G.R. No.

79269

June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City
Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated
July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 for Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for
reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying
petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow
petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be
denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be
waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which was filed on 24 October 1986, private
respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of
rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as
follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until the
present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the
Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National
Democratic Front with its other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction
and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the aforenamed accused, and with
the aid, participation or support of members and followers whose whereabouts and identities are
still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the country against the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat
of which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to that government and its
laws, the country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying
property or committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose,
such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had
earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture.4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for
private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court 5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in
detail, was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties
under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court
having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled
and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished,6 to which petitioner filed an Opposition7 citing, among other

grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009,
private respondent categorically conceded that:
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Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987,8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for
bail,9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the ground that since
rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those
who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his
guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996,
942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed
before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24)
which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 198711 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private
respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the
first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the offense of
rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to
Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses before final
judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation
to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the present circumstances in this case, said
accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion
ceased to be a capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent
considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all
vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return
to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes
his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-capital
offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the prosecution, "the
existence of the government that bestows the right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to
state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of the rights of the
individual, civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed by the Constitution against
impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action. Emphasis is placed on the dignity of
man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of certain inherent and inalienable rights of
the individual, which the government is prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now
pictured by the prosecution, the same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the
eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State.
Anyway, the government is that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and the
wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly society
and its existing civil and political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded
that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further
disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a
reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an
accused is entitled as a matter of light to bail.Dura est lex sed lex.

In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to increase
the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular No. 10
dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an amount computed at
P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and
explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent "had in the past escaped
from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator has achieved his
end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is
attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the court to
deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the
"inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail to appear in
court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are widely known by
the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented
a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity
and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court for
trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers, are now engaged in
an open warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens the existence of this very Court from
which he now seeks provisional release," and that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of
Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former
prevails for "the right of the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United
States of America holding "that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings, 14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated
until trial as he presents a risk of flight;15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with
serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to
the community which no condition of release can dispel. 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order 17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the "supplemental"
motion for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first motion for
reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of bail is concerned and hereby
reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the additional condition that accused
Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of
every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the
"sudden turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration
wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to increase the amount of
bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May
1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the cases involved deportation of
aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of an accused
to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail; and quoted the concurring

opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez
vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following
issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT
OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL
TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail,
having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his
co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is
not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious threat to the very existence
of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present evidence for the denial of bail.
Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he did not allow petitioner to
present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that
the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it
never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if release on
bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00
only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of private respondents' criminal background, the
gravity of the pending charge, and the likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued
a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing his
order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION
PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NONEXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT
ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987.22
In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November 24 and 23 November 198725 petitioner
and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that the petition and reply
be considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the Memorandum for private
respondent, which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November 1987 26 and 1 December
1987,27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on the
issues raised in this petitions,28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May
199029 wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent Judge
of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent
had waived the light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail to him is
accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against him which would
be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of whatever amount"; and
application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on
the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains
that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied
by respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for
bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private
respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail
Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as
originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the
governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged
with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the
penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the right is
absolute.32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the
accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in the
amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of
the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the security of the State so requires, and
because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is
strong, We held:

. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican
state, like ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public
safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system
that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the
Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11),
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several
aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's
ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of
the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released,
they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt
is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many states provide that
all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the
proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a
matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in
the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital
offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof is great! 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in
the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail.35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the
fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not
matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170
SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial
thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable byprision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved
on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of general
circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:

Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. Any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or
insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to
its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5
of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No.
76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his
co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida
Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the
petition be given due course and a writ ofhabeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to
produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-accused before the Court and explain
by what authority they arrested and detained them. The following proceedings took place
thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required respondents to
make a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition
for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To
The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs.
Mercado", and Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the military
on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave.,
Mangga being leaders or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People's
Army and National Democratic Front, organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government through violent means, and having actually committed acts of rebellion under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest they were forthwith charged with
rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their arrest were issued and respondents continue to
detain them because of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the criminal cases against
them. Respondents further allege that, contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private
respondent was not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the
Government; neither is he and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe
conduct pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements
reached between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and
William Chua appeared for the petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor General
Ordoez arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in conformity
with the agreement reached with the government, the petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody, whereas his codetainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.

Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing
statement made by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition
for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed to the immediate release
of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be required
of them, but they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further,
that they will not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the trial court
provided that they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel today relative to
the compromise agreement that they have previously undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as
member of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have agreed
to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered their
immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and required
both parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00 o'clock this
afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation
and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S.
Villanueva, counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel, and
to this Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordoez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were conducted to
find out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and human considerations may be
called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at
the trial of the criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal
Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region) filed against them under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation before the
Supreme Court that they will submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction
over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the
Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and
their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on October
14 and the present manifestation in compliance with the resolution announced in court
this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas,
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio

Saldajeno] considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed
by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva
as counsel for respondents which states that they have entered into an agreement
whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial
of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No.
4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed
against them, on their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the
warrant of arrest for the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of the formal manifestation before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said
agreement, the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS
the petition for habeas corpus but subject to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel,
Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to
ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee,C.J., is on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during
the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail." 37 Upon the other
hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their
petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention
of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not resolved by this Court or by
the compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further determination in another proceeding.
Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by either party nor resolved by this Court, and
the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent after the agreement was reached, like the filing of
the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and
positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not only provisional but final and
permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint
Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of
the law or in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the
detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing or
person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320
and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence,
the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail
should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the
court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his copetitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they
agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should
be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court
having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the
persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement
that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise,
or had this been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a
clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested before this Court
on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against private
respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the
agreement that herein petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:

. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term
"in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the
person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty.40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed;
the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the
intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it."41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
"waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution,provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual,
are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and
the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage
of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity,
if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitutionmay be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver
will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy
or morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal
liberty are subjects of waiver.42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the
state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused,
which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of
the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will."44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;45 the right to counsel and to remain silent;46 and the right to be
heard.47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights.1wphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:

. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests
that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend
Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1072

(OCA I.P.I. No. 95-34-MTJ)

January 31, 1996

DANIEL MAMOLO, SR., complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROGELIO R. NARISMA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Br. 1, Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao
del Sur,respondent.
DECISION
In his letter to the Secretary of Justice dated 6 June 1994 and endorsed by the Department of Justice to
the Office of the Court Administrator on 8 July 1994 for appropriate action complainant Daniel Mamolo Sr.
seeks an independent investigation concerning the immediate grant of bail allegedly without hearing by
respondent Judge Rogelio R. Narisma, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Br. 1, Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao,
to accused Antonio Balagot in Crim. Case No. 1765(94)-B who was charged with the capital offense of
murder.
On 16 May 1994 a criminal complaint for murder was filed against Antonio Balagot and Ariel Acha before
the MCTC of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, for the murder of Daniel Mamolo, Jr., son of
complainant, docketed as Crim. Case No. 1765(94)-B. After Judge Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the
requisite preliminary examination he issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against the accused.
Respondent Judge recommended no bail since murder is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was
strong. Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered to the PC Provincial Command in Cotabato.
Subsequently, Balagot through counsel filed a Petition For Admission to Bail and set the same for hearing
on 25 May 1994. At the scheduled hearing defense counsel informed the court that Balagot was ill and
asked the court to dispense with the submission of his petition and, instead, to allow Balagot to be treated
at the hospital.
Complainant claims that despite the fact that respondent Judge recommended no bail for both accused
he nevertheless allowed Balagot to put a bail of P150,000.00 without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to present its evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.
Complainant also avers that on several occasions he saw respondent Judge and counsel for accused
Balagot together and engaged in a series of private talks at a nearby restaurant. Complainant also alleges
that respondent's highly irregular actuation led him (complainant) to entertain thoughts on "How much
was the reason why the Petition for the Admission to Bail was secretly and favorably granted over the
objection of the prosecution much less giving (the prosecution) a chance to present the evidence of guilt."
On the other hand, respondent Judge asserts that he approved Balagot's Petition for Admission to
Bail after conducting a hearing on 25 May 1994 and upon the Manifestation of 2nd Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Quiones that he was submitting the resolution of the petition to the sound discretion of the
court.
Respondent denies having received anything from accused Balagot, pointing out that the
prosecution's Traverse To the Petition for Admission to Bail was not filed in court and therefore was not
appreciated in resolving the petition; and, that the prosecution did not appeal the order granting bail.
Respondent Judge likewise denies having met and talked to counsel for Balagot on several occasions.
He admits however that he saw counsel only once at an eatery while taking his lunch and that counsel
merely inquired then within hearing distance of several persons whether the petition for bail could be filed
in the municipal court, so that respondent was constrained to talk to counsel as the latter was already in
front of him.
In his Memorandum of 21 July 1995, approved by Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pao, Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez found that respondent Judge disregarded procedural due process in
granting bail to the accused. He opined that the prosecution's waiver to present evidence ought to have
prompted respondent Judge "to ask the prosecution to present its witnesses at another date set for the
purpose (of asking) clarificatory questions from which he may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt of

the accused." DCA Suarez then submitted the instant case to the Court upon finding no further necessity
for an extended investigation. He also informed the Court that respondent Judge was on 3 July 1995
appointed RTC Judge of Br. 23, Kidapawan, North Cotabato.
We agree with OCA's evaluation. The procedure of conducting a hearing on the application for admission
to bail should provide the basis for judges to determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or
strong. In the case at bench, while respondent conducted a hearing on Balagot's petition for bail such
proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of
the petition. A review of the TSN of the 25 May 1994 hearing1 reveals that only the amount of bail was
discussed after an impasse on the plea regarding the confinement of the accused
Atty. Palmones (counsel for accused):
Another proposal we are submitting for consideration by this Hon. Court and the prosecution:
accused is willing to put up bond for his temporary liberty in the amount of P100,000.00 just to
assure the court and the prosecution that the accused will face charges against him.
Prosecutor Quiones:
I will first consult my head of office regarding the proposal of the accused.
Court:
You raise that to P200,000.00.
Atty. Palmones:
As a matter of fact we are ready with our property bond. What we are prepared to post is
P150,000.00.
Court:
That might soften the heart of Fiscal Quiones.
Prosecutor Quiones:
May I be allowed to consult my chief this afternoon. I think we can consider that proposal.
Nowhere in the transcript of the hearing do we find questions propounded by respondent Judge verifying
the strength of the prosecution's evidence. In Payao v. Lesaca2 we stressed that in a bail hearing the
judge is under legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether evidence of guilt
is so strong as to warrant denial of bail.
In justifying his grant of bail respondent claims that he afforded the prosecution the chance to present
evidence but the latter submitted the resolution of the petition to the sound discretion of the court without
presenting additional evidence.
The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot excuse respondent's disregard of his peremptory duty. It
is worthy to note that in the resumption of the hearing in the afternoon of 25 May 1994 the prosecution
prefaced its submission with a statement of its "serious vehement objection to the petition for bail." Such
manifestation ought to have alerted respondent of the next appropriate steps in resolving the petition.
In Borinaga v. Tamin3 we delineated a clear guideline on the exercise of judicial discretion in hearing
petitions for bail
. . . (w)hile the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, this discretion by the nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence
is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in
custody in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to

introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied of
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the
court granting bail should be considered void on that ground . . . (E)ven where the prosecutor
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask
the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or judge
the adequacy of the amount of bail . . .
The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic, fundamental procedure cannot be lightly
overlooked. As correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by respondent constitutes gross ignorance of
the law since it resulted in depriving the prosecution the time-tested and enduring procedural due
process.
It is an oft-repeated dictum that a judge should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. For the role of judges in the administration of justice requires a continuous
study of the law and jurisprudence.4 Indubitably, the industry of a judge in keeping abreast with the law
and court rulings will enhance the faith of our people in the administration of justice since litigants will be
confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
WHEREFORE, for his failure to afford procedural due process to the prosecution in the grant of bail to the
accused in Crim. Case No. 1765(94)-B while then the MCTC Judge of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del
Sur, Judge Rogelio R. Narisma, now RTC Judge, Br. 23, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, is FINED
P20,000.00 which he is required to pay within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same act or the commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148571

September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
DECISION
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for
their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is
"No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this
Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently
and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION
PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent
in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking
of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented

by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the
Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a
vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to
file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was
docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject
of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April
15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 9900281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation
of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire
fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections
441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the
trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed
to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted
the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4,
2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee
before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on
provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for
such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4,
Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as
bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant
of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a
well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by
the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589,
relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the
subject bail orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice
and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the
alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We
shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive
issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion
would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis
therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues
and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues
resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the
Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below
refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same
attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of
Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would
resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus,

cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court
has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This
rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is
involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the
questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed
upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
when there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in
the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest
because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would
only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched
in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of
the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus,
and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the
law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to
its intent. 25Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which
the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly
deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the
only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should
be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of
criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of
detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime
within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence
of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is
to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government.
More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this
irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with
other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept
and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized
representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is
sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of
an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding

allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence
to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has
the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings
will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with
the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve
the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the
other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world
community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions
precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of
the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the
surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it
be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that
the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning
that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to
avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him,
given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue: Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant
of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may
set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers
and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.

On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of
his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law
or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for
extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the
presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
[H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any
where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time
fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of
a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts
and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency
and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true
and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney
in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2)
Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes
charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of
the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4)
Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed
Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate
for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be
arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the
extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee."
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.
Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the
accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing
at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point
that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans
to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step
in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less
reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is
no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon
which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing
before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant
with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in
his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at

all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b)
they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At
his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of
the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer
the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best
serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged
with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the
relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as
practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according
to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the
right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and

distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be
deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always
call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an
extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges
independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply
for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the
due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He
already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to
resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process
that he had previously shunned pales against the governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
"[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be
carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to
increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the
absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to
bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be
a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article
14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the
requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary
nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is
broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling

circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting
state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is
basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should
be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea
of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the
Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into
a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations
are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against
their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered
and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be
unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize
that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the
extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence.
Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the
accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is
quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely
anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of
bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of
bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to
stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the
preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not
flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to
mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the
applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied.
In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which
may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a
cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents
claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners application for an arrest
warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately
filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda
and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a
procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the
Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this
Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by
private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court
would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous
pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he

realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the
factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not
solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting
Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed
upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only
further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be
summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case
is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say
that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and
fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed
in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the
hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person
sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in
bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the
criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to
police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped
bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether
it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to
personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the
judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or
her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and
no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is
sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and
the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority
and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs
of government.

8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "overdue process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not
only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good
faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all
deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as
well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1)
the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and
(2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001
filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent
judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense
of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining
the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on
April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 9995733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent
filed, in the same case,-a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733.
It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing
private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for
bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in
the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time
that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on
bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings
for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot
ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in
public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries
to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of

international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past
century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have
been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the
other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained
in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are
part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is
in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to
secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the
prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as
a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a
criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions
relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the
finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition"
as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty
of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt
or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a
crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention
of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt
of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated
until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such
an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings.
In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.
However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are

guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is
a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 114
Bail

Section 1. Bail defined. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash
deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force
at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of these
Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice
shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed
in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking
and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months
showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)
Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. No person under detention by legal
process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
(3a)
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter
of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused,
of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a)
Section 6. Capital offense defined. A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (6a)
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (7a)
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon
motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is
dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. (8a)
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application
shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
Section 10. Corporate surety. Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in accordance
with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the
accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. (10a)
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the
real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the
bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Register
of Deeds if the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided
therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding
tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall
be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and detention. (11a)

Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. The qualification of sureties in a property bond
shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the
undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in
the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of
bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all
just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution. (12a)
Section 13. Justification of sureties. Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the judge that
he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given
as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered
into by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath
concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the
surety is qualified. (13a)
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in
cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of
bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money
deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if
any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. (14a)
Section 15. Recognizance. Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release a person
in custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a)
Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. No bail shall be required when the
law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to
the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused
may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for
the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the
court. (16a)
Section 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also
be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether
on preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)

Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule,
the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation. (18a)
Section 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge
with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail
shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the
case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed. (19a)
Section 20. Increase or reduction of bail. After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon
good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to
custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to
answer a criminal charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at
any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be
required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody. (20a)
Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these
Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the
accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given
thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally,
for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen,
unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)
Section 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor,
the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bond. (22a)
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen
may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be
arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (23a)
Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. No bail shall be allowed after the judgment of
conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused has applies for probation, he may be
allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one,
the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (24a)
Section 25. Court supervision of detainees. The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in
custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial
Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and their
prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on
their proper accommodation and health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order

the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to
confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or municipal
circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in their respective
municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
therein.
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court Administrator
which shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for more than thirty (30) days,
the duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the cause for detention, and other
pertinent information. (25a)
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation.
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest
or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of
a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his
plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the
case. (n)