Self-Determination Conflict Profile

FOREIGN POLICY IN F CUS

Indonesia:
An Archipelago of Self-Determination
& Communal Conflicts
By John Gershman
(We offer this analysis as part of FPIF’s Self-Determination and Governance project. It does not necessarily reflect the views of
the FPIF staff or the boards of either sponsoring organization. Comments are welcome. Please send to Tom Barry
<tom@irc-online.org>.)

Map of Indonesia.

Indonesia is the world’s fourth-most-populous • Communal conflicts

nation. An archipelago of more than 17,000 islands,
Self-determination conflicts involve conflicts where
of which 3,000 are inhabited, Indonesia has 360 trib-
major political organizations raise demands for inde-
al and ethno-linguistic groups, about 25 language
pendence or significant autonomy. These include
groups, and over 250 different dialect groups. The
Aceh, West Papua and, previously, East Timor.
Javanese (in central and eastern Java) constitute
Communal conflicts involve violent conflict among
about 40% of the population, the Sundanese (west-
groups typically organized along ascriptive (ethnic,
ern Java) about 15%, with the remainder divided
religious, or cultural) lines. The issues at stake in such
among various outer island communities including
conflicts are not typically cultural, but may involve
the Acehnese (1.4%), and the Melanesians and Sino-
struggle over economic, environmental, and political
Indonesians (3%). In religious terms, Indonesia is
resources. Demands for autonomy or secession are
about 90% Muslim, 8% Christian, 1-2% Hindu,
typically not central to such conflicts.
and 1% Buddhist.
The human costs of these conflicts have been
In addition to conflicts over democratization and
severe. In addition to the dead and wounded, esti-
class conflict, there are two major types of violent
mates of the internally displaced due to these con-
conflicts in Indonesia:
flicts range from 750,000–1,300,000 nationwide.
• Self determination conflicts Although the violence associated with the separatist
page 2
Foreign Policy In Focus
Self-Determination
Regional Overview
October 2002
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and communal conflicts have increased
since the collapse of the New Order
regime in 1998, the collapse of
Suharto’s “New Order” regime and the
transition to a more democratic regime
did not cause the increase in violent
conflicts in Indonesia. Conflicts in
Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor had
earlier roots and the increase in political
violence associated with communal
conflicts dates back to the early 1990s
in some cases. Nevertheless, the change
in government, and the consequent
weakening of state authority has,
arguably, created conditions conducive
to increased conflict in the short term.
Both types of conflicts are embedded
in grievances over the distribution of
economic resources. This sense of eco-
nomic injustice arises from perceptions
of Jakarta’s (or outsiders’) control and
exploitation of regional economic
resources in such a way that local peo-
ple reap minuscule rewards compared
to outsiders, or suffer significant losses
to their livelihoods from the exploita-
tion of such resources by others. These
grievances have been shaped by a num-
ber of development policies: centralized
and elite ownership and control of nat-
ural resources, transmigration, and the
displacement of indigenous inhabitants
from their sources of livelihood, typi-
cally land and forest resources.
Until recently, natural resources were
owned and controlled by the central
government, and access to resources
and the distribution of benefits from
their exploitation was determined by
alliances with the ruling elites in
Jakarta. Since 1999, local and regional
governments have more control over
regulating access to and sharing the
benefits from natural resources. In
many cases, however, local elites have
simply displaced national elites as the
beneficiaries, and the basic inequalities
have not been addressed. The decen-
tralization of control over local
resources has also raised the stakes of
competition for local office.
Transmigration began as a policy in
the 1930s under Dutch colonial rule as
a strategy to depopulate Java by trans-
ferring people to more sparsely popu-
lated islands in the archipelago. After
independence it was continued (and
expanded to include other densely pop-
ulated islands such as Madura, Bali,
and Lombok.) Under the New Order,
transmigration was a central program
with a cabinet-level office, and the des-
tination of transmigrants shifted from
Sumatra to Sulawesi, Kalimantan, West
Papua (then Irian Jaya), and Maluku,
all of which are areas where self-deter-
mination or communal conflicts were
ongoing or have subsequently emerged.
The inter-island transmigration pro-
gram was reportedly terminated in late
2000. In some areas, transmigrants and
development activities such as com-
mercial logging or plantations have dis-
possessed indigenous communities
from control over land and forest
resources.
The Context for Conflict
Under the New Order, challenges to
the territorial integrity of Indonesia
were dealt with primarily through
repression. This, combined with a
degree of shared economic growth, an
ideology of tolerance and multicultur-
alism, and a form of corporatism
through Golkar, enabled it to stay in
power. The New Order’s veto on dis-
cussion of racial, ethnic, and religious
issues (so-termed “SARA” issues) com-
bined with pervasive administrative
control from the center maintained a
veneer of national unity. (SARA refers
to Suku, Agama, Ras, and Antar-golon-
gan—basically ethnicity, religion, race,
and inter-group relations; public dis-
cussion of any of which was taboo dur-
ing the New Order.)
Self-determination Conflicts
There are two main types of self-
determination conflicts in Indonesia:
• Self-determination conflicts that
include independence movements
engaged in armed combat with

the Indonesian military. This
includes Aceh and West Papua as
well as East Timor’s recent success-
ful independence struggle.
• Self-determination conflicts that
do not include armed indepen-
dence movements. This includes
campaigns for independence in
which there is no armed wing (of
which there is only one significant
movement, in the province of
Riau) as well as a larger set of con-
flicts led by regional movements
whose interests and demands are
more diffuse, but share a desire for
greater autonomy from central
government control. Some seek to
carve out their “own” province or
district from existing political
units, while others demand the
right to choose their leaders with-
out interference from Jakarta, a
more generous share of national
government revenues, and more
authority to determine how
regional revenues are spent.
Among the many regions where eco-
nomic grievances exist, two major con-
ditions have shaped the degree to which
secessionist/autonomist movements
have resorted to violence to advance
their claims. The first is an historical
one: violence has been more common
in regions that were not deeply inte-
grated into the Netherlands East Indies,
the colony that was the foundation for
Indonesia. Since East Timor became a
country in May 2002, there are now
two major self-determination conflicts
in Indonesia: Aceh and West Papua.
Two of the three areas where armed
secessionist movements existed or cur-
rently exist were not part of Indonesia
at the time of independence: East
Timor and West Papua. Aceh was only
weakly integrated into the Netherlands
East Indies during Dutch colonial rule
and engaged in a nine-year campaign to
establish an Islamic republic following
independence.
The second factor shaping the degree
of violence in the conflicts is the degree
to which there is a legacy of severe
human right abuses committed by the
Indonesian military. Armed secessionist
groups have emerged in those regions
where Indonesian military violence has
been the most sustained and forceful.
In all three cases (East Timor, Aceh,
and West Papua) Indonesian and inter-
national human rights organizations
documented repeated and widespread
incidents in which Indonesian troops
have engaged in rape, arbitrary execu-
tion, detentions without trial, and
other gross violations of human rights.
The fact that these abuses occurred over
a long period of time, and are not asso-
ciated with a single specific event, cre-
ates a powerful legacy of conflict
between the national government and a
very broad range of local society, not
just small, radical groups. Jakarta’s use
of military coercion against rebel forces
in each case has produced more atroci-
ties that have spurred even greater
opposition to its rule. In the more open
political environment since the collapse
of the New Order regime in 1998, the
legacy of human rights abuses has
become a powerful mobilizing force for
self-determination activists.
The most dramatic case of separatist
conflict that actually resulted in the cre-
ation of a new state occurred in East
Timor. The success of the separatist
struggle in East Timor was not due to a
battlefield victory or even a military
stalemate. Rather, it was in large part
due to the fact that a large number of
powerful countries never recognized
the legitimacy of Indonesia’s occupa-
tion of East Timor (Australia being a
major exception). The combination of
Suharto’s departure and the economic
crisis provided the political opportuni-
ty and leverage for external actors to
demand redress for the Timorese.
The referendum in East Timor had
ripple effects in West Papua and Aceh,
the other two main regions where sepa-
ratist movements are active. Most advo-
cates for self-determination in both
West Papua and Aceh utilize nonvio-
lent means to advance their objectives.
page 3
Some groups push for independence
while others call for a greater degree of
autonomy.
Communal Conflicts
Communal violence includes vio-
lence against the Sino-Indonesian com-
munity as well as violent communal
conflicts in West and Central
Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and the
Malukus. Although violence directed
against Sino-Indonesians has not
involved issues of self-determination,
violence in other areas has implications
for the emergence of more well-defined
claims for self-determination.
Sporadically since late 1996, Muslim
immigrants from the island of Madura
clashed with mostly Christian, Dayak
people in the province of West
Kalimantan. Most recently, violent
attacks occurred in Central Kalimantan
in March 2001. In December 1998,
violence broke out in Poso in Central
Sulawesi and sporadic violence contin-
ues. In January 1999, conflicts between
Christians and Muslims on the island
of Ambon in Maluku province began
and have continued through the pre-
sent. Smaller scale outbreaks of inter-
religious or inter-ethnic violence have
occurred in other parts of the country,
giving rise to a sense that these conflicts
may be indicative of a broader deterio-
ration in social cohesion throughout
the country.
There are important differences
between the three sets of events. The
killings in West Kalimantan preceded
the economic crisis that began in 1997
as well as the last general election of the
Suharto era. In Ambon, the violence
began only during the transitional gov-
ernment of President Habibie. Another
critical difference concerns the contri-
bution of political and policy factors to
the violence. In West Kalimantan, there
were no serious allegations that political
maneuvering at either the national or
local level had prompted the violence.
(Although there are accusations that
the military did not act quickly to stop
page 4
the violence once it had broken out.) In
West Kalimantan, the conflicts primar-
ily concern economic resources and
political power, layered over a commu-
nal conflict. Although the conflict is
often presented as simply ethnic con-
flict, the fact is that the Dayaks have
focused their anger against the
Madurese and not other ethnic groups
on the island, such as Javanese and
Chinese.
The communal conflict in the
Malukus began in January 1999 with
economic and ethnic as well as religious
undertones, and quickly polarized into
Christian-Muslim conflict.
Transmigration under Suharto was
responsible for relocating Muslims to
the Malukus from other parts of the
country, altering the religious balance
and displacing the Christian elite.
Although there have been occasional
lulls in the violence and weak attempts
at mediation by the central govern-
ment, the clashes have always resumed
and the situation has steadily deterio-
rated. Some Christian leaders have
called for UN and U.S. intervention,
while many Muslim leaders have reject-
ed such initiatives. The situation has
been exacerbated by the arrival of mem-
bers of Laskar Jihad (Islamic militia),
most of whom are from Java. There is a
widespread belief that supporters of for-
mer President Suharto are behind the
continued conflict. Laskar Jihad has
also been involved in the conflict in
Central Sulawesi.
These are often framed as ethnic or
religious conflicts, which disguises what
are often political and resource-based
conflicts. In Sulawesi and the Malukus,
the conflicts have largely been between
Muslims and Christians, while in
Kalimantan the conflicts are between
Dayaks (who may be Muslim or
Christian) and the Madurese (who are
Muslim), but not other ethnic groups
in the region. There is a history of pro-
independence activity in the Malukus,
where a small group of Christian-based
separatists (but loyal to Dutch colonial
rule) declared the South Maluku
Republic (RMS) in 1950. RMS
activists, most of them now living in
the Netherlands, have continued their
campaign for international recognition.
The FKM is affiliated to the RMS.
In all these cases a combination of fac-
tors contributed to the emergence of
the violence. Common elements in
each include the breakdown of consoci-
ational forms of governing (such as
alternating leadership of local commu-
nities between Muslims and Christian
leaders), increased struggles over con-
trol of local resources under the decen-
tralization law, or dispossession of tradi-
tional land and resource rights. In all of
the locales where conflict emerged, the
historic balance was altered due to the
state-sponsored program of transmigra-
tion. Development programs in
Sulawesi and Kalimantan have under-
mined traditional land use systems and
deprived indigenous communities of
livelihood opportunities. In all cases,
military and police forces contributed
to the violence either directly (as in the
Malukus), or indirectly by failing to
halt the violence quickly and holding
people on all sides accountable for com-
mitting violent acts.
Efforts to forge peace agreements
among representatives of the key actors
in each conflict have met with uneven
success. The violence in Kalimantan has
largely ended as the Madurese popula-
tion has fled. In Sulawesi there is recur-
ring violence despite several efforts to
forge peace agreements. In Sulawesi and
the Malukus, Islamist militias have
been involved, the most prominent
being the Laskar Jihad, which has com-
plicated conflict resolution efforts. In
the Malukus there have been two
agreements (Malino I and II,
reached December 2001 and February
2002 respectively), which have not yet
been successfully implemented.
In all the regions where communal
conflict has taken place, there is significant
variation in the intensity of violence.
The violence is concentrated in a few
areas, whereas neighboring areas may
experience much less or virtually no
violent conflict. This suggests that there
may be important lessons to be drawn
from the leadership exercised by local
political and traditional leaders in some
regions, as well as previously ignored
institutions and mechanisms of local
governance and conflict resolution.
Policy Responses
Federalism would be one possible
response to both secessionist demands
as well as those for greater regional
autonomy and decentralization. But
federalism in Indonesia has a negative
association with Dutch colonial rule.
Since the fall of Suharto, two sets of
laws have been passed that have tried to
address concerns regarding autonomy.
In April 1999 President Habibie signed
two laws, which went into effect in
2001, to promote regional autonomy
and fiscal balance between Jakarta and
the regions. Legislation granting greater
autonomy for Aceh and West Papua
took effect on Jan. 1, 2002. This legis-
lation provides the legal basis for the
two provinces to have greater control
over the regions’ economy, politics, and
security, as well as the cultural and reli-
gious life of its people. The laws cover
revenue sharing for the oil and gas sec-
tor, where the regions are to receive
70%, the freedom to set up a people’s
council, the freedom to have their own
anthem and flag along with the
Indonesian national anthem and flag,
and the implementation of shariah or
Islamic law in Aceh. The passage of the
autonomy legislation, however, has
failed to dampen mobilization because
it does not provide justice for the
victims of military repression, fails to
create the conditions for effective
democratic control over local govern-
ments, has strengthened unaccountable
and often corrupt local elites, and was
drafted by a small elite.
Role of the U.S.
Numerous U.S. administrations have
stated that maintaining the territorial
integrity of Indonesia is in the national

interest of the United States. Indonesia
was seen as a key ally under the New
Order regime and U.S. military assis-
tance to Indonesia was significant until
the violence following the 1999 refer-
endum in East Timor. Since the end of
the cold war, Indonesia’s role as a mod-
erate Muslim-majority country was
important. Also increasing its impor-
tance are its strategic location astride
sea lanes in Southeast Asia, as the cen-
terpiece of ASEAN, in its efforts to
build an alliance to contain China, and
as a key target in the war on terrorism
after the attacks of September 11th.
No administration has ever supported
any of the demands for independence
by movements in Aceh or West Papua.
Although it did not officially recognize
the annexation of East Timor by
Indonesia, the U.S. government gave a
green light for the invasion when it
happened. The Indonesian government
has labeled both the GAM and the
OPM as terrorist organizations, but the
U.S. has not made any steps to add
those groups to its list of official terror-
ist organizations and continues to sup-
por t negotiations between the
Indonesian government and these orga-
nizations.
The policy arena most open for rais-
ing concerns about human rights viola-
tions that is associated with self-deter-
mination and communal conflicts in
Indonesia has been through the U.S.
Congress. Human rights advocates and
supporters of self-determination for
East Timor combined to support legis-
lation that impose human rights condi-
tions on U.S. military aid to Indonesia
that have limited U.S. military aid to
the Indonesian military. In the context
of the war on terrorism, Bush adminis-
tration officials are seeking to lift those
restrictions.
Both economic and strategic interests
loom large in shaping U.S. policy
toward Indonesia. U.S. companies are
major investors in extractive industries
and since the 1980s, large numbers of
U.S. companies have established manu-
page 5
facturing firms or contracting arrange- Jihad, whose involvement in the Malukus
ments with firms in the footwear, tex- and Central Sulawesi is correlated with
tile, and other light manufacturing a significant increase in violence in
industrial base in Indonesia. U.S. cor- those regions. In the absence of any
porations are notably active in Aceh sign of significant reform within the
(Exxon-Mobil) and West Papua military with respect to a demonstrated
(Freeport McMoran). Activists have commitment to an end to impunity,
attempted to bring charges against increasing support for the Indonesian
these companies for complicity in military would increase the likelihood
human rights violations and for causing of violent conflict within Indonesia,
environmental destruction (in the case weaken democratic institutions, and
of Freeport). The Bush administration result in continued instability.
has intervened to make it more difficult
(John Gershman <john@irc-online.org> is a
for Indonesians to bring court cases senior analyst at the Interhemispheric Resource
against U.S. corporations operating in Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org)
Indonesia (most notably ExxonMobil and Asia-Pacific Editor for Foreign Policy In
in Aceh), in part because it was believed Focus.)
that such efforts could undermine
efforts Indonesia’s potential role in the
war on terrorism.
The war on terrorism has given new
life to the Bush administration’s efforts
to restore ties with the Indonesian mil-
itary. Those ties were severed because of
Indonesian military complicity in the
violent riots in East Timor in 1999.
The efforts to restore those military ties
is driven by two concerns: that
Indonesia may be a major node in the
Al Qaeda network (a concern that
many analysts believe is over-blown),
and the objective of building a strong
military alliance in Southeast Asia that
For More Information
can be used to contain China. The
ongoing self-determination and com- Internet Links
munal conflicts are seen as weakening Amnesty International – Indonesia
Indonesia’s ability to play such roles.
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/coun-
The danger of expanded U.S. support tries/indonesia
for the Indonesian military is that it is
Human Rights Watch – Indonesia
precisely the military that has been a
principal cause of much of the violence http://www.hrw.org/asia/indonesia.php
associated with self-determination con-
Indonesia Human Rights Network
flicts. Any hope of a peaceful resolution
http://www.indonesianetwork.org/
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tary personnel accountable for their Indonesian Regional Information and
complicity in human rights violations Promotion
in those regions. Such accountability is
http://www.infoproda.com/
also central to strengthening Indonesia’s
fragile civilian democratic institutions. Inside Indonesia
In terms of communal conflicts, research http://www.insideindonesia.org/
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among others has indicated that ele- International Crisis Group
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page 6
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