Zach

By Zach Goldberg (#332400274)

Abstract
A prevailing assessment among certain circles of the Terrorism discourse perceives the alQaeda perpetrated 9/11 attacks as a blunder that has miserably backfired and pushed the
organization towards operational entropy. The evidence provided to support such assertions is
compelling, yet superficial. It ignores the long term, serpentine objectives al-Qaeda intended to
achieve with 9/11 and how goading the US into responding excessively has helped to realize
them. The following paper explores this strategic success through the framework of existential
psychology. It portrays the Muslim world as tussling with an ontological crisis born out of the
epoch of Western-led globalization and secular modernity. In launching 9/11, AQ set a process
in motion that exploited the ontological insecurities of the Islamic world and leveraged them to
both promote its anti-Western narrative and transform the organization into a more robust,
global movement. As this paper will show, with the help of the US War on TerrorAQ has
succeeded.

Table of Contents
Preamble ................................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 2
Answering the Unanswerable: What is Our Purpose? ................................................................................ 2
The Research Question ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Hypothesis and Argumentative Overview ............................................................................................. 5
The History of Islams Ontological Crisis ................................................................................................ 5
Islams Grapple with Liberalism ................................................................................................................ 7
9/11: Lighting the Ontological Fuse ......................................................................................................... 8
9/11: Radicalization in Europe ................................................................................................................ 10
Layout of the Paper ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Definitions and Clarifications ....................................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 1: Al-Qaedas 9/11 Detractors ....................................................................................... 12
The Jihadists ................................................................................................................................................... 12
The Academics ............................................................................................................................................... 15
AQs Post 9-11 Collective Action and Management Problems ....................................................... 18
Closing Arguments ....................................................................................................................................... 21
Chapter 2: The Strategic Mastery of 9/11 .................................................................................. 22
9/11: Bin Ladens Power Play .................................................................................................................. 22
Provoking a Battle of Identities: Americas Cowboy Mentality ................................................... 24
Islams Identity Crisis: On Top of the World ........................................................................................ 26
Down in the Dumps ...................................................................................................................................... 27
At Loggerheads: Islamism and Secular Modernity ............................................................................ 29
The Islamic Solution Under Assault ..................................................................................................... 31
The Secular Storm Approaches ................................................................................................................ 35
So Shouldnt Every Muslim Grab a Gun? ............................................................................................... 37
Ontological Pacifiers .................................................................................................................................... 37
The Radicalizing Influence of the WoT .................................................................................................. 39
Post 9/11: Increased Support for Terrorism ...................................................................................... 40
Majority Support for AQs Goals .............................................................................................................. 42
Post-9/11: More Perceive US as Threatening Islam ......................................................................... 42
Closing Arguments ....................................................................................................................................... 43
Chapter 3: The European-Muslim Search for Meaning ......................................................... 43
Their Plight: A Background ...................................................................................................................... 43
European Identity: Barriers to Entry ..................................................................................................... 44
9/11: Fanning the Flames of Xenophobia and Radicalization ....................................................... 45
The Search for Meaning .............................................................................................................................. 46
Meaning through Jihad ............................................................................................................................... 48
The Consequences of Muslim Alienation .............................................................................................. 50
The Radicalization Ripple Effect of 9/11 .............................................................................................. 51
The European Prison System .................................................................................................................... 53
The Domino Effect: ....................................................................................................................................... 56
Closing Arguments ....................................................................................................................................... 59
Chapter 4:WoT; Going So Well Yet Going So Wrong ............................................................... 59
The Chimera of Victory in Af-Pak ............................................................................................................ 60
Af-Pak: The Perfect Venue for US defeat ............................................................................................... 61

The Sons of Soil and the Birth of AQ 2.0 .............................................................................................. 62

How the Iraq Invasion Helped AQ in Af-Pak ........................................................................................ 66
The AQ-driven Comeback .......................................................................................................................... 69
AQ or Taliban; Whos Who These Days? ............................................................................................... 70
Even Under Drone Attack, AQ Still Better Off Post-9/11 ................................................................. 71
The Radicalizing Influence of Club-Gitmo .......................................................................................... 74
Closing Arguments ....................................................................................................................................... 77

Chapter 4: How the WoT Vindicated al-Suris Global Islamic Resistance ..................... 78
al-Suris Vision: Open and Individual Theatres of Jihad .................................................................. 78
WoT: Giving al-Suri a Helping Hand ....................................................................................................... 80
Socio-Economic Factors: Why AQ Threat Could Grow ..................................................................... 82
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 84
Closing Thoughts ........................................................................................................................................... 89
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................... 91

Preamble
Life is never made unbearable by circumstances, but only by lack of
meaning and purpose.- Viktor E. Frankl

There is perhaps nothing more humbling than a pensive gaze into a clear night sky. For
the celestially nescient, its important to note that each star in the heavens above is a sun not
unlike our own. In the right setting, a naked eye may suffice to capture several thousand of these
distant solar kin. With a small telescope we can progress to 15 million stars. Further pushing the
envelope--with the help of observatories and space telescopeswe can elucidate stars in the
billions and even trillions. By some estimates there are 400 billion stars in our Milky Way galaxy
alone. And for those still clinging to our cosmic exceptionality, scientists estimate the existence
of 200 billion galaxies in the observable universe alone; a number thats accruing unabatedly.
Indeed, there are more stars in the universe than there are grains of sand on our planet earth. And
as weve been able to confirm through decades of astronomical exploration, a planetary nexus
some not too different from our own, environs nearly every one of them. The universe is,
therefor, a vast and endless ocean of which we are but a speck of dust. But the melancholy
doesnt end there.
In a further blow to our egos: Everything that has a beginning also has an end. You, me,
the universewere all scheduled to meet this inescapable truth. Humans today can expect to
live a mere 1% of recorded history. (Impey, 2010) Our planetary abodes, Earthwhile perhaps
outliving usfaces no shortage of inevitable, existential cataclysms. Should it defy the odds and
dodge the apocalyptic asteroid--whose arrival scientists deem a question of not if but when--it
will nonetheless venture down the path of entropy as its burned alive by our sun in 6 billion years
time. If its any consolation, the future of our universe doesnt look so bright either (no pun
intended). While there are numerous competing theories prognosticating our universes ultimate
fate, many scientists have gravitated towards the Big Freeze model; a hyper-expanding
universe whose ever-diverging stars burn until, one by one, their fuel hits empty and fade out
into black holes. At this point, any element and atom that ever was will be quickly engulfed in

the coldest and purest darkness the universe has ever known. Lodged in this cosmic death row,
tangibility awaits its perdition; the bellies of omnipresent black holes.

Introduction
Answering the Unanswerable: What is Our Purpose?
Apologies in advance, the above was an exercise in existential disquiet. If its aim was
realized, perhaps the reader is left ruminating; If were but a measly speck of dust heading
towards the dustbin, whats the meaning to all of this? The unanswerability of this very
question, together with the cognizance of our own mortality, has perennially bedeviled mankind
throughout its short history on this planet. Naturally, man has an implacable need for ultimate
closure. To think the world just is is a vexingif not terrifying--prospect. Man requires a
sanative balm; an emollient narrative or prism through which the world makes sense and
existential purpose becomes conspicuous. He isnt complacent to just livehe demands
something to live for; a cause higher than himself whose sanctity and continued existence
becomes inseparable from his own. (Kruglanski, 2009, p.336) Famed psychologist Viktor
Frankl refers to this as filling the existential vacuum. (Frankl, 1967, p.122) Staring down
mortality and the uncertainty of life, man strives to somehow leave his footprint; terrified of
becoming a speck of insignificant dust in an uncaring universe. (Ibid, p.335) The more one
does, the more human he is and the more he actualizes himself. (Frankl, 2006, p.133)Though
mans physical presence has an expiration date, the legacy he can build will live on forever.
Interestingly, several analyses of human motivation have confirmed this implacable
human drive (Becker, 1973; Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszcynski 2004); betokening a linkage
between mans biological need for physical survival and an indefatigable quest for personal
meaning and significance. (Ibid. 2009, p.335) Abjuring nihilism, man turns to a pantheon of
mechanisms to seek out self-significance. Frankl compartmentalizes this recourse into three
overarching appellations. (Krasko, 2004)
The first can be understood as the Work We Create. Heart wrenching as it may be, most
of us will spend the bulk of the spry, exuberant years of our lives working to sustain our
subsistence. While some will plod through these years in desiccative fashion--their hearts

perhaps set on early retirementfor others, their jobs constitute the locus of their selfsignificance and meaning. For scientists its the ardor of discovery and its contribution to
mankind that jolts them out of bed in the morning. For doctors, its the act of bringing hope and
changing the lives of the haplessly ill. For artists, its the indelible impression their work sears
into the hearts of their followers. By actualizing ones potential and ingenuity, man leaves his
mark on the world of today and the future, and in turn, obtains existential significance.
Another--perhaps more inclusivesource of meaning manifests through Human
Encounter and Love. At the crux of this theme is the esteem one derives from a distinct and
unique identity. This identity is often bestowed through the membership and interactions within
an external, usually cultural, community. Whether art, music, religion, folklore or history, our
cultural idiosyncrasies imbue in us distinct identities that provide us with a sense of endearment
and belonging. Moreover, through these communal transactions were equipped with cognitive
maps and narratives through which were afforded self-purpose when interpreting the world
around us. According to Terror Management Theory (TMT), these narratives are most
important as therapeutic devices for blunting mans unremitting ontological/existential anxieties.
In one study, for example, evoking thoughts of mortality in a sample group of Italians increased
their bias in favor of Italy (their in-group) and the perception that Italy was cohesive and united.
(Kruglanski, p.338) Researchers ultimately concluded that, Becoming part of a collective
entities allows individuals to extend their selves in space and time [and hence] to overcome the
inherent limitations of their individual identity inextricably linked to a perishable body.
(Castano, 2005,p.233) In this spirit, the utility of religion as the opiate of the masses is
unmistakable. Eschatological narratives of life after death or Gods chosen people provide us
with worldviews that serve to protect us from feelings of terror, and allow us to function
effectively despite the inevitability of death. (Moghaddam, 2006, p.18) But should that narrative
be challenged, disparaged, or attacked, mans existential equilibrium hangs in the balance and his
anxieties--once again--fling to the surface. His dignity subverted, man works to restore it by all
means necessary. He cannot live without it.
Last, is the meaning one may derive from the Hardship and Affliction of an
unchangeable fate. Simply put, when our backs are against the wall--our fates pried away from
our gripwhat matters is the right attitude towards fate. (Frankl V. E., 1967, p.127) This

means stoutly staring down our adversity, and going down on our own terms--turning personal
tragedy into a triumph. (Frankl V., 2006, p.99) A research study conducted in the Netherlands
on assisted suicide revealed only a 3rd of terminally ill patients as being driven by a desire to end
their immense physical suffering. In the majority, it was the unremitting fear of a loss of selfimage, control and dignity. (van der Mass et el., 1991) Suffering, therefore, need not take the
form of bodily atrophy for this anxiety to come to bear; self-image and dignity is umbilically
rooted in ones identity. Should ones environment be perceived as assailing, derogating, or
posing an existential threat to ones self-significancerather than capitulate, he may choose to
go down heroically with his head up high. Though he will be no more, his sublime act of
valiance and its potential inspiration for others will vindicate a life cut short; better to die a
meaningful death than live a purposeless life.

The Research Question

The quest for meaning is a potent driver of human inflection shaping the course of
history; for better or for worse. There is perhaps no better testament to this than the 9/11 attacks
and the attendant US War on Terror. (WoT) Through the US cultural prism, the attacks marked
the beginning of a Manichean battle of good (America) vs. evil (radical Islamists); an
opportunity to vindicate theodicean justice and burnish its bona fides as the defender of the
free world. The diabolical and freedom hating forces of the world would soon receive their
deserts. But through the lenses of the Muslim world, the retaliation that ensuedthe invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq-- was its own incarnation of evil; a further testament to Americas sinister
obsession with subjugating and effacing a historically proud and divinely chosen people. Both
communities were entrenched in their black and white narratives and refused to look the other
way--their collective identities and self-images simply wouldnt allow it.
In this spirit, by looking at 9/11 and the WoT through the frameworks of
ontological/existential psychology, one can glean profound insights of the drivers of Islamic
extremism and how best to remediate them. To be sure, the terrorism discourse is awash with
competing theories of what motivates terrorism. Some scholars posit singular drivers. For
instance, Pape (2005) holds foreign occupation as the primary catalyst, while Sageman (2004)
suggests a combination of psychological impetuses, such as the need for emotional and social

support. Others demur settling on single factors and contend a hodgepodge of reasons as holding
more explanatory power; whether of a psychological, organizational, or strategic (i.e. because its
effective in achieving its goals) hue. This paper doesnt seek to gainsay any of these myriad
theories. Quite the contrary, it believes that most can be synthesized and subsumed under a
broader category of ontological needs; that is, mans quest for existential purpose and
significance. Because this category is so encompassing, this paper uses it to tackle the seemingly
immaterial subject of discussion: Was 9/11 a strategic success or failure for AQ? Put
differently, if AQ could go back in timeknowing what it knows todaywould it still pull the
trigger on 9/11? The question is a complicated one, and warrants others such as: Has 9/11s
provoked responsethe WoTbeen a success or failure? It is by looking at the 9/11 attacks,
and terrorism in general, as an ontologically driven phenomenon, that we can begin to answer
these questions.

Hypothesis and Argumentative Overview

This paper argues that, to our chagrin, 9/11 succeeded beyond AQs wildest dreams; with
the WoT a key factor in its success. Of course, there is an abundance of compelling evidence to
the contrary, which this paper will dutifully present in due time. But briefly, much of it consists
of superficial assessments; AQs truncated manpower, operational constraints, and souring
public opinion among the Muslim masses. From a tactical perspective, this is accuratethe WoT
has killed a lot of terrorists and devastated the AQ the organization. But lost in the discussion is
a true appreciation of the pernicious ontological impact the WoT has had on millions throughout
the Muslim world; how it has translated into newfound support for AQs overarching goals; and
how it has spawned a truly global fan base and constituency for jihadi activity around the
Muslim world. The following provides a preliminary overview of this forthcoming argument.

The History of Islams Ontological Crisis

To be sure, 9/11 was a tragedy of epic proportion. Our anger and militant response was
understandable and, to a great degree, justified. But shrouded in our emotions was the existence
of another, more enduring tragedy. One that may be of little consequence to us, yet is poignantly
felt throughout the Islamic world: a sense of purpose and clarity that--in a modernizing and
secularizing world--is eerily slipping away.

For thousands of years Muslims derived esteem and self-worth as the standard bearers of
Gods final revelationthe Quran. To Muslims, these revelationsimparted to the prophet
Muhammed between 610-638 CEare incontrovertible recipes for success and prosperity, and
most important, a treasured place in the world to come. Simply put, by hewing the word of God,
one receives his grace and protection. On an epistemic level, this wasnt just dogmabut was
empirically conspicuous. For roughly a thousand years Islam was the uncontested, hegemonic
powerhouse of the world. The preeminence and ostensible infallibility of the Islamic faith was
for Muslims an ontological balm like no other. However, eventually Islamic aplomb would grind
to a halt and cultural malaise ominously crept in. Once on top looking down, Islam soon found
itself looking upsupplanted by the same benighted, miscreant, Western culture they had once
rolled over.
The resurgence of Western power (a coeval corollary of scientific enlightenment) and its
predominance over the high seas slowly ushered in the dawn of modern globalization. With its
onset, the arrival of the Occidentalists to the Muslim world specifically, cultural exchanges
soared. Yet they seemed to only flow from West to East. The ensuing cultural didacticism
became rank humiliation for many Muslims. Sure, they wanted to modernizethey werent
Luddites. But to ape the Western way was an admission of fideistic inferiority and consequently-ontological uncertainty. Nevertheless, they played alongit didnt seem they had a say in the
matter anyways. The ruling aristocratsin cahoots with their Western protectorsaspired to
make the transition to Western modernity a foregone conclusion. But as the realignment project
consistently stumbled--and the kleptocratic Arab rulers self-servingly filled their coffers--the
Muslim existential vacuum grew wider. The elitist favoritism immanent in job markets
demoralized a budding, expectant intelligentsia thatwhile gifted-- had nowhere to apply itself.
Forced into menial vocations, self-worth and purpose for this secular-educated class was at a
premium. Modernity having failed them, and toiling at the bottom of their existential holes, they
longed for a way out. Through religion, the one ontological balm that was for long a proven
success, theyd find it. The prevailing assessment that God hadnt abandoned them, but that
theyin favor of Western materialism- had abandoned God, provided ontological reassurance
and a way forward; the purging of Western culture and the restoration of Islamic omnipresence.
The Islamic re-awakening was in full bloom, yet the challenges opposing it were
Herculean. Globalization and the diffusion of Western norms showed no signs of slowing;

particularly after the fall of the USSR. If anything, its pace was quickening and whats worse
Islams secular rulers werent even batting an eye. The West kept encroaching, whether through
its archipelago of regional military bases, stalwart support of Israel, or licentious pop culture and
media. Though the colonial days were over, the US-led Western world was again up to its old
tricks: The eradication of a proud Islamic culture.

Islams Grapple with Liberalism

Imagined or not, many Muslims are terrified of losing their cultural ontological balms.
Like the intelligentsia above-- they simply dont have anything to replace it with. More so, they
perceive the West, especially the US, as working to make this premonition reality. This
sentiment has long been boiling. Frankly, in the authors view, whether it takes years or decades,
the Islamic Worldlike the Christian West before itwill ultimately reconcile with modernity,
its fundaments of liberal thought, and find other means for tempering ontological anxieties. Their
economic/social prosperityboth anchored in technological progress and human ingenuity-depend on it. The rub is that this progress is inextricably linked to rationalism and the liberty to
leave everything open to skepticism; seeking out the truth in accords with empirical reality while
shedding preconceptions and superstition. But due to circumstance, superstition and shibboleths
mean the world to Muslims. Freedom of inquiry, fundamentally at odds with very the fideistic,
uncompromising truths underpinning their ontological narratives, is thus no simple matter. And
resistance to change, whether passive or active, is to be expected.
To shed some perspective, Muslim countries contribute only 1% of the worlds published
scientific papers. (Paulson, 2011) Beyond institutional constraints, the biggest challenge, as one
Arab professor puts it, is the widespread aversion among students to rethinking their opinions,
to challenge their preconceived opinions, to be in their uncomfortable zone. (Ibid.) With
fideism the predominant filler of the Muslim existential vacuum, this cognitive dissonance is
understandable. Asked whether they agree or disagree with Darwins Theory of Evolution, the
overwhelming majority of respondents in 5 large Muslim countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt,
Malaysia, Turkey) said that the theory could not possibly be true. (Hassan, 2008, p.91-93) As
sociologist Riaz Hassan explains, In modern times, science has become religions main rival in
this endeavor to explain the nature, purposes and meanings of human conditions and destiny.
Beliefs and statements that counter some core religious beliefs usually place the individual under

considerable social and psychological pressure to reject such beliefs. (Ibid. p.91) Similarly,
these psychological pressures help explain the pervasive irascibility exhibited when elements of
Islamic belief are made the object of derision. The apoplectic and--in some cases--violent,
response to the viral YouTube video, the Innocence of Muslims, was a case in point of this.
Even in the US, 46% of Muslim respondents in one poll thought that Americans who offer
criticism or parodies of Islam should face criminal charges. (Unruh, 2012)
Ontological equilibriums can be understood as possessing an inherent defense
mechanism; an impulse to safeguard the meaning that maintains its levelness. Accordingly, the
Muslim transition towards enlightenment will be gradual and, at times, labile. Itll be
psychologically encumbering for some, but most will adapt placidly, progress, and revise their
beliefs to conform with reality. Others, unfortunately, will be spoilers; those who--in lieu of
forfeiting their emollient, albeit insular, perceptions of realitychoose to go down in truculent
defiance. Psychologist Roberta Sigel once noted that There exists in humans a powerful drive to
maintain the sense of ones identity, a sense of continuity that allays fear of changing too fast or
being changed against ones will by outside forces. (Sigel, 1989, p.459) If this Muslim
modernization process is allowed to transpire indigenouslyperhaps at times with external,
unobtrusive assistance (i.e. developmental aid)--these spoilers wont draw much of a crowd. If,
however, an outside force is seen as maliciously pushing the issueon its own terms and
timetable and before alternative existential fillers can come to pass--the spoilers and their
message will become more potent and worst of all, the process will begin to retrogress. It is for
this reason that 9/11 was such a victory for the spoilers of today; to wit, AQ and the global jihadi
community.

9/11: Lighting the Ontological Fuse

The Islamic world was already on edge in the years preceding 9/11. Western arrogance
was resented, as was its slanted domineering of global affairs. In a unipolar world, Westernism
ostensibly knew no boundaries. At the helm of supranational organizations like the IMF, World
Bank, and UN Security council, the West could throw its weight around unobstructed. And after
the Persian Gulf War, the Islamic world appeared to be in its crosshairs; angering the masses
who wanted no part in the Western norms it purveyed. Still, though conspiracy theories and
suspicions were abounding, the Muslim response was mostly subdued. Jihadi groups like AQ,

with their evangelical narratives, failed to draw much of a receptive audience. Though
ballyhooed for their work in Soviet Afghanistan, by the 1990s, Jihadi groups were faltering left
and right. Chief among them was AQ, who failed time and time again to lure recruits into its
anti-Western front. Nobody was listening. However, On September 11, 2001 this all began to
change.
By launching 9/11, AQ sought to co-opt the global Jihadi community into a protracted,
grueling struggle against Western hegemony. As this paper will show, it succeeded; thousands of
jihadistswho previously had no interest in fighting the USwere radicalized and brought into
AQs global fold. Concurrently, by brazenly challenging American machismo and striking its
symbols of cachet, AQ presciently understood it could sic the sleeping giant on the Islamic world
and see its conspirational narrative take on whole knew level of persuasive power. Here too, it
succeeded-- the US played the AQ-scripted Muslim villain to the letter. The perceived cultural
attack against Islam was no longer just the parlance of the radical fringe. In the eyes of many
Muslims, the West wasnt just corroding Islam through its media and economic leverage--it was
overtly doing so through the barrel of a gun. In effect, AQ had engineered a collective
significance loss that would activate the Islams ontological defense mechanism, and thereby,
prompt an attempt at significance restoration via the embarkation on a culturally revered act
(i.e. Jihad). (Kruglanski, p.344). By casting the US WoT as the reincarnation of the Christian
crusades, Muslims were presented with an opportunity for significance gain. (Ibid.) Their lifepurpose was being challengedthe West had dropped the gauntlet. And regardless of how their
lives had faired before, the exemplar of meaning-- defending Islam and fighting the Westwas
staring at them in the face.
Though it may have specious score-cards and kill-lists to show for it, for AQ, the
WoT was Americas gift to AQ; one that keeps on giving. Whether the two invasions, its drone
war, the recruitment cash cow that is Guantanamo prisonUS policies are creating more
enemies than [they] are removing from the battlefield. (Harris, 2012) It may have devastated
one AQ iteration, but it replaced it with another that now fields more Anti-American Jihadists
than ever before. (Gerges, 2011) No amount of PR work or explaining can counteract the
insidious effect Americas Global military campaign has had on the minds of millions of
Muslims. Decades ago foreign adventures could be conceivably pulled with relative low
profilein the information age that soft-footprint is no more. Now, a camera hovers over every

step, broadcasting footage that reverberates and forms lasting impressions across the world. AQ
understood this very well and hence, made it a critical component of its war strategy.
Extenuating circumstances aside, pictures like Abu-Graihb and Robocop-esque soldiers busting
down doors and rounding up and flexycuffing families in the dead of night envenomed the
impressionable hearts and minds the US hoped to win. Yes, the US has withdrawn from Iraq and
will soon do the same in Afghanistan. But the effects of invasion and occupation, the suffering
inflicted upon many thousands of average Muslims will not easily be forgotten. (Shore,
loc.354) From the streets of Paris and London to Tripoli and Cairo, the WoT has cemented AQs
narrative of an America hell-bent on cultural suppression and domination. The damage has been
done. And, consequently, the proverbial can of Islamic secularization has been kicked further
down the road.

9/11: Radicalization in Europe

Though Jihadists will ultimately losehaving no prosperity or platform of hope to
offerrather than delegitimize them, the Wests 9/11 response has seen their message go global.
This is especially true in Europe where 9/11 backlash fanned the flames of Islamophobia and
saw law enforcement and indigenous publics grow leery of the potential 5th column lurking
about. Whether 2nd or 3rd generation it didnt matterMuslims were to be looked at askancely.
Efforts at integrating a long alienated and disenfranchised demographic fell by the wayside, as
right-wing parties mushroomed in power and anti-immigrant invectives percolated through the
streets. The Madrid and London bombings only added to the smog. As Europe followed the USs
lead in bucking a trend ostensibly careening out of control, the Muhammed Q. public paid an
invidious price. Police raids of Muslim religious and business establishments became quotidian
spectacles, as did gratuitous arrests of thousands ultimately released without charge. In one case,
an old German woman calls the police merely to report that an Arabic-speaking family is living
in the apartment above her. Though the police ultimately found nothing, the family was
overwrought with fear and humiliation. (Shore, 2006, p.59)
The terrorist-stigma became a fact of life and, in some cases, a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Economically and socially estranged, European Muslims, in effect, stumbled to find meaning
and purpose in their lives. Desperate to fill their existential vacuums, many have turned to Islam.
Germans reject us, Turks in Turkey dont understand us, but Muslims accept us, a once secular
European explained. (Shore, loc. 512) This cultural polarization is exactly what al-Qaeda had in

10

mind when it launched 9/11. As the big American giant went to work in Afghanistan and Iraq,
European Muslims felt themselves every bit apart of the wars victims. Former President George
W. Bush pugnacious youre either with us or against us speech only added insult to injury. As
record numbers of European-Muslim youth continue to trickle into global Jihadi theatres today
many of whom will certainly return more radicalized and trained in explosives-- the externalities
of 9/11 continue to rankle.

Layout of the Paper

The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. Five additional chapters are
forthcoming. Chapter 1 will present the opposing arguments; that is those believe 9/11 was a
strategic failure for the AQ movement. This group includes academics and former/current
jihadists alike. Chapter 2 will begin to expound on several of the arguments made above. First it
will outline the numerous misfortunes and setbacks AQ endured throughout the 90s in trying to
grow as an organization and get its global strategy off the ground. In doing so it will begin to
explain how 9/11 became a last ditch effort to advance these goals and rescue the group from
irrelevance. This section will be followed by an etiology of Islams ontological insecurity in the
modern era and how --through 9/11AQ was able to exploit it. Survey data will be extensively
adduced to reject the reputed notion of AQ support as confined to the infinitesimal margins of
Muslim public opinion. Chapter 3 will elaborate on the points previously issued regarding
9/11s effect on Muslim-Europe. It will demonstrate how the resulting surge in discrimination
and xenophobia hampered Muslim integration and fertilized the ground for the jihadi
radicalization that imperils the world to this day. Chapter 4 will primarily focus on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) theatre; how an AQ in retreat was able to recover and exploit
local animosities in its strategy of ideologically co-opting unaffiliated Jihadist groups and turning
them loose against the US. Later, the Af-Pak and Iraqi theatres will be bridged to highlight the
beneficent interplay (i.e. radicalization, knowledge exchanges) that has implications to this day.
Chapter 5 will tie everything together and show how the post-9/11 developments are heralding
the realization of Abu Musab al-Suris vision of a Global Islamic Resistance.

Definitions and Clarifications

Before commencing with Chapter 1, some terminological clarifications are necessary for
avoiding potential bouts of confusion.

11

Firstly, this paper will define terrorism as the use of extra-normal violence, including
threats to use such violence, against civilian non-combatants as a means of advancing
political/religious goals.
Second, radicalization will be construed in accords with a definition befitting the theme
of this paper; specifically, the arrival of the ontologically distressed/conflicted to the extreme,
violent, end of the remediative spectrum for restoring his/her ontological equilibrium and selfpurpose. Accordingly, radical will be ascribed to terrorists, their active supporters/facilitators
as well as their passive fan bases. It must be stated that one need not act on his sentiments (i.e.
join a terrorist group) for this nomenclature to apply. While every terrorist is a radical, not every
radical is a terrorist. Yet the mere sympathy or passive support for groups exercising
extranormal violence against civilians isat least in the authors viewbeyond the realm of
moderation. The reason is that though such individuals may not be deriving ontological catharsis
through the direct use of violence, they nonetheless enjoy these fruits vicariously through the
work of others.
Lastly, this paper should in no way be interpreted as holding Islamor religion in
general for that matteras the provenance of jihadi terrorism and extranormal violence.
Terrorism, regrettably, will outlive the prevailing Islamic strain of today and will continue to
pulsate so long there are those who perceive it as the ultimate existential filler. In other words,
terrorism begins in the human mindand religious extremism is its therapy; a means for
mollifying ones ontological despair. Not surprisingly, almost all of the terrorists referred to in
this paper grew up in secular backgrounds. But while religion is not the raison detre for the
proliferation of Islamic terrorism today, the lack or inadequacy of alternative modes of
existential significance is. And this is precisely what makes radical Islam so appealing to many
across the Muslim world; and also why the WoT completely missed the point.

Chapter 1: Al-Qaedas 9/11 Detractors

The Jihadists

12

You know you have your work cut out for you when jihadists themselves disagree with
you. But this paper wont try to burry that beneath the cushionits the truth. In fact (at least
according to testimony given by AQ mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammed) among AQs pre9/11 Shurah Council, an overwhelming majority opposed the prospective attacks on both
ideological and strategic grounds. (CTC, 2007, p.18) Furthermore, many of this cohort
expressed serious misgivings over the organizations capacity to withstand a likely US retaliatory
attack in which the gloves were almost certain to come off. In the eyes of one skepticAQs
leading syndicated strategist Abu Musab al-SuriAQs fielded an over-centralized, overt, and
immobile organizational structurewhich was extremely vulnerable to US air attack. (Lia,
2009, p.281) As such, and after a less than honorable discharge from its erstwhile Sudanase
hosts, provoking the US risked laying waste to the years worth of time and money AQ and its
syndicates had invested in setting up shop anew. On top of that, launching an operation from
Taliban-controlled Afghan soil was considered a flagrant violation of the house rules. The
Taliban jaded by Usama bin Ladens (UBL) proclivity for saber rattling and bravado laden
media interviewshad no dog in AQs global fight. They made this clear to UBL in a personal
dressing-down: If you wish to fight America and your adversaries then do so without much talk
and shouting from our lands as our condition is critical. (Ibid. p.287) Drawing America into
Afghanistan risked a falling-out with AQs Afghan landlords. While UBL may have had other
places to run to, many Arab-Afghanswho herded their entire families to the new, permanent
home of Afghanistanhad nowhere to go. (Ibid. p.290) Their concerns would fall on deaf
earsdrowned out by a hawkish minority dead set on luring the US out of its hole. (Gerges,
p.95)
As Arab-Jihadis and their Afghan hosts ran for the hills in the wake of Operation
Enduring freedom, the public haranguing continued. To some, the 9/11 conferred the US all the
legitimacy it needed for invading and occupying the Islamic world and inflicting heavy losses
on Muslims. (Lia, p.314) Others, such as Abu Musab Al-Suri, were even more fatalistic:
The outcome [of the 9/11 attacks] as I see it, was to put a catastrophic end to the Jihadi
current, and end to the period which started back in the beginning of the 1960s of the past
century and has lasted up until September 11th. The Jihadis entered the tribulations of the current
maelstrom which swallowed most of its cadres over the subsequent three years. (Ibid.)

13

And fulminating from his Iranian redoubt in June 2002, a jaundiced senior AQ military
leader, Saif al-Adel, painted 9/11 as a, Precipitous folly having plunged AQ from misfortune to
disaster. (CTC, p.19)
Other ex-Jihadi veterans, many of whom had fractious relationships with AQ during their
careers with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, soon joined this bitter chorus. Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif
who goes by the nom de guerre Dr Fadlis arguably most outspoken of this bunch. Dr. Fadl,
reportedly one of AQs founding members and a longtime fellow Islamic Jihad associate of AQhead Ayman Al-Zawahiri, has come out swinging in recent years over the organizations
depraved, misbegotten obsession with global jihad. In lambasting 9/11, a fuming Fadl opined
that:
Ramming America has become the shortest road to fame and leadership among the
Arabs and Muslims. But what good is it if you destroy one of your enemy's buildings, and he
destroys one of your countries? What good is it if you kill one of his people, and he kills a
thousand of yoursThat, in short, is my evaluation of 9/11. (Blair, 2009)
In other words, the 9/11 attacks may have delivered a broadside blow, but the blowback-the loss of the sole Islamic emirate and jihadi sanctuary (i.e. Taliban ruled Afghanistan)
meted a disastrous price. In driving this point home, Fadl concludes that AQ committed suicide
on 9/11 and lost its equilibrium, skilled leaders, and influenceSeptember 11 was a failure.
(Gerges, p. 121)
Other statured Jihadi-veterans took shots directly at AQ figurehead Usama Bin Laden and
his catastrophic leadership. (Ibid, p.95) The most senior of which was Abu al-Walid al-Masri,
once one of UBLs closest minions. In it what was arguably the most scathing and disparaging
invectives of them all, Abu-al-Walid holds the 9/11 attacks as a disaster surpassing the calamity
of the Arabs and Muslims in their wars with the Jews in 1948, which the Arabs call the
catastrophe and the 1967 war. (Brooke, 2011, p.53) Far from fitting the intended bill, the US
didnt buckle under UBLs three painful blows, and instead retaliated and destroyed both the
Taliban and al-Qaeda. (Ibid. p.95)
Muhammed Essam Derbala, a senior leader of the Egyptian al-Gamaa who was released
from a life sentence for his role in the 1981 Sadat assassination, authored an entire book on AQs
strategic quagmireswith 9/11 its crowning failure. Titled al Qaeda Strategy: Mistakes and
Dangers (2004), Derbala berates AQ for attempting to bring down a Rhino with a BB-gun:

14

Where are the capabilities that allow for all of that? AQ was trying to ignite a clash of
civilizations without possessing the means to wagelet alone prevail ina global struggle.
Thus, if AQ proved capable of mastering anything, it was in making enemies rather than
following the Prophet Muhammads example and neutralizing them. (Gerges, p.99)
In sum, the dismay of the 9/11 attacks writ large in the voices of many disenchanted
Jihadists. Though some castigated the attacks on religious and moral grounds, others unlikely
shed a tear for the victims. Still, they viewed the resulting price tag as steep: AQ had lost most of
its quality and trained manpower, as well as the sanctuary needed to sustain it. In attacking the
US, the Ummahs first Islamic emirate was over before it started. And going down with it, were
the lives of thousands of young Muslims. (Ibid. p.98) All things considered, in this view, the
9/11 attacks were a strategic failure; one that would release great damage on the Ummah and,
concomitantly, the AQ brand name itself.
Many of the 9/11 critiques emanating from the Jihadi community are undoubtedly
genuine, but we cannot preclude the existence of personal vendettas and intra-group rivalries that
could impinge on the objectiveness of their assessments. Therefore, we now turn to the academic
community for a second opinion.

The Academics
Writing in a Spring edition of Parameters, retired US Lt. Col. Thomas R. McCabe
leaves little room for doubt: The AQ leadership had a disastrously distorted misunderstanding
of the US and miscalculated the will and capability of the US when it launched the 9/11 attack.
(McCabe, 2010, p.62) In other words, AQ was barking up the wrong tree. Perceiving the US as a
paper tiger, AQ underestimated US capabilities and continues to do so. (Ibid. p.63) While
expecting a flimsy US response (i.e. similar to the cruise missile barrages AQ sustained
following the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings) or perhaps none at all (i.e. ala post-USS Cole
attack), what they received instead was an America that showed an unprecedented ability to
move quickly and with overwhelming force. (Ibid.)
That AQ was confounded by the ferocity of the US retaliation is an important point to
dwell over. For if true, it to some measure undermines a central premise of this paper; that being
that if AQ could go back in time, it would still have pulled the trigger on 9/11. There is certainly
a precedent for the contrary under similar circumstances in another terrorist locale. In the

15

aftermath of the 2nd Lebanon War, it was Hezbollah chief Hassan Nassrallah who categorically
admitted that had he known the operation to capture two Israeli soldiers would lead to a war at
this time and of this magnitudewould I do it? I say no, absolutely not. (Haaretz, 2006)
But is that the case here? Many scholars seem to think so. (Fishman, 2011) For example,
Fawaz Gerges concludes that, it is doubtful if Bin Laden would have instigated the bombings
had he known what to expect. (Gerges, p.92) Others back up this claim by invoking an
exclusive interview given by Noman Benotman, a former UBL confidant who trained in
Afghanistan and led the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in the summer of 2000. Benotman
appeared to be more than convinced; in fact he was 100% sure they [AQ] had no clue about
what was going to happen. (Green, 2010) Dovetailing with McCabes assessment, Benotman
revealed that AQ in fact made a mockery of a prospective US retaliation, figuring that if the US
launched 75 cruise missiles and 8 people got killed following the East Africa bombings, this
time, maybe they will launch 200 and they laughed about this. (Ibid.) Though Benotmans
accounts are anecdotal, they are corroborated by the testimony of a former CIA officer who was
an active player on the front against AQ. Wishing to remain anonymous, the officer reported that
several captured terrorists have said publicly that AQ never expected the towers to fall. Their
goal was to frighten people and impact the US economy, so they really didnt plan for the
massive response the US launched. (Ibid.)
Prima facie, one can conclude AQ got more than they bargained for and perhaps view--at
least internally--9/11 as a gross mistake. While this contention will be tackled in the coming
sections, its worth notingas some arguethat even if AQ expected and deliberately intended
to goad US troops into Afghanistan, they certainly underestimated the USs staying power.
Considering AQs longer-term objective of driving the US out of such locales, the resilience
the US has exhibited in Afghanistan has ostensibly rendered its bleed-America-to-bankruptcy
strategy (i.e. ensnaring the US in expensive military engagement in Islamic countries)
counterproductive. (Fishman, p.9)
In formulating its anti-US strategy (of which 9/11 was the primer), AQ seemingly
operated under a selective reading of history that was neither relevant nor applicable to the
context at hand. (Smith, 2007, p.25) Inspired by Paul Kennedys Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers--and using the collapse of the USSR and the Roman Empire as comparative models-AQ extrapolated that it could coax the US into imperial overreach and doom its empire like

16

the historical antecedents. But as McCabe points out, they ignore the fact that Kennedy was
wrong, that it was the USSR that collapsed, at least partially from imperial overreach (including
the costs of its inner empire), and that 20 years later the US is still very much the central power
of the world and will remain so for the foreseeable future. (McCabe, p.62)
Moreover, like the Soviet invasion before it, AQ envisioned a US military entry as an
opening act that would galvanize an ocean of Muslim recruits to rise up and violently resist. Here
again, AQ is convicted of cherry-picking historical facts. For one, the Afghan jihad was a
response to a flagrant Soviet invasion and occupation. The legitimacy and religious imprimatur it
garnered was undisputed. Clarion calls for Jihad trumpeted trenchantly on every Muslim street
corner; drawing thousands of vengeful volunteers thirsting to defend their beleaguered brethren.
In contrast, the US invaded Afghanistan only after AQ wantonly murdered 3,000 of its noncombatant citizens. While expecting a full house and a repeat performance, this time the seats
would be empty. The victory party was short-lived for AQ and the morning hangover brutal. As
many in the Islamic world condemned their dastardly acts, AQ and their uninformed hosts
awoke to face Americas wrath on their own. (Gerges, p.91) Interestingly, AQs apparently
poor or distorted construal of history, and the unfounded optimism it engenders, is a
confirmation bias thats beset many a terrorist groups in history. (Smith) AQ was just its latest
victim.
Intended to mobilize the masses in an ideological heavy weight battle, 9/11 appeared to
join the Muslim world on the US side of the ring leaving AQ in the lurch. As the US pummeled
the group from on one end, Muslim intelligence and military apparatuses offered their services
on another. True, many of them had less than convivial stances vis--vis Jihadi groups to begin
with. But for countries like Pakistan, Jihadi groups constituted strategic assets in securing its
interests in neighboring Afghanistan and destabilizing Indian-administered Kashmir. (Shahzad,
2011) Nonetheless, 9/11 empowered the US not to take no as an answer. Reluctantly or not,
countries bent to the will of a scowling Bush administration and ran to do its bidding in the fight
against AQ. The noose around AQ was tightening from all directions. Fleeing Jihadists crossing
Afghanistans western border must have been nonplussed to discover that even Americas Shiite
nemesisIran--was chipping in; rounding up and detaining hundreds of fighterssome of
which were transferred to the custody of US interrogators. (CBS, 2008) To the South and West
of the country, Pakistans contributions were even more bodacious. As AQ fighters made a

17

beeline for Pakistans tribal boondocks, the latters best of the best waited to greet them. 402 of
UBLs top lieutenants and operatives would be detained in all; the infamous Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and Abu Zubayda among then. (AP, 2002) Those that managed to make it found no
repose. With the Pakistani military launching their first of many anti-Taliban campaigns in June
2002, South Waziristan would become more an AQ preserve than a hospitable sanctuary.
(Shahzad)
At the vertex of its power in its pre-9/11 years AQ boasted a force of roughly 4,000
fighters. (Gerges, p.128) By some estimates, that number would be truncated by 3/4 just two
months later. (Shahzad, p.2) And today, US intelligence officials claim a paltry 50-100 active
members to be left in Afghanistan. On the face of it, 9/11 sowed the seeds for AQs own
disembowelment. The US invasion of Iraq did give it a new lease on lifeone it bungled
perversely. For that, its disjointed post 9/11 structure was largely responsible.

AQs Post 9-11 Collective Action and Management Problems

No longer was AQ longer the cohesive and centrally controlled machine of years past. Its
post 9/11 flight from Afghanistan rived its cogs in every direction. Whoever was to pickup the
reins of Jihad would have to do so distally; outside the purview of AQs now largely titular
leadership. The implications of this transformation were significant, leading to a host of
collective-action problems that plague the movement to this day. (Jones, 2008) Unable to steer
policy through organizational fiats, AQ Centrals stewardship of strategy and tactics was
effectively limited. As Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones write in their 2008 article
Why AQ May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think:
A network, as in a hierarchy, complex decisions have to be made regarding resource
allocation, tactics, whether and when to use violence, what social and political levers to
manipulate, and so on. Because these decisions will not flow from centralized leadership,
decision- making is likely to be a complicated, protracted process as all members try to have a
sayor go their own way. (Ibid. p.21)
Thus, AQ in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab Zarqawis gruesome sectarian attacks on Iraq
Shiites went forward without evaluation, coordination, and a sober assessment of the overall
benefits and risks. (Ibid.) When a disappointed upper-management did catch up to him (as
featured in the famed 2005 Zawahiri letter), what they encountered was blithe obduracy. Despite

18

operating under the organizational brand name, Zarqawi showed himself to be an unruly
employee. Had AQ-Central (AQC) the luxury of vetting its franchise managers, its unlikely
that the hotheaded and seemingly pathological Zarqawi would have made the cut. But in the post
9/11 environment, that prerogativeenjoyed by hierarchized structures--was all but lost.
The collective action problems that attended AQs decentralized evolution in the post9/11 world continue to beset the movement to this day. AQC fractious control over AQIs
unsavory methods was no aberration. Other subsidiary groupsAl Shabaab and AQMI to name
a fewhave also drawn reproach for their odious, draconian treatment of civilianparticularly
Muslim--populaces under their effective control. (Wabala, 2012) Needless to say, images of
charred, mangled bodies dont exactly win you a large fan base. As John Mueller writes, With
the September 11 attacks and subsequent activity, bin Laden and his followers mainly succeeded
in uniting the world, including its huge Muslim population, against their violent global jihad.
(Stewart, 2012, p.92)
AQs apparently dismal poll ratings are frequently cited to underscore this claim. One
such pollthe centerpiece of the book Who Speaks for Islam? (2008)was a corollary of a
studious 6 year Gallup study (2001-2007) composed of tens of thousands of hour-long, face-toface interviews with a sample (which the authors claim represented more than 90% of the worlds
1.3 billion Muslims) from more than 35 predominantly Muslim countries. Canvassed regarding
their views of the 9/11 attacks, the collated responses give us ostensible room to exhale: Only
7% told pollsters they saw the attacks as completely justified. (Esposito, 2008) If thats too
parochial for some, recent polls provide a more general outlook of AQs festering reputation.
According to the latest 2013 Pew study of 11 Muslim publics, 57% evinced an unfavorable
view of the organization while half or more expostulated its use of suicide bombings and
targeting of civilians in the name of Islam. (Pew, 2013) More importantly, and perhaps
betokening the common ground that can be forged with the moderate majority, a median of 67%
say they are somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremism in their countries.
AQs souring public support is not just a cosmetic stain but a vicissitude that many claim
carries operational, if not existential, constraints. The blow its legitimacy has endured, some
argue, is translating into few skilled recruits and fewer shelters. (Gerges, p.127) Their current

19

manpower withering and the recruitment pool to replenish it drying up, the best they can do is
hope that one or a few of these disillusioned and radicalized young Muslims who live in the
West, such as the failed Christmas Day Bomber or the times Square plotter, get to their bunkers
and acquire the explosives training to carry out an attack at home. (Ibid. p. 25)
Here again, AQs collective action problems rear their dirty heads. Its Jihadi University
of Afghanistan destroyed, AQ has passed the buck to autonomous and local Jihadists to fill its
operational void. But unlike the days of old, a decentralized AQ no longer possesses the ability
to winnow out the quality and capable of operatives. This foible is salient in the relative
shoddiness of AQs post-hierarchy operations. In this respect, the poor training and lack of
operationalparticularly securityskills displayed by autonomous AQ members has scuppered
numerous would-be attacks and, at times, shot the organization in the foot.
One such case was Zuhair Hilal Mohammed al-Tubaitis plot to attack US naval vessels
in the Straits of Gibraltar. Denied the blessings of AQ higher-ups, al-Tubaiti decided to
experiment on his own rather than wait for further instructions. Lacking the requisite operational
training, al-Tubaiti was quickly arrested by Moroccan authorities. Under questioning, the omerta
typical of trained AQ recruits was a no show; al-Tubaiti spilled the beans on his handlers, and in
doing so, harmed the wider organization via his betrayal of sensitive information. (Jones, p.38)
Some security missteps committed by poorly trained informal operatives are even more
prosaic. For instance, the London bombers were known to be carrying their communications
through easily monitored phones; that intelligence authorities could conceivably listen in was a
memo they apparently never received. (Stringer, 2007)
The lack of a formal boot camp base has also forced prospective operatives into the
precarious affair of improvised training; a regimen that often leaves them with fewer limbs (or
none at all) and no effectual explosive device. (AP, 2013) The Casablanca bombers, for
instance, were forced to train haphazardly with jury-rigged explosives on weekend camping
trips. Many of their finished products were erratic, with only one resulting in mass casualties.
(Jones, p.39) Autonomous operatives can refer to online bomb-making guides all they want
nothing can substitute the intimate hands-on instruction typical of AQs pre 9/11 workshops.
Perhaps most consequential for the absence of an untrammeled pedagogic venue is the

20

loss of a medium for integrating prospective recruits into the AQ ethos. As any serviceman can
tell you, beyond learning the fundamentals of the trade, boot camps are critical for forging
strong social ties, unity of purpose, and a clear sense of belong among unacquainted inductees.
(Jones, p.41) Given that many scholars are convinced that the yearning for an endearing
camaraderie constitutes a principal allure for joining the ranks of terrorist groups, the loss of
Afghanistan as a plantation for brotherhood and unity cannot go underappreciated.

Closing Arguments
The aim of this chapter was to highlight the compelling pieces of evidence that cast much
doubt on this papers central premise; that 9/11 was a considerable boon for AQ and that-allowed to go back in timeit would still press the attack button. The evidence opposing this
contention ison the face of itoverwhelming. Jihadists themselvesamong them senior AQ
leaders and operativeshave heavily inveighed on UBLs decision to carry out 9/11. It was a
decision that made them witnesses to an execrable sight; the evisceration of a talented and
dedicated wave of mujahedeen, along with their families, homes, and acts of glory that would
never have a chance to flower. Those that made it out alive continue to bare the consequences of
that rubberstamped policy to this day; forever looking over their heads for the drones above and
enduring furtive, peripatetic lives as fugitives.
In addition to the destruction of vast amounts of tacit operational knowledge, resources,
and infrastructure--the forced evolution to a decentralized entity has facilitated collective action
problems with pestilent effects. As a result, the AQ brand name has been defiled, its affinity
with the Muslim world decimated, and its operational wherewithal made effete. Devolved into a
web of desperate local affiliates and cells, many now question whether AQ has the ability to
plan and execute complex attacks. (Gerges, 2009, p. 40) As former CIA director Leon Panetta
acknowledged, Its pretty clear from the intelligence we are getting that they are having a
difficult time putting together any kind of command and control, and they are scrambling.
(Finn, 2010)
To make matters worse, AQ appears to be in dire financial straits. According to an email
authored by AQs counterintelligence unit, the group is losing the espionage war due to the
very low budget they have to underwrite activities. (Jacobs, 2011) Here, credit can be given to
the WoTs global anti-fundraising front, which has put a serious dent into AQs post 9/11

21

coffers. While pre-9/11 the USs interdiction of AQ-related financial entities could be described
as tepid, it has been relentless ever since. On this count, the disruption of AQs sources
facilitators, and conduits, primarily through deaths and arrests, has made funds less available and
their movement more difficult. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p.14)
On a closing note, the goal AQ had intended to realize with 9/11that of instigating an
anti-western insurrection in the Muslim world--remains a pipe dream. AQs methods and
ideology have been resoundingly rejected and consigned to the radical fringes of Muslim public
opinion.

Chapter 2: The Strategic Mastery of 9/11

Looking at the picture in chapter 1, its easy to conclude 9/11 as a miserable failure.
However, the picture presented was captured though a figurative low resolution lens. It
therefore came out distorted; some of its profound features obfuscated or rendered 2dimensional. Therefore, in the proceeding chapter we will move up in pixels, alternate our
angles, and give ourselves a deeper and holistic understanding of the issue at hand. In doing so,
the picture will be sharper: 9/11was an astounding AQ success story.

9/11: Bin Ladens Power Play

By the mid-90s, UBLs grand vision of assembling a global Islamic army for extirpating
Western hegemony looked dead in the water. The jihadi community bogged down in local
projects (i.e. the Jihadi theatres of Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Bosnia, and the
Philippines)UBLs bold, quixotic proposal saw few buyers. (Brown, 2011) The ideological
and strategic fault lines dividing the Jihadi community were unmistakable. One on end were
those who wanted no part in divesting from the greater cause of cleansing their respective
domains of apostate rule and laying the ground work for the ultimate liberation of Palestine.
(Brooke) For them, attacking the West and drawing the ire of the worlds most powerful war
machine was seen as a frivolous distraction at best, and a patented death sentence at worst. With
Muslims besieged in Bosnia and Chechnya, certainlyin terms of theological jurisprudence
especiallythe priority shouldnt be placed on tangential enemies. (Brown) Opposing this
assessment were those who argued the converse: It was the fight against the Western-backed

22

local regimes that was the real death sentence. Bankrolled by Western largesse and armed to the
teeth with its weaponry, disposing of Islams apostate establishment was viewed by this group as
a futile affair. Their western-backed campaigns of repression were simply indomitable. To make
any headway meant first defanging the beasts and sheering off their roots of power: America and
the West. Only then would the regimes fall and the road to Jerusalem beckon.
UBL would spend long, frustrating years trying to convert the former group to his own
but nobody was listening. Spilling salt on the wound was the volte-face of many of his dispirited
legionnaires. While UBL saw the value in buying influence in his new Sudanese host-state
through sprawling civil affairs projects, the dreary assignments failed to whet the action-teeth of
many of his followers. (Farrall, 2011) As such, many deserted UBL to chase adventure in Jihadi
theatres elsewhere. In the doldrums, UBL sought to buy his way towards fealty--doling out
money to Jihadi groups from Algeria to the Philippines. It would all be for naught, however
many showed little interest in sacrificing both local objectives and operational autonomy. Having
to flee Sudan for Afghanistan, UBLs unification travails continued.
By 1996 UBLs meager following appeared to be fading into irrelevance; reduced to
some 30 members and overshadowed by the panoply of competing Jihadi training-camps. (Ibid.)
His campaign of persuasion all but exhausted, UBL opted to up the ante; formally declaring war
on the US and bombing US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and later the USS Cole in
2000. Though the bravado afforded AQ worldwide notoriety as the only jihadi group that not
only dared but also succeeded in directly confronting US hegemony in the heartlands of the Arab
world, it was still unable to overcome its enduring marginality or emerge as a vanguard in the
late 1990s Jihadi milieu. (Brown, p.102) The subsumption of a threadbare and financially
bankrupt Egyptian Islamic Jihad under the AQ flag in 2001 hardly affirmed that a page had been
turned (in the end, just 5 EIJ membersincluding Zawahiri himself--joined AQs core cadre).
(Farall)
AQs last-ditch effort at uniting the Jihadi masses behind his global campaign had to be
big. All else failed, there was no other way. If the nearsighted Jihadi mlange couldnt look
westward, then the West had to be brought eastward. In doing so, the battle against the US could
transpire locallycaptivating the wrath of the larger Jihadi community and hopefully, the

23

Islamic world. The name of the game was 9/11 and it proceeded as planned.

Provoking a Battle of Identities: Americas Cowboy Mentality

If one man could be credited with nurturing the philosophy that eventuated in the 9/11
attacks it would be Ayman al-Zawahiri. Though then #2 in AQs organizational hierarchy,
Zawahiri was nonetheless UBLs spiritual mentor and the ideological thrust behind the decision
to flout the organizations 9/11 naysayers and proceed with the attacks. (Shahzad) What
Zawahiri cultivated in the mind of UBL was profound and harks back to one of this papers
central motifs.
In a 2004 Terrorism Monitor interview, Saad al-Faqih, a widely acknowledged AQ
expert who heads the Saudi opposition group MIRA, explains that:
Zawahiri impressed upon Bin Laden the importance of understanding the American
mentality. The American mentality is a cowboy mentality-- if you confront them with their
identity theoretically and practically they will react in an extreme manner. In other words,
America with all its resources and establishments will shrink into a cowboy when irritated
successfully. They will then elevate you and this will satisfy the Muslim longing for a leader
who can successfully challenge the West. (Abedin, 2004)
In other words, what Zawahiri hoped to accomplish through 9/11 was rile the Dionysian
flames of two cultures and pit their inherent identity complexes against one another. In the US
case, its idiosyncratic cowboy mentality is entwined with American exceptionalism; a
national zeitgeist anchored in (at least in contemporary terms) the vanity of being the worlds
sole, enduring democratic super power and concomitant leader of the free world. (Meiser,
2012) This latter mantle was largely born out of the bi-polar world of the cold war when the
forces of freedom and liberalism squared off against the dark and godless communist empire.
That the former prevailed while the latter collapsed was to some theodicean justice; affirming
Americas role as a force for good or the shining city upon a hill. (Ceaser, 2012) This credo,
some argue, perennial influences US foreign policy to this day. As historian Walter Nugent
writes, fueling US foreign policy is a conviction that it is not tainted with evil or self-serving
motives. (Nugent, 2008, p.xiv) Americans, rather, are exceptions to the moral infirmities that
plague the rest of humankind, because our ideals are pure. Like their founding fathers who saw

24

themselves as the vanguard of an English civilization that was leading humanity into the
future, many 20th century American leaders believed in the countrys duty to employ its force
for the elevation of the spirit of the human race. (Restad, 2012, p.59-60) Though this entails
US expansion or intervention in the affairs of other nations, the cause of helping other nations
become more like itself is pure. Because inside every foreigner there is the potential, even the
desire, to be an Americanwhether they realize it or not. (Ibid. p.62)
The veracity of American exceptionalism is moot. Whether true or not, and semantics
aside, it is sedimented in the American ethos and identity. The US is thus exceptional as long as
Americans believe it to be exceptional. (Ibid. p. 70) Still, it must be qualified that American
society is by no means a monolith trapped in a sclerotic belief system. Ideas and perceptions
change and evolve in lockstep with the generations that foster them. But for all intents and
purposes, the American public and leadership of pre and post 9/11 firmly believed in American
preeminence (cultural and military) and the need to defend it. 61% of respondents in one poll
believed that America is a nation specially blessed by God. (Vu, 2008) Moreover, a 2002 Pew
poll found that 60% of Americans believed their culture is superior to others. (Pew, 2011)
True, most Western cultures (according to polls) are partial towards their own. But what
separates the US from others is the military power that provides its superciliousness unparalleled
weight. On this count, 59% of respondents surveyed in 2001 pre-9/11 Gallup poll viewed
maintaining superior military power world wide as a very important goal. (Gallup, 2002,
p.57) Asked the degree of role the US should play in solving International problems, 73%
responded with either leading role (16%) or major role (57%). (Ibid. p.56) Furthermore, in the
2002 Pew poll cited above, 62% of respondents agreed that the US should get even with any
country that tries to take advantage of it, and that the the best way to ensure peace is through
military strength. (Pew, 2012)
Though 80% of Americans today still believe that the US has a unique character because
of its history and Constitution that sets it apart from other nations as the greatest in the world,"
12 years of costly overseas military commitments have seen the above numbers slightly decline.
But the point here is how, taken together, this sentiment radiates the cowboy mentality
perceived in other parts of the world. Al-Zawahiri keenly understood Americas conceited selfimage and astutely manipulated it to jolt the country to its defense. Simply put, you dont hijack

25

4 planes, crash them into a superpowers prestigious national landmarks--killing thousands of its
citizens in the process--and expect the US to just lob a few missiles at you. The aforementioned
scholars who subscribe to such sophistry are fooling themselves. As former head of the CIAs
UBL unit Michael Scheuer remarked, I would like to believe that bin Laden was shocked and
dismayed by what we did after 9/11, but I come hard up against an awful lot of evidence that
that's exactly what he wanted. (Green)
In short, AQ knew the US would flex its muscles, and frankly, the US may have even
relished the opportunity to do so. Having defeated the defeated the evil empire the preceding
decade, the entrance of radical Islam as its successor fit perfectly into its narrative as the
defender of good. With 9/11, the US could once again burnish its credentials as the vanguard of
virtue and bask in the vainglory of confronting evil. As Michael Mazarr writes in his book
Unmodern Men in the Modern World, beyond the USs refusal to take seriously the social and
psychological foundations of Islamist thought and anger, US policies towards radical Islamism
reflects an, apparent wish or need on the part of the US for a new enemy to battle after the Cold
War, for new dragons to slay in the name of strength and credibility and heroism. There is no
question that AQ and other selected radicals wanted a war with the US. The strategic question,
on September 12, 2001, was whether it made sense for the US to give them one. (Mazarr, 2007,
p.19-20)

Islams Identity Crisis: On Top of the World

The US response to 9/11 was a godsend for AQ. With the attacks they managed to
activate the defense mechanism of one cultural identity (US) and leverage it to prime another
(Islam). AQ understood very well the Muslim malaise in the age of modernitythey were
among its casualties. Theylike their progenitors before themwere lodged in an endless
existential morass from which they stumbled to find an exit.
For roughly a 1,000 years everything had made sense in the Islamic world. A sense of
meaning was easily derivable; they were the exalted ones, chosen by God to bestride the globe
with his dominion. Their successes in following through were prophetic-like and became in
many ways the standard against which Muslims have measured Gods support for their cause.
(Ibid. p.133) The Islamic kingdom, stretching from the Iberian Peninsula in the West to the

26

borders of China and the Indian subcontinent in the East, appeared to be the hallmark of
heavenly craftsmanship. Nothing could stand in its way; the rich, vibrant, and mighty
civilizations of centuries past collapsed to their knees while roughly 1 million of its peoples
became shackled and enslaved. (Scott, 2011) Islam was on top of the worldjust as God had
intended. From a psychological perspective, the primacy and seeming validation of divine will
served as an existential balm for the Islamic nation. Ontological clarity and purpose in an
otherwise cryptic world were secured, and the existential vacuum filled to the top. But soon
everything turned on its head; this equilibrium was upset and the ontological niche fizzled.
Though their setbacks arguably began at the Gates of Vienna in 1683, by the 1820s,
historian Stephen Humphreys writes, Muslim armies were suffering one disastrous defeat after
another, while their once omnipotent rulers were being compelled to sign humiliating treaties
with Britain, France, and Russia. (Humphreys, 1999, p.185) An era of soul-searching ensued
that continues to this day.

Down in the Dumps

Once Gods proxy at the throne of the physical world--now the obeisant subjects of
ungodly, dissolute infidels? Something had clearly gone amiss in the Islamic world. The if you
cant beat them, copy them approach adopted by Islams contemporaneous Ottoman rulers only
added to the abject debasement. That Islam itself lacked the answers and deigned to turn to
Occidentalists for enlightenment was an impugnment of Islamic apotheosis. And yet the
imitation project peddled onward, as the Ottoman Empire pursued modernization and often
explicit Westernization in an effort to catch up to the West they both admired and despised.
(Mazarr, p.134) But by the early decades of the 20th century this reclamation project hit a snag.
The conclusion of World War 1 would culminate in the dismemberment of the once prestigious
Caliphate and the arrogation of power by Arab aristocrats and their European Protectors. In one
swoop, this backroom, Faustian agreement (i.e. Sykes Picot treaty) sold out Islamic unity
together with its pride. The indelible ignominy of this watershed would be poignant throughout
the Islamic-Arab world for years ahead.
Despite this historical nadir, glimmers of hopethrough a chimera of Pan-Arabism
appeared to be on the horizon. Free from the drag of Western colonialism, the Arab-Muslim
world sought to resurrect its identity and standing yet againthis time on its own terms.

27

Through Arab Nationalism or Pan-Arabism, Arabs could once again become a great people who
would command the respect of the world. (Brown C. E., 1992, p.160-164) But how it was to
manifest seemed to reek of de javu. Like their Ottoman predecessors, Arab rulers embarked on a
campaign of structural catch up; superimposing secular modernity in hope of closing the power
gap vis--vis the West. That there was something fake about the facsimiled Western identity
writ large among the Muslim masses. It was not an identity they could be proud about.
As psychologist Fathali Moghaddam helps explains, a psychological demand placed on
individuals by societies is to achieve an authentic identity, and this social demand creates a
need in each of us which our lives are spent trying to satisfy. (Moghaddam, p.26) But more
than that, there are twoat times conflictingemphases that humans desire in their identities:
The first is that it is viewed positively by fellow-out groups. The second is that it is viewed as
distinct and unique. Whether one values the positive feature vs. the distinct is subject to cultural
context. In the West, for instance, the former is largely prioritized (hence the ease of immigrant
assimilation in the US. In contrast, in Islamic communities, the higher priority challenge is for
them to retain or manufacture a distinct, different identity. (Ibid. p.28) Failure to do so becomes
a crushing blow to ones self esteem. As mentioned earlier, the US may operate under the
assumption that everyone aspires to be like it. But for many Muslims, becoming good copies
of the West is tantamount to selling out their souls and dignity. (Ibid. p. 42) And that is exactly
how many Muslims viewed the Nasserist reforms of the 50s and 60s.
Many had high hopes for secular-nationalism; particularly the new and educated middle
class. But its bitter disappointmentsthe barriers to social mobility, political expression, and the
climactic, ignominious 1967 defeat against Israel--only accentuated Islams visceral contempt
for ape-like Westernization schemes. Education and literacy may have been on the rise, but this
was a curse in disguise. The entrepreneurial, alienated and intelligent young men had nowhere to
turn for meaning in their lives. They were left with little for to salve their existential wounds in
any way other than armed rebellion. (Mazzar, p.195) Referring again to Frankls 3 avenues for
the achievement of meaning: Elitist controlled economies denied Muslims meaning through
self-actualization (i.e. Work and Creativity); and the failures of Pan-Arabism for providing a
viable identity of esteem and self-worth denied them meaning through Human Encounter and
Love. What was left was meaning through Hardship and Affliction. Helping them realize

28

this meaning and offering the belonging they craved were the forces of radical Islam.

At Loggerheads: Islamism and Secular Modernity

It must be clarified that the pillars for an Islamic revival were laid well before the failures
of Pan-Arabism; its collapse was just its point of efflorescence. Indeed, for Islamic intellectuals
such as Rashid Ridah, Hassan al-Banna, and Sayid Qutbthe writing was on the wall. All three
were seminal in both diagnosing the ills plaguing Muslim society and prescribing its cure.
Though they diverged in the cures mode of deliverywith Qutb advocating violent
insurrectionthey were in harmony with the end result: A return to the fundamentalist,
unadulterated form of Islam as was practiced during its hegemonic Golden era. It wasnt that
God didnt exist or that he had abandoned the Ummah; rather the Ummah that abandoned him.
What these three highbrow thinkers had in common was a brooding assessment of Islamic
atrophy in the modern world.
Decades earlier, a series of scientific earth-quakes shook the foundation of religious
epistemology, calling into question a plethora of verities long propagated throughout the theistic
world. Whether the Darwinian theory of evolution or Leeuwenhoeks discovery of microbiology,
the prevailing themes of rationalism and humanism as the answer to earthly ontology presented a
menacing rebuttal to the folklores of the past. But that Muslims/Arabs were imbibing such
profanities as the answer-- yet their societies nonetheless continued down the path of decadence
and Western subserviencewas self-discrediting. In the eyes of al-Banna and Qutb, it was rather
Western secularism that was on shaky epistemological grounds:
Its foundations are crumbling, and its institutions and guiding principles are falling
apart. Its political foundations are being destroyed by dictatorships, and its economic foundations
are being swept away by crises. The millions of its wretched unemployed and hungry offer their
testimony against it, while its social foundations are being undermined by deviant ideologies and
revolutions which are breaking out everywhere. (Abu-Rabi, 1996, p.81)
Western civilization as a whole, they cautioned, was bankrupt and is in decline. (Ibid.)
And unless Muslims restore the true Islamic spirit that brought them 1000 years of greatness,
theyd be next in line. (Ibid. p. 142) The extent that Salafi thinkers, such as al-Banna and Qutb,
are terrified of Western materialism cannot go understated. In their view, man is not capable of
rectitude without the belief in a God who is an active participant in the creation and
preservation of the universe and the lives of humans. (Ibid. p. 152) Nor can he live

29

meaningfully without a doctrine capable of explaining the universal character of man in the
universe. (Ibid. p.148) Because it is this revelatory doctrine that is his guide in the complexity
of life. (Ibid. p.149) In the eyes of Qutb, a sinister effort is being waged by the forces of
Westernism to exterminate this religion as even a basic creed and to replace it with notions,
categories, and ideas that are solely derived from facts, senses, and experiments. (Ibid. p.150)
The belief that empiricism can obsolete faith rests on the fallacious premise of a) an unlimited
innate ability of man to rationally transcend the human predicament. (Ibid. p.149) And b) that
even God can be grasped and manipulated rationally. Against this, Qutb draws inspiration from
Alexis Carrels Man the Unknown (1935), quoting him directly:
Although men and women have joyfully welcomed modern civilization, because of the
material comforts it has to offer, modern man is not as well-balanced, emotionally and
intellectually, as was classical manModern civilization seems to be incapable or producing
people endowed with imagination, intelligence, and courage. In practically every country there is
a decrease in the intellectual and moral caliber of those who carry the responsibility of public
affairs. Thus it is unable to produce men of sufficient intelligence and audacity to guide it
along the dangerous road on which it is stumbling. Born from the whims of scientific
discoveries, it is not calibrated with our real nature, nor adjusted to our size and shape.
Like Frankl, Qutb believes in the innate human quest for self-transcendence; the locus of his
true freedom. As cited in the introduction, Frankl posits something similar; arguing that man
becomes more human the more he transcends the self in pursuit of higher cause. But whereas
Frankl leaves room for this pursuit through temporal modes of altruism, for Qutb, the only
avenue for achieving ultimate and highest sphere of human consciousness is religion. (Ibid.
p.154)
Its worth noting that from an evolutionary perspective, altruism has played an
indispensible role in ensuring human survival and prosperity. (Anwar, 2009) Inferable from
Qutbs polemics on Capitalism and its attendant moral disintegration, is the idea that without
deference to God and his precepts of probity, what is to prevent man from succumbing to base
and materialistic selfishness? (Abu-Rabi, p. 161) With materialism replacing spiritualism, mans
idee fixe becomes self-interest and hedonism; a malady that fulminates into a state of spiritual,
mental, and psychological chaos, and the ultimate collapse of human society. (Ibid. p.158) The
truthwhich may consternate someis that while Qutbs prescribed cure for these ailments
(violent jihad and insurrection) are undoubtedly extreme and brutishhis prognosis of modern

30

society is in harmony with that of many acclaimed, contemporary social psychologists.

One such psychologist who eloquently articulates Qutbs apprehension is Peter Berger.
Berger writes of the dangers of secular societies wherein moral absoluteness is supplanted by
moral relativity. The former, he argues, concretizes normative consistency and coherence, and is
crucial for instilling mutual expectations of behavior. The latter, however, muddles these
expectations and consequently, arouses an aura of insecurity within social interactions. In such a
state:
A person will not be able to give reasons for acting in one way rather than another; his
or her actions must appear completely arbitrary and no one would be able to expect that he or she
would not completely change in character in the next moment. Therefore, individuals no longer
responsible for their actions cannot maintain the mutual obligation of social relationships. The
minimum of mutual respect that is essential for the existence of communities of life and
therefore for the whole of a society would be lost. (Berger, 1995, p.60-61)
Potential anarchy of such deeply perturbed Qutb and al-Banna, who saw these symptoms
as slowly fermenting within modern day Muslim societies. Rationalism and humanism had failed
and was leading them to ruin. Moral absoluteness, certainty and the answer to the question
implied in mans finitude could only be found in religion. (Ibid. p.152,154) God and Islam,
therefore, had to be restored as the dominant authority in all affairs and spheres of human life.
This is abundantly clear in the Muslim-Brotherhoods charter which states, I shall work toward
re-establishing Islams leading role in thought and moralsI shall fight against free-thinking
and atheism that threatens Islams leading role. (Hussein, 1956, p.300) When Islam was in
the drivers seat--the Umah thrived and reigned supreme. When it wasntthe Umah
degenerated and ultimately groveled in fetters before the infidels. Secular Pan-Arabism was an
albatross that had to go.

The Islamic Solution Under Assault

As already suggested, the Arabs humiliating defeat in the 67 war was arguably the coupe
de grace for the credibility of Pan-Arabism. Though it would make a short-lived comeback with
the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war and the 1973 oil crisis, these marginal victories went on
quite paradoxicallyto compound the Muslim existential crisis for two reasons.
First, if before the oil boom there was little imperative for heeding the voice of the Arab

31

street, now, the rulers atop sky-high mountains of cash wouldnt hear a single decibel. With a
deluge of money flowing into their pockets, Arab autocrats felt indomitable, and consequently,
impassive towards the humiliating plight of their subjects. Rather than secure prosperous futures
for their populaces and erect the institutions needed to sustain it, these ruling arrivistes luxuriated
in their opulence, muffled descent, while doling out occasional thank you for being quiet
indemnities in charades of munificence. (Moghaddam) Muslim self-worth would sink to new
lows. And beyond the religious domain they had few cathartic or ameliorative outlets.
Second, the skyrocketing, insatiable Western dependence on Arab oilin addition to
heightening cross-cultural exposure and influencessaw the former adopt dispositions of
realpolitik vis--vis their relations with Middle Eastern suppliers. So long as oil and commerce
were flowing uninterruptedly through the spigots, Western powers (though not rhetorically)
could ignore the draconian essence of their business partners. This carte blanche would not be
lost in the minds of Muslims in the years of head. Though they had sloughed off the protectorate
skin of years past, Western colonialismunder the guise of cultural imperialismendured
notwithstanding.
On the backs of bustling trade deals rode cultural exchanges of Muslim students and
businessmen into Western countries, and Western ideas, norms, and Westerners into the heart of
the Islamic world. Against this backdrop, Muslim natives and visitors alike began to observe
and describe what they saw as the moral degeneracy and consequent weakness of Western
civilization. (Mazzar, p.136) Their [Muslim] sense of moral superiority and concern about
the importation of the Western degeneracy virus under the cloak of Westernization set the stage
for the arrival of radical Islamism. (Hassan, 2003, p.124) The psychological effects of these
encounters were far-reaching and they were nothing short of a challenge of pluralism; the
breakdown of taken-for-granted tradition and the opening up of multiple options for beliefs,
values, and lifestyles. (Mazzar, p.41) One Muslim writer, who spent a year teaching Arabic
literature at Berkeley, described his contempt for the Wests, total individualism, the control of
multinationals, the manipulation of the media over the ordinary person. Adding that there are
no moral values, no broad-minded attitudes toward life in general or a sense of what is
happening in the world. (Ibid, p.58) Famed Egyptian playwright and columnist Mohamed
Salmawy professed a collective apprehension that, Liberalism was a Trojan horse for the West

32

to creep into Egypt and dominate it and endanger its identity. Identity is very important here.
(Remnick, 2004)
Relating again to TMT, its worth recalling the emollient utility of culture. Living life in
a vacuum of ontological certainty isfor mostan utterly dreadful thought. Forced to stare this
abyss straight in eye, our psyches might collapse under the weight. Preserving our sanity, as a
sort of self-therapeutic device, is culture. It works to infuse reality with order, stability, meaning
and permanence and gives us an appreciation that we are a significant contributor to this
meaningful reality. (Pyszczynsk, 2004,p.830) It is thus the foundation for our mental stability
and our sense of belonging. We are housed in an in-group; one that has found absolute truth
and the understanding of our existential purpose. As the sole proprietors of that truth, we are
buoyed with esteem and self-assurance. Peering through our cultural prisms and its narratives,
we then become persons of value in a world of meaningand thus capable of transcending the
natural boundaries of time and space, and in so doing, eluding death. (Greenberg, 2003, p. 1517, 27) But what if, suddenly, dozens of cultural narratives are available, how can I be sure
mine is valid? (Mazarr, p.85) As I ponder this, the existential protective shell so vital to my
mental stability slowly begins to crumble. If that isnt distressing enough, the ultimate blow
comes when I realize that these alien cultures and values appear to be greatly more successful
and prosperous than that of my own. (Ibid.)
How does one remediate such psychological crises? TMT lists several primary responses:
1) cultural disavowal and the wholesale adoption of competing ideologies; 2) defending my
cultural narrative through the disparagement and derogation of others; 3) attempts at assimilating
and converting competing ideologies; 4) accommodation (i.e. adopting the opposing cultures
appealing aspects and discarding others). Should none of these approaches bear fruit, and those
others persist in holding on to their threatening alternative worldviews, something more drastic
has to be done: If they refuse to join you, beat them---literally. (Greenberg, p. 30-32)
Throughout Islams 20th century tussle with Westernism, approaches 1-4 featured most
prominently. 1 and 4, as mentioned, were effectuated in vain by autocratic Pan-Arabists (i.e.
identity crisis persisted) While approach #2conceptually inaugurated through the 1961
creation of the Muslim World League (MWL)culminated in a gargantuan Saudi-sponsored

33

Dawa campaign for waging an ideological counter-attack; a diffuse attempt at cultural

insulation (Kepel, 2003) Despite this campaigns seemingly non-violent vein, it doubled as a
radicalizing agent for an entire generation of Muslims; many of whom would go onto fight the
Soviets in Afghanistan. By 1991, many of these veterans would return to conclude responses 1-4
as having run its course; it was time to push the envelope.
That Islam was under cultural or ideological attack, besieged by Western powers bent on
effacing the Islamic way of life, was an assessment propagated en masse by leading clerics
across the Islamic world. As the eminent Saudi Islamic scholar Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz
warned in a widely distributed mini-book:
The Muslims today face a barbaric onslaught from their enemies - the Jews, Christians,
atheists, secularists and others. The Islamic lands are being invaded by various forms of
unbelief and deviations; and throughout the Islamic lands the winds of desire and corruption
blow, the likes of which cannot be truly known except by Allah, Lord of the servants. Supported
by a demonic global plan as well as unlimited financial backing, this attack aims at domination
and hegemony over the Islamic world; dividing it, attacking it culturally and morally and
perverting the true image of the Religion. Therefore, it is amongst the priorities of the Islamic
call (dawah) to break this attack and to counter it with every legitimate means of dawah
possible. (Baz, 1999, p.5)
Following the placement of Western troops and military bases in Islams most sacred
country (i.e. Saudi Arabia) in the lead up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, this foreboding
manifested ostentatiously. If anyone doubted or trifled the vociferous Anti-Western alarmism
pervading the mosques and media, they could do so no longer. Western intentions appeared to be
on full display. That 70 womenhaving received drivers licenses in the US and Europe
abruptly dismissed their drivers and began driving around the city on their own was to some no
coincidence at all. (Teitelbaum, 2000, p.30-31) Rather, their profanities were directly related to
the US troop presence, as female American soldiers were seen driving trucks around Riyadh
while (shudder) wearing short pants. This, together with the concurrent, growing calls for
liberal reforms from the more secular elements of the population, exemplified US efforts to
subvert Saudi society and put an end to the rule of religion. (Ibid.) Needless to say, cultural
animus was brimming.
In the ensuing years, this iconoclastic anxiety joined with the collective indignation
stemming from both the US sanctions against Iraq and the backing for the Israeli occupation of

34

Palestine to form a noxious mix of resentment. Invoking TMT once again, how couldMuslims
queried --a community of people accustomed to regard themselves as the sole custodians of
Gods truth, commanded by Him to bring it to the infidels suddenly find themselves dominated
and exploited by those same infidels. (Lewis, 2003, p.21-22) Islamic hegemony is no distant
memory in the Muslim psyche. Their culture once led the world, and it is that very pride in their
past that makes the humiliation of the present so bitter. (Palmer, 2004, p.20-22) This accretion
of vicissitudes posed grievous challenges for both the religious epistemology and ontological
composure of 23% of the world population.
To be sure, US foreign policies werent and arent the principal sources of Muslim
acrimony in and of themselves. No, the bedrock of that rancoras explained-- is the collective
and individual feeling of irrelevance and uncertainty of purpose in a globalizing/modernizing
world. The US is just the epochal mascot, and therefore--a proverbial punching bag. US policy
and cultural imperialism are mere signifiers of a process whose brakes have broken off. Put
succinctly, secularismtogether with its hallmarks of scientific skepticism and rationalismis
sweeping through the Western world and shows no signs of ebbing.

The Secular Storm Approaches

Europe, once the bulwark of world Christianity, is in religious free fall (with the
exception being Islam). (Ames, 2013) In a 2010 survey, just 51% of citizens in the EUs nations
said they believed in God. Ireland, a putative bleeding Catholic country, has seen its religiosity
fall from 69% in 2005, to a striking 47% in 2012. America, long thought as the trends Western
outlier, is moving in a similar downward direction. Though not as acute as is in Europe,
religiosity has fallen from 73% in 2005 to 60% in 2012. (Winston, 2012) Of course, one
shouldnt jumble religion and spirituality. Spiritualitythe belief in a transcendent force or
reality--will remain a part of many peoples lives indefinitely. It provides us with repose from
our daily, material lives, and mollifies us in times of stress. But beyond spirituality, secular
societies have other psychological intermediaries; whether therapy, self-help groups, nature
retreats, yoga classes, and even sports. (Berger) For long, religion filled this capacity. But in the
secular Western world, religious institutions now face a burgeoning market of niche competitors.
For a ballooning Western demographic, religion is no longer the sine qua non of ontological
security. Still, for many in the Muslim world, this has yet to be the case. If anything, Muslims are
on the polar opposite end of the spectrum. This was the case before 9/11 and is so today.

35

One eye-opening study attesting to the extent of this reality was a wide-ranging public
opinion survey carried out by Riaz Hassan in the late 1990s. Sampling Muslims from Indonesia,
Pakistan, Egypt, and Kazakhstan, Hassan asked a series of questions regarding their faith and its
role in the world. One such question was whether the Quran contained all the essential religious
and moral truths required to humanity. Between 92 and 97 percent of the sample responded
with the affirmative. In a follow-up question, asked if they thought, The ideal Muslim society
must be based on the model of early Muslim society under the Prophet, an astonishing 94% of
Pakistanis agreed, along with 59% of Indonesians, and 85% of Egyptians. (Hassan, p.128) In a
more recent study published this past spring, overwhelming majorities in in 37 Muslim countries
(Albania the lone exception) held that one couldnt be a moral person sans belief in a deity.
(Pew, 2013) In MENA and in South-Asia Muslim countries, only one state (Lebanon-64%)
registered below 82% of those supporting this notion.
Taken into consideration, it becomes clear why Muslim countries are terrified of the
atheists and skeptics within their midst; going the lengths of brutally and even mortally
punishing such satanic renegades. (Evans, 2012) The uncertainty of life without prescribed
direction may be liberating for someyet is terrifying for others. As Anthony Giddens writes:
What is distinctive about tradition is that it defines a kind of truth. For someone following a
traditional practice, questions dont have to be asked about alternatives. (Giddens, 2000, p.44)
In this spirit, 61.6% of respondents across 4 large Muslim countries in one survey
indicated that, Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state of uncertainty.
(WPO, 2009) Moreover, a plurality of 47.8% agreed that, After having found a solution to a
problem, I believe it is a waste of time to take into account diverse possible solutions.
Incidentally, 56.6% expressed that they get very upset when things around me arent in their
place. The frenetic pace of change inherent in secular-modern societies, the pluralism or
abundance of choices and alternative lifestyles are all disquieting for cultures wont to certainty.
And when Muslims peer up at the tempest of licentious secularity overtaking the Western
world, they cant help but be alarmed that its coming their way.
We shouldnt kid ourselves either. In the end, for all its obvious appeals and rewards,
modernization is a form of cultural imperialism. (Mazzar, p.57) Studious or not, globalization
(or culture imperialism if you may) is an undeniable, active force in the world; the US being its
standard-bearer. We dont need to make any apologies for it. For as long as the world has the

36

world has been even somewhat connectedwhether in the Roman, Byzantine, or Caliphate era,
through commerce or conflicttheres always been a modicum of cultural imperialism. And,
invariably, the strongest powers have been at the forefront.

So Shouldnt Every Muslim Grab a Gun?

Its worth clarifying that the Muslim world is rather ambivalent towards modernity. The
majority embraces its technological fruits, but could do without its moral externalities (i.e.
secularism, pluralism, values) that undercut the traditions and narratives inextricable to purpose
and meaning in their lives. (Shore, 2006) Furthermore, itd be rather bombastic to contend that
all 1 billion+ Muslims are going to react towards ontological discomforts of the modern era with
suicide bombs and fully fueled jetliners. The overwhelming majority of Muslims does indeed
hate the West and suspect its plotting a conspiracy to subjugate Islamyet masses arent
flocking to join terrorist groups. Why not?
This question remains a contentious subject matter within the academic community.
Scholars have offered up slews of postulates, which they tout as a so-called theory of
everything (see Pape) but in reality, a universal trigger accounting for every conceivable
circumstance is hard to pin down. An entire book can be authored on this predicament. But given
that this paper is already thoroughgoing as it is, some measure of descriptive parsimony must be
maintained. As such, several possible explanations that are most relevant to the current focus will
be listed in brief.

Ontological Pacifiers
Despite the proclivity of some to lump Muslims together as an indivisible whole, the
reality is that the Muslim world is a mosaic of different societies and sub-cultures that feature
distinct idiosyncrasies indigenous to their respective environments. In some, a culture of honor
might be more pronounced than others. (Nisbett, 1996) Those domiciled in such a milieu,
therefore, might experience a greater degree of significance loss upon a humiliating experience
than ones who have been socialized in other milieus. (Kruglanski, p.351) Simply put, cultures
and even varying segments within them might be more primed for aggression on psychological,
cognitive, and behavior levels. (Ibid.) Gender differences may also be strong explanatory

37

factors. In this regard, some researchers found men as being more likely to subscribe to a
culture of honor than women. (Ibid.)
On a more general level, individual makeupparticularly ones hierarchy of values and
the degree to which a given occurrence threatened those most weightedmay also determine
ones response to the experience of significance loss. (Ibid.)
An individuals congenital nature or child-formed psychological makeup, can also be a
difference maker. (Mazzar, p.94) Anthony Giddens asks why, if modernity is so disconcerting,
isnt everyone in a state of high ontological insecurity? (Giddens, 1990, p.94)
The abbreviated answer (one can download his book for free to get a more
comprehensive account) is that most people receive a basic dosage of trust early in life that
deadens or blunts these existential susceptibilities. The coddling and paternal love we receive as
infants; the norms our parents and societal contexts inculcate within us-- usually suffices to
generate the robust trust and self-identity needed to withstand the psychological yoke of
modernity and the institutional vagaries it inheres. Crucial components of this socialization
process are the routines and habits were taught that provide our lives with stable predictability.
(i.e. praying 5 times a day, working the farm, having dinner every night with our families)
Routines are psychologically relaxing to the human man, and are therefore, deeply involved
with a sense of psychological security. The stability and continuity of these family and social
systems is integral to the trust we have in ourselves, and society around us. But when these
routines are shatteredfor whatever reasonanxieties come flooding in, and even very firmly
founded aspects of the personality of the individual may become stripped away and altered.
(Ibid. p.98) Dynamic worlds of pluralism, moral relativity, and cultural heterogeneity all subvert
this psychological equilibrium.
It stands to reason that this process is running its course variably within the Muslim
world. Some countries, such as the UAE and Malaysia, are slowly adapting their populaces to the
conditions of the modern world and are constructing the mediatory social institutions needed for
helping people cope with a new stream of life. Those eschewing accommodation are responding
hermetically (which Berger terms fencing)insulating their populaces from the perils of
pluralism; though its hard to believe theyll holdout forever. The tentacles of globalization will
eventually breach their ramparts, and when they do, we might be exposed to an entire new wave

38

of ontological crises, and ultimately Jihadi terrorism. Many individuals have already gotten there
and constitute the cohort we are battling today.

The Radicalizing Influence of the WoT

The object of our counter-terrorism policy must center on preventing Muslims from
ascending the latter of aforementioned TMT responses and reaching the state of violent
inflection. Some will get there anyways irrespective of our policieswhether militant or
conciliatory--vis-a-vis the Muslim world. But for others, our actions may have an incendiary
effect of either inducing full-scale ontological crises, or accentuating those that are dormant and
pre-existing. By provoking the US into a heavy-handed military response, AQ succeeded in
escalating the psychological insecurity for vast clusters of Muslims; some of which are joining
their violent fold to defend self-purpose or achieve it.
As already discussed, even before 9/11, large majorities of the Muslim world saw
themselves as besieged by Western forces. Though opinion surveys from the 90s are few and far
between, those that were conducted portray an embittered Muslim public. In one pre-9/11 poll
84% of Pakistanis and 80% of Egyptians viewed the US as anti-Islamic. (Hassan, p.217) In a
survey taken in 1997, majorities of Jordanians (61%), Palestinians (71%), and Lebanese (54%)
held unfavorable views of the US. (Kull, 2011, ch. 1) Widespread animus notwithstanding, the
overwhelming majority of Muslims conceivably constituted the bottom segment of what Clark
McCauley perceives as the anti-American pyramid: (Ibid.)

39

But following the launch of the US War on Terror, significant numbers appeared to head
north; a small, albeit considerable, minority joining Jihadi terrorist groups and even more
significant minority joining the class that approved of attacks on US civilians.

Post 9/11: Increased Support for Terrorism

A 2008 poll taken by World Public Opinion was especially disturbing in this respect.
Sampling Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Jordan, and Morocco, participants were
presented a host of questions regarding their approval and support of Jihadi groups. Asked how
they felt about AQ, 16.5% of respondents indicated, I support AQ attacks on Americans and
share its attitudes, 24.5% said I oppose AQ attacks but share many of its attitudes, and 23.8%
expressed that they opposed both. But often overlooked in Muslim opinion polls are the
substantial numbers of dont know responses. Considering that the War on Terrorat least by
that pointhad been raging for roughly 7 years, its hard to muster credulity for the fact that all
of the 35.3% of this group have yet to form any tangible opinion with respect to AQ. Its more
likely that many reacted cagily to such questions, fearing that their genuine opinions might in
some way incriminate them and draw the attention of notoriously brutal state security forces. In
fact, the pollsters themselves suggested as much and reported that in some countries, Interviews
were discontinued when questions turned to Islam and terrorism. (START, 2011) In regions of
Indonesia for example, some respondents, Did not want to answer certain questions, or they
refused to be interviewed because they thought it was not safe for them to talk about Islam and
America. Though theres no way to definitively prove it, itd be obtuse not to assume that at
least some of that 35.3% werein some way shape or formsympathetic towards AQ and its
acts of terrorism.
Moving onto other questions fills in the more of the picture. Asked what they thought
about groups in the Muslim world that attack Americans, 50% responded that they either
approved of all or most of all these groups (10.6%) or approve of some but disapprove of
others. (35.4%) And of course, the ever-evasive Dont Know group debuts yet again (24.1%).
Asked if theyd approve if a member of their family were to join a terrorist group, 27.5% either
had mixed feelings (17.2%), somewhat approved (7.5%), or strongly approved (2.8%).
Incidentally, 11.5% somewhat disapproved compared to 45.4% who strongly disapproved
(how big the gap between the two or what contrasts mixed feelings with somewhat
disapprove is anyones guess). And not to be forgotten, 15.6% Didnt know. How supportive,

40

on a scale from 1-10 (10 being very supportive), were the respondents of attacks on European
or US civilians? 47.4% of the sample scored 5+. Interestingly, AQs late organizational
figurehead Usama Bin Laden received greater support than the group as a whole. In 6 of 8
countries (Turkey and Azerbaijan the lone exceptions) majorities have between mixed to very
positive feelings towards the AQ leader.
Some may question why this paper is belaboring all this data. The answer is that many
scholars in the Terrorism academia make a pastime out of championing public opinion polls that
ostensibly show how fringe of a group AQAM have become within the hearts and minds of the
Muslim world. This then helps them make that case that 9/11 ultimately failed to achieve its
intended goal of stirring widespread support for violence against the West.
One scholar who is tenacious on this front (and who is cited prolifically in chapter 1) is
Fawaz Gerges. Gerges and others love to trumpet the exhaustive 6-year Gallup poll (also
mentioned in chapter 1) in a big to highlight that only 7% of the Islamic world saw the 9/11
attacks as justified. But had Gerges research went beyond a perusal of the back cover, he
would have discovered that the question of justification contained 5not 2--possible responses
(i.e. largely, somewhat, or partly justified). To be fair, those who authored the book (quite
conveniently) made no mention of the questions numerous parameters. But in a 2006 Foreign
Policy article they shed some light, explaining the 5 point scale employed in the survey (i.e. 1s
were those who saw 9/11 as completely unjustified with 5s viewing them totally justified.) Yet
they concealed another important piece of information: Those that registered as 4s the 6.5%
of the sample who largely justified 9/11 and were initially clustered into the radical column
with 5swere ultimately lumped in with the rest of the 1-3 moderates. This was only
discovered at a Q&A session hosted by the Washington Institute, whenin a moment of candor
(and after persistent nudging by one of the audience members)--the authors admitted that:
Yes, we can say that a Four is not that moderate . . . I don't know. . . .You are writing a
book, you are trying to come up with terminology people can understand. . . . You know, maybe
it wasn't the most technically accurate way of doing this, but this is how we made our clusterbased analysis. (Satloff, 2008)
Unfortunately, the whitewashing goes further: In addition to the radical 13.5%, 23.1%
of respondents300 million Muslimstold pollsters that the attacks were in some way justified.
For those counting that amounts to roughly 475.8 million Muslims (36.7%). Coincidentally (or
not), these results were nearly identical to those obtained in a similar survey taken by a Dubai-

41

based British research firm in 2011; of 200 thousand sampled Arab-Muslims, 36% of agreed that
9/11 was justified (26% were unsure). (al-Arabiya, 2011)
Still, and as stressed, this is not to say that the AQ brand enjoys the love of the majority
or even plurality of Muslimsthey dont. But when your population is 1.3 billion--you dont
have to. Even if 20-30% supports you in some way, that still amounts to a significant base of
sympathetic minds who are least amenable to your message and objectives. How many of that
group will jump to the vertex of the pyramid is unknowable. But the very fact theyre just one
step belowhowever big it isfrom joining terrorist groups should certainly be cause for alarm
and most certainly shouldnt be glossed over. True, most wont take the extra step, but given that
the Muslim ontological crisis could very will deepen in the years ahead (to be discussed in
chapter 5), the darker days of Islamic terrorism may be ahead of us.

Majority Support for AQs Goals

That AQs fan base would be even larger had it avoided the immoderate targeting of
Muslims is certainly a plausible argument. However, the sweeping Muslim support for every one
of AQs goals is an indicator that it may still have room to grow.
Referring again to the WPO survey cited above, respondents were asked categorically
about their support for several of AQs chief goals. Concerning the long term AQ goal of a
unified Caliphate state, Egyptians (70%), Pakistanis (69%), Moroccans (71%) showed
overwhelming support (though support in Indonesia dropped to 35%). AQs goal of enforcing
strict sharia law received similar embrace: Egypt (65%), Indonesia (49%), Pakistan (76%),
Morocco (76%). Even more noteworthy was the large consensus received by AQs cultural
struggle; the goals of keeping Western values out of Islamic countries and standing up to
America to affirm the dignity of the Islamic people. Responding to the former: Egyptians
(88%), Indonesians (76%), Pakistanis (60%), and Moroccans (64%) all wanted to ward off
Western cultural influence. Similarly, Egyptians (86%), Indonesians (69%), Pakistanis (56%-but 30 percent did not answer), and Moroccans (69%) agreed with the need of confronting the
US and securing Islamic dignity.

Post-9/11: More Perceive US as Threatening Islam

Other data indicates that 9/11 and its provoked response did indeed succeed in
engendering the perception of a deliberate campaign to threaten Islam. Prior to 9/11, only small

42

minorities were of such a viewTurkey(33%), Pakistan, (30%), and Indonesia (26%). (Kull) By
2005, a Pew poll found that to be the majority opinion in nearly every Muslim country surveyed.
In the 2009 WPO poll, majorities in Egypt (82%), Bangladesh (74%), Turkey (67%), and
Indonesia (55%) all agreed that a US goal is to make Muslim societies less Islamic. Pluralities
also see it aspiring for the humiliation of the Islamic world. And in 8 out of 9 countries the US
was seen as seeking to impose American culture on Muslim societyspread Christianity in the
Middle Eastand weaken and divide the Islamic world.

Closing Arguments
This chapter made the case that 9/11 and its retaliatory responsethe WoT--has
radicalized millions throughout majority Muslim countries. While Muslims were agitated enough
by what they perceived as a Western-steered cultural imperialism bent to finish off Islam once
and for all, the military imperialism that soon manifested sent these anxieties to Defcon 1. The
ontological defense mechanisms of many Muslim minds have thus been triggered to varyingat
times violent--degrees, and militant anti-Westernism has come to replace the relative, mellow
resentment of years past.
Thus far, little attention has been given to how 9/11 interfaces with the ontological
security of Muslims living outside their ethnic homelands. Considering the large diaspora
communities residing in Europein the proceeding chapter, our attention will shift westward.

Chapter 3: The European-Muslim Search for

Meaning
Their Plight: A Background
European Muslims have notoriously faired poorlyboth economically and sociallynot
just compared to ethnic Europeans, but to the continents other immigrant demographics. This is
markedly true for young Muslim men between the ages of 15-30 whose unemployment rate is a
staggering two or three times that of their non-Muslim peers. (Sageman, p.69) Indeed,
juxtaposed with their Hindu counterparts, Indian Muslims in Britain are twice as likely to be

43

unemployed. (Shore, loc. 1212) And within the Pakistani ethnicity it becomes even starker:
Muslims are three times as likely to be jobless as British Hindus. (Ibid.) Furthermore, twice as
many Muslims work in manual as opposed to white-collar labor, compared to non-Muslim
whites, while earning on average two-thirds that of their non-Muslim white counterparts.
(Ibid.) In the self-employed bracket, Muslims earn only the income of non-Muslim whites.
This slough transcends to other spheres like educationwhere scholastic performance
languishes and illiteracy runs comparatively high; and crime where, despite comprising just 5%
of the country, Muslims constitute 13% of the British prison population; a figure thats jumped
200% since 1997 and grows at a clip 8 times faster than that of the overall prison population.
(Kern, 2013) Incidentally, the increase is so acute that some prisons appear turning into their
own authoritarian Caliphates. As one prison official put it: People are being radicalized,
forcibly radicalized by these gangs. We see it as a real danger, now and for the future of
prisons. (Ibid.)
In other European countries the picture is more of the same. In Germany, 3rd generation
Muslims find themselves less integrated than their parents or grandparents. Their knowledge
of German is weak, their high school drop out rate is high, and this has resulted in considerably
higher unemployment rates, crime, rates and social alienation. (Shore. Loc. 1245) This
description equally applies to French Muslims who primarily inhabit ghetto communities on the
outskirts of Paris and make up 70% of the countries prison population; which faces radicalization
problems of its own (Sage, 2013)
The issue of Muslim integration has long been a Gordian knot for the European
community. Its etiology is complicated. While a thoroughgoing analysis falls beyond the scope
of this paper, suffice it to say that European xeno-or-Islamophobia doesnt help. (Gallis, 2005)
Relevant to this chapter is that 9/11 and its response have made matters worse and, in the
process, have furthered the cause of the global AQ movement.

European Identity: Barriers to Entry

Muslims have long had trouble being accepted as equals by their ethnic Europeans peers.
Whereas the US prides itself on being a nation of immigrants, its the converse across much of
Europe. As a 2001 report by the German Independent Commission on Migration makes clear:
The political and normative guiding principle of the past [is] that Germany is not a country of

44

immigrants. (ICM, 2001, p.1) Furthermore, hyphenated identities (i.e. French-Algerian) fail to
take on the recognition that they do in the US; making a sense of belonging even harder to
develop. (Shore, loc. 601) Until only a decade ago, citizenship in some EU countrieslike
Germanywas a question of blood. While that has since changed, the perception among ethnic
Europeansfor the most parthasnt. For example, 42% of French citizens consider the
presence of a Muslim community in their country to be a threat to their national identity.
(Bars, 2011) Such sentiment is largely the rule, not the exception, throughout many EU states.
(Kern, 2011) Despite being 3rd generation residents, living their entire lives in Europe, and
speaking the native language better than they do their ethnic, many Muslims are still considered
guests or 2nd class citizens.
The implications this quandary poses for economic and social integration are clear, and
educated/non-educated Muslims alike suffer the consequences. True, part of the problem is
institutional. In contrast to the US where employee rights are relatively lax, in Europe, laying off
workers can be a lengthy and costly legal process. (Sageman, p.99-100) Employer, therefore,
want to be confident that the workers they hire are industrious and reliable. This often entails a
degree of nepotism; hiring on the basis of connections and informal referrals. But because most
employers are not immigrants, this means that the networks of potential hires will not include
immigrants either. (Ibid.) Worse, if they enter the interview room, the widespread mistrust
towards Muslim immigrants compromises any lens of impartiality.

9/11: Fanning the Flames of Xenophobia and Radicalization

To be sure, this isnt an apologia for European Muslims. Theres certainly enough blame
to go around and itd be unfair to demonize Europeans who cherish their values and ethos and
fear for its integrity. The problem--as said--is complicated. However, 9/11 only made this
problem worse; escalating both European xenophobia and Muslim alienation to a whole other
level.
Following 9/11, the volkisch miasma on the European street was palpable. According to
one study, levels of implicit or indirect discrimination against Muslims rose by 82.6% and
experiences of over discrimination by 76.3% (Sheridan, 2006) And though, as suggested,
xenophobia was already brewing, 9/11 brought on an intensification of preexisting sentiment,
exacerbated by feelings of fear and vulnerability and a perceived threat of the enemy within.
(Ibid. p.319)

45

The response of law enforcement, particularly the ethnic profiling and the singling out of
Muslim-looking residents, only added to the problem. In England, stops and searches by police
without due-cause increased 150% a year after 9/11.(Hayes, 2005, p.36) Between 9/11 and
2004, more than 600 peoplethe vast majority Muslimswere arrested under British Antiterrorism legislation. Yet as of 2004, only 15 were convicted with any terrorism related offense.
(JI, 2009, p.88) Numerous post 9/11 studies show that the UK is no exception, having
documented a growing perception among Muslim leaders and communities across Europe that
they are being stopped, questioned, and searched not on the basis of evidence and reasonable
suspicion but on the basis of looking Muslim. (JI, 2009, p.9) In the wake of 9/11, German
authorities instructed local police units to start amassing data on young men with Islamic
backgrounds. Though, Of the 8.3 million people scrutinized, not a single terrorist was identified.
(Ibid. p.7) In addition, German police were routinely stationed outside dozens of mosques to
carry out mass identity checks; those without valid identification are often detained and held in
police stations for hours until their status is verified. (Ibid. 65) As one German Muslim leader
observed, It is humiliating to have policemen with machine guns checking identification in a
prayer space; even [checking] 10-year-olds. Is that the sort of image that is supposed to make
children feel at home here? (Ibid. p.109)
However one justifies it is beside the point. The vigilant post 9/11 police response--from
stop-and-frisk searches and data mining to wholesale raids on businesses and places of
worshipis a galling background noise for the European-Muslim community; instilling a sense
of big-brother-is-watching at best, and alienation and discrimination at worse. (Nachmani,
2010, p.64) The abject paucity of Muslim and immigrant faces in local police forces only
intensifies this aura and impresses on many the self-perception of being a fifth column in a
society that detests them. On a deeper note, this estrangement catalyzes crises of meaning and
purpose in no small number of European-Muslims. By again invoking Frankls framework for
meaning attainment we begin to see why.

The Search for Meaning

At the individual level Muslims have little prospects of actualizing their potential through
vocational creativity and self-efficacy. Whether due to institutional handicaps, personal
shortfalls, or societal prejudice, the European economic milieu is not conducive avenue for the

46

Muslim fulfillment of self-worth and esteem. High Muslim-unemployment also means that
many are on the dolea factor that increases their leisure for dwelling over their malaise and
dejection.
At the societal level, meaning cannot be readily found through cultural endearment.
Despite knowing no other country outside of their places of birth, Muslim youth are treated as
faux-Europeans at best, and loathed aliens at worst. The psychological impact of such despair
shouldnt be trivialized. Studies have shown that depriving people of a sense of belonging
increases death-related cognitions. (Kruglanski, p.340) Attempting to extinguish the attendant
anxiety, some gravitate towards the only club with vacant membership: Pan-Islamism. Indeed, in
a survey take two months after 9/11 68% of British Muslims indicated that their faith was more
important than being British. (Palmer, 2007, p. 23) Some argue that this isnt necessarily a bad
thing and tout the important role Pan-Islamism plays in providing a group identity and enabling
constructive associations for the peaceful resolution of social inequities. (Shore, loc. 1234) Far
from stymieing integration and fueling radicalism, they say, Islamic organizations could serve as
an alternative to extremismunless, of course, some of those organizations are themselves
extremist.
Like the Israeli funded Jewish agency or Chabad which sponsors and hosts activities for
diaspora Jewish youth as a way of strengthening religious or cultural affiliation, the Islamic
world has something similar (albeit a more evangelical incarnation). It was mentioned briefly in
the previous chapter how Saudi largesse is used to bankroll Dawa or Islamic outreach groups
across the globe. (Vidino, 2005) One such groupthe World Assembly of Muslim Youth
(WAMY)is heavily active in the European-Muslim diaspora community, and seeks to arm
Muslim youth with full confidence in the supremacy of the Islamic system over other systems.
(Ibid.) By interacting with diaspora through camps and educational programs, they strive to
inoculate youth from the corruption of Westernism and inspire their return to Islam as pro-active
members of its greater cause. As written in one of their publications: Teach our children to
love taking revenge on the Jews and the oppressors, and teach them that our youngsters will
liberate Palestine and Al-Quds [Jerusalem] when they go back to Islam and make jihad for the
sake of Allah." (Ibid.) With billions of dollars worth of investments flowing into the continent,
WAMY isnt the only player. Thousands of Islamic schools and mosques have been built to
ballast the faith within local communities across the continent. Although many such efforts are

47

innocuous and even beneficent for the droves of alienated youth longing for purposeful
direction--some purvey therapy of a different sort; one that may satisfy the thirst for meaning,
but lead them on a path towards altruistic destruction.

Meaning through Jihad

The implications of Muslim idleness cant be ignored, as it seems to have been a factor
in the growth of global Islamist terrorism in Europe. (Sageman, p.102) With welfare payments
removing the urgency to find regular work, many European-Muslims spend their downtime
searching for the antidote to their existential dread. The restoration of dignity and selfsignificance is what they crave. But when its direct restoration proves impossible, some may
seek to do so indirectly through alternative means, including an identification with a collective
loss (or ones groups relative deprivation) that affords a clear path to renewed significance via
a tightly bound community in the service of a heroic cause. (Mazzar, p.87; Kruglanski, p.348)
For Muslims, that cause is Jihad. And once theyre apart of this exclusive guild the
insignificance of their previous lives is but a distant memory. Theyre born anew; this time with
a purpose that grants them veneration in this life, and eternal bliss in the next.
The ingress into this reincarnated self is at times unconscious or unexpected, and the
metamorphosis is seldom instantaneous. While the process may transpire differently for each,
the common denominator is usually a lust for a superordinate family and an interface with the
identity entrepreneurs who provide it. The latter can be anyone professing religious mastery,
whether genuine or fabled. Some may start the process through an inquisitive appearance at a
local mosque. There, they may become captivated by the fiery speeches of its imam or charmed
by the familial embrace of the congregants who refer to them as brother. Others, jaded by the
vapidity of Western lifestyle or rejected by its society, may befriend and socialize with Muslims
in the same boat as them, forming a close-knit camaraderie along the way.
These interactions and, moreover, the entrancement by a social community, need not
manifest in person. Internet chat rooms and forums adequately fill this capacity, allowing
alienated Muslims to become a part of the virtual Ummah. As Marc Sageman writes: Young
Muslim men and women share their hopes and dreams with their virtual friends on these radical
forums. Some might have joined a given forum out of a sense of alienation, of feeling alone. In

48

the forums they feel at home. The anonymity of the Internet encourages participants to speak
freely, making them feel ever close to each other. Ultimately, this provides them with a sense
of belonging to a greater community on the basis of what they have in common, Islam.
(Sageman, p.116) And because the diffident of the bunch are passive spectators, while the true
believers air their views, the formers beliefs harden through an illusion of numbers. If 20
participants are citing and affirming a violent Hadith against non-Muslims, even
misapprehensions gain exegetical credibility.
A bond is formed--whether at the mosque, the chat room or the Halal deli--and
associations increase in frequency. Over time, the identity entrepreneursthe Imam or the
evangelical friend--are formative in funneling ideas and beliefs that satisfy the individuals
psychological needs. They are given a specific role and a narrative story line, which clarifies
who they are, why they have suffered and a clear nomination of whom to hate.
(Juergensmeyer, 2003, p.50, Mazzar, p. 51) The addled world of before is no longereverything
becomes elucidated. A security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what
it appears to be is restored. (Kinnvall, 2004, p.746)
This perception only hardens as news reaches that a US drone strike errantly pulverized
an entire family at an apartment complex in Pakistan. It strengthens again when the individual
turns on the TV and sees footage of American flags plastered around Baghdad and US soldiers
abound triumphantly gesticulating the V. Suggestions that the West is at war with Islam, out to
enslave its people and plunder its resources take on new meaning, as whats perceived is
confirmed through observable reality. The shrill sermons at the mosque and the zealous diatribes
of their virtual/non-virtual chums transcend pure rhetoric. Vicariously humiliated by news
footage and personally humiliated by their own realor imagined--persecution on the streets of
London, they feel every bit apart of the struggle as those stuffed into the back of Hummers
thousands of miles away. Ironically its through this adversity that their lives take on new
meaning. They are now a part of something bigger than themselves; an honorable cause that
yields more purpose than any Western, materialist life could ever dangle. A shot at immense
stardom and ultimate significance is up for grabs. (Kruglanski, p.349 Sure, they may lose their
lives in the process. But to lose ones life is but to lose the present; and clearly, to lose a defiled,
worthless present is not to lose much. (Hoffer, 1966, p.63) Or as UBL would put it, death is

49

better than life in humiliation! (Mazzar, p.139)

Those that go the distance and commit acts of terrorism, whether locally or abroad, are
not deranged or pathological. Nor are they necessarily religious fanatics in the conventional
sense. In fact, in Marc Sagemans study sample of 500 Islamic terrorists, about a quarter were
deeply religious when they were young and two-thirds grew up secular in secular environments
(the rest were Christian converts). 84% either joined terrorist groups while living in a country
they didnt grow up in or were the sons (2nd generation or 3rd generation) of Muslim immigrants
to the west. Most terrorists were also well educated, having completed university degrees or
undergone some form of tertiary education. As Sageman writes, Far from being a product of
failing expectations, the jihad was more a result of rising expectations among its members.
(Sageman, 2004, p. 78). But when reality doesnt merge with its utopian counterpart, the
yawning gap in between compels some into action. (Mazarr, p.189)

The Consequences of Muslim Alienation

Writing about the behavioral consequences of alienation, Arab sociologist Halim
Barakat proposed three basic categories of human response: Compliance, retreat, or activism.
(Barakat, 1969)
Compliers are the alienated class who comply with the status quo; submitting to its
conventional norms and falling in line with their designated societal roles. They may
acknowledge the injustices and deprivations of the current social system, but nonetheless choose
to be inconspicuous and complacent so to avoid confrontations that may worsen their standings.
Theyd rather just live and take what they can get, perhaps perceiving that it could be worse.
Retreaters reject the social system entirely, but rather than try and change it, they opt to
insulate themselves from it. Some may do so by retreating from the present to seek refuge
from the past or dream of the future. (Barakat, 1993, p.199) Within the current discussion, this
is redolent of European-Muslims who ghetto themselves into cultural enclaves to obtain the
comfort of home away from home. Alternatively, others may retreat by immersing themselves
into the excitements of the present and seeking immediate gratifications. (Barakat, 1969, p.8) In
this way, they can escape their worries and problems Through gallivanting and debauchery,
these individuals, in effect, are distracting themselves from realities of despair. The many
European-Muslim youth who join gangs and lose themselves to drugs and crime are the bywords

50

of this category. (Leiken, 2011)

Faced with the yawning gap mentioned above, Activists are those who cant sit idly
by; choosing instead to engage in activities and practices aimed at changing the system. These
can be sublimators; those who work within the system to transcend their alienation and
change their world for the better through creativity, hope, love, knowledge, wisdom, and
courage. (Barakat, 1969, p.9) But they can also be revengers; those who denounce the system
in its entirety and engage in activities aimed at destroying the system rather than improving it.
Initially, both meet at the same starting point, with meaning and significance waiting for them at
the finish line. The only question is what lane theyll choose to get there.
By launching 9/11, and baiting a Western overreaction, AQ stoked the woes of alienation
within the European-Muslim diaspora. The post 9/11 Islamophobic backlash intensified their
sense of existential emptiness and spurred many to fill it. Some did so by retreating; further
isolating themselves in cultural ghettos and clinging ever harder to their faith; or, on the opposite
end of the continuum, chasing transient thrill through drugs and crime. Others became activists;
the sublimators working to bridge cultural gaps and promote moderation and tolerance. The
rejecters, however, perceiving their alienation as beyond repair, found meaning through
victimhood and the opportunity avenge it. By embracing the AQ narrative, whether passively or
actively, they acceded to a community with a clear and common purpose that could rescue them
from their wretched solitude. Through its good vs. evil, with us or against us rhetoric, the halfbaked invasions of Muslim countries--the US fed into this purpose and made constituency to it
ever more meaningful. As Eric Hoffer writes, usually the strength of a mass movement is
proportionate to the vividness and tangibility of its devil. And an ideal devil is omnipotent and
omnipresent. (Hoffer, p.91-93) In that respect, the US rendition should win an Oscar.

The Radicalization Ripple Effect of 9/11

Those that belittle AQs 9/11 success story often suffer from a case of myopic tunnel
vision. They get caught up in superficial victories; usually scorecards purporting the devastation
meted to AQs leadership and force-structure. In the process they fail to appreciate AQs strategy
of losing small now, and winning big later. In other words, though 9/11 attacks may have cost
AQ considerable manpower in the short term, it is proving to be a force multiplier that will make
it more dangerous and resilient than ever before. Part of that payout has materialized through the

51

radicalization of European-Muslim. Though not exclusive to the European contextthere are

indeed radicalized American Muslimsthe estrangement within the former runs far deeper and
hence is the focus of this chapter.
In Europe, 9/11 can be seen as precipitating a radicalization ripple-effect. The resulting
police vigilance, aura of xenophobia, and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan all combined to
exacerbate the psychological insecurity of many Muslims. Some of those that chose to act on
this insecurity, in extreme fashion, would go on to produce the earth-shattering Madrid and 7/7
London bombings. The effects of these bombings, like 9/11, go beyond the innocents who
tragically perished. Because if the pot of public hostility vis--vis Muslims was brought to a boil
post-9/11, Europes own 9/11 saw it explode.
In London, 269 faith-hate crimes were recorded in the three weeks following 7/7 alone
compared with 40 the same period the year before. (Gilligan, 2013) And police stop-and-search
practicesalready on the upswing after 9/11intensified following the London underground
bombings of July 7. (JI, p.60) 2,405 Asians (a category that includes the United Kingdoms
substantial South Asian community of persons of Bangladeshi, Indian, and Pakistani origin, and
persons most likely to be Muslims) and black pedestrians were stopped compared to 196 the
previous year. (Ibid, p.61) The prejudice of law enforcement wasnt circumscribed to the UK,
either. Rather, it became the norm across a constellation of other EU states. (Ibid.) Just 5 days
after 7/7, police in Italy carried out a nationwide sweep targeting Islamic militants. 201
locations were raided and 423 people detained; almost all of who were later released without
charge. Despite not netting any terrorists, Italian Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu considered it
a necessary preventative operation in high-risk environments. (Ibid. p.77)
This paper recognizes the tension between safeguarding against terrorism and upholding
liberal values and norms. Its no doubt a dichotomous dilemma with no absolute answer. But
where one stands on the matter is moot for the moment. The bottom line is that any terrorist
attack that fuels Muslim alienation and estrangement is a victory as far as AQ is concerned. It
means more Muslims whose psychological equilibriums are shaken, and by consequence, more
who may be receptive to the AQ offered solution.

52

The European Prison System

Naturally, as increasing numbers of Europeans are radicalized, the chance that some will
sublimate sentiment into action improves commensurately. That an attack on European soil has
yet to materialize since 7/7 is not for lack of trying. According to the director of the British MI5,
there have been 34 terrorist plots in the UK since the 7/7 bombings, including one or two major
plots aimed at mass casualty that have been attempted each year. (Joscelyn, 2013) Many of the
thwarted perpetrators have joined the 150 terrorists locked away in UK prisons. (Hamm, 2013,
loc. 3640) And although its hard to verify precisely (European authorities arent forthcoming
with the relevant data), similarif not greaternumbers are incarcerated within the penal
systems of other European countries, such as Spain and France. In Spain, between 2001-2005,
188 individuals had been imprisoned for violent jihadists terror offenses. (Hannah, 2008, p.
409) While France, in 2012 alone, arrested some 91 people on suspicion of what it categorized as
religiously inspired terrorism. (Reuters, 2013) The respective law enforcements no doubt
deserve commendations for their efforts in keeping their publics safe and the bad guys off the
street. Unfortunately, as more radicalized Muslims turn to violence and the population of
incarcerated terrorists accrues, so too will the menace they pose behind bars.
Relating again to the factors of idleness and retreat, while some spend their downtime
time actively seeking out the ultimate cure to their existential pains, othersthrough gangs and
crimesettle for numbing it. That Muslims are disproportionally incarcerated is, thereby, no
coincidence. But the implication here is the danger arising from the intramural interactions of
these impious criminals and their radical cellmates. The desolateness of prison life allows plenty
of leisure for soul searching and pensive self-reflection. Brooding over their emptiness and
despair, Islam presents itself as the perfect remedy for the lost delinquent soul. As Mark Hamm
writes, Islam offers prisoners a:
Sense of identity and belonging in a like-minded community of abstemious believers;
also the Islamic work ethic values self-discipline and the use of each period of the day
specifying segments for grooming, eating, studying, praying, and working to benefit the world or
hereafterso Muslim prisoners learn to conquer time. It is often their greatest accomplishment.
(Hamm, loc. 1149)
Interestingly, Islams appeal holds sway not just for secular Muslims, but also for the
religiously unaffiliated. Since 2000, Islam has become the fastest growing religion among

53

prisoners in Europe and North America. (Ibid.) In and of itself, this trend is of no alarm. To the
contrary, Islam provides a self-imposed discipline on inmates that, in turn, gives prison
authorities a convenient force in helping them maintain order. (Ibid., loc.1164) One study of
Muslim converts in British penitentiaries found that Islamic faith provides inmates with a moral
framework from which to rebuild their lives. (El-Hassan, 2007) Yet, while itd be a mistake to
demagogue the issue and inflate its dangers, the real picture isnt all rosy.
Parallel to the increasing prisoner Islamisation, the largest increase in prison-based
terrorist events over the past 4 decades has occurred since 9/11 (38/51 cases); mirroring a global
trend in support for jihadist ideologies outside prison during the same period. (Hamm, loc.
1316) One constituent of this jump was Muktar Said Ibrahim who, after serving five years for
robbery, apparently became radicalized and went on to lead the attempted 21 July 2005 attacks
on the London transport network. (Hannah, p. 409) Prison radicalization was also found to play
a role in the hatching of the 2004 Madrid train bombings by a loosely affiliated cluster of
childhood friends, neighborhood home-boys, siblings, cousins, petty criminals, drug dealers, and
former cell-mates. (Atran, 2010, p. 206) Indeed, it was during a prison stint in 2000 that a
fellow inmate introduced Jamal Ahmidan, a key player in the attacks, to the Salafist theology.
Another case of infamy was Mohammed Merah, a 23-year-old French-Algerian who in
2012 savagely gunned down a total of 7 people (including 3 Jewish school children) in the cities
of Montauban and Toulouse. Merahwho, according to his friends, never even went to
mosqueserved two short prison terms for robbery in 2005 and 2007-08? (Govan, 2012) And
it was then, many claim, that he made his induction to radical Islam.
As some researchers note, the accumulating cohort of incarcerated terrorists appears to be
begetting a radicalization domino effect whereby new prisoners who before had little
association with religionare being transformed into neophyte extremists. (Brandon, 2009)
Whether because of inmate coercion, or out of despair and the need for protective brotherhood,
some warn that prisons are at risk of becoming universities for terrorism. (Ibid.) To be sure,
prison officialsspecifically in Britainare addressing the issue by cordoning Islamic terrorists
and criminals in separate cellblocks. Yet, as one report predicted: It seems likely that, as the
number of convicted and remanded violent jihadist prisoners in Britain grows, the resources
available to the authorities to manage this to manage this difficult prisoner population will

54

become increasingly stretched. (Hannah, p.408)

One radicalized group was a gang called the Muslim Boys which debuted at Britains
high-security Belmarsh Prison in 2006. Theyd soon become make their name as a, Criminal
vanguard of religious extremists with ties to potentially more dangerous networks, including
AQ. (Allen, 2006) According to one Home Office report, Islamist gangs, including the Muslim
Boys, are terrorizing inmatesas they trawl for AQ recruits, and force prisoners to accept
the Muslim faiththose who refuse suffer assaults. (Ibid.) Incidentally, it was around this
period (2006-2009) that 40% (20/38) of prison-based terrorist events occurred. (Hamm)
Although any direct correlation here is dubious, by some accounts, prisoner radicalization was
indeed buoyed by the US invasion of Iraq whenas one cellmate recounted: People [were]
recruiting on the yard every day. Its scandalous. Everybodys glorifying Osama Bin Laden.
(Ibid., p.1260)
Whether the prisoner-radicalization trend will snowball into a far-reaching danger
remains to be seen. Alarmists warn that day is coming, while skeptics hold the specter as
negligible or overblown. But whats clear is that the post-9/11 hyperinflation of the Muslim
prisoner population has the potential to allow for this phenomenon to expand. As the following
section will show, the scores of radicalized youth migrating to participate in the ongoing Open
Fronts of Jihad is a factor that could feed into the problem. Many of those who are intercepted on
return will no doubt bring their ideological fervor and stories of battlefield glory with them to
prison. If so, more identity entrepreneurs are likely in the pipeline; and more criminal retreaters
may be made into activists.
The concatenation of radicalism, brought on by 9/11 and later 7/7, is responsible for
much of this. By stunting integration and furthering alienation, more Muslims than ever before
have turned to crime or radical, at times violent, genres of Islam. Taken together, more
incarcerated jihadists coupled with more criminals to prey on is a dangerous combination.
Considering AQs expressed intent on recruiting Westerners, particularly those radicalized in
prison, this development is just another feather in its post 9/11 cap.

55

The Domino Effect:

9/11->Public Backlash->Alienation->Radicalization->7/7->More Alienation-> More
Radicalization->Record Numbers of Jihadi migrants
Its for the reasons above that attacks, like 9/11 and 7/7, ultimately become inadvertent
force multipliers. Since 9/11, thousands of European-Muslims have travelled overseas and joined
the ranks of AQ-affiliated/inspired terrorist groups all around the globe. For instance, by April
2008, British security services estimated that 4,000 British Muslims had visited training camps in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, as one report put it, all the evidence suggests that the UK is
presently producing more Jihadists than many Muslim-majority states such as Malaysia, Nigeria,
or Oman and indeed perhaps even more than countries traditionally thought of as exporting
terrorism such as Lebanon, Somalia, or Sudan. (Brandon, 2008) In light of the expanding Jihadi
arenas of today, that number will likely rise in the in the years ahead.
The marquee Jihadi-tourist hotspot de jour appears to be the Syrian theatre whereas of
this writinganywhere from 1,100 to 1,700 Europeans from 14 countries, including Belgium,
Spain, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany have fought since conflict erupted in 2011.
(Hegghammer, 2013) In fact, a convincing argument can be made that many of the Westerners
pouring into Syria today are, in fact, latent Jihadists; those long radicalized by the WoT, yet
missed the boat with Iraq/Afghanistan due to circumstantial constraints (i.e. the unfeasibility of
traveling to Iraq/Afghanistan vs. Syria.) Whats unique about the Syrian theatre compared to
others is its contiguous border with a relatively Western Turkey. Whereas trips by European
Muslims to notorious Jihadi enclaves like Pakistan or Somalia often arouse the sentinels of
Western intelligencethats not the case with flights to Turkey. Aspiring-Jihadists can easily
purchase tickets to Istanbul and thereon travel to assembly areas along the Syrian border.
Incidentally, business appears to be booming in these border towns as new hotels, electronic
stores, and cafes are springing up to satisfy the groundswell of demand for a taste of home near
the battlefield. (Reuter, 2013) The Turkish government, for its part, has claimed helplessness in
bucking this trend, retorting that, There are 4 million tourists coming into Turkey. How can we
check each of these tourists? (Hurriyet, 2013)

56

In Germany alone, Intelligence officials have warned of 200 jihadists who departed the
country on route to a German camp in Northern Syria. (Spiegel, 2013) Together with
Germany, France and the UK lead the pack with an estimated 200-400 jihadi tourists apiece.
These figures arent just remarkable; they may exceed the total number of Muslim foreign
fighters from all Western countries to all conflicts between 1990-2010. (Hegghammer)
Considering were only 2.5 years into the Syrian war, the migratory phenomenon were
witnessing today is truly historic. Absolute numbers dont even tell the full story. Adjusting for
population size, Denmarks Syrian contingent of 65 fighters amount to an equivalent of 3,600
Americans. This is significant, because large countrieslike the UShave more police
resources for intercepting potential returnees. (Ibid.) Whereas catching ten prospective terrorists
may be facile work for the latter, a country like Luxemburg might be stretched to the limit. And
with no end in sight to the conflict, the numbers of these Jihadi tourists are certain to increase
in the months and years ahead. Even worse, Syria is just one theatre of many; conflicts in, inter
alias, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, and Chechnya also appear to be European-Jihadi tourist attractions.
The dangers of this migratory phenomenon are clear. The open Jihadi fronts of today
like Afghanistan of the 80sare veritable universities likely to graduate a coming class of
Western terrorists. Matriculated into these schools, Western recruits are no doubt taking
courses in weapon operation, urban warfare, and most dauntingexplosives 101. On the Syrian
campus, the faculty of professors are some of the best in their fields of study; many being
battle-hardened operatives from AQs Iraq affiliate (formerly AQI). These instructors spent years
making the lives of US troops and Iraqis alike a living hell. In the process, they have IED
assembly down to an art and have gained a wealth of tacit battlefield knowledge, which they no
doubt will impart to their new disciples. (Lewis J. , 2013) We can only hope that their students
never make it out alive. Otherwise, as one alarmed US military official put it, Theyll eventually
return home with skills that bring the battle zone to our front door and endanger our way of life.
It's overseas where they gain the knowledge to build bombs, use weapons, and connect with
leaders in the jihadist movement. It's not a matter of if we'll see terror attacks at home but when."
(Carter, 2013)
Some are already entertaining such plans. Flanked by fellow British comrades, all decked
out in combat vests and black balaclavas, one Anglo-Jihadi promulgated his future itinerary: I
say to United States that your time will come and we will bleed you to death and, inshallah

57

[Allah willing], will raise the flag in the White House. (Schwartz, 2013) For another, theres no
place like home: Britain will be next.
Having returned, like their teachers before them, these migrants may establish local
bomb-making workshops of their own. It was the eminent AQ strategist Abu-Musab al Suria
man who wrote the book on grass-roots Jihad--who advised as much when he called for local
cells to setup training labs in secret houses, apartments, or gyms. (Cruickshank, 2007, p.10) As
we recall, a key barrier inhibiting local, networked cells are the handicaps inherent in
operationalizing explicit knowledge (i.e. bomb-making blue prints). Minus a centralized training
ground--ala pre-9/11 Afghanistansuch groups would have no means for accruing the tacit
know-how for mitigating the procedural perils, and most important, assembling effective
weapons. With some Western-Jihadists almost certain to return, the helping hand they can
provide may very well fill that that lacuna and simplify a very fraught learning curve. And yet,
they might return with more than just operational expertise.
Indubitably, many will take to the net-waves to publicize their exploits, disseminate
newfound Jihadi lore, and regale Internet forums with anecdotes of mythological greatness. For
instance, in one forum, a British Jihadi-veteran titillates members with the sublime, prophetic
martyrdom he witnessed on the battlefield: A martyr had a dream in which he met a beautiful
young woman who told him he was the chosen one and that she and her sisters would meet him
tomorrowhe was killed in battle the next day. (Atwan, 2012, p.264) Upon probing the fallen
corpse, an overwhelming waft of musk trickled through the air signaling a safe passage to
paradise. Other fables are even more grandiose: The enemy aircraft came immediately after
Salat al-Isha but many of the brothers had not yet reached their trenches. Then Allah sent clouds
and it started to rain! Themes of angelic figures dressed in white robesremoving injured
fighters to a place of safety, sometimes fighting alongside the mujahedeen also feature
prominently. (Ibid.)
Recently, Western-Jihadists have taken to Twitter where they post picture
documentation of fallen comrades smiling or in some cases, pointing to heaven. (Warrick,
2013) Writing under the name FahadJabbar1, one comments that, we have seen many martyrs
smiling when they meet with their God, but we havent seen a smile this wide. This folklore
may sound like hocus-pocus to us. But to those desperate for transcendence from their dreadful,
empty lives; ethereal stories of such are the psychological medicine they badly desire. As Steve

58

Stalinsky of the Middle East Media Research Institute foretells, those besotted by it all will no
doubt look at the photos and say, I can be this guy. (Ibid.)

Closing Arguments
Though there is much to discuss regarding the Jihadi boom in Syria and elsewhere, itd
be a disservice to detract from the papers overarching message: The attacks of 9/11 directly and
indirectly gave rise to all of this. It is what started the chain reaction. This chapter focused on one
aspect of that reaction; mainly, the tilling of Muslim Europe (psychologically, ontologically,
socially, etc.) for the growth and acceptance of AQs radical ideology. True, not all will move to
the vertex of the triangle and become activists. But the miasma that prevailed after 9/11that
continues to worsen to this dayensures the entry of an unavoidable, growing number. AQ may
never enjoy the embrace of the masses, but neither does it need it to. After all, with a few
hundred dollars, a pressure cooker and some fireworks, two AQ-inspired lone wolves had a
major American city of 600,000 cloistered in their homes under mandatory lockdown. There will
be more 7/7 attacks --perhaps even of sorts larger in scale in the future. And by succumbing to
our emotions--fear or angerand overreacting as a public or government, we ensure terrorists
inadvertent victories that infuse them with flows oxygen and manpower. The next chapter will
highlight the same dynamic has having unfolded in every locale of our failed War on Terror.

Chapter 4:WoT; Going So Well Yet Going So

Wrong
Those who planned this battle actually aimed to bring the world's biggest Satan [US] and its
allies into this trap and swamp [Afghanistan]. Afghanistan is a unique place in the world
where the hunter has all sorts of traps to choose from. It might be deserts, rivers, mountains and
the urban centers as well. This was the thinking of the planners of this war who were sick and
tired of the great Satan's global intrigues and they aim for its demise to make this world a place
of peace and justice. Late AQ Mil. Committee Head Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri.

59

The Chimera of Victory in Af-Pak

While the maelstrom of jihadi activity in Syria and Africa predominates the media news
wire, AQs exhaustive 12-year and counting Af-Pak campaign is seemingly consigned to the
attentional periphery. To some, this is where it belongs. After all, they argue, there are more kids
in your typical high school English class than there are AQ fighters on the prowl in Afghanistan.
More than that, the AQ personnel remaining are hiding under a mattress gasping for air and
awaiting the hellfire missile that puts them out of their misery. AQ is a shell of its former self,
and it is just trying to survive at this point. (Taylor, 2013) Refrains like these have been
iterated ad nauseam by military officials and academics for years. And though itd be a losing
battle to try and refute an axiom, its okaythis isnt one.
The whitewash of AQs Af-Pak victory--as well as the miserable US failure--is hard to
miss if you really look for it. Too many things are fishy and dont add up to the sanguine
progress reports delivered by the Obama administration and its military chiefs. A recent
foretaste of this lies in the tallied estimate of50-100 AQ fighters remaining in Afghanistan.
Whats peculiar about these numbers is that theyve remained immutable for over 3 yearsthis
despite the over 357 reported ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) raids against AQ
targets since 2007. (Roggio, 2013) In fact, from April 1 to September 30 of this year alone,
coalition forces supposedly eliminated dozens of AQ operatives and facilitators. (Ibid.) Yet,
the figures of 50-100 (some even as low as 25) havent changed one iota. Could we be up against
AQs Terminator contingent, or is someone just forgetting to click the update button?
The truth is neither. Rather, as evidenced above, the US is in bitter denial over the true
extent of its Afghan imbroglio. The distortion above is but a microcosm of this unfortunate
reality. But considering how much was invested, and how little was returned, perhaps the
subterfuge is a matter of course. According to the Watson Institutes Costs of War Project,
between 2001-2011 the US has spent what will ultimately total $3.2-$4 trillion on its War on
Terror. (Masco, 2013) Needless to say, the expenditure of lifeboth military and civilianhas
also been costly. 10,000 US military personnel and contractors have been killed, with 675,000
disability claims submitted to Veteran Affairs by September 2011. (Ibid.) Incidentally, hundreds
of thousands of civilians have been killedmany by enemy combatants, but a still significant

60

number by our own. Yet, despite the hefty investments, the US is packing up and leaving town
without even a Pyrrhic victory to call its own.

Af-Pak: The Perfect Venue for US defeat

Having arrived after 9/11 to sterilize a Jihadi virus, the US made quick work of many of
its spores and appeared well on the road to total victory. But to its disbelief, although many
spores were killed, many others would survive and mutate. Eventually they would find new,
willing hosts to infect with their virulent ideologies. It took time to metastasize, but before long,
the pathogen was more numerous and resilient than ever before. The US no longer had a vaccine
for it. Its will to persist exhausted, the US ignominiously withdrew and the AQ virus continued
to proliferate.
The narrative above is an apt, albeit incomplete, portrayal of how AQ got the best of the
US in the immediate post 9/11 battlefield. The thrust of it is that the US long gauged AQs pulse
according to its pre-9/11organizational composition. It failed to realize that behind the scenes,
AQs Afghan-presence had mutated; having co-opted other local Jihadi groups under its global
umbrella and amalgamating into an entity far surpassing its pre-9/11 iteration. This strategy
was, in fact, pre-meditated. As the late Syed Saleem Shahzad writes: AQ needed to turn the
region into a theater of war and trap the US in an Afghan quagmire, and when 9/11 ignited the
region, this was keeping with AQs plans. AQ saw the invasion of Afghanistan by the US as just
as inevitable as the Talibans defeat and retreat into Pakistans border regions. (Shahzad,
p.xviii)
The venue it chose for this scheme was perfect from a strategic, tactical, and ideological
perspective. That Afghanistans mountainous and rugged terrain is unforgiving for conventional
armies is, by now, self-evident. Its track record speaks for itself in the relics of war that litter the
countryside to this day; graveyards of burned out, decaying, or armored vehicles that never made
it home. From the Greeks and the Mongols to the British and the Soviets, Afghanistan had seen
its fair share of Sisyphuses. Though the US thought it could be the one to finally make it up the
hill, that it couldnt had long been written on the wall.
Beyond the hostile terrain, Afghanistanfrom AQs perspectivecame with the
ultimate escape chute; the porous Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) that straddled the

61

Afghan-Pakistan border. Together with the mountain strongholds of North-South Waziristan ,

these lawless regions were inhabited by many of the longtime friends AQ had met on the AntiSoviet battlefield. These enduring relationships were ultimately pivotal in AQs resurrection.
Pakistan, to begin with, was fertile ground for AQ indoctrination. Its government spent fortunes
over the years nurturing anti-Indian Jihadi groups who served as its main players in the
countrys border dispute with India. As Shahzard writes, There were at least 600,000 youths
there who had been trained and had fought in Afghanistan and Kashmr since 1979. At least
100,000 Pakistanis were active members of different Jihadi cadres. Over 1 million students were
enrolled in various Islamic seminaries, and there were several hundred thousand supporters of
Pakistans Islamic religious parties. (Shahzad, p.8)
From an ideological point of view, Afghanistan was also a felicitous venue. It is
considered part of Khurasan; an ancient stretch of land (which also includes parts of Iran,
Central Asia, and areas in Pakistan) in whichaccording to a Muhammadic Hadiththe initial
victory of the End of Time battles would occur:
Then there will come people from the East carrying black flags...they will wage war and
emerge victorious. (Sunan Ibn Majah, v2, Tradition #4082, The History of Tabari al-Sawaiq
al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar, Ch. 11, section 1, pp.250-1)
That AQ has made the black flag its organizational trademark is no coincidence.
Besides being a passage Muslims learn by rote, Jihadists take its message to heart and firmly
believe that once this vision is realized, theyll march to the Middle East to join forces with the
promised Mahdi, and do battle against the Antichrist and its Western allies for the liberation of
Palestine. (Ibid. p.201)
While this paper scoffs at such a fantasy, a Jihadi victory in Khurasanat least its
Afghani swatheis well within reach. Should it come to pass, it will be huge fillip for the global
AQ movement on a multitude of levels. This will be elaborated in the proceeding bodies of this
chapter. But first a question must be answered: How did AQ, a movement thats just fighting to
survive, turn the tables and move the ball closer to victory? The answer, in short, is that its plan
went as scripted and them some. For its part, the US provided plenty of helping hands.

The Sons of Soil and the Birth of AQ 2.0

62

Any American (yours truly included) tuning into media coverage of the 2001 Afghaninvasion could enjoy the smug tingle of Serotonin pumping through his/her brain. The images we
sawAQ training camps blown to smithereens, Jihadists running and hiding for dear life as US
Spec-Ops swooped inwere poetic justice. They may have thrown the first punch, but we would
throw the last. Yet lost in this picturesque retribution was what was transpiring on the ground, off
camera. Surely, AQ was badly bruised; thousands of its fighters wereas mentioned
decimated. Still, while exact numbers are hard to pin down, a rough estimate of 10,000 Uzbek,
Chechen, Uighur, Chinese, and Arab fighters made it across the border into Pakistan. (Ibid, p.23) Among this cohort, no more than 2,000 could be considered bona fide AQ members.
However small this group was, theytogether with the thousands of Afghan-Taliban that
werent included abovewere all in the same boat, joined by a common enemy, and had
nowhere to go. To their luck, that boat was about to get a whole lot bigger.
The US War on Terror is riddled with catch-22s and the following is one of them. As
mentioned, Pakistan was a exuberant sponsor of a large matrix of Kashmiri/anti-Indian Jihadi
groups. Chief among them were the infamous Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT; responsible for the 2008
Mumbai attacks,) the Kashmir Liberation Movement (KLM) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Many
of these groupswho were patronized by the Pakistani Internal Security Service (ISI)
underwent intense military and guerilla training under the tutelage of Pakistans most elite
fighting units. Incidentally, Pakistans formal army itself, particularly the ISI, was awash with
Jihadi predispositions cultivated by the trenchant Islamic advocacy of its erstwhile 11-year-long
military government. Quite naturally, an informal crossover often prevailed in which military
retirees brought their skills and experience with them to the ranks of Kashmiri-Jihadist groups.
For example, a key handler in the 2008 Mumbai attacks was Haroon Ashik, a former army major
in Pakistans elite commando unit who joined LeT upon retiring in 2000. (Mir, 2012)
The implication here is that with the launch of the US WoT, the Bush administration
turned up the heat on the Musharaf led government to clamp down hard on these domestic Jihadi
groups. And just like that, many of this Kashmiri crew were either laid-off with nothing to do
or became wanted individuals on the run. Having the rug pulled out from under themtogether
with their livelihoods and self-purpose--these Jihadists were none too happy. Seeing themselves
betrayed at the behest of American infidels, the Kashmiri groups made for natural AQ blood

63

brothers. Thanks to US pressure, their goals would fuse. And soon enough, theyd be donning
the insignia of AQs new Af-Pak alliance by the thousands. A security crackdown on militants,
particularly those associated with the KLM, would see the AQs revamped global-jihadi
umbrella swell to 50,000 fighters. (Shahzad, p.43) Among these new additions was Ilyas
Kashmiri, a deft, battle-hardened special forces veteran who would not only go on to play a
leading role in AQCs military command, but would also be included on the short-list of
candidates for the movements heir to the throne. (IBN Live, 2011)
To be sure, Washington correctly assessed the Taliban-AQ center of gravity to be their
sanctuaries and allies of the Af-Pak border region. Naturally, success against the former in
Afghanistan was seen as inextricably rooted in efforts to raze the latter. Sans progress on the AfPak front, the Afghan theatre would turn into an eternal game of Whac-a-mole; the US could
deliver tactical defeats, but the Talibans Waziri life-support would allow it to convalesce and
fight on. Despite the urgency to act in the FATA, and the Waziristans in particular, acting
unilaterally and trampling on the sovereignty of a rabidly anti-American country would have the
effect of producing an invidious situational powder keg. Understandably, the US preferred to
depute those maneuvers to the Pakistani army who would act as a surrogate force. But in being
construed as quislings whoin attacking fellow Muslimswere doing the USs bidding, the
outcome was equifinal. No matter what approach the US took, this was going to be a losing
battle whose final product would be more enraged Pakistanis pushed into the arms of the AQTaliban alliance.
Though its antecedent force structure was eviscerated by the end of 2001, AQs
ideological fire continued to burn and spread. The plan had always been to permeate Western
Pakistan with AQs ideology and strategy; to split Islamists into sundry camps and exploit their
special skills. That, not its core-fighter base, was AQs ultimate weapon to fight NATO in
Afghanistan. AQ long aspired for every Muslim land to have its own version of AQ. (Atwan,
p.14) They sought to spawn AQs ideological genes in the Inbul Balad (Sons of Soil),
transforming them into blood brothersfrom which AQ aimed to produce a new generation of
al-Zawahiris. (Shahzad, p.81) And once their message was disseminated among the targeted
professional Muslims youths, mobilizing material resources would not be a problem, because
the Muslim soldiers and officers whod be recruited and indoctrinated would be able to produce

64

weaponry using their own ingenuity. (Ibid.) With the unintended help of the US-backed
campaigns in the FATA, that vision was congealing.
Since the very beginning, the deployment of Pakistani troops into FATA (at the behest of
the US) had been a thorn that wrung deep in the hind of Pakistani society. So much so that even
secular parties couldnt reconcile themselves with what many perceived as Pakistans support
for neo-imperialism. (Ibid, p.42) In the eyes of the general public, the Taliban was an antiimperialist resistance movement. (Ibid.) Ironically, even as Pakistani-Taliban groups
increasingly targeted civilians as part of their ruthless campaigns of suicide bombings, just 32%
of the populace supported using the Pakistani Army to fight extremists. (Pew, 2012)
Apparently, India (59%), not Al Qaeda (4%) or the Taliban (23%) is where the armys attention
should be. Thus, in 2003, when the Pakistani military intensified military operations against the
FATA-based AQ-Taliban, anti-Americanism in Pakistan soared to new heights. (Shahzad,
p.42) The outpouring of public wrath was an expedient opening the wily AQ couldnt pass up.
Beginning in 2003, AQ sent one of its leading Egyptian, ideologues--Sheikh Essa AlMisiri--to lobby grassroots, Islamic politicians/organizations and shore up support for the
movements Anti-Western jihad. A high water mark of this correspondence was the co-option of
two esteemed prayer leaders from Islamabads Lal Masjid religious schools; Maulana Abdul
Aziz and Abdul Rasheed Ghazi. In 2004, on the advice of AQ, the former issued a religious
decree that declared the Pakistani armys military operations in South Waziristan as unIslamic. (Ibid.) Accordingly, both funeral prayers and the burial for fallen soldiers in Muslim
graveyards became verboten. The fatwa soon received the imprimatur of 500 clerics and was
quickly disseminated throughout the country. It quickly spurred bitter controversy and was all
that was needed to further ignite anti-American feelings in Pakistan. (Ibid.) Parents were seen
refusing to receive the dead bodies of their sons who had been killedreligious clerics refused
to say prayers over their bodies, and the rank and file of Pakistans armed forces was totally
demoralized. Scores of lower-ranking NCOs defied the commands of their officers to fight and
were court-martialed, while hundreds of officers resigned from service on receiving orders of
their postings to South Waziristan. (Ibid., p.43) As Shahzad who covered the uproar writes:
The Pakistan Army had been well placed to defeat the militants in 2004, but AQs timely spin
by using Lal Masjid had clipped its wings. The stunt was no one-off affair either. Its important
to note that there are 13,500 Islamic seminaries across the country where 1.8 million students are

65

inculcated with the Talibans Deobandi school of thought. Under AQ guidance, Lal Masjid was
to use these structures to defy and revolt against Pakistans policies supporting the US-led
WoT. (Ibid, p.161) Incidentally, they were also an incubator for a new wave of global-jihadi
recruits. Whenever Pakistan turned up the heat in FATA, AQthrough Lal Masjidresponded
in kind with social unrest.
In parallel, AQ worked assiduously to infect and supplant the FATAs traditional tribal
structure with its Anti-American vitriol and rear a likeminded Islamic emirate in its place. To this
end, thousands of idle Kashmiri fighters, including powerful groups like LeT and JeM
(mentioned above), were imported to inundate the FATA regions of North and South. Together
with the blessings of pro-AQ tribes (particularly the Mehsud and Wazir) and warlords such as
Jalaluddin Haqqani, this amalgam paved over large swathes of tribal territory under the new
Islamic Emirate of Waziristan (IEW) umbrella. The groundwork for Pakistans AQ subsidiary
had thus been laid, and the IEW would become the birthplace of a fledgling pro-AQ neoTaliban movement (aka Pakistani Taliban or TTP). Though they fight under the command
Afghan-Taliban head Mullah Omar, the TTP owe final allegiance to AQ ideology and its
goals. (Ibid, p.109) Whereas the war may begin and end in Afghanistan for the former, the
TTPs war starts from Central and South Asia and ends with the emergence of the Global
Caliphate. (Ibid, p.221-222) Under AQ shepherding, the TTP has been a prodigious player
supporting the Talibans campaign for ousting Western forces from Afghanistan, particularly in
the realm of suicide bombings. For this, credit goes out to the rank disaster that was Operation
Iraq freedom.

How the Iraq Invasion Helped AQ in Af-Pak

Its worth digressing momentarily to explain how AQs Af-Pak success story directly ties
in to the US invasion of Iraq. As briefly discussed in relation to AQIs pedagogic role in the
ongoing Syrian Jihad (i.e. IED classes), the organization was equally important role in
furnishing the operational capabilities of Pakistani-based terrorist groups fighting Western troops
in Afghanistan. As one TTP fighter explains: Arab and Iraqi mujahedeen began visiting us,
transferring the latest IED technology and suicide-bomber tactics they had learned in the Iraqi
resistance. (Bergen, 2009) Many such Iraqis were, in fact, highly trained officers from Saddam
Husseins Republican Guard (RG). (Atwan, 2012, p.140) That they at one time served in this

66

staunchly secular (in many cases even anti-Islamic) unit and went on to adopt Salafism and the
lifestyle of the global Jihadi was not for lack of a reason to fight. Rather, we can reasona
prioriwith their backs against the wall, they craved one that conferred more significance and
meaning.
Within 3 weeks time, these RG muckety-mucks went from living like kings to plebeian
irrelevance. The US-backed de-baathification of the army, and generally speaking, the end of
their halcyon kleptocracy, did not augur well for their futures. No doubt, the psychological crises
befalling many in the former privileged Sunni caste were severe. The world had turned upside
down; uncertainty ruled the day. With this in mind, the palatability of the AQ narrative for those
pining for the days of old is unavoidable. In it, the conflictual context was anachronistically
reframed and embellished; appearing nobler than ever before. The Shiites took on their
traditional roles as saboteurs of Sunni Hegemony, while the West, once again, was neck deep in
Crusades Take 2. History was reliving itself in nostalgic fashion. The AQ credo, since the days
of al-Banna and Qutb, never differentiated between the challenges to Islam of today and the past.
It was all part of one protracted struggle, with reprieves interspersed every now and then. The
scores of RG officers above bought into it. Their previous sources importance and meaning were
torn from them and could never be restored. Meaning would have to be made anew, and
Jihadism was there to help.
The US invasion of Iraq turned the country into a breeding ground for global jihadists.
Needless to say, if not for 9/11, it never would have happened. In the 2000 US presidential
election, George W. Bush ran on a largely domestic, even isolationist, platform that expressly
eschewed costly foreign adventures. With the jolting blow of 9/11, those plans would change.
Though this paper views the US invasion of Iraq as one of the biggest strategic blunders in US
history, without the benefit of hindsight it was at the time understandable. When you have 4
jetliners crashing into buildings with the intent of mass murder, anything that was previously
consigned to a Hollywood action movie enters the realm of possibility. The modus operandi AQ
employed on 9/11 was both novel, and shocking. Sure, terrorism has a long history, but the
macabre nature of 9/11 was truly unprecedented. The psychological dent it inflicted was
enormous. Combine that with AQs expressed religious duty for acquiring WMD and one
understands both the urgency to act, and also, the susceptibility to overreact.

67

In following up in Afghanistan with its Iraq invasion, overreact the US did. In doing so,
AQI became a US creation; the implications of which still haunt the world today. With the
exodus of large numbers of Jihadists from Afghanistan, the US presence in Iraq presented itself
as a perfect nesting spot. The Sunni heartland of the country would transform into Jihadi hornets
nest, as thousands of foreign fighters descended on the country. It was here that they would link
up with the insurgents of Saddams once elite RG, and begin picking each others brains. The
former shared its ideology (a psychological buoy for the secular RG), while the latter--as in Syria
todaytaught the nitty-gritty of IEDs. Soon enough, the seculars were radicalized and AQ
would markedly upgrade its operational skills, particularly in the assembly of IEDs with
sophisticated accessories like infrared trip wires and daisy chain detonators (where one remote
detonator can set off a whole line of explosions capable of destroying an entire NATO convo).
(Ibid.)
AQI, under its Emir Abu Musab al Zarqawi, certainly dropped the proverbial ball in Iraq.
Its grotesque brutality ultimately precipitated a backlash in the form of the Sunni Awakening
Movement. Under amplified US and local pressure, AQI had largely worn out its welcome, and
many departed. Yet even moments of relative US success carried unintended consequences. It
seemingly couldnt catch a break.
Returning again to the focus of the Af-Pak arena, fleeing AQI fighters and their newly
converted RG peers set off for the tribal hinterlands of Pakistan; bringing their tacit bomb
making and urban warfare knowledge with them. As early as 2005, there were exchanges
between many Taliban and Iraqi delegations who examined and compared their know-how on
the battlefield. (Shahzad, p.31) Former RG officers were seen increasingly running militant
training camps in the tribal regions on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. (Atwan, p.140)
"The Arabs taught us how to make an IED by mixing nitrate fertilizer and diesel fuel and how to
pack plastic explosives and to connect them to detonators and remote-control devices like mobile
phones. We learned how to do this blindfolded so we could safely plant IEDs in the dark,"
explained one Taliban fighter. (Bergen) "Arab and Iraqi mujahedin began visiting us,
transferring the latest IED technology and suicide-bomber tactics they had learned in the Iraqi
resistance," adds another. As Peter Bergen writes, these instructors were embedded with much
larger Taliban units and have played a role not unlike that of U.S. Special Forces in the Afghan
National Armyas trainers and force multipliers.

68

In addition to the infusion of skills, the Iraqi delegation brought with them wads of Jihadi
propaganda material, particularly motivational videos and CDs, as well as training video CDs
for suicide missions. (Shahzad, p.30) Considering the lack of historical precedence for suicide
attacks in Afghanistan, this consignment was formative in instilling acceptance for what was
long a strictly forbidden taboo among the rigid Pashtun society. Soliciting the Talibans embrace
of suicide-bombings was no easy sell. To that end, the airing of the newly obtained propaganda
material was pivotal in providing the religious sanction needed to convince the masses. Taliban
commander Mullah Dadullah, for example, made prolific use of video presentations that featured
leading Arab Islamic scholars explaining, how and why suicide attacks were allowed in Islam.
(Ibid.) He held screenings of AQI-recorded in-the-field videos for his fighters that touted the
attacks as its most effective weapon. (Ibid. p.31) Augmenting these educational overtures
was the formation of Al-Sahab, AQs Af-Pak media/propaganda mouthpiece. Over the years,
Al Sahab has played a significant role in radicalizing and joining new Muslimsparticularly
from Pakistani madrassasinto the AQ fold. It produces state-of-the-art footage of Jihadi attacks
on US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and publishes inciteful literature, which is then
disseminated en masse all over Pakistan. The impact AQI fighters and their propaganda had on
the Af-Pak battlefield speaks for itself.

The AQ-driven Comeback

It was not long after the Iraqi contingent had arrived that Dadullah had succeeded in
motivating 450 suicide attackers, notably including 70 women, into its legion of human
precision guided bombs. (Ibid.) And those numbers would grow immensely. In 2004, there were
only four suicide attacks in Afghanistan, followed by 17 in 2005. (Goodenough, 2011) In 2006
and 2007, those numbers jumped to 136 and 116 respectively and continued to balloon; 2008-10
saw an average of 142 attacks a year. The upsurge of IED attacks was even more impressive,
doubling to 8,200 between 2008-9 and soaring to 14,661 by the end of 2010. 2012 set the record;
an astounding 16,000 attacks. (Brook, 2012) The bombs80% of which originate in Pakistan
are responsible for 90% of US casualties.
AQs contributions to the Af-Pak battlefieldparticularly in terms of skills and
recruitmentwrit large. By 2006, the Taliban were on the rebound, as its spring offensive
rendered much of southern Afghanistan virtually ungovernable. (Shahzad, p.61) Just two years

69

later, the Taliban grabbed a permanent presence in 72% of Afghanistan, alongside the 90% of
territory they occupied in the Pakistani SWAT. (Hemming, 2008, Shahzad, p.64) The US didnt
know what hit them. True, the famed Obama-led troop surge of 2009 made gains in rectifying
the damage and pushing the Taliban southward. But the Taliban, today, remains far from beaten
and still control what some estimate as 40-60% of Afghan territory. (Malashenko, 2013) The
impending US withdrawal in 2014 will leave an underequipped and under resourced Afghan
National Army as the only sheriff in town. Many doubtat least in the long run--whether theyre
even up to the task. (Biddle, 2013) Though the Taliban may not come to swallow the entire
country under its thrall, their present and future territorial holdingscoupled with the TTPs
emirate in Pakistanafford AQ the strategic depth needed to train its posterity of global
Jihadists.
For lack of an alternative, the West has bet their hopes that the more progressive and
moderate factions of the Taliban can be reasoned with and persuaded to outlaw the presence of
foreign Jihadis in any future Afghan state. (Cordesman, 2013)This is largely based on the
assessment of the more pragmatic wing that, in addition to craving international legitimacy and
acceptance of their future regime, hasnt forgiven AQ for the foolhardy recalcitrance it displayed
in launching 9/11. (Gerges) No doubt, if such an agreement were in fact forged, it would be a
positive development and setback for AQAM. But given how ideologically and operationally
wedded the two are today its hard to believe the Taliban will throw AQ under the bus. AQ was
a seminal player in their success and wont be left unrequited.

AQ or Taliban; Whos Who These Days?

Though AQs contributions were perhaps most palpable in the realm of tacit operational
knowledge, the efforts were all part of the larger goal of infecting the Taliban with its global,
anti-Western ideology. By all accounts, theyve largely succeeded. As one expert notes, The
radicalization of the Taliban and their conversion away from Deobandism to Wahhabism under
Sheikh Essa al Masri and other al Qaeda leaders is a clear sign of the al Qaeda's preeminence.
(Roggio, 2009) The line between the Taliban and AQ has become increasingly blurred,
especially from a command and control perspective. Besides a very abstract level, the alliance is
essentially indistinguishable. (Ibid.) This is especially true in the case of the conglomerate
Shadow Army; an elite Jihadi unit comprised of fighters from AQ, the AT-TTP, and other

70

groups like Haqqani and LeT. Under the command of a senior AQ military leader, the unit is a
formidable, even overwhelming, force on the battle. Capable of conducting battalion-sized
operations, the group was decisive in the Talibans resurgence in eastern and southern
Afghanistan, and its consolidation of power in FATA. Those pitted against it often find
themselves outmatched. As one Pakistani military officer noted: Even their sniper rifles they
use are better than some of ours. Their tactics are mind-boggling and they have defenses that
would take us years to build. It does not look as though we are fighting a rag-tag militia; they are
fighting like an organized force." (Ibid.)
Beyond operational synergy, the symptoms of the AQ ideological flu are evident in the
Talibans increasingly expansive and hyphenated activities. Most noteworthy was the TTPs
hand in the failed 2010 Times Square bombing; the first Taliban terrorist attack ever perpetrated
on US soil. Other developments also prefigure the groups outward operational pivot. Just last
year, in the Afghan breakaway northern region of Mali, Pakistani jihadists were spotted training
Islamist recruits and providing tactical advice to the local AQ affiliate (AQIM). (France 24,
2012) And just recently, a TTP spokesman announced the group had established an outpost in
Syria, while another stated hundreds of fighters along with our Arab friends had already been
sent to help fight the Assad regime. (Burke, 2013) Though the claims should be taken with a
grain of salt, they nonetheless signal the groups ambitions of operating at an international level.
Try as it may, the US will be hard-pressed to dislodge AQ from the Talibans embrace.
Its presence is no longer just corporeal, but pervades the heart and soul of thousands of regional
Muslims and counting. As the Director of Military Affairs of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
explains in an al-Sahab interview:
There is no difference between us, for we are united by Islam and the Sharia governs us. Just as
the infidels are one people, so are the Muslims, and they will never succeed in disuniting the
Mujahedeen, saying that there is Al- Qaeda and Taliban, and that Al-Qaeda are terrorists and
extremists. They use many such words, but by the Grace of Allah, it will not affect our brotherly
relationship. Now they are also trying to disunite the Taliban, saying that there are two wings,
one extremist and another moderate. However, the truth is that we are all one and are united by
Islam.. (Sahab Media, 2009)

Even Under Drone Attack, AQ Still Better Off Post-9/11

AQ couldnt have picked a better locale from which to green light the 9/11 attacks.
Though it indubitably expected the shellacking itd be dealt, the short-term losses in manpower

71

and bases were mere down payments for the winning strategy it would unveil in the years ahead.
Having routed the Taliban and their Arab guests, the US proclaimed a premature victory. In
reality, however, the battle had been wonbut the war was just getting started. By luring
Western crusaders into the heart of the Muslim world, AQs material existence may have been
degraded, but its ideology had become infectious. And neighboring Pakistan--awash with statenurtured Jihadi groups and religiously indoctrinated populaces--was arable land for its continued
culture.
As the US worked to stabilize post-war Afghanistan, AQnow in Western Pakistan
was laying the groundwork for its renaissance. Its fightershaving married into local tribes
went about propagating the Jihadi narrative the US had helped to concretize. Finding a receptive
audience proved none too difficult; the USs co-option of the Pakistani regime as its partner in
the regional WoT created a lot of enemies. From the firings of Kashmiri-Jihadi groups, to the
popular resentment incurred from its contentious FATA military offensives, Pakistan andby
extensionthe US, bought AQ scores of new friends. Once under its orbit, AQ further cemented
the ideological conversion of their new allies. The US, again, was of great assistance. In terms of
propaganda material, the US-invasion of Iraq was the gift that kept on going; effectively
validating AQs narrative of a downtrodden Islam. The delivery of propaganda and tacit battle
knowledge by their new Iraqi and Arab advisors was decisive in changing the tide of war
against the US. In the process, the Talibanbeholden to its ancillariesnestled even closer to
the AQ world-view. Before long, the first-ever popular local and fully tribally supported AQ
franchise in the world came to fruition. (Shahzad, p.63) Yes, the US largely destroyed one
strain of the AQ virusbut the remaining genes would mutate to spawn a larger, and even
stronger generation of global jihadists. This was the plan even before 9/11, when mastermind
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was convinced that, Although the US might mercilessly butcher
AQs human resources at the outset, AQs spiritual and ideological strength would breed a long
line of poverty stricken Muslims ready to fight the war anew. (Ibid, p.220)
Having taken the bait and drained its vitality and resources in two wars, the US has little
appetite for any more entanglements. It is disengaging expeditiously from Afghanistan, as it did
in Iraq. No doubt, the sight of US troops leaving in defeat will embolden AQAM and spur
additional recruitment. The ontological boost this will provide cant be ignored. Because if it is
God who decides the outcome of battles then victory in Afghanistan lends further proof that he

72

is on AQs side. (Jenkins, 2012, p.9) Propelled by Gods will, AQs superior spiritual
commitment triumphed against Americas superior military technology. (Ibid.) Naturally,
this is precisely how Jihadists and their sympathizers alike will read it.
Some scholars (i.e. Moghadam, Fishman) as previously mentionedargue that
goading the West into occupying Muslim countries contradicts the AQ goal of purifying Islamic
soil of Western footprints. However, this goal was never to be realized over night. Indeed, by
exhausting the US in decade long wars and generating archives of propaganda material in the
process, AQ has bolstered its ranks and arguably ensured the West never returns.
As such, in a mea culpa, the US has turned to a smaller, more surgical, footprint.
Decapitory drones strikes are the new game in town, and on a tactical level theyve certainly
proven their worth. Since Obama entered the Oval Office, US drones have liquidated over 3,300
AQ, Taliban, and other Jihadi operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. (Byman, 2013) But as Audrey
Cronin counters, there are many reasons to believe that drone strikes are undermining
Washingtons goal of destroying AQ. (Cronin, 2013)
For one, they have significantly enhanced the propaganda put out by AQs al-Sahab
media branch. In Pakistan, drones have killed a total of 2,200 people since 2004; of which at
least 400 were civilians. (VN, 2013) The lurid images of disfigured, scorched Muslim bodies all
go on to make excellent recruitment videos. Exhibit A was the case of Faisal Shahzad, the
aforementioned TTP Times Square bomber, who expressly intended to help put a stop to the
drone strikes in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan. (Bollier, 2013)
On a regional level, drone attacks further fuel anti-American sentiments and calls for
vengeance. (Gerges, p.198) And why wouldnt it? While the US may exculpate itself with
euphemisms such as collateral damage or necessary evil, the bereaved or newly orphaned on
the ground are entered into a confused, psychological chaos. This is especially true in
Afghanistan, where some 92% of the population has never heard of this event which foreigners
call 9/11. (MFS, 2011) Those who previously had no dog in Americas fight lose loved ones
and morph into what insurgency expert David Kilcullen call accidental guerillas. (Kilcullen,
2009) Trying to make sense of their loss, and more importantly, find meaning amidst the tragedy
(as Frankl would call it), the allure of the AQ narrative for the afflicted is unmistakable. Its no
coincidence that following an errant drone strike that killed dozens of women and children at a
Bedouin camp in al-Majalla, Yemen, AQAP saw its ranks more than triple from 300 members in

73

2009 to over 1,000 just 3 years later. (Johnsen, 2012, p.263. As one local tribal leader explains,
The US sees AQ as terrorism, and we consider the drones terrorism. (Ibid.) For every AQ
operative we kill, estimated a former US state department official, were generating roughly 40
to 60 new enemies. (Khoury, 2013) Although those might not be hard numbers, the point is that
the more we feed into Muslim resentment, the more Muslims enter into the terrorist vertex of
the triangle.

The Radicalizing Influence of Club-Gitmo

Americas jihadi retirement home at Guantanamo Bay prison is another propaganda
cottage industry. In declaring total war against global terrorism and hectoring Muslim countries
to play along, the US was quickly cascaded with hundreds of terrorist detainees. Catching them
proved to be the easy part--now they had to figure what to do with them. Tongue-in-cheek, US
magnanimously arranged their guests a locale with tropical climate and an oceanfront view at an
old US naval base in Cuba. For years, a merry-go-round of suspected Muslim terrorists were
trawled from the battlefield and checked into rooms at their new, indefinite, suites. At its peak
in 2003, Club-Gitmo housed 680 enemy combatants. (Johnsen, p.169) But apart from the
Caribbean dcor, it was no bed and breakfast. Overcome with the urgency of stopping the next
attack, as well as the hankering for retribution, the US wanted its Muslim tenants as confused
and disoriented as possible. (Ibid., p.169)
A 1970s sociology book entitled The Arab Mind became required reading among
Gitmos overlords. (Ibid.) Its central premise was the blanket argument that Arabs only
understand power. Accordingly, detainees were to be denuded of any marker of identity and
self-image, until they lost their bearings and, the CIA hoped, their defenses. Their beards
would be shaved, their hands couldnt leave the inside of their blankets, and for a time
speaking and even the public call to prayer were banned. The treatment methods employed by
Gitmos handlers were untested, and the interrogatory modus operandi a design of two outside
consultants who reverse-engineered a US army training manual on surviving torture. (Ibid.)
In what would later be euphemized as enhanced interrogation methods, detainees often
were locked in rooms with female handlers whod spray their naked bodies with ice water.
(Ibid.) Many were often kept nude and placed in solitary confinement in over-air-conditioned
cells where theyd be exposed to loud rock and hip-hop music, strobe lighting, and sustained
noise from tape recordings of crying babies and American TV commercials; prolonged sleep

74

deprivation, and various forms of personal humiliationfrom forcing prisoners to soil

themselves to the use of attack dogs and sexual abuse. (Hamm, loc. 1574) A 2003 audit by the
International Red Cross confirmed all this and more, including techniques that involved
deliberate desecrations of the Koran and the, excessive isolation of detainees. (Masood, 2005)
The report also cited a worrying deterioration in the psychological health of a large number of
the detainees because of uncertainty about their fate. (Hersh, 2005, p.14)
Alas, many Muslims didnt even belong at Gitmo; they were victims of tragic
misunderstandings, or more broadly, Americas haphazard bounty hunt. With the weight of an
incandescent super power coming down on them, countries like Pakistan offered lucrative
bounties to anyone who could deliver in capturing suspected terrorists. (Johnsen) Sadly, this
created a bounty hunter gold rush and those who were in the wrong place at the wrong time
paid the price.
One such individual was a Yemeni who had traveled to Pakistan in search of cheap
medical care for a brain injury. Swept up in the post-9/11 dragnet and shuttled to Gitmo, he
never seemed to grasp the charges against him, confusing AQ the terrorist organization with a
city of the same name in the Yemeni highlands. (Ibid., p.166) Brought before a US military
tribunal, the flustered detainee insisted that he was from, Urday city in Yemen, not a city in AQ.
My city is very far from the city of al-Qaeda. After having the charges repeated to him and
explained through a translator that AQ was an organization, not a city, the prisoner, still
confused, reiterated, Whether it is a city or an organization, I am not from AQ.
Another capture-gone-wrong was Abdullah Mehsud who, after losing his leg in a land
mine explosion, was forcefully conscripted into the Taliban as a desk clerk. (Hamm, loc. 1563)
Lumped in with the rest of the jihadists, Mehsud was interned at Guantanamo until 2004, when
the parole board assessed that he did not pose a future threat. (Ibid., loc.1582) Three years
later, a radicalized Mehsud spearheaded a terrorist attack that killed 31 people in Pakistan and
thereafter made his final statement in a suicide attack against the Pakistani Army.
The cases of Mehsud and the hapless Yemeni are not isolated incidents. There are many
others who if they werent terrorists when we got them, relents a CIA officer, they are now.
(Hersh, p.3) Some of them, like Said Ali al-Shihiri--who went on to become commander of AQs
Yemen branch (AQAP)--are released and turn to jihad with a vengeance. In fact by 2010, 150 of
598 released detainees had joined/re-joined terrorist groups. (HSNW, 2010) Others linger and

75

continue to rot in their cells. Out of 166 prisoners at Gitmo today, 86 have been cleared for
release and 46 are being held without enough evidence to prosecute but still too dangerous to
transfer. (Postel, 2013) Only 6 are facing formal charges. Yet even those cleared for release
wont be leaving anytime soon. Like the CIA officer above, the many intelligence officials
acknowledge the likely outcome should they be set free. Theyre well aware, as one leaked
document disclosed, that their techniques have nurtured an intense hatred for Americans that
was festering in the cellblocks [which served] as a bond for the captives. (Novak, 2005, p. 71)
From an ontological perspective this bond makes sense. America had compelled these
men to find meaning through Hardship and Affliction. Why they were there was
inexplicable. But the more they dwelled on it, the more theyd drive themselves into a mental
abyss. Adopting AQs radical narrative was the only means for keeping sanity and self-purpose.
They thus came to view their detention as part Americas war against Muslims. And by default,
they were now at war with America. Guantanamo was seen as putting them on their mettle, and
became a battleground like anywhere else. To Jabir al-Fayfi, former drug addict turned AQAP
terrorist, That [Guantanamo] was the first time I was really affected by Takfiri ideology. In
Afghanistan the thinking wasnt really extreme. We were just fighting. ( Johnsen, p.168) But in
Gitmo, those ideas took on new meaning for Fayfi, and his prison behavior soon reflected it. One
internal report indicated that he was becoming increasingly non-compliant and hostile to the
guard force and staff, participating in block disturbances and even throwing urine in the face of
a guard. (Ibid.) Said al-Shihri, the Gitmo detainee turned AQAP commander mentioned above,
had long been an [radical] ideological adherent, but it was Guantanamo that truly convinced
him of the righteousness of his path. (Ibid.)
For many, a long stay at Guantanamo becomes a pathway for significance enhancement.
Its seen as a badge of honor in the eyes of the global jihadist community; those that leave are
treated like rock stars andlike al-Shihiriare often elevated to premier roles in AQ.
(HSNW) Their lives are thus refurbished with newfound meaning. They become poster boys for
AQ recruitment, their stories of persecution, resistance and perseverance featuring prominently
in AQ publications like Inspire Magazine. (Postel) Their plight has won AQ new
sympathizersif not fans and members. Air Force Officer Mathew Alexander, who was in
charge of an interrogation team in Iraq, puts it bluntly: The longer [Guantanamo] stays open the
more cost it will have in US lives. (Ibid.)

76

In the eyes of the Muslim world, Guantanamo is a paragon of Americas unabashed

philistinism, and a further demonstration of how it and the West make the war against terrorism
synonymous with the war against Islam. (Ibid.) Even those amiable or who had held no ill will
towards the US became disenchanted by the odious images of the cages, the orange suits and
the shackles that have come to characterize Gitmo. The Americans were good people before,
remarked a former Afghan commander. Definitely, people are changing their minds towards the
Americans. (Masood) At one of Pakistans most prestigious private schools, students showed
their solidarity by producing and performing in Guantanamo; a docudrama showcased at their
annual school play. (Ibid.) Clearly its an issue that sinks into peoples heads, as even illiterate
people in one Pakistani province pronounce [Guantanamo] in a perfect manner; something
one columnist deemed, quite frankly, surprising.

Closing Arguments
For all the trillions America has invested in its discursive attempt at wiping it off the face
of the earth, AQ has mutated into a more resilient entity all but impervious to the use of force. If
anything, force is its pick-me-up. Fixed on destroying AQ the organization, the US was blinded
towards the why people joined in the first place. Regrettably, US actions gave them more reasons
to do so. While its numbers momentarily dwindled, AQs narrative started blossom. The coopting of Pakistan, the impetuous Iraq invasion, the drone strikes, and the enhanced
interrogation protocols of Gitmo and Abu Grahb, all acted as its fertilizer. Its flowers having
sprouted across a constellation of countries, AQ is bigger now than it ever has been. (Bailey,
2013) And greater size has translated into greater destructive power. AQ attacks have increased
fourfold since 11 September 2001 compared to the number before and, the attacks on the twin
towers aside, the numbers of deathshas also increased considerably. (Russel, 2013, p.1)
Moreover, and in contrast to the snubs it confronted pre-9/11, everyone now wants a piece of the
AQ brand name. Jihadists across the world fight for its CEOs (Zawahiri) attention like theyre
waving their little hands about and saying, Please can we join? (McKelvey, 2013)
These days, to be apart of AQ, Islams premiere guardian, the entity that challenged and
survived the worlds most powerful army, carries a lot of street cred. As this chapter has shown,
by launching 9/11 and provoking the US, AQ made itself a more consequential force than it ever
would have become on its own. With 9/11, AQ put all its money on red and hit the jackpot. Its
puzzles the author how many scholars can see it differently.

77

The following chapter will synthesize everything discussed thus far and bridge it to AQ
visionary Abu Musab al-Suris grand strategy of Global Islamic Resistance.

Chapter 4: How the WoT Vindicated al-Suris

Global Islamic Resistance
al-Suris Vision: Open and Individual Theatres of Jihad
If we recall in Chapter 1, Abu Musab al-Surione of AQs premier strategic
luminarieswas far from reticent in expressing his disapproval of the 9/11 attacks. He viewed
its immediate implicationsthe pretext for US invasion and the demise of Islams sole
emirateas catastrophic. Three years later though, equipped with some measure of hindsight,
al-Suri began singing a different tune--a paean even. He lavished praise on UBL for having
placed the battle on its right course, by imposing a confrontation between us and our real
enemy, who supports from behind the curtain all our enemies at whichever battlefront we
confront them. (Lia, p.322) It was 9/11 that woke the Islamic Nation, which [had] been
drugged, put to sleep and been absent from the confrontation, in order to put her face with her
duty of jihad. (Ibid, p.323) Furthermore, he maintained, Americas aggressive response
succeeded in globalizing the Islamic causehelping those who are not supported by belief and
understanding, to move towards this universal thinking, which is among the fundamentals of our
religion. (Ibid, p.377)
The importance of this outcome lies in al-Suris unalloyed belief in the need for
globalizing Jihad. Put differently, al-Suri aspired for a Jihad that was all-inclusive; one in which
individual Muslims, anywhere in the world could contribute, each to his own ability. Until 9/11,
AQ was largely a formal, constricted jihadi secret organization that did not have room for
everyone. (Ibid, p.427) Moreover, being that this formal tanzim was consistently being

78

monitored and interdicted by law enforcement, Muslims--who may have wanted to join --shied
away from the commitment with all its security-related and personal consequences. (Ibid.) The
fix to both these dilemmas was stoking the flames of radicalization throughout the Muslim world
and inviting the masses to assemble small, clandestine cells for waging Jihad at the local and
grass roots level. This way, aspiring jihadists could keep a low profile, and could fight in their
own alleys, street corners and villages, rather than travel to a distant land. (Ibid, p.324) Under
this format, a starry-eyed al-Suri envisioned thousands, even hundreds of thousands of Muslims
participating in Jihad. (Cruickshank, 2007, p.10)
While al-Suri was emphatic in championing individual or grass-roots terrorism
having argued the unsustainability of centralized and conventional organizational frontshe
viewed its interplay with the open theatres of jihad as crucial for success of the wider struggle.
Participating in these Open Fronts would enable Jihadi syndicates to heighten their military
skills and improve their training possibilities. (Lia, p. 436) Furthermore, those arriving at the
Open Fronts could be recruited and redirected to, operate in their countries, or wherever they
are able to operate in the field of individual or cell terrorism. The existence of Open Fronts
also provides a way out or secure haven for those individual jihadists who are on the run
from local law enforcement. On the flipside of the coin, Open Fronts benefit from individual
and cell terrorism, because the activity of these units constitutes a long arm that is fighting jihad
for the Open Fronts causes. These distal long arms can then operate behind enemy lines, and
execute special operations in cooperation with the Emirs in those arenas and for those causes in a
covert and programmatic way. (Ibid, p.437) A case in point of this was the 2004 Madrid train
bombings; a watershed that led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Though their
degree of coordination with AQ commanders is open to dispute, local terroristsfar removed
from the Open Front of Iraqwere able score a strategic victory for their brothers fighting in
the field.
Ultimately, individual Jihad is not an end in itself. Rather, it is designed to pave the
way for the other kind (Open Front Jihad) which is fundamental for seizing control over land
in order to liberate it, and establish Islamic law, with the help of God. (Ibid, p.371) Here, it must
be clarified that for all their hubbub of establishing a Caliphate stretching across the Muslim
world, jihadi ideologies are absolutely serious about establishing Islamic states in the near
term. (Mccants, 2006, p.19) Itd be a mistake, however, to confuse our Westphalian

79

understanding of nation-state with AQs short-term vision. AQ is more minimalist in this

regard, and is less interested in overthrowing a ruler and replacing his apostate regimethan
they are in establishing small enclaves across the globe in regions that are not well-policed.
(Ibid.) These emirates, therefore, may spread across several states and be as small as a city
or province.
Frankly, AQ can fantasize all it wantsthe amalgamation of these scattered territories
into an Islamic utopia is beyond the realm of this universe (though it may happen in another).
Yet, that shouldnt be our overriding concern, because any black flag staked over an area is not
only important as a training base, but as a specious marker of the caliphate to come. Like an
AQ victory in Afghanistan, the establishment of emiratessize notwithstandingprovides
fodder to the veracity of the Jihadi narrative. No doubt such a development has the force to
enchant ontologically distraught Muslims longing for an imagined, invented past whose
resuscitation will restore an all-too-real, despoiled present. (Mazzar, p.157)

WoT: Giving al-Suri a Helping Hand

To put things into context, the WoT has done wonders for the congealment of al-Suris
global vision. Though many of its constructs were formulated in the years before 9/11, the post9/11 world is slowly conforming to the binary design (Open-Individual Jihad) al-Suri had in
mind.
For al-Suri, a key requisite for the strategys ascent is the radicalization (or awakening) of
the Muslim world. On this count, the US-9/11 response2 invasions, drone strikes, and
Guantanamo--can be credited with helping to satisfy this condition; elevating those at base of the
triangle (those who disapprove of US foreign policy) upwards towards the levels of passive or
active support/execution of acts of terrorism. True, the majority still remains at the bottombut
as the data presented shows, a significant number have left and may eventually reach the top.
Another strategic requisite 9/11 helped fulfill is the direct/indirect maintenance and
expansion of Open Fronts; the Afghanistan-Iraq invasions being direct facilitators. The USAfghan campaign ultimately heralded the consolidation of control by the AQ-inspired TTP in
FATA, as well as the encroachment of Afghan-Taliban rule in what some estimate is the
majority of the country. In Iraq, where AQs pre-911 presence was virtually non-existent,
Americas invasion ushered in AQ control over a territory (Anbar province-53,208sqm) larger
than the country of Greece. Although its emirate was short livedlasting until around 2006

80

the groups destructive legacy continues. It has reestablished training camps and bases in the
deserts of Western Iraq and has more than doubled both in strength (estimated at 2,500 now) and
its capacity to execute attacks since the US withdrew in 2011. (Roggio, 2012) Moreover, the US
invasion led to the creation of a Syria-Iraq interstate Jihadi highway; an invaluable life support
in terms of weapons and manpower for AQs past and present fronts in both countries.

The expansion of the Open Jihad has also upgraded the interface with that of the
Individual Jihad. Today, there are an estimated 5,500 foreign jihadists in the Pakistani FATA,
ranging from Arab and African nationals to Turkish, Russian, Chechnyan, and German. (AP,
2012) There, as in Syria, these foreign passport holders are being drilled in the jihadi curriculum;
inheriting the legacy of knowledge bequeathed by the Iraqi experts. Upon completion of their
training or tour of duty at the front, these graduates can make their way home to assemble their
own grass-roots cells and help constitute the jihadi long arm. This past year, for instance, a
Canadianwho had been living in Pakistan for three yearsrevealed to the AFP that he was
now preparing to leave to wage jihad at home. (AFP, 2013) Sure, some of this talk may just be
bluster. But the more Jihadi tourists that come and go--the more likely it is that a growing
number will act on their pretentions.
In an ominous sign, the ethnic diversity of the arriving trainees appears to be growing.
As one TTP fighter boasted: A few months ago, we even welcomed some (two or three) people
from Fiji for the first time! (Ibid.) In the coming years this phenomenon is likely to increase as
Internet access continues diffusing across the world. Already, usage has increased exponentially
in the past decade, particularly in Muslim countries. Consequently, its causing a growing
number of people from a growing number of countries to be touched and inspired by jihadist
ideas. (GISS, 2012, p.24) In countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen,
experienced jihadists are just beginning to come online, driving and enriching the dynamics of
online Jihadism with their knowledge, expertise and connections, thus bridging a knowledge and
experience gap. (Ibid.) And as the knowledge purveyors near the Open Fronts liaise virtually
with their Western fans and consumers, more foreigners will travel to said hotspots in order to
take part jihadist activities; the former conceivably serving as travel agents.

81

Socio-Economic Factors: Why AQ Threat Could Grow

Considering the socio-economic conditions prevalent across much of the MENA region
(i.e. youth bulges, rapid urbanization, underemployment/underemployment), the above trend
may pose additional implications. To be sure, the causality between poverty (at least in its
objective form) and support for terrorist groups rests on flimsy empirical grounds. (Shapiro,
2012) And when correlations do surface, theyre never universally applicable. In fact, numerous
academic and government studies find that terrorists tend to be drawn from well-educated,
middle-class, or high-income families. (Krueger, 2007, p.3) But hereinas suggested--lies the
problem: The ongoing boom of net-connected, educated, middle classes across much of the
Muslim world.
Majority-Muslim countries are urbanizing at a clip faster than any other countries in the
world, many of which are already heavily urbanized. (PRC, 2011, p.61) But despite attendant
drops in fertility rates and increases in completion rates for secondary and tertiary educations, in
the MENA regionunlike most regionsunemployment rates are highest amongst the most
educated youth. (Drine, 2012) Apparently, the more highly qualified the job seeker, the more
difficult it is to secure employment. (Wilson, 2013, p.59) The principal barrier is two fold. First,
is the mismatch between graduate skills and market demand. And second, the dearth of
meritocracy; the jobs that are available are divvied out nepotistically. (Brodmann, 2012) Things
become bleaker when you consider that those under 14 years of age constitute more than 40% of
the total population, while 5 million new workers hope to enter the labor market annually.
(Drine) Moreover, according to the Arab Labor Organization, the estimated funds needed to
provide these cohorts with new jobs will exceed $20 billion annuallya hefty sum for cashstrapped governments. (Ibid.) In lieu of finding jobs that match their skill-set, Muslim graduates
either become unemployed (and dependent on their parents), take part/full time positions in
which theyre overqualified, or try to immigrate.
Is the above a recipe for radicalization? Some scholars tend to think so. Because it isnt
just that Muslim youth are more educated than ever beforetheyve also been profoundly
influenced by the consumerism of Western societies, not the least through the information
revolution, which has provided Internet access, satellite dishes and cable television to a growing
number of people. (Lia, 2005, p.146) As such, this cohort is less likely to be content with the

82

low-paid manual jobs performed by their less educated parents. No longer beset with the penury
suffered by their parents, middle-class Muslim youth, nonetheless, feel deprived. That education
was the way upas their parents had insistedwas an adage their hopes and dreams were
grafted to. Tantalized by the indulgences and comforts enjoyed in the West, the modern age
appears to leave them in the dust. Frustrated over their inability to realize the ambitions that
could afford them significance, some inevitably will begin to breed fantasies of every possible
kind. (Berlin, 2001, p.130) The brewing anger that results manufactures ready recruits for the
identity entrepreneurs of extremist movements. (Mazzar, p.177) For it is these entrepreneurs
that offer a seemingly cogent panacea: a comeback to a puritanical and egalitarian way of
lifeand more criticallya concomitant lowering of the overall level of expectations, and
thus limiting tensions and bitterness. (Sivan, 1990, p.126) The continued spread of Internet
access will only make these identity entrepreneurs more accessible, and hence, may strengthen
the prospects of a Global Islamic Resistance.
Incidentally, a recent research study lends empirical fodder to the hypothesis above.
(Schomaker, 2013) In it, the prevalence of three factors was found to be correlated with
significant statistical increases of domestic terrorism: Missing migration opportunities, failing
state institutions, and a youth bulge (where the 0-14 age bracket exceeds 30% of the population).
When all three are present, terrorist attacks appeared to increase roughly 500%. Given that for
most MENA countries, in particular all labor-rich countries, all three factors are indeed
present, a high vulnerability to domestic terrorism pre-exists both today and for the foreseeable
future. (Ibid, p.135)

Closing Arguments
Despite the ingredients for radicalization catalogued above, there is certainly room for
hope. Some estimates see the Muslim youth bulge as already tapering; birthrates are in decline
and even in free-fall in some countries. (Williams, 2013) This is good news because historically
the general relationship between age structure and conflict is weakened as countries experience
declining fertility rates and become positioned to take advantage of their young age structures to
achieve demographic dividends. (Urdal, 2011, p.10) However, at least for years to come, the
Muslim youth bulge will remain pronounced and caution is still very much warranted.
This is especially true in Europe whereagainst a backdrop of xenophobia-- an aging

83

work force will necessitate steady, imported flows of abled body youth to fuel its economy;
many of whom will be Muslim. Should integration continue to falter, and Islamophobia continue
to heighten, the West vs. Islam narrative AQ trumpeted on 9/11 will find new hosts to infect.
Questioned why they had joined the TTP in Pakistan, many European-Muslims describe feeling
left aside by capitalism and discriminated by unfair laws, like the Swiss one on minarets or the
French one on hijabs. (AFP)
The Muslim crisis of meaning in the modern age is real. And the more the West couches
it in terms of good vs. evil the more poignant it becomes. This was AQs real objective when
launching 9/11 and it was largely achieved.

Conclusion
As this paper has documented, AQ was a movement in decline in the years leading up to
9/11. Having tried fruitlessly for years to join the global jihadi community and the Muslim world
in his Manichean struggle against the West, 9/11 was likely going to be UBLs swan songhis
last shot. The previous attempts at striking US symbols of power receiving only tepid notice
this time AQ would hit closer to home. Its calculus was spot-on. America, the greatest country
on the face of the earth; a country in which 61% of people believe their nation is uniquely
blessed by God; the country that preened itself on its mantle as leader of the free world
would not shy away when confronted by the forces of evil. If anything, it would come out
swingingand swinging hard.
Little did it know that from AQs perspective--the harder the better. The animus of the
Muslim world vis--vis the US and its policies had long been simmering. The epoch of
modernity and Western-led globalization was none too kind to the ontologically frail Muslim
world. The Western dominance over global affairs and the international order couldnt be
reconciled with the overriding Islamic creed of the Ummah as Gods exalted favorites. To
concede the opposite speltfor many-- existential dread. Thus, the accepted diagnosis was an
endemic dereliction towards the will of God. For its part, the Westby pushing its vices,
deviance and cultural iniquitieswas a corruptive force bent on stymieing the Ummahs oneness
with God and thereon its destiny with greatness. Though they were never too fond of the US,

84

and suspected its policies were a reflection of its imperious intent, the overwhelming majority of
Muslims rested at the base of the pyramid; deeply resentful of US behavior--but inclined
towards cultural insulation if not for lack of a better alternative.
9/11 would change everything. The Western tentacles were no longer creeping in
inconspicuously through the back window; they were batter ramming right through the front
door. And to those who resisted, bring it on was the rejoinder that greeted them. The assault on
Islam appeared to manifest every time one flicked on their satellite TVs orin some contexts
went out in public. Whether Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghrab, the thousands killed by errant air
strikes, the prejudiced scrutiny and discrimination of law enforcement and the publicAQs
West vs. Islam narrative became more compelling than ever. Many, hitherto at the bottom of the
pyramid, started to make their way up.
For those fighting to sustain or achieve ontological clarity in the maelstrom of the modern
age, AQs message resonated limpidly. This was true of the thousands of Pakistani madrassa
students whoperceiving Americas treacherous designs in Afghanistan and Iraqsaw both
meaning and the opportunity to defend it. By heeding the call to Jihad, these purpose hungry
souls obtained a way of becoming a hero and part of an exalted elite-- and more importantly-personal redemption from an otherwise insignificant or disappointing life. (Crenshaw, 2007,
p.153) Far removed from the battlefield, this same ontological dragnet continues to ensnare
throngs of young, dejected, European-Muslims who see their desultory lives ticking by with little
teleological significance. The backlash of 9/11 only pushed them further along the ropes. Objects
of suspicion, and socially and economically shunned by their pure-blooded countrymen, these
lost individuals found homes through the only doors left open; Islam. In entering, they derive
meaning through communal endearment, and most importantly, a collective lens and narrative
through which to decipher the world around them. They learn that Islam is a sacred, unitary
family. Not subject to artificial divisions and boundariesthey all dwell in the House of God.
Ennobled by this sanctimony, they now had something to live forand for someto die for.
The stories of oppression of their newfound brothers in Iraq now made sense; as did their own
experiences on the streets of Europe. The West is out to extirpate Islama storyline through
which some find existential purpose, and more importantly, ontological redemption. With
Americas help, that storyline ascended to a whole new level of believability.

85

Taken as a whole, the 9/11 attacks were a major success; the extent of which--even
today-- has yet be appreciated in its entirety. The score card reads like this: With a $500,000
investment, UBL resurrected AQ from the realm of insignificance and turned it into a household
name that inspires aggrieved and ontologically distraught Muslims throughout the world. In
parallel, it manipulated the US into putting boots on the ground in 2 Muslim countries and
spending a cumulative total of $5 trillion and thousands of its best and brightest. For its
investment The US inflicted substantial--albeit cosmeticdamage on AQ the organization. In
doing so, however, the US aggrandized AQs actual significance, validated its narrative, deified
it in the eyes of sympathetic onlookers, and envenomed a new, larger and more diverse
generation of Jihadists that continue to join its cause. The Jihadi theatres are today more
expansive than ever, and consequently, there is no shortage of heuristic workshops. The field of
individual jihad has never looked brighter and we can expect some dark days ahead on the
streets of major Western cities. The amount of knowledge that is circulatingboth ideological
and operationalcoupled with the sophisticated open-access technology of today and the future,
doesnt augur well. The next 9/11whether occurring in the US or Europe-- is perhaps a
question of when, not if. Given the collective neurosis acts of terrorism can induce (especially in
the US where 35-40% of Americans continue to worry that they or a family member might
become a victim of terrorism) and consequently, how politically charged buzzwords like tough
against terrorism have become, will we respond any differently the next time? (Stewart, p.107)
One would hope that, trillions of dollars later, the US has internalized the cardinal lesson
of 9/11. That being that kinetic and forceful approaches to fighting terrorism may be good at
killing terrorists and tactical victories, but thats all theyre good for. At the same time, we cant
ignore why they predominate our counter-terrorism policy: Its easy to press a button and blow
something up, and the tactical successes are easily discernable (and therefore easier to trumpet to
the public). The problem with it all is it ignores the psychological or human element of terrorism,
and oversimplifies a hugely complex situation. We delude ourselves into thinking that if we can
only kill or immobilize them all, we will have destroyed and justice. (Mazzar, p.235) Its this
specious reasoning that produced the failures that were the War on Crime, War on Drugs, and
now--the War on Terror.
As hard as it may be for our congenial black and white views of the world, we must

86

discard our egos and begin to humanize the terrorist. No terrorist is born a terrorist-- he is
molded into one. Only by humanizing him can we begin to understand what made him tick. This
is what this paper set out to do. As humans, our unparalleled ability to ponder our existence is
both a blessing and a curse. A blessing in that were better equipped to plan our corporeal
survival, a curse in that we long for a purpose to do so. We all share this existential vacuum and
it must be filled one way or another. For those struggling to do so, the despair may lead them to
the one filler that does the job, which in the present discussion, is radical Islam.
To succeed against terrorism, viable substitutes must be provided. Rather than overreact
and--in the processfurther alienation and resentment, this paper hopes the US has come to
realize that its money is better spent investing in schemes for satisfying the ambitions of aspiring
and educated Muslim youth-- than on drones and hellfire missiles. But going by the numbers,
this realization has yet to come; over 80% of US foreign aid to MENA countries is allocated for
military and security assistance, while only a fraction goes towards economic development and
governance. (Bockenfeld, 2013) Americas autocratic allies arm themselves to the teeth with the
latest weaponry, while stillborn private sectors--endemic throughout the Muslim world--continue
to fester. With the lions share of the job market residing in the unproductive and saturated
public sector, qualified Muslim graduates have nowhere to go. (Bteddini, 2012) A thorough
cataloguing of potential policy suggestions is beyond the ambit of this paper. But suffice it to
say that had the US invested even a fraction of its war expenditures in getting MENAs private
sector off the ground, the security gains would likely far outweigh what it gets from any mowthe-lawn drone strike. The dividends wouldnt be immediate, and thered be no post-attack
pomp. But in the long run, investing in their futures will afford Muslim youth the opportunity to
actualize their potential, find meaning through Work and Creativity, and save them from the
lure of destructive religious fables.
Another investment-worthy area is the Internet. A recent Pew study documented an
association between Internet use among Muslims and more positive views of Western culture.
(Tenety, 2013) While Internet accessparticularly on mobile networks--is already surging
across much of the Muslim world, it still lags behind the rest of the world in many important
categories (i.e. liberalization of fixed-lines, access in educational institutions, government
regulation). (Breslow, 2011) Breaking down access barriers and amplifying the pace of adoption

87

should become a principal CT strategy. True, to an extant, this may increase exposure to radical
ideologies. But in the long run, the risks are offset by the Internets power as a global village
for bridging cultures, extruding similarities, eroding stereotypes, and molding new perceptions of
self and the world around us.
Ultimately, success in mitigating political violence of any breedwhether war or
terrorismis contingent on our willingness as a world community to embrace critical thinking
and skepticism. The lack of skepticism, particularly the Muslim world (where its criminalized in
many cases), is a massive drain on humanity and a constant source of suffering. (Harrison,
2013, p.28) When people invest their lives in frivolous fantasies, hate and kill as a dictum of
superstition, and believe that a 13.6 billion year old universe plays favorites among a 200,000
year old human species occupying a mote of dust suspended on a sunbeam-- the whole world
loses; both in resources and in potential inputs of ingenuity that could have went towards making
it a better place. (Sagan, 1997, p.6) Mythopoeia may be ontologically comforting, but it at best
gets humanity nowhere, and at worst--destroys it. Indubitably, it will be disconcerting at first,
but those clinging to self-aggrandizing shibboleths must learn to humble themselves and find
meaning and excitement through the mysteries of our existence. Muslims shouldnt be afraid of
not knowing all the answers. Instead, they should confront the difficult questions and join others
in cracking the riddles that house the truth. This is science at its essence. Its by no mistake that as
the West embraced the scientific method with wholehearted vigor we soon spawned a century
which saw more technological and scientific progress than all the other centuries combined since
the dawn of civilization. The Muslim world must be brought on board as the scientific
trailblazers they once were; human progress needs all the brainpower it can get.
Therefore, a renewed focus of scientific enrichment and education within the Muslim
world must become a cardinal Western goal for combatting Islamic extremism. Sure, given the
current circumstances outlined throughout this paper, this idea is quixoticif not delusional. No
doubt, the resistance will be fierce and tensions will be high. Yet it must become a long-term
goal in which must do all we can to slowly facilitate its realization. As it stands today, many
Muslims have little to be proud of beyond the deified memories of a heavenly past, and the
misguided conviction thatthrough religious austerityits reprise will come. At a time when
we are on the cusp of major breakthroughs in fields such as quantum mechanics,

88

nanotechnology, and astrobiology, by proselytizing science we can show the salutary promise the
futurenot the pasthas to offer. Folklore and culture may always have a place on the gamut
of meaning and identity. But it must be modulatedas it was in the West--to allow for human
progress, creativity, inquiry, and discovery. It is thus science that will promote the very
skepticism needed to inoculate young Muslim minds from the pernicious dogmas standing in the
way of achieving truenot bogus--ontological purpose.

Closing Thoughts
In the words of Carl Sagan, Extinction is the rule, survival is the exception. In the
future, humanity will face no shortage of challengesman-made or natural--that will imperil its
very existence. If we succumb to divisive shibboleths, meaningless hate and destruction, and fail
to forge a common identity as earthlings--our time here as a species will be cut short. But if our
nations, cultures or religions can turn the page on history and realize the similarities between us,
our shared destinies, and begin to unite as a whole to pool resources and respond as the planetary
civilization we genuinely arewe might just have a chance. To get there, we can start by
looking at ourselves:

89

From this distant vantage point, the Earth might not seem of any particular interest. But for us, it's different.
Consider again that dot. That's here. That's home. That's us. On it everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone
you ever heard of, every human being who ever was, lived out their lives. The aggregate of our joy and suffering,
thousands of confident religions, ideologies, and economic doctrines, every hunter and forager, every hero and
coward, every creator and destroyer of civilization, every king and peasant, every young couple in love, every
mother and father, hopeful child, inventor and explorer, every teacher of morals, every corrupt politician, every
"superstar," every "supreme leader," every saint and sinner in the history of our species lived there on a mote of
dust suspended in a sunbeam.
The Earth is a very small stage in a vast cosmic arena. Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those generals and
emperors so that in glory and triumph they could become the momentary masters of a fraction of a dot. Think of the
endless cruelties visited by the inhabitants of one corner of this pixel on the scarcely distinguishable inhabitants of
some other corner. How frequent their misunderstandings, how eager they are to kill one another, how fervent their
hatreds. Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we have some privileged position in the
universe, are challenged by this point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping cosmic dark.
In our obscurity in all this vastness there is no hint that help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves.
The Earth is the only world known, so far, to harbor life. There is nowhere else, at least in the near future, to which
our species could migrate. Visit, yes. Settle, not yet. Like it or not, for the moment, the Earth is where we make our
stand. It has been said that astronomy is a humbling and character-building experience. There is perhaps no better
demonstration of the folly of human conceits than this distant image of our tiny world. To me, it underscores our
responsibility to deal more kindly with one another and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home
we've ever known.- Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space (1997)

90

Bibliography
9/11 Commission. (2004). Monograph on Terrorist Financing. Washington DC: National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.


Abedin, M. (2004, February 5). The Essense of al-Qaeda: An Interview With Saad al-Faqih.

Spotlight on Terror .

Abu-Rabi, I. (1996). Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World.

Albany: State University of New York Press.

AFP. (2013, January 27). Pakistan still global jihad hub. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from

Dawn: http://dawn.com/news/781674/pakistan-still-global-jihad-hub

Allen, C. (2006, Autumn). (Muslim) Boys-N-the-Hood. ISIM Review , p. 2006.


Ames, P. (2013, June 3). Religion in Europe, also in crisis. Retrieved November 10, 2013,

from Global Post: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/culture
lifestyle/world-religion/130602/europe-church-mosque-christianity-islam
religious-crisis

Anwar, Y. (2009, December 9). Social Scientists Build Case for 'Survival of the Kindest'.

Retrieved November 8, 2013, from Science Daily:

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/12/091208155309.htm

AP. (2002, September 10). 402 Al Qaeda Suspects Arrested, Pakistan Says. Retrieved October

31, 2013, from Fox News: http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/09/10/402-al
qaeda-suspects-arrested-pakistan-says/

AP. (2013, August 3). Man In Tunisia Blows Himself Up While Making A Bomb, Interior

Ministry Says. Retrieved November 3, 2013, from Huffington Post:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/03/man-blows-himself
up_n_3701431.html

AP. (2012, September 4). Number of foreign jihadists in Pak on rise, Arabs declining.

Retrieved November 20, 2013, from The Indian Express:

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/number-of-foreign-jihadists-in-pak-on-rise
arabs-declining/997350/

Atran, S. (2010). Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists.

New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Atwan, A. B. (2012). After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation. London: Saqi Books.

91

Bailey, N. (2013, October 4). Former Intelligence Analyst: "Al-Qaeda's Bigger Now Than It

Ever Has Been". Retrieved December 5, 2013, from Town Hall:

http://townhall.com/tipsheet/nicolebailey/2013/10/04/former-intelligence
analyst-alqaedas-bigger-now-than-it-ever-has-been-n1716289
Barakat, H. (1969). A Process of Encounter between Utopia and Reality . The British Journal

of Sociology , 1-10.
Barakat, H. (1993). The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State . Berkeley: Univeristy of

California Press .

Bars, S. L. (2011, January 4). Islam et intgration: le constat d'chec franco-allemand.

Retrieved November 11, 2013, from Le Monde:

http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/01/04/islam-et-integration-le
constat-d-echec-franco-allemand_1460748_3224.html

Baz, A. A. (1999). The Ideological Attack. Hounslow: Message of Islam.
Bergen, P. (2009, October 19). The Front . Retrieved November 17, 2013, from New

Republic: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/the-front

Berger, P. (1995). Modernity, Plurality and the Crisis of Meaning. Gtersoh: Bertelsman

Fnoundation Publishers.

Berlin, I. (2001). The Roots of Romanticism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Biddle, S. (2013, September/October). Ending the War in Afghanistan: How to Avoid

Failure on the Installment Plan. Foreign Affairs .

Blair, D. (2009, February 20). Al-Qaeda founder launches fierce attack on Osama bin Laden.

Retrieved October 28, 2013, from The Telegraph:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/47363

58/Al-Qaeda-founder-launches-fierce-attack-on-Osama-bin-Laden.html

Bockenfeld, S. M. (2013). The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014:

Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East & North Africa.

Washington DC: Project on Middle East Democracy.

Bollier, S. (2013, November 11). Deconstructing the Drone War. Retrieved November 19,

2013, from Al Jazeera:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/deconstructing-drone-war
201311792612993264.html

Brandon, J. (2008). British Muslims Providing Foot Soldiers for the Global Jihad. West Point:

Combatting Terrorism Center.

Brandon, J. (2009). Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist Extremism in British Prisons. London:

Quilliam .

92


Breslow, H. a. (2011). A Decade of Internet Time in the Arab World: Or How to Stop Worrying

and Love the Internet. Social Science Research Network.

Brodmann, J. M. (2012, August 29). Is being employable enough to get a job in the Arab

World? The double transition from education to work in MENA. Retrieved November

22, 2013, from The World Bank: http://menablog.worldbank.org/being
employable-enough-get-job-arab-world-double-transition-education-work-mena

Brook, T. V. (2012, January 26). IED attacks in Afghanistan set record. Retrieved November

18, 2013, from USA Today:

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-01-25/IEDs
afghanistan/52795302/1

Brooke, S. (2011). The near and far enemy debate. In A. M. Fishman, Fault Lines in Global

Jihad (pp. 47-62). New York: Routledge.

Brown, C. E. (1992). Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and Its Afro
Asian Successors. Princeton: The Darwin Press.
Brown, V. (2011). Classical and global jihad: Al-Qaida's franchising frustrations. In F. L.

Jihad. New York: Routledge.

Bteddini, L. (2012, September 5). Governance and Public Sector employment in the Middle

East and North Africa. Retrieved November 26, 2013, from The World Bank:

http://menablog.worldbank.org/governance-and-public-sector-employment
middle-east-and-north-africa

Burke, J. (2013, July 14). Syria conflict: why Pakistani Taliban is pledging support for rebels.

Retrieved November 18, 2013, from The Guardian:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/14/syria-conflict-pakistani-taliban
support

Byman, D. (2013, July/August). Why Drones Work: The Case for Washingtons Weapon of

Choice. Foreign Affairs .

Carter, S. (2013, May 24). Terror Fears Stoked By Trend Of Young Muslims From U.S., Europe

Fighting With al-Qaeda in Syria, Africa. Retrieved November 13, 2013, from Yahoo

News: http://news.yahoo.com/terror-fears-stoked-trend-young-muslims-u-europe
153610885.html

Castano, E. &. (2005). On defeating death: Group reification and social identification as

strategies for transcendence . European Review of Social Psychology , 221-255.

CBS. (2008, October 7). Iran Gave U.S. Help On Al Qaeda After 9/11. Retrieved October 31,

2013, from CBS News: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-4508360.html

93

Ceaser, J. W. (2012, Spring). The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism.

American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture , 1-25.

Cordesman, A. (2013). The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition.

Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Crenshaw, M. (2007). Explaining suicide terrorism: A review essay . Security Studies , 133
162.

Cronin, A. K. (2013, July/August). Why Drones Fail When Tactics Drive Strategy. Foreign

Affairs .

Cruickshank, P. (2007). Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda . Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism , 1-14.

CTC. (2007). Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qaida From 1989-2006 .

West Point: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point .

Drine, I. (2012). Youth Unemployment in the Arab World: What Do We know? What is the

Way Forward? . Retrieved November 22, 2013, from UN World Institute for

Development Economics Research:

http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles-2012/en_GB/06-07
2012-Drine/

El-Hassan, B. S. (2007). Muslim Converts in Prison. Journal of Criminal Justice , 99-114.

Esposito, J. L. (2008). Who Speaks For Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think.

Washington DC: Gallup Press.

Evans, R. (2012, December 12). Atheists around world suffer persecution, discrimination:

report. Retrieved November 11, 2013, from Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-religion-atheists
idUSBRE8B900520121210

Farrall, L. (2011, March/April). How al Qaeda Works: What the Organization's Subsidiaries

Say About Its Strength. Foreign Affairs .







Finn, J. W. (2010, March 18). CIA director says secret attacks in Pakistan have hobbled al
Qaeda. Retrieved November 3, 2013, from The Washington Post:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031702558.html

Fishman, A. M. (2011). Introduction: Jihadi "endogenous" problems . In A. M. Fishman, Fault

Lines in Global Jihad. New York: Routledge.

94

France 24. (2012, July 6). Afghan, Pakistani jihadists 'operating in northern Mali'. Retrieved

November 18, 2013, from France 24: http://www.france24.com/en/20120607
foreign-jihadists-operating-trainers-northern-mali-issofou-france24-interview

Frankl, V. E. (1967). Psycho-Therapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on Logotherapy.

New York: Simon & Schuster.

Frankl, V. (2006). Man's Search for Meaning. Boston: Beacon Press.

Gallis, P. (2005). uslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries. Washington DC:

The Library of Congress.

Gallup. (2002). The 2001 Gallup Poll: Public Opinion. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers.

Gerges, F. (2009). The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Gerges, F. (2011). The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Giddens, A. (2000). Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives. London:

Routledge.

Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Polity Press.

Gilligan, A. (2013, June 1). The truth about the 'wave of attacks on Muslims after Woolwich

murder. Retrieved November 13, 2013, from The Telegraph:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10093568/The
truth-about-the-wave-of-attacks-on-Muslims-after-Woolwich-murder.html

GISS. (2012). Jihadism on the Web: A breeding ground for Jihad in the modern age .

Zoetermee: General Intelligence and Security Service.

Goodenough, P. (2011, September 7). Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan, Pakistan Have

Soared in Decade Since 9/11 . Retrieved November 18, 2013, from CNS News:

http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/suicide-bombings-afghanistan-pakistan
have-soared-decade-911#sthash.juduZmJR.dpuf

Govan, H. A. (2012, March 24). Toulouse shootings: the making of a French jihadi killer with

a double life. Retrieved December 3, 2013, from The Telegraph:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/9165091/Toulouse
shootings-the-making-of-a-French-jihadi-killer-with-a-double-life.html

Green, J. (2010, April 27). Bin Laden had 'no clue' about Sept. 11 retaliation. Retrieved

October 29, 2013, from WTOP: http://www.wtop.com/778/1943289/Bin-Laden
had-no-clue-about-Sept-11-retaliation-

95



Greenberg, T. P. (2003). In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror. Washington DC:

American Psychological Association.

Haaretz. (2006, August 27). Nasrallah: We wouldn't have snatched soldiers if we thought it

would spark war. Retrieved October 29, 2013, from Haaretz:

http://www.haaretz.com/news/nasrallah-we-wouldn-t-have-snatched-soldiers-if
we-thought-it-would-spark-war-1.199556
Hamm, M. S. (2013). The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist

Threat (Kindle ed.). New York: NYU Press.

Hannah, R. W. (2008). Meeting the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners: The

Experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain . Oxford Journals , 402-411.

Harris, P. (2012, June 5). Drone attacks create terrorist safe havens, warns former CIA

official. Retrieved October 27, 2013, from The Guardian:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/05/al-qaida-drone-attacks-too
broad

Harrison, G. (2013). Think: Why You Should Question Everything. Amherst: Prometheus

Books.

Hassan, R. (2003). Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society . Oxford: Oxford


University Press.

Hassan, R. (2008). Inside Muslim Minds. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Hayes, B. (2005). A Failure to Regulate: Data Protection and Ethnic Profiling in the Police

Sector in Europe . New York: Open Society Justice Initiative.

Hegghammer, T. (2013, November 27). Number of foreign fighters from Europe in Syria is

historically unprecedented. Who should be worried? Retrieved December 1, 2013,

from The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey
cage/wp/2013/11/27/number-of-foreign-fighters-from-europe-in-syria-is
historically-unprecedented-who-should-be
worried/?Post+generic=%3Ftid%3Dsm_twitter_washingtonpost

Hemming, J. (2008, December 8). Taliban in 72 pct of Afghanistan, think-tank says.

Retrieved November 18, 2013, from Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/08/idUSISL26617._CH_.2400

Hersh, S. M. (2005). Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York:

Harper.

HSNW. (2010, December 9). Gitmo repeat offender rate rises sharply. Retrieved December 4,

2013, from Homeland Security News Wire:

96


http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/gitmo-repeat-offender-rate-rises
sharply

Hoffer, E. (1966). The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements . New York :

Harper & Row .

Humphreys, S. (1999). Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age.

Berkeley: University of California Press;.

Hurriyet. (2013, November 19). No tolerance for militants headed to Syria, Turkish FM

Davutolu says. Retrieved December 1, 2013, from Hurriyet Daily News:

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-tolerance-for-militants-headed-to-syria
turkish-fm-davutoglu-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58149&NewsCatID=338

Hussein, M. (1956). Al-Ittijahat al-watania fi-al-adab al-mysri al-hadis. Cairo.

IBN Live. (2011, June 4). Illyas Kashmiri may succeed Osama: US officials. Retrieved

November 15, 2013, from IBN Live: http://ibnlive.in.com/news/ilyas-kashmiri
may-succeed-osama-us-officials/151946-2.html

ICM. (2001). Structuring Immigration, Fostering Integration. Berlin: Independent

Commission on Migration to Germany.

Impey, C. (2010). How It Ends: From You to the Universe. New York: W.W. Norton &

Company.
Jacobs, A. (2011, July 3). Osama bin Laden emails show concern over al-Qaedas financial

future . Retrieved November 3, 2013, from The Daily Caller:

http://dailycaller.com/2011/07/03/osama-bin-laden-emails-show-concern-over
al-qaedas-financial-future/#ixzz2jbYpGBWo

Jenkins, B. (2012). Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory? .

Arlington: Rand Corporation.

JI. (2009). Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective, and Discriminatory

. New York: Open Society Institute.

Johnsen, G. D. (2012). The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War. New York: W.

W. Norton & Company.

Jones, M. E.-S. (2008). Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less

Threatening Than Many Think . International Security , 7-44.
Joscelyn, T. (2013, November 12). British officials discuss 'rising' al Qaeda threat during

testimony . Retrieved November 14, 2013, from The Long War Journal:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/uk_officials_discuss.php#ixzz2

kdR1L5ih

97

Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.

Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kepel, G. (2003). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Boston: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press .

Kern, S. (2013, August 2). Britain: Muslim Prison Population Up 200%. Retrieved November

11, 2013, from Gatestone Institute : http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3913/uk
muslim-prison-population

Kern, S. (2011, August 15). European Concerns Over Muslim Immigration Go Mainstream.

Retrieved November 11, 2013, from Gatestone Institute:

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2349/european-concerns-muslim-immigration

Khoury, N. (2013, October 23). In Yemen, Drones Aren't Policy. Retrieved November 19,

2013, from The Cairo Review of Global Affairs:

http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=443

Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search

for Ontological Security . Political Psychology , 741-767.

Krasko, G. (2004). This Unbearable Boredom of Being: A Crisis of Meaning in America.

Bloomington: iUniverse.

Krueger, A. B. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers Motivation and the Quest for

Personal Significance . Political Psychology , 332-357.

Kull, S. (2011). Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America. Washington DC:

Brookings Institution Press.

Leiken, R. (2011). Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt of The Second Generation. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Lewis, B. (2003). The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror . New York: Random

House LLC.

Lewis, J. (2013). Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War.

Lia, B. (2009). Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri .

New York: Columbia University Press.

98

Lia, B. (2005). Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions. New

York: Routledge.

Malashenko, A. (2013, October 24). The Losers and Winners in Afghanistan. Retrieved

November 18, 2013, from Carnegie Moscow Center:

http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53395&reloadFlag=1

Masco, J. (2013). Auditing the War on Terror: The Watson Institutes Costs of War Project .

American Anthropologist , 312-320.
Masood, S. S. (2005, May 21). Guantnamo Comes to Define U.S. to Muslims. Retrieved

December 4, 2013, from The New York Times :

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/21/international/asia/21gitmo.html?pagewan

ted=all&_r=0

Mazarr, M. (2007). Unmodern Men in the Modern World: Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the

War on Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCabe, T. (2010). The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda. Parameters , 60-71.

Mccants, J. M. (2006). Stealing Al-Qaidas Playbook. West Point: Combating Terrorism

Center at West Point .

McKelvey, T. (2013, October 1). Al-Qaeda loosens its admissions standards. Retrieved

December 5, 2013, from BBC News : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine
24306159

Meiser, D. D. (2012). American Exceptionalism. In M. C. Stokes, U.S. Foreign Policy (pp. 25
42). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MFS. (2011, September 9). Most Afghans do not even know about 9/11, according to

disturbing poll . Retrieved November 20, 2013, from Mail Online:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2035160/Most-Afghans-know-9-11
according-disturbing-poll.html#ixzz2lBTi846e

Mir, A. (2012, March 21). Pakistan frees suspected Mumbai plotter. Retrieved November 15,

2013, from Asia Times Online:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NC21Df02.html

Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and

Why They Come to Destroy. Westport: Praeger.

Nachmani, A. (2010). Europe and Its Muslim Minorities: Aspects of Conflict, Attempts at

Accord. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press.

Nisbett, R. E. (1996). Culture of honor: The psychology of violence in the South. Boulder:

Westview Press .

99


Novak, E. S. (2005). Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness Account of

Life at Guantanamo. New York: Penguin Press.

Nugent, W. (2008). Expansion, Habits of Empire: A History of American. New York: Knopf.

Palmer, M. P. (2004). At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists, and America's War on

Terrorism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Palmer, M. a. (2007). Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, and Challenges. Lanham:

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers .

Paulson, S. (2011, June 19). Does Islam Stand Against Science? Retrieved November 27,

2013, from The Chronicle Review: http://chronicle.com/article/Does-Islam-Stand
Against/127924/

Pew . (2012, June 4). Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years Trends in American

Values: 1987-2012. Retrieved November 5, 2013, from Pew ResearchCenter for the

People & the Press: http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/04/section-7-values
about-foreign-policy-and-terrorism/

Pew. (2013, September 10). Muslim Publics Share Concerns about Extremist Groups.

Retrieved November 28, 2013, from Pew Research Global Attitudes Project:

http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about
extremist-groups/

Pew. (2012, June 27). Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S. Retrieved

November 17, 2013, from Pew Research Global Attitudes Project:

http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more
critical-of-u-s/

Pew. (2011, November 17). The American-Western European Values Gap. Retrieved

November 5, 2013, from Pew Research Global Attitudes Project:

http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-values
gap/












PJ, V. D. (1991). Euthanasia and other medical decisions concerning the end of life. Lancet ,

669-674.

PRC. (2011). The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030 .

Washington DC: Pew Research Center.

Pyszczynsk, T. (2004). What Are We So Afraid Of? A Terror Management Theory

Perspective on the Poiitics of Fear. Social Research , 827-848.

100

Remnick, D. (2004, July 12). Going Nowhere. Retrieved November 29, 2013, from The New

Yorker:

http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/07/12/040712fa_fact1?currentPage=al

l

Restad, H. E. (2012). Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign

Policy and American Exceptionalism . American Political Thought , 53-76.

Reuter, C. (2013, September 27). Video Games and Cigarettes: Syria's Disneyland for

Jihadists. Retrieved November 14, 2013, from Spiegel Online International:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/foreign-jihadists-in-syria-favor
liberal-transit-towns-over-front-a-910092.html

Reuters. (2013, May 7). Radical Islam Spreads in Prisons of France. Retrieved December 3,

2013, from The Jewish Daily Forward:

http://forward.com/articles/176138/radical-islam-spreads-in-prisons-of
france/?p=al l


Roggio, B. (2012, November 6). Al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bomber kills 31 at Iraqi Army base in

Taji . Retrieved November 20, 2013, from Long War Journal:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat
matrix/archives/2012/11/al_qaeda_in_iraq_suicide_bombe.php#ixzz2lCYLlqV2

Roggio, B. (2009, February 9). Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army'. Retrieved November

18, 2013, from The Long War Journal:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php#ixzz

2he5D2zcz

Roggio, B. (2013, November 10). US continues to claim al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is

minimal . Retrieved November 14, 2013, from The Long War Journal:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/us_continues_to_main.php#ixz

z2ke7PbtDx

Ross, B. (2009, December 2). President Obama's Secret: Only 100 al Qaeda Now in

Afghanistan. Retrieved October 31, 2013, from ABC News:

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/president-obamas-secret-100-al-qaeda-now
afghanistan/story?id=9227861

Russell, N. B. (2013). A New Index to Assess the Effectiveness of Al Qaeda . London: Quilliam.

Sagan, C. (1997). Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space. New York: Ballantine

Books.

Sage, A. (2013, May 7). France struggles to fight radical Islam in its jails. Retrieved

November 11, 2013, from Reuters:

101


http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-france-radicalisation-insight
idUSBRE9460OQ20130507

Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sahab Media. (2009, September 17). An Interview With The Director Of Military Affairs Of

Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan For Paktika Province Mawlawi Sangeen (May Allah

Protect Him). Retrieved November 18, 2013, from The Unjust Media:

http://theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/sept09/An%20Interview%20

with%20the%20Director%20of%20Military%20Affairs%20of%20Islamic%20Emir

ate%20of%20Afghanistan%20for%20Paktika%20province%20Mawlawi%20Sange

en%20(May%20Allah%20protect%20him).htm

Satloff, R. (2008, May 12). Just Like Us! Really? Retrieved November 11, 2013, from The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/just-like-us-really

Schomaker, R. (2013). Youth bulges, poor institutional quality and missing migration

opportunities - triggers of and potential counter-measures for terrorism in MENA.

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies , 116-140.

Schwartz, S. (2013, November 10). We Will Bleed You To Death: British Jihadis Describe

Their Aims For America After Syria Fight . Retrieved November 14, 2013, from The

Blaze: http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/11/10/we-will-bleed-you-to-death
british-jihadis-describe-their-aims-for-america-after-syria-fight/

Scott, E. (2011). Mohammed and Charlemagne Revisited: The History of a Controversy.

London: New English Review Press.

Shahzad, S. S. (2011). Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11. London:

Pluto Press.

Shapiro, C. F. (2012). Relative Poverty, Perceived Violence, and Support for Militant

Politics: Evidence from Pakistan. American Journal of Political Science , 1-19.

Sheridan, L. (2006). Islamophobia Pre and PostSeptember 11th, 2001. Journal of

Interpersonal Violence , 317-336.

Shore, Z. (2006). Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sigel, R. (1989). Political learning in adulthood. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

102


Sivan, E. (1990). Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, Enlarged Edition.

New Haven: Yale University Press.

Smith, P. R. (2007). The Strategy of Terrorism: How it Works, and Why it Fails. New York:

Routledge.

Spiegel, D. (2013, October 20). Verfassungsschutz-Geheimbericht: 200 Islamisten aus

Deutschland ziehen in syrischen Krieg. Retrieved November 13, 2013, from De

Spiegel : http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/verfassungsschutz-beobachtet
reisewelle-nach-syrien-a-928900.html

START. (2011, June 15). START Terrorism Data Archive Dataverse: Public Opinion In The

Islamic World On Terrorism, Al Qaeda, And Us Policies. Retrieved November 10, 2013

, from START:

http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/start/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=

hdl:1902.1/16078&studyListingIndex=6_3a9906cccdf3dad5f60c7fe8902e

Stewart, J. M. (2012). The Terrorism Delusion: Americas Overwrought Response to

September 11 . International Security , 81-110.

Stringer, D. (2007, April 30). London subway attackers linked to Al Qaeda. Retrieved

November 3, 2013, from The Star:

http://www.thestar.com/news/2007/04/30/london_subway_attackers_linked_to_a

l_qaeda.html
Taylor, R. (2013, July 26). U.S. General says al Qaeda just surviving in Afghanistan. Retrieved

December 1, 2013, from Reuters:

http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINDEE96P06Q20130726

Teitelbaum, J. (2000). Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition. Washington DC:

Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Tenety, E. (2013, May 31). How the Internet is changing the Muslim worlds view of the West.

Retrieved November 25, 2013, from The Washington Post:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/wp/2013/05/31/how-the
internet-is-changing-the-muslim-worlds-view-of-the-west/

Unruh, B. (2012, October 30). Guess who U.S. Muslims are voting for. Retrieved November

28, 2013, from WorldNetDaily: http://www.wnd.com/2012/10/guess-who-u-s
muslims-are-voting-for/

Urdal, H. (2011). A Clash Of Generations? Youth Bulges And Political Violence. New York: UN

Department of Economic and Social Affairs .

Vidino, L. (2005). The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe. Middle East Quarterly

, 25-34.

103


VN, S. (2013, November 6). Pakistan's Defense Ministry Admits To Submitting Inaccurate

Data To Parliament On Civilian Deaths In US Drone Strikes; Critics Claim Data Was

Fabricated. Retrieved November 19, 2013, from International Business Times:

http://www.ibtimes.com/pakistans-defense-ministry-admits-submitting
inaccurate-data-parliament-civilian-deaths-us-drone

Vu, M. A. (2008, October 23). Survey: Most Americans Believe God Uniquely Blessed U.S.

Retrieved November 24, 2013, from The Christian Post:

http://www.christianpost.com/news/survey-most-americans-believe-god
uniquely-blessed-u-s-34991/

Wabala, D. (2012, September 12). Al Qaeda criticises al Shabaab over heinous and anti
Islamic activities. Retrieved October 31, 2013, from The Star: http://www.the
star.co.ke/news/article-3134/al-qaeda-criticises-al-shabaab-over-heinous-and
anti-islamic-activities

Warrick, J. (2013, November 4). Islamist rebels in Syria use faces of the dead to lure the

living. Retrieved November 14, 2013, from Washington Post:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/islamist-rebels-in-syria
use-faces-of-the-dead-to-lure-the-living/2013/11/04/10d03480-433d-11e3-8b74
d89d714ca4dd_story.html

Williams, C. J. (2013, November 1). Childbirth in the Arab world: No longer so early or so

often . Retrieved November 24, 2013, from Los Angeles Times:

http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-arab-world-childbirth
declining-20131101,0,6177575.story#ixzz2lZWDEBQS

Wilson, R. (2013). Economic Development in the Middle East. New York: Routledge .

Winston, K. (2012, August 13). Poll shows atheism on the rise in the U.S. Retrieved

November 10, 2013, from Washington Post:

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-13/national/35491519_1_new
atheism-atheist-groups-new-atheists

WPO. (2009). Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies .

College Park: World Public Opinion.

104

105