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Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are
not
inofficious
[a will inconsistent with the moral duty and natural affection of the
testator, especially one denying the legitimate heirs the portions of the estate to which they are legally entitled].
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual [efficacious], without prejudice to the right of
representation. (814a)
Art. 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any;
if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs. (1080a)
Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be
fully satisfied. (815)
Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not
one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a)
A.
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors, Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, Jr. all surnamed Reyes y Barretto, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUCILA
MILAGROS BARRETTO DATU, Defendant-Appellant.
Recto Law Offices, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates, for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; ARTICLE 1081 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1889 (then in force) CONSTRUED. Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force)
provided that "a partition in which a person was believed to be an heir without being so, has been included, shall be null and void." Based on this
Article, the lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of B.B. to be null and void ab
initio because the distributee, S.B., was not a daughter of the decedent. HELD: Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the
present case by the lower court. S.B. had been instituted heir in the late decedents last will and testament together with M.B., decedents daughter;
hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not
null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction
between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one
of the heirs expressly named in his testament, for B.B. was at a liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
2.
ID.; LEGITIME; ALLOTMENT OF SMALLER SHARE THAN LEGITIME DOES NOT INVALIDATE INSTITUTION OF HEIR. While the share (1/2)
assigned to S.B. impinged on the legitime of M.B., S. B. did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of B.B. Nor does the fact that M.B.
was allotted in her fathers will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of S.B. as heir, since there was here no preterition, or
total omission of a forced heir.
3.
ID.; COMPROMISE ON CIVIL STATUS PRESUPPOSES SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSY THROUGH MUTUAL CONCESSION OF PARTIES.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of S.B. This view is erroneous, since a
compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties, and the condition of S.B. as daughter
of the testator, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be no compromise over issues
not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that
should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
4.
ID.; PARTITION; JUDICIAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION; ITS EFFECT. Independently of a project of partition which is merely a proposal for
distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled; and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the
distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal;
but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant.
5.
ID.; ID. Even without the (questioned) project of partition the distribution could stand since it was in conformity with the probated will of the
deceased, against the provisions whereof no objection had been made.
6.
ID.; JUDICIAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION; MINORITY OF HEIR DOES NOT IMPLY THAT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTER
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION. That M. B. was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply
that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution.
7.
ID.; ID.; PROBATE PROCEEDING; NATURE OF. The proceeding for probate is one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons
interested, through the publication of the notice and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them. A final order of distribution
of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees.
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE. The only instance in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is a) when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or b) through mistake or c) inadvertence not imputable
to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
Page 1 of 44
ID.; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; SUIT BASED ON FRAUD SHOULD BE BROUGHT WITHIN 4 YEARS FROM ITS DISCOVERY. Granting that
there was fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.
10. ID.; GUARDIAN; WAIVER OF RIGHTS BY GUARDIAN DOES NOT BIND HIS WARDS. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an
act of disposition and not of administration, cannot bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court.
DECISION
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes
and ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto Datu, the properties received by his deceased wife under the terms
of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share of plaintiffs wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of
plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors.
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991,
57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of
plaintiffs wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and
nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, abovementioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerardo. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in
her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of Partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took
immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo
died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both
surnamed Barretto, as her heirs, and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later
will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court
held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court,
which affirmed the same. 1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of
the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half
portion thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties
willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking
the validity, not only of the project of partition but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
The Lucia contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire
any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor."
Finding for the Lucia (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because
the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The
nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows:
"A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void."
The Court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one- third (1/3) of his estate
under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as
defendant Lucia was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latters children and successors, all the
properties received by her from Bibianos estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that
property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion,
the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the project of partition previously
mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barrettos counterclaim. However, it denied defendants prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal
interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is
obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barrettos last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence,
the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and
void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between
forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of
the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose. While the share (1/2) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary
heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was
here no preterition, or total omission, of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri v. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case
involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testators former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code.
This view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil
Page 2 of 44
Nuguid v. Nuguid
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.]
REMEDIOS NUGUID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID,Oppositors-Appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for Petitioner-Appellant.
Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for oppositors-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PROBATE OF WILL; COURTS AREA OF INQUIRY LIMITED TO EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILL; WHEN COURT MAY RULE ON INTRINSIC
VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrixs testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed the by law. In the case at bar, however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before this Court on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. The result would
be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical considerations induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the
provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy awaiting solution.
2. SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; OMISSION OF NAMES OF FORCED HEIRS. The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending time her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether. Said
will rather than he labelled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
3. ID.; ID.; PRETERITION DISTINGUISHED FROM DISINHERITANCE. Preterition "consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because the are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." (Neri, Et. Al. v. Akutin, at al., 72 Phil., p. 325.) Disinheritance; in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of heir
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law," 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8,
citing cases.) Disinheritance is always "voluntary" ; preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary." (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de
Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volume 20, p. 1131.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS FLOWING FROM PRETERITION AND DISINHERITANCE. The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code "shall annul the institution of heir. "This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in
the case of preterition. (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961. Edition, p. 172.) Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
6. ID.; ID.; WHEN LEGACIES AND DEVISES MERIT CONSIDERATION. Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 of the Civil Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition
would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must he, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED LEGACY. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited
are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
extent of said legitimes. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of
heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions
contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by
Article 817 of the same code.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Page 4 of 44
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ
and ROSA DIONGSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985
(Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72)
denying respondents (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby
ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB. No special pronouncement is made as to costs."
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late
Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB (Rollo, p. 29), on
the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion,
Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27)
with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial
rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the
testators property, the will provided:
"THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be
given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN, Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my
brother Segundo Acain predeceases me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share
shall be given by me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose all surnamed Acain."
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in
Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB.
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of the deceased and the latters widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has
no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
(Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11,
1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Courts decision on December 18,
1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986
(Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the
intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to
preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their
omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET ERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
Page 7 of 44
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, v. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D.
SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the
nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 98 90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio'Santos as special administrator and guardian
ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the
estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one
of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is
found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99 93396, was filed by petitioners before the
RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98 90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maLiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang panganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa
akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni
Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Page 9 of 44
When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2)
When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3)
When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4)
When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(5)
A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6)
(8)
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic
will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. 10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law,
must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It
is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned asKasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to
be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in
the Court's opinion, Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999,
are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio.
The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
II.
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871)
A.
BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDES,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF
DOA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, Respondents.
Eligio G. Lagman and Roberto A. Gianzon for Petitioner.
Teves, Campos, Mendoza and Hernandez Baizas, Alberto and Association, Macias and Achos for private-respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Page 12 of 44
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; RESERVA TRONCAL; NATURE. Resersa troncal is also called lineal, familiar, extreordinaria o semitroncal. It is provided for in Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code now article 891 of the Civil Code. In reserva ironcal, (1) a descendant inherited or
acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) who belong to the line from which the property came.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSMISSION INVOLVED. The three transmissions involved are: (1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which
two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor
to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Toneas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9). If there are only two
transmissions there is no reserva.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS INVOLVED. The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the
reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (ltnea o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIVES CONSIDERED RESERVEES. The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodrigues v. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.
1098; Chua v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-2990l, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included
(Jardin v. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392). First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their
parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid or to prevent persons who are strangers to the family from
acquiring, by some chance or accident, property which otherwise would have remained with the same family "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos sedularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras", or
"impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas extraas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella" (6 Castan
Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PREPOSITUS DEFINED. Prepositus or the person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the
one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 190).
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NEAREST RELATIVE EXCLUDE THE MORE REMOTE. Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura v. Baldovino, 104
Phil. 1065).
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP CONTEMPLATED. Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GRATUITOUS TITLE DEFINED. Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donation and succession (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th. Ed.,
1951, p. 360).
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS CREATED BY RESERVA. The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely: (I) the death
of the ascendant reservor (reservista) obliged to reserve; and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came (Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RESERVORS TITLE. The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to
the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the time o the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when
the reservees predecease the reservor (Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279). "The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatorios that
survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property." (J.B.L. Rayes in Cano v.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5).
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESERVORS TITLE COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE VENDEE A RETRO OR TO A FIDEICOMISO CONDICIONAL. The
reservors title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional. The reservors alienation
of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservors death, there are reservees, the
transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the reservors death, the transferees title would
become absolute (Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664: Gueco v. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono v. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RESERVEES TITLE. The reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right
would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute [inchoate, expectant or contingent right] should the reservor predecese
the reservee. There is a holding that renunciation of the reservees right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96). And there is a dictum that the reservees right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
Page 13 of 44
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting,
reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces,
and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and
the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following:
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd.,
Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of
the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael described in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
1/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero);
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena
Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Page 14 of 44
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her
daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third
share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in Legarda v. Gonzalez, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her
mothers estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties
which should be inherited by Filomena Legardas three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces and her mothers estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not
bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz v. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez. In this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six
assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda
acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y
De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzalez petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its
resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower
court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did
not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third
degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree,
the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. It was resolved in Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on
the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserva troncal, which together with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedents estate from being entailed [involved], to eliminate the
uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the
confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reservas, insofar as they
penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal institution which, according to
Manresa and Castan Tobeas, has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."
In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same
property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the
line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the
deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the
same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part I,
1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan
Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna v. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
Page 15 of 44
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin v. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos
extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras", or "impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas extraas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella" (6 Castan Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. In that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father
Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of
Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property
in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter,
Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half
portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. It was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in
the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and maternal aunts of
Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot v. Maalac, 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala v. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915;
Maghirang and Gutierrez v. Balcita, 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon v. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa v. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno v.
Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina v. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and
upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father,
Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo,
a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees . They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the
third degree from the prepositus (Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donation and succession
(Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186-189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished
if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes
v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands v.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservors title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.
The reservors alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservors death,
there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the reservors
death, the transferees title would become absolute (Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco v. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono v. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the
reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by
the purchaser (Riosa v. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco v. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservees right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance
(Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservees right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the reservor (Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservistas lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property." (J.
J.B.L. Reyes in Cano v. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
"Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their
right in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive" (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the
reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo v. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
Page 16 of 44
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at
the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and
Roces
lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legardas death.
Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not
lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva
troncal and not in accordance with the reservors holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legardas estate (Cano v.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower courts decision is reversed and set aside. It is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de
Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in
1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
B.
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre, Respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for Private Respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
DECISION
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias
Chua, Et. Al. v. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre."
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio, he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and
Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with
whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo
Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others,
the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chuas widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No.
399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo Frias Chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of
Ignacio Frias, Chua , his sons in the second marriage; By the virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28,
1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners-pro-indiviso of Lot No. 339.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After his death, is mother Consolacion de la
Torre succeeded to his pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399
was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending
line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage
and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the
complaint a quo 3 (subsequently segregated as distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias Chua but
which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latters death, be declared as reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to
reserva troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil code. Private respondent SUSANA DE LA TORRE as administratrix of the estate of the
Consolacion de la Torre and the heirs of the latter traversed individually the complaint of petitioners. 4
On July 29, 1968, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioners. Hence this instant petition.
The pertinent provision on reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have required by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came."
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to
wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died
without an issue: (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399
was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre by operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had
relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of
the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisite of reserva troncal whether the property in question as acquired by
Juanito Frias Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
"It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300
Page 18 of 44
Edroso v. Sablan
EN BANC
G.R. No. 6878
Page 19 of 44
Page 20 of 44
Page 24 of 44
Sienes v. Esparcia
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellees.
Florentino v. Florentino
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14856
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F.
MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee, v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL.,Oppositors-Appellants. JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET
AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
Ramon C. Fernandez for Appellants.
Jose B. Dealca for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. SUCCESSION; RESERVA TRONCAL; RECORD RESERVA; DEATH OF RESERVISTA; ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF RESERVEE.
Once an original certificate of title by virtue of the final decree of the land court was duly issued in the name of the reservista, subject to reserva
troncal, and subsequently the latter died, the registration court, in view of the said recorded reserva has authority under Sec. 112 of Act 496 to order the
reservatario; for the reason that the death of the reservista vested the ownership of the property in the sole reservatario troncal.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. Where, however, the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without
determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatories dispute the
property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO VEST TITLE IN RESERVE. The only requisites for the passing of the title from the reservista to the reservee are (1)
the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact the reservitario has survived the reservista.
4. ID.; ID.; RESERVATION NOT RESERVISTAS SUCCESSOR MORTIS CAUSA. The reservatario is not the reservistas successor mortis causa nor
is the reservable property part of the reservistas estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), the
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservistas lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more a life interest in the reservable
property.
5. ID.; ID.; DEATH OF RESERVISTA; RESERVATARIO AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES OWNER OF RESERVABLE PROPERTY. Upon the death of
the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.
6. ID.; ID.; RESERVABLE PROPERTY CANNOT BE TRANSMITTED MORTIS CAUSA BY RESERVISTA. The reservable property cannot be
transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa so long as a reservatario, within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
DECISION
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G. L. O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots. Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and
conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to
the above-mentioned two parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general default,
that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their
improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the
understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of Civil Code. After this
decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
Page 30 of 44
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed
MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners, v. JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS
SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO,
LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS
SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. 1chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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Banawa v. Mirano
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980
DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA ABRENICA, Petitioners, vs. PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA
MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO MIRANO, Respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
Recto Law Office for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 12, 1965 1 in CA G.R. No. 23597-R,
entitled "Primitive Mirano, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus, Doroteo Banawa, et al., Defendants-Appellants", the dispositive part of which is: chanrobles
virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendants-appellants.
The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint; chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of land to the plaintiffs; chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Maria Carmen Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza, dated April 4, 1940, as evidenced by Exhibit 'E' and its registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas, to be null and void; chanrobles virtual
law library
(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7, 1956, evidenced by Exhibit 'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza in favor of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica as well as Tax Declarations No. 26818 in the names of the spouses Doroteo
Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, and No. 26845 in the names of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, and the registration of the said
deed of donation in the registry of deeds of Batangas; and chanrobles virtual law library
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SECTION 6. Disinheritance
Art. 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes expressly stated by law. (848a)
Art. 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. (849)
Art. 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the testator, if the disinherited heir
should deny it. (850)
Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not
one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a)
Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1)
When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2)
When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3)
When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4)
When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(5)
A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6)
(7)
(8)
Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. (756, 853, 674a)
Art. 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate:
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(1)
When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their
virtue;
(2)
When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(3)
When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found to be false;
(4)
When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(5)
When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(6)
(7)
(8)
An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a reconciliation between them. (756, 854, 674a)
Art. 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:
(1)
When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants;
(2)
When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and the
accusation has been found to be false;
(3)
When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(4)
(5)
When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority;
(6)
Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse. (756, 855, 674a)
Art. 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and renders
ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made. (856)
Art. 923. The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs
with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes the
legitime. (857)
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