MIDTERM CASES PRINCIPLES:

EPSA V. CHR
*cited the case of Carino
ISSUE:
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or
restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel
them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?
HELD:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law"
FABELLA V. CA
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents were
denied due process of law.
RULING:
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor,
and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent

jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged

administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[13]
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not
include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension
or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative
of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have
given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[14]
LEPANTO V. CA
Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the
right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in
granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue
of its constitutional rule-making powers.
VAR ORIENT V. ACACOSO
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners allegation that they were
denied due process because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard (Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side

(Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. v.

Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister
of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72
SCRA 388).
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, it was
agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda
and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision (Annex 7 of
Bunyogs Comment). This procedure is authorized by law to expedite
the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private respondents
submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the
respondents filed a motion to resolve (Annex 7, Bunyogs Comment).
The petitioners counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve"
or the respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated October
19, 1987 (Annex 10), both of which were furnished them through
counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been
denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should
have opposed both motions.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
UP BOARD OF REGENTS V CA
In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent's petition
precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals
reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however,
various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that
private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the
investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any
criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private
respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too
many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all
resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in

submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was

conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a
chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27 A
party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot
tenably claim to have been denied due process.28
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges
against her29 and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked
to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September
25, 1993.30Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and
the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In
addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her
position.31
VICTORIAS MILLING
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, PPA enacted Administrative
Order No. 13-77 precisely to govern, among others, appeals from PPA
decisions. It is now finally settled that administrative rules and
regulations issued in accordance with law, like PPA Administrative
Order No. 13-77, have the force and effect of law (Valerio vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719;
Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, et al., 17 SCRA 316; and
Macailing vs. Andrada, 31 SCRA 126), and are binding on all
persons dealing with that body.
NICOLAS v. DESIERTO
Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative
liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot
always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the
latters own negligence.29 While Arriola might have been negligent in
accepting the spurious documents, such fact does not automatically
imply that Nicolas was also. As a matter of course, the latter relied on

the formers recommendation. Petitioner is not mandated or even

expected to verify personally from the Bureau of Customs or from
wherever else it originated each receipt or document that appears on
its face to have been regularly issued or executed.
FORTICH V CORONA
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of
petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an
error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
[36]
This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.17 They must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as
with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute
and an administrative order, the former must prevail.18

[37]

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments,

final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising
quasi-judicial functions,[38] including the Office of the President,
[39]
may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition
for review[40] within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment,
final order or resolution,[41] whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]
SMART V NTC
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers.16
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate,
which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of

an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary
for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.19
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies
only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was

performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the

assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.