Inalienable Lands of the Public Domain
B. Lands already registered under the Torrens System.
VII. Innocent Purchaser For Value
The RTC shall not entertain a petition for review of the decree of registration where
an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529)
Guaranteed Homes v. Heirs of Valdez [577 SCRA 441]
It is basic that a person dealing with registered property
need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his
predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of registration is the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons
are concerned, it follows that where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of
the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.
It is enough that petitioner had examined the latest
certificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of the
immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not
bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of
the person from whom he had purchased the property.
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement
was a forgery, the Court still has to uphold the title of petitioner.

The case law is that although generally a forged or fraudulent deed

is a nullity and conveys no title, there are instances when such a
fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. And one
such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained
that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.
For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the
certificate.
Clemente v. Razo [452 SCRA 769]
Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens
certificate of title, in the absence of any suspicion, is not obligated
to look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller
appearing on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.
However, when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the
lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or
arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the
face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can
neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of
the law.
Cabuhat v. CA [366 SCRA 176]
Just as an innocent purchaser for value, a mortgagee may
rely on what appears on the face of the Torrens title. And when an
innocent mortgagee acquires rights over the mortgaged property, the
court cannot disregard such rights which must be respected and
protected.

A mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the

certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as security
and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no
obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the
mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title
to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is
nonetheless entitled to protection.
San Roque v. Republic [532 SCRA 493]
The adverse claim of the Republic by virtue of the
expropriation proceedings will not defeat the rights of San Roque
which acquired the subject lot for value and free from any lien and
without knowledge of the Republics adverse claim.
The Republics claim may have given San Roques
predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subject
properties. However, prior to the acquisition by San Roque, the lot
had been subdivided and covered by separate titles of the
subsequent transferees. These titles, which includes the subject
properties, have not been voided at the time of the sale to San
Roque. As such San Roque acquired good title, having purchased
them in good faith and for value and without notice of the sellers
defect of title, if any.
Estate of Yujuico v. Republic [537 SCRA 513]
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to
innocent purchasers for value and the government did not undertake
any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.
Where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who
relied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be cancelled
and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we ruled that
it is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to
innocent purchasers for value.

While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of

the public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by
laches or estoppel. Section 32, PD 1529 recognizes rights of
innocent purchasers over and above the interests of the government.
Estate of Olaguer v. Ongjoco [563 SCRA 373]
According to the provisions of Art. 1874 of the civil code,
when the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is made
through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing.
Absent this requirement, the sale shall be void. Also under Art 1878,
a SPA is necessary in order for an agent to enter into a contract by
which ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired, either
gratuitously or for value.
Here, the good faith of Ongjoco hinges on the existence of
the written power of attorney.
While the law requires a SPA, the GPA was sufficient as the
agent was expressly empowered to sell any of the principals
properties. Even if a document is designated as GPA, the
requirement of SPA is met if there is a clear mandate from the
principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act. The
SPA can be included in the general power when the act or
transaction for which the special power is required is specified
therein.
Exceptions to the IPV:
Sanchez v. Quinio [463 SCRA 471]
It is a settled rule that when two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in
part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive
registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land,
the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against
a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.

As between two persons both of whom are in good faith

and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and
prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a
vendor bereft of any transmissible rights.
Torres v. CA
Moreover, even if we grant Mota the status of an innocent
mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a
forged instrument may become the root of a valid title, cannot be
applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate
of title covering the same interest in a realty. The doctrine would
apply rather when the forger thru insidious means obtains the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and
subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder
for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the
owner (Sec. 55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner
holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be
indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocent
holder's. Prior tempore potior jure

Double Sales requires the second buyer to acquired the

immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.
Constructive notice to the second buyer through registration
under Act 3344 [which governs the registration of all instruments of
land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens
System] does not apply if the property is registered under the
Torrens.
Coronel v. IAC [155 SCRA 270
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the
Torrens System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true
owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a
title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or
oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens
systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the
owner of the lands illegally included.
The buyer does not own the land mistakenly included in the
TCT issued to him.

Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera

Private Development v. CA [475 SCRA 591]

Between two buyers of the same immovable property

registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership
priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first
possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if
the property is not registered under the Torrens system.

Concededly, a person, be he a buyer or mortgagee, dealing

with a titled property, as the exterior lot is, is not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the covering title itself.
Unfortunately for petitioner PDCP, however, the aforementioned
rule does not apply to banks.

Since the land was already registered under the Torrens

System, the registration of the sale to Abrigo under Act 3344 was
not effective to bind the land for purposes of Double Sales.
Registration must be done in the proper registry to bing the land.
On the other hand, the registration of De Vera under the
Torrens system should prevail over that of Abrigo considering the
registration was done in good faith.

Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in

dealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, for their
business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money
belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss
by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of
good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of
land registration statute, Act 496, extended only to purchasers for
value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same
character and description.

Tio v. Abayata [556 SCRA 175]

The rule has always been that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
However, where the land sold is in the possession of a
person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the
certificate of title and make inquiries concerning the actual
possessor. A buyer of real property which is in possession of
another must be wary and investigate the rights of the latter.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer cannot be said to be in
good faith and cannot have any right over the property.
Tio were without actual knowledge of the claim of Abayata,
which was not discoverable by them, after examining the title, its
annotations and after an inspection of the property. The Bank led
them to believe that the possessors were mere squatters on the land.
Tio is entitled to the status as innocent purchasers for value.
Expresscredit Financing v. Velasco [473 SCRA 570]
To fulfill the requirement of good faith, it is imperative for
a mortgagee of the land, in the possession of persons not the
mortgagor, to inquire and investigate into the rights or title of those
in possession. It is true that a person dealing with the owner of
registered land is not bound to go beyond the certificate of title. He
may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on the property
annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any annotation.
However, we note that the Garcia spouses are unlike other
mortgagors. They are in the business of constructing and selling
townhouses and are past masters in real estate transactions. Further,
petitioner is in the business of extending credit to the public,
including real estate loans. In both these businesses, it devolves
upon both, greater charge than ordinary buyers or encumbrancers
for value, who are not in such venture. It is standard in their
business, as a matter of due diligence required of banks and

financing companies, to ascertain whether the property being

offered as security for the debt has already been sold to another to
prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. They also have the
resources to ascertain any encumbrances over the properties they
are dealing with.
Here, EFC through its agents who made an ocular
inspection were already informed of the previous sale of the land to
Velascos but despite knowledge of the unregistered sale still
accepted the mortgage. EFC was a mortgagee and purchaser in bad
faith.
Francisco v. CA [153 SCRA 330]
There were in a word sufficiently strong indications to
impel a closer inquiry into the location, boundaries and condition of
the two (2) smaller lots embraced in the purchase on the part of
Casimiro Espiritu and his co-vendees. That inquiry is in truth
dictated by common sense, expected of a man of ordinary prudence.
"The earth," it has been said, is "that universal manuscript open to
the eyes of all. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty his
first duty is to read this public manuscript, that is, to look and see
who is there upon it, and what are his rights.
Had that inquiry been made, the adverse claim of Candido
Francisco over the two (2) small lots would have immediately come
to light, and the controversy would have died a-borning The
Espiritus failure to undertake such an inquiry precludes their
successful invocation of the character of purchasers in good faith.
"A want to caution and diligence which an honest man of ordinary
prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases is, in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith." The buyer who could
not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in
the adverse possession of another, is a buyer in bad faith, such
knowledge being equivalent to registration.
Sarmiento v. CA [470 SCRA 99]

Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser may be considered

a purchaser in good faith when he has examined the latest certificate
of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts
that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go
beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it.
Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately ignores a
significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value.
Where, as in this case, the land sold is in the possession of a
person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond
the certificate of title to make inquiries concerning the rights of the
actual possessor. Failure to do so would make him a purchaser in
bad faith.
Lepanto Consolidated v. Dumyung [89 SCRA 532]
A certificate of title is void when covers property of the
public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And
any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.
A transferee can set up the defense of IPV but the applicant
himself cannot.
Abad v. Guimba [465 SCRA 356]
The law requires a higher degree of prudence from one who
buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the
land object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys
from the registered owner does not need to look behind the
certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all
factual circumstances necessary for one to determine if there are
any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in the capacity to transfer
the land. The same rule applies to mortgagees.
Here, Abad the mortgagee failed to inquire into the
authority of dela Cruz to mortgage the property. And even if dela

Cruz pretended to be Guimba, Abad failed to inquire into the

identity of the person he was dealing with. Abad is in Bad Faith.
(Note: To be considered as an IPV, the seller must be the
registered owner himself.)
Orduna v. Fuentebella [June 29, 2010]
Basic is the rule that a buyer of a piece of land which is in
the actual possession of persons other than the seller must be wary
and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise,
without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in
good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty
is to read the public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is there
upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence
which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to
exercise in making purchases is, in contemplation of law, a want of
good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the
land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in
bad faith.
Here, the subsequent purchasers failed to make any
inquiries into the possession of Orduna, which if they did they
would have discovered the adverse claim of Orduna. They cannot
be considered purchasers in good faith.
Erena v. Querrer-Kauffman [492 SCRA 298]
Indeed, a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the
certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as security
and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no
obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the
mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title
to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is
nonetheless entitled to protection.
This doctrine presupposes, however, that the mortgagor,
who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already succeeded
in obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his name and that,

after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property

to another who relies on what appears on the said title. The innocent
purchaser (mortgagee in this case) for value protected by law is one
who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the
registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly
states.
Such is not the situation of petitioner, who has been the victim of
impostors pretending to be the registered owners but who are not

said owners. The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith does not apply
to a situation where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner
and the mortgagor is a different person pretending to be the owner.
In such a case, the mortgagee is not an innocent mortgagee for
value and the registered owner will generally not lose his title.