Metacommentary

Author(s): Fredric Jameson

Source: PMLA, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Jan., 1971), pp. 9-18
Published by: Modern Language Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/460996
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FREDRIC JAMESON

Metacommentary
IN OUR TIME exegesis,interpretation,
com-

mentary
have fallenintodisrepute:books like
Susan Sontag'sAgainstInterpretation
emphano lesscentralto modernlitersize a development
ature than to modernphilosophy,whereall the
greattwentieth-century
schools-whetherthoseof
pragmatismor phenomenology,existentialism,
or structuralism-share
a renunlogicalpositivism,
in forciationof content,find theirfulfillment
malism,in therefusalof all presuppositions
about
substanceand humannatureand inthesubstitution
of methodformetaphysicalsystem.
Whatis feltto be contentvaries,of course,with
the historicalsituation:thus the concept of a
symbolonce serveda negative,criticalfunction,
as a wedgeagainstan olderVictorianmoralizing
criticism.Now, however,along with the other
basic componentsof the new-criticalideology
such as ironyand point of view,it all too often
encouragesthe most irresponsibleinterpretation
of an ethicalor mythicaland religiouscharacter.
To namea symbolis to turnit intoan allegory,to
pronouncethewordironyis to findthatthething
itself,with all its impossiblelived tension,has
vanishedintothinair. No wonderwe feelsymbolism in the novel to be such a lie: no wonder
Williams'attack on metaphorcame as a liberation to a whole generationof Americanpoets!
The question about meaning,most frequently
expressingperplexitybeforean object described
as obscure,signalsa fatefulimpatiencewithperceptionon the part of the reader,his increasing
temptation to short-circuitit with abstract
thought.Yet just as everyidea is trueat thepoint
at which we are able to reckon its conceptual
situation,its ideologicaldistortion,back into it,
so also everyworkis clear,providedwe locatethe
angle fromwhichthe blurbecomesso naturalas
to pass unnoticed-provided,in otherwords,we
determineand repeatthat conceptualoperation,
oftenof a veryspecializedand limitedtype,in
whichthestyleitselforiginates.Thus thesentence

of GertrudeStein: "A dog that you have never

on a level of pure
had has sighed"is transparent
sentenceformation,
as paradigmaticas theoperationsof translationmachinesor transformational
grammar.But I wouldhesitateto claimthatit has
a meaning,and indeed GertrudeStein is a particularlygood example of a writerwhose characteristicmaterials--householdodds and ends,
string,boxes, lettuceleaves, cushions,buttonsdisarm modern criticismin that they neither
solicitvisualperceptionnor hauntthe mindwith
We
of depthpsychology.
thesymbolicinvestment
these sentences,but
interpret
cannot,therefore,
mentaloperations
we can describethe distinctive
a
of whichtheyare markand whichin thepresent
case (distantrelativesin thatof lonesco's mimicry
of French middle-classconversation)consist in
collagesof Americanwordsdesignedto revealin
pure syntacticalfashion,above and beyondany
individualmeanings,the peculiarflatnessof the
Americanidiom.
In mattersof art, and particularlyof artistic
in otherwords,it is wrongto wantto
perception,
what is
decide, to want to resolvea difficulty:
wantedis a kindof mentalprocedurewhichsudin an
denlyshiftsgears,whichthrowseverything
tangleone floorhigher,and turnsthe
inextricable
of thissentence)
veryproblemitself(theobscurity
into its own solution(the varietiesof Obscurity)
by wideningits framein such a way that it now
takes in its own mentalprocessesas well as the
object of those processes.In the earlier,naive
state, we strugglewith the object in question:
in thisheightened
one, we oband self-conscious
serveour own strugglesand patientlyset about
them.
characterizing
Thus, veryoftenthe urge to interpretresults
froman optical illusion: it is no doubt a fairly
naturalfirstthoughtto imaginethat thereexists
attainable,some finaland
somewhere,ultimately
readingof,say,a late sonnetof Maltransparent
larme. But veryoftenthat ultimatereading,al-

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10

Metacommentary

waysjust a hair beyondour own reach,turnsout

associatedwiththenamesofNietzsche,Marx,and
to be simplythereadingof otherpeople,thepres- Freud.
tigeof theprintedword,a kindof ontologicalinThe startingpoint forany genuinelyprofitable
feriority
therefore
mustbe not
complex. Mallarme's works exasperate discussionof Interpretation
thishopelesseffect
butthe need forit in
throughtheirverystructure,
the natureof interpretation,
in
that-wholly relational-nothingever remains thefirstplace. Whatinitiallyneedsexplanationis,
behind,even fromthe most exhaustivereading, inotherwords,nothowwe go about interpreting
a
from the most thoroughgoingfamiliarity.For
butratherwhywe shouldevenhave
textproperly,
the poet has devisedhis sentencesin such a way
must
to do so. All thinkingabout interpretation
thattheycontainno tangiblesubstancesor objects sinkitselfin thestrangeness,
of
theunnaturalness,
whichwe can substituteforthe work itself,not
the hermeneuticsituation;or to put it another
evenas a mnemonicdevice.All theapparentsym- way, everyindividualinterpretation
mustinclude
bols dissolveback into sheerprocess,whichlasts
an interpretation
of its own existence,mustshow
onlyas long as the readinglasts.Thus Mallarme its own credentialsand justifyitself:everycomshows us how the reluctanceto interpret,
on the mentary
mustbe at thesametimea metacommenpart of the critic,tends to veer around into an
taryas well.
estheticon the part of the artist,tendsto reapdirectsthe attenThus genuineinterpretation
pearin theworkitselfas thewillto be uninterpret- tion back to historyitself,and to the historical
able. So formtends to glide imperceptibly
into situationof the commentatoras well as of the
content: and Miss Sontag's book is itselfnot
work.In thislight,it becomesclearhow thegreat
exempt from the conceptual embarrassmentof
Talmudic
traditionalsystemsof hermeneutic-the
thisposition,whichbeginsbydenyingtherightsof
and the Alexandrian,the medievaland the aborall interpretation,
of all content,only to end up
tive Romanticeffort-sprangfromculturalneed
defendinga particulartype of (modernistic)art
and fromthe desperateattemptof the societyin
thatcannotbe interpreted,
thatseemsto have no
questionto assimilatemonumentsof othertimes
determinate
contentin theoldersense.
and places, whose originalimpulseswere quite
We mustapplyto theproblemofInterpretation foreignto them,and whichrequireda kindof reitselfthemethodI have suggestedfortheinterpre- writing-throughelaboratecommentary,
and by
tation of individuallyproblematicworks: not a
meansof thetheoryof figures-totake theirplace
head-on,directsolutionor resolution,but a comin the new schemeof things.Thus Homer was
mentaryon theveryconditionsof existenceof the
allegorized,and both pagan texts and the Old
problemitself.For we are all now in a positionto
Testamentitselfrefashionedto bring theminto
judge the sterility
of efforts
to devisea coherent, consonancewiththeNew.
positive,universally
valid theoryof literature,
It will,ofcourse,be objectedthatsuchrewriting
of
attemptsto workout some universalcombination is discreditedin our own time,and thatif the ingood forall timesand places byweighing
it means rethevari- ventionof Historymeans anything,
ous critical"methods":theillusionofMethodhas
of
the
past itself
spectforthe intrinsicdifference
come to seemjust as abstractand systematic
an
and of othercultures.Yet as we become a single
enterprise-inthebad sense-as theoldertheories worldsystem,
as theotherculturesdie off,we alone
of Beautywhichit replaced.'Far moreusefulfor inherittheirpastsand assumetheattemptto masour purposesis Paul Ricoeur'sdistinction,
in his
terthatinheritance:FinnegansWake,on the one
monumentalstudyof Freud (De l'interpretation, hand, and Malraux's Voices of Silence,on the
Paris: Seuil, 1965),betweena negativeand a posiother,stand as two examples-the mythicaland
tivehermeneutic:
thelatteraimingat therestora- the conceptual-of the attemptto build a syntion of some original,forgotten
meaning(which cretistic
Westernsystem.In theSocialistcountries,
Ricaeur forhis part can only conceiveof in the wherethe feelingof a consciouselaborationof a
formof accessto thesacred),whiletheformer
has
universalworldcultureand worldviewis stronger
as its essentialfunctiondemystification,
and is in
than in our own, the problemof a Marxistherthat at one withthe most fundamentalmodern meneuticposes itselfwithincreasingintensity:
let
critiquesof ideologyand illusoryconsciousness theworkof ErnstBloch standas an illustration
of

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FredricJameson
it has so far achieved.Yet our initial
everything
embarrassment
remains:forin moderntimeswhat
is not the art of other
criesout forinterpretation
culturesso muchas it is our own.
Thus it would seem thatwe are condemnedto
at thesame timethatwe feelan increasinterpret
ingrepugnanceto do so. Paradoxically,however,
does not necessarily
therejectionof interpretation
resultin anti-intellectualism,
or in a mystiqueof
the work: it has also, historically,
been itselfthe
sourceof a newmethod.I am referring
to Russian
Formalism,whose originalitywas preciselyto
have operateda crucial shiftin the distancebetweenthe literaryobject and its "meaning,"between form and content. For the Formalists
carriedthe conventionalnotion of artistictechniqueto itslogicalconclusion;in Aristotelianism,
thisconceptof techniquehad alwaysled outside
theworkof artitself,towardthe"end" or purpose
forwhichit was constructed,
towarditseffect,
towardpsychologyor anthropology
or ethics.
The Formalistsreversedthismodel,and saw the
aim of all techniquesimplyas the productionof
theworkofartitself.Now themeaningsofa work,
theeffectit produces,theworldviewit embodies
(such as Swift'smisanthropy,
Flaubert's ennui),
becomethemselves
technique:rawmaterialswhich
are therein orderto permitthisparticularworkto
come intobeing;and withthisinversionof prioritiestheworkitselfis turnedinsideout, seen now
fromthe standpointof the producerratherthan
thatof the consumer,and a criticalrevolutionis
achievedwhichbearsstriking
to what
resemblance
the "epoche" or settingof realitybetweenparenFor now
thesesdoes forHusserl'sphenomenology.
valuesofthework(its meaning,the
thereferential
or imitates)are sus"reality"it presents,reflects,
pended,and for thefirsttimethe intrinsicstructuresof thework,in its autonomyas a construction,becomevisibleto thenakedeye.
At the same time,a host of falseproblemsare
disposedof: in a classicessayon "The Makingof
Gogol's Overcoat,"for instance,Boris Eichenbaum is able to adjournpermanently
the vexing
problemof whetherGogol is to be considereda
c"romantic"
(the grotesques,the ghostat the end,
the occasional pathos in tone) or a "realist"(the
evocationof Saint Petersburg,
of poverty,of the
livesof littlepeople). For Gogol's starting
pointis
not a "visionof life,"not a meaning,but rathera

11

style,a particulartypeof sentence:he wishesto

the gestures
transposeto thelevelof the art-story
of the
techniquescharacteristic
and storytelling
traditionalRussian skaz or oral yarn(something
on theorderoftheAmericantalltale or thestories
of Mark Twain, as the Formalistswere fond of
a misconceptionto
pointingout). It is therefore
imaginethatin Gogol formis adequateto content:
on thecontrary,
itis becauseGogofwishesto work
in a particularkindof form,and to speak in the
tone of voice of the skaz, thathe casts about for
raw materialsappropriateto it, for anecdotes,
names,piquantdetails,suddenshiftsin manner.It
now becomesclearwhyneitherthegrotesquenor
thepatheticcan be seen as thedominantmode of
thestory:fortheskaz livesbytheiropposition,by
witheach other.2
theirabruptalternation
In muchthesameway,ViktorShklovskyundertook to provethatthe meaningof character,the
implicationsof apparentlymythicalfigures,resuitsfroma similarkind of optical illusion:Don
Quixoteis not reallya characterat all, but rather
an organizationaldevicewhichpermitsCervantes
to writehis book, servingas a threadthatholds a
typesof anecdotestogether
numberof different
in a singleform.(Thus Hamlet's madnessperseveralhetermittedShakespeareto piecetogether
ogeneousplot sources,and Goethe's Faust is an
excuse for the dramatizationof many different
moods: indeed, one begins to wonder whether
betweenthese
thereis not somedeepercorrelation
and theirtechnicalfuncWestern"myth"figures,
tion as a meansof holdingtogetherand unifying
large quantitiesof disparateraw material.)
Ultimately,of course,the implicationsof Formalistdoctrinespillout oftheworkintolifeitself:
for clearly,if contentexistsin order to permit
form,thenit followsthatthelivedsourcesof that
thepsychological
content-thesocial experiences,
obsessionsand dispositionsof the author-also
come to be formallymotivated,to be seen as
means ratherthan ultimateends or meanings.
".Tout,au monde,existepour aboutir'a un livre,"
radisaid Mallarme,and Formalismis a similarly
a
cal esthetizationof life: but one of relatively
artisanal variety.In an essay on
non-mystical,
"Tolstoy'sCrises,"Eichenbaumshowshow even
Tolstoy'sreligiousconversionitselfcan be considereda kindof"motivationofthedevice,"in the
sensethatit providednew materialforan artistic

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12

Metacommentarv

practiceon thepointof exhausting

itself.Thus the
writerhimselfbecomes only anotherinstrument
towardthebringingintobeingof his work.
Formalismis thus, as we have suggested,the
basic mode of interpretation
of thosewho refuse
interpretation:
at thesametime,it is important
to
stressthe factthat thismethodfindsitsprivileged
objectsin thesmallerforms,in shortstoriesor folk
tales,poems,anecdotes,in thedecorativedetailof
largerworks.For reasonsto whichwe cannotdo
justice in the presentcontext,the Formalistic
model is essentiallysynchronic,
and cannot adequatelydeal withdiachrony,
eitherin literary
historyor in the formof theindividualwork,which
is to say thatFormalismas a methodstopsshort
at thepointwherethe novelas a problembegins.
For thenovel-no longerreallya "genre"in the
traditional
sense-may be thoughtofas an attempt
to cometo termswithTime, and sinceit is a temporal process,and neverfullypresentat anypoint,
everyeffort
to graspit conceptually,
to stepback
and thinkabout it as an object, is of necessity
interpretation
beforethe fact.So thatwhat cries
out forexplanationabove all else is not so much
thatwe interpret
novels,butthatwe do notalways
feelthe needto do so: thatthereare certaintypes
of novelswhich,forwhateverreasonsof internal
structure,somehow seem self-justifying
and to
dispensewithexternalcommentary.
I'm thinking,
for example,of the classical well-madeplot, the
novel of intrigueand denouement,of whichthe
model,no doubt,remainsTomJones.
At thispoint,therefore,
we reacha secondbasic
principleof metacommentary:
namelythat the
absence of any need for interpretation
is itselfa
factthatcallsout forinterpretation.
In thenovelof
plot, in particular,the feelingof completenessis
forthefeelingof meaning:therewould
substituted
seemto be something
mutuallyexclusiveaboutthe
typeof attentionrequiredin apprehensionof the
variousstrandsof plot, and the transformational
processwherebyforthesentencesoftheindividual
work is substituteda suddenglobal feelingof a
visionof lifeof some kind.The processesof plot
resolutiontend to sink us evermore deeplyinto
the empiricaleventsthemselves,and find their
intrinsicsatisfactionin a logic immanentto the
anecdotal.Indeed,the"philosophic"effectof the
well-madeplot, if I may termit that,is firstand
foremostto persuadeus that such a logic exists:
that eventshave theirown innermeaningalong

withtheirowndevelopment,
and do nothaveto be
transformed
into images. But such "philosophic
content"is nota questionof ideas or insights,
but
rathersomethingmore along the lines of what
classicalGermanphilosophywould have called a
formalIdea, one thatworksthroughsensibleappearanceonlyand cannotbe abstractedout,cannot existin theformof thegeneralbut onlyin its
particular,sensorymode. Not as illustrationto
abstractthesis,therefore,
but ratheras experience
to the veryconditionsof experienceitself,the
novelofplotpersuadesus in concretefashionthat
human action, human life, is somehow a complete,interlocking
whole,a single,formed,meaningfulsubstance.
In the long run, of course,the source of this
livedunitylies not in metaphysics
or religion,but
in societyitself,
whichmaybe judged,at anygiven
momentof its development,
fromthe factthatit
does or does not offerraw materialssuch that
Plot can be constructed
fromthem.Thus the appearanceof a melodramatic
strainin classicalplot
(particularly
towardthe middleof the nineteenth
is a signthateventsno longercohere,that
century)
theauthorhas had to appealto Evil,to villainsand
conspiracies,to restoresome of the unityhe felt
beyondhis powerto conveyin the eventsthemselves.
For it is axiomaticthat the existenceof a determinateliteraryformalways reflectsa certain
possibilityof experiencein the momentof social
in question.Our satisfaction
withthe
development
a kind of satiscompletenessof plot is therefore
factionwithsocietyas well,whichhas throughthe
verypossibilityof such an orderingof eventsrevealed itselfto be a coherenttotality,and one
withwhich,forthe moment,the individualunit,
is notin contradictheindividualhumanlifeitself,
tion. That the possibilityof plot may serve as
of the social
something
like a proofof thevitality
fromourown
organismwe maydeduce,in reverse,
time,wherethatpossibilityis no longerpresent,
wheretheinnerand the outer,the subjectiveand
the objective,the individualand the social, have
fallenapart so effectively
thattheystand as two
incommensurable
realities,two whollydifferent
or
languages codes,two separateequationsystems
forwhichno transformational
has been
mechanism
found: on the one hand, the existentialtruthof
individuallife,which at its limitis incommunicable, and at its most universalturnsout to be

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FredricJameson
nothingmorethan the case history;and, on the
other,thatsociologicaloverviewof collectiveinstitutions
whichdeals in typesof characterwhen
it is not franklyexpressedin statisticsor probabilities.But at thetimeof theclassicalnovel,this
is notyetso; and facedwithsuchtangibledemonstrationof the way in whichindividualdestinies
interweave
and are slowly,throughtheprocessof
transformed
into the collective
theirinteraction,
substanceitselfbeforeour veryeyes,we are not
unwillingto limitourselvesforthetimeto a realabout life.For the realistic
isticmode of thinking
alwaysexcludesthesymbolic,theinterpretive:
we
can't see the,surfaceof life and see throughit
simultaneously.
Melodramais, however,onlya symptomof the
breakdownof this reality:far more significant,
fromthe point of view of literaryhistory,is the
replacementof the novel of plot withsomething
new,in theoccurrence
withwhatwe havecometo
call the psychologicalnovel. This consistsin the
substitutionof the unityof personalityfor the
unityof action; upon whichthatessential"philoof whichwe spoke above is
sophical" satisfaction
shiftedfromthefeelingof completenessof events
or permanencein timeof
to thefeelingof identity
the monad or pointof view. But thatshiftis, of
course,a qualitativeleap, whatBachelardcalled a
a kindof mutationin
"coupureepistemologique,"
our distancefromlifeand our thinkingabout it.
Whatis relevantaboutthepsychologicalnovelfor
ourpresentpurposesis thatinthenovelofpointof
view,wherelittleby littlethe action of the book
comes to coincidewiththe consciousnessof the
is once more interiorized,
hero, interpretation
immanentto the work itself,for it is now the
point-of-view
figurehimselfwho fromwithinthe
on themeaningofhis experiences,
book, reflecting
does the actualworkof exegesisforus beforeour
own eyes.
Point of view, therefore,
is somethinga little
than
sheertechniqueand expressesthe inmore
creasingatomizationof our societies,wherethe
privilegedmeetingplaces of collectivelifeand of
the intertwining
of collectivedestinies-the tavern,themarketplace,
thehighroad,thecourt,the
paseo,thecathedral,yes,and eventhecityitselfhave decayed,and withthem,thevitalsourcesof
the anecdote. The essentialformalproblem of
monadicstorytelling
is, of course,thelocationof
the proper windows: in this sense, when Jean

13

Roussetsees theveryparadigmof the novelform

La Princessede
in theact of eavesdropping-from
therebydesigClevesto Sodomeet Gomorrhe3-he
natestheessentialnarrativegestureof thepsychologicalnovel,ratherthanthatof thenovelin genthe
eral,whichcan have no paradigm.Ultimately,
social realitywnichlies behindpointof view-the
isolationand juxtapositionof closed subjectivities
of theformto
-stands revealedin theveryeffort
of
re'cits
those
through
transcenditself: think
exisindividual
of
truth
the
expressed
whichGide
in
one
roman,
to
tence,and thenofhis attempt, his
"combine"themin additivefashion,as thoughto
throughan
collectivestructure
fashiona genuinely
of thewill.
effort
Withthedeathof thesubject,of the consciousnesswhichgovernedthepointof view,the novel,
bereftof eitherunityof actionor unityof characagreed to
ter, becomes what we are henceforth
call "plotless,"and withthe plotlessnovel,interpretationreassertsits claims with a vengeance.
For once again it is a questionof sheerreading
timeitself,sheerlength:on everypage a book like
intenNaked Lunchapproachesthe hallucinatory
sityof themoviesor thedream:a kindof narcosis
of sensoryperception.But over longerstretches
themindblows itsfuses,and its abstract,patternReason,
reappearunderground:
makingfunctions
one is temptedto say, at work unconsciously,
unable to cease makingthose intricatecross-refwhichthe surfaceof
erencesand interconnections
theworkseemsto deny.
The plotlessworkthusstandsbeforeus as a kind
of rebusin narrativelanguage,a strangekind of
and analcode writtenin eventsor hieroglyphs,
at this
tales:
fairy
or
to
myth,
primitive
ogous
developed
hermeneutic,
a
new
point, therefore,
preciselyout of the studyof such privilegedobFor
jects, proposes itself:that of structuralism.
structuralism
as a methodor mode of researchis
in that it studiesorganizationrather
formalistic
than content,and assumes the primacyof the
linguisticmodel, the predominanceof language
and of linguisticstructuresin the shaping of
All thelayersor levelsof
experiences.
meaningful
only insofar
social lifeare orderedor systematic
as theyformlanguagesof theirown, in strictest
analogyto thepurelylinguistic:stylesof clothing,
economic relationships,table mannersand nationalcuisines,kinshipsystems,the publicityapthecosmological
paratusofthecapitalistcountries,

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14

Metacommentary

legendsof primitivetribes,even the mechanisms

of the Freudianmentaltopology-all are systems
of signs,based on differential
perceptions,and
governedby categoriesof exchangeand transformation.4
Structuralism
may thus be seen as one of'the
mostthoroughgoing
reactionsagainstsubstantialist thinkingin general,proposingas it does to
replace the substance(or the substantive)with
relationsand purelyrelationalperceptions.This
means,in our own terms,thatit eschewsinterpretation in the older sense, whichwas essentially
substantialistic:for just as Adam, naming the
creatures,foundeda poetryof nouns,so forthe
older formsof interpretation
symbolsare visual
nouns,whichyou translateback intotheirmeanings; and the attachmentto contentin general
may be seen as a markof beliefin substanceas
such. But when,as in structuralism,
substanceis
replacedbyrelationship,
thenthenoun,theobject,
even the individualego itself,becomenothingbut
a locus of cross-references:
not things,but differential
thatis to say,a sense of the
perceptions,
identityof a given elementwhich derivessolely
fromour awarenessof its difference
fromother
and ultimately
froman implicitcomparielements,
son of itwithitsownopposite.Thus thedominant
as a methodis theconcategoryof structuralism
cept of the binaryopposition,the notionthatall
meaningsare organized,followingthe patternof
phonology,in pairs of oppositionsor determinate
differences.
The valueof thebinaryoppositionas an instrumentof exegesismay be most strikingly
demonstrated,
perhaps,inL6vi-Strauss's
henceforth
classic
analysisof the Oedipus legends,'the episodes of
which he sorts out into paired groups of ever
wideningcomprehensiveness.
Thus, on the one
hand, struggleswithmonsters(the Sphinx,Cadmus' dragon);on theother,physicaldeformity
(as
signaledetymologically
by the namesof Oedipus
and of his forefathers);
elsewherean unnatural
intimacybetween kin which stands in evident
contrastto the murderof fathersand brothers.
These groupingsor categoriesare not,however,
empirically
derived;fortheycould scarcelyhave
beenformulated
in theabsenceofthekeymethodological presuppositionas to the essentialstructural organizationof the materialby pairs of
oppositesin thefirst
place. In a different
schemeof
things,forinstance,the Antigoneepisode might

have been understoodin contrastto the paternal

incest,as the defenseof naturallaw againstthe
unnaturalbreakingof a taboo. Here,however,the
two episodes are feltto be structurally
related;
and theirclassification
togetheris preselectedby
theinitialarrangement
of thematerialintoan oppositionof the"'overestimated
kinshiprelations,"
ofwhichtheyaretheembodiment,
withthe"'underestimated"ones of patricideand fratricide.
The interpretation
bybinaryoppositiondepends
therefore
on a processofincreasing
on
abstraction,
the evolvingof a concept"such that" otherwise
unrelatedepisodesmay be feltin its lightto be
opposed to each other,a conceptsufficiently
general to allow two relativelyheterogeneousand
contingent
phenomenato be subsumedbeneathit
as a positiveto a negative.Nowhereis thisprocess
moretransparent
of the
than in the construction
first
pair of oppositions,whereit is thecategoryof
theInhumaniin generalwhichallowsus to assimilate the Monstrousto the Deformed,whichpermits us therefore
to correlatethe slayingof the
monsters(as a triumphof man over the dark
forces)withthatphysicaldeformation
oflifewhich
marksa partialdefeatat theirhands.
Binaryoppositionis, of course,onlyone of the
heuristicinstruments
of structuralist
analysis,just
as itis onlyone aspectofthestructure
oflanguage.
It seemsto me an exceedingly
usefuldeviceforthe
explorationof enigmaticworks,such as medieval
romances,wherea stringof apparentlyarbitrary
episodes must somehow be correlatedtogether
meaningfully.
Yet when the structuralists
come
to deal withmoreconventional
literaryforms,we
findthattheconceptof binaryoppositionis subsumedunderthe analogyof discoursein general,
and thatthe standardprocedureof such analysis
is the attemptto determinethe unityof a single
workas thoughit werea singlesentenceor message. Here themostrevealingparadigm,perhaps,
is thatof Freud in the Interpretation
of Dreams,
particularlyas the unconsciousmechanismsdescribed in it have been reworkedby Jacques
Lacan intoa seriesofrhetorical
figures.6
Andlet us
also mentionhere, for completeness'sake, that
ultimatelinguisticopposition of metaphor to
metonymy,codifiedby Roman Jakobson,and
similarly
adoptedbyLacan to describethepsychic
forces.The work is thereforeanalyzable as a
communicationelaborated according to these
mechanisms,whichare the basic mechanismsof

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Fredric
Jameson
languageand of all languagesystems
or systemsof
signs.
But a sentence,of course,also has a meaning:
and to returnto Levi-Strauss'streatment
of the
Oedipus myth,we may theresurprisean imperceptibleslippagefromformintocontentwhichis
one way or anothercharacteristic
of all the other
typesof structuralist
analysisas well. For having
workedout his essentialpatternof oppositions,
Levi-Straussthen proceeds to interpretit: the
monstersare Earthdeities,or symbolsof Nature,
the human figureseitherpossessed by them or
fromthemare consequently
liberating
themselves
imagesof consciousnessor betterstillof Culture
in general:"the overevaluation
of blood relationshipis to theunderevaluation
of thelatteras the
to escape autochthony
effort
is to theimpossibility
ofdoingso."7 The mythbecomesa meditationon
oftheoppositionbetweenNatureand
themystery
culture:becomes a statementabout the aims of
culture(thecreationofthekinshipsystemand the
incesttaboo) and about itsultimatecontradiction
by thenaturalitself,whichit failsin thelong run
to organizeand to subdue.But whatI would like
to stressis not so much the overemphasison
knowledge(forLevi-Strauss,
as is wellknown,socalled primitivethoughtis a type of perceptual
science as worthyof respectas, althoughquite
different
from,our own): but ratherthe way in
whichthemythis ultimately
givena contentwhich
is none otherthan the verycreationof the myth
(Culture) itself: "myths," he says elsewhere,8
"signify
thespiritwhichelaboratesthembymeans
of the worldof whichit is itselfa part." Thus a
methodwhichbeganby seeingmythsor artworks
as languagesystemsor codes in theirown right
ends up passingover into the view thatthe very
subject matterof such works or mythsis the
emergenceof Language or of Communication,
endsup interpreting
theworkas a statement
about
language.
As a pure formalismtherefore,
Structuralism
yieldsus an analysisoftheworkofartas an equation the variablesof whichwe are freeto fillin
withwhatevertypeof contenthappensto appeal
to us-Freudian, Marxist,religious,or indeedthe
secondaryand, as it were,involuntary
contentof
Structuralism
itselfas a statement
aboutlanguage.
The distinction
wouldseemto be thatdescribedby
Hirsch9(followingFrege and Carnap) as the
meaningor Sinnof thework,itsessentialand un-

15

changingformalorganization,
and itssignificance,
or Bedeutung,
the changingevaluationsand uses
to whichit is put by itsgenerations
of readers,or
indeed,whatwe havecalledthegivingof a typeof
content,interpretation
in the more traditional
sense.But I cannotthinkthatthisliteraryagnosticismoffers
anything
morethana temporary
and
pragmaticsolutionto thedeepertheoretical
problemsinvolved.
It seemsto me thata genuinetranscendence
of
structuralism
(whichmeans a completion,rather
than a repudiation,of it) is possible only on
condition we transformthe basic structuralist
categories(metaphorand metonymy,
the rhetorical figures,
binaryoppositions)-conceivedby the
structuralists
to be ultimateand ratherKantian
formsof the mind,fixedand universalmodes of
organizingand perceivingexperience-intohistoricalones. For structuralism
necessarilyfalls
shortof genuinemetacommentary
in thatit thus
forbidsitselfall commenton itselfand on itsown
conceptualinstruments,
which are taken to be
eternal.For us, however,itis a matter,
notonlyof
solvingtheriddleofthesphinx,thatis, ofcomprehendingitas a locus of oppositions,butalso, once
thatis done,of standingback in such a way as to
apprehendthe veryformof the riddleitselfas a
literary
genre,and theverycategoriesofourunderstandingas reflections
of a particular
and determinatemomentof history.
Metacommentary
therefore
impliesa modelnot
unlikethe Freudianhermeneutic
(divested,to be
sure,of itsown specific
content,ofthetopologyof
theunconscious,
thenatureoflibido,and so forth):
onebased on thedistinction
and
betweensymptom
repressedidea, betweenmanifestand latentcontent,betweenthe disguiseand the messagedisguised.Thisinitialdistinction
alreadyanswersour
basic question:Whydoes theworkrequireinterpretationin the firstplace? by posing it forthrightly
fromtheoutset,byimplying
thepresenceof
some typeof Censorwhichthemessagemustslip
past. For traditionalhermeneutic,
that Censor
was ultimatelyHistory itself,or cultural Difinsofaras thelatterdeflected
ference,
theoriginal
force and sullied the originaltransparencyof
Revelation.
But beforewe can identify
theplace of censorshipin our own time,we mustfirstcometo terms
withthemessageitself,whichmayverylooselybe
describedas a typeof Erlebnisor expe'rience
vecue,

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16

Metacommentary

a lived experienceof some sort,no matterhow

minimalor specialized.The essentialcharacteristic
of such raw materialor latentcontentis thatit is
neverinitiallyformless,never,like theunshaped
substancesof the otherarts,initiallycontingent,
but ratheris itselfalreadymeaningfulfromthe
outset,beingnothingmorenorless thanthe very
componentsof our concretesocial life: words,
thoughts,
objects,desires,people,places,activities.
The workdoes not confermeaningon theseeletheirinitialmeanments,but rathertransforms
ings into a new and heightenedconstructionof
can hardlybe
meaning:and thattransformation
I
do
not
mean
an arbitrary
process.
bythatthatit
all
mustbe realistic,but onlythatall stylization,
abstractionin theform,ultimately
expressessome
profoundinnerlogic in its content,and is ultimatelydependentfor its existenceon the structuresof theraw materialsthemselves.
At thispoint,therefore,
we touch on the most
basic justificationfor the attack on "interpretation," and forthe resoluteformalismof a metaor a metacriticism.
Contentdoes not
commentary
needto be treatedor interpreted
becauseit is itself
already essentiallyand immediately
meaningful,
as gesturesin situationare meaningful,
meaningful
as sentencesin a conversation.Contentis already
social and historiconcrete,in thatit is essentially
cal experience,and we may say of it what the
to remove
sculptorsaid ofhisstone,thatitsufficed
all extraneousportionsforthe statueto appear,
alreadylatentin themarbleblock.Thus, theprocess of criticismis not so muchan interpretation
of contentas it is a revealingof it,a layingbare,a
restorationof the originalmessage,the original
of thecensor:
experience,beneaththe distortions
and thisrevelationtakesthe formof an explanation why the contentwas so distorted;it is inseparablefroma description
of the mechanismof
censorshipitself.
And since I have mentionedSusan Sontag
above, let me take as a demonstrationof this
process her remarkableessay on sciencefiction,
"The Imaginationof Disaster," in whichshe reconstructs
thebasicparadigmofthescience-fiction
movie,seeingin it an expressionof "the deepest
anxietiesabout contemporary
existence. . . about
the
of
physicaldisaster, prospect universalmutilationand evenannihilation. . . [butmoreparticularly] about the condition of the individual

psyche."'0All ofthisis so, and heressayprovidesa

thoroughworkingthroughof the materialsof
sciencefictiontakenon itsown terms.But whatif
those termswere themselvesbut a disguise,but
the "manifestcontent"that servedto mask and
distractus fromsome more basic satisfactionat
workin theform?
For beneaththesurfacediversionoftheseentertainments,beneaththe surfacepreoccupationof
reveals
our mindsas we watchthem,introspection
fromthe
a secondarymotivationquite different
one describedabove. For one thing,theseworks,
particularlyin the period atmosphereof their
heydayafterthe war and in the nineteenfifties,
ratheropenlyexpressthe mystiqueof the scientist:and by thatI do notreferto externalprestige
or social function,
butratherto a kindofcollective
folk dream about the conditionof the scientist
himself-hedoesn'tdo realwork,yethe has power
is not
his remuneration
and crucial significance,
monetaryor at the veryleast moneyseems no
object, thereis somethingfascinatingabout his
laboratory(the home workshopmagnifiedinto
institutional
status,a combinationof factoryand
clinic),about the way he worksnights(he is not
bound by routineor by the eight-hourday), his
are caricaveryintellectual
operationsthemselves
tures of the way the non-intellectual
imagines
brainworkand book knowledgeto be. There is,
tooldermodes
ofa return
moreover,
thesuggestion
of work organization:to the more personaland
world of the guilds,in
psychologically
satisfying
which the older scientistis the masterand the
in whichthedaughter
youngerone theapprentice,
of the older man becomes naturallyenough the
of functions.
And so forth:
symbolof thetransfer
enumeratedand
thesetraitsmay be indefinitely
enriched.WhatI wantto conveyis thatultimately
to do withscienceitself,
noneof thishas anything
but is simplya distortedreflectionof our own
feelingsand dreams about work,alienated and
non-alienated:it is a wishfulfillment
whichtakes
as itsobjecta visionofidealworkor whatHerbert
Marcusewould call "libidinallygratifying"
work.
of a peculiartype,and
But it is a wishfulfillment
it is thisstructure
thatI wishalso to insiston: for
we do nothave to do herewiththekindof direct
and wish fulfilland open psychicidentification
mentthat mightbe illustrated(for the subject
matterof scientists)throughthe works of C. P.

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FredricJameson
Snow, for instance.Rather, this is a symbolic
gratification
which wishes to conceal its own
presence:theidentification
is not
withthescientist
herethemainspring
of theplot,but ratheritspreconditiononly,and it is as though,in a rather
Kantian way,thissymbolicgratification
attached
itself,not to the eventsof the story,but to that
framework
(the universeof science,the splitting
of the atom, the astronomer'sgaze into outer
space) withoutwhich the storycould not have
come into being in the firstplace. Thus, in this
perspective,all the cataclysmicviolence of the
science-fiction
narrative-thetopplingbuildings,
the monstersrisingoutof Tokyo Bay,thestateof
siegeor martiallaw-is buta pretext,
whichserves
to divertthemindfromitsdeepestoperationsand
fantasies,and to motivatethose fantasiesthemselves.(In thisfashion,metacommentary
adopts,
if not the ideology,then at least the operative
techniquesof Russian Formalism,in its absolute
inversionof the prioritiesof the work itself.)
No doubtwe could go on and showthatalongside the fantasyabout work thereis presentyet
anotherwhichdeals withcollectivelife,and which
uses the cosmicemergenciesof sciencefictionas
a way of relivinga kind of wartimetogetherness
and morale,a kind of drawingtogetheramong
survivorswhichis itselfmerelya distorteddream
of a morehumanecollectivity
and social organization.In thissense,thesurfaceviolenceofthework
is doublymotivated,forit can now be seen as a
breakingof the routineboredomof middle-class
existenceas well, and may containwithinitself
impulsesof resentment
and vengeanceat thenonrealization of the unconscious fantasy thus
awakened.
But the keyto the disguisesof such deep content,of suchpositivebut unconsciousfantasy,lies
in the verynatureof thatfantasyitself:we have
attachedit thematically
to the idea of worksatisfaction,and it is certainthatexperiencehas as its
mostfundamental
workitself,as theprostructure
ductionof value and the transformation
of the
world. Yet the contentof such experiencecan
neverbe determined
in advance,and variesfrom
the most grandioseformsof action to the most
minute and limitedfeelingsand perceptionsin
whichconsciousnesscan be specialized.It is easier

17

to express the propertiesof this phenomenon

negatively,
by sayingthatthe idea of Experience
always presupposesits own opposite,that is, a
kindof lifewhichis merevegetation,
whichis routine,emptiness,
passage of time.The workof art
therefore
provesto unitea livedexperience
of some
kind,as itscontent,
withan impliedquestionas to
ofExperienceitself,
theverypossibilities
as itsform.
It therebyobeys a double impulse:on the one
contactwith
hand, it preservesthe subject'sfitful
forthat
genuinelife,and servesas the repository
mutilatedfragmentof Experiencewhich is his
treasure.And on the other,its mechanismsfunctionas a censorshipwhosetask is to forestallany
consciousrealizationon thepartof thesubjectof
hisownimpoverishment;
and to preventhimfrom
drawinganypracticalconclusionsas to thecauses
forthatimpoverishment
and as to
and mutilation,
theiroriginin thesocial systemitself.
When we pass froma collectiveproductlike
sciencefictionto the productsof what mightbe
thissituacalledofficial
orofficialculture,
literature
tionchangesonlyin degreeand in complexity,
and
not in its basic structure.
For one thing,thereis
now to be reckonedinto it the value of writing
oftheelaborationofstyleor oftheindividual
itself,
sentencesofthework:butas we have alreadysuggested,thisvalue (whichmakesthe Formalistinversionof the workpossible,and whichjustifies
stylistics
as a way into thework)may at once be
forit is
convertedintotermsof worksatisfaction,
precisely
in theformofthesentencethatthewriter
in moderntimesconceivesof concreteworkin the
firstplace. For another,theworknow showsa far
greaterdegreeof conscious and unconsciousareletisticelaborationon the basis of its primitive
mentor originalcontent:but it is thiselaboration
and its mechanismswhichformthe objectof the
howmethodsdescribedabove. Metacommentary,
ever,aims at tracingthe logic of the censorship
itselfand of thesituationfromwhichit springs:a
languagethat hides what it displaysbeneathits
own realityas language,a glancethatdesignates,
throughthe veryprocessof avoiding,the object
forbidden.
University
of California
San Diego

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18

Metacommentary

Notes
1I regretto saythatthisholdstrueevenforso stronga
as E. D. Hirsch,Jr.'sValidity
recentstudyoftheproblem
in
Initerpretationi
(NewHaven,Conn.:Yale Univ.Press,1967),
wlhichi
strikesme as a victimof its own Anglo-American,
idea in thebook,
"analytic"method:themostinteresting
indeed-thatof a "generic"dimension
to everyreading,
a
as tothetypeandnatureofthetextorWhole
preconception
whichconditions
ourapprehension
ofthevariousparts-is
on thecontrary
a speculative
anddialectical
one.

4The model derivesfromthe Cours de linguistiquegene-

raleof Ferdinandde Saussure,itswiderrelevancehaving

beensuggested
by MarcelMauss'sEssai surle do/i,where
variousbehaviorpatterns
are analyzedin termsof prestationor exchange,
thusmakingthemeasilyassimilableto
theexchange
ofinformation
inthelinguistic
circuit.
5 Anthropologiestructurale (Paris: Plon, 1958), "La
Structure
desmythes,"
esp.pp. 235-42.
6

See A. G. Wilden,The Language of theSelf (Baltimore,

Md.: JohnsHopkinsPress,1968),particularly
pp. 30-31:
Seuil,1965).CompareShklovsky
on thepredominance
ofa
"Ellipseand pleonasm,
hyperbaton
or syllepsis,
regression,
particularauthorialmode of being-in-the-world
such as
repetition,
apposition-theseare thesyntactical
displacesentimentality:
"Sentimentality
cannotserveas the conments; metaphor,catachresis,antonomasis,allegory,
tentof art,ifonlybecausearthas no separatecontents
in
and synecdoche-these
metonymy,
are thesemanticconthe firstplace. The presentation
of things'froma senti- densationsin whichFreudteachesus to read theintenmentalpointof view'is a specialmethodof presentation, tions-ostentatious
or demonstrative,
dissimulating
or perlikethepresentation
of themfromthepointof viewof a
suasive,retaliatory
or seductive-outof whichthesubject
horse(as in Tolstoy'sKlholstorner)
or of a giant(as in
modulates
hisoneiricdiscourse."
Swift'sGiilliver's Travels). Art is essentiallytrans-emo7Anthropologie siructutrale,
p. 239.
tional. . unsympathetic-or
beyond sympathy-except
8 Le Cru el le ccit (Paris:Plon,1964),p. 346.
9 Validity in Initerpretationi,
wherethefeeling
of compassionis evokedas materialfor
pp. 8, 211. Cf. Barthes'
theartistic
structure"
(Lee T. Lemonand MarianJ.Reis,
analogousdistinction
betweenliterary
scieniceand literary
RuissianiFormalistCriticism:FoiurEssays, Lincoln: Univ.
criticismin Critiquie
et vDrit6(Paris: Seuil,1966),p. 56.
10 AgainistIiiterpretationi
ofNebraskaPress,1965,translation
modified).
(New York: Farrar, 1966), p.
I In Formeet signiificationt
(Paris:Corti,1965).
220.
2

TIluoriede la littiraitire,ed. Tzvetan Todorov (Paris:

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