Miranda vs.

Arizona

the victims died of injuries inflicted by her

assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of
checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was
arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewarts
wife and three other people who were visiting him.
Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next
five days, was interrogated on nine different
occasions. During the ninth interrogation session,
Stewart stated that he had robbed the deceased,
but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police
released the four other people arrested with
Stewart because there was no evidence to connect
any of them with the crime. At trial, Stewarts
statements were introduced. Stewart was
convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of
California reversed, holding that Stewart should
have been advised of his right to remain silent and
his right to counsel.

Digest
Facts and Case Summary - Miranda v. Arizona
Facts
The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v.
Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial
interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was
questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting
attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside
world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full
and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning
elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed
statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his

home and taken in custody to a police station
where he was identified by the complaining
witness. He was then interrogated by two police
officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed,
written confession. At trial, the oral and written
confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda
was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was
sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each
count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New
York police in connection with the robbery of a
dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He
was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad
headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th
Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the
robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He
was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention,
where he was questioned by an assistant district
attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who
transcribed the questions and answers. At trial, the
oral confession and the transcript were presented
to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree
robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without
opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested
by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two
Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police
station. A report was also received from the FBI
that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in
California. Westover was interrogated the night of
the arrest and the next morning by local police.
Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the
station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation
by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions,
which had been prepared by one of the agents
during the interrogation, to each of the two
robberies in California. These statements were
introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the
California robberies and sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment on each count. The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating
a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of

Issues
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible
against him in a criminal trial and whether procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself are necessary.
Supreme Court holding
The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. As
such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.
The Court further held that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so
freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the
New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of California in Stewart.

Full Text Link:

https://www.princeton.edu/~ereading/Miranda.pdf

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/384/436/case.ht
ml

16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion for

reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents
Ho Wai Pang vs. People
HO WAI PANG,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No.On
176229
September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening,
United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals
who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area,
the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented
Present:
a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L.
Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express
Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13
CORONA,
passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling
bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
clothing,
shoes and chocolate boxes which she
pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed
BERSAMIN,
chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as
those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out
DEL
four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of
them.
VILLARAMA,
JR.,Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white
crystalline substance contained in a white transparent
plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her
immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs
Promulgated:
Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided
October the
19, tourists
2011 to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while
bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier
discovered.

x------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial

investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. [2]

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse

assails the June 16, 2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6,
1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him
and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,
[5]
Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin San Ho[7] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article
III[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other
using the passenger manifest and further examined their
bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain
three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which
contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco,
however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier
discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing
Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes
while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin
San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate
boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from
the baggages of the six accused.

NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the

relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the presence of
the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test
on the white crystalline substance contained in said
chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent
Test.[10] The result of his examination[11] of the white
crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes
were bundled together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag
and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were

brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over
to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined
them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126
kilograms and that the representative samples were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[12] Out of the

13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No.

6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September

19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his coaccused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97.Subsequently, however, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation [13] which the trial court
granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a
finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted
to the filing of a single Amended Information[14] under
Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the
other Informations.[15] The Amended Information reads:

That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into
the country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms,
more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also
popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.

DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of

death cannot be imposed since the offense was committed
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused

WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI
LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.

SO ORDERED.[19]

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court

where the case records were forwarded to per Order of the
RTC dated May 10, 1995.[20] Later, all the accused except for
petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective
withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after being satisfied that
the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the
consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal of
their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18,
1997.[22] Per Entry of Judgment, [23] said Resolution became
final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner
was the only one left to pursue his appeal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, [17] all the
accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about
the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from
their traveling bags which were provided by the travel
agency.

Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the

brief[25] for the respondent People of the Philippines was
filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this
Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition
and determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v.
Mateo.[27]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all

the accused guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds

the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG,
WU HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN
SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to
transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of
methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu,
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF
IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND
TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is being imposed pursuant to Republic Act No.
7659 considering its applicability to the accused though
retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than that of
life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The
fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to
R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than]
that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed

the Decision of the RTC. While conceding that petitioners
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on
to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant
his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he
was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to
confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted
with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the
existence of conspiracy among the accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[28] which the CA denied in its
Resolution[29] dated January 16, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the

following grounds:

WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED

OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS
OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.

IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER
BY THE CONSTITUTION.[30]

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as

evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the

fact that he was not assisted by a competent and
independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He
claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of his
choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding
evidence taken during such investigation.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all

the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said
constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against
himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically
ruled that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant
to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession

or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession
extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no
statement was taken from petitioner during his detention
and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in
determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused,
the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran,[33]
[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which
an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Hence,
petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not excluding
evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves
scant consideration.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People

v. Wong Chuen Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime
charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case
of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The
disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the
trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their
respective decisions.Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in
convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures
which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the
plastic bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of
affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the
crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of
their Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the
admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In
ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave
credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner
whom it presumed to have performed his duties in regular
manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction,
the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present

case was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the
country and not on the basis of any confession or
admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to
be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it
need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire
incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held
in People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a

testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x

Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt
on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the
lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found
positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the
lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.

Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted

and applied to another case when there are stark
differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided
based on their own unique facts and applicable law and
jurisprudence.

Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.

Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes

the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the
1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to
confrontation,viz:

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any

objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence
particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence
of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the
lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all,
the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was
able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses
and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is
essentially a guarantee that a defendant may crossexamine the witnesses of the prosecution. InPeople v. Liboon,[36] the Court held:

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights

guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers
are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on
their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation
is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if
the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the
function and test of confrontation has also been
accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic
preliminary to cross-examination.

Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him
was not impaired.

Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.

Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial

courts finding of conspiracy which was quoted by the
appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once
again herein reproduce with approval:
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know
and understand what the witnesses testified to. According
to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses
would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend
the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by
cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.

In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given

the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the
witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel crossexamined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not
do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any
rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless
able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that
such examination suffices as compliance with petitioners
right to confront the witnesses against him.

We agree with the OSG.

On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct

evidence to conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other
cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct
evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds
that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if
taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot
be denied that the accused somehow have known each
other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila.
Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the
accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang
identified him as the one who assisted him in the supposed
tour in the Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with
the travel agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who
received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be
place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused
Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin San for
about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a
restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at
large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum
and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to the
presumption that they have the capability to enter into a
conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances confiscated

from the six accused were contained in chocolate boxes of

similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in
their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial
prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense
charged [c]ould have been perpetrated only through an
elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the
accused assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each
other in order to ensure its success.[37]

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.

[38]
[C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability need
not entail a close personal association or at least an
acquaintance between or among the participants to a
crime.[39] It need not be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design.[40] The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred
from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be
deduced from petitioner and his co-accuseds collective
conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common
design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in
bringing about the crime committed.

Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital
on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his
traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed
that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in
ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate
boxes.

Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.

True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified

on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did not see any
chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioners bag.
[42]
Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony
that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from
petitioners bag when they were still at the counter. This
sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate
boxes from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU. [43] To
us, this slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her
credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.

The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved

petitioners Demurrer to Evidence in its Order[44] of February
16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus

In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the

prosecution is insufficient to command conviction, the
Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco
is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its
mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she
even testified that she found nothing inside the handcarried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3,
1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda
Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going
to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already
carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which]
taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two
retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang.
Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the
ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54,
TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag
and could recall the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang.
Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from
the personal perception of the witness and out of her
personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural. [45]

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a

witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering
a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and
anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything
stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations
must be calibrated and considered.[46] Also, where there is
nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason
on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused, identification should be given full weight. Here,
petitioner presented no evidence or anything to indicate
that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was
moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so

overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else
can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the
unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very
act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into
the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of

the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was
provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing
that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is
a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense
under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the
act is what constitutes the offense punished and same
suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught
committing the act so punished regardless of criminal
intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not
presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the
evidence for the prosecution. It is basic that affirmative
testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the events or
facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony. [47]

All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed

no error in adjudging petitioner guilty of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country
in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED

and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Penalty

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as

affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord
with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the
time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1683.[48] The decree provided that
for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however,
R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced new amendments to
Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the
penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00 to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand,
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV
of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the
amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity
of the dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the

penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather
than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659
could be given retroactive application, it being more
favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less
stricter punishment.

RODEL LUZ y ONG,

G. R. No. 1

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., C
- versus -

BRION,
PEREZ,

We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:

SERENO, an
REYES, JJ.

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this

Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more lenient
and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive
application, x x x.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1]

Promulgated

Respondent.

February 29
And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life
imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal
statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to
him, a retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court
sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion
perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to
him.

DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011[2]and
Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which

sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the
Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at
around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and
going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket
for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from
his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused
to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that
upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of
the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the
other two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel,

entered a plea of Not guilty to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on
24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a
forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other
hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense
of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted
petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to
a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of
two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC
also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be
weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive
portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September
2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court
required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January
2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his
Petition:
(i)
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii)
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii)
THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE
OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.
(iv)
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE
DOUBT (sic).[7]

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and

seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that
the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous,
since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged
with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there
was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to
the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully
arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and
Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an
ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and
prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused
himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the
time when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is
legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag
down and arrest the accused because the latter was
actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the
accused, being caught inflagrante delicto violating the said
Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or
arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x. [8]

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for

the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he

or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense.[10] It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part
of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be
an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary. [11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for
any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant
thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary
to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the
driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued
by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventytwo hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt.
The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle
his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension
will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations

Manual[12] provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept
and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car
crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a
Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR).
Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or
argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme
Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning
of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop
should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by
virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of

the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop
significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver and
the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the
law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped,
to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the
phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent.
Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that
it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations
in which the concerns that powered the decision are
implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently
impair his free exercise of his privilege against selfincrimination to require that he be warned of his
constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger
that a person questioned will be induced to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The
vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes.
A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light
flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a
short period of time answering questions and waiting while
the officer checks his license and registration, that he may
then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely
will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect,
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite
different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently
is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators
the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical
traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels
completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the
aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer
and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert
some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these
forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is
public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more
analogous to a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of
Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic
stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not in custody for the purposes
of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by
respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as
soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler,
463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who
has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is
subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of

protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v.

Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
(Emphasis supplied.)

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the

motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions
while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that
moment placed under custody (such that he should have
been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time
that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine
only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not
be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a
corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or
to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that
petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the
warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against
them.[14] It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that
the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are
to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently
compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting
itself, which work to undermine the individuals will to resist,
and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning
of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested
when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while
he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no
need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the
police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was
already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless

search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search
is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a
moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii)
exigent and emergency circumstances.[15] None of the
above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to
a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged
to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was
actually concealed inside a metal container inside
petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent
to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear
and convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of
his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or
a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to
the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the
police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State
that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and
was freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was
alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a
finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk
rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop
and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the
latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that
there was no justification for a full-blown search when the
officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales
for the search incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and

10

(2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x

But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search
in the present case.

still it must be exercised and the law implemented without

contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government. [24]

We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis

both legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to officer
safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal
less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we
stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer
because of the extended exposure which follows the taking
of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that [t]he
danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest,
and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not
from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine
traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief
encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry
stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.
S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a
person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely
to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence).

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are

inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.[26]

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is

absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is
not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413414. But while the concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the minimal additional intrusion
of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype
search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges,
officers have other, independent bases to search for
weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example,
they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms,
supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414;
perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry
patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and
may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search
of the passenger compartment, including any containers
therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February

2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19
February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region,
Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel
Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately
released from detention, unless his continued confinement
is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN

AND MANUEL D. ANDAL,
Petitioners,

- versus -

SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, SENATECOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONSAND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,SENATE
COMMITTEE ONPUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD
GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

Respondents.

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the

authority to search incident to arrestthe need to discover
and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for
speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary
to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either
on the person of the offender or in the passenger
compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare,

11

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails

and seeks to enjoin the implementation of and nullify
Committee Report No. 312[1] submitted by respondents
Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate
Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been
approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Factual Antecedents

The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

(PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a
government-sequestered organization in which the Republic
of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.
[2]
Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC),
meanwhile, is a private corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws and a holding company
whose main operation is collecting the money market
interest income of PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both

directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees
of the government to the board of directors of both POTC
and PHILCOMSAT.[3] By virtue of its interests in both
PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has, likewise,
substantial interest in PHC.

regularly received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998,

however, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004, PHC
sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating
expenses. By 2005, PHC's operating expenses had
ballooned tremendously. Likewise, several PHC board
members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI),
a wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had
been allegedly advanced without the appropriate
accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. [4]

On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the

government continued to incur and in order to protect its
interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of
the Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines, introduced
Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455[5] directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous
losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the
mismanagement committed by their respective board of
directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent
Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public
hearings[6] on various dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal
were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons.

On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees

submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it
noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the
management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due
proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found
overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its
nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG
was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the
government's interests in the said corporations. In sum,
Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the
privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares
of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the
Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the
Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of
government nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.

On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition

before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with
which the respondent Senate approved the challenged
Committee Report No. 312.[7] They also claim that
respondent Senator Richard Gordon acted with partiality
and bias and denied them their basic right to counsel,[8] and
that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite having
voluntarily recused himself from the proceedings in view of
his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to
participate actively in the hearings.[9]

Issues Before The Court

For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),

12

The basic issues advanced before the Court are: (1) whether
the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving
Committee Resolution No. 312; and (2) whether it should be
nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having
been hastily approved by the respondent Senate.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation [15] that

their constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was
violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No.
455 is specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can only
be invoked by a person under custodial investigation
suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore
attaches only during such custodial investigation.[16] Since
petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public
hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly
invoke their right to counsel.

The Court's Ruling

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry

relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in
the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,[10] which cited Article VI,
Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:

SO ORDERED.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative

power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this
case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it
all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
[11]

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot

be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor
can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the
very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted.
The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these
legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article
VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.[12]

G.R. No. 199877

August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:

Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in

the Sabio case, and as suggested[13] by the parties in their
respective pleadings, the issues put forth in the
petition[14] have become academic.

This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July

28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268,

13

finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with
robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, armed
with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one
unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to
gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money
amounting to P 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to
San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented by Enrique
Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said
Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his
death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Laras plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and
PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of
San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on
May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he
withdrew the amount of P 230,000.00 from the MetrobankMabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he
rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob
(Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista);
(d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and
immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the
morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at
the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at
him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f)
Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong
ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the bag in
Bautistas direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag,
Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein
Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he
had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards
Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to
relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pickup was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle
and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one
bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police
arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were brought
to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001,
while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw
Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel,
Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter
arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob
identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastians money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the FollowUp Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55 in
the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police
station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr.
Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went
to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him

for questioning; (e) at the police station, Lara was placed in

a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong,
Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was
informed of his rights and subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the
Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took
place at the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers,
proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat,
one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of
them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and
six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his
investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at
the police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able
to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was
brought after the incident.7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who
resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on
May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench
while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort
room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until
3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around
7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his
cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was
Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the
police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay
Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the
patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we
were able to caught you in your house, if in another place
we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police
station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told
where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h)
when he told the police that he was at home when the
subject incident took place, the police challenged him to
produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the
station, one of the police officers told them to come back
the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up
holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and
Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his
witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he
will be subjected to an inquest.8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his
neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May
31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara
working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00
in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa
Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line
the whole day of May 31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with
homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic Act
7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said
accused.
SO ORDERED.12

14

The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecutions witness Enrique Sumulong positively
identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted
away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services,
Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 oclock in the
morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave.,
Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which
caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As
repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper,
an accused must show he was at some other place for such
a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been
at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the
crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering
the proximity of the distance between the place of the
incident and the residence of the accused where he
allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene within
the same barangay. The positive identification of the
accused which were categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused
whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA
259).13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly
attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested without
a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a
warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings including
those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted
by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be
identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up
is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had
already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the
alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the
one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from
him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to
the police was different from the one he gave during the
trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the
perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that
it was his unidentified companion who shot Bautista and
took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be
reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with
moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting
the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that
they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his
favor, their testimonies should have been given the
credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his
sister and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the
existence of bias or impair their credibility.
The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was
supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a
ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections
to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been
raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused
enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further,
that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set
aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that
sufficiently establishes culpability:
Appellants avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his

plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In

voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a
plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for
lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is
deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his
arrest. Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone,
appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of his
arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or
moved to quash the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The
warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all
other proceedings including those leading to the conviction
of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be
deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts
on record point to their culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police
line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was violated,
the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford
him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not
part of custodial investigation.
Appellants assertion that he was under custodial
investigation at the time he was identified in a police line-up
and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water.
Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is
not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of custodial
investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused
had been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified
in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of
persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no
proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori,
We refuse to hearken to appellants hollow cry that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard
fact that during the police line-up, the accusatory process
had not yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to
interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it does
not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was
convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness
and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or
admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions failure
to present a witness who actually saw him commit the
crime charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the
prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he shot
the victim and took the money.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Contrary to appellants assertion, prosecution witness
Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act
was there any other words spoken by this person?
A There was, sir.

15

Q What did he say?

x x x x x x"

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.

"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or
happened after you stepped down from the Nissan pick-up,
that is correct?

Q Where were you looking when this person approached

you?

A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.

A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to
him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to
give the money or the bag so I immediately threw away the
bag at the back seat, sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person standing by
your car window?

Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding

towards that store to call your office by phone, that is
correct?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra
when you heard this gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the
back of the vehicle, that is correct?

A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.

A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle,

he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.

Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing

money to the back of the vehicle, what did that person do?

Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this

alleged holdup(p)er followed him?

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and
ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody shoot a gun?

A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.

Q Who was firing the gun?

Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?
A The one who held-up us, sir.
A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.
Q By how, do you know his name?
A No, sir.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to
recognize him?

Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the
gun because he was holding the gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx

A Yes, sir.
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize
him?

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court,

circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites concur:

A Yes, sir.

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court

whether indeed the person you saw holding you up at that
time is in court?

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and

A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify
him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first
bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and black
pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the
vehicle and ran away with it, what did the accused do? (sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
Q Around how many shots according to your recollection
were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to

produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly
sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and
Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly emerged
and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong,
demanding from him to produce the bag containing the
money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the
victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

16

6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime

six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Laras alibi failed to convince.
Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that
positive identification of the accused, where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and
denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a)
that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility "refers to the distance between the place
where the accused was when the crime transpired and the
place where it was committed, as well as the facility of
access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed
to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the
locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the
felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a
stones throw (about three minutes away) from the crime
scene.17(Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court
accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to
file their supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their right
to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in
their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Laras conviction for robbery with
homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and
Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Laras supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for
the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Laras alibi can be given credence so as to
exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court.19 Any objection to
the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused
submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a
plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes
him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his
arrest.20

Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a

sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that
was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial
conducted without error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on
the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of
Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with
counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he
stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel
did not render Sumulongs identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen
at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting
point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court
previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12
(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda
rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of
the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs.
Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs.
Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police line-up
because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not
yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is
usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated
and who gives a statement in the course of the lineup.23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the
finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial
evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering
that only direct and not circumstantial evidence can
overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even
in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if
the established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis
that he is not.24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon
the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the

17

inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination

of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be
convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free
and denying proper protection to the community. 25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances
established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly
indicate Laras guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie,
Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the intersection of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front
passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing
the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat,
Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing
the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong
gave it to Bautista who was seated at the back of the pickup; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and
ran towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after
Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautistas
direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds;
and (g) Bautistas blood was on the crime scene and empty
shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of
personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence
proving the physical act of asportation by the accused must
be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the
original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the
homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation
of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime
scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove
the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to
realize such intent.
In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs
positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at
him and demanded that the bag containing the money be
turned over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order
to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs
testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to
prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the
middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of visibility
are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased
against the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity
of the malefactor should be normally accepted.27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate
that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a
serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court
found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith
and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order
of events and of human nature and against the presumption
of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify
against the former.28
IV
In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA
was correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled
that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a

defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to

disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be
demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be
supported by clear and convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of
the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Laras
claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer
trench on the day of the incident, it is possible that his
witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning
given that the distance between his house and the place
where the subject incident took place can be negotiated,
even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put,
Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all
respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July
28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189843

March 20, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ZENAIDA SORIANO y USI, and MYRNA SAMONTE y
HIOLEN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 6 February
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02842,
which affirmed the trial court's conviction of herein accusedappellants Zenaida Soriano (Zenaida) and Myrna Samontc
(Myrna)2 for Violation of Sections 5 and I 1, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In three separate Informations3 all dated 26 June 2003 filed
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, City of
Malolos, Bulacan, accused-appellants were charged with
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. They
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.4 After conducting
the mandatory pre-trial,5 joint trial ensued.
For the prosecution, PO1 Carlito Bernardo (PO1 Bernardo),
who was designated poseur-buyer during the buy-bust

18

operation organized by the Bulacan Provincial Drug

Enforcement Group (PDEG) against accused-appellants,
testified:
x x x On June 10, 2003 while he was assigned at the
Provincial Drug Enforcement Group, one of their confidential
informant (CI) arrived in the office and was looking for his
chief P/Chief Insp. Celodonio Morales. When the C.I. was
able to talk to their chief, the C.I. reported that a certain @
Zeny was engaged in selling illegal drugs at Sitio Gulod,
Brgy. Tubigan, San Rafael, Bulacan. Thereafter, their chief
talked to police officer Tomas Nachor, the Records PNCC of
their office to confirm if the name Zeny of Barangay
Tubigan, San Rafael, Bulacan was included in the watch list.
When it was confirmed that Zeny was among those listed in
the watch list, their chief instructed the C.I. to arrange a
drug deal with Zeny. At about 5 oclock in the afternoon, the
C.I. returned to their office and informed their chief that he
managed to arrange a drug deal with Zeny and the same
would take place at Myrnas house.6 Immediately thereafter,
their chief conducted a briefing wherein a team was formed
composed of SPO1 Violago, as team leader, PO2 Rullan, PO1
Jacinto, PO1 Quizon, PO1 Magora, PO1 Chan and himself to
conduct a buy bust operation against Zeny. They were
dispatched at about 9:30 oclock in the evening and were
ordered to proceed to the target place. They arrived at
Barangay Tubigan at about 10:30 in the evening and they
set their plan into motion. The C.I. went ahead and was
followed by them. As they were approaching the venue,
they saw two (2) women talking and according to the C.I.
one was Zeny while the other was Myrna. Zeny and Myrna
saw them and recognized the C.I. The women then called
the C.I. by wavingtheir hands at him. When they reached
Zeny and Myrna, the C.I. introduced him to the ladies as
the[ir] prospective buyer. Zeny immediately demanded for
the amount they have agreed upon, in response he handed
the two (2) pieces of one hundred peso bills to Zeny which
the latter in turn handed to Myrna. Zeny then took a match
box from the pocket of the "duster" she was wearing and
took one (1) plastic sachet of shabu there from and handed
the same to him. Thereafter, he executed the pre-arranged
signal by lighting a lighter prompting his companions to
alight from their hiding places and approach them. They
introduced themselves as police officers and informed both
accused that the same is a buy bust-operation. He frisked
Zeny and from her he recovered the match box from where
she took the plastic sachet that she sold to him. Violago, on
the other hand, searched the person of Myrna and from her
they recovered the marked money and one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu. The plastic sachet of shabu sold by Zeny
was marked by him the letters "BB-CB" while the six (6)
other plastic sachets which he recovered from the match
box he seized from Zeny was marked by him with B P-1 CB
to B P-6 CB. Violago, on the other hand, marked the plastic
sachet recovered from Myrna with "C P RV". At their office a
request for laboratory examination was prepared by their
duty investigator and together with the specimen recovered
from the accused was sent to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. The result thereof yielded positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Witness positively identified both accused in open court as
well as all the pieces of evidence presented by the State.
xxxx
Witness further testified that after the operation they
boarded both accused in their Tamaraw FX service vehicle
and were brought to the PDEG Office at Camp General Alejo
Santos in Malolos, Bulacan. Witness then revealed that the
markings on the seized evidence were placed by them after
they have recovered them from the accused. He, however,

admitted that there were no barangay officials present

when they recovered the plastic sachets from the accused
neither was there any formal report made to the barangay
authorities of the buy bust operation.
On re-direct examination, witness testified that accused
Samonte and Soriano were known to each other and they
were together at the time of the buy bust operation and
were only less than a meter apart. It was Zeny who handed
the marked money to Myrna after he handed the same to
Zeny.7
The corroborating testimony of buy-bust operation team
leader SPO2 Rogelio Violago (SPO2 Violago) was ordered
stricken off the record due to his repeated failure to
reappear in court for cross-examination.8
Meanwhile, the court dispensed with the testimony of
forensic chemist P/C Insp. Nelson Cruz Sta. Maria after the
defense admitted that, if so presented, the witness will
testify on, among others, the identity of the specimen and
the request for laboratory examination he received, the
actual examination he conducted thereon, and the issuance
of Chemistry Report No. D-405-2003 showing that the
specimen tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu).9
The Court of Appeals summarized the version of the
defense in the following manner:
According to Soriano, while she was at her house preparing
milk for her grandson, she heard a noise at the door. As she
was approaching the door, five to six armed persons barged
into her house. The armed men searched her house. She
asked them the reason for the search. The men conducting
the search appeared to be drunk. They smelled of liquor.
The men, likewise, searched her person. Instead of allowing
the men to frisk her, she removed her clothes. One of the
men approached her and asked her to accompany him to
the store to buy soft drinks. But instead of bringing her to
the store she was forcibly taken inside a van. There she saw
accused Myrna Samonte. Both of them were first brought to
a hospital in Malolos, Bulacan before proceeding to Camp
General Alejo Santos. Once there, they were instructed to
alight from the vehicle and was brought inside an office.
Inside, the men who arrested her asked if she had any
money. The following day, she was informed that a case was
filed against her for illegal possession of shabu. She
protested and told the police officers that they were lying.
She first saw the plastic sachets of shabu used as evidence
against her when they were already at Camp General Alejo
Santos in Malolos, Bulacan.
Samonte, on the other hand, stated in her testimony that on
June 10, 2003, while she, together with her parents, was
sleeping at her house in Sitio Gulod, she was awakened by
the barking of the dogs. She stood up and peeped through
the window to see what the commotion was about. She then
heard a knock on the door. She asked for the identity of the
person knocking but she heard no reply. Thereafter, she saw
two men climb the window. They informed her that they
were looking for a person who resides in Samontes house.
They then started searching the house. At this point,
Samontes father woke up and asked them what they were
looking for. The men frisked her father but found nothing.
Having failed to find what they came for, the men asked
Samonte to go with them. She resisted. The men assured
her that they just wanted to talk to her. They took her into a
van and left her there with the driver. After some time, they
came back with Soriano, who she did not know until that
night. The men took them to a camp in Malolos where the
two women were separated. Samonte was then asked to

19

sign a piece of paper. At first, she refused but the men

forced her, thus, she had no choice but to acquiesce. After
signing the document, they brought her to a room where
she stayed the whole night. The next day, they transferred
her to a detention cell. She only came to know that cases
were already filed against her during the initial hearing. 10
After trial, the court found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of both crimes.11
On appeal, the defense denied that there was a legitimate
buy-bust operation, and argued that assuming that there
was one conducted, it was in effect a form of instigation. 12 It
likewise assailed the credibility of the testimony of the
prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals, however, was
not convinced. It affirmed the decision of the trial court.13
In its Supplemental Brief14 filed with this Court, the defense
maintained that the prosecution failed to establish the
corpus delicti warranting the acquittal of accusedappellants.
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
At the outset, we cannot agree with the position of the
defense that the transaction arranged by the confidential
informant with accused-appellant Zenaida constitutes
instigation. It bears stressing that she was in the Provincial
Watch List Target Personality, and "the solicitation merely
furnished evidence of a course of conduct."15
As to the merits of the case, the prosecution has established
with moral certainty that accused-appellants sold prohibited
drugs and that they were in possession of shabu.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the
prosecution must prove the presence of the following
essential elements: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the
thing."16 It is necessary to establish that the transaction or
sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus
delicti as evidence.17

Q: Who was that person who was telling you that?

A: The CI.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: When the two female persons @ Zeny and Myrna saw us,
they recognized the CI so they called us.
Q: How far were you from the 2 women?
A: Approximately, 3 meters, sir.
Q: Who was called by the 2 women?
A: The CI.
Q: How did the 2 women call the CI?
A: By waving their hands.
Q: What happened next when the CI was called?
A: I was introduced as the prospective buyer based on their
agreement.
Q: What happened when you were introduced to be the
prospective
buyer?
A: @ Zeny demanded for the payment of the agreed
amount.
Q: How did @ Zeny demanded for the amount?
A: She asked for the money.
Q: What did you do?
A: I handed it to @ Zeny.
Q: After you handed the money, what did @ Zeny do?

The requisites for illegal possession of shabu, on the other

hand, are the following: "(a) the accused was in possession
of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug."18

A: In turn, she handed it to @ Myrna.

These requirements were all present in the instant case.

Q: What happened after that?

PO1 Bernardo gave a detailed account of the transaction

commencing from the introduction made by the confidential
informant between him, as the poseur-buyer, and accusedappellants to the time the sale was consummated until the
latter were arrested and several additional plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances, which later tested
for shabu,19 were found in their possession six from
Zenaida and one from Myrna.

A: She took the match box from her dusters pocket which
contains several pieces of plastic sachet.

That the sale actually took place and that several sachets
were recovered from the accused-appellants were clear
from the following testimony of PO1 Bernardo:
Q: What happened next?
A: We reached the venue and while we were walking, two
(2) female persons were talking and according to the CI, one
of them is @ Zeny and the other one is @ Myrna.

Q: You handed it to @ Zeny and in turn, she handed it to @

Myrna, what is that being handed?
A: The money, sir.

Q: After taking the match box from the pocket of her duster,
what happened next?
A: She took 1 piece and handed it to me.
Q: By the way, how much was the money you gave?
A: 2 pieces of P100 bill.
COURT:
Q: Who handed to you the plastic sachets?
A: @ Zeny.20
xxxx

20

Q: After you introduced yourself as policemen and you were

conducting a buy bust operation, what happened next?
A: After that I frisked @ Zeny and recovered from her the
matchbox containing plastic sachet.21
xxxx
Q: The money that you handed to Zeny which in turn was
handed to Myrna, what happened to that money?
A: After I frisked @ Zeny SPO2 Violago frisked @ Myrna and
recovered from her the marked money and one piece of
transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance.22
The credibility of PO1 Bernardo was put to test on crossexamination but his statements were consistent all
throughout that we are convinced that his testimony,
supported by evidence, was reliable. This is further
strengthened by the fundamental principle that:
x x x Findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature
and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded
respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of
facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason
for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the
Court of Appeals.23
It is also worthy to note that PO2 Bernardo was able to
render a clear and direct narration of the details of the buybust operation that led to the arrest of accused-appellants.
The accused-appellants, on the other hand, could not
impute any ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to
falsely accuse them of committing the crimes. In fact, both
accused-appellants testified that they did not know the
apprehending officers. For these reasons, the contention of
the defense that the doctrine of regularity of performance of
official duty is inapplicable in the present case must fail. 24
The defense now posits that the prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti because the arresting team
failed to comply with Section 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165, 25 to
wit: (1) there is no showing that a physical inventory was
conducted in the presence of the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official; and (2) no photograph of the seized items was
taken in the presence of the above-enumerated
representatives.26
We have time and again ruled, however, that such
omissions are not fatal to the prosecutions case as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved.27
Here, on the basis of the testimony of PO1 Bernardo and the
documentary evidence presented, the Court of Appeals
correctly determined:
x x x The prosecution also accounted for the chain of
custody of the subject substances. From appellants
possession, police officers Bernardo and Violago seized the
sachets of shabu, marked them for evidence before handing
them over to their chief Pol/Chief Insp. Celodonio Morales
("Morales"). Morales then requested for a laboratory

examination of the seized drugs. Police Inspector Sta. Maria

found the white crystalline granules contained in seven
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drugs.28 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
And, absent a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof of
tampering with the evidence, the presumption that the
integrity of the evidence had been preserved lies.29 The
case of People v. Quiamanlon30 is instructive on this point:
x x x In this case, Quiamanlon bears the burden to show
that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and a presumption that they
properly discharged their duties. Failing to discharge such
burden, there can be no doubt that the drugs seized from
Quiamanlon were the same ones examined in the crime
laboratory. Evidently, the prosecution established the crucial
link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs.31 (Citations
omitted)
All considered, the prosecution has established with moral
certainty that the prohibited drugs recovered from the
accused-appellants were the same presented in court as
evidence.
Finally, we find the penalties imposed by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals in order.
Under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the crime of
illegal possession of shabu weighing less than five (5) grams
is punishable by imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).32
On the other hand, Section 5, Article II of the same Act
provides that a person found guilty of unauthorized sale of
shabu, regardless of the quantity and purity involved, shall
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ranging
from Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos to Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).33
Applying Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,34 which provides that "if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same," the trial court correctly imposed
the following penalties:
(1) for the crime of illegal possession of 0.399 gram of
shabu in Criminal Case No. 2300-M-2003 against accusedappellant Zenaida Soriano, imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of twelve years and one day, as
minimum, to fourteen years and eight months, as
maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (1!
300,000.00);35
(2) for the crime of illegal possession of 0.511 gram of
shabu in Criminal Case No. 2301-M-2003 against accusedappellant Myrna Samonte, imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of twelve years and one day, as
minimum, to fourteen years and eight months, as
maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (1!
300,000.00);36 and
(3) for the crime of illegal sale of shabu in Criminal Case No.
2302-M-2003 against both accused-appellants, life

21

imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P500,000.00) each.37
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 6 February 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02842 is AFFIRMED,
and, thereby the 13 April 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Criminal Case Nos. 2300-M-2003 to 2302-M-2003 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty.

Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large; the case
against him was archived. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutions version was testified to by the victims
wife and daughter, in succession.
On that fateful day, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo)
was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and
Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredos
daughter, an adolescent at the time, was underneath the
house (silong in the vernacular) of a neighbor, three
(3)meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his
companions were ostensibly in merrymaking.
Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate.
While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt
from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the
head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was
fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by
Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest.
Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo
in the head. Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she
watched the attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her
mother running out of their house and crying for help.

G.R. No. 197813

September 25, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDWIN IBANEZ y ALBANTE and ALFREDO (FREDDIE)
NULLA y IBANEZ, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal via a Notice of Appeal from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04051.1 The appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch18, Malolos, Bulacan
which convicted accused-appellants Edwin Ibaez y Albante
(Edwin) and Alfredo Nulla y Ibaez (Alfredo) of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 3517-M-2004.
Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares
(Jesus), were all charged in an Information for Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Jesus
Montisillo y Taniares @ Dodong, Edwin Ibaez y Albante and
Alfredo(Freddie) Nulla y Ibaez of the crime of murder,
penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the
municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a soil digger (bareta)
and with intent to kill one Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
attack, assault and hit with the said soildigger (bareta) the
said Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog, hitting the latter on his
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries
which directly caused his death.3

On that same auspicious date, 29 August 2004, Rowena,

Wilfredos wife and Rachels mother, was inside their house
taking care of their youngest daughter. She heard a
commotion coming from the neighboring house, about eight
(8) steps away, so she rushed in that direction. Once
outside their house, she saw Wilfredo prostrate on the
ground covered with blood on his face and forehead. Upon
reaching Wilfredo, Rowena saw accused Jesus, standing one
meter away from Wilfredo, holding an iron bar. Edwin and
Alfredo stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt.
Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran away while Edwin went
home. Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the
hospital. However, Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive
and was pronounced dead on arrival.
Expectedly, the defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo,
proffered an altogether different version of the events.
The two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole
culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being
at the scene of the crime only because of their curiosity for
what had occurred.
Allegedly, on that day, the two buddies were having their
regular drinking session at Edwins house when they heard
a commotion outside. Curious about the ruckus, they
approached and saw Wilfredo prostrate on the ground;
Jesus, held an iron bar and was being held back by his sister
who was shouting, "Tama na! Tama na!." Edwin then called
for a tricycle so Wilfredo could be brought to a hospital and
given medical attention. Alfredo stood by and merely
watched as events transpired.
To corroborate their claim of innocence, the defense called
Aniceta Dosil (Aniceta) to the witness stand who testified as
follows:
(1) She sold doormats for a living which she peddled on the
road;
(2) On 29 August 2004, Rachel helped her in selling the
doormats;
(3) On that day, they finished at around 6:00 p.m. and
headed to their respective residences along the railroad
track;

22

(4) Upon arriving at their vicinity, Aniceta witnessed the

immediate aftermath of the purported fight between Jesus
and Wilfredo;
(5) At that juncture, Jesus was being embraced by his sister,
Marilou, and the two were two meters away from the body
of Wilfredo;
(6) Marilou recounted to Aniceta that Jesus had hit Wilfredo
with an iron bar, a preemptive move because Wilfredo was
about to stab Jesus;
(7) While Aniceta and Marilou discussed the incident, Rachel
stood and listened to them;
(8) At that time, only the four of them, Jesus, Marilou,
Aniceta and Rachel, were at the place of the incident;
(9) After learning the entirety of what had transpired,
Aniceta, who was afraid to get involved, and Rachel, ran to
their respective houses;
(10) For the duration of the day, Aniceta did not step out of
her house, neither did she volunteer information to the
police when the case was investigated in the following days;
and
(11) Aniceta only came forward to testify at the request of
Adela Ibaez, wife of Edwin.
As previously adverted to, the trial court convicted Edwin
and Alfredo of Murder. It disposed of the case, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused Edwin Ibaez y Albante and Alfredo
(Freddie) Nulla y Ibaez are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and are hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo D. Atendido in the amount
of:
a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity;
b) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate
damages;
c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
d) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and
e) One Million Nine Hundred Forty-Six Thousand and One
Hundred Eighty Pesos (P1,946,180.00) for the unearned
income of Wilfredo Atendido.4
On appeal, Edwin and Alfredo found no reprieve. The Court
of Appeals did not deviate from the RTCs ruling and
affirmed in toto its finding of guilt.
In this appeal, Edwin and Alfredo assign the following as
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
FULLWEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THEALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS.
II
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
GIVINGWEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSES
EVIDENCE.

III
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THEACCUSED-APPELLANTS WHEN THEIR GUILT WAS NOT
PROVENBEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.5
In sum, the issue is whether the accused are guilty of
murder.
Edwin and Alfredo maintain their innocence and point to
Jesus as the sole perpetrator of the crime. They insist that
they were at the scene of the crime only because they
wanted to know what the commotion was all about. They
claim that, in fact, Edwin called for a tricycle so Wilfredo
could be brought to a hospital. To discredit the eyewitness
testimony of Rachel, they presented Aniceta who testified
that she and Rachel were out on that day selling doormats
and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel could not have
witnessed the murder of Wilfredo.
Both lower courts, however, found the testimony of Rachel
credible:
This Court finds the testimony of Rachel clear and
convincing. The testimony flows from a person who was
present in the place where the killing occurred. They are
replete with details sufficient to shift the burden of evidence
to appellants. We have no reason to doubt Rachels
credibility. Her candid account of the incident, standing
alone, clearly established the components of the crime of
murder. Appellants defense of denial, not sufficiently
proven, cannot overcome the conclusions drawn from said
evidence. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings and conclusions of the trial court. Rachels
testimony was delivered in a firm, candid, and
straightforward manner. There is no showing that Rachel
wavered from the basic facts of her testimony, even when
she was subjected to a rigorous examination.
Rachel was only ten (10) years old when she witnessed the
murder of the victim. She testified in open court two (2)
years later. Thus, she cannot be expected to give an errorfree narration of the events that happened two years earlier.
The alleged inconsistencies between her sworn statement
and testimony referred to by appellants do not affect her
credibility. What is important is that in all her narrations she
consistently and clearly identified appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime. Inconsistencies between the
sworn statement and the testimony in court do not militate
against witness credibility since sworn statements are
generally considered inferior to the testimony in open
court.6
We find no error in the lower courts disposal of the issue.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is that the trial court's
evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the
highest respect because of its direct opportunity to observe
the witnesses on the stand and to determine if they are
telling the truth or not.7 This opportunity enables the trial
judge to detect better that thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court.
Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence and
credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on review,
unless it is clear from the records that his judgment is
erroneous.8
We have scrutinized the testimony of lone eyewitness,
Rachel. Throughout her testimony, in her direct, cross and

23

re-direct and re-cross examinations, she candidly recounted

the events surrounding the killing of her father as follows:

Q: And who was that compadre who called your father?

A: Freddie, maam.

PROS. LAGROSA:
Q: Do you know the full name of this Freddie?
Your Honor please, may we invoke the right of the child the
provisions (sic) under the child witness wherein we can ask
leading questions and in Tagalog.
COURT:
Anyway, the questions can be interpreted.
PROS. LAGROSA:
Only the leading questions, your Honor.
Q: You said that your father came from sleeping in your
house, did you know what time of the day your father went
to sleep?
A: I do not know because I do not know how to read time.
xxxx

A: Freddie Nulla, maam.

Q: Why do you know Freddie Nulla?
A: He is a compadre of my father, maam.
Q: Did you often see him in your place?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Is Freddie Nulla now here in court?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Will you look around and point to him?
INTERPRETER:

Q: But do you know whether or when your father went to

sleep? It was morning, noon or afternoon or nighttime or
daytime?

Witness pointed to a detention prisoner (sic) when asked to

identify himself answered FREDDIE NULLA.Q: Now, you said
that Freddie Nulla, the compadre, called your father, do you
still remember how he was called?

A: "Hapon po." (In the afternoon.)

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Early afternoon, late afternoon or mid-afternoon?

Q: How?

A: Late in the afternoon, Your Honor. ("bandang haponhapon po.")

A: "Pare. Pare."

Q: Was it already dark?

A: Not yet, your Honor.
PROS. LAGROSA:
Q: According to you, your father went to sleep, where were
you when your father went to sleep?
A: I was in the house, maam.
xxxx
Q: And when your father woke up, were you still in the
house?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: And when your father was called, what did your father
do?
A: My father followed Freddie at the back of the house of
Kuya Edwin.
Q: At the time your father followed Freddie at the back of
the house of your Kuya Edwin, where were you?
A: I was under the house of Kuya Unyo, maam.
Q: Now, you mentioned that your father followed Freddie at
the back of the house of Kuya Edwin, who is this Kuya
Edwin?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a detention prisoner who identified
himself as EDWIN IBAEZ.PROS. LAGROSA:

Q: Also inside the house?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: You said that at that time you were under the house of
Kuya Unyo, what is the full name of this Kuya Unyo, if you
know?

Q: When your father woke up, what did he do?

A: I do not know, maam.
A: All of us ate rice, maam. ("Kumain po kaming lahat ng
kanin.")

Q: What were you doing under the house of Kuya Unyo?

Q: Can you tell us if that is already dark or still daytime?

A: I was throwing stones, maam.

A: It was still daytime, maam.

Q: And this house of Kuya Unyo, is that near or far from your
house?

xxxx
A: Just near our house, maam.
Q: After eating rice, will you tell us what happened, if you
still remember?
A: My father was called by his compadre, maam.

Q: Can you point a place here where you are now sitted (sic)
up to this courtroom to show the distance between your
house and the house of Kuya Unyo?

24

PROS. LAGROSA
The witness pointed up to the wall.

Q: And how about Kuya Dodong when Kuya Edwin put

around a piece of cloth and when Kuya Freddie boxed your
father, where was Kuya Dodong at that time?

ATTY. MALLILLIN:

A: He was also there, maam.

Can we estimate, your Honor.

Q: And what was he doing, if he was doing anything at that

time?

A: Just near, maam, 3 to 4 meters.9

xxxx
Q: Rachel, last time you testified that your father followed
Freddie Nulla at the back of the house of Kuya Unyo and at
that time you were under the house of Kuya Unyo, do you
remember having stated that last time?

A: "Binareta na po yong papa ko sa ulo."

COURT:
Q: What did he use noong" binareta"?
A: It is a long iron bar used in digging soil?

A: Yes, maam.

PROS. LAGROSA:

Q: While you were at the house of Kuya Unyo, do you

remember anything unusual that happened at that time?

Q: Now, what happened after Kuya Dodong " binareta" (sic)

your father on the head?

A: When my father was being killed, maam.

A: "Nandoon pa po ako sa silong nila Kuya Unyo nakita ko

nalang ponandoon na po ang nanay ko pati po mga kapatid
ko tsaka na poako lumabas."10

Q: You said that your father was being killed or "pinapatay

na po si papa ko," who killed your father?
A: Kuya Edwin, Kuya Freddie and Kuya Dodong, maam.
Q: You said that Kuya Freddie, Kuya Edwin and Kuya Dodong
were killing your father, how did Kuya Edwin, how was he
killing your father as you said?
A: "Pinuluputan po sa mukha ng damit ni Kuya Edwin."
(Kuya Edwin put around a piece of cloth).
Q: You said that Kuya Edwin put around a piece of cloth on
your papa, in what part of your fathers body (sic) that cloth
being put around by Kuya Edwin?
A: He put it around all over the face and the head, maam.
PROS. LAGROSA:
The witness was demonstrating by making a circling
movement or motion of her hand all over the head and the
face.
Q: And then what happened when Kuya Edwin put around
that piece of cloth all over the head and face of your papa?
A: "Itinumba po siya."
Q: You said "itinumba po siya," who caused your father to
tumble down?
A: After Kuya Edwin had put around the piece of cloth on my
father, he tumbled him down.
Q: And when your father tumbled down, what else
happened?
A: Kuya Freddie boxed him, maam.
Q: Did you see in what part of your fathers body was he
boxed by Kuya Freddie?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What part of his body was boxed?

As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and

credence to Rachels testimony. She was young and
unschooled, but her narration of the incident was
categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a
concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.
The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further
discredit Rachels testimony by arguing that Rachel was a
mere child who had studied only until the first grade of
elementary school and could barely read, and did not know
how to tell time.
We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because
she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and
when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing
that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of
testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, 11 all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even
buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be
a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof
lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child. 12 Thus,
petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels lack of education
and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and
cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of
Rachel as to who killed her father.
We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense
during cross-examination on the competency of Rachel to
read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how
her father was attacked by accused-appellants. From her
position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she saw
her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants.
Although she was astonished as the happening unfolded,
her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her
perception was not diminished.

A: On the left portion of the shoulder blade, maam.

25

As regards Anicetas version of the events that Jesus was

the sole perpetrator of the crime who attacked Wilfredo only
in self-defense, we easily see the fatal flaw: Aniceta arrived
after the supposed fight between Wilfredo and Jesus, and
what transpired was merely relayed to her by Jesus sister,
Marilou.
Quite apparent from Anicetas narration of events is that
she has no personal knowledge of Wilfredos killing.
Anicetas testimony is mainly hearsay, specially on the
purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in
Wilfredos death. Anicetas testimony as such carries no
probative weight. At best, Anicetas testimony is an
independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact
of its declaration and the substance of what had been
relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof. 13
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
We detect a clever, albeit transparent ploy, to pin Jesus who
had already fled and is temporarily out of reach of the law.
Thus, with Jesus temporarily shielded from punishment,
accused-appellants freely accuse and point to him as the
sole perpetrator of the crime. This cannot trump the solid
testimony of Rachel on accused-appellants direct
participation in killing Wilfredo.
We likewise affirm the lower courts appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of treachery:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor. Treachery attended the killing
of the victim because he was unarmed and the attack on
him was swift and sudden. He had not means and there was
no time for him to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be
more sudden and unexpected than when petitioners Edwin
and Alfredo attacked the victim. The latter did not have the
slightest idea that he was going to be attacked because he
was urinating and his back was turned from his assailants.
The prosecution was able to establish that petitioners
attack on the victim was without any slightest provocation
on the latters part and that it was sudden and unexpected.
This is a clear case of treachery.14
Finally, we affirm the lower courts award of damages
consistent with jurisprudence:15 (1) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(3) P50,000.00 as moral damages. Consistent with current
jurisprudence, we increase the award of exemplary
damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.16 However, we
delete the award of P1,946,180.00 representing the
unearned income of Wilfredo.
To obviate confusion on the award of loss of earning
capacity, we reiterate herein that compensation for lost
income is in the nature of damages and as such requires
due proof of the damages suffered; there must be unbiased
proof of the deceaseds average income.17 In this case, we
only had he testimony of Wilfredos spouse, Rowena, who
claimed that Wilfredo earned P400.00 to P500.00 daily as a
doormat vendor.

On more than one occasion, we have held that the bare

testimony of a deceaseds mother or spouse as to the
income or earning capacity of the deceased must be
supported by competent evidence like income tax returns or
receipts.18
In People v. Caraig,19 we have drawn two exceptions to the
rule that "documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity," and have thus awarded damages where there is
testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
victim's line of work no documentary evidence is available;
or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws."
Although Wilfredos occupation as a doormat vendor may
fall under the first exception, the minimum wage for Region
III, which includes the province of Bulacan, is below P400.00
as per the National Wages and Productivity Commission
Regional Daily Minimum Wage Rates as of August
2013.20 Regrettably, except for the bare assertion of
Rowena, Wilfredo's spouse, we have nothing to anchor the
award for loss of earning capacity. Thus, we delete the
award for loss of earning capacity in the amount
of P1,946,180.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C. No. 04051 and the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No.
3517-M-2004 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award
of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00 and we delete the award for loss of earning
capacity in the amount of P1,946, 180.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40294 July 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS,
ROSENDO ANOR and RODOLFO TORRES,defendantsappellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is now before us for automatic
review.
There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo
Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor, Rodolfo Torres and
Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New Bilibid Prison at
Muntinlupa, Rizal One of the however, Loreto Rivera, died
during the pendency of the case.
We find the facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the
trial Court, home by the evidence thus:
From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18,
1971, at about 7:56 o'clock in the evening, prisoners from
brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal succeeded in opening the door of
their dormitory by means of a false key (tin can) and attacked
the inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the latter were then getting
their food rations from the delivery truck wherein the victim was
among them. Records further show that while the victim

26

Bernardo Cutamora, was getting his ration he was sandwiched

by the accused who rushed towards the door and stabbed the
victim simultaneously whereby the latter sustained multiple stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds caused
his death as evidenced by Necropsy Report marked Exhibit 'A'.
To gain exit from their brigade, accused Tobias Ribadajo used a
false key (tin can) and immediately the door was opened and his
co-accused rushed towards the place where the prisoners of
brigade 3-a were waiting for their ration and with respective
matalas on their hands they stabbed the victim to death. All the
assailants confessed participation in the killing claiming that they
did it because they were being mocked by the inmates of 3-a
who were members of the OXO there was a time when these
inmates threw human waste on their brigade shouting that 'you
Commando members could not do anything', and then they
would laugh at them; that in order to avenge this mockery the
accused headed by Tobias Ribadajo called up a meeting in the
afternoon of November 18, 1971, at around 1:00, and they
planned to kill any prisoner from brigade 3-a in the evening and
they would do the killing at the time they (inmates from 3-a) were
waiting for their 'rancho'. Soon their plan was consummated and
the victim, Bernardo Cutamora was the unlucky guy overcome
by their respective bladed weapons. 1
In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the
New Bilibid Prisons on November 20, 1971, all the accused
executed statements admitting their participation in the slaying
of Bernardo Cutamora. 2 Consequently, an Information for
Murder was filed against them on April 24, 1973 with the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing was due
to the separation from the service of a principal investigator.
Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo,
Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera (who died on August 15, 1974, p.
46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of
counsel de officio, pleaded Guilty, while the other two accused
Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias Rolando Amor, alias
Rolando Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Guilty. 3 The
Information was amended to correct the name of Rolando Aunor
to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro, alias Tagalog. Thereafter,
evidence was adduced.
At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias
Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo Torres withdrew their
pleas of Guilty. 4 Accused Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their
participation in the killing of Bernardo Cutamora, and repudiated
their confessions, claiming that they had signed the same under
duress. Accused Federico Basas and Rodolfo Torres admitted
having executed their respective confessions, 5 while accused
Rosendo Anor changed his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty of the
lesser offense of Homicide. 6
On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of
guilty, as follows:

I
The Trial Court erred in admitting as evidence, and in giving
weight to the supposed extrajudicial confession of the accused.
II
The Trial Court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
recidivism.
III
The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused and in imposing
the death penalty.
Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were
extracted by force; that they had been exposed for more or less
one day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of
the rain, and had been subsequently beaten up and placed in a
"bartolina "
On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show
any suspicious circumstance Casting doubt on their integrity. On
the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants could
have supplied. In those statements, they called their co-accused
by their nicknames, not knowing their true names, like "Lilat" for
Basas, "Manok" for Anor and "Bukid" for Torres. The
investigators could not have concocted that on November 18,
1971, at around 1:00 P.M., appellants had planned to kill any
prisoner from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the "rancho";
that they are members of the Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang and
their leader is accused Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same
date at around 8:00 P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin can
opened the door of their dormitory and an the accused rushed
towards the place where the inmates from Brigade 3-a were
waiting for their food; that they stabbed the victim with their
"matalas"; and their motive was to avenge the throwing of
human waste on them by inmates of Brigade 3-a.
What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the
defense, they were all admitting their guilt but for the lesser
offense of Homicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel.
Atty. Galvan
Your Honor, inasmuch as I have also conferred with all the
accused and that having appointed me as counsel de oficio
before when Fiscal Guerrero was here and after a long
conference with the accused, and if the Fiscal will not object if all
the accused will change their former plea of not guilty to that of
guilty, as that was their proposal and they were very insistent,
that if the Court will allow them to withdraw their former plea of
not guilty and substitute with a plea of guilty to a lesser of
homicide, your Honor. 8

WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all

the accused, namely: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico
Basas, Rosendo Anor and Rodolfo Torres, the Court finds them
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information, and hereby sentences each one of
them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the amount of P12,000.00, jointly and severally; to pay
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and another
P10,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and to
pay their proportionate shares of the costs. 7

Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution,

however, opposed the change of plea because it had already
finished with the presentation of its evidence.

Appellants claim infirmity of the Trial Court Decision on the

following grounds:

No error either was committed by the Trial Court in imposing the

death penalty. The penalty for murder isreclusion temporal in its

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be

considered because all the accused at the time of the
commission of the offense, were serving their respective
sentences by virtue of a final judgment for other crimes
embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code (Corpuz
for Homicide; Ribadajo for Murder; Basas for Murder; Anor for
Murder; and Torres for Homicide).

27

maximum period to death. 24 Considering that appellants

committed the present felony after having been convicted by
final judgment and while serving their respective sentences, they
should be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony. 25 Given this circumstance,
Anor's change of plea from Guilty to Not Guilty will not change
his liability besides the fact that it was made after the
prosecution had rested its case. 26
The defense contention that appellants should be held guilty
only for "Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray" and sentenced
to prision mayor under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon the allegation that the commotion was spontaneous, lacks
merit. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray,
nor was there a reciprocal aggression between both
parties. 27 Appellants rushed out of their cell with the common
purpose of attacking the victim of a rival group, which unity of
purpose indicates appellants' common responsibility for the
consequences of their aggression. 28
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, for lack of the necessary votes, the penalty to be
imposed on all the accused-appellants is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased
is hereby raised to P30,000.00. Proportionate costs against the
accused.
SO ORDERED.

with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and

commendations attesting to his competence and performance
as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day
he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as
the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal
delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt.
Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit,
Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo
Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino
Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was charged in
the following Information: 4
That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two of
whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence,
threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the
Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur
Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then
take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:
1) Postal Delivery Truck
2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers
3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers

G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996

4) Treasury Warrants

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

PANGANIBAN, J.:p
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is
constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most
cherished of these is the right "to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his choice". The 1987
Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants that
such guarantee "cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel". In the present case, petitioner claims that
such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his
custodial investigation took place in 1983 long before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest
was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was extracted
through torture, and that the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by
petitioner, the question of what crime - brigandage or robbery
was committed is likewise motu proprio addressed by the
Court in this Decision.
Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision 1 of
respondent Sandiganbayan 2 in Criminal Case No. 8496
promulgated on June 19, 1987 convicting petitioner of
brigandage, and the Resolution 3 promulgated on July 27, 1987
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the
Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to

US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS
Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan,
Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the
damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned
amount.
Contrary to law
On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator
and Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro
and Escalada were never arrested and remained at large.
Accused Mateo escaped from police custody and was tried in
absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973
Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear
during the trial on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986,
respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but remained at
large since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against
them were held in absentia. 5 Only Filoteo filed this petition, after
the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and
Resolution.
Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the
prosecution for a stipulation of facts, the defense admitted the
following: 6
The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737B-82, consisting of 343 pages from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A);
in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Bernardo Relator was a PC
Sergeant at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such
PC Sergeant, accused Relator was issued a service revolver,
Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707
(Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1) with six (6) live ammo
(Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel

28

was a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused

Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles,
a former PC Sergeant, was invited for investigation in
connection with the hijacking of a delivery van by the elements
of the Special Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of
their right to remain silent and to have counsel of their choice, as
shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the existence of
the sworn statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit
A-11) as well as the Certification dated May 30, 1982, subject to
the qualification that said document was made under duress.

As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling

"densely confined." We was allowed to raise his head but with
eyes closed. However, he sneaked a look and recognized the
driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and the fellow beside him
who poked a "balisong" at him as Angel Liwanag. The man in
uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he
was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and recognized
Frias. 15These incidents yielded the pieces of information critical
to the subsequent identification of Mendoza, Liwanag, Saguindel
and Frias in the line-up of suspects at Camp Crame later on.

The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of

Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer,
M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr. 6-a and the
submission of Exhibits A to K. In their defense, accused Filoteo
and Miravalles presented their respective testimonies plus those
of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also submitted
his Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written
evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution proffered rebuttal evidence
and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A-31 and L.

The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came

to a stop, the captured men discovered that they were along
Kaimito Road in Kalookan City They were made to remove their
pants and shoes and then told to run towards the shrubs with
their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers had left,
they put on their pants and reported the incident to the Kalookan
Police Station.

Evidence for the Prosecution

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post
mail van no. MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up
and deliver mail matters to and from Manila. On board the
vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two couriers named
Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were seated
beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning at
the Airmail Distribution Center of the Manila International Airport
where they were issued waybills 7 for the sacks of mail they
collected. They then proceeded to the Central Post Office where
they likewise gathered mail matters including 737 check
letters 8 sent by the United States Embassy. All the mail matters
were placed inside the delivery van, and its door padlocked.
As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan,
they took the MacArthur Highway on the return trip to
Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan
at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue Mercedes Benz
sedan 9 overtook their van and cut across its path. The car had
five (5) passengers three seated in front and two at the back.
The car's driver and the passenger beside him were in white
shirts; the third man in front and the person immediately behind
him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in the
back had on a long-sleeved shirt. 10
Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at
driver Nerito Miranda as someone uttered, "Are you not going to
stop this truck?" 11 Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped
the van's engine. Alighting from the car, the armed group
identified themselves as policemen. 12 They ordered the postal
employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out of the
van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when
threatened, he surrendered it to one of the car
passengers. 13 The three postal employees were then ordered to
board the Benz.
As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw
one of the malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo Frias,
going up the van. Inside the car, the three delivery employees
were ordered to lower their heads. They sat between two of their
captors at the back of the car while two others were in front.
Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up as he
was feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a
glimpse of the pimply face of the man to his left. He also
recognized the driver who had glanced back. These men turned
out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias, respectively. 14

The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts

recovered the postal van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo
Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on May 4, 1982. Discovered
missing were several mail matters, 16including checks and
warrants, along with the van's battery, tools and fuel. 17
In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon
Montao, then Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the
assistance of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the
Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of the hijacking
incident. 18 Responding to the request, the SOG, which was
tasked to detect, investigate and "neutralize" criminal syndicates
in Metro Manila and adjacent provinces, organized two
investigative teams. One group was led by Capt. Rosendo
Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they
conducted a "massive intelligence build-up" to monitor the drop
points where the stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.
On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian
informer that two persons were looking for buyers of stolen
checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the informer to arrange a
meeting with them. The meeting materialized at about 9:00 P.M.
of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao, Quezon
City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The
informer introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias
in turn showed Capt. Ferrer a sample Social Security System
(SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk of the checks
were in the possession of their companions in Obrero, Tondo,
Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed to proceed to
Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer introduced
himself and his companions as lawmen investigating the
hijacking incident. Shocked and distressed, Frias calmed down
only when assured that his penalty would be mitigated should he
cooperate with the authorities. Frias thus volunteered to help
crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo Perez and
Raul Mendoza.
Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations
officer who was in another car during the mission, to accompany
Frias to Obrero Tondo while he escorted Alcantara to their
headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the headquarters,
Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking although he
admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in
possession of several checks. Alcantara was turned over to the
investigation section of the SOG for further questioning.
Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilao's group was able to corner Ricardo
Perez in his house in Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking
incident, Perez admitted participation therein and expressed
disappointment over his inability to dispose of the checks even

29

after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered the checks in

his possession to Lt. Pagdilao.'s. 19

iyong isasalaysay ay maaring gamitin pabor or laban sa iyo sa

kinauukulang hukuman;

An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over

their two-way radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza were
in Lt. Pagdilao's custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of
returning to headquarters, Lt. Pagdilao and his companions
should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to apprehend Martin
Mateo. They met at the designated place and proceeded to
Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29,
1982.

d. Na kung ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, ako

mismo ang makipag-ugnayan sa CLAO-IBP upang ikaw ay
magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang bayad.

Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed

two men heading in their direction. Perez identified them as
Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The latter threw something
into the ricefield which, when retrieved, turned out to be bundles
of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic bag. 20 As the
two were about to board the SOG teams's car, Mateo said, "Sir,
Kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa
panalo.Marami pa akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na
natin para di na natin
babalikan." 21 Capt. Ferrer accompanied Mateo to his house
where they retrieved several other checks in another plastic bag.
On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo
and Liwanag admitted participation in the postal hijacking. At a
confrontation with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed
to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind of the crime.
Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany
Mateo to the house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen
found petitioner at home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to
shed light on his participation in the hijacking, petitioner was
dumbfounded (" parang nagulat). Pursuant to standard operating
procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his constitutional
rights, 22 whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame. However,
the group, including petitioner, returned to the latter's place to
recover the loot. It was "in the neighborhood," not in petitioner's
house, where the authorities located the checks. 23
The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the
hijacking, telling him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier
volunteered the information that petitioner furnished the Benz
used in the hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement
in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie
Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned
out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in
the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn
statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt.
Romeo P. Espero which, quoted in full, reads as follows:
BABALA Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, na ang
dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol sa isang kasong
Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo
1982 doon sa Meycauayan, Bulacan, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng
hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saang maraming tsekeng US,
tseke ng BIR at iba pang mga personal na tseke ang nabawi
mula sa iyo. Nais ko ring ibigay sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa
mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang
Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod:
a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik;
b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong
sarili mong pili upang may magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw ay
sinisiyasat;
c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga
katanungang maaring makasira sa iyo sa dahilang anumang

1. TANONG: Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang

naipaliwanag sa iyo ay iyong lubos na naiintindihan at
nauunawaan?
SAGOT: Opo.
2. T: Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at
sagot na ito bilang katibayan na iyo ngang naiintindihan ang
iyong mga karapatan at gayun na rin sa dahilan ng pagsisiyasat
na ito, at ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng isang
malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay, sumagot sa mga
katanungan at sumusumpang lahat ng iyong isasalaysay ay
pawang mga katotohanan lamang?
S: Opo, pipirma ako Ser.
(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
(Affiant)
MGA SAKSI:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROMEO P. ESPERO THERESA L. TOLENTINO
Ssg., PC C1C, WAC (PC)
3. T: Maari bang sabihin mong mull ang iyong buong
pangalan, edad at iba pang bagay-bagay na maaring
mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?
S: Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may-asawa, isang
Patrolman ng Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force
na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya at
kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810 Cabesas St., Dagupan,
Tondo, Manila.
4. T: Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang
Kabatas?
S: Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong
petsa, noong ako ay mapasok sa serbisyo.
5. T: Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?
S: Noon lamang pong January 1982.
6. T: Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saang bayan,
lungsod or lalawigan?
S: Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang
aking ina naman ay Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa
Maynila noon July 17, 1951.
7. T: Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?
S: Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil
hindi ko natapos ang second semester ng 4th year ko.
8. T: Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID,
WPD-MPF?
S: Sa Follow-Up Unit ako.

30

9. T: At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit no GAS, ano

naman ang iyong mga specific duties?
S: Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga
at-large sa mga suspects namin sa mga kasong hawak ng
investigation.
10. T: Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng
hapon humigit-kumulang, saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong
ginagawa?
S: Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin
iyong hi-nayjack namin na Philippine Mail delivery van.
11. T: Wika mo'y kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga
kasamahan?
S: Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin
Mateo, Jr. who was seated in the investigation room and asked
the name and was duly answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey
Frias, Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at ang mga taga LRP ng
PC Brigade na sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravales at isa
pang Sergeant na ang alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag
namin. Walo (8) (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as
"SIYAM [9]") kaming lahat doon noon at ang mga gamit naman
naming kotse noon ay ang kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy
Miranda na isang Mercedes Benz na may plakang NMJ-659
kung saang ang driver namin noon ay si Raul Mendoza
(corrected and initialled by affiant to read as "AKO") at ang mga
kasama naman naming sakay ay sina Angelo Liwanag, Sgt. Ed
Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP (affiant added and
initialled this additional fact: "AT RAUL MENDOZA"). Ang isang
kotse namang gamit namin ay pag-aari daw ng pinsan ni
Carding Perez na kanya na rin mismong minaneho na isang
Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang mga sakay naman ni
Carding Perez ay sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt. Dan
Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may kasama pa kaming contact ni
Carding Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina Alias NINOY
na isang dispatcher at Alias JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito
sa trabahong ito ay si Carding PEREZ at kami naman ng mga
sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta upang
umeskort sa kaniia sa pag-hijack ng delivery van.
12. T: Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng
Post Office patungong norte?
S: Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng
alas- 4:00 hanggang alas-5:00 ng hapon.
13. T: Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga
naganap noong hapon na iyon?
S: Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post
Office, sinundan na namin, una ang van, sumunod ang Lancer
at huli ang Mercedes Benz namin. Pagdating namin sa Malinta,
Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng puwesto sa
pagsunod, van naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes Benz at
huli na ang Lancer. Noong makapasok na kami ng boundary ng
Meycauayan, Bulacan ay kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon
makatiyempo kami ay kinat namin ang delivery van. Tumigil
naman ito at bumaba kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun
ng LRP datiil sila noon ang may hawak ng kanilang Armalite
Rifle pero may service pa silang maiksing baril. Pinababa nila
ang tatlong maydala ng delivery van at pinasakay sa Mercedes
Benz, habang nakatutok ang kanilang mga baril sa kanila. Ako
naman ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at sumakay ng delivery
van at ako na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako
nina Junior Mateo at si Rey Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa
puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post Office na maydala ng

delivery van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na namin

sa Manila ang van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minaneho pa rin ni
Raul Mendoza ay dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang Lancer
naman ay nag-U-turn din at sumunod sa amin. Noong
makarating na kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila ay
inunahan na kami ng Lancer at iyon na nga, parang follow the
leader na dahil siya na noon ang aming guide.
14. T: Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?
S: Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo
nina Carding Perez, at noong nakarating na kami roon ay
iniyatras ko na ang van sa kaniling garahe at doon ay ibinaba
namin lahat ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na ho alam kung ilan
lahat iyon, na siyang laman ng delivery van at pagkatapos ay
umalis kaming muli ng mga kasama ko rin sa van papuntang
Quezon City kung saan namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa
Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung hindi ako nagkakamali.
15. T: Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?
S: Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina
Carding Perez sa may bahay nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at
inabutan na namin sila na nagkakarga na noong mga duffle bag
sa (sic), madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng mamula-mula o
orange na Camaro at isa pang Mercedes Benz na brown, dahil
ang Lancer ay isinoli na raw nila sa may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon
ang mga duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi ang usapan
namin noon dahil sumilip lamang ako noon at kasama ko si
Carding Perez, kami naman ngayon ay pumunta sa bahay nina
Rudy Miranda sa San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na sakay ng
isang Toyota Corona na brown na si Carding Perez ang
nagmaneho. Pagdating namin doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay
naroon na rin noon ang Mercedes Benz na ginamit namin, pero
wala na ang crew ng delivery van dahil ibinaba at iniwanan daw
nila sa Caloocan City. Ang naroroon na lamang noon ay sina
Angelo Liwanag, si Raul Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si
Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon ang Mercedes
Benz namin doon kina Rudy Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi
doon sa kamag-anak, dahil hindi nila alam ang trabahong ito.
Sumakay na iyong apat naming kasama sa Toyota Corona na
sakay namin at inihatid namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun
doon sa tinitirhan nitong huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa
malapit sa Del Pan Bridge sa may Recto Avenue sa San Nicolas
yata iyon sa Manila. Kami naman ngayong apat, sina Carding
Perez, Angelo Liwanag at si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa
Bocaue, Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa North Diversion Road at
paglabas namin sa exit papuntang Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na
kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam ang lugar pero alam kong
puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak ni Carding Perez
iyon pero hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Naroon na ngayon ang
buong tropa, maliban sa mga dalawang sundalong naihatid na
namin sa may Manila, at may mga nadagdag pang ibang mukha
pero hindi ko ito mga kakilala. Si JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay
naroon din noon. Kumain kami, pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na
ng mga duffle bag. Iyon na nga, nakita na namin ang mga
tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to the checks he voluntarily
surrendered) at aming inihiwalay ngayon sa mga sulat na
naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa bahay ni Junior
Mateo sa Novaliches. Di magdamag ngayon ang trabaho namin,
kinabukasan ay kanya-kanyang uwian na, pagkatapos ay
pahinga. Kinabukasan mull, gabi, inilipat na namin doon sa
bahay ni Junior Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito (Affiant again
referred to said checks). Isinakay namin noon sa isang cargo
truck na pag-aari din daw nina Carding. lyong mga tsekeng iyan
ngayon ay nakalagay noon doon sa isang sikretong
compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may chassis.
Sikretong compartment iyon, na mahirap mahalata.

31

16. T: Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung

ganoon, sabihin mo nga kung anong uring baril iyon?
S: Wala po akong baril, Ser.
17. T: Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the
checks recovered from the Affiant was referred to) sa iyo?
S: E, di ganoon na nga he, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang
situwasyon sa aming grupo, dahil iyong partehan sana namin ay
puro pangako ang nangyari. Kaya napagpasyahan namin na
hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang onsehan sa
amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt.
Dan Miravalles Alias JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay
doon muna sa amin ito nakatago (The checks recovered from
the Affiant was referred to). Pero habang tumatagal ay umiinit at
nalaman namin pati na may alarma na, kaya't inilipat namin
doon sa may Raxa Bago sa may likod ng Alhambra Cigar &
Cigarette Factory sa Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago sa
isang kumare ko doon, pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong
kumare ko ang laman noon dahil mahigpit kong ipinagbilin na
huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin kinuha iyon noong
isurender ko ang mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa
kinuha na namin ang supot na ito (the checks placed in a plastic
bag was again referred to) ay wala pa rin kamalay- malay ang
kumare ko.
18. T: Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez
sa Central Post Office, mga kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito?
S: Iyong araw lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon
ko noon silang nakikita, itong si Alias NINOY lamang ang
dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya noon at nakikipag-usap kina
Carding Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias. Makikilala
ko itong si AliasNINOY kung makita ko siyang muli.
19. T: Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa
trabahong ito?
S: Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa
buong tropa na namin.
20. T: Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa
iyo, mayroon ka bang nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya
sa salaysay na ito?
S: Wala na po.
21. T: Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito
bilang patotoo sa katotohanan nito nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan
or pinangakuan kaya ng anuman upang lumagda lamang?
S: Opo.
WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . ./ac
(Sgd)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:
(Sgd.)
SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC
(Sgd.)
C1C THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC) 24
Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May
30, 1982. One was a certification stating that he voluntarily
surrendered "voluminous assorted US checks and vouchers,"

that because of the "large number of pieces" of checks, he

affixed his signature upon the middle portion of the back of each
check "to serve as identification in the future, prior to the
completion of its proper inventory and listing conducted by
elements of SOG" in his presence, and that he "guided the
elements of SOG" to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the
owner of the sky-blue Mercedes Benz car which was
surrendered to the SOG Headquarters. 25 The other document
was a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to his waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and
the following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional
rights under Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that
he understood all his rights thereunder, and that the
investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP but he
refused to avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG
men in his house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982" sa
dahilang ako ay kasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury
Warrants, SSS Pension Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare
Checks and Vouchers mula sa delivery van ng Philippine Mail;"
(c) that the SOG men confiscated from him numerous checks
and a Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was
not hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken from him which
was not duly receipted
for. 26
As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document),
he led the SOG operatives to the house of Rodolfo Miranda on
Singalong where the latter admitted that petitioner was his
friend. He denied, however, having knowledge that his car was
used in the hijacking until the authorities came to his house.
According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his car would
be used for surveillance purposes because petitioner's jeep was
not available. The car was not returned until the evening
following that when it was borrowed. 27 After the trip to Miranda's
house, petitioner informed the investigators that some more
checks could be recovered from his kumare. Said checks were
retrieved and turned over to headquarters along with the car
surrendered by Miranda who later executed a sworn statement
dated May 31, 1992 at the SOG. 28
Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie
Saguindel and Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer
proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the afternoon of May 30,
1982. They met Miravalles along the way to his house. Informed
by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were already under
custody and that they implicated him as one of their
confederates, Miravalles reacted by saying, "Sir, ang hihina kasi
ng mga loob niyan, eh." 29
Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed
sworn statements. 34 Prior to doing so, they waived their right to
counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted their participation and
implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez, on the other hand,
denied having driven a Lancer car in the hijacking and stated
that he was implicated in the crime only because in one drinking
spree with petitioner, Mateo and one alias "Buro" during that
month of May, they had a heated altercation. Like petitioner,
Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they voluntarily surrendered
vouchers and checks which were part of their loot in the
hijacking; they also executed waivers under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. For his part, Relator executed a
certification to the effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .32
caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used in the commission
of the crime. In spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a
lawyer, petitioner did not manifest that he needed the assistance
of counsel. During the taking of his statement, petitioner was
visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade from the
General Assignment Section of the WPD.

32

For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint

affidavit 35 manifesting their option to avail of their right to remain
silent until such time as they would have retained a counsel of
their choice. Frias and Mendoza executed a similar joint
affidavit. 36 Severino Castro, the postal employee implicated,
also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in court.
However, he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a
former clerk of the Central Post Office and son of a director of
the Bureau of Posts in Region I. 37
SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for
robbery-in-band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against petitioner and ten (10) others,
namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles, Perez, Frias,
Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal Case No.
7885). 42
On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and
aforequoted was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8496.
On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Romeo M. Escareal issued orders for the arrest of the
accused 43 and fixed bail at P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and
Relator filed a motion to quash the Information asserting that
under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D. 1850, they
should be tried by a court martial. 44 The Sandiganbayan denied
the motion on January 3, 1984 45 on the ground that courts
martial could no longer exercise jurisdiction over them by virtue
of their separation from military service.
Evidence for the Defense
Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a
patrolman since August 21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation
Division or the Detective Bureau of the WPD to which the
General Assignment Section belonged, he was the recipient of
several awards and recognitions starting with ranking fifth in the
Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police officers. 46 He
also claimed to have received a loyalty medal for meritorious
service above the call of
duty 47 and several commendations 48 for the distinguished
performance of his duties. On that fateful date of May 3, 1982,
he was a member of the Special Task Force Unit covering the
tourist belt area.
Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted
knowing only Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial
follow-up operation he allegedly participated in regarding a
P250,000 qualified theft case on May 16, 1980 at the Shemberg
Marketing Corporation. 49 Although a suspect, Mateo was not
charged in the information subsequently filed in that case.
Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police
headquarters seeking assistance in his bid to lead a new life.
Considering Mateo's familiarity with underworld characters,
petitioner readily made him an informer who was paid from time
to time out of the police intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an
effective informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital information
on the identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery cases
at the La Elegancia Jewelry Store, at the Likha Antique and
Crafts, 50 and in an alleged racket in Aranque Market in Manila
involving jewelries.
As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing
petitioner's owner-type jeep whenever he was given an
assignment. In one instance however, petitioner saw Mateo
using his jeep with some male companions. Because Mateo
denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner from then on

refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an

allowance to cover his traveling expenses.
About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and
requested the latter to give him a good project as he was
working for his transfer to the Metrocom Intelligence Security
Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged petitioner to lend
him his jeep in order that he could follow-up a bank robbery
case. That same evening, petitioner approached his kumpare,
accused Rodolfo Miranda, to borrow the latter's old Mercedes
Benz since, if the jeep was used, Mateo could be identified as
an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and "went
around boasting of the Mercedes Benz." 51
Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner
advised him to return the car between the hours of two and three
in the afternoon at the Lakan Beer House at the corner of Rizal
Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta. Cruz, Manila where
petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera who would
be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and
company at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo
until shortly before 5:00 in the afternoon when he was
constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because he had to
attend a mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the
police headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to his
area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He returned to the beer
house at about 6:00 in the evening hoping to find Mateo and the
automobile. A little before 8:00 o'clock, someone informed him
that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded
Mateo for being late; the latter apologized and said that his
surveillance bore good results. Petitioner then returned the car
to Miranda, through the latter's cousin.
At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo,
escorted by a group of military men, went to petitioner's house at
810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The group refused to give any
reason for their visit but arrested him. Wearing only short pants,
petitioner was made to board a car where he was handcuffed.
The men asked him about the Benz and the identities of his
companions in an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted
having knowledge of the exact location of the car but denied
participation in the crime. Nobody apprised him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel. 52
Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the
residence of Miranda to get the Benz. They were on board two
cars. When petitioner noticed that they were not heading for
Miranda's place, he clutched the hand of Lt. Pagdilao, pleading
for pity and thinking that he was about to be "salvaged". Lt.
Pagdilao however informed him that they would be dropping by
petitioner's house first per the investigator's information that
more checks could be recovered thereat. A warrantless search
was then allegedly conducted in petitioner's house but nothing
was found. Suddenly, someone from the other car came out of a
nearby house owned by Mateo and reported that they had
recovered some checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
house of Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The
latter surrendered his Benz to the group.
At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner was
repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking. As he
vehemently denied the accusation against him, someone
blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded him in a
car. He was taken to an unidentified place and made to lie flat on
his back. An object was tied to his small finger to electrocute
him. While a wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth,
someone mounted his chest and applied the "water cure"
("tinutubig") through his nose. Because these ordeals were

33

simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable pain. He

sought permission to get in touch with his father-in-law, Atty.
Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They urged him to
cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him.
Meanwhile, petitioner's wife reported to the WPD General
Assignment Section her husband's forcible abduction by armed
men whom she mistook for CIS agents. A check with the CIS
yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo Dator went to
the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was being
investigated but no details were given thereon pending
clearance with superior officers. 53 Consequently, a newspaper
carried an item on the SOG's refusal to allow petitioner's copolice officers to see him in his detention cell. 54
Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD
who was transferred to the SOG, was able to visit him. Petitioner
revealed to Victorino the maltreatment done him but the latter
expressed helplessness about it. In fact, Victorino advised him to
just cooperate so that the SOG would not incriminate him (" para
hindi ka pag-initan dito"). 55 The advice came after petitioner was
warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be
liquidated by the SOG, 56 should he refuse to cooperate. Later,
Mateo came to petitioner's cell and confided that he had been
similarly maltreated and forced to implicate petitioner.
After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to
petitioner. Because its contents were false, petitioner refused to
sign it. Placing his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt.
Lagman told petitioner that he thought they had an
understanding already. Petitioner later discovered that Lagman
was not member of the military but an "agent" of the SOG, and a
member of the "Contreras gang". Petitioner was therefore
constrained to sign the statement because of his excruciating
experience ("hirap na hirap"). He however admitted having read
the document before affixing his signature thereto and initialing
the corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and the certification he executed were
allegedly also obtained by duress. Although he picked out one
Severino Castro in a police line-up, he did not even know
Castro. He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a
certain Boy Zapanta.
Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment
against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and several John Does. On August
4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its
dismissal for petitioner's failure to appear despite subpoenas
and to answer clarificatory questions as well as to authenticate
his statement. 57However, petitioner swore that he never
received the subpoenas.
Petitioner's alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose
birthday on May 3, 1995 was the reason for the celebration at
the Lakan Beer House. While his baptismal certificate indicated
that he was born on May 4, 1956,58 a joint affidavit 59 also
attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956. Gary
Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated
Almoguera's testimony as to petitioner's alleged presence during
the birthday celebration.
The Respondent Court's Decision
On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein
questioned 51-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo
Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as

co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section

2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974 and hereby sentences each of said accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as
maximum, both of reclusion temporal, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of the action. Accused Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with costsde oficio, for
insufficiency of evidence.
No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth
of any proof as to the actual damages suffered by the Bureau of
Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail matters, and it further
appearing that the mail van which was hijacked had been
recovered, as well as most of the checks and warrants which
were surrendered by some of the accused, without prejudice to
the institution of the proper civil action to recover damages
should proof thereof be available.
Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-l and B-2,
which are the .32 Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson, Serial No.
11707, its holster and six (6) live ammunition respectively, which
were surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J, J-l to J-5,
consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22 pieces,
respectively, of Social Security System and Medicare checks
and vouchers, be returned to the Firearm and Explosives Unit
(FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the Social Security
System, respectively, upon proper receipts.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General,
Central Post Office, Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the
Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame,
Quezon City for their information and guidance with respect to
the other accused who are still at-large.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Decision was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of
July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant alternative petition
for certiorari and/or review on certioraricharging the
Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible
error in arriving at said Decision.
The Issues
The amended petition raises the following:
Assignments of Error
and/or
Excess of Jurisdiction/Grave Abuse of Discretion
xxx xxx xxx
First
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it made its determination
of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis of mere
preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
Second
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioner's having
borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the other accused

34

in the hijacking of the mail van indubitably established his direct

participation and/or indispensable cooperation in the said
hijacking, the same being in gross disregard of basic Rules of
Law.
Third
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the voluminous
SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were confiscated from and
surrendered by petitioner and three of the other accused and in
finding the testimonies and investigation reports relative thereto.
"credible and unrefuted", said findings being, insofar as
petitioner is concerned, absolutely without any basis in the
evidence and in fact contrary to the prosecution's only evidence
that has some measure of competency and admissibility.
Fourth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in
finding that dorsal portions of the checks and warrants allegedly
taken from petitioner were signed by him to indicate his
admission of accountability therefor and that his signatures
thereon confirm the confiscation from and/or surrender by him of
said checks, said findings being absolutely without any support
in the evidence.
Fifth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting and considering
against petitioner his alleged extra judical confession, despite
petitioner's uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof
that he was made to give or sign the same through
torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and
intimidation and without the presence and assistance of
counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross violation of
Constitutional Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence.
Sixth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioner's
participation in the hijacking of the mail van is indubitably
established "by the manner by which the SOG operatives
succeeded in ferreting out the members of the hijacking
syndicate one by one through patient sleuthing" and in finding
that they did so "without resorting to extra-legal measures" and
that "no evidence having been adduced to show that they were
actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the herein
accused, then their testimonies should be accorded full
credence".
Seventh
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that "even setting
aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo
and Liwanag, . . substantial and sufficient evidence exist which
indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo" (Petitioner).
Eighth
Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred
and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that "accused Filoteo's ( petitioner's) and
Mateo's [alleged]unexplained possession of the stolen checks
raised the presumption that "they were responsible for the
robbery in question", petitioner's alleged possession not being
borne out but disputed by the prosecution's own evidence.

Ninth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that "accused Filoteo's
denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and
implausible". The truth of the matter being that they should have
been sustained since petitioner was not identified by direct
victims-eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or
were present at the hijack and none of the checks and treasury
warrants were found in his possession or retrieved from him.
Tenth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the participation
of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of record and that said
evidence "not only confirms the conspiracy between [him and
the other accused] as easily discernible from their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the offense, but also
their participation and/or indispensable cooperation".
Eleventh
The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in cavalierly rejecting, through
the use of pejorative words, and without stating the legal basis
of such rejection, the various vital factual points raised by
petitioner, in gross violation of the express mandate of the 1987
Constitution.
The Court believes that the above "errors" may be condensed
into four:
(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial
confession executed by the accused without the presence of his
lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?
(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress,
maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?
(3) Was petitioner's warrantless arrest valid and proper?
(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
The Court's Ruling
Preliminary Issue: Rule 4 or Rule 65?
Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on
the procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner, a "segurista",
opted to file an (amended) "alternative petition"
for certiorari under Rule 65 and for review oncertiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however hold that the instant
petition must be considered as one for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. In Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 60 this Court clearly
ruled:
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606,
which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review
on certiorariby this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides, in Section 2, that only questions of law may be raised
in the Petition for Review and these must be distinctly set forth.
Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are not
to be reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
There are, of course, certain exceptions to this general principle.

35

Here, reading petitioner's Petition for Review and Memorandum

in the most favorable possible light, petitioner may be seen to be
in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan misapprehended
certain (f)acts in arriving at its factual conclusions.

preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the

services of counsel, he must be provided with one.These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No.

1606 expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions
of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower
court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from
the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by
this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal
cases, a person's life and liberty are at stake. 61

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; or any other

means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is
that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy. For waffling on procedural matters,
petitioner could have lost this battle through a summary
dismissal of his "alternative" petition. But in view of the
importance of the issues raised, the Court decided to take
cognizance of the matter.
First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver
On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here
is the admissibility of petitioner's extrajudicial confession which
lays out in detail his complicity in the crime.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his
extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted
testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the
same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion,
threats and intimidation and without the presence and
assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in
the sameway that his waiver of the said right was likewise
without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the
respondent Court's admission evidence of his extrajudicial
confession on the strength of cases 62 upholding the admissibility
of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of
counsel "especially where the statements are replete with details
and circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness." We
shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right
to counsel.
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution reads as follows:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their
families." (emphasis supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution
did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the
right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section
12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above underscored.)
In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 the Court
categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973
Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must
be prospectively applied. This Court said:
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate
has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective
effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not
been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against
the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity
of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to
counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before that date.
. . . The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to
counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made
one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales
vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. . .
.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no
comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the
date of promulgation of Morales.
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the
benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed
his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel
on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective
application of "judge-made" laws was underscored in Co
vs. Court of Appeals 68 where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil
Code which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines," and Article 4 of the same Code
which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of
statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions,
which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the law means. 69

36

Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987

Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being
favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)enal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what is being
construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained
in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill
of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights
and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect
against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups
of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the state. 70 Penal laws, on the other
hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an
offense committed against the state which the executive of the
state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law
denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a
crime or offense against its law. 71
Hence, petitioner's vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison 72 to
make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In
that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19,
1983, clearly after the promulgation of Morales on April 26,
1983.
The admissibility of petitioner's uncounselled waiver of the right
to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine
whether such waiver was made voluntarily and
intelligently. 73 The waiver must also be categorical and
definitive, 74 and must rest on clear evidence. 75
In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 petitioner stated that:
. . . matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng
Special Operations Group, PC/INP Central Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga
karapatan alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV
ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya
at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na
walang abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa
dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at wala
naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga katotohanan lamang,
bagama't ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na ikuha ng isang
abugadong walang bayad mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin namang
tinanggihan:
xxx xxx xxx
Na ako ay hindi sinaktan a minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha
mula sa akin na hindi niresibohan;
xxx xxx xxx
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he
apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the
same right 77 but petitioner did not even inform him that his
father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty
minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD
General Assignment Section, 78 still, petitioner did not invoke his
right to counsel.
It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been
ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year
criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic
course. 79 Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints
at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the
tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal

suspects. 80 In other words, he was knowledgeable on the

matterof extrajudicial confessions.
The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture?
Petitioner's claim that he was tortured into signing the
confession appears incredible, or at least susceptible to serious
doubts. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical
report 81 showing no evidence of physical injuries upon his
person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is
no reason to maltreat him in particular when the record shows
that the investigating team respected the right of the other
suspects to remain silent. When he was presented before Judge
Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan,
petitioner even waived his right to present evidence 82 instead of
impugning his confession on account of the torture allegedly
inflicted upon him. If indeed he had been tortured, he would
have revived the case he filed against his alleged torturers upon
learning of its dismissal.
Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different
documents on record bearing the same discloses an evenness
of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly
consistent in his certification, extrajudicial confession and waiver
of detention. Human experience has proven that the lines and
strokes of a person's handwriting reflect his disposition at a
certain given time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is
needed to declare that petitioner's signatures were written
voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately after
he had been subjected to maltreatment. In view of the foregoing,
his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily
made, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that
petitioner's consent in executing the same had been vitiated. 83
Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed
subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual question
addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are
binding on this Court whose function, as afore-discussed, is
principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover, we have
pored over the assailed Decision and we are satisfied that
respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence.
More on this later.
The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?
Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the
arresting officers "invited" him without a warrant of arrest and
brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected
to torture almost a month after the commission of the
crime. 84 Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should have
questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in
the trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People
vs. Lopez, Jr.: 85
Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of
his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was
arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his
evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before
he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant.
He did not move for the quashal of the information before the
trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering
a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the

37

illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting

aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after
trial free from error.
The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file
a complaint for "grave coercion, grave threat & maltreatment"
which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684 before the Fiscal's
Office of Quezon City. 86 The complaint was an offshoot of his
alleged maltreatment in the hands of the SOG upon his arrest.
However, as stated above, he did not lift a finger to revive it
upon its dismissal.
The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
Contrary to petitioner's claim, his culpability has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the
hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-type jeep would give
away his identity. Hecould not be identified by the postal
employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking
said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up driving
the Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were made to
ride, and commandeered the van. That the checks were not
found in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and
upon learning that the authorities had begun to nail down the
identities of the malefactors, hehad entrusted them to his
"kumare". It was petitioner himself who led the team of Lt.
Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio
Carlos that his share of the checks were in the possession of his
"kumare" in the neighborhood. 87
In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a
direct participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi has
been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak
and implausible. The distance between Kalvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan and downtown Manila where petitioner claimed to have
been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated
during that time in approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not
therefore have been physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene or its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed. 88
Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner's
confession, this Court holds that the full force of the totality of
the prosecution's evidence proves his guilt well beyond
reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense is the
well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts in
this case, the Sandiganbayan itself particularly in the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this
Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
. . . It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of the
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 89
The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on
issues of credibility is accorded with highest respect by the
appellate courts (People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170).
Appellate courts will generally respect the findings of trial courts
on the credibility of witnesses since trial courts are in a better
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. They heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. . . . 90

So overwhelming is the prosecution's evidence that respondent

Court opined that even without the "inter-locking confessions of
Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag" the remaining evidence would still
be sufficient for conviction. 91 Said the respondent tribunal:
However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional
statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the
considered opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence exist
which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo and
Saguindel who had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
this Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was responsible for securing
the use of the Mercedes Benz car used by the co-conspirators in
the hi-jacking. Together with Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he
surrendered voluminous assorted checks which were part of the
loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm was used by him in
the hi-jacking, which firearm was identified by prosecution
witnesses Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel was identified in
line-ups at the SOG office as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform
and carrying an Armalite rifle by prosecution witnesses Tagudar
and Bautista. All three (3) accused, namely, Mateo, Relator and
Saguindel also jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any
evidence to refute the evidence presented by the prosecution
against them. Such flight to evade prosecution constitutes an
implied admission of guilt.
Moreover, accused Filoteo's and Mateo's unexplained
possession of the stolen checks raises the presumption that they
were responsible for the robbery in question. It is a rule
established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen
property is found in the possession of one, not the owner,
without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be
presumed the thief. This rule is in accordance with the
disputable presumption "that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
doer of the whole act." In the instant case, said accused has not
given such satisfactory explanation, much more so when their
possession had been positively established by the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Capt. Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by
accused's own signatures at the back of said checks.
Furthermore, accused Filoteo's denials and alibi cannot be
entertained for being quite weak and implausible. His claim that
he merely borrowed the Mercedes Bent car from Rodolfo
Miranda to help out his co-accused Mateo, who had been
utilized by the police as an "informer" and was following up tips
in certain unsolved cases, appears to be incredible and
fantastic. He also claimed that he could not have participated in
the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the morning
of May 2, 1982, he waited at the corner of Zurbaran St. and
Avenida Rizal between 2-3:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day and
then went to the WPD headquarters to attend the police
formation at around 5:00 o'clock p.m. when Mateo failed to show
up. Thereafter, he tried to show through his witnesses Gary
Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with them between
3:00 o'clock to 4:45 o'clock p.m., then from 6:00 o'clock to 8:30
o'clock p.m. and, finally, from 10:45 o'clock p.m. to 11:00 o'clock
of the same date. It was through said witnesses that he tried to
establish his whereabouts between 4:30 o'clock to 7:30 o'clock
p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period from the time the mail van was
hi-jacked up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and
Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City and freed by their
captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the scene of the hi-jacking.
We take judicial notice that the distance between the crime
scene and down-town Manila is some 15-20 kilometers and
negotiable over first- class roads in some thirty (30) minutes.

38

We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of

conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of
each of the accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision: 92
The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and
Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic) been proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which
evidence not only confirms the existence of the conspiracy
between them as easily discernible from their conduct before,
during and after the commission of the offense, but also their
participation therein as co-principals by direct participation
and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted efforts were
performed with closeness and coordination indicating their
common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal
responsibility, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the
participants are responsible for what the others did in all the
stages of execution of the offense.
Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?
The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and
though not argued by the parties in their pleadings, the question
of which law was violated by the accused should be discussed
and passed upon. In fact, petitioner should have brought up
such question as it may benefit him with a reduced penalty.
The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. 93
Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision
ratiocinates:
Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect
to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a
"Philippine Highway" which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been
defined as "any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or
any part thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines,
used by persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods,
articles or property or both", while under Section 2 (e) thereof
"Highway Robbery/ Brigandage" has been defined as the "the
seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes or the taking away of property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things
or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any
Philippine Highway". (Emphasis supplied)
The offense described in the information and established by the
evidence presented by the prosecution properly falls within the
ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively
proven that a postal van containing mail matters, including
checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national highway
in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force,
violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal employees
who were occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and
asportation of the entire van and its contents consisting of mail
matters. Also the evidence further showed that the crime was
committed by the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman
(sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with their co-accused
Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who
participated in the planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the
essential requisites to constitute a consummated offense under
the law in point are present. (Emphasis in the original text.)
Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because
the taking or robbery was perpetrated on anational
highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No.

532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway

Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated.
Such reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the
case of People vs. Isabelo Puno, 94 where it was ruled in
unmistakable language that it takes more than the situs of the
robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court
through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and
are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists
in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for
the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to
constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of
the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when
the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such
as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only
robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of
more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306,
it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." (Emphasis ours.)
In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that
distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there
being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed
by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one
drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which
the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law.
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on
Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is
evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries:
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.)

39

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery

against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation would be
capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the
people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,
and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people, such
that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished is said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or
highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the
fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is
essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not
just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate
commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no
evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws
organized for the purpose of "depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another." What was duly proven in the present
case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no
evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the
accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. 95
Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention
P.D. 532. 96 The facts alleged therein and proven by the
evidence constitute the offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in
relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 244, par. 5, all of the
Revised Penal Code. 97 From the facts, it was duly proven that:
* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools,
etc.)

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and
295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to
pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action.
All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 71523-25. December 8, 2000]

ROLANDO SANTOS y RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 72420-22. December 8, 2000]
JESUS E. ESTACIO, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
[G.R. No. 72384-86. December 8, 2000]
ALFREDO R. FAJARDO, JR., petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 72387-89. December 8, 2000]
MARCELO S. DESIDERIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION

* belonging to another were

BUENA, J.:
* unlawfully taken by the accused
* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)
* with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)
* in an uninhabited place, or
* by an band, or
* by attacking a moving motor vehicle
* on a highway; and
* the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)
Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which is,
" prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period".
Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be
lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only herein
petitioner and not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal
the Sandiganbayan's Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is partially
MODIFIED to read as follows:

Challenged in these four separate petitions for review

on certiorari is the Decision dated July 19, 1985[1] of the
Sandiganbayan disposing of Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
Alfredo Fajardo, Jr. alias Boy Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y
Silvestre, Jesus Estacio y Estrella and Rolando Santos y
Ramirez alias Mickey Mouse, GUILTY as co-principals in the
three (3) separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of
Public Documents and hereby sentences them as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5949, there being no modifying
circumstance in attendance, each of said accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines in the amount
of P1 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay
their proportionate costs of said action;
2. In Criminal Case No. 5950, there being no modifying
circumstance in attendance, sentences each of said accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to

40

indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine

Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines, in the amount
of P3 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay
their proportionate share of the costs of said action;
3. In Criminal Case No. 5951, there being no modifying
circumstance in attendance, sentences each of them to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands in the amount of P5 million representing the amount
defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of
said action.
Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and Desiderio appear to
have been detained at the NBI as of February 16, 1982 by virtue
of a Presidential Commitment Order, although all of them were
later bonded and released on different dates, except Santos who
has remained in custody up to the present. Accordingly, they
should be granted the benefits of such preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as
follows: Santos from February 16, 1982 up to the date of the
promulgation of this decision; Estacio up to April 29, 1985;
Fajardo, Jr. up to April 26, 1982 and Desiderio up to April 19,
1982.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Hon. Governor,
Central Bank; the Citibank; the Bank of the Philippine Islands
and the Bankers Association of the Philippines for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan
three (3) informations for estafa thru falsification of public
documents against Felipe Salamanca, Mariano Bustamante,
Basilio Tan, Alfredo Fajardo, Jr., Jesus Estacio, Rolando San
Pedro, Manuel Valentino, Rolando Santos, Marcelo Desiderio,
Jaime Tan and Emilio Reyes.[2] The informations filed were
similarly worded except for the dates of commission of the crime
charged, the number of the checks involved, and the amounts
allegedly misappropriated. Thus:
That on or about (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30,
1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), in the City of Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Manuel
Valentino, employed as Bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing
Office, Central Bank of the Philippines and accused Jesus
Estacio y Estrella, employed as Janitor-Messenger of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and as such are public
employees, with abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their official position, in order to implement a plan or scheme to
defraud the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch,
which plan or scheme was previously formulated and agreed
upon by all the herein accused immediately prior to (October 19,
1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case
No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951),
accused Manuel Valentino pursuant to said plan or scheme, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and taking
advantage of his official position and with intent to gain and to
defraud, falsify the Clearing Statement prepared by the Central
Clearing office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and
submitted to the Clearing Section of the Central Bank of the
Philippines as well as the Manifest prepared by the Central Bank
Clearing Office in connection thereto by crossing out the entry in
the duplicate copies of the aforesaid Clearing Statement and

Manifest which entries refer to Check No. (27101 in Crim. Case

No. 5949, 27111 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and 27108 in Crim.
Case No. 5951) and Check No. (27105 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
27118 in Crim. Case No. 5950 and 27121 in Crim. Case No.
5951) issued by accused Bustamante against his checking
account at the Bank of Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch,
which has only an outstanding balance of P1,000.00 and which
checks were deposited in the current account of Magna
Management Consultant with the Citibank Greenhills Branch by
accused Rolando San Pedro and as a result of the aforesaid
falsification which made it appear that no such checks were
submitted by the Bank of Philippine Islands to the Central Bank
of the Philippines for clearing, the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Laoag City Branch has not issued any notice of dishonor or stop
payment to the Citibank Greenhills Branch, and as a
consequence thereof accused Rolando San Pedro was able to
withdraw from the Citibank the full amount of the two checks
amounting to (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No.
5949, P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951) and thereafter all
the accused appropriated among themselves the proceeds
thereof to their own personal use and benefit and to the damage
and prejudice of the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch in the
aforementioned amount of (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No.
5949, P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951).
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo,
Desiderio, Estacio, Valentino and Santos, assisted by their
respective counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
[3]
Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan, Reyes and Bustamante
have remained at-large while San Pedro died. Upon agreement
of the prosecution and the defense, a joint trial of the three
cases was ordered conducted.[4]
Estacio was first discharged as an accused to be utilized as a
state witness.[5] Later, he filed a motion for his re-inclusion in the
information as an accused allegedly for the sake of the safety of
his family. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion and thus he
was re-included as an accused in Crim. Case Nos. 5949-5951.
[6]
The prosecution also moved for the discharge of Valentino as
an accused but the Sandiganbayan denied that
motion. Exercising its discretion, the Sandiganbayan eventually
discharged Valentino from the three informations to be a state
witness.[7]
The antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petitions are
as follows:
Sometime in 1981, a syndicate masterminded by Felipe
Salamanca infiltrated the Clearing Center of the Central Bank of
the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity). In its operation, the
syndicate employed two schemes: the switching scheme, and
the pilferage scheme.
In the switching scheme, a syndicate would open a current
account with such banks as the Bank of America (BA) and the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) in Iloilo. As a matter of
procedure, checks drawn on the BA were forwarded to the
Central Bank for clearing. Upon receipt of those checks by the
clearing clerk of the Central Bank, who was a member of the
syndicate, he would substitute those checks with ones bearing
the stamp of another bank. Thus, instead of forwarding the
checks to the BA, these were misrouted to cause delay in the
clearing procedure. Upon the lapse of the clearing period, the
depositor would withdraw the amount of the checks. However,
the scheme faltered as the huge amounts covered by the checks
caused suspicion on the part of the PVB. It called up the BA to

41

inquire about those checks and hence, the former bank

discovered that the checks were insufficiently funded.
In the pilferage scheme, current accounts would be opened with
a provincial bank, such as the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), Laoag branch, and a city bank such as the CitibankGreenhills, Manila. A BPI check deposited with Citibank would
then be forwarded to the Central Bank clearing house where
members of the syndicate, who were employed there, would
pilfer the check and alter the Central Bank manifest and the
entries in the clearing bank statements. The pilferage was
intended to provide opportunity for the syndicate to blot out
entries referring to the pilfered check. Consequently, BPI-Laoag
would not know that a check drawn on it had been deposited
with Citibank. After the lapse of the five-day clearing period, the
syndicate would withdraw the amount deposited from Citibank
simply because said bank would have considered the check
cleared and funded, as no protest or notice of dishonor could be
received from BPI-Laoag. In utilizing this scheme in the
commission of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 5949
to 5951, the syndicate netted Nine Million Pesos
(P9,000,000.00).
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The prosecution offered the testimonies of sixteen (16)

witnesses,[8] and documentary evidence marked Exhibits A to
DD, and Annexes B to QQ, with sub-markings, to prove the
following:
On October 14, 1981, one Mariano Bustamante[9] opened a
savings account with BPI-Laoag with an initial deposit
of P3,000.00: P2,000.00 of which was in check, and P1,000.00
in cash.[10] That same day, he opened a current account
with P1,000.00 as initial deposit in the same bank. Upon his
request, a checkbook was issued to him.[11]
That same month, Marcelo Desiderio, allegedly a representative
of Magna Management Consultant, approached Maria Nieves
Garrido, personal banker of Citibank-Greenhills, and requested
signature cards and other requirements for the purpose of
opening a current account. Thereafter, Desiderio returned to the
bank, submitted the required documents and duly accomplished
forms, and made an initial deposit of P10,000.00. Thus, a
checking account in the name of Magna Management
Consultant was opened in Citibank-Greenhills with Rolando San
Pedro as its representative. A checkbook was given to
Desiderio.[12]
On October 15, 1981, at the Ramada Hotel, Felipe Salamanca
informed Manuel Valentino that two (2) checks were to be
deposited with Citibank the following day. Salamanca instructed
Valentino to watch out for those checks in the clearing house at
the Central Bank. On October 16, 1981, two (2) checks in the
amounts of Four Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Seven
Hundred Nineteen Pesos (P498,719.00), and Five Hundred One
Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Pesos and Thirty Centavos
(P501,260.30) were indeed deposited with the CitibankGreenhills under the current account of Magna Management
Consultant, represented by Rolando San Pedro. On October 30,
1981, two (2) more checks were deposited at the same bank in
the total amount of P3,000,000.00. Another deposit of checks
was made on November 20, 1981 in the total amount
of P5,000,000.00. All these checks were brought to the Central
Bank Clearing Center.
The checks deposited on October 16, 1981 did not reach the
Central Bank on that day, which was a Friday, but on Monday,
October 19, 1981. Manuel Valentino, a bookkeeper at the

Clearing Operations Division of the Central Bank, received from

Jesus Estacio, a Central Bank janitor-messenger, the demand
envelope containing the two (2) BPI-Laoag checks in the total
amount of P1,000,000.00 in the comfort room on the fourth floor
of the Central Bank administration building. Therein Valentino
altered the amount of P1,076,416.95 by crossing out the amount
of One Million Pesos. Thus, under the column Total amount
received, only the amount of P76,416.95 was reflected in order
that BPI-Laoag would not look for the P1 million check.
[13]
Valentino then brought the altered clearing statement back to
the Clearing Center and prepared a Central Bank Manifest
where he changed the figure in the original copy to tally with
those in the altered clearing statement.
On October 30, 1981, the syndicate employed the same
scheme. As soon as the demand envelope containing the BPILaoag checks arrived, Valentino took it and gave it to Jesus
Estacio who then brought the same to the comfort room at the
fourth floor. Valentino followed him there and took the two BPI
checks amounting to P3,000,000.00, and altered the figures in
the BPI Clearing Statement. Valentino thereafter brought said
envelopes to the clearing house, and prepared the Central Bank
Manifest, likewise altering the figures in the original to tally with
the figures in the altered clearing statement.
At the last operation on November 20, 1981, the group followed
the same procedure Valentino asked Estacio to give him the
demand envelope and the former then went to the comfort
room. Valentino took the two BPI-Laoag checks in the total
amount of P5,000,000.00 which he later gave to
Salamanca. Again, he altered the figures in the clearing
statement and those in the Central Bank Manifest so that these
would conform with each other.[14]
As a matter of procedure, the demand envelopes containing the
checks intended for BPI-Laoag, the altered Central Bank
Manifests, and the clearing statements were forwarded to the
Regional Clearing Center. The pilfered checks deposited in the
account of Magna Management Consultant were not included in
those envelopes. Because BPI-Laoag did not receive the checks
with a total value of P9,000,000.00, these were not
processed. Consequently, as no objection or protest regarding
the checks were registered and no notice of dishonor of the
checks for insufficient funds was made by the BPI-Laoag, and
since the reglementary period for making such protest or notice
of dishonor had elapsed, Citibank-Greenhills considered the
checks as good and funded.
Hence, on different dates covering the period from October 26 to
December 6, 1981, Citibank-Greenhills allowed withdrawals in
the aggregate amount of P9,000,000.00 from the account of
Magna Management Consultant. Withdrawals were made
through checks endorsed by Rolando San Pedro and encashed
by Jaime R. Tan.[15] The proceeds of the anomalous transactions
were divided among the members of the syndicate. Salamanca
gave Estacio P10,000.00 after the October 19, 1981
operation, P4,900.00 after the October 30, 1981 operation
and P5,000.00 after the November 20, 1981 operation. Valentino
received P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 after the
October 16 and 30, and November 20, 1981 operations.
On January 28, 1982, Segundo Gonzaga, then Administrative
Assistant for Transit Center (Clearing Center of BPI), was
informed through a long distance telephone call by the manager
of BPI-Laoag that their clearing transactions on October 19,
1981, October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981 registered an
outstanding discrepancy of P9,000,000.00 as reflected in their
inter-office reconciliation statement. The manager of BPI-Laoag
and the BPI Regional Manager for Northern Luzon who went to

42

the office at BPI-Ayala showed the clearing statements to

Gonzaga. Upon comparing the xerox copies of the BPI Clearing
Statements (Laoag copies) and xerox copies of the clearing
envelope sent to Citibank Manila, Gonzaga noticed the
alterations. Thus, he went to the Accounting Department of BPIAyala and found out that the Central Bank debited their bank in
the amount of P9,000,000.00.[16]
Gonzaga went to Citibank-Greenhills and talked to Jake
Ocampo, its assistant manager, about the clearing items. After
checking their outgoing clearing checks for October 19, 1981,
October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, Ocampo told
Gonzaga that they did not recall said clearing checks. He gave
Gonzaga reproduced microfilm copies of those
checks. Gonzaga submitted the checks to his superiors with an
accompanying report.[17] The BPI and the Central Bank jointly
referred the matter for investigation to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which assigned the case to Head Agent
Salvador Ranin of the Special Investigation Division. [18]
On February 12, 1982, the Chief of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of
the Central Bank, Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the banks Chief Security
Officer, and the BPI Vice-President and Comptroller brought
Manuel Valentino to the NBI. The following day, Agent Ranin
took Valentinos statement. Valentino waived his rights to remain
silent and to counsel. He signed the waiver on the first page of
his statement. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took Valentinos
supplementary sworn statement. The same NBI agent took
Jesus Estacios statement on February 17, 1982 and
supplementary statement on March 22, 1982. Like Valentino,
Estacio waived his right to counsel. In their respective
statements, Valentino and Estacio admitted their participation in
the commission of the crime, narrated how they carried out the
plan to defraud the banks, and identified those who participated
in the criminal acts. After the investigation, Agent Ranin came
out with a Memorandum Report dated April 26, 1982. [19]
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

On December 2, 1969, the Central Bank of the Philippines

employed Jesus Estacio as janitor-messenger. In 1978, a certain
Rico Javier introduced Estacio to Felipe Salamanca. When
Salamanca learned that Estacio was connected with the Central
Bank, he asked Estacio if he knew any bookkeeper thereat as
his compadre needed one. Estacio replied that he would look for
one. A week later, Salamanca called up Estacio and asked him if
he had found a bookkeeper. Estacio mentioned Manuel
Valentino. Salamanca instructed Estacio to bring Valentino to
Jacks Restaurant in Quezon City after office hours. In that
restaurant, Estacio introduced Valentino to
Salamanca. Valentino was in turn introduced to Basilio
Tan. During their conversation, Valentino told Salamanca about
his work as a bookkeeper at the Central Bank.[20]
Sometime in October 1981, Valentino requested Estacio to
accompany him to the EDCOR office. There they met
Salamanca, Marcelo Desiderio, Rolando Santos and Basilio
Tan.Salamanca told Estacio to stay outside the office because
the group was going to discuss something. Half an hour later,
the group dispersed. That same month, Estacio saw Romeo
Villasanta, another accused, at the clearing office of the Central
Bank. When Estacio asked why Villasanta was there, the latter
answered that he was just expediting something. Estacio saw
Villasanta for the second time that same month talking with
Valentino at the clearing office. Valentino asked Estacio to point
out the office of the Department of Economic Research to
Villasanta because Villasanta would be doing some
research. Estacio went with Villasanta to the fourth floor and
showed him the said office. Villasanta then inquired where the

comfort room in that floor was. Estacio thereafter went back to

his work and did not see Villasanta anymore. [21]1
On November 20, 1981, Valentino asked Estacio to bring an
envelope to the fourth floor and to wait for him at its
lobby. Estacio acceded and later, Valentino arrived. Valentino
took the envelope from Estacio and went to the comfort
room. Thereafter, Estacio went to the Clearing Office.[22]
Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from
the NBI was looking for him, Estacio went to the NBI. There he
told Agent Ranin that he wanted to call a lawyer but Agent Ranin
did not allow him to do so. Agent Ranin investigated him from
5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on February 17, 1982. This continued
the following day and lasted a week. In the course of the
investigation, Agent Ranin promised Estacio that he would not
be harmed should he cooperate and admit the charges against
him, and that he would be freed once he becomes a state
witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a newspaper and
poked his gun at him. Estacio was allowed to read the statement
before he signed it.[23]
On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at
the NBI for about two months, his wife and children would visit
him every week and he could talk to them freely.[24] He was
transferred to Muntinlupa and detained at the Death Row for two
years. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took his second
statement that was a continuation of his first statement. He was
unable to read his supplementary statement because of fear of
Agent Ranin, who was scaring him. He stressed that the
statements he made before the NBI were not true and that he
only signed those documents[25] because he was afraid of Agent
Ranin.[26]
Rolando Santos came to know Felipe Salamanca when he sold
his car to him (Salamanca) on installment with P15,000.00 as
down payment with the balance of P20,000.00 to be paid in two
or three months. He accepted partial payment for the car. After a
time, Salamanca fully paid the balance. In July 1981, Salamanca
gave him P3,000.00. Twice or thrice, Salamanca tried to
convince him to join a scheme to defraud a bank. After
Salamanca had paid him the full price of the car, Salamanca
asked him again to join his group. All he had to do was to open a
checking account. He could have easily facilitated this, being the
Vice-President for Finance of American Steamship Agencies. In
those meetings with Salamanca where he was persuaded to
open a checking account with a bank, Basilio Tan, the son of a
general and his classmate at San Beda College, Valentino, and
Desiderio were present. When he told Salamanca that he was
not interested in the scheme to defraud a bank, as he was busy
with his job, Salamanca got mad. On October 20, 1981, an
unidentified assailant shot him in his house. He sustained three
(3) gunshot wounds and was confined at the Paraaque Medical
Center.[27]
Marcelo Desiderio came to know Felipe Salamanca sometime
in July 1981 when Salamanca went to his office[28] because he
wanted to open an account with Citibank-Greenhills.Desiderio
went to Citibank-New York to inquire about the requirements for
opening an account. Two days later, he gave Salamanca the
bank forms and signature cards to be accomplished.He learned
from Salamanca that the forms would be filled up by Rolando
San Pedro. For the initial deposit, Salamanca gave
him P10,000.00 in cash and check. He also receivedP2,500.00
as consultancy fee. He went to Citibank-Greenhills to make the
deposit and the bank issued him a checkbook.[29]
Desiderio denied that he was present in any meeting where
Salamanca and his group discussed a plan to defraud a

43

bank. He acceded in opening the bank account at CitibankGreenhills because Salamanca assured him that the account
would be opened in connection with a loan application with the
Citibank of New York. He denied that Salamancas group tasked
him and Rolando Santos with opening accounts in Metro Manila
banks, particularly with Citibank-Greenhills. He denied knowing
Santos and Estacio personally although he admitted that
Estacio, with Manuel Valentino, came to his office to deliver a
tailored suit for a certain Atty. Martin. He further denied knowing
Jaime Tan but admitted knowing Alfredo Fajardo, who was his
client when he was still connected with BPI.[30]
Alfredo Fajardo opted to waive his right to testify and said that
he has no documentary evidence to present before the
Sandiganbayan.[31] Another accused, Emilio Reyes, voluntarily
surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and was detained at the
Security and Sheriff Services office.[32] He filed a motion for
reinvestigation on June 16, 1987 but it was resolved against
him.[33]He pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.
[34]
However, since July 17, 1989, Reyes failed to appear for
trial. On February 16, 1990, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him in
these cases on account of the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[35] Because the cases against
Reyes were tried in absentia, the Sandiganbayan ordered that
these be archived without prejudice to revival for purposes of
contempt citation in the event that he shall have been
apprehended and brought within the jurisdiction of the court.[36]
Rolando San Pedro was arrested on March 22, 1988 at the
vicinity of the Sandiganbayan.[37] He entered a plea of not guilty
to the charges against him.[38] On June 11, 1989, he died.
[39]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases against
him. In the Resolution of February 23, 1990, which was
promulgated on March 12, 1990, the Sandiganbayan resolved
that the cases against Felipe Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime
Tan and Mariano Bustamante be archived.[40]
As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio,
Desiderio, Santos, and Fajardo of the complex crimes of estafa
thru falsification of public documents. Estacio, Desiderio and
Fajardo filed separate motions for reconsideration,[41] while
Santos filed with the Supreme Court a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for certiorari.[42] On September 26, 1985, the
Sandiganbayan denied those motions for reconsideration.
[43]
Hence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari that they
individually filed with this Court, but which were consolidated in
the Resolution of December 10, 1985. [44]
In its consolidated comment on the petitions, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) questions the propriety of raising factual
issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan.[45] The OSG asserts that in such
a petition, this Courts jurisdiction is confined to questions of law
and hence, this Court is not supposed to reweigh evidence but
only to determine its substantiality. On this matter, in Filoteo, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan,[46] this Court, after citing Jariol, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,[47] said:
As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No.
1606 expressly provides that `(d)ecisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions
of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower
court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from
the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by
this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply

because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be

overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal
cases, a persons life and liberty are at stake.
While only petitioner Estacio is a government employee in these
cases, as the three others are private individuals, it is in the light
of this pronouncement that the instant petitions shall be
considered and resolved. Moreover, in the recent case
of Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[48] the Court, citing
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990, held that
a petition for review on certiorari questioning the final judgment,
order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Courts or other courts, may raise factual
issues. In the exercise of its sound discretion, taking into
account the attendant circumstances, this Court retains the
option of either taking cognizance of, and deciding such issues,
or referring the case to the proper court for determination. In
these criminal cases, this Court chooses to take cognizance of
factual questions raised in the interest of proper administration
of justice.
In their separate petitions, petitioners assert that there was no
proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crimes
charged principally because:
(a) the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and
Valentino are inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel
was violated when said confessions were executed;
(b) the discharge of Valentino from the informations to be a state
witness was improper; and
(c) conspiracy, which made all petitioners equally guilty, was not
adequately proven.
Notably, petitioners Santos and Estacio aver that, should they be
convicted as charged, they should be held individually liable only
as an accomplice.[49]
Relevant to petitioners contention on the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino is
Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the
rights of an accused during custodial investigation. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution states:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the
1973 Constitution does not specify the right against
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found in
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. However, the latter constitutional provision cannot

44

be applied to extrajudicial confessions made prior to its date of

effectivity. InFiloteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court held
that:
x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that
a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counselmay
not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such
argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held
that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution
was in force and effect, should have been made with the
assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only
on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs.
Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers
during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that
`(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter,
in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:
`x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made
one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs.
Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no
comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the
date of promulgation of Morales.[50]
Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these
cases as the extrajudicial confessions in question here, were
taken on February 13, February 17 and March 22, 1982, long
before the date of promulgation of the Morales Decision on April
26, 1983. Prior to this date, the guidelines requiring that waiver
of the right to counsel by an accused can be properly made only
with the presence and assistance of counsel, had yet to be
formulated and pronounced by this Court.[51]
The rule on prospective application of judge-made laws was
stressed in Co vs. Court of Appeals.[52] In that case, the Court,
through then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, ruled that in
accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing that
(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code stating that (l)aws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided,
the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory,
shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves
are not laws, are nevertheless evidences of what the law means.
As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino
and petitioner Estacio of their right to counsel during custodial
investigation, the intelligent and voluntary execution thereof
should be determined. The pre-interrogation advisories to the
extrajudicial confessants uniformly state:
01. QUESTION: Mr. MANUEL VALENTINO, we are informing
you that you are under investigation in connection with the
alleged Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial/Official
Documents committed at the Central Bank of the
Philippines. But before we ask you any question, you must
understand your legal rights. You have the right to remain

silent. You have the right not to give any statement if you do not
wish to. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you
in any proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of counsel
of your own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want
one, a lawyer will be appointed for you before we ask you any
question. Now, after having been so informed, are you still
willing to give a free and voluntary statement and swear to tell
the truth and nothing but the truth in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
02. Q: Are you willing to sign a Waiver of your rights?
A: Yes, sir.
WAIVER
I have been advised of my right to remain silent; that anything
that I say may be used as evidence against me and that I have
the right to a lawyer to be present with me while I am being
questioned.
I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement
and answer questions. I do not want the assistance of counsel
and I understand and know whag (sic) I am doing. No promises
or threats have been made to me and no force or pressure of
any kind has been used against me.
(Sgd. with thumbmark)
MANUEL VALENTINO y SOCAN
13 February 1982, NBI, Manila[53]
It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was
compliance with the constitutional requirement on preinterrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his
confession is involuntary and untrue.[54] The defense attempted
to prove that Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to
threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their
confessions. Other than their bare assertions, Valentino and
petitioner Estacio miserably failed to present any convincing
evidence to prove the NBIs use of force or intimidation on their
persons. Before signing their statements, they never protested
against any form of intimidation, much more, of maltreatment
that they could have relayed to relatives visiting them at the
NBI. In People vs. Pia,[55] the Court said:
x x x It has been held that where the defendants did not present
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons;
where they failed to complain to the officers who administered
the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence
on their bodies and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all
these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions.
That the statements were intelligently executed is borne out by
the fact that both confessants have reached the tertiary level of
education: Valentino holds the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce[56] while petitioner Estacio reached the first year of
college education in banking and finance.[57] Possessed with
sufficient education and not proven to be mentally unfit, they
could have protested the forced extraction of culpability from
themselves if indeed that was true.

45

Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions in question are replete

with details on the manner in which the crimes were committed,
thereby ruling out the probability that these were involuntarily
made.[58] Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that, if upon its face the confession exhibits no
sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could possibly be
supplied only by the accused reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a
mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be
considered voluntary.[59] In U.S. vs. De los Santos,[60] the Court
said:
If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the
accused with a full comprehension of its significance, there is no
impediment to its admission as evidence, and it then becomes
evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the
presumption a very strong one that no person of normal mind
will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless
prompted by truth and conscience.
In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the
members of the syndicate and the sophisticated manner by
which the crimes in question were perpetrated if Valentino and
Estacio, who were directly involved therein, did not reveal these.
With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions
of Valentino and petitioner Estacio against their co-accused,
once again, this Court declares that although an extrajudicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant,
jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of
other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.
[61]
In People vs. Alvarez,[62] this Court ruled that where the
confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession
is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. The Court
elucidated further in People vs. Encipido[63] as follows:
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial
confessions were independently made without collusion, are
identical with each other in their material respects and
confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as
circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation
in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as
corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from
other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than
the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the
crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known
as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the
general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are
admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
Petitioner Estacio claimed that, to his surprise, he found
Valentino at the NBI. They talked for a while and Valentino told
him to say whatever he (Valentino) would say.[64] That allegation
alone cannot be considered as indicative of collusion between
them as their sworn statements both contain facts showing their
deep involvement in the scheme to defraud a bank. Human
experience dictates that no one would volunteer to demonstrate
ones culpability unless it was the truth. It may thus be safely
presumed that in telling petitioner Estacio to say whatever he
would say, Valentino was merely cautioning petitioner Estacio to
tell the truth. Nevertheless, even without the extrajudicial
confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence on
record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.[65]

On the validity of the discharge of Valentino from the information

to be a state witness, the determination of who should be used
as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses is part of prosecutorial discretion. [66] However, it
is the courts that finally determine whether the requirements of
the Rules of Court[67] have been satisfied to justify the discharge
of an accused to become a state witness.
It should be recalled that petitioner Estacio was originally
discharged to be a state witness. Upon his manifestation that he
would rather remain an accused in these cases for the
protection of his family, the court re-included him in the
information. Apparently considering the nature of the crimes and
the secrecy by which these were perpetrated, the prosecution
was left with no recourse but to side with Valentinos motion for
his discharge to be a state witness. The absolute necessity for
the testimony of someone who was a participant in the criminal
scheme is buttressed by the ruling that where a crime is
contrived in secret then the discharge of one of the conspirators
is essential so he can testify against the other conspirators. [68] In
a conspiracy which was done in secret, there is a necessity to
discharge one of the accused to provide direct evidence of the
commission of the crime.[69]
Worth noting, however, is that Valentinos testimony and his
sworn statements differ with regard to petitioner Estacios
participation in the commission of the October 19, 1981 criminal
act, and the participation of petitioner Fajardo in the three
crimes. Valentino stated in his sworn statement that on October
19, 1981, when he noticed that the BPI representative had
placed the demand envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks
for clearing at the Laoag counter behind him, petitioner Estacio,
who was the syndicates messenger, immediately came with a
push cart. Petitioner Estacio placed the demand envelope in the
pushcart and proceeded to the comfort room in the fourth floor
where Valentino followed him to alter the documents to suit the
syndicates purposes. On the other hand, when he testified,
Valentino asserted that he did not see petitioner Estacio at the
meeting when they hatched the first operation on October 16,
1981. When the alterations were made on October 19, 1981,
Valentino claimed that petitioner Estacio was not with them [70] for
it was he himself who brought the bundle of checks to the fourth
floor comfort room where Villasanta took the checks and altered
the bank statements.
With respect to petitioner Fajardo, Valentino averred in his
supplementary sworn statement that petitioner Fajardo was
present in three or four conferences where he participated in the
discussion to defraud a bank.[71] However, on the witness stand,
Valentino swore that petitioner Fajardo had no participation in
these cases[72] or in the three operations subjects of these cases.
These discrepancies in Valentinos sworn statements and
testimony are material ones as far as petitioners Estacio and
Fajardo are concerned. On this issue, the Court has consistently
held that:
x x x discrepancies between the statement of the affiant in his
affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are generally
incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to
open court declarations because they are oftentimes not in such
a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which has transpired in his affidavit and those made by
him. This is so because affidavits are frequently prepared by the
administering officer and cast in the latters language or the
latters understanding of what the affiant had said, while the
affiant frequently simply signs the affidavit after the same has
been read to him. [73]

46

In People vs. Fabro, the Court ruled that repudiation and

recantation of confessions which have been obtained in
accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor
as unreliable.[74] However, that ruling may not find application
under the circumstances of these cases. In Fabro, it was the
accused himself who recanted his confession when, on the
witness stand, he denied he committed the crime. No other
witness testified for the defense. On the other hand, in these
cases, Valentino, a co-conspirator who appeared as a state
witness before the court, adhered to his confession as regards
the participation of the accused, except that he testified that
petitioner Estacio was absent when the first crime was planned
and committed, and that petitioner Fajardo was not involved in
the three cases. It has been held that where a witness who
testified for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the
defense by retracting his previous testimony, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence.[75] Although these
cases do not involve the conflicting testimonies of a witness, that
rule may be applied in a conflict between a sworn statement and
the testimony while recognizing the inferiority of a sworn
statement to a testimony.In these cases, the narration of facts in
Valentinos sworn statements were in substance reproduced in
his testimony which, in turn, was supported by other testimonial
evidence and the voluminous documentary evidence.
In the absence of any reason to question the credibility of
Valentino and that of his testimony, that portion of his testimony
on the nonparticipation of petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case No.
5949 and petitioner Fajardo in all three cases shall be
controlling. We deem the variance in Valentinos testimony as
endeavors to rectify his sworn statements to conform to the
truth. To reiterate, such variance, does not make him a less
credible witness or affect the merit of his testimony, as the other
pieces of prosecution evidence support it and do not prove that it
is untruthful or contrived.
The value of Valentinos testimony in the prosecution of these
cases cannot be underestimated. It fills in the gaps in the
prosecution evidence that the other prosecution witnesses failed
to cover. Without it, conspiracy to defraud the BPI-Laoag
of P9,000,000.00 through falsification of the clearing statement
and manifest would not have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[76] As creditably shown by the prosecution, the crimes
were committed not solely by the person who altered the
clearing statement and manifest. That all-important act, the
conception of which could have been hatched only by one
familiar with banking procedures, would not have been possible
if not for the indispensable cooperation of others. Thus,
Valentino testified:
Q Will you please describe in detail what was agreed upon
during the meeting?
A It was agreed upon that Salamanca and Villasanta will open
an account at Laoag Branch of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and Desiderio also and Santos are also in charge in
opening accounts in Metro Manila, particularly Citibank,
Greenhills. Basilio Tan, he is stationary in the office. Jaime Tan
and Rolando San Pedro are the ones in charge in withdrawals at
the Citibank.[77]
However, the liability of each of the petitioners must be
considered within the purview of the following pronouncement in

the celebrated case of People vs. Berroya[78] where the Court

said that:
x x x to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the time of the commission of
the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other coconspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
conspiracy. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any
active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes
of conviction. Thus, assuming Vienes was a participant in the
planning to abduct a Taiwanese national, in the absence of
eyewitnesses to the actual abduction, there is a paucity of
evidence as to whether or not Vienes carried out his part of the
plan. (emphasis supplied)
In these cases, even if Valentinos supplementary sworn
statement stating that petitioner Fajardo participated in the
discussion of the scheme to milk money from a bank should be
given evidentiary weight, still, that evidence is not enough to
convict him. There is no evidence showing that he participated in
opening a bank account in the procedure to alter the clearing
manifests and statements, or in the withdrawal of substantial
amounts resulting from such alteration of documents. There is
thus insufficient evidence against petitioner Fajardo to find him
culpable for the crimes charged in these cases and hence, he
should be acquitted.
Similarly situated as petitioner Fajardo, is petitioner Santos. His
admission to having attended several meetings of Salamancas
group did not satisfactorily define his liability as a conspirator
considering the absence of any proof that he committed an overt
act in pursuance of the syndicates scheme. His pretext of having
entered into a car sale with Salamanca may ring hollow in truth
but the weakness of his defense cannot be taken against him
considering the insufficiency of prosecution evidence on his
participation in the actual commission of the crime. His acquittal
is, therefore, likewise in order.
With respect to petitioner Estacio, Valentinos testimony on the
first syndicate operation on October 16, 1981 should be counted
in his favor. There is insufficient evidence that he participated in
the alteration of documents at the Central Bank Clearing Office
on October 19, 1981 much more in the prior discussion to
perpetrate the crime. Hence, his acquittal in Criminal Case No.
5949 should follow. However, as regards the syndicate
operations on October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of his role in carrying the
demand envelopes to the Central Banks fourth floor comfort
room where alterations were made. By the nature of his work, he
had access to these demand envelopes containing BPI
checks. His participation in the conspiracy was therefore vital to
the realization of the syndicates objectives.
Parenthetically, the Court notes with dismay the
Sandiganbayans pronouncement that petitioner Estacios wishywashy attitude in offering himself as a state witness confirmed
his knowledge of the intimate details of the conspiracy and the
mode or manner by which its operations and schemes would be
initiated and consummated.[79] Such conclusion is in consonance
with the presumption of guilt, not with that of innocence. An
accused may have some reasons for his irresolute action as far
as testifying for the prosecution is concerned.Petitioner Estacio
had such reason he feared for the safety of his family
considering that he would be up against a syndicate that,

47

because of the success of its evil scheme, had the money to

harm their perceived enemies. That petitioner Estacio was
deeply enmeshed in the syndicates activities to bleed money
from banks is shown by the fact that in Crim. Case No. 6603
involving the syndicates operation in the Solidbank, his
conviction for the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public/commercial documents was affirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 75362.[80]But such conviction for another crime must not be
the basis for a conclusion that the accused is guilty of another
crime charged, although basically, the same criminal acts were
committed.We therefore find the Sandiganbayans
pronouncement totally unexpected of a court that must
determine the culpability of an accused based on the
prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the defense or
the reputation of an accused.
Petitioner Desiderio, on the other hand, has been proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for having participated both in the
discussion and mapping out of the malevolent scheme and in its
actual execution. Desiderios knowledge of banking procedures
provided the rationale for his giving birth, or having authored the
scheme along with Salamanca and Villasanta.[81] He had served
as branch manager in the BPI where he was employed for
twenty-seven years, or until he was charged with estafa for
accommodating a clients loan against an uncollected deposit.
[82]
Nieves Garrido, a personal banker at Citibank-Greenhills,
who entertained him when he made queries about opening a
current account, confirmed his having opened said account for
Magna Management Consultant, thereby lending credence to
and corroborating Valentinos testimony on his role in the
implementation of the criminal scheme.
Petitioner Desiderios claim that he opened that account in
accordance with his legitimate role as consultant in Mardes
Management Consultant is a lame excuse. Anyone, especially a
businessman such as San Pedro or Salamanca, could have
opened a current account without hiring the services of a
management consultant. That lame excuse sounds even lamer
considering the evidence showing that his alleged client was
also engaged in management consultancy. Desiderio thus relied
on denial as a mode of defense. A denial, like other defenses,
remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence
which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the
prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the
probative value of the denial is negligible.[83] Desiderios denial of
complicity in the scheme cannot, therefore, prevail over the
positive testimonies of Nieves Garrido and Valentino that he
played the important role of opening the current account that
paved the way to the inside jobs of petitioner Estacio, Valentino
and, probably, Villasanta. His sole overt act under the syndicates
scheme facilitated the commission of all three counts of estafa
thru falsification of public documents.
Notably, in these cases, the Sandiganbayan observed that none
of the accused refuted the documentary exhibits offered in
evidence by the prosecution.[84] The pieces of documentary
evidence consist of bank records including deposit slips, ledger
cards, specimen cards, checks for deposit and withdrawal,
clearing statements and clearing manifests. All of these clearly
and positively buttress the prosecutions theory as to how
the pilferage scheme was successfully implemented. The
defense obviously could not demolish the evidentiary weight of
the prosecutions documentary evidence and hence, it focused
on the prosecution evidence on the membership of the accused
in the syndicate, and on the probative value of the interlocking
confessions of Valentino and petitioner Estacio. There is thus no
alternative to giving full credence and merit to the prosecutions
documentary evidence, and to declaring them to be in complete
accord with the prosecution theory on the commission of the

offenses and the nature and extent of participation of the

accused.
The informations filed in these cases individually charge an
offense defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2 (a) in
relation to Article 171, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation.[85] It is indubitable that estafa
was committed by abuse of confidence in these cases. The
conspirators that enlisted and utilized the assistance of Central
Bank employees abused the confidence that the banking system
reposed upon such employees. As a result of such abuse of
confidence, the BPI sustained damage in the aggregate of Nine
Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00). Verily, the perpetrators of the
crimes breached even the confidence that people reposed on
the Central Bank and the whole banking system.
By falsifying clearing documents, the offenders committed the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code,
any public officer or employee who, taking advantage of his
official position, makes untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, commits the crime of falsification of public
documents. This kind of falsification requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[86]
The prosecution has duly proven these requisites. Valentino
occupies a public position as bookkeeper at the Clearing Office
of the Central Bank. He intercepted and pilfered BPI-Laoag
checks with the assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitormessenger at the Central Bank. In the comfort room, Valentino
and/or Villasanta, who has so far avoided the clutches of the law,
tampered with the clearing statements and clearing manifests
which Estacio had taken from Valentinos desk. The tampered
documents, along with the pilfered demand envelopes, were
then sent to the Central Bank Regional Clearing Center in
Laoag. These inside jobs were perpetrated as part of the
decadent scheme that private individuals had hatched to gain
monetary gratification.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) under which the defendants were
charged in these cases, states that any person who shall
defraud another by means of using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits shall be held liable for the crime of
swindling (estafa). Under the peculiar circumstances proven in
these cases, the crime actually committed by the offenders is
that defined in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code on other
deceits. The first paragraph of this article states that (t)he
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount
of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount
shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter. Although the information charged the
accused with violation of paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code defining the crime of falsification by public
officer of employee, the Sandiganbayan correctly found that the
accused violated paragraph 4 of the same Article which states
as follows:
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or

48

notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify

a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
Inasmuch as the crime committed in these cases is the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code states that when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period,
the penalty for the crimes committed in these cases is that
imposed for falsification of public documents or prision mayor in
its maximum period and a fine of P5,000.00.
While it appears that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the
basis for imposition of penalty should be that imposed by law for
falsification of public documents, it erred in imposing the
maximum penalty of the indeterminate sentence it meted upon
the accused. Finding no modifying circumstances, the
Sandiganbayan imposed for each complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public document, the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Under the procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for
complex crimes enunciated in Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan,
[87]
the first step in determining the proper penalty is to consider
whether or not aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances
attended the commission of the crimes.
Only petitioner Estacio claimed that he voluntarily
surrendered. For said mitigating circumstance to be appreciated,
surrender must be made spontaneously or in such a manner
that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt, or because he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense of finding and capturing him.[88] According
to NBI Agent Ranin, petitioner Estacio went to the NBI bearing a
referral note from Atty. Agapito Fajardo, Chief of Anti-Fraud Unit
of the Central Bank.[89] However, it was proven by the
prosecution beyond peradventure of doubt that petitioner
Estacios alleged surrender was anything but spontaneous. He
went to the NBI on February 17, 1982,[90] five days after Atty.
Fajardo had brought Valentino to that office for questioning, and
a day after a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) had been
issued against him and Valentino.[91] Moreover, the booking
sheet and arrest report states that petitioner Estacio was
arrested on February 16, 1982.[92] Voluntary surrender having
been insufficiently proven, as far as penalty is concerned,
petitioner Estacio in Crim. Cases Nos. 5950-51 shall suffer the
same penalty as petitioner Desiderio who did not present proof
that could mitigate the penalty that he should suffer for the
crimes.
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the
penalty prescribed by law is a single divisible penalty, the
accused shall be imposed the medium period of such penalty
when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances. The propriety of imposing the medium period of
the more serious penalty for a complex crime after considering
the modifying circumstances notwithstanding that Article 48
requires the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period has
been settled.[93] It is supported by the doctrine that penal
provisions shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.
The medium period of prision mayor is eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years. In the absence of impediments to the

application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for each crime

committed, the penalty that should be imposed upon petitioner
Estacio in Crim. Case Nos. 5950 and 5951, and upon petitioner
Desiderio in Crim. Case Nos. 5949, 5950 and 5951, shall be the
indeterminate sentence comprising of the minimum penalty
within the range of prision correccional, to the maximum penalty
of prision mayor medium plus a fine of P5,000.00. It will be
observed that the maximum penalty erroneously imposed by the
Sandiganbayan is ten (10) years and one (1) day which is
already within the period of prision mayor maximum.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner
Rolando Santos y Ramirez in G.R. Nos. 71523-25, petitioner
Alfredo R. Fajardo, Jr. in G.R. No. 72384-86 and petitioner
Jesus E. Estacio in G.R. No. 72420-22 with respect to Criminal
Case No. 5949 are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged
for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan as far as petitioner Marcelo S. Desiderio in G.
R. No. 72387-89 and petitioner Jesus E. Estacio, with respect to
Criminal Case Nos. 5950 and 5951 are concerned, is herby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification that, for each crime, they
shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccionalmaximum to ten
(10) years of prision mayor medium.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140740

April 12, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUANITO BALOLOY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del
Sur, on the evening of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was
found. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant
Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that
he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby
creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession,
coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate fate
was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks
that his alleged confession be disregarded for having been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his
conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
The information1 charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with
homicide reads as follows:
That on August 3, 1996 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, at
Barangay Inasagan, Municipality of Aurora, province of
Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
Genelyn Camacho, a minor against the latters will and on said
occasion and by reason of the rape, the said Genelyn Camacho
died as a result of personal violence, inflicted upon her by the
accused.
Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156.

49

Upon arraignment2 on 10 December 1996, JUANITO entered a

plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan,
Purok Mabia, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about
5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, he asked GENELYN to borrow
some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house
was about 200 meters away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never
returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo, who
informed him that GENELYN had already left with one ganta of
rice. Jose then started to look for GENELYN. Speculating that
GENELYN might have taken shelter at the house of their
neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to
Olipios house. Unfortunately, Jose did not find GENELYN there.
Not losing hope, Jose proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio.
On his way, he met Wilfredo, who accompanied him to the
house of Ernesto. GENELYN was not there either. They
continued their search for GENELYN, but when it proved to be in
vain, the two decided to go home.3
A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and
JUANITO arrived. JUANITO informed Jose that he saw a dead
body at the waterfalls, whose "foot was showing." When asked
whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was GENELYNs.
Immediately, the three went to the waterfalls where JUANITO
pointed the spot where he saw GENELYNs body. With the aid of
his flashlight, Jose went to the spot, and there he saw the dead
body floating face down in the knee-high water. True enough, it
was GENELYNs. Jose reported the incident to Barangay
Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon Cenizas order, the Bantay
Bayan members and some policemen retrieved and brought
GENELYNs dead body to Joses house.4
Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that
GENELYN came to his house in the afternoon of 3 August 1996
to borrow some rice. GENELYN had with her an umbrella that
afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN failed to
reach her home when Jose came to look for her.5
Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about
6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo
Balogbog, arrived at his house to look for GENELYN, but they
immediately left when they did not find her. At about 7:30 p.m.,
JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house, trembling and apparently
weak. JUANITO was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp.
When Ernesto asked JUANITO where he was going, the latter
said that he would catch frogs; and then he left. After thirty
minutes, JUANITO returned and told Ernesto that he saw a foot
of a dead child at the waterfalls. With the disappearance of
GENELYN in mind, Ernesto lost no time to go the house of Jose.
JUANITO followed him. There, JUANITO told Jose that he saw a
foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. When Jose asked whether
it was GENELYNs, JUANITO answered in the affirmative. The
three then proceeded to the waterfalls, where JUANITO pointed
the place where he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose
immediately approached the body, and having confirmed that it
was GENELYNs, he brought it to a dry area.6
Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio
Camacho hand over a black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza.
The latter asked those present as to who owned the rope. When
JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza brought him
away from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him.7
Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to
molest his (Ernestos) child, an incident that caused a fight
between him (JUANITO) and his (Ernestos) wife.8

Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August

1996, he was informed by Joses brother that GENELYN was
"drowned." He and the Bantay Bayan members proceeded to
the place of the incident and retrieved the body of GENELYN. At
8:00 a.m. of the following day he, together with Edgar
Sumalpong and Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace
the path up to where GENELYN was found. There, they found a
black rope and an umbrella. They gave the umbrella to Joses
wife, and the black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza, who was
then attending the wake of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who
were at the wake whether anyone of them owned the rope.
JUANITO answered that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza talked
to JUANITO.9
Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the
recovery of the black rope and umbrella at the waterfalls where
GENELYNs body was found.10
Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del
Sur, testified that at about 8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose
Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio Camacho, and JUANITO
arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found
GENELYNs dead body at the waterfalls. Ceniza forthwith
ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body
of GENELYN, and reported the incident to the police
headquarters of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She specifically
named JUANITO as her suspect. She then went home and
proceeded to Joses house for GENELYNs wake. She saw
JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he was very uneasy.11
Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on
her way to Joses house, Antonio gave her a black rope, which
he reportedly found at the spot where the dead body of
GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the people at the
wake about the rope. JUANITO, who was among those present,
claimed the rope as his. She brought JUANITO away from the
others and asked him why his rope was found at the place
where GENELYNs body was discovered. JUANITO answered: "I
have to claim this as my rope because I can commit sin to God if
I will not claim this as mine because this is mine." Ceniza further
asked JUANITO to tell her everything. JUANITO told Ceniza that
his intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest and
kill her. When GENELYN ran away, he chased her. As to how he
raped her, JUANITO told Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers
into GENELYNs vagina and then raped her. Thereafter, he
threw her body into the ravine.12
After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a
wound on his right shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches
on other parts of his body. Upon further inquiry, JUANITO told
her that the wound on his shoulder was caused by the bite of
GENELYN. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a policeman
for his own protection, as the crowd became unruly when she
announced to them that JUANITO was the culprit. JUANITO was
forthwith brought to the police headquarters.13
Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at the Aurora Police Station, testified that at
about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he was at Joses house.
Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the killing
of GENELYN, and she turned over to him a black rope which
belonged to JUANITO. He wanted to interrogate JUANITO, but
Ceniza cautioned him not to proceed with his inquiry because
the people around were getting unruly and might hurt JUANITO.
Mosqueda immediately brought JUANITO to the police station,
and on that same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses.
The following day, a complaint was filed against JUANITO. 14

50

Dr. Arturo Lumacad, Municipal Health Officer of the Aurora Rural

Health Clinic, testified that he examined JUANITO so as to verify
the information that JUANITO sustained wounds in his
body.15 His examination of JUANITO revealed the following
injuries:

foot was GENELYNs and that she was already dead. Upon
Joses request, JUANITO and Ernesto informed Joses brother
about the incident, and they proceeded to the house of Ceniza.
Thereafter, they, along with the members of the Bantay Bayan,
went back to the creek to retrieve the body of GENELYN.21

1. fresh abrasions on the right portion of the cheek;

JUANITO further recalled that after the body of GENELYN was

brought to her parents house, he helped saw the lumber for her
coffin. Thereafter, he went to Ernestos house to get the sack
containing the seventeen frogs he had caught that night, which
he earlier left at Ernestos house. He was shocked to find out
that the rope which he used to tie the sack, as well as all the
frogs he caught, was missing. As it was already dawn, JUANITO
left his sack at his mothers house; then he proceeded to the
house of Jose to help make the coffin of GENELYN. But, at
around 8:00 a.m., policeman Banaag came looking for him. He
stopped working on GENELYNs coffin and identified himself.
Banaag took him away from the house of Jose and asked him
whether he owned the rope. JUANITO answered in the
affirmative. At this point, policeman Mosqueda came near them
and escorted him and Banaag back to Joses house. At Joses
house, Mosqueda announced to the crowd that JUANITO was
the suspect in GENELYNs untimely demise. JUANITO was then
detained and investigated at the police station. 22During his
investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, he was
never assisted by a lawyer.23

2. multiple abrasions on the right shoulder;

3. abrasion on the left shoulder; and
4. abrasions on the left forearm.16
Dr. Lumacad also testified that he examined the dead body of
GENELYN on 4 August 1996 and found the following injuries:
1. 2.5-inch lacerated wound at her left neck, front of the head;
2. 1-inch wound at the right cheek just below the first wound;
3. multiple contusions on her chest;
4. contusion at the right hip; and
5. fresh lacerations on her vagina at 9 oclock and 3 oclock
positions.17
He opined that the fresh lacerations could have been caused by
a large object inserted into GENELYNs vagina, such as a male
sex organ, a rod, or a piece of wood or metal.18
Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court
of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that when he arrived in
his office at around 8:30 a.m. of 4 August 1996 several people,
including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were already in his
courtroom. He learned that they came to swear to their affidavits
before him. After reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked
Ceniza whether her statements were true. Ceniza answered in
the affirmative and pointed to JUANITO as the culprit. Judge
Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether the charge
against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect:
"[N]apanuwayan ko, sir" ("I was demonized"). While Judge Dicon
realized that he should not have asked JUANITO as to the
truthfulness of the allegations against him, he felt justified in
doing so because the latter was not under custodial
investigation. Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO
whether he had a daughter as old as the victim and whether he
was aware of what he had done to GENELYN. Again, JUANITO
responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously
narrated that after he struck GENELYNs head with a stone he
dropped her body into the precipice.19
Lopecino Albano, process server in the court of Judge Dicon,
corroborated the testimony of the latter as to JUANITOs
admission that he was demonized when he raped and killed
GENELYN.20
The sole witness for the defense was JUANITO, who invoked
denial and alibi. He testified that he was at his mothers house at
around 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996. An hour later, he left for the
creek to catch frogs; and while catching frogs, he saw a foot. He
forthwith headed for Ernesto Derios house to ask for help.
There, he told Ernesto and his wife of what he had seen.
Ernestos wife asked JUANITO whether the person was still
alive, and JUANITO answered that he was not sure. At this
point, Ernesto informed him that Jose Camacho was looking for
GENELYN. JUANITO and Ernesto then proceeded to the house
of Jose to inform the latter of what he, JUANITO, had seen. The
three forthwith went to the creek. There, they found out that the

In its challenged decision,24 the trial court found JUANITO guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. On
the challenge on the admissibility of the admissions he made to
Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon, it ruled that they are
not the law enforcement authorities referred to in the
constitutional provisions on the conduct of custodial
investigation. Hence, JUANITOs confessions made to them are
admissible in evidence. Moreover, no ill-motive could be
attributed to both Ceniza and Judge Dicon. It also found
unsubstantiated JUANITOs claim that he was threatened by his
fellow inmates to make the confession before Judge Dicon; and
that, even assuming that he was indeed threatened by them, the
threat was not of the kind contemplated in the Bill of Rights. The
threat, violence or intimidation that invalidates confession must
come from the police authorities and not from a civilian. Finally, it
ruled that JUANITOs self-serving negative evidence cannot
stand against the prosecutions positive evidence.
The trial court, thus, convicted JUANITO of rape with homicide
and imposed on him the penalty of death. It also ordered him to
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 by way of civil
indemnity. Hence, this automatic review.
In his Appellants Brief, JUANITO imputes to the trial court the
following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO
WITNESSES LUZVIMINDA CE[N]IZA AND JUDGE CELESTINO
DICON AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
II
ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
ACCUSEDS ALLEGED CONFESSION THE COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON MERE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Anent the first assigned error, JUANITO maintains that the trial
court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the

51

Constitution25 when it admitted in evidence his alleged

extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge
Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his
constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit
from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that
Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public
officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express
mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived,
the prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his
rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of
counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the
prosecution miserably failed to establish with moral certainty his
guilt. He points to the contradicting testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope owned by him.
Consequently, with the inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial
confession and the apparent contradiction surrounding the
prosecutions evidence against him, the trial court should have
acquitted him.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
supports the trial courts finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. His bare denial and
alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of the witnesses
for the prosecution. Moreover, he was unable to establish by
sufficient evidence that Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge
Dicon had an ulterior motive to implicate him in the commission
of the crime.
The OSG recommends that the civil indemnity of P50,000
awarded by the trial court be increased to P75,000; and that in
line with current jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000 be awarded to the heirs of GENELYN.
We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs
extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial
investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or
confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime
before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 26
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black
rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO
voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and
thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a
spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary
manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under
custody for investigation in connection with the commission of
the offense.
It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts
disclosed to her by JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of
Dr. Lumacad. GENELYNs physical resistance and biting of the
right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the wound on
JUANITOs right shoulder and scratches on different parts of his
body. His admission that he raped GENELYN was likewise
corroborated by the fresh lacerations found in GENELYNs
vagina.

Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or

ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have
compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is no
evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy.27
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his
constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated
by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating
questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is
settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to,
or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked
about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of
counsel.28 Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been
filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary
investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains
that at that time JUANITO was already under the custody of the
police authorities, who had already taken the statement of the
witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the
administration of their oaths on their statements.
While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but was
rather brought to the police headquarters on 4 August 1996 for
his protection, the records reveal that JUANITO was in fact
arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the primordial concern
of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him of
his freedom of action would not have been necessary. Arrest is
the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense, and it is
made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by
his submission to the person making the arrest.29
At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial
confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice
and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it
could however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused,
which could be established through the testimonies of the
persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the
accused.30
JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own
admission that he was at the scene of the crime. Alibi is a
defense that places an accused at the relevant time of a crime in
a place other than the scene involved and so removed therefrom
as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty
party.31 Likewise, a denial that is unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.32
Anent the alleged inconsistencies in the details surrounding the
recovery of the black rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and
do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Minor
inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses, as they erase doubts that
such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.33 What
matters is that the testimonies of witnesses agree on the
essential fact that JUANITO was the owner of the black rope and
the perpetrator of the crime.
Even if JUANITOs confession or admission is disregarded,
there is more than enough evidence to support his conviction.
The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was JUANITO who
raped and killed GENELYN:

52

1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his

daughter GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor
Wilfredo Balogbog. GENELYN did so as told, but failed to return
home.
2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at
Ernestos house bringing a sack and kerosene lamp, trembling
and apparently weak.

In consonance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending

Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this
Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernestos

house and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the
waterfalls, without disclosing the identity of the deceased.
4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Joses house, the
former told Jose that it was GENELYNs foot he saw at the
waterfalls.
5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh
lacerations on her vaginal wall at 9 and 3 oclock positions.
6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho,
Andres Dolero and Edgar Sumalpong recovered at the crime
site a black rope, which they turned over to Ceniza, who was
then at GENELYNs wake.
7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the
black rope, JUANITO claimed it as his.
8. When Ceniza examined JUANITOs body, she saw a wound
on his right shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body.
9. Dr. Lumancads physical examination of JUANITO revealed
abrasions, which could have been caused by scratches.
Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the inferences are based on proven
facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.34 All these requisites are present in the case at bar.
With JUANITOs guilt for rape with homicide proven beyond
reasonable doubt, we are constrained to affirm the death
penalty** imposed by the trial court. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
pertinently provides: "When by reason or on occasion of the
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
As to JUANITOs civil liability, prevailing judicial policy has
authorized the mandatory award of P100,00035 as civil
indemnity ex delicto in cases of rape with homicide (broken
down as follows: P50,000 for the death and P50,000 upon the
finding of the fact of rape). Thus, if homicide is committed by
reason or on occasion of rape, the indemnity in the amount of
P100,000 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the
seriousness of the said special complex crime. Moral damages
in the amount of P50,000 may be additionally awarded to the
heirs of the victim without the need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings, which constitutes the
basis for moral damages under the Civil Code, is too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial.36
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
30, Aurora, Zamboanga Del Sur, in Criminal Case No. AZ-CC96-156, finding accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy guilty of the
crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification that he is
ordered to pay the heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as
indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

----------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 187725

January 19, 2011

BENJAMIN JESALVA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 17, 2008,
which affirmed with modification the decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated November 18,
1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben
Sabaw4 (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide.
The Facts
On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, filed a criminal complaint5 for Frustrated Murder
against petitioner. Four days thereafter, or on September 15,
1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner with the
crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo6 (Leticia) died on
September 14, 1992.7After conducting a hearing on the bail
application of petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992, granted him
bail.8 On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of
Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon. 9
Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an
Information10 dated January 26, 1993, which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the
Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior
strength, with treachery and evident premeditation with the use
of motor vehicle and during night time, did then and there
[wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, manhandle
and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon
the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her
death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her
legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of
not guilty to the offense charged.11 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution

53

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially

summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
follows:
In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc,
together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva
(petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,12 Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were
at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and
Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 oclock that night,
Glorias group left Nenas place and boarded the Isuzu panel of
petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales, the group
proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While Gloria had
softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest
consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.
After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog
Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded
petitioners Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove
them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front
seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first,
followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from
Leticias house. While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to
drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day
because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave
Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her and
petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the
Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his car and
went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards 7th Street
where Leticias house was situated.
At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of
SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon
PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu
[panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Ladys Village] OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the
vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front
portion of the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1
Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated
in front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of
heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond,
immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon
town proper which is directly opposite his place of residence
which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the
MCST Sisters holding office at the Bishops Compound in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was
walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman naked
from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her
jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining,
Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed
some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being
driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction.
De Vera called out, "What is that?" Because he received no
response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger
home first and just come back to check the site later.
Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the
woman was bleeding that he even got stained with her blood.
Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at
Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he no longer
found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police station to
report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.
De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned
to comb the area but to no avail. On their way back at about
1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with
Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him to be the man
he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the

allegation but professed innocence. He admitted he left the

woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not
released until the next day. However, because the evidence
pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a
search for him was conducted. He "surrendered" at one (1)
oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his
first cousin.13
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc,
Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia.
However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as
friends because she was already married, and that she loved
her handsome husband.14 Moreover, the prosecution
asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992,
while conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, 15 together with
other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza
(SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on
board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately
started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of
Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his residence in Ticol,
Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas calls.16Lastly, at about
1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first
cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police
station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder
(SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle.17 At about
1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria,
together with other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner
inspected the place, which petitioner identified as the place
where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat.18
After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the
defense moved for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence.
On February 21, 1994, the defense filed before the RTC, Branch
51, its Demurrer to Evidence,19 which the RTC, Branch 51,
denied in its Order20 dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the
defense filed a Motion21for Reconsideration of the Order dated
July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the
prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch
51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in
the case;22 hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch
52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the
defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the
same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.23
Version of the Defense
In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied
that he killed Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason
to kill her, and that he had many reasons why he should not kill
her.24 The prosecution manifested that it would not conduct a
cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony
was tantamount to pure denial.25 To prove that there was a
broken chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented,
as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The CA narrated:
12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at
about 12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route to OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national
road or highway, he saw a man and a woman three meters from
the edge of the road; he stopped his tricycle and focused the
headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he saw the woman
leaning on the left arm of the man while the man was on a
squatting position; he asked them "what is that?" and did not get
any response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little
blood on the clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with
clothes, a polo shirt and pants; he decided to bring home his
passenger home (sic) first and then returned to the scene but

54

found no one there; he reported the matter to [SPO1] Balaoro,

who immediately accompanied him to the place; they searched
for the man and woman but they could not find them; they
checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but nobody had been
brought there; then they proceeded back to the junction and
later to the Sorsogon town proper; upon reaching Barangay
Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia talking with a man, whom he (De
Vera) recognized as the man with the woman; [Lt.] Caguia
directed the man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the police
Sub-Station 1, he came to know the name of the man Noel
Olbes; he saw bloodstains on Olbes arms, hands, face and
nose; the police interrogated him about it and he replied that he
just helped the woman.

she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the
panty and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle
stopped for a while and focused its headlight on them and
proceeded on its way; when he laid down the woman in the
shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and he was stained with
her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left; he
walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about fortyfive minutes, two policem[e]n apprehended him and brought him
to the police station for investigation; while being investigated,
he was not apprised of his constitutional rights and made to sign
the police blotter; he was detained as he was a suspect for the
injuries of the victim; after 7 or 8 hours, he was released; and he
executed a Sworn Statement and affirmed its contents.27

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known

[petitioner] for a longtime; and he has good relationship with him;
[petitioner] was his bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for
illegal possession of firearms and because of this, he is indebted
to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to [petitioner];
[petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the case.26

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.28 and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr.

Abrantes) testified on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which
eventually caused her death:

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the

testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes),
as follows:
6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of
September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the
Police Sub-Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting
position, and a woman, who had blood on the upper right breast
of her clothes, lean[ing] against the man and that after De Vera
brought his tricycle passenger home, he returned to the site but
he could not find the two anymore; upon receiving the report, he
(SPO1 Balaoro), together with SPO1 Sincua and De Vera,
proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going to the
hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they
searched the place and went to the hospital but found nothing;
on their way back, at around 1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes
talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos; De Vera pointed to
Olbes as the man he saw with the woman at the crossing so
they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation; Olbes
told them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so
he tried to lift her up but when he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he
became afraid as he might be implicated in the crime so he
brought her to Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the
highway; at 2:25 a.m. the patrol team found Leticia Aldemo,
whom they found naked from the waist down; at the garage of
Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim lying beside
her and noted that her panty was still on one of her knees; the
victims body appeared to have been laid down; they did not find
any blood in the garage except where the victims body was
found outside the garage, they saw the other pair of shoes of a
woman and thick bloodstains; he (SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes
to Balogo station and entrusted him to their investigator.
7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters
who are holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon; that on September 8, 1997, he went out with his
friends Danny, Oca and Ely in Almendras to drink a bottle of gin;
at around 6:30 p.m. he went to downtown Sorsogon and roamed
around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to Bahay Kainan and at
about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food and took
a bottle of beer; upon the invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena
and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her home at
OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas house, he
walked and upon reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman
lying on her belly naked from the waist down; the woman was
just uttering guttural sound; her jeans and panty were just lying
beside her; taking pity on the woman and since it was raining
that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in order that

9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on

September 9, 1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo,
who was in comatose state; she sustained the following injuries
(1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5 cm punctured wound,
occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal left area[;] (4)
multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid left
area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3rd upper left arm; (6) contusion
hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;] (8) hematoma,
3rd left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple confluent
abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12)
abrasion right elbow[;] (13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;]
and (14) skull-segmented fracture parietal bone with separation.
He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area
(lower back of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they
recovered from said area; the punctured wound on the parietal
left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been
secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three findings
could also have been caused by the punch made by the
perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the sixth
findings could have been caused also by some of the abovementioned means; the eighth finding could have been caused by
a fall or rubbing on a hard object; the ninth finding could have
been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow while the tenth
finding could have been caused by a fall on a rough object and
the knee rubbing on a rough object; the eleventh finding could
have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth finding
could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow
and the thirteenth finding could also be caused by a fall or fist
blow.
He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he
performed on her.
xxxx
14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different kinds of
injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated that since
there were wounds sustained by the victim in the dorsum part of
the foot and sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of
the back of the hand, the victim could have been thrown off while
unconscious.29
The RTCs Ruling
On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the
prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
based on circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder,
but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of
any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery

55

was not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse

of superior strength were not duly proven. Thus, the RTC
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Art.
249 of the Revised Penal Code and considering that there was
no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto
and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of
the sum of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim,
plus P42,755.45 for compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages andP10,000.00 as attorneys fees
(People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).
SO ORDERED.30
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.31
The CAs Ruling
On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others,
that petitioner could not point to Olbes as the culprit because,
when Eduardo de Vera saw the former holding on to Leticia in a
squatting position, Olbes was in the act of lifting her in order to
bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any misdeed
or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to
bring Leticia to a nearby hospital, because his fear of being
implicated in the crime clouded his better judgment. Thus:
All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to
sustain the accused-appellants conviction for homicide.
As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award
of P10,000.00 by the trial court meritorious, the records reveal
that services of private prosecutor was engaged.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is
punishable by reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender of accused-appellant, the
penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its minimum period.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum and SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated
November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 3243 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to the penalty.
Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve
the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.32
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,33 which
the CA, however, denied in its Resolution34dated April 7, 2009 for
lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS
CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE

BASED ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE

BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH
CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE
CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND
B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL
COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS
MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE
ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON
RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE
POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM
UNDER HIS CUSTODY.35
Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to
how, when, and where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness
ever testified as to who was responsible for her injuries. He
refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if he took the 6th
Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where Leticias
house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have
been considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he
was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still alive.
He avers that the statements he made at the police station are
not admissible in evidence, considering that he was, technically,
under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of his
right to remain silent.36 Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal
injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes,
are consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioners
innocence. Petitioner claims that the evidence shows that there
was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place where Olbes
spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than
her jumping out of the vehicle might have happened. 37
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, argues that only questions of law may be
entertained by this Court, and that we accord great respect to
factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the
CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs ruling, did
not err in convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, because the particular circumstances enumerated by
both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the requirements of
the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG
claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4
Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given
and were not elicited on custodial investigation. Lastly, the OSG
counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he
was never held for questioning by any police officer upon
arriving at the police station and, besides, he was accompanied
by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona.38
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or a confession from him.39 The rule begins to
operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed
upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and
to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions
which tend to elicit incriminating statements.40 The assailed
statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and
were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established
that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally

56

went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement

that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of
September 9, 1992.41 The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err
in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial
investigation is not applicable in the instant case.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner
could still be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The
prosecution established his complicity in the crime through
circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and
which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner
committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their
totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not
the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and
findings of guilt. There are instances when, although a witness
may not have actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he
may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as
the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.
Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition
where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is
insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons
who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places
will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.42
Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the
perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply
with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.43
We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming
those of the RTC:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that
the circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, when
viewed in its entirety, points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin
Jesalva as the person responsible for the death of the victim
Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the following combination of the
circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an
unbroken chain that points to [petitioner] and no other, as the
perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting
the victim Leticia Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop
as she was already married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six
other individuals left Nena Ables house at 10 p.m. of September
8, 1992 after playing mahjong thereat. They rode in [petitioners]
red panel.
2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two
others proceeded to Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with
other two male companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador,
in addition to the three bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group
left the place.

3. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin

Jesalva, together with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria
Haboc to her home, which was only twenty meters away from
Leticias residence.
4. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five minutes, and
denied another drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately accelerated
his vehicle en route to 6th Street instead of the shorter and
direct route, the 7th street, where Leticia Aldemos house is
located;
5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her
husband Efren Aldemo;
6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police
patrolling the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat
and when they approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw
Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly drove away
in the direction of Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he
lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom he
had known since his teen-age years) to stop but the latter did
not respond or heed his call;
7. At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body
of Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction
of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist
down. He lifted her up and brought the body at Hazelwood,
which is about 10 meters away from the highway.
8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at
around 2:15 a.m. of the same day, and brought her to the
Sorsogon Provincial Hospital in comatose condition.
9. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister, who in turn
informed the victims husband of the incident.
10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for
Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was not
able to find him.
11. At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin
Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose
Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon
headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the victim Leticia
Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30 in the
early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael Subdivision
but upon reaching the crossing of OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital, she jumped out of his
vehicle. These declarations were recorded in the police blotter
by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4 William
Desder, the PNP Sorsogon Chief Investigator.
12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together
with [petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St.
Ra[f]ael Subdivision to conduct an ocular inspection. [Petitioner]
pointed to the police the place where he and the victim spent
their time. The police photographed what appear[ed] to be
bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed by
[petitioner].
13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the
occipital area was caused by a pebble which he recovered from
said area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was
caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall
on a rough surface, the cerebral contusion, the punctured wound
in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be caused by
a punch by the perpetrator. As to the multiple contusion
hematoma anterior lateral aspect of the deltoid left area was
caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the

57

contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left elbow could
as well be similarly caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a
strong grip. As to the abrasion on the right knee, the same could
have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow. The
multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the right foot could have been
caused by a fall on a rough object. The abrasions on the right
elbow could have been caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall
or by a fist blow. The same is true with the contusion hematoma
found on the victims right elbow.44
Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial
evidence clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged.
It is well-settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution
witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused. The
evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the
CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of
denial was weak, self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated.
Petitioners silence as to the matters that occurred during the
time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can
only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum
of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. We find that the prosecution has met this quantum of
proof in this case.45
All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision
which would warrant the modification much less the reversal
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126,
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No.
3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y
SOTELO, JAIME OCHOA, all of the National Power
Corporation, and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas,
Alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo (At large),
Accused. JAIME OCHOA, Appellant.

Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George Aonuevo, alias

Mara Aonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange
trader, said public officers taking advantage of their official
positions, with grave abuse of authority and committing the
offense in relation to their office, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with their private co-accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause
to be falsified the NPCs application for managers checks with
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE
PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25),
Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars
from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the
account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in
truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment
Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did
not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby
making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified
commercial documents, accused succeeded in diverting,
collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency from the
National Power Corporation, which they thereafter malverse,
embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power
Corporation in the aforementioned sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to
the charge, while Gutierrez has remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated
1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a
Treasurer at the NPC;
2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in
the information was (sic) the Manager of Loan Management and
Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED);
3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst,
LOMAFED, at the time mentioned in the information;

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US
Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose
Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,1 Jaime Ochoa and Raul
Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the
complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of
Commercial Documents defined and penalized under Articles
217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, in an amended Information,2 docketed as Criminal Case
No. 19558, which alleges
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public
accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa,
both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management
and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader
Analyst, respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul

4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic)

public funds;
5. That accused Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not
require him to take custody or control of public funds;
6. That the application forms for cashiers check or Managers
check are not accountable forms of the NAPOCOR.3
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa
is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial
Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which
is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE
PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25)
solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa

58

shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs

against the accused.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN
UY, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Commercial Document. However,
because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY LIABLE
for the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND
TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with
accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against the
accused embodied in this Courts Resolution dated April 18,
2002 is recalled.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez,
alias Raul Nicolas, alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara
Aonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Mabini Street,
Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard,
Manila.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the
Sandiganbayan erred in
1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;
2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;
3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and
the NBI Report.6
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the
Sandiganbayan, are not disputed by the parties:
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC") became
embroiled in a controversy involving the disappearance of
P183,805,291.25 of its funds which were originally on deposit
with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch ("PNB") but were
subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers/cashiers
checks (the first check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00
while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply
with its loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB").
As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to
follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars
from a local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or
UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local bank was supposed to
remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in
this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to
remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this
case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit
the funds to the account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with
the concerned banks (embodied in three [3] "Payment
Instructions") included a "value date" (which was July 13, 1990),
the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned
procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC
obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the
second bank) remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the
Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per routing procedure,
UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on
said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M.
Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already
issued two (2) managers/cashiers checks ("Managers check"
for brevity) for such purpose, did not make the agreed
remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no
payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan,

Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered

explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit
the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais.
Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.7
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds
covered by the two PNB Managers checks by falsifying a
commercial document called an "Application for Cashiers
Check" (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-121204) of a private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB,
T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the
insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by
NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be
charged to NPCs savings account did not contain any account
number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded
in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor
of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George Aonuevo @ Mara
Aonuevo, who is still at large.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that
he committed any of the acts alleged in the information,
particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that he deposited the
checks subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds
thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He
claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn
statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a
supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel and the
report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant
maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at
the Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not
be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was
he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the
affidavit.
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove
the following essential elements:
a.] The offender is a public officer;
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property
for which he is accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted
the taking by another person of, such funds or property.8
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the
allegations in the information without violating his constitutional
right to due process and to be informed of the accusation
against him. He points out that the information alleges willful and
intentional commission of the acts complained of while the
judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting
to malice.
Appellants contention lacks merit. Malversation may be
committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of
public funds or property or passively through negligence by
allowing another to commit such misappropriation.9 To sustain a
charge of malversation, there must either be criminal
intent or criminal negligence10 and while the prevailing facts of a
case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove
the existence of negligence because both areequally
punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

59

More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and

whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law
makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty
therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversation,
conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of
commission of the offense.11 Explicitly stated
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against
petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the
information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of
misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is
committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper.12
The question of whether or not an information charging the
commission of the crime by means of deceit will preclude a
conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first
impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,13 we ruled that
an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can
validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful
crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of
Bacolor, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi
offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon
the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is
the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was
charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted
by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely
failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of
the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man
would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which
charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful
but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a
variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to
some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.
....
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification
was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this
deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by
appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him.
Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it
would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was
committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.

contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit
of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section
12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states that
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a
"custodial" investigation where a suspect has already been
taken into police custody15 and the investigating officers begin to
ask questions to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the suspect.16 More specifically
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.17
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pretrial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect.18 Such a situation contemplated has been
more precisely described thus where
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins
a confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal.
The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but
as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his
morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They
employ all the methods and means that experience and study
has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out
of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not
aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence....19

In People v. Consigna, et al.,14 we ruled that the afore-stated

rationale also applies to the felony of malversation, that is, that
an accused charged with willful malversation, in an information
containing allegations similar to the present case, can be validly
convicted of the same offense of malversation through
negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of
perpetrating the offense.

Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional

provision invoked by accused-appellant are not
available before government investigators enter the
picture.20 Thus we held in one case21 that admissions made
during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine
Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The
protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not
extend to admissions or confessions made to a private
individual,22 or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer
who was not part of the investigation,23 or even to a mayor
approached as a personal confidante and not in his official
capacity.24

Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his

conviction was based on his sworn statement, transcript of
stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken
and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He

Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview

showing the accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the
provision although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take

60

extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because

we recognized the distinct possibility that the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them
beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an
offense on television.25
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial
investigation extends to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed
the crime,26 nor to a person undergoing an audit examination
because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.27
Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes
immediately apparent vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks,
considering that his statement was taken during
the administrative investigation of NPCs audit
team28and before he was taken into custody. As such, the
inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the
time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody
because he was confined at the time at the Philippine Heart
Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to
police authorities.29 Appellant can hardly claim that, under the
prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of
compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the
unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would
force him into making false and incriminating declarations
against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into
doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way
as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary
constitutional provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously
conducted at the time the sworn statement was taken will not
extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the
constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The
interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by
NPC personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate,
distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be
confused or lumped together with the latter.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran30 in insisting that the
constitutional safeguard should have been applied
notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested or under detention
at the time. He also invites our attention to the pronouncements
of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas31 that "the right to counsel is available if
a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not
yet in custody but he is a suspect."
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the
constitutional protection covers not only confessions but
admissions as well, we qualified the ruling with the statement
that what is being eschewed is the evil of "extorting" a
confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As
defined, "extortion" is an act or practice of taking or obtaining
anything from a person by illegal use of fear, whether by force,
threats or any undue exercise of power.32 In the context of
obtaining an admission, "extorting" means "compelling or
coercing a confession or information by any means serving to
overcome his power of resistance, or making the confession or
admission involuntary."33 In this case, we find nothing on record
to support appellants claim that his statements were extorted
from him.

Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986

deliberations on what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the
1987 Constitution may lead to the conclusion that the rights are
available when the person is already in custody as a suspect, or
if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any
significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas34 qualified this statement
by saying that "[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution,
however, has consistently held, following Escobedo, the stricter
view, that the rights begin to be available only when the person
is already in custody."35
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn
statement were admissible in evidence, the contents thereof
may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. He contends that
although his statement was supposedly gathered from the
transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him
and Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who
actually prepared the sworn statement was presented.
Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution
presented as witness Atty. Lamberto P. Melencio who saw
appellant at the hospital to show him the prepared statement
and to verify from him the truth of its contents.36 Atty. Melencio
testified that he asked appellant to go over the document before
affixing his signature thereto.37 He also inquired whether or not
appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the
statement was taken.38 Appellant denied that he was coerced or
intimidated,39 affirmed the contents of the document as a true
reflection of his statements,40 and signed the same.41 It need not
be overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized
document which has in its favor the presumption of regularity
and, thus, it can be contradicted only by clear and convincing
evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its execution, as well as the
statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon,
stand.42
In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant
insists that at the time he signed the document, he was confined
in the hospital and therefore not physically and mentally fit to
assess the significance of his signature. This pretext however
collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita
Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days
and, who, when queried whether "ischemic heart disease" had
any emotional or psychological effect, gave the inconclusive
reply that it "may or may not." Moreover, as aptly observed by
the Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed
as he was by the alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that
appellant, who is supposedly astute in business matters as he
then occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC,
nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit
retracting the same after his recovery from illness. Verily,
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances.43
Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report
and the transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having
been made extra-judicially. The record, however, shows that the
prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators
who conducted the investigation, although his testimony was
dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and
due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without
admitting the truth of its contents. If at all, the admission of the
reports existence is an acknowledgment that it is neither
spurious nor counterfeit.

61

All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments

advanced by appellant to prop up his cause, his appeal must
fall.

Additionally, petitioners, Benitez and Norberto "Carlo" Javier

(Javier) were individually charged also with Qualified Theft in
four (4) separate Informations all dated September 9, 1996.

WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the

Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

The Information indicting petitioner Rosario, docketed

as Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-67829, and that indicting petitioner
Filipina, docketed as Q-96-67830, respectively read:

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159734

November 29, 2006

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 159745

November 29, 2006

FILIPINA M. ORELLANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Rosario "Baby" Astudillo (Rosario) and Filipina "Lina"
Orellana (Filipina) via separate petitions for review on certiorari
seek a review of the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals affirming with modification that of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 783 (the trial court) finding
them guilty of Qualified Theft and denying their Motions for
Reconsideration, respectively.
On complaint of Western Marketing Corporation (Western),
petitioners were collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along
with Flormarie Robel (Flormarie) and Roberto Benitez (Benitez),
in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, under an Information dated
September 9, 1996 reading:
The undersigned accuses FLORMARIE CALAJATE ROBEL,
ROBERTO F. BENITEZ, ROSARIO ASTUDILLO a.k.a. "Baby"
and FILIPINA ORELLANA Y MACARAEG of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT as follows:
That during the period comprised from January 1996 to
February 1996, the above-named accused, being then
employed as relieving cashier/service-in-charge (Flormarie
Calajate Robel), supervisor/floor manager (Roberto F. Benitez[)],
sales clerks (Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby" and Filipina
Orellana y Macaraeg) at the WESTERN MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by LILY CHAN ONG, and as such
had free access to the company premises, materials, supplies
and items store[d] thereat, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with grave abuse of
confidence and intent of gain, and without the consent of the
owner thereof, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away two (2) booklets of Sales
Invoices Nos. from 128351 to 128400 of the said corporation
and thereafter use the said invoices in the preparation of
fictitious sales and withdrawals of merchandise with the total
value of P797,984.00 Philippine Currency, belonging to the said
WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Emphasis supplied)

The undersigned accuses ROSARIO ASTUDILLO a.k.a. "Baby"

of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT as follows:
That on or about the period from May 1, 1994 to February 16,
1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
being then employed as sales representative/clerk at the
WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION (P. Tuazon Branch),
represented by LILY CHAN ONG, and as such had free access
to the company cash sales, with grave abuse of confidence and
intent of gain, and without the consent of the owner thereof, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away the excess sum/amount between the tag price and
discounts price in the sum of P12,665.00, belonging to the said
WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and
prejudice in the amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx
The undersigned accuses FILIPINA ORELLANA Y MACARAEG
of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, committed as follows:
That on or about the period from May 1, 1994 to January 27,
1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
being then employed as Sales clerk at the WESTERN
MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by LILY CHAN
ONG, and as such had free access to the company cash sales,
with grave abuse of confidence and intent of gain, and without
the consent of the owner thereof, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away the excess sum/amount between the tag price and
discount price of each and every items sold by her to company
customers, in the sum of P4,755.00, belonging to the said
WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and
prejudice in the amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Petitioners, Benitez and Javier, with the assistance of their
respective counsel, pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.6 Flormarie has remained at large.
By Order of December 10, 1997, Criminal Case No. Q-9667828, the case against Javier, was dismissed on account of the
desistance of the private complainant.7 The remaining cases
against petitioners and Benitez were consolidated for joint trial.
By Decision of May 28, 1998, the trial court found the accusedherein petitioners and Benitez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Theft and were accordingly sentenced as follows:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67827
Accused Roberto F. Benitez, Rosario Astudillo a.k.a.
"Baby", and Filipina Orellana y Macaraeg shall each suffer
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of
reclusion temporal, and to pay the amount of P797,984.00,
jointly and severally for their civil liability;

62

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67829

Accused Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby", shall suffer
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of
reclusion temporal, and to pay the amount of P12,665.00 for
her civil liability;
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67830
Accused Filipina Orellana y Macaraeg, shall suffer
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY,as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of
reclusion temporal, and to pay the sum of P4,755.00for her civil
liability; and
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67831
Accused Roberto F. Benitez, shall suffer imprisonment
of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum,
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of reclusion
temporal, and to pay the amount of P11,079.00 for his civil
liability.
The penalties imposed on all the accused are quite harsh, but as
the maxim goes, "Dura Lex Sed Lex", the Court could not
impose otherwise.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners and Benitez elevated their cases on appeal. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with
modification as to the penalties imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 28, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78 isAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, appellants Roberto
Benitez, Rosario Astudillo and Filipina Orellana are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor in its maximum period to 15 years of reclusion
temporalas maximum, and to pay to the offended party the
amount of P797,984.00, jointly and severally, as reparation for
the unrecovered stolen merchandise;
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67829, appellant Rosario Astudillo
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 10 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum, and to pay to the offended party amount
of P12,665.00 as reparation for the stolen goods.
3. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67830, appellant Filipina Orellana
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day of prision correccional in its maximum period
as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium
period as maximum and to pay to the offended party the amount
of P4,755.00 as reparation for the stolen property;
4. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67831, appellant Roberto Benitez
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its minimum period as minimum to 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period as

maximumand to pay to the offended party the amount

of P11,079.00 as reparation for the stolen goods.
SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
After petitioners and Benitezs respective Motions for
Reconsideration were denied by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners filed these separate petitions for review which were,
on motion of the Office of the Solicitor General, ordered
consolidated.10
In her petition, Rosario proffers the following assignment of
errors:
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
CONSIDERED AN APOLOGY FOR BREACH OF PROCEDURE
AS AN ADMISSION OF A CRIME.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT DEPARTED [FROM]
THE NORMAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND
CONVICTED PETITIONER OF THE OFFENSE OF
THEFT WITHOUT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL
TAKING.
THE COURT OF A QUO (sic) GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TO ARRIVE AT CONCLUSIONS OF
FACTS BY INDECENTLY CONSIDERING AND DISTORTING
EVIDENCE TO CONFORM TO ITS FLAWED
CONCLUSION.11 (Underscoring supplied)
On her part, Filipina raises the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FILIPINA
ORELLANA Y MACARAEG OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
WHETHER OR NOT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION
OBTAINED THROUGH TRICKERY AND SCHEME WITHOUT
THE BENEFIT AND ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS A
SUFFICIENT GROUND TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED
WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY MAY BE PROVED SIMPLY
ON THE GROUND THAT ALL ACCUSED ARE COEMPLOYEES AND WORKING IN ONE
COMPANY12 (Underscoring supplied)
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is
gathered:
Petitioners were hired by Western, a chain of appliance stores,
as salespersons at its branch at P. Tuazon Boulevard in Cubao,
Quezon City. Benitez and Flormarie were hired as floor manager
and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively, at the same
branch of Western.13
On February 21, 1996, in the course of preparing the January
monthly sales report of the P. Tuason branch of Western, Branch
Accountant Marlon Camilo (Camilo) noticed that the computer
printout of the monthly sales report revealed a belated entry for
Cash Sales Invoice No. 128366. Upon verification from
Westerns head office, Camilo learned that the branch received
the booklet containing 50 cash sales invoices to which Invoice
No. 128366 formed part.
Camilo then confirmed that the booklet of sales invoices bearing
numbers 128351 up to 128400 was missing. And he noted that

63

the daily cash collection report did not reflect any remittance of
payments from the transactions covered by the said invoices.

In a still subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina made a written

statement in the formers presence reading:

Some cash sales invoices were later recovered. From recovered

Invoice No. 128366, Camilo found out that Flormarie was the
one who filled it up and received the payment reflected therein.

Ako po si Lina M. Orellana na nangangako kay Ate Lily

na hinding-hindi ko na uulitin iyong naglalabas ng mga items
tulad ng cookware set at casserole na ang mga kasama ko po
rito ay sina Lolit, Norma, Robert na isinagawa namin. Na kami
po si Robert ang nagsabi kay Lolit na maglabas ng stock pero
bago po namin ginagawa iyon nagsabi po kami kay Lolit na
sumagot naman ng ng oo pero kami po ni Robert and
nagkumbinsi sa dalawa. Kung mauulit pa ho ito kung anuman po
ang gusto ni Mam Lily na gawin sa akin ay lubos ko pong
tatanggapin.18 (Underscoring supplied)

From recovered Invoice Nos. 128358 and 128375, Camilo found

out that the goods covered thereby were missing. Concluding
that the transactions under the said invoices were made but no
payment was remitted to Western, Camilo reported the matter to
Ma. Aurora Borja (Aurora), the branch assistant manager.
Benitez soon approached Camilo and requested him not to
report the matter to the management, he cautioning that many
would be involved.
Aurora and Camilo later met with Benitez, Filipina, cashiers Rita
Lorenzo (Rita) and Norma Ricafort (Norma) during which
Benitez and Filipina pleaded with Camilo not to report the matter
to the management. Flormarie, who called on Camilo by
telephone, made a similar plea as she admitted to stealing the
missing booklet of invoices, she explaining that her father was
sick and had to undergo medical operation, and offering to pay
for the goods covered thereby.14
In the meantime, Flormarie had gone absent without leave.
Aurora eventually reported the case of the missing invoices and
the shortage of cash sales collection to Westerns branch
manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily).15
In a subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina admitted having
brought home some appliances while Benitez gave a
handwritten statement reading:16
Ako si Roberto F. Benitez ay humihingi po ako ng tawad kay
Mrs. Lily Ong at Western Marketing Corp. Ang mga kasalanan
ako po ay:

Also in a meeting with Lily, Rosario, who was earlier implicated

by Flormaries husband in his telephone conversation with
Aurora,19 wrote:
Mam Lily,
Sana ho Ate Lily patawarin ninyo ako sa nagawa kong
kasalanan, regarding sa "Short-over". Siguro ho nagawa ko lang
ho yon sa pakikisama sa kanila, sa mga kasamahan ko dito sa
Nuestra, alam ko ho na mali yon kaya pinagsisisihan ko ho yon.
Sana ho mapatawad ninyo ako sa nagawa kong kasalan.
Yun pong tungkol sa kaso ni Marie, wala ho akong alam don.
Kumare ko nga ho sya pero yung pagnanakaw niyang ginawa
wala akong kinalaman don. Kahit ho siguro magkautang-utang
ako hindi ko magagawa yon.
Inuulit ko ho, sana ho mapatawad ninyo uli ako sa nagawa kong
kasalanan at pinapangako ko ho nahinding-hindi ko na uulitin.
Maraming salamat ho,
(Sgd.)Baby Astudillo
P.S. yun ho palang perang na-oover naming, pinaghahatian po
namin nila Rita at ni Marie.20(Underscoring supplied)

1) Ang pagkuha ng Promo na dapat ay para sa Customer.

2) Ang paggamit ng gift check na para rin sa Customer ang
kinukuha ko at ako ang gumagamit.
3) Ang pagamit na rin sa Pera na tinatawag na Short-Over ay
amin ding ginagawa. Example nagbayad ang Customer ng 9000
and C.P. 8,900 and 9,000 ay nasulat sa original na INV.

Still in a separate meeting with Lily and her siblings on one

hand, and Flormarie and her husband on the other, Flormarie
wrote what she knew of the incident as follows:
Ito ang nalalaman ko kung paanong nangyari ito sa loob ng
tindahan ng Western Mktg. P. Tuazon Branch.
*SHORT-OVER

4) Ang pagkuha na rin ng mga Product tulad ng sumusunod, na

ako nagplano at si Ate Lina.
Kay Ate Lolit Tiffin Carrier

Ang tag price, kung ang customer ay hindi tumawad, binabago

na lang ang presyo sa duplicate copy and then kinukuha na lang
sa cashier ang pera tapos naghahati-hati na lang si robert,
baby, lina, lolit, Rita at Marie, Norma, Fe.

Cookware Set 7 pcs.

xxx
Ate Lina Cookware Set 7 pcs.
*INVOICE
Norma Cookware Set 7 pcs. Airpot Lemon
Robert National Elec. Stove HNK-211 Rice Bowl
Ito lahat ay nilabas namin ng linggo 02-18-96 ng gabi. Ako po ay
nangangako na hindi na ito uulitin ang lahat ng mga kasalanan
sa Western ay kay Mrs. Lily Ong at Pinapangako ko po na
Sumpa man kasama ang pamilya at salamat din po dahil ako ay
pinatawad nila at binigyan pa ng isang pagkakataon. Maraming
maraming salamat po.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ito ay itinuro sa akin ni Kuya Robert, kukunin ko ang invoice at

pagkatapos binigyan niya ako ng (3 resibo series) at hindi ko na
po alam kung anong ginawa na niya sa invoice.
Ang paraan magreresibo ako tatatakan ko ng paid kasama kung
sino ang taong maglalabas ng unit tapos ibebenta ko na yong
unit yung pera kinukuha ko na bibigyan ko lang siya ng kahit
magkanong amount kung sino yong taong inutusan
ko.21 (Underscoring supplied)

64

Flormarie, in the company of her sister Delma and Lily,

subsequently appeared before a notary public to execute a
similar statement reading:
xxxx
2. Ako ngayon ay kusang loob na lumapit sa Western
upang humingi ng kapatawaran sa aking mga nagawa at upang
makipagkasundo sa isang maayos na pagbabayad sa mga
halagang aking nakuha sa Western at mahalaga sa lahat, upang
isiwalat ang mga taong kasangkot sa katiwaliang ito at mga
paraan ng paggawa nito.
3. Halos lahat ng mga kawani ng tindahan ay kasangkot sa mga
sumusunod na katiwalian:

S : Ganito po ang ginawa ko, iniuwi ko sa aming bahay yung

tatlong series ng resibo na ibinigay sa akin ni ROBERT
BENITEZ at tinuruan po niya ako na sulatan ko yung mga resibo
ng mga items na gusto kong ilabas, at pagkatapos po ay ibinalik
ko ito sa Western Marketing Corp at binigay ko ito kay ROBERT
BENITEZ, at ang sabi niya sa akin ay siya na raw ang bahala na
magpalabas noong mga items na aking isinulat sa resibo.
xxxx
T : Bukod kay ROBERT BENITEZ may mga tao bang karamay
sa naganap na transaksiyon?
S : Mayroon po.
T : Sino-sino ito?

3.1. Short-Over Ito ay ang pagtatala ng mas mababang halaga

ng paninda sa mga "duplicate copies" ng resibo kapag ang
kustomer ay hindi tumawad sa "tag price" at nagbayad ng
"cash". Ang sobrang halaga ay pinaghahatian namin nina
ROBERT BENITEZ ("Robert"); ROSARIO ALTUDILLO
("Baby"); FILIPINA ORELLANA ("Lina"); LOLIT BORJA ("Lolit");
RITA LORENZO ("Rita"); NORMA RICAFORT ("Norma") at FE
CABIGAN ("Fe").
xxxx
3.3. INVOICING Sa pamamagitan ng mga resibong na may
tatak na "paid" na ibinibigay ni Robert sa aking nailalabas ko ang
mga paninda na akin namang naibebenta.22
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Flormarie and her sister, together with Lily, later executed a
statement before Cubao SPO1 Jose Gil Gregorio, reading:
TANONG: Ayon kay MARLON CAMILO, Western Marketing
Corp Branch Accountant nadiskubre niya ang pagkawala ng
isang booklet ng Sales Cash Invoice (50pcs.) na may numerong
128351 to 128400 nitong mga nakaraang araw may kinalaman
ka ba sa nasabing pangyayari?
SAGOT: Opo.
T : Kung mayroon kang kinalaman sa nasabing pangyayari ito
ba ay kusang loob mong ginawa?
S : Itinuro lang po ito sa akin.
T : Ano ang iyong ginawa?
S : Ako po ang kumuha noong nawawalang isang booklet ng
Cash Sales Invoice sa turo ni ROBERT BENITEZ na Sales
Supervisor sa Western Marketing Corp.
xxxx
T : Sa tatlong series ng Cash Sales Invoice na napunta sa iyo
ano ang iyong ginawa?
S : Ginamit ko po ito sa paglalabas ng mga items/unit sa
Western Marketing Corp.
xxxx
T : Sa maikling salaysay, ikuwento mo nga sa akin kung
papaano mo isinagawa ang iyong pagnanakaw sa pag-gamit ng
mga Cash Sales Invoice?

S : Sina LINA ORELLANA po, Sales Lady po, ROSARIO

ASTUDILLO, sales lady.
T : Sa iyong pagkakaalam, ano ang kanilang mga partisipasyon
na naganap na transaksiyon?
S : Si LINA ORELLANA po ang sales lady, at siya rin ang may
pirma doon sa resibo, at ganoon din po itong si ROSARIO
ASTUDILLO.
xxxx
T : Magkano naman ang ibinibigay sa iyo ni ROBERT BENITEZ
kapag nailabas ng yung mga items doon sa resibo na iyong
ginawa?
S : Hindi ko na po matandaan basta pinapartihan niya ako at
yung dalawang sales lady.23 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In an inventory of stocks conducted at the branch office of
Western, several other appliances were found missing as were
unauthorized deductions from the cash collections.24 The total
missing merchandise was valued atP797,984.00 as reflected in
the inventory report.25 And discrepancies between the actual
sales per cash sales invoice and the cash remittance to the
company in the sum of P34,376.00 for the period from January
1994 to February 199626 were also discovered, prompting
Western to initiate the criminal complaints for Qualified Theft.
Both petitioners raise as issue whether the employees extrajudicial admissions taken before an employer in the course of an
administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed
against them.
Petitioners posit in the negative. They argue that as their extrajudicial statements were taken without the assistance of counsel,
they are inadmissible in evidence, following Section 12, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.27
It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally
offered its evidence, petitioners failed to file any objection
thereto including their extra-judicial admissions.28 At any rate,
this Court answers the issue in the affirmative. People v.
Ayson29 is instructive:
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody
interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an
adversary proceeding against the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him

65

in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an

attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional
rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated,
by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ayson adds:
The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at
the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do
so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be
absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against
him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel
and to be informed thereof, etc) which, to repeat, are relevant in
custodial investigations.31
People v. Tin Lan Uy, Jr. 32 is similarly instructive:
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional
provision invoked by accused-appellant are not
available before government investigators enter the picture.
Thus we held in one case (People v. Ayson, [supra])
that admissions made during the course of
an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not
come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of
the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions
or confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal
admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal
confidante and not in his official capacity. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that
petitioners were not under custodial investigation to call for the
presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written
incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.
The extra-judicial confession33 before the police of Flormarie
(who, as earlier stated, has remained at large) in which she
incriminated petitioners bears a different complexion, however,
as it was made under custodial investigation. When she gave
the statement, the investigation was no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular
suspect. The records show that Camilo had priorly reported the
thievery to the same police authorities and identified Flormarie
and Benitez as initial suspects.

It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial

that prior to in-custody questioning, the confessant was informed
of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of
official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption
of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting
officers complied with these constitutional safeguards,
extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot
be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words,
confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article
III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the
declarant and more so against third persons. This is so even
if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily
given.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners at all events argue that their written statements were
obtained through deceit, promise, trickery and scheme, they
claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is
nothing on record, however, buttressing petitioners claim other
than their self-serving assertion. The presumption that no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience35 such that it is
presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved thus
stands.36
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the written
admissions likewise militate against petitioners bare claim.
Petitioners admittedly wrote their respective letters during office
hours in Lilys office which was located in the same open booth
or counter occupied by the cashier and credit card incharge.37 And this Court takes note of the observation of the trial
court that petitioners written notes were "neatly written in
Tagalog, and not in broken Tagalog as spoken by Lily Ong".38
In another vein, Rosario labels her written statement as a mere
"apology for breach of procedure".39 Her resort to semantics
deserves scant consideration, however. A cursory reading of her
letter reveals that she confessed to the taking of "short-over."
There is a "short-over" when there is a discrepancy between
the actual amount collected appearing in the yellow (warehouse)
copy and the remitted amount appearing in the blue (accounting)
copy.40
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a
confession. It is but a statement of facts by the accused, direct
or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which
he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths
charged. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or
circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of
guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in
express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.41
The issue on the admissibility of petitioners respective extrajudicial statements aside, an examination of the rest of the
evidence of the prosecution does not set petitioners free.
The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things.42
Theft becomes qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a

66

domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of

confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the
property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6)
the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.43

Q : So when Filipina Orellana refers this customer to the

invoicer, the invoicer now will take over from that
function of Filipina Orellana after referring this customer?

Cashier Rita testified in a detailed and categorical manner how

the petitioners took the alleged amounts of "short-over"
deducted from the sum of cash collections. The tampered
invoices presented by the prosecution which glaringly show the
variance in the amounts corroborate Ritas claim.

A : Yes, sir.

Rosario contends, however, that there was no "unlawful taking"

since the amounts of "short-over" did not belong to Western. The
argument does not lie. The "excess" sums formed part of the
selling price and were paid to, and received by, Western. The
discrepancy in the amounts came about on account of the
alteration in the copies of the invoices which should have
faithfully reflected the same amount paid by the customer.
As for petitioners claim of entitlement to the "excess" amounts
as salespersons commission, it was not established in
evidence.
Even assuming that the "short-over" was intended to defray
sundry expenses, it was not incumbent upon the salespersons
to claim them and automatically apply them to the miscellaneous
charges. It was beyond the nature of their functions. The
utilization of the "short-over" was not left to the discretion of the
salespersons. The element of unlawful taking was thus
established.
A further review of the nature of petitioners functions shows,
however, that the element of grave abuse of confidence is
wanting in the case.
Q : As an accountant employee since June 1995, Mr. Witness,
you are familiar that in the procedure in any particular branch of
Western Marketing Corporation, are you aware if somebody
buys an item from one store, do you know the flow of this sale?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : In fact, in the store there are employees which are assigned
with specific duties or functions, is it not?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Like for instance, lets take the case of Filipina Orellana. Her
function is merely to entertain customers who go to the store
and intend to buy one of the items that are displayed, is it not?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : So, if this customer is resolved to buy one item, Filipina
Orellana as a sales clerk, all she has to do is to refer the
particular customer to another employee of the company, is that
correct?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Now, you have also employees who are preparing invoices,
they are called invoicers, is it not?
A : Yes, sir.

A : Yes, sir.
Q : And this invoicer now will refer the invoice for this particular
item for payment to the cashier of the company, is it not?

Q : And it is the cashier who will receive the payment from this
customer?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And in fact, the customer or the cashier will receive the exact
amount of payment as reflected in the invoice that was prepared
by the invoicer, is it not?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : From that point up to the payment, Filipina Orellana has
no more hand in that particular transaction, her function is
only to entertain and refer the customer for sales purposes,
that is correct?
A : Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied)
Mere circumstance that petitioners were employees of Western
does not suffice to create the relation of confidence and intimacy
that the law requires.45 The element of grave abuse of
confidence requires that there be a relation of independence,
guardianship or vigilance between the petitioners and
Western.46 Petitioners were not tasked to collect or receive
payments. They had no hand in the safekeeping, preparation
and issuance of invoices. They merely assisted customers in
making a purchase and in demonstrating the merchandise to
prospective buyers.47 While they had access to the merchandise,
they had no access to the cashiers booth or to the cash
payments subject of the offense.
Lily conceded that petitioners were merely tasked to "assist in
the sales from day to day"48 while Camilo admitted that the
cashier is the custodian of the cash sales invoices and that no
other person can handle or access them.49 The limited and
peculiar function of petitioners as salespersons explains the lack
of that fiduciary relationship and level of confidence reposed on
them by Western, which the law on Qualified Theft requires to be
proven to have been gravely abused. Mere breach of trust is not
enough. Where the relationship did not involve strict confidence,
whose violation did not involve grave abuse thereof, the offense
committed is only simple theft.50 Petitioners should therefore be
convicted of simple theft, instead of Qualified Theft.
On Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827 respecting
petitioners collective guilt in taking away merchandise by
making it appear that certain items were purchased with the use
of stolen cash sales invoices:
It is settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it. To effectively serve as a basis for
conviction, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the
criminal act. Direct proof is not absolutely required for the
purpose.
A review of the inference drawn from petitioners acts before,
during, and after the commission of the crime to indubitably

67

indicate a joint purpose, concert of action and community of

interest is thus in order.51

P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The

end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty.

In Rosarios case, the Office of the Solicitor General made a

sweeping conclusion that the extent of her participation in the
act of taking merchandise need not be specified since she
attributed her other act of taking "short-over" to "pakikisama" or
companionship.52 The conclusion does not persuade.

The total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed
20 years, however.

Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.53 As

indicated early on, there were two different sets of imputed acts,
one individual and the other collective. Rosarios admission was
material only to her individual guilt as she referred only to the
"short-over". The wording of her admission cannot be construed
to extend to the other offense charging conspiracy under which
no overt act was established to prove that Rosario shared with,
and concurred in, the criminal design of taking away Westerns
merchandise.1wphi1
The prosecution relied on Auroras statement that Flormaries
husband mentioned Rosario as among those involved in the
anomaly.54 Under the hearsay evidence rule, however, a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, those which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules.55
Aurora testified that she witnessed Filipina, along with Benitez,
in inter alia hiring third persons to pose as customers who
received the items upon presenting the tampered invoice.56
Filipina in fact gave a written statement acknowledging her own
act of asporting the merchandise. The rule is explicit that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.57 The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.58
Moreover, Filipinas statement dovetailed with Benitezs
admission, which was corroborated by Flormaries
confessions.59 In cases alleging conspiracy, an extra-judicial
confession is admissible against a co-conspirator as a
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of
said co-conspirator in the crime committed. 60
Except with respect to Rosario, then, this Court finds well-taken
the trial courts observation that the admissions were full of
substantial details as to how the accused conspired to commit
the criminal acts and as to how they manipulated the sales
transactions at Western to effect and consummate the theft of
the goods.
In fine, insofar as Filipina is concerned, a thorough evaluation of
the evidence warrants the affirmance of her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of having conspired with Benitez et al.
On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado61 is
instructive. In the determination of the penalty for Qualified Theft,
note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which
is P797,984.00. Since the value exceedsP22,000.00, the basic
penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to
be imposed in the maximum period Eight (8) Years, Eight (8)
Months and One (1) Day to Ten (10) Years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, the amount
of P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,984.00, which yields a
remainder of P775,984.00. This amount is then divided by

As for the penalty for Qualified Theft, it is two degrees higher

than that for Simple Theft, hence, the correct penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 18, 2002 is MODIFIED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67829, petitioner ROSARIO V.
ASTUDILLO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple
Theft, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods as
minimum, to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods as
maximum, and to pay to the offended party the amount
of P12,665.00 as civil liability.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67830, petitioner FILIPINA M.
ORELLANA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple
Theft, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Two (2) Months, and One (1) Day of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods as minimum, to One
(1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods as maximum,
and to pay to the offended party the amount of P4,755.00 as civil
liability.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, petitioner ROSARIO V.
ASTUDILLO is acquitted.
In all other respects, the assailed Decision is affirmed except
that petitioner FILIPINA M. ORELLANA is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102786 August 14, 1998

ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated June 18, 1991, which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding petitioner Alejandro
B. de la Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an
indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum, and ordering him
to indemnify the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), the
offended party, in the amount of P41,786.000.
The facts are as follows:

68

In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an

electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned to inspect six electric
meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel and
Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, discovered that the said
electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to the
MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On April
20,1989, Manalo and Felino Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave
statements to the Northern Police District at Camp Karingal,
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding the loss of the electric
meters. They suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have
damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and that
to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the
electric meters. They expressed suspicion that MERALCO
personnel were involved.
Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case,
proceeded to the scene of the crime and inquired from people
he saw there if they had seen the electric meters being taken
down from the post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to
Enopia, one of those he asked, Danilo Garcia, said he had seen
at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a
MERALCO service truck, with the number 522 painted on its
side, removing the electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia
asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom
turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO
service truck number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned
to it.
On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD
headquarters for investigation. They were included in a line-up of
eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de la Torre as the
leader of the group which took down the electric meters from the
CAPASSCO premises, but he did not recognize the three (3)
other crewmembers.
Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario,
Edgar Enopia, and Danilo Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor
Demetrio Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an information
charging petitioner de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in
Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
That on or about the 11th day of April, 1989, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
ALEJANDRO DELA TORRE Y BERNAL, being then employed
as leadman of a 5-men service crew of linemen of MERALCO,
with grave abuse of confidence, in conspiracy with his coaccused JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLES DOE,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
following properties owned by the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) which were installed at the premises of the
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL AND SMELTING CORPORATION
(CAPASSCO), located at No. 292 P. dela Cruz Street, San
Bartolome, Novaliches, this City, customers of the aforesaid
MERALCO, to wit:
One (1) GE Type C-9,
120 volts, Co. No. 42GRM-219 P13,025.00
One (1) GE Type VW-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41G208 4,997.06
One (1) GE Type V-63-A,

120 volts, Co. No. 41 GD-558 2,870.94

One (1) GE Type G-9,
139 volts, 3 phase, No. 42GRIM 1091 13,025.00
One (1) WH Type
D4A-2, 3 phase, Co. No. 41D4AW-92 4,997.06
One (1) Reactive Meter,
No. 41CA-34 2,870.94
with an aggregate value of P41,786.00, Philippine Currency,
belonging to MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, represented by
FELINO R. OLEGARIO, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City,
presided over by Judge Pacita Caizares-Nye. Trial was held
from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a decision
rendered on March 16, 1990, Judge Caizares-Nye, relying
heavily on the testimony of Garcia, found petitioner de la Torre
guilty of Qualified Theft and thus sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum; and ordered him to pay MERALCO the
amount of P41,786.00.
Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals,
contending first, that his constitutional rights were violated during
the custodial investigation conducted in the case; second, that
the RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, when the same were not formally
offered; third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence
in arriving at its judgment; and fourth, that the uncorroborated
testimony of Garcia was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Court of Appeals 2 affirmed the
lower court's decision. 3 The Court of Appeals subsequently
denied reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
First. Petitioner de la Torre alleges violation of his constitutional
rights under Art. III, 12 (1) of the Constitution which provides
that "any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed of his
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel
during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD
headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO service
truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up. He further
invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same 12 that "any
confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him."
In Gamboa v. Cruz, 4 this Court ruled that "no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the
right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made
in writing and in the presence of counsel." 5 However, this
applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to
ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions,

69

confessions, or any information from the accused. A police lineup is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is
conducted before that stage is reached. 6
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other
crewmembers of MERALCO truck number 522, was merely
included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was
picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group which had
removed the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises.
Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner.
Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the questions
were directed to witnesses of the complainant. There is,
therefore, no basis for petitioner's allegations that his rights as a
suspect in a custodial interrogation were violated.
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in
evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when the
fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not
formally offered as required by Rule 132, 35 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, as held in People v. Java: 7
. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
that for evidence to be considered, it should be formally offered
and the purpose specified. . . .
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the
said rule which became effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the
testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is
called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the
testimonial evidence at the end of the trial after all the witnesses
had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice
whether the witness to be presented is a material witness and
should be heard, or a witness who would be testifying on
irrelevant matters or on facts already testified to by other
witnesses and should, therefore, be stopped from testifying
further.
. . . Sec. 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection
in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was
made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on
appeal will not be considered. 8
Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of
Appeals. He thus waived his objection by his failure to raise it at
the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the
trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from
December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. That was after the
adoption of the new rule which required that the offer be made at
the beginning of the testimony of a witness. Petitioner should
have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their testimonies,
then at least at the time their testimonies were formally offered at
the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not
having done so, he must be deemed to have waived his
objection based on this ground. Consequently, the trial court
committed no error in considering the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such
testimonies had not been offered before they were given.

witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a

different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally." The reason for this rule is two-fold: to afford the
judge the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witness
and to allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining him.
Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value. The explanation for this is given
in People v. Valero, thus: 9
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation
of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that
violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the
striking out of the same does not give such evidence any
probative value. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In this case, documents material to the guilt of the accused were
admitted without the prosecution presenting in court those who
executed them, to wit: Exhibit M, certification signed by a certain
G.B. Pilapil, Jr., which states that MERALCO did not send out
any personnel to inspect the electrical installations at
CAPASSCO during the period April 11, 1989 to April 12, 1989;
Exhibit N, certification issued by one Vitaliano A. Dizon, which
states that MERALCO did not receive any complaint from
CAPASSCO concerning the electric meters in question during
the same period; and Exhibit P, certification given by a certain
E.M. Lopez, Jr., stating that MERALCO did not authorize any of
its employees to remove the subject electric meters.
These documents contain statements of facts and, therefore,
those who made them should have been presented in court so
that they could be cross-examined by the defense. Otherwise,
whatever matter they contain is hearsay and, consequently,
without probative value.
Fourth. We likewise agree with the final point raised by
petitioner, namely, that the evidence for the prosecution at the
trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court convicted petitioner solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of Danilo Garcia.
Garcia claimed that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989, while
he was waiting for his wife in front of the CAPASSCO compound
on P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon
City, he saw petitioner supervising the other crewmembers of a
MERALCO service truck number 522 in bringing down the six
electric meters from the MERALCO post at the CAPASSCO
compound. According to Garcia, he noticed the Meralco truck
parked below the Meralco post outside the CAPASSCO gate.
The truck was equipped with a crane-like structure to which was
attached a basket in which two men rode. The basket was raised
toward the Meralco post while two or three men remained on the
ground next to the Meralco truck. One man was giving
instructions to the men removing the meters. Garcia recognized
the truck to be that of Meralco because of its familiar orange
color. Thus, he testified:

Third. Petitioner claims that, in violation of the hearsay rule,

written statements pertaining to disputed facts were considered
by the trial court in its decision without presenting the declarants
at the trial for examination.

Q: While conversing with your friends at a sidewalk beside

CAPASSCO, did you observe any unusual incident?

Rule 132, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the

examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be
done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the

Q: Could you please tell us what is this unusual incident that you
observed?

A: There is, sir.

70

A: Yes, sir, a MERALCO truck was parked and the basket was
being raised to the post.
Q: And could you please tell us what happened after the basket
was raised to the post, Mr. Witness?
A: While the basket was being raised to the post with two (2)
men on board, another one was giving instructions from below.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the adjustment of the basket, what happened, Mr.
Witness?
A: Then, they opened the box that was attached to the wall of
CAPASSCO while the other one was tampering the meters and
handing it to his companion who was with him in the basket.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, could you recognize the two (2) men aboard the
basket if you have the opportunity of seeing them again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other man who was giving instructions on the
ground? Can you recognize that person if you have the
opportunity of seeing him again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you look around inside the courtroom if he is here?
A: No, sir.
Q: I will show you photographs of several persons. Can you
identify the person whom you saw giving instructions on April 11,
1989?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(Witness pointed to a photograph of Alejandro de la Torre which
appears on the bailbond filed by the accused.)

phenomenal memory to be able to recall almost three months

after the incident the appearance of a complete stranger whom
he had seen only once. The removal of electric meters by
crewmembers of MERALCO was hardly a remarkable event that
would have deserved the attention to detail that Garcia, a mere
chance passerby, apparently lavished upon it. As this Court said
in People v. Ibal: 11
. . . the presence of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a
witness could be an indication of truth. A witness whose
testimony is perfect in all aspects, without a flaw and
remembering even the minutest details which jibe beautifully
with one another, lays himself open to suspicion of having been
coached or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.
On the other hand, if, as Garcia said, he noticed that the
MERALCO men were "tampering with the meters," it is a source
of wonder why he did not report the matter to the barangay
authorities.
Not only is the testimony of Danilo Garcia improbable. His
credibility as a witness is likewise doubtful in view of the
testimony of Pio Bautista, a council member of Barangay San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. He testified that Danilo
Garcia was not known to residents of P. de la Cruz Street in San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. According to Bautista, he
made inquiries upon the request of petitioner de la Torre
concerning the residence address of Garcia. Bautista testified:
Q: . . . Were you able to make some exhaustive inquiries of Mr.
Danilo Garcia which he said in his sworn statement "nakatira sa
looban of P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Quezon City?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then what happened when you went in looban, P. de la
Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City?
A: Nobody was able to tell me that a certain Danilo Garcia
resides in that place. 12
Evidence to be believed must come from a credible witness and
must itself be credible.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and
petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre is ACQUITTED on the ground
of reasonable doubt.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.
Q: Can you remember the body number of the truck, Mr.
Witness?
A: Body number 522, sir.

EN BANC

Q: You stated that it was Body No. 522. Why do you say that it is
522, Mr. Witness?

G.R. No. 129970

A: It so happened that I won in the jueteng, sir. 10

To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is
sufficient basis for the conviction of the accused if it is credible,
positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
latter is guilty. However, in the case at bar, the answers given by
Garcia to questions asked during his direct examination fall short
of this standard. First, Garcia must have an extremely acute
sense of perception to recall a feature of the MERALCO service
truck, such as its number, which at the time had absolutely no
significance for him. His claim that he remembered the number
because it was the number of a winning bet in "jueteng" is too
facile to be convincing. Second, Garcia must have a

April 5, 2000

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PAVILLARE y VARONA and SOTERO SANTOS y
CRUZ,
accused,
EDUARDO
PAVILLARE
y
VARONA, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case no. Q9665214 entitled People vs. Eduardo Pavillare y Varona, a
prosecution for kidnapping for ransom.

71

On March 14, 1996 the accused-appellant and his co-accused

were criminally charged as follows:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses EDUARDO PAVILLARE Y VARONA
and SOTERO SANTOS Y CRUZ of the crime of kidnapping for
Ransom, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of February, 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines,
the
above-named
accused,
conspiring,
confederating with another person, whose true name, identity
and whereabouts had not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, by means of force, violence and/or
intimidation did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one SUKHJINDER SINGH at the corner of
Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, this City, and thereafter
brought him at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston
street, this City, for the purpose of extorting ransom money in the
amount of P20,000.00 Philippine currency, thereby detaining and
depriving him of his liberty for more than three hours, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
On April 29, 1996 both accused were arraigned and both
pleaded "not guilty".
The accused Sotero Santos y Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss the
charge against him for failure of the private complainant to
identify him as one of the malefactors. On February 28, 1997 the
trial court granted the motion and acquitted accused Sotero
Santos. The trial of the case proceeded only as against the
accused-appellant Pavillare.
The private complainant, an Indian national named Sukhjinder
Singh testified in court that at about noon of February 12, 1996
while he was on his way back to his motorcycle parked at the
corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, three men blocked
his way. The one directly in front of him, whom he later identified
as herein accused-appellant, accused him of having raped the
woman inside the red Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied
the accusation, the three men nevertheless forced him inside the
taxi cab and brought him somewhere near St. Joseph's College
in Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his
motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. Singh testified that
the accused-appellant and his companions beat him up and
demanded one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for his
release but Singh told him he only had five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) with him. The accused-appellant forced him to give
the phone numbers of his relatives so they can make their
demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his cousin
Lakhvir Singh and the appellant made the call. The private
complainant also stated in court that it was the accusedappellant who haggled with his cousin for the amount of the
ransom.1 When the amount of twenty five thousand was agreed
upon the complainant stated that the kidnappers took him to the
corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston streets and parked the
cab there. The accused-appellant and two of the male abductors
alighted while the driver and their lady companion stayed with
the complainant in the car. When the complainant turned to see
where the accused-appellant and his companions went he saw
his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle and together with the
kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers
brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his
relatives. The ransom money was handed to the appellant by the
complainant's cousin, after which the accused-appellant counted
the money and then, together with his cohorts, immediately left
the scene.2
Lakhvir Singh, the complainant's cousin, testified in court that
the kidnappers made about three to four phone calls a few
minutes apart. The kidnappers allowed him to talk to the private
complainant to prove that he is indeed in their custody. The
kidnappers also told Lakhvir that his cousin, Sukhjinder, raped
their companion and threatened that unless Lakhvir pays one
hundred thousand pesos for Sukhjinder's release "tutuluyan

namin ito". Lakhvir told the kidnappers he does not have that
much money and after some haggling the kidnappers settled for
twenty five thousand pesos.3 The kidnappers also gave
instructions to deliver the money outside the Aurora Boulevard
branch of the Land Bank near the old Arcega's movie house.
Lakhvir stated in court that he did as instructed. When he and
another relative reached the designated place three men
approached him and one of them, whom he identified in court as
the accused-appellant herein, asked him "Ano dala mo ang
pera?" Lakhvir said "yes" but he refused to give the money until
he saw his cousin. One of the kidnappers told him to follow them
and they proceeded to a mini-grocery nearby. A few minutes
later one of the kidnappers came with his cousin. Lakhvir
handed the money to the accused-appellant who counted it
before leaving with his companions.4
SPO1 Eduardo Frias testified for the prosecution that he was the
police officer who took the sworn statement of the private
complainant on February 14, 1996 pertaining to the February 12,
1996 incident.5 When the accused-appellant was apprehended
in connection with another case involving the kidnapping of
another Indian national the private complainant herein again
showed up at the police station on March 11, 1996 and identified
the accused-appellant as one of his kidnappers. Another sworn
statement was executed by the private complainant after he
identified the accused-appellant at the police station.6
For the defense, the accused-appellant testified that on the
whole day of February 12, 1996, the alleged date of the incident,
he was at the job site in Novaliches where he had contracted to
build the house of a client and that he could not have been
anywhere near Roces Avenue at the time the complainant was
allegedly kidnapped.7One of his employees, an electrician,
testified that the accused-appellant was indeed at the job site in
Novaliches the whole day of February 12, 1996. 8
On July 15, 1997 the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding EDUARDO PAVILLARE guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of kidnapping
for the purpose of ransom, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Death; to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of P20,000.00, as actual damages, with interest at
6% percent per annum from February 12, 1996; to pay him the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
The Branch clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately
transmit the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.9
This case is before us on automatic review.
The accused-appellant Pavillare prays for an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt. On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant
was apprehended in connection with the kidnapping of another
Indian national. While under police custody the appellant was
required to stand in a police line-up where he was supposedly
identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors.
Five separate charges arising from five separate incidents of
kidnapping, all of whom were Indian nationals, were filed against
him. He claims that he was identified by the private complainant
as one of his abductors because the Indians needed a
"scapegoat" for the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian
nationals then pending.
The appellant argues that the private complainant could not
identify his captors by himself which is shown by the
inconsistencies in his testimony and by the improper suggestion
made by the investigating police officer pointing to the accusedappellant as one of the malefactors. In court the private
complainant stated that he described his abductors to the police
investigator while the latter typed his sworn statement. He said
that two of the abductors look like policemen, the third one was
"tall, a little bit aged" and the other one was the driver. Their
female companion was pretty. Pavillare points out however, that

72

the sworn statement given by the private complainant does not

contain a physical description of the kidnappers and that SPO1
Frias, who took the complainant's statement, testified in court
that the complainant described one of his abductors as short,
bejeweled and with a pock marked face. The different
descriptions allegedly given by the private complainant and the
absence of a physical description of the kidnappers in his sworn
statement supports the accused-appellant's contention that the
complainant could not describe his abductors. Pavillare
contends that his arrest in connection with a different case for
the kidnapping of another Indian national provided the
complainant an improper suggestion that he was indeed one of
the culprits in this case. The appellant claims that SPO1 Frias
pointed to him and conversed with the private complainant
before the latter was asked to identify the kidnappers. The time
interval from the date of the incident on February 12, 1996 up to
the day the accused-appellant was identified at the police line-up
on March 11, 1996 further weakened the complainant's vague
recognition of the culprits. Pavillare finally argues that he should
not have been convicted of kidnapping for ransom but only of
simple robbery as it is borne by the undisputed facts that the
offenders were motivated by an intent to gain and not to deprive
the complainant of his liberty. The money demanded by the
offenders was not ransom money but one in the nature of a bribe
to drop the accusation for rape of their lady companion.
The Solicitor-General filed brief praying for the affirmance in
toto of the appealed decision. The appellee contends that in
court the private complainant unhesitatingly and consistently
identified the accused-appellant Pavillare as one of the
kidnappers. Throughout his narration of the incident in court the
complainant referred to Pavillare as one of the kidnappers
because he was the one who made the phone call and the one
who received the ransom money. The complainant had more
than adequate opportunity to observe his abductors and he
testified in court that Pavillare is one of them. As a sign of the
complainant's candor, he admitted in court that he does not
recognize the other co-accused, Sotero Santos, as one of his
abductors and for which reason the case was dismissed against
him. The complainant's failure to state an accurate description of
the kidnappers in his sworn statement does not belie his
identification of Pavillare in court as it is the general rule that
affidavits are often inaccurate and incomplete. The argument of
the accused-appellant that his identification in the police line-up
was made with improper motive either from the other Indian
nationals who were at the police station or from SPO1 Frias is
without evidentiary basis. Moreover, the complainant's testimony
is corroborated by the testimony of his cousin who met the
kidnappers and handed over the ransom money to them. The
trial court did not err in giving credence to the complainant's
identification of Pavillare as one of the abductors.
The Solicitor-General further contends that the accusedappellant's alibi that he in Novaliches when the crime was
committed cannot stand against the positive identification of two
witnesses and that his alibi does not make it physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it
happened. As regards accused-appellant's plea to be convicted
instead of simple robbery is without legal nor factual basis. The
complainant was restrained of his liberty even if only for a few
hours and his captors demanded money for his release which in
fact they did after the ransom money was paid. Whether or not
the kidnappers only wanted money from the complainant the
manner by which they compelled him to give money, i.e. by
restraining his liberty until the ransom money was paid,
constitutes kidnapping for ransom. Finally, the submission that
the offenders demanded a bribe and not ransom money is
likewise unfounded. There is no evidence that any one of the
kidnappers was a public officer in the performance of his duties
when they demanded money from the complainant in exchange
for his liberty.
Accused-appellant Pavillare filed Reply brief to reiterate his
contention that the prosecution did not controvert his testimony
to the effect that the complainant could not recognize his
abductors and that it was SPO1 Frias who pinpointed him to the
private complainant as one of the malefactors. Pavillare cites the

complainant's failure to identify his own relative who met him at

the police station after the arrest of the accused-appellant and
argues that considering that the complainant was held captive
only for about two hours and the interval of almost one month
from the day of the incident up to the time the accused-appellant
was identified at the police line-up, the complainant was
deprived of any reliable recollection of his captors. The
complainant's failure to give a physical description of the
abductors when he gave a sworn statement to the police two
days after the incident supports the accused-appellant's
contention that the complainant could not identify his captors. It
is also claimed that the improper identification of the accusedappellant at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel
renders the said identification, including that made in court,
inadmissible in evidence.
The appeal is without merit.
The accused-appellant's defense that the identification made by
the private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible
because the appellant stood at the line-up without the
assistance of counsel is without merit.
Sec. 12 (1) Art III of the Constitution states that "Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial
investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel. Any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is
inadmissible in evidence. 10 The prohibition however, does not
extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an
investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. 11 It has
been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences
when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. 12 The
stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a
police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of
protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in
nature. 13 It has also been held that an uncounseled identification
at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an incourt identification. 14 The identification made by the private
complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of
his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accusedappellant was not assisted by counsel. In court, the private
complainant positively identified Paviallare as one of his captors
and testified as follows:
Q: Were you able to recognize the faces of the men and woman
who abducted you on the afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: Yes, sir I can recognize if I see them again.
Q: If you see them in court will you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point to them if the accused are inside the court
room?
A: That man, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing at a man seated inside the court room and
when asked to identify himself he gave his name as Eduardo
Pavillare.

73

ATTY. CRUZ:

A: He is the one, sir.

Q: Other than the accused Pavillare, do you recognize anybody

else in this court room if among those who abducted you in the
afternoon of February 12, 1996?

INTERPRETER:
Again, witness is referring to accused earlier identified as
Pavillare.

A: None, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Tell us how were you abducted by the accused Pavillare and
his companions in that particular date in the afternoon of
February 12, 1996?
A: While I was returning to my motorcycle, they blocked my way
and asked for my name, sir.

Q: Who blocked your way and asked for your name?

A: He was infront of his companions, sir.

xxx

xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Where did the two of you go?
A: Inside the mini-grocery, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness referring to accused earlier identified as Eduardo
Pavillare.
xxx

A: Because I was near him and I saw him talking to Lakhvir, sir.
xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:

xxx

Q: Why do you know that it was the accused Pavillare who was
talking to Lakhvir over the telephone?

xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: If you know, Mr. Singh, where were you taken by the accused
after they abducted you at the corner of Roces Avenue and
Scout Reyes St., Quezon City?
A: It was a deserted street somewhere in St. Joseph College,
Quezon City, sir.
Q: After you reached that deserted place, what happened next, if
any?
A: They asked me for P100,000,00 and I told them that I have
only P5,000.00 and they told me that if I give P100,000.00 they
will let me go, sir.

Q: After you went inside this mini-grocery, what happened next,

if any?
A: I saw my cousin Lakhvir. He asked me if I am okey and I told
him that they bit me up but I am still fine, sir.
Q: After you told your cousin that you are okey except for the
beating that you got but you are fine, what transpired next, if
any?
A: Lakhvir gave the P20,000.00, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: To whom did Lakhvir handed the P20,000.00?
A: To him sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the accused Pavillare earlier identified.

Q: Who demanded the amount of P100,000.00 from you?

ATTY. CRUZ:
WITNESS:
Q: Why do you know that only P20,000.00 was handed over by
accused Pavillare?

A: He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

A: Because they counted the money and they complained about

it, sir.

Again, witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as

Pavillare.

Q: Who counted the money?

xxx

A: He was the one who counted the money, sir.

xxx

xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:

INTERPRETER:

Q: Could you tell us what did your abductors tell to Lakhvir while
they are talking over the telephone?

Witness pointing to accused Pavillare earlier identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:

A: They told him that they should pay the amount of money for
my release, sir.
Q: Incidentally, can you tell us who among your abductors who
actually talked to Lakvir over the telephone?

Q: Were you present when Pavillare counted the money?

A: Yes, sir.

74

Q: After Pavillare got the P20,000.00, what happened next, if

any?

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: You said that there were 5 persons who abducted you?

A: They left immediately and they left me too, and we went to get
my motorcycle, sir. 15
On cross-examination the complainant stood firm on his
identification of the accused-appellant as one of the abductors.
He testified:
ATTY. MALLABO:

A: Yes, sir. 4 male and one female.

Q: On March 11, 1996 your cousin informed you or your friend
informed you that there were persons apprehended because
also of kidnapping incident?
A: Yes, sir. There were 4 of them arrested and when I went to
see them I only recognized one of them, sir.

Q: You said that at approximately 12:00 o'clock noon of February

12, 1996 while you are going back to your motorcycle you were
blocked by four persons, is that correct?

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Who was that person?

ATTY. CRUZ:
Misleading, he said 3 persons, your Honor.

A: He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

COURT:

Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare.

Reform.

ATTY. MALLABO:

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: You were blocked by 3 persons, is that correct?

That would be all for the witness, your Honor.

COURT:

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was the person immediately in front of you when you
were blocked?
A: He was the one, sir.
INTERPRETER:

Any redirect?
ATTY. CRUZ:
Few redirect, your Honor.
ATTY. CRUZ:

Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was earlier

identified.
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: What about the two (2) other persons?

Q: Mr. Witness, before you went to the police station on March

11, 1996 you were aware of how many suspects were in custody
of kidnapping of Gormel, is it not?
A: Yes, sir they were 4 of them.
Q: You were aware that 4 persons were arrested for the
kidnapping of your friend Gormel?

WITNESS:
A: They were behind me, sir.
ATTY. MALLABO:

A: Yes, sir.
Q: These 4 people were shown to you, were they not?

Q: What was the distance if you can tell us?

A: Yes, sir.

A: Almost together and then when they asked me my name I

replied and they hold my arms, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q: Who hold your arms?

Q: But when you were asked to identify who among them were
involved in your kidnapping you only pointed one of them?

A: He was the first, sir.

A: Yes, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Q: You did not point to the other accused?

Witness pointed to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was

identified earlier.

A: No, sir.

xxx

Q: The only one whom you pointed as being involved in your

kidnapping was none other than the person of the accused
Pavillare?

xxx

xxx

75

A: Yes, sir. 16
Moreover, the complainant's cousin Lakhvir Singh who met the
kidnappers to pay the ransom money corroborated the
complainant's identification of the accused-appellant Pavillare.
Lakhvir Singh testified as follows:

A: I immediately approached Sukhjinder Singh and I asked him if

he was hurt by the kidnappers and he said "yes but I am now
okey."
Q: After Sukhjinder confirmed to you that he was previously
beaten and that he was already okey at that time, what did you
do next, if any?

Q: After reaching the designated area somewhere along Aurora

Boulevard, what happened next, if any?

WITNESS:

A: As we parked our motorcycle near Land Bank, the kidnappers

immediately approached us, sir.

A: After that, one of the kidnappers said: "Andiyan na ang tao

ninyo ibinigay mo sa akin ang pera".

Q: How many kidnappers approached you?

ATTY. CRUZ:

A: Three (3) of them, sir.

Q: Who among the kidnappers who said that?

ATTY. CRUZ:

A: That person, sir.

Q: How were you able to know that they are the kidnappers?

INTERPRETER:

A: Because when they approached us one of them said: "Ano

dala mo and pera?"

Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Eduardo

Pavillare.

Q: Tell us, were you able to recognize the faces of these three
persons who approached you and demanded to you whether
you brought the money?

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: After Pavillare demanded that you turn-over to him the
money, what did you do next, if any?

A: Yes, sir.
A: I gave him the money, sir.
Q: If you see anyone inside the courtroom, please point to him.
Q: When you said "him", to whom are you referring to?
INTERPRETER:
A: To him, sir.
Witness pointing at a man sitting inside the courtroom and when
asked to identify himself, he gave his name as EDUARDO
PAVILLARE.

INTERPRETER:

ATTY. CRUZ:

Witness pointing to accused earlier identified as Eduardo

Pavillare.

Q: After Pavillare demanded to you whether you brought with

you the money, what did you do next, if any?

ATTY. CRUZ:

A: I told them "I have the money with me but I would not hand
the money to you until I see Sukhjinder Singh."
Q: What was the response of the accused Pavillare after you
told him that Sukhjinder Singh be first shown to you before you
turn over the money?
A: One of them told us to follow him and they would bring
Sukhjinder Singh, sir.
Q: From that place, where did you go if you can still recall?
A: We proceeded to a small grocery store near Land Bank, sir.
Q: After going inside this grocery store near Land Bank, tell us
what happened next, if any?
A: After a few minutes, one of the kidnappers arrived together
with Sukhjinder Singh, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: After you saw Sukhjinder Singh together with one of his
kidnappers, what did you do next, if any?

If you recall, how many money all in all did you give to Eduardo
Pavillare that afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: P20,000.00, sir. 17
xxx

xxx

xxx

We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and
credence to the identification in open court of the accusedappellant by the private complainant and his cousin as one of
the kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample opportunity to
observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The
complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was
abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled
on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare
face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid the
ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in
close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a
recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted
in court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees them
again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him
as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as the one who
blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's
cousin and received the ransom money. As an indicium of
candor the private complainant admitted that he does not
recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the
case was dismissed against him. It bears repeating that the
finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given

76

utmost respect and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal

because it had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor
of the witness in court.
As regards the alibi forwarded by the appellant, we find that the
positive identification made by two eyewitnesses for the
prosecution pointing to the appellant as one of the kidnappers
prevails over it. The appellant's employee who testified to
corroborate his alibi only stated that in the month of February
1996 the accused-appellant was at the Novaliches job site
everyday. 18 The trial court properly took judicial notice that it will
take only a few hours drive from Novaliches, where the accusedappellant claimed to be on the day of the incident, to Roces
Ave., in Quezon City, where the complainant was
kidnapped. 19 Absent any competent proof that Pavillare could
not have been at the scene of the crime at the time and day it
was committed, the trial court correctly denied weight and
credence to the appellant's alibi.
Pavillare's argument that the complainant could not have
identified his abductors were it not for the improper suggestion
made by the police investigator is based on the bare and
uncorroborated allegation of the accused-appellant himself. The
police investigator was not confronted with this accusation 20 and
the defense did not present any evidence to support it. It is on
record that when Pavillare's counsel made an attempt to
question the police investigator, SPO1 Frias, on a matter not
covered by the direct examination, i.e., where SPO1 Frias
recorded the physical description given by the complainant of his
abductors, the trial court suggested that the defense may later
call SPO1 Frias to the stand as a defense witness apparently to
give the defense a chance to prove its allegation that the
complainant did not give any physical description of his
abductors and that the identification at the police line-up is
tainted with an improper suggestion. 21 The defense counsel
never called SPO1 Frias to the stand. The appellant must prove
the veracity of his own defense 22 and the prosecution could not
controvert what was not presented in evidence. In the same
vein, the defense did not present any competent proof that
Pavillare was identified by the complainant only as a scapegoat
for the four other kidnapping cases committed against other
Indian nationals.
The cited variance between the complainant's testimony in court
and his affidavit on whether or not the complainant gave a
physical description of his abductors before the police
investigator pertains to a minor detail. Both the complainant and
police investigator SPO1 Frias testified that the former gave a
physical description of the abductors to the police. The
complainant testified that he gave the physical description of the
kidnappers while the police typed his affidavit but no such
physical description of the kidnappers is stated in the affidavit.
On the other hand, the police investigator testified that the said
description was entered in the police logbook. The defense
never required SPO1 Frias to produce the logbook in court to
ascertain whether such a description was given during the
investigation. As a rule, variance between the private
complainant's affidavit and his testimony in court, as long as it
does not deviate from the nature of the crime as stated in the
Information, does not weaken the credibility of the testimony in
court. 23

2 If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is the subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 24
The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin
are replete with positive declarations that the accused-appellant
and his companions demanded money for the complainant's
release. The pretense that the money was supposedly in
exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not
supported by the evidence. The complainant's cousin testified
that at the agreed drop-off point Pavillare demanded the ransom
money and stated, "Andiyan na ang tao ninyo ibigay mo sa akin
ang pera". The accused-appellant released the complainant
when the money was handed over to him and after counting the
money Pavillare and his companions immediately left the scene.
This clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money is
in exchange for the liberty of the private complainant. The death
penalty was properly imposed by the trial court. 25
The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does
not alter the nature of the crime committed.1a\^/phi1 The crime
of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty
whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from
going home. 26 As squarely expressed in Article 267, abovequoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration
of the detention is not material.
Four Members of the court maintain their position that RA 7659
is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
Nonetheless they submit to the ruling of the majority of this
Court i.e., that the law is constitutional and the death penalty
should be imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q96-65214 finding the
accused-appellant Eduardo Pavillare y Varona guilty of
kidnapping for ransom and imposing the DEATH penalty and the
awards for actual and moral damages is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
4. CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INVESTIGATION

Finally, the accused-appellant's argument that he should have

been convicted of simple robbery and not kidnapping with
ransom because the evidence proves that the prime motive of
the accused-appellant and his companions is to obtain money
and that the complainant was detained only for two hours, are
both unmeritorious. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code states:

G.R. No. 146277

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. any private

individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death;

MENDOZA, J.:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than

three days.

June 20, 2002

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated October 17, 2000, of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accusedappellant Albert Casimiro guilty of violating Republic Act No.
6425, 4, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty

77

of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the

costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2
DOROTHEO SUPA of the 14th Regional Field Office, Narcotics
Unit, posing as buyer, about nine hundred fifty (950) grams of
marijuana dried leaves in brick form, without any authority of law
to do so and knowing fully well that the article is a prohibited
drug, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.2
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged, whereupon the trial of the case followed.3
Three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo
Supa,4 Alma Margarita D. Villaseor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay,
Jr. Their testimonies established the following:
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked
into the office of Police Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng
at the 14th Regional Narcotics Office, DPS Compound in Baguio
City. She informed Chief Inspector Leleng and PO3 Juan
Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant
herein, was engaged in the distribution or sale of marijuana. As
proof, Rose told the police officers to wait and accused-appellant
would call them up on that day. Accused-appellant, however, did
not call up. Nonetheless, Police Chief Inspector Leleng formed a
buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Edgar Afalla as team leader,
PO2 Dorotheo Supa as poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marquez
Madlon and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. as back-up men.5
The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the
Narcotics agents to wait for a call from accused-appellant. True
enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the telephone rang. When PO2
Supa answered the telephone, he found that it was accusedappellant who was calling. Rose introduced on the telephone
PO2 Supa to accused-appellant as someone who wanted to buy
marijuana. Accused-appellant allegedly agreed to meet PO2
Supa at around 1:00 p.m. the following day outside Anthonys
Wine and Grocery at the YMCA Building, Post Office Loop,
Upper Session Road. PO2 Supa said he wanted to buy one
kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said it would
cost P1,500.00. Accused-appellant said he would wear white
pants and a black leather jacket to their meeting the following
day.6

booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the
laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana. 9 They also
prepared a "receipt of property seized," dated August 18, 1999,
(Exh. L) which states:

18 August 1999

RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the
undersigned seizing Officer have seized and taken possession
of the property described hereunder from the
a. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs.-old, single,
waiter, native of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and resident of #2
Happy Homes, Old Lucban, Baguio City.
b. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this
office on or about 181330H August 1999, in front of Anthonys
Grocery along the vicinity of Post Office Loop, Baguio City.
c. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as
amended by RA 7659.

EXHIBIT QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION

"A"

One (1) Bricks Marijuana Dried Leaves Delivered by the

wrapped in a newspaper page placed suspect to a poseur
inside a black plastic bag with markings buyer.
Prime wear shirt haus place[d] inside a
dark gray paper bag with markings
Spencer & SM City

WITNESSES:

(signed)
On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose
went to the grocery store. SPO2 Madlon and PO3 Piggangay
waited secretly inside the Post Office building, around 12 meters
across the street, where they could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At
around 1:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived. Rose greeted him,
"O Bert, heto na yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na
kayong mag-usap. Aalis na ako." (Bert, here is the buyer I told
you about. Ill leave you two alone to talk.) Rose then left the two
men alone.7
PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the
marijuana. Accused-appellant gave the poseur-buyer a paper
bag, which contained an object wrapped in plastic and
newspaper. After determining from its appearance and smell that
the object inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the
back-up team to make an arrest by combing his hair. He testified
that he no longer gave the marked money to accused-appellant
because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to him his
rights, while the back-up team ran from across the street.8
After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the
14th Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3
Piggangay wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before
giving it to the evidence custodian. The policemen prepared a

REMARKS

1.
PO3
PNP

(signed)
Juan

A.

Piggangay ALBERT CASIMIRO

(Suspect/ Owner)

(signed)
2.
PO2
PNP

CER

K.

Ma

(signed)
Dorotheo

T.

Supa SPO2
Marquez
PNP (Seizing Officer)

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of

counsel.10 The dried leaves were then examined by the PNP
Crime
Laboratory
Service,
Cordillera
Administrative
Region.11 Police officer and forensic chemist Alma Margarita
Villaseor found the specimen to weigh 904.6 grams. The
chemistry report dated August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor,
stated that the leaves were positive for marijuana.12
The defense then presented evidence showing the following:
Accused-appellant, then 25 years old, residing at No. 1 Old
Lucban Street, Happy Homes, Baguio City,13 said that at around
8:00 a.m. of August 16, 1999, he took the child of his neighbor to
the Christian Mission Center School near the Baguio General

78

Hospital. He then went home and stayed there during the day,
as he usually did, except when he needed to fetch the boy from
school. At around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., he reported for work at the
Perutz Bar14 on Magsaysay Avenue, where he worked as a
waiter, until 3:00 a.m. of the next day.15
On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call
from Rose, an acquaintance who worked as a guest relations
officer at a club on Magsaysay Avenue. Rose offered to help him
find a better job and asked that they meet at Anthonys Wine and
Grocery. In the past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or
marijuana, but he refused to buy from her as he had no
money.16 At around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant met
Rose in front of the grocery store. While she talked to him about
a job opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay
grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted "I-handcuff,
i-handcuff!" (Handcuff him, handcuff him!) Accused-appellant
was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the
policemen, accompanied by Rose.17
At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accusedappellant about the marijuana allegedly seized from him.
Accused-appellant said he denied having carried the bag of
marijuana which he had seen Rose carrying earlier.18 After
taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen
threatened to shoot him in a secluded place if he did not admit
owning the marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership
of the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release accusedappellant if he gave them money. When accused-appellant
replied that he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, "If you have
no money, then we will work on your papers so that you will go
to Muntinlupa." The policemen then took accused-appellant to a
hospital for a physical examination and afterwards asked him to
sign a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report
without explaining their contents or allowing him to read them. 19
On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive
portion of its decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Albert Casimiro
guilty beyond doubt of Violation of Section 4 of Article II of
Republic Act 6425 as amended by Sections 13 and 17 of RA
7659 (Sale or delivery of 904.6 grams of marijuana brick) as
charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a Fine
of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
The marijuana brick weighing 904.6 grams (Exhs. J to J-4) being
the subject of the crime and a prohibited drug is hereby declared
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed
immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Albert Casimiro, being a detention prisoner, is
entitled to be credited in the service of his sentence 4/5 of his
preventive imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that the
evidence against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.21

First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from

accused-appellant, the lower court declared:
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by
the police which was signed by the accused does not affect the
liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was
issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating
procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was
seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or
confession.23
Indeed, the receipt (Exh. L) could not be considered evidence
against accused-appellant because it was signed by him without
the assistance of counsel. 24 Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution
provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was
delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by
accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as "suspect/ owner." In effect,
accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug
to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made
without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof
that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in
evidence.25
In People v. Obrero,26 this Court held that an uncounseled
statement is presumed by the Constitution to be psychologically
coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded
by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of a police
interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his
Miranda rights while he was being arrested outside the grocery:
Q:
What happened after you brought out your comb and
started combing your hair?
A:
Sir, my two companions went to our place and effected
the arrest of the suspect.
Q:
What else happened after the two members of the team
rushed to your place?
A:
We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and
brought him to our Narcotics office.
Q:
said?

A:
Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by
saying, "You are under arrest for violation of 6425. You have the
right to remain silent. You have the rights to call for a lawyer of
your own choice. Anything you say may be used as evidence in
favor or against you." And we brought him to the office, sir.
Q:

We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts

evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, the
rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of weight and
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied
by the trial court.22 In this case, several such circumstances
stand out as having been overlooked or misapprehended by the
lower court which entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.

How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you

What happened after that?

A:
Sir, we investigated him and the suspect identified
himself as Albert Casimiro.27
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that,
if accused-appellant could not afford counsel, one would be
assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without
any effort to find out if he understood it. It was merely ceremonial
and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the

79

suspect.28 We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a

lawyer, accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely.
What is more, the police investigators did not pause long
enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was
willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of
counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at
all.
Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accusedappellant. As he points out, he could not have been so careless
as to call the telephone number of the 14th Regional Narcotics
Office and offer marijuana to the policemen there. Nor can we
believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the
appointed place, Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the
one who wanted to buy marijuana as if the latter were buying
something not prohibited or illegal. While drugs may indeed be
sold to police officers,29 these transactions are usually done
face-to face. It is improbable that a drug dealer would discuss
the details of an illegal sale over the telephone with someone he
has never seen before.

liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well

meaning but without understanding."38 Our desire to stamp out
criminality cannot be achieved at the expense of constitutional
rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of
accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
6, Baguio City is REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert
Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody,
unless he is being lawfully held for another crime. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ordered to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147201

Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the

prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related case.30
In People v. Mapa,31 accused-appellant was granted an acquittal
after the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen
submitted to the NBI for laboratory examination was the same
one allegedly taken from the accused. In People v.
Dismuke,32 this Court ruled that the failure to prove that the
specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist was
that seized from the accused was fatal to the prosecutions case.
In People v. Laxa,33 the policemen composing the buy-bust team
failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
alleged apprehension of accused-appellant. One policeman
admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them
for the first time in the police headquarters. It was held:
This deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics
operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana.
Were the bags which the policemen allegedly recovered from
the scene of the buy-bust operation the same ones which PO2
Espadera marked in the police headquarters? This question
gives rise only to surmises and speculations, and cannot prove
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in
the chain of custody. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa,
SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write
their initials on the brick of marijuana immediately after allegedly
seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but
only did so in their headquarters. 34 The narcotics field test, which
initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics
office.35 There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and
given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.
According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw accusedappellant give PO2 Supa was colored gray or blue, the same
color as that of the bag sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service for laboratory examination. 36 PO2 Supa stated, however,
that the bag of marijuana which accused-appellant was carrying
in the grocery was colored brown.37 The discrepancy in the
testimony of these two police officers casts additional doubt on
the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus
delicti.
Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard
operating procedure for a buy-bust operation. The governments
drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it is
precisely when the governments purposes are beneficent that
we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As
Justice Brandeis warned long ago, "the greatest dangers to

January 15, 2004

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y
VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and (2) finding
appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in
the crime of homicide.
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin
Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel
Buenviaje with murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:
That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of
Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, and who were then armed with a firearm, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident
premeditation, by means of treachery and with intent to kill,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
Joseph Galam y Antonio, by then and there suddenly firing at
the said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not given any
provocation, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.1
At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio
Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje pleaded not guilty to the
charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on
10 July 1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness
Abel Ramos was at a vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid screaming
from across the road: "Enough, enough, enough!" In front of her
were Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were engaged
in a fisticuff. By the time Pawid was able to subdue the two men

80

by standing between them and embracing Galam, Buenviajes

face was already bloodied and Galams shirt collar torn. As
Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to face Galam and, with his
right index finger making a slicing motion across his throat,
shouted: "Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin, papatayin
kita." Galam retorted, "Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika."
Buenviaje did not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.2
More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994,
Galam was shot to death at the Rooftop Disco and Lodging
House (Rooftop, for short) owned by him, which was located
at Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez
Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of that fateful day, a man whom
she later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the
Rooftop and asked whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt
had checked in. She answered in the negative. As she was
about to leave, Sayaboc asked another question, "What time
does your bosing arrive?" She replied that she did not know. She
then went to the second floor of the establishment.3
Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that
between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. Sayaboc, who was still seated in
the swing beside the information counter with his hands tucked
in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of beer. She then
went up to the kitchen, but was delayed in delivering the beer
because she gave some instructions to the dishwasher. When
she gave the beer to Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked
why it took her so long to bring the beer. Thereafter, she went
upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and some other waitresses.
Then the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.4
Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the
ground floor of the building. When Jaramillo looked down, she
saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the latter to fall to the
ground face up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc
forthwith ran out and disappeared into the darkness.5
Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito
Parungao, Chief Barangay Tanod of BarangayQuezon, Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon Restaurant
located along the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with
his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The three
were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the
Rooftop and Diego Theater. The younger Buenviaje was on the
drivers seat, while the older Buenviaje and Escorpiso were
inside the sidecar. Parungao ordered pancit bihon. While he was
waiting outside of the restaurant, he noticed that the tricycle was
still parked in the vacant lot, and the three occupants thereof
were talking with each other. After getting his order and while he
was getting out of the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots
coming from behind the Rooftop building. He thereafter saw a
person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc,
walking briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon
Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle sped off towards the center of
the town.6
The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to
a hospital, where he was declared dead on arrival. 7 Dr. Antonio
R. Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his cadaver, found
four gunshot wounds and opined that the first two of which were
inflicted from behind and the last two were frontal.8
That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of
the Solano Police Station, assigned some investigators to go to
the scene of the crime to gather evidence. At about 10:00 to
11:00 p.m., he and Lt. Alejandro Parungao brought Pilar and
Jaramillo to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo
were interviewed by the cartographic artist, who thereafter drew
a cartographic sketch showing the face of the assailant.9

On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin

Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as
the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death.10
On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the
Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived at
the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by
reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought
Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the
statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional
rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have a counsel
of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one,
Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour
later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the
PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After
Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, "okay," he continued the
investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the
entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning
Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the
comfort room.11 That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial
confession12 in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing
Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of
P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and
attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.
At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its
case, 1counsel for accused Mike Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso manifested that he be given fifteen days
to file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the
evidence.13 The trial court acceded. But instead of filing such
motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July
1999.14 The motion for leave to file the pleading was filed the
next day only.15
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an
order16 issued on 16 August 1999. Further, it ruled that because
of they did not seek nor were granted express leave of court
prior to their filing of the demurrer to evidence, the Buenviajes
and Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted their case for
judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the
presentation of his defense.
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the
defense of alibi. He also flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or
having been informed of his rights. He testified to having been
beaten by six or seven police officers in the investigating room,
who then coerced him to confess to having killed Galam. 17 Apart
from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated
20 March 199518 and an affidavit dated 10 April 199519to support
his claim of police brutality and retraction of his confession.
In its decision dated 9 November 2000,20 the trial court found
Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with treachery
as the qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as
aggravating circumstances. It then sentenced him to the
maximum penalty of death. As for Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel
Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the
treachery employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against
them and, therefore, declared them guilty of the crime of
homicide only, with the first as principal and the two others as
accomplices. Each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty and to pay solidarily with Sayaboc the amounts of
P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and
the costs of the suit in favor of the heirs of Joseph Galam.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT SAYABOC GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

81

DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND SENTENCING HIM

TO DEATH.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS
GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY ONLY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC
WHEN IT WAS TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A
COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN
EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.

the claim that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the

NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was made for the first time in
this appeal, and was based merely on an information furnished
by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro (now deceased) to
Sayabocs counsel in this appeal, which makes the said
information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no
exceptional circumstance exists in this case that may warrant
the relaxation of the rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer
to evidence carries with it a waiver of the accuseds right to
present evidence.
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial
confession, we hold that such cannot be used in evidence in this
case.

IV

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON

BUENVIAJE AND ACCUSED ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY
WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
BE HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL AFTER THEY
FILED THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend

that the crime committed by Sayaboc was homicide only, there
being no proof of treachery because the two eyewitnesses did
not see the commencement of the shooting. Besides, treachery,
as well as evident premeditation, was not specifically designated
as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Neither can the
aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward be
appreciated because they were not alleged in the information,
albeit proved during trial. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating
and qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the information,
are beneficial to the accused and should, therefore, be applied
retroactively.
As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the
extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in
evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer
who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not
a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He
was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire
proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a
judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding
court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and
Patricio Escorpiso claim that they were denied due process
because they were not able to present evidence in their defense.
They ask this Court to relax the rule of criminal procedure in
favor of enforcing their constitutional right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
maintains that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession that he shot
the victim in the back is adequate proof of treachery. Invoking
People v. Aquino,21 the OSG contends that for treachery to be
considered as a qualifying circumstance, it needs only to be
specifically alleged in the information and does not have to be
preceded by the words qualifying or qualified by. As to the
proven circumstances of craft and price or reward, the same
cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which are applicable to actions that are
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
The OSG further asserts that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession
is admissible in evidence against him, since it was made after he
was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights,
particularly the right to an independent counsel of his own
choice. No evidence was adduced during the trial to substantiate

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are
presumed to be voluntary.22 The condition for this presumption,
however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the
constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights
during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with,
especially when the extrajudicial confession has been
denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear
that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the
confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the
confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators
for maltreatment,23 the failure to properly inform a suspect of his
rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession
valueless and inadmissible.24
In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungaos claim that he
conferred with Sayaboc for half an hour informing him about his
constitutional rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only
the following:
PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that
questions will be asked to you regarding an incident last
December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam,
owner of the said Disco House as a result of his death. Before
questions will be asked [of] you I would like to inform you about
your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the Philippines, as
follows: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to
answer the questions which you think will incriminate you; That
you have the right to seek the services of a counsel of your own
choice or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.
QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights,
are you willing to give your true statement regarding the death of
Joseph Galam?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.

82

QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this

investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo
Cornejo.
QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want
him to assist you in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 25
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the
confession contains the passing of information of the kind held
to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara, 26 the Court
explained:
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature
of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer
or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting.
Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on
the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free,
and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." 27 It
should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights.
More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an
educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva
Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police
officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for
another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional
right to a competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the
unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police,
still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and
prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo
remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial
investigation. The trial court attributed the silence of Atty.
Cornejo to the garrulous nature and intelligence of Sayaboc,
thus:
As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent.
It was in his character for him to want to be a central figure in a
drama, albeit tragic for others. He would do what he wanted to
do regardless of the advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo could
only advise him of his constitutional rights, which was apparently
done. The said counsel could not stop him from making his
confession even if he did try.28
We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a
"garrulous" man who would "do what he wanted to do regardless
of the advice of others" is immaterial. The waiver of a right is
within the rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a showing, to
the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful attempt at each stage
of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the
consequences of his actions. If anything, it appears that
Sayabocs counsel was ineffectual for having been cowed by his
clients enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that
the counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the
investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded. In
People v. Deniega,29 we said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives

perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the

rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given
is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an
accused from making a confession. Indeed, as an officer of the
court, it is an attorneys duty to, first and foremost, seek the
truth. However, counsel should be able, throughout the
investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring
with his client and halting the investigation should the need
arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect
under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an
accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police
investigators in obtaining evidence to bring criminals to justice.
But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be
interfered with. Those tasked with the enforcement of the law
and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden of
ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the
performance of their duties are untainted with constitutional
infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the law is
to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak,
against possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the
government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of
such deviation shall be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc
cannot be used in evidence against him. We hold, however, that
the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for
the crime of homicide.
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that
Sayaboc shot and killed Galam in the early evening of 2
December 1994. He was seen waiting at the Rooftop from 3:00
to 6:00 p.m. of that day, shooting Galam shortly after the latters
arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime to a waiting
tricycle. Credible witnesses described Sayabocs appearance to
the police soon after the shooting incident and prepared
affidavits about the incident. They identified Sayaboc at the
police station while he was in custody, during the preliminary
investigation, and, again, in open court. Such positive
identification constitutes more than sufficient direct evidence to
uphold the finding that Sayaboc was Galams killer. It cannot just
be rebutted by Sayabocs bare denial and weak alibi.
Appellants claim that the information against them is insufficient
for failure to specifically state that treachery and evident
premeditation were qualifying circumstances holds no water. In
People v. Aquino,30 we held that even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such
as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.
Nevertheless, from our review of the case, we find that neither
evident premeditation nor treachery has been sufficiently proved
to qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. Thus, two conditions must be
present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the
attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing
began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be
supposed. 31
In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the
witnesses did not hear any shout or conversation between the
assailant and the victim immediately before the attack could only
mean that Sayaboc had approached his victim through

83

stealth.32 While not improbable, that conclusion is merely an

inference. The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified
as to how the aggression began. The witnesses testified having
heard four shots, the last two of which were seen as having
been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The autopsy
conducted by Dr. Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the
thigh and the shoulder, and two wounds on the right side of
Galams back. Although it is plausible that the initial shots were
fired from behind, such inference is insufficient to establish
treachery.33

The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure on demurrer to
evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to
present evidence on their behalf. They cannot now claim that
they were denied their right to be heard by themselves and
counsel.

Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying

circumstance. Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that
the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The
requisites of evident premeditation are (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his
act.34

It has been held that price or reward is evidence of

conspiracy.39 But the same was not established by competent
proof in this case. The extrajudicial confession 40 and the
newspaper reports41 adduced by the prosecution, which both
contained Sayabocs statement pointing to Marlon Buenviaje as
the one who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible
in evidence. The first, as earlier stated, was executed in violation
of Sayabocs constitutional rights. The second are hearsay,
since the authors of such reports were not presented as
witnesses to affirm the veracity thereof.42

Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc

was hired to kill Galam, the testimony that the former inquired
about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to
6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time when
Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is
not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what
time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered.35

Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it

may be shown by circumstantial evidence. 43 As correctly found
by the trial court and concurred with by the OSG, the
concatenation of circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon
Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc, thus:

The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward,

even if proved, can neither be considered because they were
not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
information specify the aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime for it to be considered in the imposition
of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may,
therefore, be given retroactive effect.36
Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the
crime of homicide only, which is punishable by reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances appreciated for or against him, the penalty to be
imposed upon him should be in the medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty
whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose
maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon
Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso that the
case should be remanded to the trial court because they were
denied the right to be heard by the trial court. It must be
remembered that their demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July
1999 was without prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file
the said pleading was filed only the next day. The filing of the
demurrer was clearly without leave of court. The trial court,
therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to evidence
found in Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to
present evidence on their behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an
unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the
accused.37 The rationale for this rule is that when the accused
moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of
the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said
evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for
him to present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be
allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by
espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
convenience. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the
dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to
the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then
claim the right to present its evidence.38

On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the

existence of conspiracy between Marlon Buenviaje and
Sayaboc.

1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with

Joseph Galam, causing him injuries on his face and prompting
him to make a threat to kill the latter;44
2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc,
who had no discernible motive to do so;45
3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon
Buenviaje and the other appellants in the tricycle, which was
waiting in a vacant lot near the crime scene;46
4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and
disappeared;47
5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long
time, or until 10 July 1997; and
6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon
Buenviaje offered prosecution eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo
a job abroad, allowances, and two motorcycles in consideration
of her retraction of her testimony against Sayaboc.48
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1)
there is more than one circumstances established; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived have been proved; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All these
requisites are present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator
equally guilty as Sayaboc, Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the
same penalty as that of Sayaboc.
However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is
paucity of evidence linking them to the killing. They might have
been with Marlon Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is nothing
to show that they knew of the conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent
any active participation in furtherance of the common design or
purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the crime scene
or in the tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not
necessarily make them conspirators. Even knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act without the cooperation
and the agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish
conspiracy.49
Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The
trial courts award of actual damages, representing the wake and

84

burial expenses, is reduced to P106,436, this being the amount

supported by receipts. The award of moral damages is, however,
increased
to
P50,000
conformably
with
current
jurisprudence.50 In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912
is MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon
Buenviaje are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Joseph
Galam the amounts of P106,436 as actual damages; P50,000
as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and the cost of
the suit. Appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso are
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133685-86

May 20, 2004

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
AMADO BAGNATE, appellant.

PHILIPPINES, appellee,

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco,
Albay, finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and of
Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Death in each case.
The Information against appellant in Criminal Case No. T-2874
reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in
the morning, more or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of
Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill and while armed with a bolo, with nocturnity, treachery,
superior strength, and with disregard of the respect due to the
victim on account of age and sex, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack with said
bolo one AURIA BROA,1 a 70-year old blind woman, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which caused her death,
to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
ACTS CONTARY TO LAW.2
The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2875 reads:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in
the morning, more or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of
Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and by means of violence, force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with ROSALIE RAYALA, against her will and
consent, and on the occasion thereof, with intent to kill, taking
advantage of superior strength and while armed with a bolo, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and hack aforenamed Rosalie Rayala, thereby inflicting upon the

latter mortal wounds on the different parts of her body, which

caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded "not
guilty" to both charges against him,4 and joint trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, appellant was turned over to
SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. Without asking
the name of appellant, SPO2 Ambion informed him in the Bicol
dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel,
that whatever he says may be used against or in his favor, and
that he cannot be tortured or molested. Asked if he is willing to
cooperate, the accused assented and gave his name as Amado
Magnate. SPO2 Ambion later learned that appellants real name
is Amado Bagnate. When appellant told SPO2 Ambion that he is
willing to confess, SPO2 Ambion again informed appellant of his
rights, and asked him further if he wants to be assisted by
counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in Manila. SPO2
Ambion offered the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which
appellant accepted. SPO2 Ambion then left to fetch Atty.
Brotamonte whose office was located several meters away from
the police station. However, Atty. Brotamonte told SPO2 Ambion
that he will just follow as he was having his office blessing at that
time. After some time, Atty. Brotamonte arrived at the police
station. Before proceeding with the investigation, Atty.
Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave the investigation room
and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to appellant
and informed him of his rights. He also asked and examined
appellant to see if he was physically harmed by the policemen
and found none although Atty. Brotamonte noticed that
appellants left hand was handcuffed to the table. Appellant told
Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. The
investigation was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with SPO2
Ambion asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into
English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the purpose of
putting it into writing. After typing the first page of the confession,
Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained the contents thereof
to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed
thereon. While all this was going on, SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales
was taking pictures.5 The first page of the confession reads:
PRELIMINARY : Mr. Amado Bagnate, you are in this office being
investigated for your involvement in the crimes imputed against
you particularly the killing of Aurea Bronia and Rosalie Rayala
and at the same time having carnal knowledge of the two in
Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. But before we proceed in this
investigation, may I inform you that under our New Constitution,
you have the right to remain silent, and that anything you may
say may be used in your favor or against you in any court
proceedings in the entire Philippines; that you have the right to
be assisted by a counsel of your own choice or if you cannot
afford to have one, the state represented by our office will
provide you a competent counsel; that you are free from torture
or any form of physical violence which will tend vitiate your
statements. Do you clearly understand your constitutional rights
which were related to you in Bicol dialect?
ANSWER : Yes sir, I clearly understand my Constitutional Rights
because it was related to me in Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you want to avail of your Constitutional
rights?
ANSWER : I want to be assisted by a competent counsel.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you have a counsel of your own choice?
ANSWER : I have none sir.

85

INVESTIGATOR : Since you do not have your own counsel, our

office will provide you one, is this acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : If our office will provide you the services of
Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, who is a competent lawyer is this
acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : May I again remind you that anything you say
in this investigation may be used in favor or against you in any
court proceedings in the entire Philippines. Do you still wish to
give your free and voluntary statements?

spank and boxed me but still I continued on kissing her but still
he spank me, so I go out of the room and sits on the door but
Rosalie Rayala followed me so I kissed her again but she spank
me again so I got hold of the bolo and hack Rosalie Rayala
hitting her on her neck which caused her to fall on the ground
and I pulled Rosalie Rayala and have carnal knowledge of her
while she is still alive, while Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles
were standing and viewing what I am doing and after satisfying
my lust said Carlito Begil goes on to of Rosalie Rayala and
started on pumping her and after satisfying his lust, my
grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and
thinks that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I
hacked her on her neck and when she fall I pulled her away from
the house towards the grassy portion of the yard wherein Carlito
Begil and Roberto Angeles followed me wherein I was unable to
determine who from the two had carnal knowledge of my
grandparent because I already left them and I proceeded to the
main road to Tabaco, Albay.

ANSWER : Yes sir.

07. Q- Please continue further.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you understand the questions that were
asked from you?
ANSWER : Yes sir, because they were related to me in Bicol
dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Are you willing to sign your given statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.6
SPO2 Ambion then proceeded with the second and third pages
of the confession, following the same procedure of propounding
the questions in the Bicol dialect and translating it thereafter into
English for each page.7 Atty. Brotamonte again read and
explained the contents thereof to appellant 8 after which they
again separately signed on pages two and three thereof. The
second and third pages are quoted in verbatim, to wit:
03. Q- Please
circumstances?

state

your

name

and

other

personal

A- Before I finally proceeded to the main road I passed by the

house of Jose which I had forgotten his family name and
Armando Bosque both Barangay Tanods of our place and told
the two that is being wanted by my godfather Julian Baloloy that
there was something that happened in the house of my
grandparents house, and the two goes with me and because I
was already then frightened I just go with them and hurriedly left
the place and proceeded to Roberto Angeles house and called
my sister and I was allowed to enter and I prepared a cup of
coffee and after drinking same I hurriedly left the house and
finally proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep bound for
the town proper and spend the rest of the night at the town plaza
and at about 6:00 A.M. August 7, 1997 I proceeded to the church
to hear mass and after that I went to my sisters house at Tayhi,
Tabaco, Albay and I eat my breakfast and after eating I left my
sisters house named Avelina Calla and it came to my mind that I
will evade arrest and decided to proceed to Metro Manila then to
my place of work in Pulilan, Bulacan.
08. Q- How were you able to reach the Tabaco Police Station?

04. Q- When and where did the incident happened?

A- I was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco,

Albay for accordingly an alarm to apprehend me was set by
elements of the Tabaco Police wherein one of them was able to
trace me but luckily I was able to evade them but finally I was
apprehended at Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay and later on was
brought to the Tabaco Police.

A- At on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 at Buhian, Tabaco,

Albay.

09. Q- How are you related with the victims namely Rosalie
Rayala and Aurea Bronia?

05. Q- Will you please narrate in detail, your knowledge of the

said incident?

A- This Rosalie Rayala she is my nephew and Aurea Bronia she

is my grandparent.

A- At on or about 6:00 P.M. August 6, 1997 I together with

Faustino Bufi9 and Carlito Begil drink a bottle of gin at the store
of Yolanda Buban at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay and while we were
drinking said Carlito Begil told us that he will have sex with a
woman on that night, however he did not elaborate who the
woman is and at about 8:00 P.M. of same date we already
consumed the bottle of gin and we decided to go home.

10. Q- This investigator, had no more question to ask from you,

do you have anything more to add in this statement of yours?

A- AMADO BAGNATE Y BRONIA, 28 years old, single, duck

caretaker presently working in Balatong Pulilan, Bulacan and a
native of Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.

06. Q- Please continue

A- So I proceeded to the house of my brother-in-law Roberto
Angeles to spend the night at the said house however at on or
about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 I go out of the house and
proceeded to my grandparents house which is about five arms
length from the house of Roberto Angeles leaving the bolo on
the ground and entered my grandparents Aurea Bronias house
and go directly on the room where Rosalie Rayala is sleeping
and once inside the room I embraced the sleeping Rosalie
Rayala and started on kissing her however Rosalie Rayala

A- Now no more sir, but I will just relate other details if the need
arises.
11. Q- Are you willing to sign this statement of yours?
A- Yes sir.10
After appellants confession was typed and signed, Atty.
Brotamonte left the police station and went back to his office. As
far as he could recall, the entire process took more than an
hour.11
The next day, August 8, 1997, appellant was brought before
Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco,
Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte

86

and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of

the confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures of
appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant
the consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and
asked him if he was coerced into admitting them. Judge Base
inspected appellants body and asked him if he was forced or
coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing
to sign it again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying
that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign
the confession again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after
which appellant affixed his signature.12
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extrajudicial confession of appellant showed how the crimes were
committed by him.

of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Rosalie Rayala in the

amount of P50,000.00 as damages.
SO ORDERED.14
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II

Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial

court and assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed
in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a
competent and independent counsel of his own choice; and that
he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his confession.
He testified that the real perpetrators of the crime were his
brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil, and
that he was only forced into owning up to the crimes because
Angeles threatened to harm him or his sister, Angeless wife, if
he did not do so.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.

Appellant recounted on the witness stand that in the afternoon of

August 6, 1997, he was having a drink with Carlito Begil and
Faustino Bufe at the store of Yolanda Bulan in Buhian, Tabaco,
Albay. While they were drinking, Begil mentioned that he is
planning to have sex with someone he did not identify. They
finished drinking at around 8:00 in the evening and started
walking home. While he and Begil were walking, Begil asked
him to accompany him to Rosalie Rayalas house but he
declined because he was already hungry and he wanted to eat
first. He then went to the house of Roberto Angeles who is
married to his sister Maria Nellie Bagnate. While he was on the
porch having a smoke, Angeles arrived very drunk. Begil arrived
later. Begil and Angeles drank "kalampunay". He took only one
glass of the drink and went inside the house to get a cigarette.
When he went back to the porch, Angeles and Begil were
already gone. At around 12:30 in the morning, he went inside
and slept. The shout of his ninong, Julian Baloloy, telling him to
fetch a barangay tanod, awakened him. He fetched Jose
Rodriquez and Armando Bosque and they went to the house of
Rosalie, located thirty meters away. He was told to build a fire
while the rest searched for "something." After idling in the yard
for some time, he went back to Angeless house to have coffee.
Angeles and Begil then arrived and Angeles told him to flee or
he (Angeles) will kill his (appellants) sister. Angeles gave
him P10.00. He took a jeep to Tabaco and reached the Tabaco
plaza at 2:00 in the morning. He proceeded to his sisters house,
Avelina Bagnate, in Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay, and passed the time
there. Then he went to the Tabaco town proper. He was finally
arrested in Bangkilingan, Tabaco and brought to the police
headquarters at 5:00 in the morning of August 7, 1997.13

The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellants

confession. Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a
competent and independent counsel as he failed to advise him
of the penalty to be imposed on the crimes he was accused of
committing; hence, he was not aware of the consequences of
his admissions.

The trial court found appellants extra-judicial confession

admissible in evidence on which basis, it convicted appellant of
the crimes charged against him. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in Criminal Case No. T2874 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to
indemnify the heirs of Auria Broa the amount of P50,000.00 as
damages; and,
2. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide as charged in Criminal
Case No. T-2875 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
MURDER AND RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.15

To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must

be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the
assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and a
person under custodial investigation must be continuously
assisted by counsel from the very start thereof. The presence of
counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession, and the assistance given must be
independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused.16
The rule is premised on the presumption that the accused is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. 17 It
is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing
guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the
accused from being coerced to admit any that is untrue. 18 To be
an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything
which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.19
In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte
is more than perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation,
Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to ascertain
the voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no
force or duress was employed by the police authorities on the
latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed
appellant of his constitutional rights and was clear in explaining
to him the questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion. The
testimony of Atty. Brotamonte during cross-examination leaves
no room for doubt that he adequately assisted appellant during
the investigation, viz:
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: Now, upon your arrival, were you offered a seat?

87

A: No, because immediately when I arrived I asked the accused

to stand and examined the body of the accused, if there were
injury or what and I asked the accused, if these policemen
inflicted injury to him, if he was harmed and according to
accused, none.
Q: And in doing that particularly, what did you do to examine the
body of the accused of it bare some signs of injury?
A: Because as a lawyer I have to protect the right of the
accused. If the accused has body injury definitely I will be
requiring the policemen to submit the accused for medical
examination before the investigation will be conducted.
Q: In doing that, how did you do it to the accused?
A: I let the accused to stand and I asked him if any of the
policemen harmed inflicted bodily injury to him and he told me
no one of the policemen.

and they translated in English and I even helped the policemen

in the translation of the question and the answer of the witness
in Bicol dialect.20
Clearly, appellant signed the confession with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it
was also sworn to by him before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering
the oath to appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his
rights and the consequences of his confession. Judge Base
testified, thus:
Q: Judge, please explain to the Honorable Court the
circumstances how this sworn statement, how the affiant was
able to come into your house and the sworn statement was
sworn to?
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
The witness is not sure whether he was in his house or office.

Q: Any of the policemen present?

A: No, when I arrived, I request two (2) policemen to step-out
because I have to talk to the accused when I propound question
and examine the body of the accused and the accused was
inside the room.
...
Q: And you were satisfied by the answer of the accused and you
did not even bother to search the body of the accused?
A: In my observation, the accused was telling the truth.
Otherwise, he will inform this representation because I already
informed him that I am a lawyer and I will protect him if
somebody harmed him.
...
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
As narrated in that affidavit, I explained to the accused that
before I introduced myself, I told him that the policemen informs
this representation that you are going to give your sworn
statement before the police and I told him that I am a lawyer and
I will assist him until the policemen finished the investigation and
I told him to tell the truth to the policemen and told him that if you
want to give your sworn statement to the police, you can do it
because that is your right under the constitution, to remain silent.
Q: That is why for example, right to be informed; you have the
right to remain silent, and whatever you said will be used against
in you, did you not explain these one by one?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
I explained that one by one. In fact I told the accused that the
sworn statement you are going to make now might be used
against you by the police but the accused is willing to give his
sworn statement.
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: I see. Now, you said that you helped in the translation of the
sworn statement in the Bicol dialect. Meaning that the questions
were propounded in English and you helped the police
investigator to translate it in Bicol dialect?
A: No, when I state that I helped the police in the translation of
the answer, what the policemen were asking the witness in Bicol

A: The police investigator came to my office and informed me

that they were investigating a rape and murder case that
happened somewhere in the mountain of Tabaco, Albay and
informed me that the suspect has been apprehended and that
the suspect is willing to sign an affidavit of confession so I
advised the police investigator to comply strictly with respect to
investigation custodial legis and I informed him that that case
should be assisted by a lawyer and the investigator told me that
he contacted Atty. Brotamonte to assist the suspect in the
investigation and I said Its better. So, after that the suspect was
brought to me together with Atty. Brotamonte because I
requested Atty. Brotamonte to be present also and the suspect. I
investigated the suspect and he admitted to me that what he
stated in this affidavit which is actually a confession that he killed
the two women and actually raped one of them is correct and
true. So, after explaining to him the consequence of his having
confession to the crime being charged against him and he was
still willing to sign the confession I let him sign the confession in
my presence and in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and after
which I subscribed the affidavit.
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: (To witness)
Q: Now, Judge could you tell the Honorable Court while the
accused was in your presence if there was any pressure or
compulsion upon the accused to sign this document?
A: When the police investigator came to me I instructed him not
to use any force and when the suspect was presented to me,
actually I inspected his body if there was any sign of abrasion
and I actually asked the suspect if he was forced or coerced into
signing the crime charged and he said, no. And I asked him if
this confession is voluntary and he said, yes. And he said he is
being bothered by his conscience.21
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the
imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a
sufficient ground to strike down appellants extrajudicial
confession. Section 12 (1) to (3), Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

88

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

Section 1722 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.

To consider appellants allegation of maltreatment as true is to

facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere
allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.26

Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence

is confession given by an accused without having been informed
of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given
competent and independent

The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the

safeguards of the Constitution. It constitutes evidence of a high
order, because of the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.27

counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the

services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver
of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence of
counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated,
by violence or any other means that vitiated his free will. There is
nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an
accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed.
Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is
incompetent or not independent just because he failed to
apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he
was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is
totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt
in the commission of a crime.
To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of
assisting an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only
required for a lawyer to be:

Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial

confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The Rule specifically requires that there should be some other
evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart
from the confession."28 Appellants confession is corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in
its primary sense, that a crime has actually been committed. 29
The evidence of corpus delicti in both cases consists of the
victims deaths, as evidenced by the death certificates of Aurea
Broa30 and Rosalie Rayala,31 and the findings of the autopsies
conducted on the victims cadavers by Tabaco Rural Health
Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba showing that both were hacked to
death and Rosalie was raped.
The autopsy on victim Aurea disclosed the following:

".willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the

accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving
a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418)
this Court stressed that an accuseds right to be informed of the
right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle."23
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant
during the entire procedure from the time appellant signified
his intention to give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he
signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant
was not aware of the consequences of his admissions as Judge
Base explained it to appellant when he appeared before the
latter to swear to the veracity of his confession.
The Court notes that while Judge Base testified that he asked
appellant to sign anew the extrajudicial confession in his
presence, the copy thereof marked as Exhibits "A", "B", and "C"
attached to the records of the case do not show any subsequent
signature made by appellant. Nevertheless, appellant did not
refute Judge Bases testimony, and it does not detract the fact
that appellant executed the extrajudicial confession voluntarily
with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel,
and that he subsequently acknowledged having executed the
same voluntarily and swore to its veracity before Judge Base.
Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was
brought to the Tabaco police station, the police officers boxed
and kicked him, telling him to confess to the crimes. 24 As the
records show, like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge Base also asked him
if he was forced to confess but Bagnate said that he was not. If it
were true that he was forced to confess to the crime, then
appellant should have complained of such abuse to Atty.
Brotamonte or Judge Base as he had the opportunity to do so
when the two conferred with him on separate occasions.
Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to
complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they
did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where
they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered
as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.25

Hacked wound back of the neck about four (4) inches in length
affecting skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscle and the cervical
bone.
Hacked wound, neck anteriorly affecting larynx about 2 inches in
length.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to hacked
wound, neck.32
While the autopsy conducted on Rosalie revealed the following:
Stabbed wound neck, posteriorly about 1 inches in length, 2
inches depth reaching the cervical bone.
Hacked wound left shoulder about 1 inches length superficial
slanting direction.
Hacked wound - right neck about 4 inches length affecting
skin subcutaneous muscle & Blood vessels, right earlobe cut.
Hacked wound below the chin about 3 inches length affecting
skin and subcutaneous tissue.
Hacked wound, left neck about 5 inches in length affecting skin
subcutaneous tissue, muscle, Blood vessels and the cervical
bone.
Hacked wound, left middle ear auricle about 1 inch in length, left
occipital region about 1 inch in length.
Multiple linear abrasion both scapular region.
Contusion floor of the vaginal wall.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple
hacked wound, neck.33
The foregoing findings coincide with appellants extrajudicial
confession. As he stated therein, he hacked both victims on the
neck with a bolo and he dragged Aurea towards the grassy
portion of the yard. Appellant also admitted that he raped

89

Rosalie. The autopsy report shows that Rayala had contusions

on the floor of her vaginal wall, thus confirming that Rosalie had
been raped. The autopsy report likewise confirmed that the
victims suffered hack wounds on their necks. The recovery of
the bolo after appellant had left the place likewise jibes with
appellants declaration in his confession that he hacked both
victims with a bolo.34 These are details that appellant could not
have known if he did not commit the crimes.
It must also be noted that appellant was arrested only five hours
from the occurrence of the crimes. It is not possible that within
such short span of time, appellant would be able to know the
details of the crimes as he described them when he gave his
confession if it were true that he really did not commit them. The
voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being
replete with details which could only be supplied by the
accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be
considered voluntary.35
Lending additional credence to the truthfulness of appellants
extrajudicial confession is the defense evidence itself,
establishing that: Around 12:00 midnight of August 7, 1997,
defense witness Julian Baloloy heard cries for help coming from
the house of Aurea. Together with his son, Rodel, who brought a
flashlight, they went to the house and called out to Aurea and
Rosalie but there was no response. When they went inside the
house, they saw blood and strands of hair on the floor but there
was no sign of the two. They shouted for help and Roberto
Angeles, whose house is located in front of the victims house
about thirty meters away, arrived. Appellant arrived next, saying
that he just came from work and was not able to clean his
hands. When Rodel Baloloy shone his flashlight on appellant,
they saw that his hands were sticky and covered in red. Julian
Baloloy then ordered appellant to fetch a barangay tanod. When
Armando Bosque and Jose Rodriguez arrived, they started to
look for Aurea and Rosalie while appellant was told to build a
fire. At the back of the house, they saw impressions on the yard
indicating that an object had been dragged, after which, they
found the dead bodies of Aurea and Rosalie fifty meters away.36
Defense witnesses also testified that appellant did not join the
search and therefore, the latter could not have known or seen
the injuries suffered by the victims when they were found. It has
been noted that appellant, in his confession, had accurately
specified the injuries he inflicted on both victims. Julian Baloloys
testimony that they saw marks on the yard indicating that
something has been dragged corroborated appellants statement
that he dragged Aurea. Moreover, that Julian Baloloy saw
appellants hand sticky and covered in red, which Baloloy
described "as if you have just slaughtered a pig and you (sic)
hands smudge with blood and when you washed your hands, it
could still (sic) red," bolsters the conclusion that appellant indeed
had participated in the gruesome crimes.37
Thus, the confession of appellant being admissible in evidence
and corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, the trial court
correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Murder and Rape with Homicide.
In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No.
T-2874, the trial court considered the aggravating circumstances
of nocturnity, treachery, superior strength, and disregard of the
respect due to the victim on account of age and sex, as alleged
in the Information, thus qualifying the killing of Aurea to murder.
However, the Court finds that the trial court erred in appreciating
the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The evidence on
record does not sufficiently prove that it attended the
commission of the crime as no one actually saw the incident.
The fact that Aurea was blind does not necessarily qualify her
killing as treacherous. Treachery exists when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself

arising from the defense which the offended party might

make.38 Appellants confession merely stated: "after satisfying
his lust, my grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was
blind and thinks (sic) that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard
what I am doing I hacked her on her neck and when she fall (sic)
I pulled her away from the house towards the grassy portion of
the yard . . .". There is nothing in appellants confession that
demonstrates that he deliberately employed a particular means,
method or form of attack in the execution of the crime.
Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating
circumstance considering that it was not shown that the
darkness of the night was purposely sought by appellant to
facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its
execution.39
It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aureas house.
However, dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the consideration of his criminal liability as it is
not alleged in the Information.40
Nonetheless, it is alleged in the Information and established by
the prosecution that the crime was committed with abuse of
superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659, 41 any person
who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by death if committed with abuse of superior strength.
Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty in
Criminal Case No. T-2874.42
As regards the damages awarded to the heirs of Aurea Broa in
the amount of P50,000.00, the Court considers the same as
representing civil indemnity. In murder cases, civil indemnity
requires no further proof other than death.43
The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the
award of moral damages, which is based on a different jural
foundation and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.44 Considering that the prosecution failed to show any
proof that the heirs of Aurea Broa are entitled to moral
damages, the same may not be awarded.45
In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.46 Considering
the
generic
aggravating
circumstances of disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.47
In Criminal Case No. T-2875, the trial court likewise correctly
imposed the death penalty. Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7659 imposes
the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, a homicide is committed.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in
favor of the heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased
the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide
to P100,000.00.48 The heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the
amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages without need of
proof,49 in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. The fact
that the heirs suffered the trauma of mental or physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for moral
damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require
recital thereof at trial.50
Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the
dwelling of the victim, exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded to the heirs of
Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should
be awarded the amount of P54,259.00 as actual damages in

90

view of the admission made by the defense that the family of

Aurea and Rosalie incurred expenses in said amount.51
Before concluding, the Court observed, as borne by the records
of this case, that appellant could not have been the only
perpetrator of the crimes. As appellant revealed in his
confession, he hacked each of the victims on the neck with his
bolo only once. The autopsy report, however, shows that Aurea
Broa suffered two neck wounds while Rosalie Rayala suffered
five hack wounds and one stab wound, all on the neck. Appellant
confessed that he dragged Aurea towards the grassy portion of
the yard and immediately
left the scene. Yet, Rosalie was also found on the grassy portion
of the yard. The autopsy report further showed that Rosalie
likewise suffered multiple linear abrasions on both scapular
regions, thus giving the impression that she was also dragged
towards the yard. Somebody else must have brought Rosalie to
the place where she was found. Indeed, there are clear
indications that there are other perpetrators of the crimes of
murder and rape with homicide. Appellant alone could not have
inflicted all the injuries sustained by the victims.
In view of all these circumstances, the police authorities as well
as the prosecutors office of Tabaco, Albay, should be required to
apprise the Court whether or not further investigation of this
case was conducted for the identification and arrest of the other
perpetrators of the crimes to completely bring justice to their
victims.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion
of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost
continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to
the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating
officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A
confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and
beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not
take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain
inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had
been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted
him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later,
against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in
Hitler's Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the
Philippines. In this case before Us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch

15) of Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case No. T-2874 finding
appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
penalty
of DEATH is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
to
damages.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Aurea Broa the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.

3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of

prisoners as follows:

The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. T-2875,

finding Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and imposing on him the penalty of
death is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. The appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Rosalie Rayala
civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00); moral damages in the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00); and Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to

obtain some information from the prisoner, the offender shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum period,
temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage caused.

Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of both Aurea Broa and

Rosalie Rayala the amount of Fifty-Four Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty-Nine Pesos (P54,259.00) as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
The Chief of the Tabaco Police Station and the Tabaco
Prosecutors Office are hereby ORDERED, with ten (10) days
from receipt of copy of herein resolution, to apprise the Court
whether or not subsequent investigations were conducted to
determine the other perpetrator(s) of the crimes involved herein.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of arresto

mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries
or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall over do himself in the correction or handling
of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the
imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest
being the case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and
strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to
extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable
violation of human rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately,
such instances constitute the exception rather than the general
rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence
imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589
of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977,
Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the
bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban,
Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different
parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks
thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein
accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion)
living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the
following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the
Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was
brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed

91

by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a

preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive
answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September 9,
1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated
Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the
crime.5 As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality
of Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe and
Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and three of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent of gain and by means of force, intimidation
and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while
in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of said
Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount,
belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount; that by
reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of
enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said
cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the
purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act, with intent
to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad Fernando
on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple
injuries on the head and extremities, which directly caused her
death, and the total amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including
valuables and cash.

portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first
entered the house through the hole that they made, followed by
the accused Galit and next to him was "Pabling", that it was
already early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able
to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could
not find anything valuable inside the first room that they entered,
Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim,
the three accused decided to kill first the victim, Natividad
Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that Juling
Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim,
who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning
sound from the victim; that after the victim was killed, the three
accused began searching the room for valuables; that they
helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of
the victim, where they found some money; that when the three
accused left the room of the victim, they brought with them some
papers and pictures which they threw outside; that after killing
and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of the
premises of the house, using the same way by which they
gained entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall;
that the three accused walked towards the river bank where they
divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim; that
their respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and
that after receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left
and went home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was
adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused
Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of accused Galit
to leave their residence immediately; that he further stated that
he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two
companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.

Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the
accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the
trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding
the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.

As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered

no less than seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral
hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to shock and
hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy
Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the
deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court,

are as follows:

8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the

commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in
Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban,
Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of
counsel.

From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in

the early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman
named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was
robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and two others
in her (victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard
accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in
connection with the robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad
Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit
and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling"
accidentally met each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their
conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it
was further agreed among them to enter the premises of the
victim's house at the back yard by climbing over the fence; that
once inside the premises, they will search every room,
especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of
looking for cash money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at
around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit
and his two companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their
previous agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw
each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a
jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban
Municipal Building, they stopped and they waited at the side of
the road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock
that night, the three repaired to the premises of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said premises through
the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises of
said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery
compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back

9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence

presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In
fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to
the accused are not supported by competent evidence. The
principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely
testified that he and the accused were living together in one
house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the
mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he
returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the
police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were
quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was
leaving the house because he and his companions had robbed
"Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in
Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him
not to leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused
carrying a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins
which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what
the accused had done, he went to the Montalban police the next
day and reported to the police chief about what he had heard;
and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house
and arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid
down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when
making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation,
and which We reiterate:

92

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the

arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger.
It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the
accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the
accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against
the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore
to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:

released from custody immediately unless held on other

charges. With costs de oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71523-25

December 8, 2000

ROLANDO
SANTOS
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RAMIREZ, petitioner,

PEOPLE

OF

THE

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 72420-22

December 8, 2000

JESUS
E.
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

ESTACIO, petitioner,

x-----------------------x
I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim
ng Saligang-Batas
ng Pilipinas
na8,
kung
G.R. No.
72384-86
December
2000
inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at
pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
ALFREDO
R. dito sa FAJARDO,
JR., petitioner,
maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang
hukuman o tribunal
Pilipinas, na sa
pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol atvs.
kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam
mo na ang mga ito nakahanda
ka bang
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
x-----------------------x
SAGOT: Opo.

G.R. No. 72387-89

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer

does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead there should be several short and clear questions and
every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar
and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover,
at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his
sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two
weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any
waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was
not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute gross violations of his rights.

MARCELO
S.
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed reenactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the
circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession,
especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated
into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness,
the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of
Justice for whatever action he may deem proper to take against
the investigating officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it
is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING
the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be

December 8, 2000
DESIDERIO, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES

and

DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Challenged in these four separate petitions for review
on certiorari is the Decision dated July 19, 1985 1 of the
Sandiganbayan disposing of Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
Alfredo Fajardo, Jr. alias Boy Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y
Silvestre, Jesus Estacio y Estrella and Rolando Santos y
Ramirez alias Mickey Mouse, GUILTY as co-principals in the
three (3) separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of
Public Documents and hereby sentences them as follows:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 5949, there being no modifying
circumstance in attendance, each of said accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision correccional as the
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines in the amount
of P1 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay
their proportionate costs of said action;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 5950, there being no modifying
circumstance in attendance, sentences each of said accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS,

93

TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as

the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines, in the amount
of P3 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay
their proportionate share of the costs of said action;
"3. In Criminal Case No. 5951, there being no modifying
circumstance in attendance, sentences each of them to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands in the amount of P5 million representing the amount
defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of
said action.
"Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and Desiderio appear to
have been detained at the NBI as of February 16, 1982 by virtue
of a Presidential Commitment Order, although all of them were
later bonded and released on different dates, except Santos who
has remained in custody up to the present. Accordingly, they
should be granted the benefits of such preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as
follows: Santos from February 16, 1982 up to the date of the
promulgation of this decision; Estacio up to April 29, 1985;
Fajardo, Jr. up to April 26, 1982 and Desiderio up to April 19,
1982.
"Let copies of this decision be furnished the Hon. Governor,
Central Bank; the Citibank; the Bank of the Philippine Islands
and the Bankers Association of the Philippines for their
information and guidance.
"SO ORDERED."
On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan
three (3) informations for estafa thru falsification of public
documents against Felipe Salamanca, Mariano Bustamante,
Basilio Tan, Alfredo Fajardo, Jr., Jesus Estacio, Rolando San
Pedro, Manuel Valentino, Rolando Santos, Marcelo Desiderio,
Jaime Tan and Emilio Reyes.2 The informations filed were
similarly worded except for the dates of commission of the crime
charged, the number of the checks involved, and the amounts
allegedly misappropriated. Thus:
"That on or about (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30,
1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), in the City of Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Manuel
Valentino, employed as Bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing
Office, Central Bank of the Philippines and accused Jesus
Estacio y Estrella, employed as Janitor-Messenger of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and as such are public
employees, with abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their official position, in order to implement a plan or scheme to
defraud the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch,
which plan or scheme was previously formulated and agreed
upon by all the herein accused immediately prior to (October 19,
1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case
No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951),
accused Manuel Valentino pursuant to said plan or scheme, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and taking
advantage of his official position and with intent to gain and to
defraud, falsify the Clearing Statement prepared by the Central
Clearing office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and
submitted to the Clearing Section of the Central Bank of the
Philippines as well as the Manifest prepared by the Central Bank
Clearing Office in connection thereto by crossing out the entry in
the duplicate copies of the aforesaid Clearing Statement and
Manifest which entries refer to Check No. (27101 in Crim. Case
No. 5949, 27111 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and 27108 in Crim.
Case No. 5951) and Check No. (27105 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
27118 in Crim. Case No. 5950 and 27121 in Crim. Case No.

5951) issued by accused Bustamante against his checking

account at the Bank of Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch,
which has only an outstanding balance of P1,000.00 and which
checks were deposited in the current account of Magna
Management Consultant with the Citibank Greenhills Branch by
accused Rolando San Pedro and as a result of the aforesaid
falsification which made it appear that no such checks were
submitted by the Bank of Philippine Islands to the Central Bank
of the Philippines for clearing, the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Laoag City Branch has not issued any notice of dishonor or stop
payment to the Citibank Greenhills Branch, and as a
consequence thereof accused Rolando San Pedro was able to
withdraw from the Citibank the full amount of the two checks
amounting
to
(P1,000,000.00
in
Crim.
Case
No.
5949, P3,000,000.00
in
Crim.
Case
No.
5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951) and thereafter all
the accused appropriated among themselves the proceeds
thereof to their own personal use and benefit and to the damage
and prejudice of the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch in the
aforementioned amount of (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No.
5949,P3,000,000.00
in
Crim.
Case
No.
5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951)."
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo,
Desiderio, Estacio, Valentino and Santos, assisted by their
respective counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.3 Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan, Reyes and
Bustamante have remained at-large while San Pedro died. Upon
agreement of the prosecution and the defense, a joint trial of the
three cases was ordered conducted.4
Estacio was first discharged as an accused to be utilized as a
state witness.5 Later, he filed a motion for his re-inclusion in the
information as an accused allegedly for the sake of the safety of
his family. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion and thus he
was re-included as an accused in Crim. Case Nos. 59495951.6 The prosecution also moved for the discharge of
Valentino as an accused but the Sandiganbayan denied that
motion. Exercising its discretion, the Sandiganbayan eventually
discharged Valentino from the three informations to be a state
witness.7
The antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petitions are
as follows:
Sometime in 1981, a syndicate masterminded by Felipe
Salamanca infiltrated the Clearing Center of the Central Bank of
the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity). In its operation, the
syndicate employed two schemes: the switching scheme, and
the pilferage scheme.
In the switching scheme, a syndicate would open a current
account with such banks as the Bank of America (BA) and the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) in Iloilo. As a matter of
procedure, checks drawn on the BA were forwarded to the
Central Bank for clearing. Upon receipt of those checks by the
clearing clerk of the Central Bank, who was a member of the
syndicate, he would substitute those checks with ones bearing
the stamp of another bank. Thus, instead of forwarding the
checks to the BA, these were misrouted to cause delay in the
clearing procedure. Upon the lapse of the clearing period, the
depositor would withdraw the amount of the checks. However,
the scheme faltered as the huge amounts covered by the checks
caused suspicion on the part of the PVB. It called up the BA to
inquire about those checks and hence, the former bank
discovered that the checks were insufficiently funded.
In the pilferage scheme, current accounts would be opened with
a provincial bank, such as the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), Laoag branch, and a city bank such as the CitibankGreenhills, Manila. A BPI check deposited with Citibank would
then be forwarded to the Central Bank clearing house where
members of the syndicate, who were employed there, would
pilfer the check and alter the Central Bank manifest and the
entries in the clearing bank statements. The pilferage was

94

intended to provide opportunity for the syndicate to blot out

entries referring to the pilfered check. Consequently, BPI-Laoag
would not know that a check drawn on it had been deposited
with Citibank. After the lapse of the five-day clearing period, the
syndicate would withdraw the amount deposited from Citibank
simply because said bank would have considered the check
cleared and funded, as no protest or notice of dishonor could be
received from BPI-Laoag. In utilizing this scheme in the
commission of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 5949
to 5951, the syndicate netted Nine Million Pesos
(P9,000,000.00).
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution offered the testimonies of sixteen (16)
witnesses,8 and documentary evidence marked Exhibits "A" to
"DD", and Annexes "B" to "QQ", with sub-markings, to prove the
following:
On October 14, 1981, one Mariano Bustamante9 opened a
savings account with BPI-Laoag with an initial deposit
of P3,000.00: P2,000.00 of which was in check, and P1,000.00
in cash.10 That same day, he opened a current account
with P1,000.00 as initial deposit in the same bank. Upon his
request, a checkbook was issued to him.11
That same month, Marcelo Desiderio, allegedly a representative
of Magna Management Consultant, approached Maria Nieves
Garrido, personal banker of Citibank-Greenhills, and requested
signature cards and other requirements for the purpose of
opening a current account. Thereafter, Desiderio returned to the
bank, submitted the required documents and duly accomplished
forms, and made an initial deposit of P10,000.00. Thus, a
checking account in the name of Magna Management
Consultant was opened in Citibank-Greenhills with Rolando San
Pedro as its representative. A checkbook was given to
Desiderio.12
On October 15, 1981, at the Ramada Hotel, Felipe Salamanca
informed Manuel Valentino that two (2) checks were to be
deposited with Citibank the following day. Salamanca instructed
Valentino to watch out for those checks in the clearing house at
the Central Bank. On October 16, 1981, two (2) checks in the
amounts of Four Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Seven
Hundred Nineteen Pesos (P498,719.00), and Five Hundred One
Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Pesos and Thirty Centavos
(P501,260.30) were indeed deposited with the CitibankGreenhills under the current account of Magna Management
Consultant, represented by Rolando San Pedro. On October 30,
1981, two (2) more checks were deposited at the same bank in
the total amount of P3,000,000.00. Another deposit of checks
was made on November 20, 1981 in the total amount
of P5,000,000.00. All these checks were brought to the Central
Bank Clearing Center.
The checks deposited on October 16, 1981 did not reach the
Central Bank on that day, which was a Friday, but on Monday,
October 19, 1981. Manuel Valentino, a bookkeeper at the
Clearing Operations Division of the Central Bank, received from
Jesus Estacio, a Central Bank janitor-messenger, the demand
envelope containing the two (2) BPI-Laoag checks in the total
amount of P1,000,000.00 in the comfort room on the fourth floor
of the Central Bank administration building. Therein Valentino
altered the amount of P1,076,416.95 by crossing out the amount
of One Million Pesos. Thus, under the column "Total amount
received", only the amount of P76,416.95 was reflected in order
that BPI-Laoag would not look for the P1 million
check.13 Valentino then brought the altered clearing statement
back to the Clearing Center and prepared a Central Bank
Manifest where he changed the figure in the original copy to tally
with those in the altered clearing statement.
On October 30, 1981, the syndicate employed the same
scheme. As soon as the demand envelope containing the BPILaoag checks arrived, Valentino took it and gave it to Jesus

Estacio who then brought the same to the comfort room at the
fourth floor. Valentino followed him there and took the two BPI
checks amounting toP3,000,000.00, and altered the figures in
the BPI Clearing Statement. Valentino thereafter brought said
envelopes to the clearing house, and prepared the Central Bank
Manifest, likewise altering the figures in the original to tally with
the figures in the altered clearing statement.
At the last operation on November 20, 1981, the group followed
the same procedure Valentino asked Estacio to give him the
demand envelope and the former then went to the comfort room.
Valentino took the two BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount
of P5,000,000.00 which he later gave to Salamanca. Again, he
altered the figures in the clearing statement and those in the
Central Bank Manifest so that these would conform with each
other.14
As a matter of procedure, the demand envelopes containing the
checks intended for BPI-Laoag, the altered Central Bank
Manifests, and the clearing statements were forwarded to the
Regional Clearing Center. The pilfered checks deposited in the
account of Magna Management Consultant were not included in
those envelopes. Because BPI-Laoag did not receive the checks
with a total value of P9,000,000.00, these were not processed.
Consequently, as no objection or protest regarding the checks
were registered and no notice of dishonor of the checks for
insufficient funds was made by the BPI-Laoag, and since the
reglementary period for making such protest or notice of
dishonor had elapsed, Citibank-Greenhills considered the
checks as good and funded.
Hence, on different dates covering the period from October 26 to
December 6, 1981, Citibank-Greenhills allowed withdrawals in
the aggregate amount of P9,000,000.00 from the account of
Magna Management Consultant. Withdrawals were made
through checks endorsed by Rolando San Pedro and encashed
by Jaime R. Tan.15 The proceeds of the anomalous transactions
were divided among the members of the syndicate. Salamanca
gave Estacio P10,000.00 after the October 19, 1981
operation, P4,900.00 after the October 30, 1981 operation
andP5,000.00 after the November 20, 1981 operation. Valentino
received P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 after the
October 16 and 30, and November 20, 1981 operations.
On January 28, 1982, Segundo Gonzaga, then Administrative
Assistant for Transit Center (Clearing Center of BPI), was
informed through a long distance telephone call by the manager
of BPI-Laoag that their clearing transactions on October 19,
1981, October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981 registered an
outstanding discrepancy of P9,000,000.00 as reflected in their
inter-office reconciliation statement. The manager of BPI-Laoag
and the BPI Regional Manager for Northern Luzon who went to
the office at BPI-Ayala showed the clearing statements to
Gonzaga. Upon comparing the xerox copies of the BPI Clearing
Statements (Laoag copies) and xerox copies of the clearing
envelope sent to Citibank Manila, Gonzaga noticed the
alterations. Thus, he went to the Accounting Department of BPIAyala and found out that the Central Bank debited their bank in
the amount ofP9,000,000.00.16
Gonzaga went to Citibank-Greenhills and talked to Jake
Ocampo, its assistant manager, about the clearing items. After
checking their outgoing clearing checks for October 19, 1981,
October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, Ocampo told
Gonzaga that they did not recall said clearing checks. He gave
Gonzaga reproduced microfilm copies of those checks.
Gonzaga submitted the checks to his superiors with an
accompanying report.17 The BPI and the Central Bank jointly
referred the matter for investigation to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which assigned the case to Head Agent
Salvador Ranin of the Special Investigation Division. 18
On February 12, 1982, the Chief of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of
the Central Bank, Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the banks Chief
Security Officer, and the BPI Vice-President and Comptroller
brought Manuel Valentino to the NBI. The following day, Agent

95

Ranin took Valentinos statement. Valentino waived his rights to

remain silent and to counsel. He signed the waiver on the first
page of his statement. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took
Valentinos supplementary sworn statement. The same NBI
agent took Jesus Estacios statement on February 17, 1982 and
supplementary statement on March 22, 1982. Like Valentino,
Estacio waived his right to counsel. In their respective
statements, Valentino and Estacio admitted their participation in
the commission of the crime, narrated how they carried out the
plan to defraud the banks, and identified those who participated
in the criminal acts. After the investigation, Agent Ranin came
out with a Memorandum Report dated April 26, 1982. 19
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
On December 2, 1969, the Central Bank of the Philippines
employed Jesus Estacio as janitor-messenger. In 1978, a certain
Rico Javier introduced Estacio to Felipe Salamanca. When
Salamanca learned that Estacio was connected with the Central
Bank, he asked Estacio if he knew any bookkeeper thereat as
his compadre needed one. Estacio replied that he would look for
one. A week later, Salamanca called up Estacio and asked him if
he had found a bookkeeper. Estacio mentioned Manuel
Valentino. Salamanca instructed Estacio to bring Valentino to
Jacks Restaurant in Quezon City after office hours. In that
restaurant, Estacio introduced Valentino to Salamanca.
Valentino was in turn introduced to Basilio Tan. During their
conversation, Valentino told Salamanca about his work as a
bookkeeper at the Central Bank.20
Sometime in October 1981, Valentino requested Estacio to
accompany him to the EDCOR office. There they met
Salamanca, Marcelo Desiderio, Rolando Santos and Basilio Tan.
Salamanca told Estacio to stay outside the office because the
group was going to discuss something. Half an hour later, the
group dispersed. That same month, Estacio saw Romeo
Villasanta, another accused, at the clearing office of the Central
Bank. When Estacio asked why Villasanta was there, the latter
answered that he was "just expediting something." Estacio saw
Villasanta for the second time that same month talking with
Valentino at the clearing office. Valentino asked Estacio to point
out the office of the Department of Economic Research to
Villasanta because Villasanta would be doing some research.
Estacio went with Villasanta to the fourth floor and showed him
the said office. Villasanta then inquired where the comfort room
in that floor was. Estacio thereafter went back to his work and
did not see Villasanta anymore.21 1
On November 20, 1981, Valentino asked Estacio to bring an
envelope to the fourth floor and to wait for him at its lobby.
Estacio acceded and later, Valentino arrived. Valentino took the
envelope from Estacio and went to the comfort room. Thereafter,
Estacio went to the Clearing Office.22
Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from
the NBI was looking for him, Estacio went to the NBI. There he
told Agent Ranin that he wanted to call a lawyer but Agent Ranin
did not allow him to do so. Agent Ranin investigated him from
5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on February 17, 1982. This continued
the following day and lasted a week. In the course of the
investigation, Agent Ranin promised Estacio that he would not
be harmed should he cooperate and admit the charges against
him, and that he would be freed once he becomes a state
witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a newspaper and
poked his gun at him. Estacio was allowed to read the statement
before he signed it.23
On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at
the NBI for about two months, his wife and children would visit
him every week and he could talk to them freely. 24 He was
transferred to Muntinlupa and detained at the Death Row for two
years. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took his second
statement that was a continuation of his first statement. He was
unable to read his supplementary statement because of fear of
Agent Ranin, who was scaring him. He stressed that the
statements he made before the NBI were not true and that he

only signed those documents25 because he was afraid of Agent

Ranin.26
Rolando Santos came to know Felipe Salamanca when he sold
his car to him (Salamanca) on installment withP15,000.00 as
down payment with the balance of P20,000.00 to be paid in two
or three months. He accepted partial payment for the car. After a
time, Salamanca fully paid the balance. In July 1981, Salamanca
gave himP3,000.00. Twice or thrice, Salamanca tried to
convince him to join a scheme to defraud a bank. After
Salamanca had paid him the full price of the car, Salamanca
asked him again to join his group. All he had to do was to open a
checking account. He could have easily facilitated this, being the
Vice-President for Finance of American Steamship Agencies. In
those meetings with Salamanca where he was persuaded to
open a checking account with a bank, Basilio Tan, the son of a
general and his classmate at San Beda College, Valentino, and
Desiderio were present. When he told Salamanca that he was
not interested in the scheme to defraud a bank, as he was busy
with his job, Salamanca got mad. On October 20, 1981, an
unidentified assailant shot him in his house. He sustained three
(3) gunshot wounds and was confined at the Paraaque Medical
Center.27
Marcelo Desiderio came to know Felipe Salamanca sometime
in July 1981 when Salamanca went to his office 28because he
wanted to open an account with Citibank-Greenhills. Desiderio
went to Citibank-New York to inquire about the requirements for
opening an account. Two days later, he gave Salamanca the
bank forms and signature cards to be accomplished. He learned
from Salamanca that the forms would be filled up by Rolando
San Pedro. For the initial deposit, Salamanca gave
him P10,000.00 in cash and check. He also receivedP2,500.00
as consultancy fee. He went to Citibank-Greenhills to make the
deposit and the bank issued him a checkbook.29
Desiderio denied that he was present in any meeting where
Salamanca and his group discussed a plan to defraud a bank.
He acceded in opening the bank account at Citibank-Greenhills
because Salamanca assured him that the account would be
opened in connection with a loan application with the Citibank of
New York. He denied that Salamancas group tasked him and
Rolando Santos with opening accounts in Metro Manila banks,
particularly with Citibank-Greenhills. He denied knowing Santos
and Estacio personally although he admitted that Estacio, with
Manuel Valentino, came to his office to deliver a tailored suit for
a certain Atty. Martin. He further denied knowing Jaime Tan but
admitted knowing Alfredo Fajardo, who was his client when he
was still connected with BPI.30
Alfredo Fajardo opted to waive his right to testify and said that
he has no documentary evidence to present before the
Sandiganbayan.31 Another accused, Emilio Reyes, voluntarily
surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and was detained at the
Security and Sheriff Services office.32 He filed a motion for
reinvestigation on June 16, 1987 but it was resolved against
him.33 He pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him.34 However, since July 17, 1989, Reyes failed to appear for
trial. On February 16, 1990, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him in
these cases on account of the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.35 Because the cases against
Reyes were tried in absentia, the Sandiganbayan ordered that
these be archived without prejudice to revival "for purposes of
contempt citation in the event that he shall have been
apprehended and brought within the jurisdiction" of the court.36
Rolando San Pedro was arrested on March 22, 1988 at the
vicinity of the Sandiganbayan.37 He entered a plea of not guilty to
the charges against him.38 On June 11, 1989, he died.39 Thus,
the Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases against him. In the
Resolution of February 23, 1990, which was promulgated on
March 12, 1990, the Sandiganbayan resolved that the cases
against Felipe
Salamanca, Basilio
Tan, Jaime
Tan and Mariano Bustamante be archived.40

96

As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio,

Desiderio, Santos, and Fajardo of the complex crimes of estafa
thru falsification of public documents. Estacio, Desiderio and
Fajardo filed separate motions for reconsideration, 41 while
Santos filed with the Supreme Court a motion for extension of
time to file a petition forcertiorari.42 On September 26, 1985, the
Sandiganbayan
denied
those
motions
for
reconsideration.43 Hence, the instant petitions for review
on certiorari that they individually filed with this Court, but which
were consolidated in the Resolution of December 10, 1985.44

Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the

rights of an accused during custodial investigation. It reads:

In its consolidated comment on the petitions, the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) questions the propriety of raising factual
issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan.45The OSG asserts that in such
a petition, this Courts jurisdiction is "confined to questions of
law" and hence, this Court "is not supposed to reweigh evidence
but only to determine its substantiality." On this matter,
in Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,46 this Court, after
citing Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,47 said:

On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of

the 1987 Constitution states:

"As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No.

1606 expressly provides that `(d)ecisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions
of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower
court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from
the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by
this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal
cases, a persons life and liberty are at stake."
While only petitioner Estacio is a government employee in these
cases, as the three others are private individuals, it is in the light
of this pronouncement that the instant petitions shall be
considered and resolved. Moreover, in the recent case
of Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,48the Court, citing
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990, held that
a petition for review on certiorariquestioning the final judgment,
order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Courts or other courts, may raise factual
issues. In the exercise of its sound discretion, taking into
account the attendant circumstances, this Court retains the
option of either taking cognizance of, and deciding such issues,
or referring the case to the proper court for determination. In
these criminal cases, this Court chooses to take cognizance of
factual questions raised in the interest of proper administration
of justice.
In their separate petitions, petitioners assert that there was no
proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crimes
charged principally because:
(a) the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and
Valentino are inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel
was violated when said confessions were executed;
(b) the discharge of Valentino from the informations to be a state
witness was improper; and
(c) conspiracy, which made all petitioners equally guilty, was not
adequately proven.
Notably, petitioners Santos and Estacio aver that, should they be
convicted as charged, they should be held individually liable only
as an accomplice.49
Relevant to petitioners contention on the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino is

"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence."

"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel."
A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the
1973 Constitution does not specify the right against
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found in
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the latter constitutional provision cannot be applied to
extrajudicial confessions made prior to its date of effectivity.
In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that:
"x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring
that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during
custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of
counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the
extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such
argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held
that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution
was in force and effect, should have been made with the
assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only
on April 26, 1983 when this Court, throughMorales, Jr. vs.
Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers
during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that
`(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter,
in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:
`x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made
one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs.
Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no
comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the
date of promulgation ofMorales."50
Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these
cases as the extrajudicial confessions in question here, were
taken on February 13, February 17 and March 22, 1982, long
before the date of promulgation of theMorales Decision on April
26, 1983. Prior to this date, the guidelines requiring that waiver
of the right to counsel by an accused can be properly made only
with the presence and assistance of counsel, had yet to be
formulated and pronounced by this Court.51
The rule on prospective application of "judge-made laws" was
stressed in Co vs. Court of Appeals.52 In that case, the Court,
through then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, ruled that in

97

accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing that

"(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," and Article 4 of the same Code stating that "(l)aws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided,"
the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory,
shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves
are not laws, are nevertheless evidences of what the law means.
As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino
and petitioner Estacio of their right to counsel during custodial
investigation, the intelligent and voluntary execution thereof
should be determined. The pre-interrogation advisories to the
extrajudicial confessants uniformly state:
"01. QUESTION: Mr. MANUEL VALENTINO, we are informing
you that you are under investigation in connection with the
alleged Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial/Official
Documents committed at the Central Bank of the Philippines.
But before we ask you any question, you must understand your
legal rights. You have the right to remain silent. You have the
right not to give any statement if you do not wish to. Anything
you say may be used as evidence against you in any
proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of counsel of your
own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a
lawyer will be appointed for you before we ask you any question.
Now, after having been so informed, are you still willing to give a
free and voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth and
nothing but the truth in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
"02. Q: Are you willing to sign a Waiver of your rights?
"A: Yes, sir.

administrative action against their alleged intimidators for

maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence
on their bodies and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all
these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions."
That the statements were intelligently executed is borne out by
the fact that both confessants have reached the tertiary level of
education: Valentino holds the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce56 while petitioner Estacio reached the first year of
college education in banking and finance. 57 Possessed with
sufficient education and not proven to be mentally unfit, they
could have protested the forced extraction of culpability from
themselves if indeed that was true.
Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions in question are replete
with details on the manner in which the crimes were committed,
thereby ruling out the probability that these were involuntarily
made.58 Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that, if upon its face the confession exhibits no
sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could possibly be
supplied only by the accused reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a
mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be
considered voluntary.59 InU.S. vs. De los Santos,60 the Court
said:
"If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the
accused with a full comprehension of its significance, there is no
impediment to its admission as evidence, and it then becomes
evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the
presumption a very strong one that no person of normal
mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless
prompted by truth and conscience."

"WAIVER
"I have been advised of my right to remain silent; that anything
that I say may be used as evidence against me and that I have
the right to a lawyer to be present with me while I am being
questioned.
"I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement
and answer questions. I do not want the assistance of counsel
and I understand and know whag (sic) I am doing. No promises
or threats have been made to me and no force or pressure of
any kind has been used against me.
(Sgd.
with
MANUEL VALENTINO y SOCAN

thumbmark)

In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the
members of the syndicate and the sophisticated manner by
which the crimes in question were perpetrated if Valentino and
Estacio, who were directly involved therein, did not reveal these.
With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions
of Valentino and petitioner Estacio against their co-accused,
once again, this Court declares that although an extrajudicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant,
jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of
other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his coaccused.61 In People vs. Alvarez,62 this Court ruled that where
the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession
is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. The Court
elucidated further in People vs. Encipido63 as follows:

13 February 1982, NBI, Manila"53

It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was
compliance with the constitutional requirement on preinterrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his
confession is involuntary and untrue.54 The defense attempted to
prove that Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to
threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their confessions.
Other than their bare assertions, Valentino and petitioner Estacio
miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the
NBIs use of force or intimidation on their persons. Before
signing their statements, they never protested against any form
of intimidation, much more, of maltreatment that they could have
relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI. In People vs.
Pia,55 the Court said:
"x x x It has been held that where the defendants did not present
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons;
where they failed to complain to the officers who administered
the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or

"It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial

confessions were independently made without collusion, are
identical with each other in their material respects and
confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as
circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation
in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as
corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from
other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than
the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the
crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known
as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the
general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are
admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof."
Petitioner Estacio claimed that, to his surprise, he found
Valentino at the NBI. They talked for a while and Valentino told
him to say whatever he (Valentino) would say.64 That allegation
alone cannot be considered as indicative of collusion between
them as their sworn statements both contain facts showing their

98

deep involvement in the scheme to defraud a bank. Human

experience dictates that no one would volunteer to demonstrate
ones culpability unless it was the truth. It may thus be safely
presumed that in telling petitioner Estacio to say whatever he
would say, Valentino was merely cautioning petitioner Estacio to
tell the truth. Nevertheless, even without the extrajudicial
confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence on
record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.65
On the validity of the discharge of Valentino from the information
to be a state witness, the determination of who should be used
as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses is part of prosecutorial discretion.66 However, it
is the courts that finally determine whether the requirements of
the Rules of Court67 have been satisfied to justify the discharge
of an accused to become a state witness.
It should be recalled that petitioner Estacio was originally
discharged to be a state witness. Upon his manifestation that he
would rather remain an accused in these cases for the
protection of his family, the court re-included him in the
information. Apparently considering the nature of the crimes and
the secrecy by which these were perpetrated, the prosecution
was left with no recourse but to side with Valentinos motion for
his discharge to be a state witness. The absolute necessity for
the testimony of someone who was a participant in the criminal
scheme is buttressed by the ruling that where a crime is
contrived in secret then the discharge of one of the conspirators
is essential so he can testify against the other conspirators. 68 In
a conspiracy which was done in secret, there is a necessity to
discharge one of the accused to provide direct evidence of the
commission of the crime.69
Worth noting, however, is that Valentinos testimony and his
sworn statements differ with regard to petitioner Estacios
participation in the commission of the October 19, 1981 criminal
act, and the participation of petitioner Fajardo in the three
crimes. Valentino stated in his sworn statement that on October
19, 1981, when he noticed that the BPI representative had
placed the demand envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks
for clearing at the Laoag counter behind him, petitioner Estacio,
who was the syndicates messenger, immediately came with a
push cart. Petitioner Estacio placed the demand envelope in the
pushcart and proceeded to the comfort room in the fourth floor
where Valentino followed him to alter the documents to suit the
syndicates purposes. On the other hand, when he testified,
Valentino asserted that he did not see petitioner Estacio at the
meeting when they hatched the first operation on October 16,
1981. When the alterations were made on October 19, 1981,
Valentino claimed that petitioner Estacio was not with them 70 for
it was he himself who brought the bundle of checks to the fourth
floor comfort room where Villasanta took the checks and altered
the bank statements.
With respect to petitioner Fajardo, Valentino averred in his
supplementary sworn statement that petitioner Fajardo was
present in three or four conferences where he participated in the
discussion to defraud a bank.71 However, on the witness stand,
Valentino swore that petitioner Fajardo had "no participation in
these cases"72 or in the three operations subjects of these cases.
These discrepancies in Valentinos sworn statements and
testimony are material ones as far as petitioners Estacio and
Fajardo are concerned. On this issue, the Court has consistently
held that:
"x x x discrepancies between the statement of the affiant in his
affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are generally
incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to
open court declarations because they are oftentimes not in such
a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which has transpired in his affidavit and those made by
him. This is so because affidavits are frequently prepared by the
administering officer and cast in the latters language or the
latters understanding of what the affiant had said, while the

affiant frequently simply signs the affidavit after the same has
been read to him." 73
In People vs. Fabro, the Court ruled that repudiation and
recantation of confessions which have been obtained in
accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor
as unreliable.74 However, that ruling may not find application
under the circumstances of these cases. In Fabro, it was the
accused himself who recanted his confession when, on the
witness stand, he denied he committed the crime. No other
witness testified for the defense. On the other hand, in these
cases, Valentino, a co-conspirator who appeared as a state
witness before the court, adhered to his confession as regards
the participation of the accused, except that he testified that
petitioner Estacio was absent when the first crime was planned
and committed, and that petitioner Fajardo was not involved in
the three cases. It has been held that where a witness who
testified for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the
defense by retracting his previous testimony, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence. 75 Although these
cases do not involve the conflicting testimonies of a witness, that
rule may be applied in a conflict between a sworn statement and
the testimony while recognizing the inferiority of a sworn
statement to a testimony. In these cases, the narration of facts in
Valentinos sworn statements were in substance reproduced in
his testimony which, in turn, was supported by other testimonial
evidence and the voluminous documentary evidence.
In the absence of any reason to question the credibility of
Valentino and that of his testimony, that portion of his testimony
on the nonparticipation of petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case No.
5949 and petitioner Fajardo in all three cases shall be
controlling. We deem the variance in Valentinos testimony as
endeavors to rectify his sworn statements to conform to the
truth. To reiterate, such variance, does not make him a less
credible witness or affect the merit of his testimony, as the other
pieces of prosecution evidence support it and do not prove that it
is untruthful or contrived.
The value of Valentinos testimony in the prosecution of these
cases cannot be underestimated. It fills in the gaps in the
prosecution evidence that the other prosecution witnesses failed
to cover. Without it, conspiracy to defraud the BPI-Laoag
of P9,000,000.00 through falsification of the clearing statement
and manifest would not have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.76 As creditably shown by the prosecution, the crimes
were committed not solely by the person who altered the
clearing statement and manifest. That all-important act, the
conception of which could have been hatched only by one
familiar with banking procedures, would not have been possible
if not for the indispensable cooperation of others. Thus,
Valentino testified:
"Q Will you please describe in detail what was agreed upon
during the meeting?
A It was agreed upon that Salamanca and Villasanta will open
an account at Laoag Branch of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and Desiderio also and Santos are also in charge in
opening accounts in Metro Manila, particularly Citibank,
Greenhills. Basilio Tan, he is stationary in the office. Jaime Tan
and Rolando San Pedro are the ones in charge in withdrawals at
the Citibank."77
However, the liability of each of the petitioners must be
considered within the purview of the following pronouncement in
the celebrated case of People vs. Berroya78 where the Court
said that:

99

"x x x to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of

conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the time of the commission of
the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other coconspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
conspiracy. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any
active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes
of conviction. Thus, assuming Vienes was a participant in the
planning to abduct a Taiwanese national, in the absence of
eyewitnesses to the actual abduction, there is a paucity of
evidence as to whether or not Vienes carried out his part of the
plan." (emphasis supplied)
In these cases, even if Valentinos supplementary sworn
statement stating that petitioner Fajardo participated in the
discussion of the scheme to milk money from a bank should be
given evidentiary weight, still, that evidence is not enough to
convict him. There is no evidence showing that he participated in
opening a bank account in the procedure to alter the clearing
manifests and statements, or in the withdrawal of substantial
amounts resulting from such alteration of documents. There is
thus insufficient evidence against petitioner Fajardo to find him
culpable for the crimes charged in these cases and hence, he
should be acquitted.
Similarly situated as petitioner Fajardo, is petitioner Santos. His
admission to having attended several meetings of Salamancas
group did not satisfactorily define his liability as a conspirator
considering the absence of any proof that he committed an overt
act in pursuance of the syndicates scheme. His pretext of
having entered into a "car sale" with Salamanca may ring hollow
in truth but the weakness of his defense cannot be taken against
him considering the insufficiency of prosecution evidence on his
participation in the actual commission of the crime. His acquittal
is, therefore, likewise in order.
With respect to petitioner Estacio, Valentinos testimony on the
first syndicate operation on October 16, 1981 should be counted
in his favor. There is insufficient evidence that he participated in
the alteration of documents at the Central Bank Clearing Office
on October 19, 1981 much more in the prior discussion to
perpetrate the crime. Hence, his acquittal in Criminal Case No.
5949 should follow. However, as regards the syndicate
operations on October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of his role in carrying the
demand envelopes to the Central Banks fourth floor comfort
room where alterations were made. By the nature of his work, he
had access to these demand envelopes containing BPI checks.
His participation in the conspiracy was therefore vital to the
realization of the syndicates objectives.
Parenthetically,
the
Court
notes
with
dismay
the
Sandiganbayans pronouncement that petitioner Estacios
"wishy-washy" attitude in offering himself as a state witness
"confirmed his knowledge of the intimate details of the
conspiracy and the mode or manner by which its operations and
schemes would be initiated and consummated." 79 Such
conclusion is in consonance with the presumption of guilt, not
with that of innocence. An accused may have some reasons for
his irresolute action as far as testifying for the prosecution is
concerned. Petitioner Estacio had such reason he feared for
the safety of his family considering that he would be up against a
syndicate that, because of the success of its evil scheme, had
the money to harm their perceived "enemies." That petitioner
Estacio was deeply enmeshed in the syndicates activities to
bleed money from banks is shown by the fact that in Crim. Case
No. 6603 involving the syndicates operation in the Solidbank,
his conviction for the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public/commercial documents was affirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 75362.80But such conviction for another crime must not be
the basis for a conclusion that the accused is guilty of another
crime charged, although basically, the same criminal acts were
committed.
We therefore
find
the
Sandiganbayans

pronouncement totally unexpected of a court that must

determine the culpability of an accused based on the
prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the defense or
the reputation of an accused.
Petitioner Desiderio, on the other hand, has been proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for having participated both in the
discussion and mapping out of the malevolent scheme and in its
actual execution. Desiderios knowledge of banking procedures
provided the rationale for his giving "birth", or having "authored"
the scheme along with Salamanca and Villasanta. 81 He had
served as branch manager in the BPI where he was employed
for twenty-seven years, or until he was charged with estafa for
accommodating a clients loan against an uncollected
deposit.82 Nieves Garrido, a personal banker at CitibankGreenhills, who entertained him when he made queries about
opening a current account, confirmed his having opened said
account for Magna Management Consultant, thereby lending
credence to and corroborating Valentinos testimony on his role
in the implementation of the criminal scheme.
Petitioner Desiderios claim that he opened that account in
accordance with his legitimate role as consultant in Mardes
Management Consultant is a lame excuse. Anyone, especially a
businessman such as San Pedro or Salamanca, could have
opened a current account without hiring the services of a
management consultant. That lame excuse sounds even lamer
considering the evidence showing that his alleged client was
also engaged in management consultancy. Desiderio thus relied
on denial as a mode of defense. A denial, like other defenses,
remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence
which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the
prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the
probative value of the denial is negligible.83 Desiderios denial of
complicity in the scheme cannot, therefore, prevail over the
positive testimonies of Nieves Garrido and Valentino that he
played the important role of opening the current account that
paved the way to the "inside jobs" of petitioner Estacio, Valentino
and, probably, Villasanta. His sole overt act under the
syndicates scheme facilitated the commission of all three counts
of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Notably, in these cases, the Sandiganbayan observed that none
of the accused refuted the documentary exhibits offered in
evidence by the prosecution.84 The pieces of documentary
evidence consist of bank records including deposit slips, ledger
cards, specimen cards, checks for deposit and withdrawal,
clearing statements and clearing manifests. All of these clearly
and positively buttress the prosecutions theory as to how
the pilferage scheme was successfully implemented. The
defense obviously could not demolish the evidentiary weight of
the prosecutions documentary evidence and hence, it focused
on the prosecution evidence on the membership of the accused
in the syndicate, and on the probative value of the interlocking
confessions of Valentino and petitioner Estacio. There is thus no
alternative to giving full credence and merit to the prosecutions
documentary evidence, and to declaring them to be in complete
accord with the prosecution theory on the commission of the
offenses and the nature and extent of participation of the
accused.
The informations filed in these cases individually charge an
offense "defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2 (a) in
relation to Article 171, par. 2" of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation. 85 It is indubitable that estafa
was committed by abuse of confidence in these cases. The
conspirators that enlisted and utilized the assistance of Central
Bank employees abused the confidence that the banking system
reposed upon such employees. As a result of such abuse of
confidence, the BPI sustained damage in the aggregate of Nine
Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00). Verily, the perpetrators of the
crimes breached even the confidence that people reposed on
the Central Bank and the whole banking system.

100

By falsifying clearing documents, the offenders committed the

complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, any public
officer or employee who, taking advantage of his official position,
makes untruthful statements in a narration of facts, commits the
crime of falsification of public documents. This kind of
falsification requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by
the offender are absolutely false.86
The prosecution has duly proven these requisites. Valentino
occupies a public position as bookkeeper at the Clearing Office
of the Central Bank. He intercepted and pilfered BPI-Laoag
checks with the assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitormessenger at the Central Bank. In the comfort room, Valentino
and/or Villasanta, who has so far avoided the clutches of the law,
tampered with the clearing statements and clearing manifests
which Estacio had taken from Valentinos desk. The tampered
documents, along with the pilfered demand envelopes, were
then sent to the Central Bank Regional Clearing Center in
Laoag. These "inside jobs" were perpetrated as part of the
decadent scheme that private individuals had hatched to gain
monetary gratification.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) under which the defendants were
charged in these cases, states that any person who shall
defraud another by means of "using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits"shall be held liable for the crime of
swindling (estafa). Under the peculiar circumstances proven in
these cases, the crime actually committed by the offenders is
that defined in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code on other
deceits. The first paragraph of this article states that "(t)he
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount
of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount
shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter." Although the information charged the
accused with violation of paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code defining the crime of falsification by public
officer of employee, the Sandiganbayan correctly found that the
accused violated paragraph 4 of the same Article which states
as follows:
"The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify
a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx

xxx

Under the procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for

complex
crimes
enunciated
in Nizurtado
vs.
Sandiganbayan,87 the first step in determining the proper
penalty is to consider whether or not aggravating and/or
mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crimes.
Only petitioner Estacio claimed that he voluntarily
surrendered.1wphi1 For said mitigating circumstance to be
appreciated, surrender must be made spontaneously or in such
a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt, or because he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense of finding and capturing him. 88 According to
NBI Agent Ranin, petitioner Estacio went to the NBI bearing a
referral note from Atty. Agapito Fajardo, Chief of Anti-Fraud Unit
of the Central Bank.89 However, it was proven by the prosecution
beyond peradventure of doubt that petitioner Estacios alleged
surrender was anything but spontaneous. He went to the NBI on
February 17, 1982,90 five days after Atty. Fajardo had brought
Valentino to that office for questioning, and a day after a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) had been issued against
him and Valentino.91 Moreover, the booking sheet and arrest
report states that petitioner Estacio was "arrested" on February
16, 1982.92 Voluntary surrender having been insufficiently
proven, as far as penalty is concerned, petitioner Estacio in
Crim. Cases Nos. 5950-51 shall suffer the same penalty as
petitioner Desiderio who did not present proof that could mitigate
the penalty that he should suffer for the crimes.
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the
penalty prescribed by law is a single divisible penalty, the
accused shall be imposed the medium period of such penalty
when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances. The propriety of imposing the medium period of
the more serious penalty for a complex crime after considering
the modifying circumstances notwithstanding that Article 48
requires the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period has
been settled.93 It is supported by the doctrine that penal
provisions shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.
The medium period of prision mayor is eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years. In the absence of impediments to the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for each crime
committed, the penalty that should be imposed upon petitioner
Estacio in Crim. Case Nos. 5950 and 5951, and upon petitioner
Desiderio in Crim. Case Nos. 5949, 5950 and 5951, shall be the
indeterminate sentence comprising of the minimum penalty
within the range of prision correccional, to the maximum penalty
of prision mayor medium plus a fine of P5,000.00. It will be
observed that the maximum penalty erroneously imposed by the
Sandiganbayan is ten (10) years and one (1) day which is
already within the period of prision mayor maximum.

xxx

"4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts."

Inasmuch as the crime committed in these cases is the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code states that when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense, "the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed" in its maximum
period, the penalty for the crimes committed in these cases is
that imposed for falsification of public documents or prision
mayor in its maximum period and a fine of P5,000.00.
While it appears that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the
basis for imposition of penalty should be that imposed by law for
falsification of public documents, it erred in imposing the
maximum penalty of the indeterminate sentence it meted upon
the accused. Finding no modifying circumstances, the
Sandiganbayan imposed for each complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public document, the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner

Rolando Santos y Ramirez in G.R. Nos. 71523-25, petitioner
Alfredo R. Fajardo, Jr. in G.R. No. 72384-86 and petitioner
Jesus E. Estacio in G.R. No. 72420-22 with respect to Criminal
Case No. 5949 are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged
for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan as far as petitioner Marcelo S. Desiderio in G.
R. No. 72387-89 and petitioner Jesus E. Estacio, with respect to
Criminal Case Nos. 5950 and 5951 are concerned, is herby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification that, for each crime, they
shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum to ten
(10) years of prision mayor medium.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143702

September 13, 2001

101

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZALDY MENDOZA Y SEVILLA, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated March 12, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City, finding accusedappellant Zaldy Mendoza guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Hernandez
Abatay, in the amounts of P75,000.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The information against accused-appellant charged
That on or about the 7th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
armed with a knife, conspiring and confederating with Marco
Aguirre who is still at large, working together and helping one
another, with deliberate intent and with violence employed upon
the person of Hernandez Abatay, that is by stabbing him with the
said knife, with which the accused was armed at the time, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry
away with intent to gain one (1) Seiko Divers wristwatch valued
at P300.00 and cash of P15.00 owned by Hernandez Abatay
and as a consequence of the stab wounds suffered by
Hernandez Abatay at the hands of the accused, the said
Hernandez Abatay died a few days thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The information was subsequently amended to include Marco
Aguirre, accused-appellant Mendoza's co-accused.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following:
On July 7, 1994, at around 1:30 a.m., the victim Hernandez
Abatay and his companion Jose Neri Tajanlangit were at the
corner of Quezon and Ledesma Streets in Iloilo City waiting for a
jeepney to take them home. They had just come from work at a
supermarket. Tajanlangit left Abatay to urinate nearby. He was
about 15 feet away from Abatay when he saw accused-appellant
Zaldy Mendoza and a companion approach Abatay. The two
men robbed Abatay. Accused-appellant's companion held
Abatay's hands behind his back while accused-appellant took
Abatay's wrist watch and money. Accused appellant then
stabbed Abatay in the abdomen. Abatay ran away but accusedappellant pursued him.3
At that time, PO3 Danilo Tan of the PNP was going home on
board a tricycle. He saw a man running on the street, going in
his direction. Tan asked the tricycle driver to stop. He alighted
and asked the person why he was running. He turned out to be
Abatay. He said that he had been held up by two persons. Tan
asked him why he was clutching his stomach. Abatay replied
that he had been stabbed by the robbers. Tan found that the
victim had a wound in the lower right portion of his stomach,
about one inch above his belt. Abatay told Tan that one of the
robbers was wearing a white t-shirt while the other was wearing
a sleeveless basketball shirt and undershirt uniform.4
PO3 Tan asked the tricycle driver to take Abatay to St. Paul's
Hospital, while he went after the suspects. He spotted one of the
suspects, who was wearing a sleeveless basketball shirt, along
Quezon St. on the way to Rizal St. The suspect, who was later
identified as accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza, was panting for
breath because he had been running. Tan identified himself and
searched the suspect. Tan was able to recover a table knife from
accused-appellant.5
PO3 Tan then took accused-appellant to the St. Paul's Hospital
where Abatay was confined. In the presence of Tan and some
nurses and the attending physician in the emergency room,

Abatay pointed to accused-appellant as one of those who had

held him up and then stabbed him. At that time, Abatay was in
good condition and even spoke with Tan. Tan then placed
accused-appellant under arrest and took him to the police
station for investigation. Accused-appellant allegedly pointed to
Marco Aguirre as his companion when they held up Abatay. Tan
tried to look for Aguirre but was unsuccessful.6
Melly De Rojo testified that on July 7, 1994, from around 11:30
p.m. to 12:30 a.m., she was washing clothes outside her house
at the Roxas Village in Mabini St., Iloilo. She was a neighbor of
accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza and Marco Aguirre in the said
village.7 According to this witness, Marco Aguirre asked her to
hide him inside her house because he had just stabbed
someone. De Rojo said Aguirre was wearing a white t-shirt with
bloodstains on it and was holding a knife. Aguirre told her that he
could not get inside his own house because it was closed. She
said she refused Aguirre's request because her husband and
children were sleeping inside the house. Then Aguirre allegedly
took off his clothes and hung them on her clothes line. She told
Aguirre not to hang his clothes on her clothes line as it might
place her in trouble. Aguirre left and De Rojo did not see him
again. Neither did she see accused-appellant. De Rojo did not
report the incident to the police because she was afraid and,
anyway, she found out later that the crime had already been
reported to the police.8
Accused-appellant went to see De Rojo twice after the event
that took place on the night of July 7, 1994. Accused-appellant's
wife asked her if it was true that Aguirre showed up at her house
on the night in question. De Rojo replied in the affirmative and
told her that she would testify in favor of accused-appellant
because it was Aguirre and not accused-appellant whom she
saw that night outside her house.9
The kitchen knife which had been recovered from accusedappellant was turned over on July 8, 1994 at 8:00 a.m. to PO3
Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Police Precinct I. The
blade of the knife was discolored but he could not say if it was
blood that caused the stain.10
Violeta Abatay, the victim's mother, testified that she saw her son
at the St. Paul's Hospital in the early morning of July 7, 1994.
Her son died on July 10, 1994, after three days' confinement. 11
Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City Police
Station, performed an autopsy on the body of Hernandez Abatay
on July 11, 1994.12 As reflected in a medico-legal autopsy report
(Exh. A) prepared by him, Dr. Doromal found that the cause of
death of the victim was a single stab wound located under the
subleeding and thoraco-abdominal region or near the right lower
abdomen. The direction and entrance of the wound was
horizontal inside the abdominal cavity and ended at the outer
portion of the right kidney. The wound, which was 18 cms. deep
and 3.5 x 1.2 cms. wide, was inflicted using a single-bladed
sharp instrument, such as a knife. The bladed instrument
penetrated the back and hit the posterior portion of the lungs,
causing the same to harden and acquire a liver-like consistency.
The victim developed hypostatic pneumonia causing his death.
Hemorrhaging secondary to the stab wound also contributed to
the victim's death.13
Dr. Doromal also found that based on the location of the wound
in the victim's body, it was possible that the victim and his
assailant were facing each other when the former was stabbed.
The assailant's thrust originated from below the victim's
abdomen and moved upwards to the inner portion of the body.
The defense of the accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza was alibi.
He claimed that on July 7, 1994, at around 11:30 p.m., he was at
the Rochelle Carinderia resting after a day's work, driving a
"trisicad." Afterwards, he walked along Mabini St. towards the
corner of Ledesma St. On the way, he saw his neighbor Marco
Aguirre with a certain person he did not know. Accusedappellant, who was about five meters away, saw Aguirre pointing

102

a knife at the person. Accused-appellant said he approached the

two and asked Aguirre what the matter was, but he was told to
leave. Then, he said, he saw Aguirre stab the person. Accusedappellant claimed he fled towards the direction of the Rochelle
Carinderia. Accused-appellant said he wanted to report the
incident to the police, but before he could do so a police patrol
car arrived. PO3 Danilo Tan alighted from the car and, while
pointing a gun at him, asked accused-appellant who his
companions were. Accused-appellant said he had no
companions. He was then made to get inside the patrol car and
taken to the Gen. Luna Police Station for investigation.14
Accused-appellant said he was handcuffed and taken to St.
Paul's Hospital. At the emergency room of the hospital, he said
PO3 Tan asked Abatay if accused-appellant was the one who
stabbed him, but Abatay answered that it was accusedappellant's companion who stabbed him.
On March 12, 1998, the lower court rendered a decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive
portion of its decision states:
WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and is hereby punished with imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua to Death, to pay the heirs of the victim
P75,000.00 as actual damages and to pay civil indemnity of
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration dated
November 25, 1994. In its order dated October 26, 1998, the
trial court denied the motion after finding no compelling reason
to reconsider its decision.16 But the trial court amended the
dispositive portion by specifying the provision of the Revised
Penal Code violated and the penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, is punished with imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay the heirs of the victim SeventyFive Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and to
pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.17
On November 25, 1998, accused-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration and new adjudication on the ground that the trial
court's order, dated October 26, 1998, was rendered after Judge
Florentino P. Pedronio had vacated his position as RTC Judge of
Iloilo.18 But the trial court denied accused-appellant's motion in
an order on March 16, 2000.19
Hence, this appeal. In his lone assignment of error, accusedappellant contends:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
ZALDY MENDOZA Y SEVILLA FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE ON
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.20
We find the appeal to be without merit.
First. The issue in this case turns on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. We have repeatedly ruled that in the
absence of any fact or circumstance of weight which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued,
appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court's findings on
the credibility of witnesses or set aside its judgment considering
that it is in a better position to decide these questions as it heard
the witnesses during trial. 21 The matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most completely
performed and carried out by a trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in the light of the

defendant's behavior, demeanor, conduct, and attitude during

the trial.22
In this case, accused-appellant questions the testimony of the
lone eyewitness, Jose Tajanlangit, claiming that the latter's
testimony is not worthy of credence because it is incredible and
is based largely on hearsay. To bolster his claim, accusedappellant cites three examples from the latter's testimony. First,
Tajanlangit did not testify that he heard any sound come from
the deceased Abatay when the latter was stabbed by his
holduppers. Accused-appellant says it is highly improbable that
the deceased did not make any outcry when he was stabbed
and equally improbable that Tajanlangit did not hear the same.
Second, Tajanlangit testified that he ran away in the direction
opposite that to which Abatay ran after being stabbed. Yet
Tajanlangit also testified that Abatay met PO3 Tan; that Tan sent
Abatay to his employer; and that Tan pursued and caught up
with accused-appellant. Accused-appellant asserts that
Tajanlangit could not have possibly testified as to facts which
took place after he ran away and that he only gathered such
facts from the victim himself when the latter was still alive in the
hospital. Third, Tajanlangit testified that he and the victim were
waiting for a jeep instead of a taxi on the night in question
because the victim only had P15.00 in his pocket. Accusedappellant claims that this is unbelievable since Tajanlangit had
P50.00 in his own pocket. Why, accused-appellant asks, did
Tajanlangit not disclose this fact to the victim so that they could
have taken a taxi?23
The questions raised by accused-appellant concerning
Tajanlangit's testimony as to what he saw, heard, and did on that
fateful night are too incidental to merit any serious consideration.
They concern only minor details that do not touch upon the basic
elements of the crime itself and therefore cannot detract from
the credibility of the witness. 24 No glaring inconsistencies in the
testimony of Tajanlangit were shown by the defense. What is
crucial is that Tajanlangit testified clearly that he saw accusedappellant and a companion being held up Abatay on that night;
that the two managed to take Abatay's money and wrist watch;
and that accused-appellant stabbed the victim. There is no
reason to doubt the accuracy of Tajanlangit's observation since
the place where the crime occurred was well-lighted, there being
a street lamp on a nearby corner.25
Witness Tajanlangit testified that he saw the actual stabbing of
Abatay and was even able to demonstrate that the direction of
the stabbing motion made by accused-appellant was downward
going upward.26 This coincides with the finding of the medicolegal expert, Dr. Tito Doromal, that the entry of the weapon into
the victim's abdomen was "backward upward," that is, that the
entrance of the weapon was horizontal inside the abdominal
cavity and ended at the outer portion of the right kidney.27 Thus,
the evidence confirms that the wound sustained by the victim
was inflicted in the manner seen and testified to by
Tajanlangit.28 Accused-appellant failed to show that Tajanlangit
had any motive to testify falsely against him and his companion
concerning so serious a crime as robbery with homicide.
Further bolstering the credibility of Tajanlangit are the
testimonies of the other witnesses presented by the prosecution
which sufficiently establish accused-appellant's guilt of the crime
charged.
PO3 Danilo Tan testified that he encountered the victim on
Ledesma Street who told him that he had been robbed and then
stabbed by two persons; that the victim suffered a wound in the
abdominal area; that the victim described the appearance of his
attackers; that he sent the victim to his employer in the
supermarket; that he caught accused-appellant, who matched
the description of one of the victim's robbers, while the latter was
running along Quezon St.; that he recovered a table knife from
accused-appellant; that he took accused-appellant to the
hospital where the victim was; and that the victim pointed to
accused-appellant as the person who had stabbed him.

103

PO3 Manuel Artuz, exhibit custodian of Police Precinct I in Iloilo

City, testified that a discolored table knife was turned over to him
in the early morning of July 8, 1994. The knife was identified by
PO3 Tan in open court as the same one he recovered from
accused-appellant on July 7, 1994.29
Violeta Abatay testified that she saw her son lying wounded in
the emergency room of the St. Paul's Hospital in the early
morning of July 7, 1994 and that her son died on July 10, 1994.
Finally, Dr. Tito Doromal, who performed the autopsy on the
body of victim Abatay, testified that the latter died as a result of a
stab wound inflicted on the lower right portion of the abdomen
and that the weapon used to inflict the wound was a sharpbladed instrument, such as a knife.30
While it is true that none of the other witnesses, aside from
Tajanlangit, actually saw the accused-appellant rob and stab the
victim, their testimonies nonetheless provide sufficient
corroborative evidence pointing to the guilt of the accusedappellant. The testimonies of Tan, Artuz, Violeta Abatay, and Dr.
Doromal together render a complete account of the events
surrounding the death of Abatay which lead to but one fair and
reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty of the
crime charged.
Accused-appellant admitted that he was on Ledesma Street and
saw the crime committed, but claimed that he immediately left
because Marco Aguirre told him to leave. According to him, the
next thing he knew was that he was accosted by PO3 Tan, who
searched his person, and later took him to the St. Paul's
Hospital, where he was pointed to by the same man whom he
had seen being robbed by Aguirre.
Accused-appellant's denial that it was not he, but Marco Aguirre,
who committed the deed is, to say the least, self-serving.
Accused-appellant's denial does not credibly support his claim of
innocence.31 For in weighing contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight must be given to the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of
the defendant.32
Nor can accused-appellant's defense of alibi prosper. Accusedappellant was positively identified as the person who committed
the crime. It is basic and well-entrenched that the defense of
alibi cannot stand against the positive identification of a credible
eyewitness.33 Nor did accused-appellant show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. It
has been repeatedly held that to establish alibi, accusedappellant must not only show that he was at some other place at
or about the time of the commission of the crime but also that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the place
where the crime was committed.34 But, as earlier stated,
accused-appellant in fact admitted that he was actually on
Ledesma Street at the time the crime was being committed.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that the decision of the trial
court, dated March 12, 1998, is a nullity since it was
promulgated twelve months, or more than ninety (90) days, after
the case was submitted for decision on March 23, 1997. He cites
the ruling of this Court in Lazaret v. Bantuas,35 in support of his
contention. 36 He further contends that the amended decision
dated October 26, 1998 is likewise a nullity since it was
issued motu proprio, contrary to Rule 120, 7 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows the modification of a
judgment of conviction only upon motion of the accused. Finally,
accused-appellant maintains that the amended decision,
consisting of a new dispositive portion contained in a twoparagraph order, was never promulgated and is, therefore, a
nullity.37
Accused-appellant's contention is without merit. The failure to
decide cases within the ninety-day period required by law
constitutes a ground for administrative liability against the
defaulting judge,38 which may take the form of dismissal,

forfeiture of benefits and privileges, 39 or a fine.40 But it does not

make the judgment a nullity. The judgment is valid.41
Accused-appellant also complains that the decision in this case
was amended without any of the parties asking for it. This is not
so. The original decision in this case was issued on March 12,
1998 and was promulgated on July 15, 1998. 42 The decision was
written by Acting Presiding Judge Florentino P. Pedronio of the
Bacolod City RTC, Branch 43. On July 24, 1998, accusedappellant, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration,
praying that the decision be set aside and accused-appellant
acquitted on the ground that the decision did not state the law
violated nor refer to the specific provision of the Revised Penal
Code.43
Acting on the motion, the trial court denied accused-appellant's
motion for reconsideration, but amended the dispositive portion
of its decision for indeed the same failed to fix the specific
penalty within the range provided for in the Revised Penal Code
for the crime committed.44 Hence, the Court amended the
dispositive portion of its decision by citing the provision of the
Revised Penal Code violated and imposing on accusedappellant the appropriate penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As the Solicitor General well observed, it is misleading for
accused-appellant to claim that the trial court motu
proprio modified its ruling as the trial court in fact resolved the
motion for reconsideration filed by accused-appellant resulting in
the modification of the imposed penalty. The trial court has the
residual jurisdiction to correct the error in imposing the penalty.
Accused-appellant further claims that the amended decision is a
nullity since the same consisted of only one paragraph and does
not contain the requisites of a decision.
The order, dated October 26, 1998, of the trial court is an
integral part of the original decision rendered on March 12, 1998
for the purpose of determining compliance with the constitutional
requirement of Art. VIII, 14 that "No decision shall be rendered
by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based."
Rule 120, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must
be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved and
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by
the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the facts;
(c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil
liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there be any, unless
the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has
been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused
in favor of the offended party. (Emphasis added)
A perusal of the March 12, 1998 decision of the trial court shows
that it conforms substantially with these requirements. The
dispositive portion, however, is defective as it did not mention
the law pursuant to which accused-appellant was convicted and
the two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua and death was

104

imposed upon him. Hence, there was a need to amend the

same, which the trial court did upon motion for reconsideration
of accused-appellant based on the same ground.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the confession he made to
PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Paul's Hospital that he and Marco
Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because
it was given without the assistance of counsel while he
(accused-appellant) was in custody.
Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article
III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was
given under custodial investigation and was made without the
assistance of counsel.45 However, the defense failed to object to
its presentation during the trial with the result that the defense is
deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. No error
was, therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence
of the confession.
Nor did the trial court err in sentencing accused-appellant
to reclusion perpetua.46
The penalty for robbery with homicide under Art. 294, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty should be
imposed, i.e., reclusion perpetua.47
With respect to the amount of damages, the following expenses
were duly supported by receipts presented in evidence:
P1,695.00 as medical expenses; P51,302.00 as hospital
expenses; and P6,500.00 as funeral expenses, or the total
amount of P59,497.00. The trial court's award of P50,000.00 by
way of indemnity as a result of the death of the victim is in
accordance with the current case law 48 and therefore is
sustained. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages must likewise be awarded in favor of the heirs of the
victim pursuant to recent rulings.49
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City, finding accused-appellant Zaldy
Mendoza guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim P59,497.00 as actual damages and P50,00.00
as moral damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00
awarded as indemnity by the trial court. Costs against accusedappellant.

Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were

charged with Joseph Bernaldez with robbery with homicide
under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information
which alleged That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro,
Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in
conspiracy with one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away "Seiko"
diver's watch valued at P1,000.00, one "Sanyo" cassette valued
at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00, with a total value
of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
(P4,325.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to Nicanor
Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his heirs, represented by
his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum; and on the
occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed
handgun and a knife, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting upon
the latter wounds which caused his death.1wphi1.nt
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea
of not guilty, whereupon they were tried.3
On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of
Court for Reinvestigation, which the court granted. As a result of
the reinvestigation, a Motion to Dismiss with respect to accused
Joseph Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the court
issued an order stating On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed
by OIC 1st Asst. Prov'l. Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding
the grounds stated therein to be well-taken and in order, said
motion is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez
only is hereby ordered dismissed. The Provincial Warden is
hereby directed to release immediately from custody the person
of Joseph Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will warrant
his further confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.4

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel

Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142932

of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of

the proceedings.

May 29, 2002

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO
BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accusedappellants
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated February 10, 2000, of
the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati,
Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-appellants Joel
Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor Suralta in the amounts

The facts are as follows:

At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses
Nicanor and Carolita Suralta had visitors at their house in
Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor was
having drinks with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and
Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one carrying a gun
and the other a knife, suddenly entered the house through the
kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a bonnet over his face,
with only his eyes exposed, while the other one carrying a knife
had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The
knife-wielder held Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses,
and announced a holdup. All persons in the house were ordered
to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from the sala.
There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from
Nicanor. Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but asked his
wife to give money to the holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00,
which was intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knifewielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder
ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount
of P325.00, which was intended for the school expenses of the

105

Suralta children. In addition, he took the family's Sanyo cassette

recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested
Arsenio Abonales, one of the guests, of his Seiko diver's
wristwatch and then left.5
As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita
thought that the first one was a mere warning shot, but later
Nicanor was heard moaning. Carolita became hysterical after
seeing her husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor
was immediately brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital
where he was given first aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to
the Tagum Regional Hospital but he eventually died.6 The death
certificate (Exh. B) states the cause of his death as Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS]
PENETRATING ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE
CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL
TRANSECTION MESENTERIC VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM &
SIGMOID
Other
significant
HYPOVOLEMIA.7

conditions

contributing

to

death:

The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same
night. Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales gave descriptions
of the holduppers and told the responding police investigators
that they would be able to recognize the suspects if they saw
them again.8
On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF
passenger bus compound in the neighboring municipality of
Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team
sent to investigate the incident was able to pick up
suspects,9 one of whom was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
He was wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh.
H). Other items, consisting of watches, a cassette recorder (Exh.
D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were recovered from his
house, some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF
bus line.10
Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of
the team investigating the robbery of the ACF bus compound,
informed Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San Isidro, about
the apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and the
recovery of the items from him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992,
Capt. Sakkam, Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales
proceeded to the Governor Generoso Police Station. Carolita
and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and
Romeo Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was
identified as the man armed with a gun who wore a bonnet to
cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the
knife-wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion
of his face.11
Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact
her nephew. Carolita and Arsenio said that they were able to
recognize the suspects despite their disguises because they
were only one to two meters away from each other during the
holdup, and the rooms of the house were well-lighted. 12 In
addition, Carolita was able to identify the Sanyo cassette
recorder (Exh. D) as the one taken from their house because of
the broken antennae and the name "Nick Suralta" written inside
the battery compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise
identified the Seiko diver's watch (Exh. A) as his.13
Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in
Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole
day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-law's farm, piling
coconut palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In the

evening, he had supper in his house and slept there together

with his family.14
On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he
was sleeping, he was awakened by Policeman Danny
Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took
him to the Governor Generoso police station in connection with
a robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the police station, he
was investigated by Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail.
While inside the jail, people came to see him. Malintad pointed
at him and asked a woman companion if he was one of the
persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman
answered, "I do not know them." For this reason, both Malintad
and the woman left. However, upon their return, the woman said
that she recognized the men and pointed to him and accusedappellant Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the
robbery.15
On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to
Mati by Policemen Ernesto Bahan and Alfredo Castro, but,
before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they alighted from
the jeep and he was made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan
and Castro with the use of an armalite and hit on the chest and
the back. He was then brought to the Mati Cemetery and there
forced to confess. Thereafter, he was placed inside an open
tomb for 12 minutes and then he was taken to the Mati Municipal
Jail. After three days, he was taken to Governor Generoso. He
denied participation in the crime and stated that the cassette
recorder and other items were not confiscated from him.16
For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that
at around 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 5, 1992, he was
sleeping in his house in Tibanban, Governor Generoso together
with his father, mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998, he
went to the Municipal Jail of Governor Generoso to answer
accusations by the police that he was concealing a firearm. At
the police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad for
the firearm he allegedly kept, which he denied. He was later
placed in jail.17 Inspector Malintad, however, testified that
Bernaldez was actually arrested in his house in Tibanban.18
Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita
Suralta, accompanied by Policemen Sakkam and Malintad, went
to the jail and made the prisoners stand up, after which they
went to Malintad's office. Then, the two returned to the jail cell
after a few minutes and Carolita pointed to him as among those
involved in the robbery.19
Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was
approximately 25 kilometers from Manikling, San Isidro, where
the robbery with homicide took place, and could be reached by
several means of land transportation.20
Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented
by the defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut
accused-appellant Joel Gonzales's testimony. According to
Bahan, at around 5 o'clock in the morning of July 21, 1992, he
left for Governor Generoso on official mission together with
SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and PO3 Hassan, upon
order of his superior to fetch Joel Gonzales, per letter-request of
Assistant Provincial Director Supt. Melchisedeck Barggio. Acting
on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo Castro of Municipal Trial
Court of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of
Governor Generoso, to turn over Joel Gonzales. The party left
Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11 o'clock in the morning
and arrived in Mati at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July
21, 1992. To support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the
court page 362 of the police blotter for July 21, 1992, 1350H, to
wit:
SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan
arrived [at the] Police Station from Governor Generoso and
brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding the request of

106

Chief Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or

Provincial Command, Mati Dvo Or to Mun. Trial Court of
Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Or duly signed by
[Judge] Rodolfo Castro to turn over the custody of accused to
Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on] to CC No. 7183
for Robbery with Homicide which is now pending in the Mun.
Trial Court of Mati, same the Chief of Police of Governor
Generoso granted to be brought at Mati Police Station provided
that maximum security must be implemented and to be returned
said to Governor Generoso Police Station within three (3) days
same said Joel Gonzales also involved in Robbery with
Homicide in CC No. 7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses
subject is hereby placed under police custody as per verbal
order of OIC SPO1 Fortuna to the Jailer guard "BJMP" SPO3
Cabillada.21
SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales to the Mati Cemetery. He said that when they arrived
in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel Gonzales to the Chief
of Police, who then turned him over to the investigating section. 22
He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was
taken to Mati in connection with Criminal Case No. 7183.
Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been administratively
charged with maltreating detention prisoners, he said the case
was later dismissed and he was exonerated.23
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of
its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and
Romeo Bernaldez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify jointly and
severally, the Heirs of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum
of P50,000.00, to indemnify also jointly and severally said heirs
the sum of P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit "D") is ordered returned to the
Suralta family, while the wristwatch (Exhibit "A") to Arsenio
Abonales.
SO ORDERED.24
Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING
THAT THE ACCUSED WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the

prosecution evidence establishes the guilt of accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide
requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of
personal property with violence or intimidation against persons
or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to
another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to
gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense
becomes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Even the Public
Attorney's Office concedes that the prosecution was successful
in proving the commission of the crime, questioning only the
identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accusedappellants as the perpetrators of the crime.27
First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in
giving credence to the identification made by the two
prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales.
They argue that the manner by which accused-appellants were
identified was suggestive and showed partiality. They argue
further that, most often, the bereaved families of victims are not
concerned with the accuracy of identification because they are
overwhelmed by passion for vindication, regardless of whether
or not the suspect is the real culprit.
This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting
aside the lower court's conclusion on the accuracy and
correctness of the witnesses' identification of the accusedappellants as the persons who robbed the Suralta spouses and
the couples' guest Arsenio Abonales and killed Nicanor Suralta.
It is the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence to
strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and
observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most
often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a
lasting impression on the victims' minds which cannot be easily
erased from their memory.28 There is no evidence to show that
the eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with fear that they mistook
accused-appellants for the men who robbed and killed the
victims. On the contrary, fear for one's life may even cause the
witness to be more observant of his surroundings. 29 Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality
committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the
victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in identifying
criminals.30 The desire to see that justice is done will not be
served should the witness abandon his conscience and
prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime.31
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically
identified accused-appellants as the armed men who held them
up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim. There was no possibility
of mistaken identification because prosecution witnesses were
able to observe their movements and their body built and height
despite the fact that accused-appellants covered their
faces.32 As Carolita Suralta testified:

II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION

DURING THE TRIAL ARE INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.25

COURT TO THE WITNESS:

On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office, on behalf of both

accused-appellants, assigns the following errors:

Q
You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet,
is that right?

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING

BOTH ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING

THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.26
We find accused-appellants' contentions to be without merit.

Yes, Your Honor.

Q
And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were
not able to identify him?
A
I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and
his actions.
Q

Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?

When they got inside, Your Honor.

107

....

At the barangay road.

Q
How is it that you can recognize his voice and his
movements that he is the accused Joel Gonzales, considering
that he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?

Was he sitting or standing?

He was standing.

A
Because at the time he said, "silence", I recognized his
voice, Your Honor.33

He was not bringing anything?

A handgun and a wristwatch.

When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?

I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.

You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]

Yes.

Accused-appellants' counsels attempted to confuse prosecution

witnesses during the trial by using the word "recognize" to
simultaneously mean identification of face and knowledge of the
name. But the witnesses were able to stand their ground. We
agree with private prosecutor that a mistake is likely when one
equates knowing the person by his movements and by his voice
with knowing a person by his name. Although the names of
accused-appellants were supplied by the police, the witnesses
nevertheless recognized accused-appellants when they visited
them in the Governor Generoso jail. 34 What is important is not
the ability of an eyewitness to give the true and correct names of
the accused, but rather his ability to identify the persons actually
seen committing the offense.35
Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by
improper motive, it is presumed that he was not so moved and,
therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 36 That
presumption has not been overcome in this case. Consequently,
the identification of accused-appellants as the killers of Nicanor
Suralta stands. Nor is motive for the killing important when there
is no doubt as to the identity of the perpetrators of the
crime.37 But here the motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob
him of his possessions.
Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot
prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellants. The
defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the positive testimonies of credible
witnesses.38
Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the
interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo
Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and
to secure the services of counsel, in violation of 2 and 12, Art.
III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission
of the crime is inadmissible in evidence against them.

....
Q

Where?

A
He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and
I brought him to the police station and interrogated him and after
the interrogation, he accepted the commission of the crime and
he told me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his
house.
....
Q
When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was
that that you said he voluntarily turned over the loot?
A

On that date.

The time when you went to the house?

Yes.

....
Q

Did you have any search warrant?

I did not go inside the house.

How many of you went to the house?

About ten (10).

You were armed?

Yes.

You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?

This contention lacks merit.

Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992,
accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was picked up at around 8:00
a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
Accused-appellant Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his
waistline and was wearing a wristwatch. According to Inspector
Malintad, accused-appellant Gonzales admitted participation in
the crime upon interrogation and voluntarily surrendered the
stolen goods to him.
ATTY. LADERA:
Q

Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?

At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.

....
Q

In his residence?

In the vicinity of his residence.

Where?

A
No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to
surrender the items.39
To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial
investigation when they made their admissions to the police. At
that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a
suspect and for this reason the latter were taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of freedom in a substantial way. 40 Hence, the
admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to Art. III, 2(1) and (3) of the Constitution.
However, the defense failed to raise its objections to the

108

admissibility of these statements immediately, as required by

Rule 132, 36, when Inspector Malintad was presented as a
witness for the prosecution or when specific questions
concerning the confession were asked of him. Consequently,
accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their right to
object to the admissibility of
Inspector Malintad's
testimony.41 Indeed, it was even the defense counsel who
provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate on
the circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales' admission in
the course of his cross-examination of the said witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales told him that one of his companions was Romeo
Bernaldez. He said:
ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
For accused Romeo Bernaldez.
....
Q
So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the
Robbery?
A

He was picked up later.

Where did you pick him up?

At Tibanban.

Why did you pick him up?

It was Joel Gonzales who told me.

Q
You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that
Romeo Bernaldez is one of his companions?
A
Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we
picked him up.42
On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in
the Municipal Jail at the Police Station of Governor Generoso in
order to identify the suspects, he asked them who killed the
victim and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it
was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
COURT:
....
Q

Were you able to talk with all the accused?

A
When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the
victim, and the other one answered - I was not responsible in the
killing - and he said, "Joel Gonzales killed the victim".
Q
Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the
victim was Joel Gonzales?
A

It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.43

Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken

as evidence against his co-appellant Joel Gonzales. For the
constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused orally admitted having committed the crime.44

Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector

Malintad had no warrant when the latter conducted a search of
his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during
the robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder
and wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector
Malintad, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales voluntarily
surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went to the
house of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches,
cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him.
What thus happened was a consented search, which constitutes
a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a search warrant. It
has been held that the right to be secure from an unreasonable
search may be waived either expressly or impliedly.45 And when
the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art. III,
3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen
goods had been taken from him. Inspector Malintad testified that
he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and
spare parts from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he
arrested the latter in his house. There is no reason to doubt
Inspector Malintad's claim that the stolen items were indeed
recovered from accused-appellant Gonzales. These items were
definitively identified by the owners as those taken from them.
Between the testimonies of the police officers, who enjoy the
presumption of regularity in their duties, and the bare denials of
accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the police
officers. This is true especially considering that the police
officers have not been shown to have any motive to testify
falsely against accused-appellants.
Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides "that
a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Since the subject
items were found in the possession of accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of the stolen
items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was unable to satisfactorily
explain his possession of the stolen items.
All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Under Art. 294(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty for robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion
perpetua to death. In view of the absence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the
trial court on accused-appellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the same
being in line with prevailing jurisprudence.46 An additional
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim. Such damages
require no further proof other than the death of the victim. 47 The
restitution of the cash and of the stolen items to their respective
owners ordered by the trial court is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati,
Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Nicanor Suralta the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,425.00 as
restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs of the proceedings. The
cassette recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor
Suralta, and the wristwatch to Arsenio Abonales.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

109

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

ALFREDO ENANORIA, (DETAINED), one alias Totong and
one alias Boy, and alias Eboy whose true name is RODRIGO
FEROLINO,Accused.
ALFREDO
ENANORIA, AccusedAppellant.

DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by Alfredo Enanoria, from the
October 31, 1989 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch II, in Criminal Case No.
16302-88, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Kidnapping with Murder and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P110,000.00 for death and burial expenses,
and P100,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs
(Rollo,
p.
22).
At around 9:00 oclock in the morning of May 7, 1988, while he
was at the Davao Medical Center where he was brought after
his arrest. Enanoria executed an "ante-mortem" statement
before P/Cpl. Cerilo S. Solana, Jr. in the presence of Mayor
Duterte and Lt. Col. Calida. Although he claimed that he would
still survive inspite of his wound, he admitted having been shot
because he was involved in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He
informed the police that one alias Amil shot Mrs. Dakudao and
that they were not able to get the P50,000.00 ransom they had
demanded
(Original
Record,
p.
6).
Four days later or on May 11, 1988, Enanoria executed a sworn
statement before P/Cpl. Solana at the Talomo Patrol Station of
the Davao City Metrodiscom. After he had been apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel of his own
choice, he admitted involvement in the kidnapping of Mrs.
Dakudao. He claimed, however, that he did not know that he
was participating in a kidnapping as he was merely picked up in
Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao by Amil and one alias
Totong. According to Enanoria, Amil and Totong each carried a .
38 caliber revolver and it was Amil who shot Mrs. Dakudao only
once at around 1:30 a.m. of May 7, 1988 (Exh. "1" ; Original
Record,
p.
7).
Hence, Enanoria, one alias Totong, one alias Boy and Rodrigo
Ferolino alias Eboy were charged in an Information filed on May
12, 1988 by 4th Assistant City Fiscal Barbara C. Pioquinto,
which
reads
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the
crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER under Article 267 and
248 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about May 7, 1988 and sometime prior thereto, in
the city of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then
private individuals, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for the
purpose of extorting money from one Lea Dakudao and her
family in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) or of
killing the said Lea Dakudao if the amount demanded could not
be given, kidnapped, carried away, brought to Maguindanao and
deprived said Lea Dakudao of her liberty without authority of law,
against her will and consent; that on the occasion of said
kidnapping and to enable them to carry out their purpose, the
said accused in pursuance of their conspiracy brought back
aforesaid Lea Dakudao to Davao City and willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation shot her (Lea Dakudao) with the use of firearm
thereby inflicting upon her (Lea Dakudao) a mortal wound which
caused
her
death."
(Original
Record,
p.
1).
On June 27, 1988, Enanoria executed a supplementary sworn
statement before T/Sgt. Florante M. Rotor of the PC-CIS.
Assisted by Atty. Jonathan M. Jocom of the CLAO XI, Enanoria

was once again apprised of his constitutional rights before he

executed the statement which was sworn before 4th Assistant
City
Fiscal
Antonina
B.
Escovilla.
In said statement, Enanoria related that he joined the group of
Rodrigo Ferolino alias Eboy, his first degree cousin, in
November 1987. The other leaders of the group were Sgt. Bibit
of the Philippine Army assigned with the 27th IB stationed at
Bansalan, Davao del Sur and one alias Lugum. The group lured
Enanoria with "instant money" as they had kidnapped a certain
Leong and one Angel who respectively paid P50,000.00 and
P200,000.00
ransom
money.
According to Enanoria, Sgt. Bibit hatched the kidnapping plan as
he had financial problems. It was also Sgt. Bibit who gave Eboy
a hand grenade but Sgt. Bibit did not participate in the
kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. In the afternoon of May 6, 1988,
when they posted themselves at the Park and Shop in Bajada,
Davao City, they were armed not only with a hand grenade
because Amil and Totong were each armed with a .38 caliber
revolver.
Enanoria claimed that Eboy instructed Amil and Totong to look
for a new car which Enanoria would drive. Hence, when they
saw Mrs. Dakudao boarding the Ford Laser car, Amil and Totong
also boarded it and Enanoria drove the car up to the corner of
J.P. Laurel and Cabaguio Avenue where Eboy was waiting. Eboy
then
drove
the
car
to
Tunggol,
Maguindanao.
Enanoria narrated that on the way, Eboy introduced himself as
Commander Bobby to Mrs. Dakudao and they discussed the
ransom to be paid. Upon reaching Tunggol, Mrs. Dakudao told
Eboy that she had P50,000.00 in cash at home. Having agreed
on the ransom, the group headed back to Davao City after
staying in Tunggol for around twenty minutes only.
Upon reaching Davao City, they stopped at the gasoline station
in front of the Tourist Lodge along MacArthur Avenue. Totong
called up the Dakudao residence and when they learned that Mr.
Dakudao was not around, Mrs. Dakudao volunteered to get the
money herself. The group then proceeded to Bajada but Eboy
just parked the car along the highway because Mrs. Dakudao
told them that there was a checkpoint manned by a security
guard before reaching their residence. Eboy then decided to
return to Tunggol but upon reaching Matina, they saw a
roadblock which had been put up by the police. Eboy did not
heed the warning of the police. Instead, he stepped on the
accelerator of the car thereby prompting the police to open fire
at them. The car stopped upon reaching a bridge because its
tires were flat. As they were going out of the car, Amil gave
Enanoria a .38 caliber revolver and they all escaped in different
directions. Enanoria, however, was arrested by the police a few
hours thereafter (Exh. "A" ; Record of Exhibits, pp. 1-4).
When arraigned, Enanoria, who was the only one apprehended
by the authorities, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged
(Original
Record,
p.
21).
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Sgt. Florante M. Rotor, then assigned as the Chief Investigator
at the 11th CIS District. He testified that he personally
investigated Enanoria on June 27, 1988 and that before
proceeding with the said investigation, he first apprised Enanoria
of his constitutional rights particularly his right to counsel of his
own choice. When Enanoria said that he could not afford to hire
one, Sgt. Rotor offered to contact the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office (CLAO), which, in turn, designated Atty. Jocom to assist
Enanoria. Upon Atty. Jocoms arrival at the CIS Office, Sgt.
Rotor introduced him to Enanoria and allowed them to confer
with each other for about five minutes. After Enanoria had
agreed to have Atty. Jocom as his counsel, the investigation
commenced. Sgt. Rotor asked questions and Enanoria
answered in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. The sworn statement,
however, which was typed by Sgt. Rotor simultaneously, was in
the English language, having been translated by Sgt. Rotor
during the investigation. Enanoria and Atty. Jocom thereafter

110

signed the statement in one anothers presence. Sgt. Rotor then

brought Enanoria to the Office of the City Fiscal for the
administering
of
the
oath.

Serenio saw that both rear tires of the car were flat. Thereafter,
the car was brought to the police station for safekeeping and
investigation.

On cross-examination, Sgt. Rotor said that Enanoria was

brought to the CIS Office after he was discharged from the
hospital where he was treated for his gunshot wounds. As
Enanoria appeared to be strong enough by then, Sgt. Rotor did
not ask about the formers injuries. Sgt. Rotos also disclosed
that Enanoria had previously executed a sworn statement before
the Talomo Police Station and that he was able to read a copy of
the same which was furnished to their office. Although he could
not recall its contents, he remembered that since the sworn
statement appeared to be inadequate, he took Enanorias
supplemental
statement
during
his
reinvestigation.

Pfc. Serenio added that he saw the lady whose back was
bleeding, apparently alive but unconscious. One male
passenger jumped to the river at the right side while the two
others, one of whom was Enanoria, proceeded to the left side of
the bridge leading to a grassy area. Nobody fired their guns
while Pfc. Serenios team chased the said passengers. Finally,
Pfc. Serenio admitted that their team was not subjected to
paraffin tests nor their rifles to ballistic examination (Hearing of
August
15,
1989;
TSN,
pp.
34-58).

Sgt. Rotor affirmed that he informed Enanoria of his

constitutional rights, namely, the right to remain silent, the right
to counsel of his own choice, that if he could not afford to have
one, the government could provide him a lawyer to assist him in
the investigation, and that whatever he would say could be used
as evidence against him. Sgt. Rotor likewise confirmed that
Enanoria voluntarily gave his statement and that he (Sgt. Rotor)
did not require Enanoria to sign a waiver considering that he
was already assisted by counsel. The investigation lasted for
approximately two hours. Four days later. Sgt. Rotor took
Enanoria, then detained at their office, to the Fiscals Office.
Then he waited outside and after the oath had been
administered, he brought Enanoria back to the CIS Office for
detention. (Hearing of August 15, 1988: TSN, pp. 4-33).
Pfc. Aquino Serenio, assigned at the Talomo Police Station. He
testified that he was on duty at around 1:30 oclock in the
morning of May 7, 1988 when he received a flash alarm relayed
by the Metrodiscom Operation Center (MOC) stating that four
unidentified armed men were spotted on board a red car with
plate number LAG-312. Acting on the said alarm, Station
Commander P/Lt. Reynaldo Obrero immediately dispatched him
together with several other police officers to put up a road block
to
intercept
the
vehicle.
As the car was allegedly coming from the poblacion and heading
south, Pfc. Serenios team set up a road block in front of Matina
Mini Market in Davao City. Not long thereafter, they saw a red
car fast approaching so they signalled the driver to stop the
vehicle. The driver, however, ignored the signal and the car went
through the road block almost hitting one of the police officers.
Several gunshots were fired at them from the red car when they
pursued it with their mobile unit. Their team successfully fired at
the tires of the car thus forcing it to stop near the Balusong
Bridge. A lone gunshot was then heard from inside the car and
then the passengers scampered in different directions. The team
quickly approached the car and there they saw a seriously
wounded lady on the front seat. The driver of the mobile unit,
Pat. Jickain, rushed the lady to the Davao Doctors Hospital for
treatment while he (Pfc. Serenio) and the others stayed behind
to
search
for
the
remaining
passengers.
Eventually, they found Enanoria in the house of a certain Dado
at Muslim Village, Central Park Subdivision in Bangkal, Davao
City. They recovered a .38 caliber snubnose revolver, i.e., a
small-barreled gun, from Enanoria who was subsequently
brought to the Davao Medical Center due to a gunshot wound at
the back. Pfc. Serenio later learned that the lady, then identified
as Mrs. Lea Dakudao, expired at the hospital while Enanoria
was investigated by P/Cpl. Cerilo Solana at the Talomo Police
Station. In court, Pfc. Serenio positively identified Enanoria as
one
of
the
alleged
kidnappers.
When cross-examined, Pfc. Serenio said that he did not know
whether there were other persons on board the red car aside
from the reported four armed men. He also admitted that he and
the rest of his team were all armed with M16 armalite rifles and
that they all fired their weapons when the passengers of the car
first opened fire at them. Pfc. Serenio stressed that their team
directed their gunfire at the tires of the car to forcibly stop it but
the car did stop when it reached the Balusong Bridge, about 200
meters from the roadblock. When they inspected the car, Pfc.

Atty. Jonathan Jocom, a lawyer assigned at the CLAO, declared

that on June 27, 1988 at around 8:30 oclock in the morning,
their office received a call from the Criminal Investigation Unit of
the CIS, requesting for a lawyer to assist a person who was
about to give a statement during custodial investigation. In
response thereto, Atty. Jocom proceeded to the CIS Camp
Leonor in Davao City. After he was introduced by Sgt. Rotor,
Atty. Jocom conferred with Enanoria. The latter told him that he
had already made a previous statement and that he was willing
to give a supplemental one to the police authorities. Atty. Jocom,
in turn apprised Enanoria of his constitutional rights and advised
him not to make any statement or to sign the same if he was
unsure of what he wanted to say. Despite such advice, Enanoria
willingly underwent investigation, in the presence of Atty. Jocom,
for about two hours. The investigation sheet was in English so
Sgt. Rotor translated the same into the Cebuano-Visayan dialect
which not only Enanoria but also Atty. Jocom knew since he
grew up in Davao City. After the investigation, he and Enanoria
signed
the
sworn
statement.
On cross-examination, Atty. Jocom stated that he did not know
Enanoria prior to the investigation yet the latter welcomed his
assistance. He informed Enanoria of the seriousness of the
charge but he observed that Enanoria was overwhelming (sic)
to tell the truth and that he (Enanoria) was really positive about
his statements. In fact, Enanoria did not consult him at all about
his answers to the investigators questions as he made them all
voluntarily. Lastly, Atty. Jocom stated that the translation which
Sgt. Rotor made relating to the investigation was substantially
correct (Hearing of August 16, 1989; TSN, pp. 5-18).
Cpl. Cerilo Solana, Jr., assigned at the Talomo Police Station.
He testified that he was also on duty on May 7, 1988 when he
was instructed by their Station Commander, Police Lt. Reynaldo
Obrero, to investigate the shooting incident which occurred in
the early dawn of that day. He was informed that a certain
Alfredo Enanoria, one of the suspects in the kidnapping of one
Lea Dakudao, was apprehended and then confined at the Davao
Regional Hospital due to gunshot wounds. He immediately
proceeded to the said hospital and he saw Enanoria being
treated
at
the
emergency
ward.
Cpl. Solana, believing then that Enanoria was in a serious
condition and could die anytime, asked questions and prepared
what he considered as Enanorias ante-mortem statement.
Enanoria, however, survived and was subsequently discharged
from the hospital after which he (Enanoria) was brought to the
Talomo Police Station. Again, the Station Commander directed
Cpl. Solana to take down Enanorias statement. When
interviewed, Enanoria disclosed to Cpl. Solana the names of his
companions as one alias Totong and the other as Amil, who died
after
having
been
apprehended
in
Digos,
Davao
City.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Upon cross-examination, Cpl. Solana said that based on his
investigation, he learned that Lea Dakudao died while on board
the car which sustained several bullet holes mostly at its rear
portion. He said, however, that he did not know the cause of the
victims death nor did he try to find out the same inasmuch as his
purpose then was only to investigate the suspect in the said
incident. He did interview Enanoria twice first at the hospital
after Solanos arrest, and second, when Enanoria had been
brought to the police station. On the second occasion, Enanoria
readily admitted that he was with a group on that fateful day.

111

Enanoria specified Alias Totong and Alias Amil, who allegedly

shot the victim once. Enanoria claimed, however, that he was
not involved in the kidnapping of the victim. Since the referral of
the case to the Criminal Investigation Service, Cpl. Solana no
longer coordinated with the said office (Hearing of August 16,
1989:
TSN,
pp.
24-37).
Dr. Jose T. Pagsaligan, a medico-legal officer assigned at the
Regional Health Office in Davao City. He testified that on May 7,
1988, he examined the body of Lea Dakudao, then already
lifeless, at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. According to his
findings, the victim died of shock secondary to severe
hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds. More particularly, Dr.
Pagsaligan stated in his Autopsy Report No. 004-88 (Exhibit "B",
Record of Exhibits, p. 5) that Lea Dakudao sustained two
gunshot wounds, both of which were caused by bullets
presumably fired from a .38 caliber revolver. The bullet which
caused the first wound entered through the right side of the back
just above the waistline and its slug was recovered in the
omentum, a part of the abdominal cavity. That which caused the
second wound, which was more fatal, entered through the right
side of the buttock and was retrieved from the ascending colon
of the large intestines. Dr. Pagsaligan opined that the assailant
could have been in a higher position than the victim when he
fired the first shot because of the bullets downward trajectory.
Aside from the gunshot wounds, Dr. Pagsaligan noted the
presence of multiple pelvic bone fragments and 1000 cc. of
blood in the abdominal cavity, indicating internal hemorrhage
caused by the severance of the iliac artery. There was also a
laceration at the left eyebrow as well as gunpowder burns at the
right scapular area extending to the right side of the neck. Dr.
Pagsaligan issued the corresponding death certificate.
When cross-examined, Dr. Pagsaligan said that the two slugs he
recovered from the body of the victim and which were endorsed
to Sgt. Saradon for safekeeping, were of two kinds, one was of
bronze or lead material while the other was more of copper.
Thus, it was possible that two different firearms of the same
caliber were used (Hearing of August 21, 1989; TSN, pp. 4-57).
Ma. Elenita Jimenez, a supervising clerk working at the local civil
registrars office in Davao City, merely confirmed as authentic
the signatures of Remedios Salingay and Teresita Fuentes who
both had certified to the correctness of the death certificate
presented as evidence before the court (Hearing of August 21,
1989;
TSN,
pp.
58-60).
Mr. Roberto Dakudao, Jr., a businessman and the surviving
spouse of the victim narrated that on May 6, 1988, at around
5:00 oclock in the afternoon, he arrived home from the golf
course. He saw his 32-year old wife, Lea, preparing to attend the
5:30 oclock mass at the Davao Redemptorist Church. Lea then
left for the said church aboard one of their family cars, a red
Ford Laser with plate no. LBT312 which she herself drove. Mr.
Dakudao thereafter took a nap and woke up at almost 9:00
oclock
in
the
evening.
As he normally expected his wife to come home within an hour
after the mass, he was surprised to know that she was not yet
around by then. This prompted him to call up their relatives and
friends hoping that he would be informed of Leas whereabouts.
Nobody knew where she was. So, he decided to take the other
family car with their driver in order to trace back the possible
route that Lea could have taken and to see if she had met an
accident or had had a car breakdown. He still failed to locate
her.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In desperation, he called up his sister-in-law, Catalina `Teling
Santos-Dakudao who, being the daughter of Luis Santos, had
`good connections with the military. Teling then requested for
police assistance and a few minutes after, Lt. Pintak met with Mr.
Dakudao. Finally, at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of the
next day, May 7, 1988. Mr. Dakudao left for home with his driver.
When they were near the DASI Motors, they realized that the
missing Ford Laser car had just passed by on the other lane.
Thus, they immediately turned around and trailed the said car
which subsequently parked at about 150 meters away from the
Shell Gasoline Station. Mr. Dakudao instructed his driver to

likewise park their car at the Tourist Lodge which was also near
the said station and there he called Teling to inform her what had
happened.
As he was getting out of the lodge, he saw hi wife with one or
two male companions about to board the Ford Laser car again.
Mr. Dakudao presumed that they, too, made a phone call at the
station. The car then sped off again heading for the south. Mr.
Dakudao and his driver would have followed suit once more but
at that moment, a Ford Fiera with military men on board passed
by. Thus, Mr. Dakudao signalled to them to pursue the Ford
Laser
car.
The Ford Fiera did trail the said car for some time with Mr.
Dakudao and his driver close behind. Somewhere along the
way, the Fiera overtook the Laser which quickly made a U-turn
at the Harana area in Matina, Davao City. Mr. Dakudao
cautioned his driver not to appear obvious in following the Laser
so it took them a while before they also made a U-turn. By then,
they already lost track of the Laser. Mr. Dakudao asked to be
brought to the Tourist Lodge to make another phone call to
Teling but Lt. Pintak, who also went there, instructed him to call
up a certain number instead and request the police to look out
for the Laser car with four armed men and a hostage. Thereafter,
Mr. Dakudao and his driver tried to locate the Laser once again.
When they failed to see it, they returned to the Tourist Lodge at
almost
3:30
oclock
in
the
morning.
As soon as Mr. Dakudao arrived there, he was informed that his
wife had been shot and was rushed to the Davao Doctors
Hospital for treatment. He proceeded to the said hospital and
there he learned that his wife had passed away leaving him and
their three children. On further questions, Mr. Dakudao said that
he transported her wifes remains and had her interred in
Bacolod, her place of birth. He spent around P80,000.00 for the
purpose. In court, he pointed to Enanoria whom he said was
apprehended and then detained by the CIS agents as one of
those responsible for the kidnapping of his wife.
When cross-examined, Mr. Dakudao revealed that before 12:30
oclock in the morning, while he was still at Telings house, he
called home. He was told by their helper that there were two
strange callers who asked if it was his (Mr. Dakudaos) house
and when it was so confirmed, the callers abruptly hanged the
phone. Mr. Dakudao supposed that the callers could have been
the kidnappers trying to contact him so he decided to go home.
He and his driver were on their way home when they saw the
Ford Laser and subsequently tailed it. As the rear windshield
was slightly tinted, Mr. Dakudao admitted that all he could see
then was a woman whom he presumed to be his wife sitting at
the front seat and at least two male passengers sitting at the
back seat of the Laser. When it stopped at the Shell station, he
did not approach the said car for fear that the male passengers
could be armed. Mr. Dakudao said that the police authorities
informed him of Enanorias arrest (Hearing of August 21, 1989;
TSN,
pp.
61-78).
Romeo Borja, the family driver of the Dakudaos, simply
corroborated the testimony of Mr. Dakudao in its material points
adding that the Ford Laser which had several bullet holes was
subsequently brought to the DAMOSA for repair (Hearing of
August 21, 1989; TSN, pp. 81-88).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law
library
4th Assistant City Fiscal Antonina Escovilla of Davao City,
declared that Enanoria was brought to her office on June 1,
1988. When Enanoria was left alone with her in the room, she
asked him under oath to tell the truth. Utilizing the CebuanoVisayan dialect which Enanoria speaks, Fiscal Escovilla
apprised him of his rights to remain silent and to engage the
services of counsel of his own choice. She also informed him
that anything he would give or say in the investigation could be
used in evidence against him. After such precautions, Fiscal
Escovilla proceeded to translate the sworn statement to
Enanoria who confirmed the truth of its contents. When she
asked if he was intimidated or forced into executing the
statement, Enanoria said he did it voluntarily and with the active
assistance of a CLAO lawyer of his choice. There was not even

112

a hint from Enanoria that he had been maltreated before or

during
the
investigation.
When cross-examined, Fiscal Escovilla said that Enanoria, who
was physically well at that time, stayed in her office for about 15
to 20 minutes, during which time she substantially translated his
sworn statement. Enanorias answers then were coherent and
when Fiscal Escovilla asked if the signatures in the statement
were his, Enanoria answered affirmatively. After Fiscal Escovilla
was through with him, the escorts were called in to take
Enanoria again into their custody (Hearing of August 31, 1989;
TSN,
pp.
22-25).
Mrs. Fortune Castillo, a resident of Davao City, claimed that she
was acquainted with the late Mrs. Lea Dakudao, whom she last
saw alive on May 6, 1988 at the Davao Redemptorist Church
located at Bajada, Davao City, Mrs. Castillo said that like her,
Mrs. Dakudao regularly attended the daily mass scheduled at
5:30 oclock in the afternoon held at the said church. On that
fateful day, as Mrs. Castillo usually sat at the last pew, she saw
Mrs. Dakudao enter the church alone at about 5:30 oclock in the
afternoon. They heard the First Friday mass together with the
other mass-goers until it was over at 6:20 oclock in the evening.
Apparently, that was the last time she would see Mrs. Dakudao,
for the following day, Mrs. Castillo attended her wake at the
Dakudao residence (Hearing of August 31, 1989; TSN, pp. 2733).
The defense, on the other hand, interposed denial and
presented only two witnesses the accused himself and his
common-law
wife.
Alfredo Enanoria, Accused herein, jobless and a resident of
Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao, testified that at about 9:00
oclock in the evening of May 6, 1988, he was at the purok near
their house in Tunggol when a car stopped in front of him.
Logum who was on board the said car, invited Enanoria to go
with him to Davao for a happening. Enanoria thereafter
changed his clothes and boarded the car with five other
passengers already inside, four of whom were male and one
was a female seated in front. Enanoria claimed that except from
Logum, the driver and the other passengers were not known to
him. They then proceeded to Davao City and arrived there at
around 12:45 oclock in the morning of May 7, 1988. They
stopped momentarily at a gasoline station near the Tourist Lodge
to buy motor oil, after which Logum remarked "Pa-Bajada tayo,
Mrs."
referring
to
the
lady
who
said
yes.
They did reach Bajada and then the car stopped again for about
fifteen minutes at a crossing. At that point, Logum instructed the
driver to turn back towards Cotabato. When they were near the
Talomo Market, Enanoria saw several police officers some
twenty meters away but he did not notice if there was a road
block. Logum ordered the driver to proceed past the lawmen
who eventually strafed the car. Enanoria immediately ducked on
the car floor to take cover. He said he did not know whether
Logum had a gun then and he himself did not have one at any
time. The car was hit at its front and rear mirrors and then he
heard the lady cry out in Tagalog, "Natamaan ako!." Enanoria
said he was also hit at his right knee and at the right side of his
back. Logum and another companion were also hit.
The car was pursued by and fired upon by the lawmen on board
a mobile unit. When the car finally stopped at the Balusong
Bridge due to its flat tires, Enanoria and his companions
scampered to different directions. Enanoria said he went to the
left side and found a well. He was taking a bath at the well when
the muzzle of an armalite rifle hit his wound at the back. Upon
turning around, he saw several police officers who later mauled
him. They were about to finish him but he pleaded for his life
and assured them that he would tell the truth.
Enanoria was then brought to the police station and
subsequently to the regional hospital for treatment. He stayed
there until the next day, May 8, 1988. After his discharge in the
afternoon, he was brought again to the police station. A police
officer who investigated him asked him to admit that he was one
of the kidnappers. Enanoria said he was not apprised at all of his

constitutional rights and that he did not understand the contents

of the written statement which was presented to him as it was in
English and was not translated into a dialect which he knew.
Enanoria also said that he collapsed before the statement was
completed. When he regained consciousness, Cpl. Solana
asked him to sign the statement. Afterwards, Enanoria was
transferred to the CIS office. He could not recall if he was also
investigated by Sgt. Rotor at the said office but when the
supplementary statement prepared by the latter was shown to
him, Enanoria affirmed that the signatures thereon were his. He
said, however, that he was forced to sign the statement by Sgt.
Rotor upon the order of Lt. Macao. He could not remember if
that was the same document which he signed before Atty.
Jocom at the CLAO. Enanoria added that he met Atty. Jocom for
the first time at the CIS office and the latter simply left as soon
as he told him (Enanoria) that it was up to him to give a
statement to the police authorities. The second time was at the
CLAO
where
he
was
asked
to
sign
a
document.chanrobles.com
:
virtual
law
library
When cross-examined, Enanoria said that he used to work for
the MINTRANCO Bus Line as a conductor. One of their
practices then was to accommodate persons asking for free
rides for fear that they could be NPA or MNLF members. Logum
was one such person whom Enanoria obliged and then came to
know later. During Logums subsequent rides, Enanoria
admittedly conversed with him, briefly though, as he was always
busy with his job. Enanoria thereafter resigned from the said
company.
On the night of that fateful day, Logum invited him to a
happening, i.e., to a disco and he acquiesced after changing
his clothes. Enanoria claimed that he never knew the names of
Logums companions as during the course of their trip to Davao
City, they addressed each other only as "bro.." He was not
introduced to Logums companions either and he did not ask
Logum to do so for he was shy. Enanoria inquired though why
they had a female companion and Logum merely told him that
she was also invited to the disco. The lady appeared unafraid
and happy although the light inside the car was off. Then they
proceeded to Davao City and reached the place at past
midnight. They stopped, however, at Kinuskusan and then at
Digos, when the driver and another male companion answered
the
call
of
nature.
Upon further questions, Enanoria admitted that he knew how to
drive a car or any vehicle but he denied that he knew about the
kidnapping. He said that he could not remember if a .38 caliber
pistol was recovered from him while he was taking a bath at the
well and he could not remember, too, if there was a house near
the same well. He also denied having been arrested at the
house of a Muslim. Likewise, Enanoria could not recall the name
of the fiscal before whom he took his oath, what he told the fiscal
and whether the said fiscal was a man or a woman.
On redirect examination, Enanoria claimed that the reason why
he could not remember having appeared before the
administering officers was that he was not yet feeling well at that
time (Hearing of August 29, and 30, 1989; TSN, pp. 5-44 and 234).
For its second and last witness, the defense presented Madelon
Taborada, Enanorias common-law wife. She testified that on
May 5, 1988, she went to Tunggol with Enanoria to get some
food provisions. The following day, Taborada left him behind as
she headed back for Davao City. On May 7, 1988, a woman
informed her that Enanoria was brought to the regional hospital.
So, on that very night, she proceeded there but the police
guards did not allow her to see him. It was only on the following
morning that she saw Enanoria. He spoke inaudibly, obviously in
pain because of his wounds. Taborada said that she did not
know what caused his wounds and that Enanoria was
discharged from the hospital on May 9, 1988 (Hearing of August
30, 1992; TSN, pp. 37-41).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
On October 31, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision finding
Alfredo Enanoria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping

113

with murder under Arts. 267 and 248 in relation to Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposing on him the aforementioned
penalty.
Hence,

the

present

appeal.

The brief for appellant was filed on May 22, 1991 (Rollo, p. 38)
while that of appellee was filed on July 23, 1991 (Ibid., p. 104).
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
I
The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant as coprincipal in a conspiracy to commit kidnapping with murder in the
absence of evidence and without proving the existence of a
conspiracy.
II
The trial court erred in admitting, the extrajudicial confession of
the accused-appellant in evidence and which coerced
confession was made the sole basis for the conviction of
the Accused-Appellant.(p.
57,
Rollo).
Enanorias counsel asserts that the extrajudicial statement which
was allegedly the only piece of evidence against his client, was
obtained under duress and in violation of the latters right to
counsel and therefore, it should have been disregarded.
Appellants counsel insists that had the court properly
disregarded his extrajudicial confession, the cause of the
prosecution would have been reduced to nothing as the
prosecution had miserably failed to prove that Lea Dakudao had
indeed been kidnapped and that Enanoria participated therein.
As conspiracy was not established, Enanoria could not be held
liable
for
the
crime
charged.
A careful evaluation of the evidence on record reveals, however,
that such contentions are baseless and utterly devoid of merit.
Firstly, the rule is well-settled that a confession is presumed to
be voluntary and that the confessant, who bears the burden of
proving otherwise (People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-32661, July
20, 1982, 115 SCRA 184; People v. Estevan, G.R. No. 69676,
June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 34), must duly substantiate his claim
that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly
executed. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn
the presumption. Considering however, that voluntariness is
largely determined by external manifestations, the Court has laid
down several factors indicative thereof. Thus, "where the
defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress
nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the
officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute
any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no
marks of violence on their bodies; and when they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim" (People v. Mada-I Santalani, G.R. No. L-29979,
September 28, 1979, 93 SCRA 3317), the defendants are
deemed to have voluntarily confessed. Still another indicium of
voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which
could have been known only to the declarant (People v. Bautista,
G.R. No. L-31900, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 465; Estacio v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 75363, March 6, 1990, 183 SCRA 12).
Significantly, all these are present in the case at bar.
It is worthy to note as well that the extrajudicial statement was
subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City Fiscal Escovilla who
herself extensively testified that she translated the contents of
the statement and inquired into the spontaneity of its execution.
There is no showing whatsoever that she was actuated by any
reason other than her desire to perform the solemn task of
having affiant voluntarily and intelligently swear to the truth of his
statement (People v. Del Pilar, G.R. No. 86360, July 28, 1990,
188
SCRA
37).
Enanorias claim that his right to counsel was violated does not

hold water either. It is already beyond dispute that he was

actively assisted by a lawyer in the person of Atty. Jocom. The
latters presence adequately fulfilled the constitutional
requirement. It must be reiterated at this point that the right to
counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however,
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Verily, whether it is an extrajudicial statement or
testimony in open court, the purpose is always the
ascertainment of truth (People v. Layuso, G.R. No. 69210, July
5, 1989, 175 SCRA 52).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Based on the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that Enanorias extrajudicial statement is admissible as
evidence. As it sets out in detail his participation in the
kidnapping and the eventual murder of Mrs. Dakudao,
Enanorias responsibility has been pinpointed. However,
Enanorias extrajudicial confession is not the sole basis for his
conviction. He has been positively identified by Pfc. Aquino
Serenio as one of those who scampered out of the Ford Laser
car when it stopped due to flat tires. Enanoria could have
disproved this testimony but he failed to do so. Neither did he
present proof that Pfc. Serenio had a motive or reason for his
inculpation. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, his flight from the scene of the crime strongly indicated
his guilt (People v. Rey, G.R. No. 80089, April 13, 1989, 172
SCRA
149).
Conspiracy has also been proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the concerted action of Enanoria and his companions (People v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 86217, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 127). As
Enanoria admitted in his supplemental sworn statement, in
kidnapping Mrs. Dakudao, his group adopted the same modus
operandi they had used in other kidnappings: they would wait for
the owner to board his or her car, get in the car with him or her
and bring the owner to either Tunggol or Kabacan, North
Cotabato where Eboy had a house (Exh. "A-2").
The crime committed is kidnapping for ransom for which the
death penalty is imposable under the last paragraph of Art. 267
of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty has been
constitutionally abolished, the penalty imposable on the
appellant
is reclusion
perpetua.
There is no proof that Mrs. Lea Dakudao was kidnapped for the
purpose of killing her so as to make the offenses one of
kidnapping for ransom and murder a complex crime. What is
evident is the fact that the killing was perpetrated, apparently as
an afterthought after the Ford Laser car had been rendered
immobile, while Mrs. Dakudao was in the custody of armed men
which included Enanoria. Hence, the killing is qualified by abuse
of superiority and with the aid of armed men. That it was
committed while the Ford Laser car was being shot at by then
pursuing police does not erase the crime there being proof that
the bullets which killed Mrs. Dakudao came from a .38 caliber
revolver like the gun retrieved from appellant during his arrest.
There being conspiracy, appellant is also liable for murder
notwithstanding his claim that it was Amil who shot Mrs.
Dakudao. For murder, Enanoria should suffer the separate
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the medium period of the penalty
of reclusion temporal maximum to death, in the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances (Arts. 248 & 64(1),
Revised
Penal
Code).cralawnad
PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellant Alfredo Enanoria is
hereby convicted of the separate crimes of kidnapping for
ransom under Art. 267 and murder under Art. 248 for which
crimes he shall suffer two penalties of reclusion perpetua which
he shall serve successively in accordance with Art. 70 of the
Revised Penal Code. He shall also indemnify the heirs of Leah
Nora Rita Puentevella-Dakudao not only the amount of
P80,000.00 for burial expenses but also the amount of P50,000
00
in
accordance
with
recent
jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

114

vs. VICTOR BACOR, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, [1] dated April 13, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Oroquieta City, finding accusedappellant Victor Bacor guilty of murder and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition, the court
ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Dionesio Albores, in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed with modification of the
penalty. The Court of Appeals sentenced accused-appellant
to reclusion perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, 13, par.
2 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, certified the case to this
Court for review.
Upon receipt of the case, the Court gave accused-appellant the
opportunity to file an additional brief if he desired. He did not do
so, however. Hence, the case was considered submitted for
resolution.
The full text of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads: [2]
Accused-appellant assails the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 dated April 13, 1993
convicting him of the crime of MURDER. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the
guilt of the accused, Victor Bacor, has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, and pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being one mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to
effect the [same], the said accused, Victor Bacor, is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, of Prision
Mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Dionisio Albores
in the amount of P50,000.00; to suffer the other accessory
penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
The case with respect to the other accused, John Doe is hereby
ordered sent to the archive, to be revived as soon as said
accused is identified and arrested.
SO ORDERED.
(Records, p. 102)
The indictment against accused-appellant and one John Doe
reads:
That on or about March 17, 1991, at about 9:00 oclock in the
evening, more or less, in barangay Seor, municipality of
Sinacaban, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforementioned accused with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack, assault
and shoot one DIONISIO ALBORES with the use of a shotgun
while the latter was inside his dwelling, unaware, unarmed and
defenseless, thereby inflicting multiple gun shot wounds on
different vital parts of his body causing his [instantaneous] death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with qualifying circumstance of treachery
and ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
(Records, p. 1)
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1991, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued. After the prosecution
rested its case, the defense demurred to the evidence on the
ground that accuseds extrajudicial confession which is the only
piece of evidence connecting him to the commission of the
murder, is inadmissible for any purpose. The Omnibus Motion To
Demur and Objection To The Admissibility Of Exhibit B For The
Prosecution was denied by the trial court in an order dated June
4, 1992 after which the defense offered the testimonies of the
accused himself and the latters father, Cesar Bacor. Their main
line of defense was that at the time the crime was being
perpetrated, accused Victor Bacor was at home grating
coconuts. It was however also established in the course of their
testimony that Barangay Seor was only about one kilometer
from Barangay SK Avancea where accused Victor lived with his
parents and was accessible by means of transportation. (TSN,

October 27, 1992, p. 49-67)

The facts as established by the prosecutions evidence are
summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
At about 9:00 oclock in the evening of March 17, 1991, Julian
Albores was resting at the living room of his house at Barangay
Seor, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental (TSN, Oct. 10, 1991, pp.
2-5). His companions in the house were his son Dionisio and the
latters common-law wife Delia, who were then eating in the
kitchen (TSN, ibid., pp. 5-6). Suddenly, Julian heard a gunfire
followed by Delias exclamation that Dionisio had fallen down on
the floor (ibid). Consequently, Julian rushed to the kitchen and
found Dionisio lying face down on the kitchen floor made of
bamboo slats (TSN, Oct. 10, 1991, pp. 4-8). As Julian tried to
move Dionisio, blood oozed from his right armpit (ibid.). Julian
shouted for his neighbors help but no one helped him (TSN, Oct.
10, 1991, pp. 6-7). Immediately, thereafter, Julian brought his
wounded son to the hospital for treatment but just a few minutes
after arrival there, his son died (TSN, Oct. 10, 1991, pp. 7-8;
Exh. A).
On March 18, 1991, Dr. Marlene Awayan, Municipal Health
Officer of Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, conducted a postmortem examination of the remains of Dionisio Albores (TSN,
Nov. 19, 1991, pp. 2-5; Exh. C). Based on her examination, Dr.
Awayan found that Dionisio Albores sustained multiple gunshot
wounds, entrance at the right anterior chest, 3 inches (in) depth
and multiple protrusions hard object at the left posterior chest
and that the cause of his death was internal hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C, C-1, C-2).
On June 6, 1991, appellant approached Jesus Bernido, Chief of
the Intelligence Section of the Sinacaban Police Station and told
the latter that he was the one responsible for the killing of
Dionisio Albores (TSN, Nov. 19, 1991; p. 6). In view thereof,
Bernido asked appellant what prompted him to surrender and
appellant told him that it was due to his guilty conscience
(ibid.).Consequently, Bernido, accompanied by SPO3 Maharlika
Ydulzura, Chief Investigator of the Sinacaban Police Station,
and two (2) other police escorts brought appellant to the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) in Oroquieta City (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991,
pp. 3-4). Upon arrival at the PAO premises, SPO3 Ydulzura
informed PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot that appellant wanted to
make a confession of a crime he had committed (TSN, Nov. 12,
1991, pp. 3-4). Thereafter, in her presence, appellant was asked
by the policemen if he had a lawyer and appellant replied that he
had none (TSN, Nov. 12, 1991, pp. 3-4). Appellant was also
asked if he wanted to avail of the services of the PAO and he
answered in the affirmative (TSN, Nov. 12, 1991, pp. 34).Consequently, Atty. Anggot requested the policemen to leave
her and appellant alone inside the office and the policemen
readily agreed and stayed outside (ibid.). She then inquired if
appellant was not intimidated, coerced or forced and whether
appellant was promised any reward (ibid.). She also informed
appellant that he had the right to remain silent and not to answer
questions which may incriminate him and that any statement he
will make may be used against him in the future (ibid.). After
being informed of such facts, appellant still declared that he was
going to confess because he had committed a crime (TSN, Nov.
12, 1991, pp. 3-4).
During the taking of appellants confession, in the presence and
with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot, SPO3 Ydulzura likewise
reminded appellant in the Visayan dialect, which he knew and
spoke, that he had the right to remain silent and the right against
self-incrimination and to secure the services of a lawyer of his
own choice to assist him in the taking of his confession (TSN,
Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 6-8). Despite such reminder, appellant still
agreed and accepted the appointment of PAO Atty. Meriam
Anggot as his lawyer to assist him during the taking of his
affidavit of confession (Exhs. B, B-3, B-4; TSN, Oct. 22, 1991,
pp. 3-7; TSN, Nov. 12, 1991, pp. 4-7). In his affidavit which was
taken in the typewriter by SPO3 Ydulzura, appellant
acknowledged and admitted that he was the one who shot
Dionisio Albores at 9:00 oclock in the evening of March 17, 1991
at Barangay Seor, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental (Exhs. B, B11, B-12; TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 8-15). He declared therein that
he shot Dionisio Albores because the latter threatened to kill him
and because he knew that Dionisio was an ex-convict who had
killed somebody with treachery in the past (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991,
pp. 13-15; Exhs. B, B-15).
Afterwards, SPO3 Ydulzura read the contents of appellants

115

affidavit to him, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO

Atty. Anggot (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, p. 15; Exh. B). Subsequently,
appellant, after correcting the date, signed his name on the
affidavit (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 15-17). Thereafter, appellant
subscribed and swore to the veracity of his affidavit before Atty.
Nora Montejo-Lumasag, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Oroquieta City (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 24-26). Before
signing the affidavit, Atty. Lumasag read to appellant the
contents thereof and informed him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, against self-incrimination and to counsel of his
own choice. She also informed appellant about the
consequences of his affidavit and that it may be used as
evidence against him. She also asked him whether he
understood the contents of the affidavit (ibid.). Subsequently,
appellant was asked if the statements in the affidavit are true
and correct and he declared that the statements therein are true
and correct and that he was willing to sign the affidavit on his
own free will (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 24-26; Exhs. B, B-1 to B2).
(Rollo, pp. 45-51)
Accused-appellant now assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION
OF
APPELLANT
IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCES FOR APPELLANT.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY.
The main thrust of these assignment of errors is the
inadmissibility of appellants extrajudicial confession on the
ground that his waiver of his right to remain silent was obtained
sans observance of the procedural safeguards embodied in
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to wit:
Section 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx.
(Underlining supplied).
There is no merit in the contention.
Atty. Miriam D. Angot, the PAO lawyer who assisted the
appellant testified that before the in-custody interrogation
started, she even asked the police escorts then present to leave
the room.She then ascertained from accused-appellant Victor
Bacor himself that the latter was not cajoled nor coerced into
making the intended confession and apprised him further of his
right to remain silent and not to answer any question
propounded to him. He was warned that statements made by
him might be used against him in the future. Bacor then
intimated that he was confessing to the crime for the simple
reason that he had done it (TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 7071). He was again informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3
Maharlika Ydulzura before the actual taking of his extrajudicial
confession (Ibid, Exhibit B-3). Despite all these, the appellant
proceeded into confessing that he was the one who killed the
victim Dionesio Albores.
The pertinent portions of said extrajudicial confession as
translated from the Visayan dialect to the English language are
as follows:
PRELIMINARY: Mr. Victor W. Bacor, you are presently under
investigation regarding the MURDER of Ignacio Ampo and
Dionisio Albores. Before proceeding with the investigation, we
will inform you of your constitutional rights. You have the legal
right to remain silent and not to answer questions which you
think might incriminate you. Anything you say may be used in
evidence against you in any court of the Philippines. You have
the right to counsel of your own choice to assist you in todays
investigation. If you cannot afford to pay the services of a lawyer
but you want to have one, a lawyer will be provided by the
government to assist you free of charge. Do you understand?

ANSWER: Yes, I understand. I desire to have a lawyer but I

cannot afford to pay one as of now.
QUESTION: In front of you now is a lawyer of the Public
Attorneys Office. Do you accept her as your counsel to assist
you in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, Sir. I accept. (Atty. Miriam O. Angot is officially
appointed as lawyer of Mr. Victor W. Bacor during this
Interrogation)
xxx xxx xxx
14 Question: Regarding the death of Dionisio Albores, do you
have any knowledge of the facts surrounding that?
Answer: Yes, Sir. I was the one who shot Dionesio Albores.
15 Question: When and where was this killing?
Answer: Last March 17, 1991, at 9:00 oclock in the evening, in
Barangay Seor, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.
16 Question: Was there someone with you during the killing?
Answer: There was, Sir. Berwin Rosales was with me during the
killing.
17. Question: Please tell us what happened.
Answer: I had been drinking a little that night. Berwin Rosales
mentioned something about my adversary, Dionesio Albores. So,
we got the weapon which was then in the possession of the
Rosales family, the same weapon used in killing Ignacio
Ampo. When we got to Dionesio Albores house, I was not able
to shoot him at first because he was lying down with his
wife. Then at nine oclock in the evening, Dionesio Albores got up
and approached his wife who was then eating in the kitchen. I
shot him. He was hit near his armpit. That caused his death.
QUESTION: What was the reason why you killed Dionesio
Albores?
ANSWER: Before that, Dionesio Albores and I had a quarrel,
and he threatened to kill me. I heard that Dionesio Albores had
previously killed someone by means of treachery and that he
had been imprisoned in Muntinglupa. So on March 17, 1991, I
thought of killing him first.
QUESTION: Where now is the weapon which you used in killing
Dionesio Albores, the same weapon used by Charlie Manliquez
in killing Ignacio Ampo?
ANSWER: According to Laloy Rosales, the weapon was
redeemed by the person who pledged it to him.
QUESTION: Why are you now here before us and telling us
what had happened?
ANSWER: I voluntarily surrendered myself to Pfc. Jesus Bernido
of the Sinacaban Police Station because I could no longer bear
a guilty conscience.
QUESTION: Were you coerced, manhandled or given money in
order to make this confession?
ANSWER: No, Sir. Everything is out of my own free will.
QUESTION: Do you have anything more to say?
ANSWER: No more, Sir.
QUESTION: Are you willing to sign this statement you have
made under oath in accordance with law?
ANSWER: Yes, I am ready to do so, Sir.
(Records, pp. 4-6)
All throughout the custodial investigation, Atty. Miriam Angot of
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) took pains to explain
meaningfully to the accused each and every query posed by
SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura. Accused then stamped his
approval to the extrajudicial confession by affixing his signature
on each and every page thereof in the presence of counsel
Miriam Angot. (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2, B-8, B-19, B20). Consequently, there was an effective waiver of the right to
remain silent. (People vs. Ruelan, 231 SCRA 650).
Here is therefore a clear case of a criminal who had hearkened
to the proddings of conscience. And by so doing, he had
wittingly furnished the missing link necessary for his conviction.
Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the evidentiary rule that an
extrajudicial confession corroborated by evidence of the corpus
delicti is sufficient to support a conviction. (Rule 133, Section 3,
Rules of Court).
The fact of death and the criminal agency, elements which are
constitutive of the corpus delicti, had been amply established by
the death certificate (Exhibit A) and the medical certificate
(Exhibit C) the veracity of which had been affirmed on the
witness stand by the examining physician. Details of the findings
therein are as follows:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS:
BODY: MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS, ENTRANCE AT THE

116

RIGHT ANTERIOR CHEST, 3 INCHES DEPTH.

MULTIPLE PROTRUSIONS HARD OBJECT AT THE LEFT
POSTERIOR CHEST.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE
GUNSHOT WOUNDS.
(Records, p. 118)
In sum: Bacor informed the police that he shot Dionesio Albores;
that the latter was hit near the armpit; and that the latter died as
a consequence thereof. The evidence of the corpus delicti
shows conformance of the extrajudicial statement with
reality. The facts dove-tail with the confession of the
accused. There is no reason to reject the same.
On the other hand, what can not be believed is Victor Bacors
subsequent denials and alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak and
unreliable defense because it is easily contrived and fabricated
(People vs. Amiguin, 229 SCRA 166; People vs. Calope, 229
SCRA 413; People vs. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289). More so when
it is established mainly by accused himself or his relatives.
(People vs. Torres, 232 SCRA 32; People vs. Apolonia, 235
SCRA 124). For alibi to prosper, the accused must show that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the commission of the felony (People vs. Servillon,
236 SCRA 385; People vs. Apa-ap, 235 SCRA 468; People vs.
Barte, 230 SCRA 401). And, as already stated, the place where
the accused-appellant claimed to be was only one kilometer
away from the scene of the crime and easily accessible.
In cases involving crimes [committed] prior to the effectivity date
of R.A. 7659 (An Act To Impose The Death Penalty On Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised
Penal Code, As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For
Other Purposes), it is mandatory for the courts to reduce the
capital punishment to reclusion perpetua in view of the
constitutional proscription embodied in Article [III], Section 19 (1)
of the organic act. This rule however applies only when the
death penalty should be imposed after giving proper
consideration to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances (People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 1071; People vs.
de la Cruz, 216 SCRA 476). In People vs. Muoz, the Supreme
Court sitting en banc had the occasion to rule:
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that
there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is
still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics
that if the language under construction is plain, it is neither
necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to
abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its
imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should
determine is whether or not they also meant to require a
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the
prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is
not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the
Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and
unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming
such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no
doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a
statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion
makes the personal observation that this might be still another
instance where the framers meant one thing and said another or
strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not say
enough.
xxx xxx xxx
" x x x (W)e return to our original interpretation and hold that Art.
III, Sec. 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.
xxx xxx xxx
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no

generic or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of

the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of
the penalty prescribed by Article 248, which conformably to the
new doctrine here adopted and announced, it is still reclusion
perpetua.
In the light of the aforecited Supreme Court ruling we are
therefore bound to consider in fixing the appropriate penalty to
be imposed herein the whole range of the penalty prescribed
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of
murder, i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Conformably with Article 77 in relation to Article 64 (no. 4) of the
Revised Penal Code, each of the three distinct penalties given
under Article 248 shall form a period and the penalty to be
imposed shall be determined after reasonably offsetting the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In this light, we
impose the medium period which is reclusion perpetua
considering that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender of the accused was offset by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the lower court is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sentence
imposed on accused-appellant Victor Bacor is RECLUSION
PERPETUA together with its accessory penalties and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
Furthermore, in view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to be
imposed on appellant Bacor, this case is hereby CERTIFIED and
the entire record thereof is elevated to the honorable Supreme
Court in accordance with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Revised
Rules of Court (People vs. Cruz, 203 SCRA 683 [1991]).
SO ORDERED.
We have examined the evidence in this case and considered the
arguments of the parties. We now find that the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant.The
findings and conclusions of the appellate court as contained in
the aforequoted decision are accordingly adopted by the Court.
The main question in this case is whether accused-appellant
validly waived his right to remain silent and, therefore, whether
his confession is admissible in evidence against him. The
question turns on the application of Art. III, 12(1) of the
Constitution which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This is a corollary of the right against self-incrimination found in
Art. III, 17. It has been noted that the Constitution has separated
the right of persons under custodial investigation from the
traditional right against self-incrimination not only to emphasize
but also to guarantee the right to proper treatment of those
under investigation.[3]
To implement the right of persons under custodial interrogation,
R.A. No. 7438, 2(d)[4] requires that any confession must be in
writing and signed by the confessant in the presence of his
counsel.
Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession
to be admissible in evidence, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel preferably of the confessants choice; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing. [5] The Court finds that
accused-appellants confession satisfies the said requirements.
First. Accused-appellants confession, as quoted in the decision
of the Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its voluntariness
and spontaneity. Accused-appellant does not deny that he
surrendered to the police on June 6, 1991, almost three months
after the fatal shooting of Dionesio Albores, and confessed to the
crime because he could no longer bear a guilty conscience. In
his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that the
signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession (Exh. B)
was his without any claim that he was forced, coerced, or
threatened to make the confession. [6] Indeed, the details
contained in his confession could have been known to accusedappellant alone.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession
without being warned of his constitutional rights. This is not
true. The record shows that he was advised of his rights,

117

particularly the right to remain silent, not only once but

thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public
Attorneys Office (PAO); second, by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura,
the investigator who took accused-appellants confession; and
lastly, by the branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom
accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each
time, he was asked whether he was willing to give a statement
and he said he was. This is sufficient.[7] Contrary to accusedappellants contention, there is no need for a separate and
express written waiver of his constitutional rights. [8] Accusedappellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the
authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he was
being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily executing his
extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and
with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed of
his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively waived his
right to remain silent.[9]
Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the
assistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was appointed
counsel de officio to assist accused-appellant and the latter
expressly accepted her appointment as his counsel before
giving his confession.[10] As this Court has held, a PAO lawyer
can be considered an independent counsel within the
contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is not a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to that of the accused-appellant.[11] Thus, the assistance
of a PAO lawyer in the present case satisfies the constitutional
requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the
accused.
Judging from Atty. Anggots testimony before the trial court, there
is no reason not to consider her a competent and independent
counsel. She testified that before the taking of accusedappellants confession, she requested SPO3 Ydulzura and the
other policemen to step out of the room so that she could
privately confer with the accused-appellant, free from pressure
or intimidation. She also testified on the circumstances
surrounding her appointment as counsel for accusedappellant. She said:[12]
ATTY. ACOSTA ON DIRECT
WIT. MERIAM ANGGOT
Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court what public office if
any were you holding in June, 1991?
A I am connected with the Public Attorneys Office based in
Oroquieta City with the designation as Public Attorney II.
Q On June 6, 1991, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon were
you in your office?
A Yes.
Q Do you know who came to your office at that time on that
date?
A There were more or less four (4) or five (5) persons one of
them is Victor Bacor, the accused in this case, the other one is
Policeman Ydulzura and the two escorts whom I believe [were]
policeman and I could not longer mention their names.
Q What was their purpose in coming to your office?
A They told me that subject Victor Bacor who is the accused in
this case is going to make his confession of a certain crime that
he has committed.
Q Since he was going to make a confession regarding his
commission of a crime, you mean he was there to ask you to
represent him as his lawyer during that time?
A Well, I was told that the subject person is going to make a
confession and he was asked whether he wanted to have his
lawyer or whether he has a lawyer but he said that he has none
and he was again asked by the policeman whether he will avail
[of] the services of the Public Attorneys Office and he said that
he will.
Q Before
the
witness
was
to
make
a detailed
confession/statements of the crime that he had committed, what
if any did you inform him regarding his rights?
A Before the interrogation started, I requested the policemen
who escorted the subject person to leave us and after they left
the office and stayed outside, I asked the subject person
whether he was not intimidated, coerce[d] or forced and
informed him of the consequences of his making the confession,
and whether he was not promised of any reward in order to
make such confession and I further told him that he has the right

to remain silent and not to answer any question propounded to

him and that his statement might be used against him in the
future.
Q And what if any was his reply?
A Well, he said that he is going to confess because he has done
the crime.
Q Was that confession reduced to writing?
A Yes, it was typewritten.
....
Q As the affidavit was formed, what was done to its contents if
there was?
A I was present all the time when the interrogation was
conducted and in fact, I explain[ed] to him the question or every
question propounded and I let him understand and explained to
him that his answers to the questions are very crucial to his
person.
Q Do you still recall before whom this affidavit was subscribe[d]
and sworn to?
A It was subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Nora MontejoLumasag.
SPO3 Ydulzura, on the other hand, testified, thus:[13]
ATTY. ACOSTA ON DIRECT
WIT. MAHARLIKA YDULZURA
Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court what position if
any were you holding in June 1991?
A I am the chief investigator of the Sinacaban Police Station.
Q On June 6, 1991 in the afternoon of that date, where were
you?
A I, together with Victor Bacor and some of my co-members of
the PNP, were in the Office of the PAO.
Q What was your purpose in going to the Office of the PAO on
that date?
A I was going to take the confession of Victor Bacor in the
presence of a lawyer.
....
Q What was done while you were in the office of the PAO?
A I began to extract the confession of Victor Bacor.
Q Before you extract his confession, was he represented by a
lawyer?
A Yes.
Q Who was the lawyer representing him at that time?
A Atty. Meriam Anggot.
Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court how . . . you [took]
the confession of Victor Bacor?
A I did the writing in the presence of Atty. Meriam Anggot and put
it directly in the typewriter.
Q Who [typed] the contents in that affidavit?
A I was the one.
Q In what dialect or language used?
A That was in Visayan dialect, sir.
Q Was it taken in the language or dialect known to Victor Bacor?
A Yes, sir.
....
Q You said that you are the one who [typed] this affidavit, kindly
inform this Honorable Court what was your first question that
was propounded upon Victor Bacor?
A Yes, I inform[ed] him that he has the right to remain silent that
he has the right not to answer any question propounded on him
that may incriminate him and that he has the right to secure a
lawyer of his choice to assist him during the taking of the
confession.
Q When that question was propounded upon Victor Bacor, was
Atty. Meriam Anggot present?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was that question placed in the affidavit of Victor Bacor?
A Yes, that is under the preliminary question your Honor.
Q You said that accused was represented by Atty. Meriam Angot
during the taking of his affidavit did the accused confirm or agree
that he should be represented by Atty. Anggot during the taking
of his affidavit?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was that also shown in the affidavit?
A Yes, sir, I made him place his name.
Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant with
the assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him before the
branch clerk of court who, before administering the oath to
accused-appellant, read the affidavit of confession to him and
informed him of his rights and the consequences of his

118

confession. Accused-appellant stood pat on his decision to tell it

all. As Branch Clerk of Court Montejo-Lumasag testified: [14]
ATTY. ACOSTA ON DIRECT
WIT. NORA MONTEJO-LUMASAG
Q What position if any were you holding in June, 1991 Atty. Nora
Montejo Lumasag?
A I am the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta
City.
Q Did you report for duty on June 6, 1991?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall on that date a certain person by the name of
Victor Bacor who was sworn to your office??
A Yes.
Q Would you kindly inform this Honorable Court who
accompan[ied] him in going to your office?
A It was SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura.
Q Who else?
A Also Atty. Meriam Anggot.
Q What was their purpose [for going] to your office?
A Their purpose was to swear before me [accused-appellants]
extrajudicial confession.
Q I am showing to you an affidavit which is found on pages 4 to
6 of the record which [are] now marked as Exhibits B, B-1 and
B-2, respectively, kindly examine the same and inform this
Honorable Court what relation this affidavit has with that affidavit
that you have mentioned which was sworn to before you?
A This is the very affidavit that was sworn before me by Victor
Bacor.
....
Q Before Victor Bacor affix[ed] his signature on this Exhibits B,
B-1 and B-2, what if any was done as to the content of this
affidavit?
A I read to him the contents of the affidavit and inform[ed] him of
his constitutional rights, that he has the right to remain silent,
that he has the right to have a counsel of his own choice and
about the consequence of his act, that it might be used as
evidence against him in the future and further ask[ed] him
whether he understood the contents of the affidavit and, after
that he sign[ed] the confession.
Q Did you read the contents of the affidavit word for word?
A Yes, sir.
Q After you read to him the contents of the affidavit what if any
did he tell you?
A He said that the statements in the affidavit are true and correct
and that he is willing to sign the same in his own free will.
Q After signing this affidavit what if any did you say to him?
A I requested him to swear under oath as to the truthfulness of
the same.
Q And did he do so?
A Yes, sir.
Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be
voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is proven and
that the burden of proof is upon the party who claims the
contrary.[15] In this case, this presumption has not been
overcome. Not only is accused-appellants confession replete
with details that only he could have supplied, but the
circumstances surrounding its execution also belie his claim that
he did not validly waive his right to remain silent. Hence, both
the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accusedappellant on the basis of the confession since, as they noted, it
was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti which dovetails with the confession.[16]
Against this evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants
alibi cannot prevail. He claimed that he was at his parents house
at SK Avancena, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental at the time of
the killing of Dionesio Albores. His father, Cesar Bacor, admitted,
however, that their house in Barangay Avancena is just one (1)
kilometer from the house of the victim in Barangay Seor where
the crime was committed and that transportation was easily
available.[17] It was thus not impossible for accused-appellant to
have gone to Barangay Seor to commit the crime.
Even if we consider accused-appellants defense of alibi a
retraction of his confession, the same is of no moment. In this
jurisdiction, retractions of confessions are generally considered
unreliable and are looked upon with disfavor. The asserted
motives for the repudiation of a confession are commonly held
suspect and subject to serious doubt.[18]
Finally, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced

accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua. When the crime of

murder was committed on March 17, 1991, the same was
punishable under Art. 248 of the Penal Code by reclusion
temporal, in its maximum period, to death. Each of the three (3)
distinct penalties covered thereby forms a period [19] and the
penalty to be imposed is determined after reasonably offsetting
the attending mitigating and aggravating circumstances. [20] In the
instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
of the accused-appellant is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling considering that the latter circumstance
is not absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY,accusedappellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby"
was accused of the crime of rape with homicide committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the
municipality of xxx, province of xxx, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by means of violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one AAA against her will and without her consent;
and the above-named accused in order to suppress evidence
against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the
said AAA, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow
blocks in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her
death.
Contrary to Law."[1]
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about
4:00 P.M., in xxx, AAA, twenty years of age and a second-year
student at the xxx, left her home for her school dormitory in xxx.
She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21,
1994. AAA wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some
personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
AAA was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited
her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. AAA agreed
to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the
house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her
to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged
the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and
left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled AAA,
who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a
pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence.
On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over
the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he
hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan
and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her
body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow
portion of the lot and abandoned it.[2]
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body
of AAA was discovered. She was naked from the chest down
with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby
was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. xxx revealed that AAA died of
"traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
"1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally
oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

119

2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.

2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate
3 inches in width, from right MCL to left AAL.
2.7. elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower
jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and
2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal
lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia,
introitus and exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal
cavity showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial
Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral
Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face."[3]
AAA's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted
Mayor xxx of xxx to form a crack team of police officers to look
for the criminal. Searching the place where AAA's body was
found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete
block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a
pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as
AAA's.[4]
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who
found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard.
They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from
Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that
accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son
left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several
articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short
pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain,
and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper
inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant.[5]
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents
live in xxx. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by
Mayor xxx traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him
aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant
denied any knowledge of AAA's death. However, when the
police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's
clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant
relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo
Dizon, killed AAA and that he was merely a lookout. He also said
that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of AAA.
[6]
Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and
Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there
by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the
house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal
under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging
to AAA. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the
two other suspects holding the bags.[7]
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police
headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical
examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal
Health Officer, Dr. xxx.[8] Appellant was found to sustain:
"HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and
back: with abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities:
freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt."[9]
By this time, people and media representatives were already
gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the
investigation. Mayor xxx arrived and proceeded to the
investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately.
The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako!
I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA." The mayor

opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked
for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available
he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.[10] In
the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the
media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed
his guilt. He disclosed how he killed AAA and volunteered to
show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated
saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. [11] He also
said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday.[12] After his
confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the
mayor to help him.[13] His confession was captured on videotape
and covered by the media nationwide.[14]
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two
days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television
reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he
affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime.[15]
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not
guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he
was at his parent's house in xxx attending the birthday party of
his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His
wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son.
They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in
the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while
he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his
father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the
afternoon and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when
he was picked up by the police.[16]
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at xxx. In one of
the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and
kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he
raped and killed AAA. When he refused, they pushed his head
into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks.
Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter,
appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his
neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go
to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from
under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was
told.[17]
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted
appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the
victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as
actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages,
thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby" is found guilty by proof beyond a
scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape
with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as
one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of AAA the amount
of P50,000.00 for the death of AAA and P71,000.00 as actual
burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision
becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED."[18]
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
"I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING
AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
POLICE
INVESTIGATORS,
REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND
TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF
CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY
SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED."[19]

120

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the

testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the
mayor of xxx and four news reporters to whom appellant gave
his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on
photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of
the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they
were made during custodial investigation without the assistance
of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provides:
"SECTION 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) x x x
(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) x x x"
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.[20] Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. [21] The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent.[22] The incommunicadocharacter of custodial
interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired. [23]
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are
accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to
focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from
the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. [24] As intended
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation
conducted by police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such
other police agencies in our government."[25]
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about the death of AAA. Indeed,
appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police
found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony
of SPO4 xxx, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
"COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was
accused who did this act?
WITNESS
First, the place where AAA was last found is at
the backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were
blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano
Calma who were his other companions in the house, he said
that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and
whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q
So you had a possible suspect?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And then, what else did you do?
A
We tried to find out where we can find him
and from information we learned that his parents live in xxx. We
went there, found him there and investigated him and in fact
during the investigation he admitted that he was the culprit."[26]
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to
inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was
investigated and interrogated.[27] His confession is therefore
inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered
from appellant's house. SPO2 xxx, a member of the
investigating team testified:
"Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover
these bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused

pointed to them, where did he point these bags?

A At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2)
bags beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q In other words, you were given information where these two
(2) bags were located?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be
located what did you do?
A We proceeded to the place together with the accused so
that we would know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the
accused pointed to the place where the bags were located?
A After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the
canal, he really showed where the bags were hidden underneath
the canal, sir."[28]
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled
confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also
inadmissible.[29]
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The
following day, Mayor xxx visited the appellant. Appellant
approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They
went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone
committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor xxx
testified, viz:
"Mayor xxx: x x x. During the investigation when there were
already many people from the media, Andan whispered
something to me and requested that he be able to talk to me
alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of
the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the
office of the Chief of Police, mayor?
A While inside the office of the headquarters he told me
"Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one
who killed AAA." So when he was telling this to me, I told him to
wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear
what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was
the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by
a television camera."[30]
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he
will tell you something and then you responded by bringing him
inside the office of the Chief of Police and you stated that he
admitted that he killed AAA . . .
Court:
He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay AAA," was that the only
admission that he told you?
A The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we
were alone and the second one was before the media people,
sir.
Q What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of
the Chief of Police?
A These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped
him from making further admissions because I wanted the media
people to hear what he was going to say, sir."[31]
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed
that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is
true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and
control" over the local police[32] and may arguably be deemed a
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter.[33] In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely
and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt
to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and
not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to
him did not violate his constitutional rights. [34] Thus, it has been
held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.
[35]
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the

121

state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to

prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. [36] Hence
we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly
admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions
by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence.[37]
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for
"Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February
27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that
appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in
the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. [38] Orlan
Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also
interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to
reach the place where the body of AAA was found, where did
you start your interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview
inside the police station of xxx and I identified myself to the
accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him
whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I
also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.
Q And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he
was responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I
asked him whether his admission was voluntary or that there
was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his
person because I knew that there were five other suspects in
this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the
policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of
drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was
present, was the uncle beside him at the time that you asked the
question?
A The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose
name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I
don't know if it is the place of the crime scene or in the place
where AAA resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the
office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or
any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on
the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a
voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who
raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying
me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and
everything that transpired during the killing of AAA.
Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask
permission from the accused Pablito Andan that you were going
to interview him?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the
office of the xxx PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who accompanied you?
A I was accompanied by some xxx policemen including Mayor
xxx and some of the relatives of the accused.
Q At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito
Andan?
A Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of AAA was
recovered.
Q How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present,
more or less?
A There were many, sir, because there were many wailing,
weeping and crying at that time when he was already taken in
the patrol jeep of the xxx police, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in
xxx, what transpired?
A I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on
how the crime was committed by the accused, so we started
inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to accompany
the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how
he carried out the rape and killing of AAA, sir.
Q Did he voluntarily comply?
A Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview

at the PNP xxx up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were
videotaped by you?
A Yes, sir.[39]
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise
covered the proceedings for three successive days. [40] His
testimony is as follows:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their
own investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the
suspect.
Q Were there people?
A The people present before the crowd that included the
mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the
group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I asked the
suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after
the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed AAA. I
reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this
offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital
offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he
said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did
it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q And that was in the presence of the crowd that you
mentioned a while ago?
A Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera
to take some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen
and several others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking
the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered
the same.
Q Also in the presence of so many people that you
mentioned?
A The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the
accused answered you affirmatively, what was the answer,
please be definite?
Court:
Use the vernacular.
A I asked him the question, after asking him the question,"
Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay
AAA? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." "Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito,
kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw ang gumawa
sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay AAA?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx
Q Did you ask him, why did you kill AAA?
A I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was
because a devil gripped his mind and because of that according
to him, your Honor, were the pornographic magazines,
pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost
everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will
you tell the court and the public what was the physical condition
of accused Pablito Andan?
A As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body
that he was really down physically and I think he was in good
condition.
Court:
So he was not happy about the incident?
A He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court:
He was happy?
A He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court:
Was he crying?
A As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but
there was no tear that fell on his face.
Court:
Was he feeling remorseful?
A As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
x x x"[41]
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed
appellant on February 26, 1994.[42] He also testified that:
"Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan
give you the permission that you asked from him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he allowed you to interview him, who were
present?
A The first person that I saw there was Mayor xxx, policemen
from xxx, the chief investigator, SPO4 xxx, and since xxx, the
chief of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there,
sir.
Q Were they the only persons who were present when you
interviewed the accused?
A There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded
with people. There were people from the PNP and people from

122

xxx, sir.
Q How about the other representatives from the media?
A Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and
there were people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q How about Channel 7?
A They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him,
was his wife also present?
A Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure
if she was really the wife but they were hugging each other and
she was crying and from the questions that I asked from the
people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q How about the other members of the family of the accused,
were they around?
A I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people
there, sir.
Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the
interview. May we know what question did you ask and the
answer.
A My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer
was "Yes."
Q What was the next question?
A I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw
the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the
house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q What was the next question that you asked him?
A He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason
why he killed the victim was because he was afraid that the
incident might be discovered, sir.
Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made
a news item on that?
A Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q Were there other questions propounded by you?
A Yes, sir.
Q "Ano iyon?"
A He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the
fence, sir.
Q Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of AAA to the
other side of the fence?
A I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A I have a xerox copy here, sir.
x x x"[43]
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were
given free from any undue influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they
interviewed appellant.[44] They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant
to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the
crime.[45] In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did
appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly
confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in
the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment.
All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his
family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in
the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are
not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. [46] It
governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist
without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be
taken away by government, rights that government has the duty
to protect.[47] Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of
Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual
against aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies.[48]
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency
of the medical evidence against him. Dr. xxx, a Medical
Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first
autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent physical
injuries in the hymen.[49] Allegedly, the minimal blood found in her
vagina could have been caused by her menstruation.[50]
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on

March 1, 1994 by Dr. xxx, a medico-legal officer of the National

Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of
spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had
lacerations, thus:
"Hymen -- contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted
blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of
the clock."[51]
Dr. xxx testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may
have been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina
when the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of
penetration.[52] His testimony is as follows:
"Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this
3 o'clock and 6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the
clock. x x x.
Court:
Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the
edges of the lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it
into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did
on the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the
body was autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the
vagina could have been sustained on account of the dilation of
the previous autopsy?
A Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the
autopsy on the victim which was already dead, no amount of
injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce blood
because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already
stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the
victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then
I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible
that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those
instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in
a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the
lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been inflicted
or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of
the lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you
have just drawn and indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds
where you found the clotted blood?
A This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the
lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage.
The clotted blood are found on the edges of the lacerated
wounds, sir.
Q What could have caused those lacerations?
A Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly
inserted into that small opening of the hymen causing
lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those
lacerations?
A It is possible, sir.[53]
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa
in the vagina does not negate the commission rape [54] nor does
the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen.
[55]
What is essential is that there be penetration of the female
organ no matter how slight. [56] Dr. xxx testified that the fact of
penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's
vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been
caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. xxx's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by
appellant are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial,
obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime
scene, viz:
(1) The victim, AAA, was last seen walking along the subdivision
road near appellant's house;[57]
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and
grandmother were not in their house;[58]
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of
appellant's house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were
also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of
appellant's house;[59]
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her
body had been dragged over a flat rough surface. [60] This
supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and

123

dragged to where her body was found;

(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the
laundry hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant
were found positive for the presence of blood type "B," the
probable blood type of the victim. [61] AAA's exact blood type was
not determined but her parents had type "A" and type
"AB."[62] The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to
be type "O," appellant's blood type;[63]
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which
he failed to explain;[64]
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after
the incident and were later found at his parents' house in xxx; [65]
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the
other circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution
evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical
improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Xxx is
only a few kilometers away from xxx and can be traversed in
less than half an hour.[66]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is
affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is
found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide
under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of
death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, AAA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
LITO
C.
MARCELO, petitioner,
vs. THE
HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo
from a decision of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
[1]
convicting him and two others of qualified theft. The
information against them alleges
That on or about February 17, 1989, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, ARNOLD PASICOLAN, a
public officer, being then an Emergency Laborer assigned as
bag opener at the printed matters section of Makati Central Post
Office, and taking advantage of his official position by having
access to the mail matters in conspiracy with accused RONNIE
S. ROMERO and LITO MARCELO, both private individuals, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with grave
abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and without the
consent of the owners thereof, take, steal and carry away from
the Central Post office of Makati one bag containing assorted
mail matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the
aggregate amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the amount
of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the different addressee (sic) or the government in the
aforesaid mentioned (sic) amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts established during the trial show the following:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the
Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto
Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage
of mail matter in the post office.[2] Among those mentioned by
Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned
as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor
Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete
likewise described the modus operandi of the group.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the group responsible for
mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin

dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that

the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day.
Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of
Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.
They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed
at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two
other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the
Esguerra Building.[3]
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai,
was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado
Street.[4] Esguerra Building is located between Adelantado and
Amorsolo Streets. Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets are parallel
to each other. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were
Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai.
[5]
Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail
bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed
through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings
going towards Amorsolo St.[6] Montepino Building is adjacent to
Esguerra Building. The two are separated by the alley. Upon
reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two
persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and
petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the
mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two
then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle.[7]
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing
Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and
started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see
Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.
[8]
At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two
accused.
Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went
back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay
Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep,
overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.[9]
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to
their headquarters. They also brought along with them the
motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail
found in their possession.[10] On their way to the NBI
headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office,
intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo.
However, they were not able to find him there.[11]
The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted
of 622 letters.[12] The names of the addressees were listed. They
were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their
letters.Many of them, after proper identification, were able to
claim their letters. Some letters contained money.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the
presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and
Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the
NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the
accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very
same letters confiscated from them.[13]
NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various
denominations of 20, 50, and 100 dollars. [14] Vela and the other
NBI agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills in
the letters which, if converted to Philippine pesos, at the then
exchange rate of P22 to US $1, were worth P11,000.00.[15] The
addressees agreed to leave the envelopes of the letters with the
NBI. Those letters which were not claimed were opened in court
in the presence of the counsel for the defense. The letters were
found to contain three (3) one dollar bills, one (1) five dollar bill,
one (1) twenty dollar bill, a check for twenty-five dollars, and fifty
(50) Saudi Arabian riyals.[16]
Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito
Marcelo were charged with infidelity in the custody of
documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
On March 8, 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
qualified theft. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused, Arnold
Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito
Mercado [should be Marcelo] y Cruz, guilty, as principals,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft defined
in Article 310, in conjunction with Articles 308 and 309, of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate

124

Sentence Law and considering the aggravating circumstances of

taking advantage of public position, the Court imposes upon
Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza the penalty ranging from EIGHT (8)
years, EIGHT (8) months, and ONE (1) day of Prision mayor, as
minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) month, and
ELEVEN (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Applying
again the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the Court imposes
upon Ronnie Romero y Santos and Lito Marcelo y Cruz, the
penalty ranging from SEVEN (7) YEARS, four (4) months, and
ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years,
SIX (6) months, and TWENTY-ONE (21) days of prision mayor,
as maximum.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the
following assignment of errors:
(1) Respondent Honorable Court had wrongly made the crucial
finding against petitioner that he has committed the act charged
in conspiracy with each other.
(2) Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence
of petitioners guilt the letters signed by the accused during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter
disregard of his constitutional right.
First. Petitioner says that since the subject of the alleged
pilferage was mail matter, only a government employee may be
held guilty of qualified theft unless a private individual was
shown to have been in conspiracy with him. He contends that
since he is not a government employee, then he cannot be
charged or held guilty of the crime as there is no proof that he
conspired with a postal employee. The petitioner argues that
there is no evidence to prove that he was at any time in
conspiracy with the members of the syndicate inside the post
office. In fact, petitioner points out, Jacinto Merete, Projecto
Tumagan, and his co-accused Arnold Pasicolan were one in
saying that it was their first time to see him and Romero on
February 17, 1989. Likewise, in the meeting allegedly conducted
by the members of the syndicate, he and Romero were not
around nor were their names mentioned. Petitioner says that
although he and Romero knew each other, it was only on
February 17, 1989 that they saw each other again in order to
see a movie.
We cannot understand petitioners theory that, as the subject of
the pilferage was mail matter, only a government employee,
presumably of the postal service, can be held liable of qualified
theft. What makes the theft of mail matter qualified is the fact
that the subject thereof is mail matter, regardless of whether the
offender is a postal employee or a private individual. This much
is clear from Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Thus, as long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in
Art. 310, the crime is qualified theft. In this case, it is mail matter.
Hence, it is not necessary that petitioner be shown to have been
inconspiracy with a government employee in order to hold him
liable for qualified theft.
Be that as it may, conspiracy was proven in this case. NBI agent
Arles Vela testified that petitioner was instrumental in
transferring the contents of the mail bag which Pasicolan
handed to them to their travelling bag and that afterward
petitioner and his co-accused Romero tied the bag to their
motorcycle.
Velas testimony was corroborated by Projecto Tumagan, who
likewise testified that Romero and Marcelo transferred the
contents of the mail bag to their bags. Although Tumagan said
petitioner and Romero had two bags, thus contradicting Velas
testimony that petitioner and his co-accused had only one bag,
the inconsistency in the testimonies of these two prosecution
witnesses is not really of much importance. What is important is
that Tumagan corroborated Velas testimony that petitioner
helped in putting the letters in their bag. The discrepancy could
be due to the fact that these two witnesses were inside a car
and were at some distance from the persons they were

observing. At any rate, during the cross-examination, Tumagan

said that the contents of the mail bag were transferred to one
other bagimplying that there was really just one bag involved.
[17]
Moreover, the defense should have confronted Tumagan with
this inconsistency and asked him to explain. For its failure to do
so, the defense cannot for the first time raise the point in this
appeal.
Petitioner Marcelo showed no sign of surprise or hesitation when
Pasicolan handed the mail bag to him and Romero. It was
apparent he was acting pursuant to a prior agreement because
when the mail bag was given to him, he got the bag and he and
Romero then transferred its contents to their travelling bag.
Petitioner acted in concert with Pasicolan and Romero, thus
indicating he was in conspiracy with them. As the
Sandiganbayan said:
The accused appear to have committed the acts charged in
conspiracy with each other pursuant to a pre-conceived plan
known to all of them to attain a common goal. Thus, when the
postal delivery jeep stopped near Esguerra Building along
Adelantado Street, Pasicolan alighted bringing with him a mail
bag, passed through an alley beside Esquerra Building, and
upon reaching Amorsolo Street handed over the mail bag to
Romero and Marcelo who were waiting for him. Upon receiving
the mail bag they quickly opened it and transferred its contents
to a bag which Aguinaldo provided for the purpose. No words
were exchanged between Pasicolan, on the other hand, and
Romero and Marcelo, on the other, in effecting the
delivery. Pasicolan did not ask if Romero and/or Marcelo were
the person or persons sent to receive the mail bag. These facts
indicate that the three accused already knew each other and
were fully aware of what each had to do. And when Romero and
Marcelo were arrested for receiving the mail bag, they said
nothing to the NBI. Not even a whimper of protest was heard
from them. They appear resigned to their fate after having been
caught red-handed.
Petitioner Marcelo claimed that he and Romero met on February
17, 1989 in order to see a movie; that when Pasicolan handed
four envelopes to Romero, he was across the street buying
cigarettes; and that when he joined Romero, a person identifying
himself as an NBI agent arrested them. Marcelo testified:[18]
ATTY. CRUZ
Q So you were asked by Ronnie Romero if you will be reporting
for work at that time?
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA
Q What time was this when you were asked by Ronnie Romero?
A 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
ATTY. CRUZ
Q What was the reason why you were asked by Ronnie
Romero?
A He wanted me to go with him to see a movie.
Q Did he tell you at what place you will see a movie?
A No, sir.
Q What was your reply?
A I told him yes, I will go with you, anyway I have to go to my
work at 10:00 oclock in the evening.
....
Q What happened next Mr. Marcelo?
A Then I rode at the back of his motorcycle and we went straight
to Makati. Suddenly we stopped near a building and I asked him
what we will do there and he told me he was going to wait for
somebody there.
....
ATTY. CRUZ
Q What was told to you when you reached there?
WITNESS
A He told me he had to wait for somebody there and I told him to
hurry up, I thought you said we are going to see a movie, and he
said, this will not take long.
Q While at Taguig, were you informed by Ronnie Romero that
you will be waiting for somebody when you reached Makati?
A No, sir.
....
Q And what happened next?
A While we were there I told Ronnie Romero I had to buy
cigarette from across the street and after a while, about half an
hour, Ronnie called me I saw somebody handing him about four
pieces of envelopes.

125

Q How would you describe that envelope?

A It was like the Manila envelope that we see being used by the
elementary grades.
Q Was there any distinguishing mark in this envelope?
A No, sir.
Q Were you able to see what was the contents of these
envelopes?
A No, sir.
Q That person who handed the envelope to Ronnie, do you
know him?
A I do not know him.
Q While that envelope was being handed to Ronnie, you mean
to say you were across the street?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so you crossed the street to reach Ronnie?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you crossed the street was the envelope still being
handed or already handed to Ronnie?
A It was already handed to him.
Q What happened next?
A After I crossed the street somebody shouted at us identifying
himself as NBI, WE are from the NBI, do not move.
The foregoing testimony is contrary to the testimony of Ronnie
Romero. Romero said that Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter,
had asked him to meet a person in Makati who would give him
an envelope to be delivered to an unidentified person at the BF
Homes Subdivision in Paraaque. Romeros version is as follows:
[19]

ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q And do you know a certain person by the name of Redentor
Aguinaldo?
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q The accusation against you is that you conspired with your coaccused Arnold Pasicolan and Lito Marcelo in stealing the
articles and things stated in the Information. Why do you say
that you are not part of the conspiracy, what do you mean by
that statement?
A Because, sir, I do not know what was the contents of the
envelope.
You can proceed now.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q You mentioned of an envelope which you claim not to have
known the contents of the same. Who gave you the envelope?
A Arnold Pasicolan.
Q Do you know Arnold Pasicolan prior to and/or before February
17, 1989?
....
A No, sir.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q When for the first time did you come to know Arnold
Pasicolan?
A On February 17, sir.
Q When, where specifically did you come to know him?
A At the NBI office, sir.
Q Now...
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q February 17, 1989?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Proceed.
....
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Do you know a certain Redentor Aguinaldo?
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q Tell us the circumstances under which you received this
envelope?
A I received that envelope given to me by Arnold Pasicolan.
Q If you answer in monosyllable we will not understand. Alright,
you tell your story?
A Redentor Aguinaldo on February 17 told me that he is going to
give me a job. What I will do is get the envelope and bring it to a
certain subdivision in Las Pias and somebody will pick it up and
pay me P100.00 for it.
Proceed.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Now, do you know the person to whom you are to deliver the
envelope?
A No, sir.

Q Now, if you do now know the person to whom you will deliver
the envelope. JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
You may not cross-examine, tell him to tell us facts.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Where specifically in the subdivision in Paraaque where you
will deliver the envelope?
A BF Homes.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q To what particular person will you supposed to deliver it?
A I was just asked to go to that place and somebody will
approach me.
Q To make your story more believable, BF Homes in Paraaque
is a very big subdivision. You enter that subdivision and there
will be several persons whom you can see there. How will the
person know that you are carrying an envelope for him. Where
were you supposed to deliver it. If you cannot explain that, we
will not believe you?
A In that subdivision, there is a vacant place where there are no
houses. It is where I often go.
Q BF Homes subdivision in Paraaque has several vacant lots,
how will you know what vacant lot to proceed to?
A It was pointed to me by Aguinaldo.
Q So, Aguinaldo went with you in the morning of that same day
and pointed to you the place?
A In the morning of that same day and he pointed to me the
place.
Second. The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred
in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he
was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the
Constitution are invoked by petitioner:
Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
....
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his
co-accuseds names was not a mere mechanical act but one
which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes
self-incrimination. Petitioners counsel presumably has in mind
the ruling in Beltran v. Samson[20] to the effect that the prohibition
against compelling a man to be a witness against himself
extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with
the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention, [21] so it was
held.
To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is
different from the use of petitioners signature in this case. In that
case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting
matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been
falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of
the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for
securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely
to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and
Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and petitioners
signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from petitioner
were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help
establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are
actually evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his
co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III, 12(1)
and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, petitioner and his co-accused signed following their
arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial
investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant
way.[22] Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person

126

under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be
provided with one.
However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in
evidence. The letters were validly seized from petitioner and
Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioners
admission that the letters in question were those seized from
him and his companion on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in
evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the
letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the
fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these
letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and
his companion and seized from them was shown by the
testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his coaccused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures
found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the
testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON

and RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XVII, Kidapawan, Cotabato promulgated on September 15,
1995, declaring appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with
rape, and sentencing each of them to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, and ordering them to pay P30,000.00 and P10,000.00
in favor of Marites Alcantara and Cesario Alcantara, respectively.
The information filed on August 31, 1987 alleged:
That on or about the 24th day of March 1986, at about 10:00
oclock in the evening at Barangay Mateo, Municipality of
Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
JOEL JANSON, RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO in company
with alias ABDUL, alias PUTO, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,
who are still at large and whose names are still unknown,
constituting a band and armed with long and short firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain, with force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away, at gun
point, cash money in the amount of P1,400.00, three (3) pieces
of wrist watches, one (1) can coffee beans and one (1) chicken
and if converted into cash it amounted to P1,845.00 or a total
amount of Three Thousand Two Hundred Fourty (sic) Five
Pesos (P3,245.00), Philippine Currency, owned by Mr. & Mrs.
CESARIO ALCANTARA; and on the same occasion, the abovenamed accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation
and armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take turns in having carnal knowledge with one
MARITESS ALCANTARA, a girl about 13 years old, daughter of
Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA, against her will and consent,
to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid persons in the
aforesaid amount.
All contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, nighttime and the use of unlicensed firearms.
Kidapawan, Cotabato, August 31, 1987.[2]
On December 9, 1987, both accused pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial
then ensued.
For the prosecution, the following witnesses were presented:
Teresa Alcantara, Marites Alcantara, Dante Alcantara, Cesario
Alcantara, Dr. Cesar Manuel, Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, and police
officers Pedro Idpan, Jr. and Ortello Achas.
TERESA ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986 at about
10:00 in the evening, the accused with six (6) other companions
asked for food. She asked them to come back the following day
but they threatened to strafe and burn the house if they are not
let in. The accused then entered the house and once inside,
made all occupants lie down before covering them with a
blanket. The accused demanded money from Teresa and she
gave them P1,000. She was brought to the kitchen and
someone guarded her. For a while, there was complete
silence.Then she went inside the room of her daughter Marites,

and saw her totally naked. Her daughter told her that she was
raped. She gave an additional P1,000 to the accused who also
got two (2) wristwatches worth P690.00, two (2) Seiko watches
worth P443.00, a chicken worth approximately P20.00, and one
can of coffee beans. The appellants were speaking among
themselves in the Manobo dialect.
Teresa identified appellants Janson and Pinantao as two of the
men who robbed their house and raped her daughter that
night. She testified that she knew appellants since they were
their neighbors at Mateo. She also claimed that while Janson
and Pinantao were masked during the incident, she recognized
them through their body built, physical appearance, and their
voices while speaking in Manobo.[4]
MARITES[5] ALCANTARA testified that she was thirteen (13)
years old at the time of the incident. She corroborated the
testimony of her mother and added that after the group entered
their house and hogtied her father, the appellants entered her
room and turned off the lights inside. Someone poked a gun at
her. Then Ricky Pinantao, who had an amputated right hand;
Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona raped her. In open court she
identified appellants Pinantao and Janson as two of her abusers,
claiming that they were previously known to her. She claimed
that she knew Ricky because he was their neighbor and that he
often went to their house to buy bananas, while she knew Joel
because he often went to their barangay to visit his relatives.She
likewise claimed that while the appellants turned off the lights in
their house, there was a full moon that night which gave her
enough light to see her abusers. She immediately told her
parents that she was raped, and she underwent medical
examination the following day.[6]
DANTE ALCANTARA testified that on the day of the robbery he
was only nine (9) years old. He said he recognized appellants
Janson and Pinantao because they were their neighbors.On
cross-examination, he admitted that the four robbers were
masked, but the witness insisted that he was able to recognize
Pinantao with his cut wrist and mustache, and also Janson
because of his built.[7]
CESARIO ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986, their
house was robbed and his daughter was raped. He admitted
that during the incident, he was not able to identify the
perpetrators since he was hogtied face downwards, and he was
covered with a blanket.[8]
The prosecution also presented DR. CESAR MANUEL. He
testified that the physical examination he conducted on Marites
Alcantara a day after the incident revealed that there were
lacerations between the labia majora, labia minora, and the
prepuce caused by a sharp instrument. There was also the
presence of seminal fluid in the vagina of the victim indicating
that there was actual sexual contact.[9]
ATTY. JORGE ZERRUDO testified that he only assisted
appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel, and that the
sworn statement was already prepared when he signed
it.Nevertheless, he asked appellant Janson if the contents of the
statement were true, and whether he wished to be assisted by
counsel.[10]
P/SGT. PEDRO IDPAN, JR. testified that he was a member of
the Integrated National Police (INP), Kidapawan, Cotabato,
assigned in the investigation of the crime of robbery with rape
involving appellant Joel Janson. He identified Jansons sworn
statement saying it was signed by him without being forced. He
admitted that during the investigation, there was no lawyer
present and that Atty. Zerrudo signed the affidavit only after the
investigation was conducted. He claimed, however, that prior to
the custodial investigation, he informed Janson of his
constitutional rights and that despite being a Manobo, Janson
fully understood Cebuano,[11] which was the language used
during the custodial investigation.
Finally, P/SGT. ORTELLO ACHAS testified that he was at the
police station when Teresa Alcantara appeared on June 24,
1986, and requested that she be accompanied to the jail to
identify the person who was earlier apprehended and
detained. She identified the person as appellant Joel Janson. On
cross-examination, P/Sgt. Achas admitted that he was not the
one who conducted the investigation on the person of Joel
Janson and that he could not remember whether appellant
Janson who was then sixteen (16) years old and a Manobo was
assisted by a lawyer. Neither could he remember whether a
mental or physical examination was made upon Janson.[12]

127

For the defense, the following witnesses were presented: Datu

Amado Pinantao, Atty. Francis Palmones, Jr., and the two
appellants: Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao.
DATU AMADO PINANTAO testified that he is an uncle of Ricky
Pinantao, and that they belong to a cultural minority group, the
Manobos. He admitted that they lived near the house of Cesario
Alcantara. He said that on March 24, 1986, appellant Pinantao
was in their house and that it was impossible for him to be
elsewhere because earlier, in 1985, Pinantao was hacked by
one Bernardo Agio resulting in the amputation of Pinantaos
hand. He averred that Pinantao could not go out of their house
because at the time of the incident, the wound he sustained was
not yet completely healed.[13]
ATTY. FRANCIS PALMONES, JR., testified that he notarized the
sworn statement[14] of the appellant Janson on April 3, 1987,
marked as Exh. 4 and that Janson affirmed and understood the
contents of said affidavit because it was translated to him in the
Visayan vernacular.[15]
Appellant JOEL JANSON, for his own defense, declared that he
was assisted by a lawyer when he was investigated and made to
sign a sworn statement before the police on June 26, 1986. But
he denied the accusation against him and claimed that he was
not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation. He
claimed that he did not know how to read or write, and that he
was made to execute a sworn statement before a certain
policeman named Ulep. Only after the investigation did Atty.
Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-examination, he said that
he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.[16]
Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against
him, saying that he did not know Marites and Cesario
Alcantara. He claimed that he was arrested in March 1987
because he was implicated by appellant Janson as one of the
perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina Agio. [17]
On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby pronounces the accused Ricky
Pinantao alias Ogco and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly,
sentences Ricky Pinantao and Joel Janson each to undergo a
prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Marites
Alcantara the sum of P30,000.00; to indemnify Cesario
Alcantara the sum of P10,000.00. No award of other damages in
the absence of proof thereof.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Both appellants filed their notices of appeal and submitted
separate appellants briefs. Appellant Ricky Pinantao averred
that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF APPELLANT JOEL
JANSON, SAID EVIDENCE BEING INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE
IT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN
AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED RICKY PINANTAO, UNDER
THEINTER ALIOS ACTA RULE AS AGAINST HIS COACCUSED RICKY PINANTAO EITHER FOR PROBABLE
CAUSE AND THE RESULTANT CONVICTION OF RICKY
PINANTAO;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES OF THE
ALCANTARA FAMILY WHICH WERE SHOT THROUGH WITH
MATERIAL CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND
UNNATURAL TESTIMONIES; and
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
AND THAT IN FACT THERE WAS A REASONABLE DOUBT IN
THE IDENTITIES AND GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED.[19]
Appellant Joel Janson, for his part, averred that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSEDAPPELLANT JOEL JANSON WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT JOEL JANSON GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF

ROBBERY WITH RAPE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION
TO
PROVE
HIS
GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[20]
Simply put, the issues in this case are as follows: (1) Was the
guilt of appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond
reasonable doubt? (2) Is the extrajudicial confession of Janson
admissible as evidence for the prosecution? and (3) May said
confession be used against co-accused Pinantao?
We find the appeal impressed with merit. Appellants should be
acquitted.
Generally, the findings of the trial court concerning credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had
the opportunity to observe closely in the first instance the
demeanor of the witnesses presented before it. [21] However,
when the trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant
contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if considered
would materially affect the result of the conviction, such findings
will not bind this Court.[22] Such is the case at hand.
Consistent with the testimonies of Teresa, Marites, Cesario, and
Dante Alcantara, we can gather that what transpired that fateful
night is as follows:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house
of Cesario Alcantara threatening to strafe and burn it should they
not be let in. Once inside, the masked group of men turned off
the lights, hogtied Cesario, pushed him facedown and covered
him with blankets. They asked for money and Teresa gave
them P400.[23] Teresa was then led to the kitchen.During this
time, her daughter Marites was raped[24] by four men. Then
Marites was led to the kitchen where the culprits threatened to
abduct her if her mother would not give them money.Teresa then
gave them an additional P1,000 while the group took three
wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one chicken. Then they left
the house, all the while speaking in the Manobo dialect.[25]
While the testimonies of the witnesses up to this point are
credible and undisputed, it is unfortunate that the certainty ends
here.
Marites testified in open court that she was raped by Ricky alias
Ogco Pinantao, Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona.[26] She said that
she came to know Ricky Pinantao because he is a neighbor and
that he often goes to their house to buy bananas. She also said
that she came to know Joel Janson because he is always going
to Mateo since he has a relative there.[27]
Upon cross-examination, however, Marites admitted that she
was not certain of the identity of her perpetrators at the time of
the incident or immediately thereafter. According to her, it was
only after Joel Janson was apprehended for another crime, and
after he confessed to the police, that she was able to confirm her
suspicion. When asked in open court, she was not able to
satisfactorily explain the discrepancy in her initial sworn
statement before the police and her testimony later.
Pertinent portions of her testimony in court are instructive:
Q: Was this Ricky Pinantao armed when he entered your room?
A: No sir, he wasnt.
Q: Where (sic) you afraid of him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Knowing that, according to you, you know him, did you not
question him, Ricky, why are you doing this to me?
A: I did not because I was only suspecting.[28]
xxx
Q: Is it not Marites, to refresh your memory, is it not that when a
sworn statement was taken from your (sic), you stated in your
affidavit that you did not recognize anybody?
A: That was what I stated in my statement.[29]
xxx
Q: Miss Marites, in this sworn statement of yours, which was
already marked as Exhibit E for the prosecution and Exhibit 1 for
the defense, there is a question here: Can you recognized (sic)
any of the four men or any of the six men that robbed and raped
you? [you answered, I do not know anyone sir. Now] in your
testimony here, you said that you know the two accused, how
will you reconcile this one?
A: It is like this, what I am telling now in Court is the one true,
during that time, when the statement was taken on me (sic), I
have already suspect in my mind and I could not tell their names
but there were some evidence that dovetailed in my mind, like,
the cut wrist of the one perpetrator, Ricky Pinantao and the
mustache. And these are the things that I recall.

128

Q: Now, how come that you did not tell the police of the
perpetrators during that time of investigation?
A: Sir, it is very hard to name names during that time when a
statement was taken on me. But when this Joel Janson was first
apprehended, it was confirmed by his statement to the
policeman. (sic)[30]
xxx
Q: So, when Joel Janson was apprehended, that was the time
you confirmed that he was the perpetrator?
A: xxx Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Therefore, you failed to recognize Joel Janson during said
time of the incident?
A: I knew him through his body built.
xxx
Q: So, you merely assumed that Joel Janson is one of those
persons who robbed you, because of the aforesaid statement,
that his alleged statement in the police?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: According to you, you have confirmed your suspicion of this
Joel Janson after he was apprehended?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the same manner you confirmed your suspicion of Ricky
Pinantao after he was apprehended?
A: He himself revealed. Aside from that I already suspected
because of his cut wrist and his mustache.[31] (emphasis ours)
While
courts
generally brush
aside
inconsequential
contradictions between declarations of the affiant in her sworn
statements and those in court, the rule is otherwise where the
discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable facts such
as those omissions in the affidavit concerning important details
which the affiant would not have failed to mention and which
omission could well affect the credibility of the affiant. [32] If
indeed, the victim recognized one of her assailants as Ricky
Pinantao because of his amputated hand, she should have
mentioned such glaring trait the first time she gave her
statement to the investigating officers. But she never mentioned
anything. On the contrary, she admitted that she did not
recognize any of her assailants. She also admitted that it was
only after Joel Janson was apprehended and confessed to the
crime, implicating Ricky Pinantao, that she confirmed
her suspicion.
The testimony of Teresa Alcantara is also riddled with
uncertainties:
Q: How many day had lapsed (sic) before you reported the
incident to the police?
A: Three months after the incident.
xxx
Q: Will you please explain why you reported the incident after
three months?
A: It was only upon hearing through radio DXND the name of
this person Joel Janson who was reported to have robbed the
corn of a certain Atty. Jalipa, that I reported to the police.
Q: That was the only reason why you reported to the police after
three months already?
A: It is like this: After hearing that, I went to the police right then
and there. I saw this Joel Janson who was the person among
those who raped my daughter and entered our house.
Q: If you knew already that Joel Janson was among those
persons who robbed you, why did you not report to the police
immediately?
A: The following morning, I immediately reported, sir.
Q: And you gave sworn statement before the police on the
following morning?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: Of course, this Joel Janson was unmasked when those six
men came to your house?
A: This Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao were the one (sic)
wearing mask.
Q: In other words, during the incident you failed to recognize
outright who were those persons masked?
A: I identified them through their body built and voice because
they were speaking Manobo.
Q: But you identified them because of their voice?
A: Voice and bodybuilt.
Q: But of course, you did not actually see the face of Joel
Janson?

A: How can I see when he is masked.

xxx
Q: You only mentioned his (Joel Jansons) name (to the police)
after you heard his name over the DXND?
A: Yes...[33] (emphasis ours)
What stands out in the testimonies of the victims is that they
were uncertain of the identities of the masked men who
committed the robbery and rape that night and anchored their
suspicion on the alleged confession of Joel Janson. This
confession, however, is itself inadmissible for failing to meet the
constitutional requirements for admissibility.
The lawyer who allegedly assisted Joel Janson in the waiver of
his right to counsel, Atty. Zerrudo, testified:
Q: In other words, this sworn statement marked Exhibit B was
already typewritten and prepared when it was brought to you by
the police?
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.[34]
xxx
Q: But before he was brought to your office allegedly to assist
him in his waiving of his right, he was already subjected to
investigation as this sworn statement was already prepared?
A: That is true, but not signed.
Q: Of course he was not assisted because he was already
subjected to police investigation in his waiving of his
constitutional rights?
A: May be, I am not sure about that. That was may be, that was
already prepared when they came to my office but only
unsigned.
Q: What was prepared, the whole investigation or this entire part
or that part of waiving his rights?
A: As far as I can remember, it was already prepared, Your
Honor.[35]
xxx
Q: Atty. Zerrudo, we are clear to the fact that this document was
already prepared before when it was brought to your office?
A: Yes, sir.[36] (emphasis ours)
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, also
admitted in open court that the sworn statement of appellant
Joel Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that
this statement together with the waiver of his right to counsel,
was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for
signing.
As shown by the transcript:
Q: But the accused during the investigation was not assisted by
counsel, is that right?
A: At the time when I conducted the investigation, the counsel is
not yet present.
Q: In other words, during the conduct of the investigation there
was no counsel being present assisting the accused Joel
Janson?
A: None, sir.
Q: So in all the sworn statement of the accused Joel Janson
made earlier was made without the assistance of counsel? (sic)
A: When I prepared the investigation I advised him to get a
counsel of his own choice but the counsel was not yet present.
Q: He was not assisted by counsel during the conduct of the
investigation?
A: Yes, sir.
Court : What do you mean, Sergeant, Atty. Zerrudo was not yet
present?
A: When I conducted the investigation, Atty. Zerrudo was not
present.
xxx
Court: He signed it after the investigation?
A: The prepared testimony.
Court: After the investigation?
A: After the investigation.[37] (emphasis ours)
Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel
Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner by which it
was obtained violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled
confession or admission and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against
the confessant.[38]
As provided for in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel

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preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the

services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.
In People v. Javar,[39] this Court was clear in pronouncing that
any statement obtained in violation of the Constitution, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain
of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it
becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. [40] In People v.
Gomez,[41] citing People v. Rodrigueza,[42] this Court held that
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the
assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he
waives the right to counsel.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence,
a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.[43]
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting
confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the
accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided
is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the
very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict
him. These constitutional guarantees have been made available
to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not
physical, atmosphere of such investigation. [44]
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to
counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,
made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel, [45]and
it must be in writing. Indeed, any waiver of the right to counsel
without the assistance of counsel has no evidentiary value.[46]
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to
counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Appellant Joel
Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the
time of the offense. As held in the case of People v. Bonola,
[47]
where the accused was unschooled and only nineteen (19)
years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe that considering
the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his
right to counsel. In such instances, the need for counsel is more
pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers
already had a prepared statement when they went to the lawyer
who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right
to counsel.
This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato,
Jr.,[48] where the police officers already prepared the affidavits of
the accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO)
lawyer, and the latter explained the contents of the affidavits
in Visayan to the accused who affirmed the veracity and
voluntary execution of the same, the court held that the affidavits
are inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily
given. As also ruled in People v. Compil,[49] the belated arrival of
the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual
signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect
of lack of counsel for the investigators were already able to

extract incriminatory statements from the accused therein. Thus,

in People v. De Jesus,[50] we said that admissions obtained
during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel,
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of
counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution.
As pointed out in People v. Deniega,[51] if the lawyers role is
reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a
priorly prepared document albeit indicating therein compliance
with the accuseds constitutional rights, the constitutional
standard is not met.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot
be used against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial confession by
an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless
repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity for the
co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial
statements. It is considered hearsay as against said co-accused
under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another.[52]
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court finding Janson and Pinantao guilty of the
crime of robbery with rape fails to persuade us that appellants
have been adequately identified as the perpetrators of the
heinous offense. In our view, to affirm that judgment of
conviction on the basis of contradictory testimony of prosecution
witnesses and the flawed extrajudicial confession of appellant
Joel Janson is to sanction a possible miscarriage of justice.
What befell the Alcantara family, particularly to Marites, is
abhorrent and should be condemned. But after due reflection
and deliberation, we still find difficulty in sustaining the trial
courts conclusion regarding appellants guilt because of
inconclusive identification. Doubts persist in our mind as to who
are the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense has been
perpetrated, but who are the perpetrators? How we wish we had
DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts! But we have
only uncertain testimonies to rely on. It is only when the
conscience is satisfied that the persons on trial are the ones who
committed the offense that the judgment should be for
conviction. Only when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
can we be certain that, after trial, only those responsible should
be made answerable.[53] The evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [54] In
this exacting standard, the prosecution failed. It follows that the
judgment of the lower court convicting appellants ought to be set
aside for failure to meet the quantum of evidence constitutionally
required.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, Branch XVII, in Criminal Case No. 2016
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Joel Janson
and Ricky Pinantao are ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable
doubt, and ordered released from prison unless they are being
held for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is
DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report to this
Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

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