What ails Muslims in China?

By Hussain Mohi-ud-Din Qadri

There are varying figures on the number of total Muslim population currently residing in
different parts of China. According to information for the years 1912-49, they were said
to be around 50 million but subsequent data in 1990 placed the total number of Muslims
at around 17 million due to their migration to neighbouring Central Asian republics and
influx of Han Chinese promoted by the government. Muslim population in China may be
divided into two large groups: Hui-who are descendents from Central Asian, Arab, and
Persian Muslim immigrants who intermarried with Han Chinese-and Turkic Muslims of
China's Western province. These include Uighur, Kazak, Tajik, and Kyrgyz groups.
Muslims of Turkic origin primarily live in Xinjiang ("the new frontier," in Chinese). The
area is in the middle of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan. The landmass of Xinjiang is one-sixth of all of China. The population of
Xinjiang includes the non-Muslim Han and various groups of Turkic Muslims (the
Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tartars).

The Uyghur's are reported to be largest group. Xinjiang has plenty of natural resources,
including precious minerals, coal, and petroleum. Confirmed oil reserves are "expected to
reach 6.5 billion tons, along with billions of cubic meters of natural gas." The record of
the Uighur independence is intermittent. It was marred by conquest by the Mongol and
then by the Manchus. After conquering China, the Manchus invaded Eastern Turkistan in
1759 and ruled it until 1862. The Eastern Turkistanis (Uyghur’s) with the help of the
Ottomans expelled the Manchus in 1863. The Uyghur’s briefly established the
independent state of Eastern Turkistan. China, with the help of Britain, regained control
of Eastern Turkistan in 1877. The area was formally annexed to China in 1884 and given
its present name, Xinjiang.

The Uyghur’s have not only maintained their religious identity throughout the long
occupation by China, but also kept alive their aspiration to become independent once
again. Traditionally, Muslim groups in China have maintained their distinction from the
mainstream Han population, largely as a result of their affiliation with Islam. Although
the Hui became more assimilated into the Han culture than their Turkic counterparts, they
still maintained their separate religious identity. The cultural differences between the Han
and Chinese Muslims (especially Uyghur’s) are acute and may not be reconciled, since
the Chinese political regime inhibits cultural and political pluralism. Thus, ethnic and
religious minorities who wish to maintain a separate identity undergo repression and
hardship to sustain their very existence. The regime strives to assimilate them into the
mainstream Han culture.

The Han social order gives primacy to a Chinese society "founded on the political,
social, and religious premises of filial piety and the Confucian ancestor cult." Chinese
Muslims did "not accept the Confucian formulation of state and society." Muslims
"remained alien to the larger culture while their shared faith led them to identify deeply
with the larger world community of Islam, the universal Ummah." Because of their
unique religious perspective, Muslims were "scorned by Confucian society," and they, in
turn, "turned more to their faith as a basis of their identity." The north-western and south-
western parts of China experienced Muslim unrest in the latter half of the 19th century.
Until the communist takeover of 1949, the general attitude of the various Chinese
governments toward Muslims of China oscillated "between a policy of assimilation and
one of autonomy that resulted in hardship for the Muslims and their continued mistrust of
the Han administrations.

In the early years after the communist takeover, during the relaxation phase of the
Hundred Flowers era in the PRC, a number of secessionist Muslim rebellions erupted.
China's Muslims suffered atrocities during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. As a
result, many fled to the Turkic regions in Soviet Central Asia. The Shadian Incident that
unfolded in 1967 led to the closing down of several mosques and burning of Muslim
religious books. This incident formed part of a larger attempt to wipe out what the
government termed the Four Olds-old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.
Muslims in China, like Marrano Jews under the Spanish Inquisition, "prayed in secret at
home. Their children pursued their study of the Quran with their imams (Akhonds) in the
evenings." Despite the repression, even the fasting in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan
was observed.

Conflicts between the Han and Muslims escalated when the latter were compelled to eat
pork. According to some reports, "abominable acts of anti-religious coercion were
perpetrated when pork bones were thrown into wells in order to pollute irretrievably the
drinking water." Official reports say 1,600 Hui Muslims were massacred and 4,400 Hui
homes were destroyed in July 1975. During the rampage, the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) "used not only guns and cannon, but also air bombings." After the fall of the Gang
of Four in late 1976, the Chinese Communist Party decided to ease tensions with
Muslims.

A document entitled "Circular of Rehabilitation to the Shadian Incident" stated that this
incident should not have been dealt with as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion." The
circular admitted that the use of military force was "wrong" and declared that "the many
leaders and the people of Hui nationality who were involved in this incident should be
rehabilitated." The Chinese government also provided economic assistance to widows
and orphans of this brutal phase. In 1987, the party committee of Yunnan "rectified the
previous records" and exonerated the leaders of the rebellion "from being treated as
counterrevolutionaries."

Nonetheless, after the emergence of five independent states in Central Asia in the early
1990s, many Muslims in Xinjiang Province harbor their own aspirations of
independence. Moreover, the success of Afghans against the former Soviet Union has
palpably encouraged the Islamist groups of Xinjiang. The increased politicization of
Uyghur’s in Xinjiang has caused a great deal of concern in China. The PRC has sought
reassurances from the Kazak and Kyrgyz governments and signed several agreements
ensuring border security. Despite these agreements, the PRC leaders remain wary of the
potential escalation of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim regions of their own country due
to the continuing war in Afghanistan and the political instability in Tajikistan.

There have been frequent reports of clashes between Uighur separatists and Chinese
government forces. The most notable clash was the so-called Pinavuanjie Assault in
1992. The Chinese authorities, like their Soviet counterparts in previous decades,
described this incident as a battle with gangster groups. However, since the clashing
forces were identified as Hui Muslims, one cannot rule out that this event was related to
the separatist activities. A year later, skirmishes and turmoil broke out in 12 counties of
Xinjiang. There was also a report of increased clashes between Chinese security forces
and Uighur Islamist separatists in Xinjiang in January 2000.

How China deals with these developments within the Xinjiang Province will also affect
the course of political stability and economic development in that province. If the past
behaviour of the Chinese leadership toward political dissent, that is, the brutal
suppression of protesters in Tiananmen Square or the more recent suppression of the
Falun Gong religious sect-were to continue in the future, then Xinjiang Province would
only edge toward increased political turbulence and instability.

The writer is a PhD candidate in Economics at an Australian University