City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No.

L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6%
of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang
Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the
exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private
property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property.
The ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without
benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would
amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate
will come forward and not the police power of the state.

Philippine Press Institute Vs. COMELEC

244 SCRA 272
G.R. No. 119694
May 22, 1995
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to
provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand

on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used
by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General
claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private
personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent
Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The
taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine
publishers.

G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner,
vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA
CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA
which affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land),
Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la),
and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking
spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.

The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking
fees by shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively
speaking, the Code has expropriated the land for parking. Also, Committee stated
that the collection of parking fees would be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer
Act of the Philippines) as to the States policy of protecting the interest of
consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code,
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the
Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked
to discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.

As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should

institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce the sanctions
for violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce
the provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and
update the National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and its
waiver of liability.

Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a

Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court against
DPWH and local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX of Implementing
Rules and Regulations of National Building Code is unconstitutional and void; 2)
respondent has the legal right to lease parking spaces; and 3) National Building
Code IRR is ineffective as it was not published for 3 consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.

OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that
their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.

The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a
controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper since all
the requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily
impose that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for
free can be considered as unlawful taking of property right without just
compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for
damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking
spaces free of charge.

OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge. On the
otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA, contending that: 1)
RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in
failing to declare IRR ineffective for not having been published as required by law;
3) RTC erred in dismissing the OSGs petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and 4) RTC erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing as it
is not a real party-in-interest.

CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following

grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies and that an
administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one and nothing of an administrative nature is
to be or can be done; 2) the validity of National Building Code IRR cannot be
proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could be settled on
other grounds without touching the issue of validity since the courts should refrain
from passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and 3) Section 803 of National
Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only intended to control
the occupancy of areas and structures, and in the absence of provision of law,
respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of charge.

As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.
Issues:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.

2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid
exercise of the police power of State.

Held:

1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSGs petition:

Sec 803 of National Building Code.

Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be

governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the use,
area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local
zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Secretary.

RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for
specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters
by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters
for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a
minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale
and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether

or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for

computation of parking requirements).
xxxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area

SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to
the aim of safeguarding life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with
the principles of sound environmental management and control. Adequate parking
spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking.
Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance
of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely,
to control partially or, as in this case, absolutely the imposition of such fees.
The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term parking fees cannot even be found at all in the
entire National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if
a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building
Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said
provisions do not regulate the collection of the same

The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include
the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section
102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard
life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound

environmental management and control; but totally ignores the second part of said
provision, which reads, and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide
for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. While the first part of Section 102
of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part
thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of
the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to
the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health, property,
and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to
ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and
structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.

Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates
that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX
is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law
because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor
of the basic law.

2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid
exercise of the police power of State.

It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the
use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case,
absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict
rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and
the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same.
Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition

by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection
of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting
the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify
the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials,
of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate,
however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking
or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or

appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a
settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential

to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that
inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives
any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him
to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation
to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that
unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes
amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees
from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish,
they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering
therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking

fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents property without payment of just compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May
2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 001208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Binay vs Domingo Case Digest

Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No.
60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross
family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken
out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro
Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program.
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the

disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection
clause

since

it

will

only

benefit

few

individuals.

Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general

welfare

2.

Whether

the

questioned

3.

Whether

the

resolution

resolution
violates

clause
is
the

for

equal

public
protection

purpose
clause

Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on
the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort
and

convenience

of

the

people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations . Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent

powers

of

the

State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection

of

property

therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope,
over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of
the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a
broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation.
Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely

indicate

the

limits

of

police

power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a

limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state
policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general
welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion

of

the

common

good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be

reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious
to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the

disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing
the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This
decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal
for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate doleouts for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389,
September 11, 1991)

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., ET. AL. vs. DSWD

G.R. No. 166494 June 29, 2007
FACTSPetitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in
thePhilippines. Meanwhile, AO 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to
Implement theRelevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257, otherwise known as the
Expanded SeniorCitizens Act of 2003 was issued by the DOH, providing the grant
of twenty percent(20%) discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines
from all establishmentsdispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior
citizens.
DOH issued Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171.
Under A.O.No. 177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase
of unbrandedgeneric medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription
and non-prescriptionmedicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that
[t]he grant of twenty percent(20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of
medicines from all establishmentsdispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the
senior citizens.
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law
is unconstitutional because itconstitutes deprivation of private property.
Compelling drugstore owners andestablishments to grant the discount will result
in a loss of profit and capital because 1)drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to
10% on branded medicines; and 2) the lawfailed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for thediscount.

RULING:

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy correspondingto

the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensabletaking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just
compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property takenfrom its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers
gain but the ownersloss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and toconvey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall bereal, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does
not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount.As such, it would not
meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question
of whether the State, in promoting thehealth and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishmentsthe burden of partly subsidizing a
government program. The Court believes so. The law grants a twenty percent
discount to senior citizens for medical and dentalservices, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concerthalls, circuses,
carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; faresfor
domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodgingestablishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for theexclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the lawprovides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to seniorcitizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power
ofeminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of
anexact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore itscomprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
for an efficient andflexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring
the greatest benefits.Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitableof powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs. It is [t]he power vested inthe legislature by the constitution to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesomeand reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, notrepugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of thecommonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.

Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102.

December 4, 2000)
18AUG
FACTS:

Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan
with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential
purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC
(now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased
the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car
sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the
constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the
Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.
HELD:
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any
standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.
RATIO:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions
could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must
be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the
Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.

MMDA v Bel-Air Village

Association, Inc.
Posted on November 18, 2012

GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent
was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying
for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening
of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as
an agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a
body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC
of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and
bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and
in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the
Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is
no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a

political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public

corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not
an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank
and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by the MMDA is illegal.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the
City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the

Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its

prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor,
the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of
respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that
the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D.
499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments,
except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court
did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated
power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with

utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
a violation of the due process clause.

Lacking a concurrence of these

two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary

intrusion into private rights

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and

protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting
for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and
unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive
of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and
moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the
alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest
the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may
be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,

fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise
its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there
are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for
the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that
it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation
and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business
operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.

to transfer to any place

outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed

businesses

The second and third options

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning

ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the
principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local
government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as
this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance
should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the
standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out
its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated

establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.
is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an
equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is

invalid.

one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish

The

standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also

discriminatory as prostitution
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit,
the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the
only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for

that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary

abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse
or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and
property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit
that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.

Acebedo Optical Company,

Inc. vs Court of Appeals
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan
City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan
granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made
Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local
optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city
(but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and
operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said
conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo
then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued
that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to
the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of
police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary
function hence the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and
not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of
Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be
given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid
exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the
granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise
the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is
a special privilege estoppel does not apply.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic

corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time
of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language
of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare

may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several
cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4,
1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances
before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court
of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are

in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting
the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,

and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called
preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849

(1967)
J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable
in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there
was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be
violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for
being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power.
As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income
of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal
infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due processrequirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate,
but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale
of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of theoperator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.

On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."