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The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced
when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another
corporation. Where badges of fraud exist; where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction
or the notion of legal entity should come to naught. The law in these instances
will regard the corporation as a mere association of persons and, in case of
two corporations, merge them into one.
Thus, where a sister corporation is used as a shield to evade a
corporations subsidiary liability for damages, the corporation may not be
heard to say that it has a personality separate and distinct from the other
corporation. The piercing of the corporate veil comes into play.
This special civil action ostensibly raises the question of whether the
National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
when it issued a break-open order to the sheriff to be enforced against
personal property found in the premises of petitioners sister company.
Petitioner Concept Builders, Inc., a domestic corporation, with principal
office at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, is engaged in the
construction business. Private respondents were employed by said company
as laborers, carpenters and riggers.
On November, 1981, private respondents were served individual written
notices of termination of employment by petitioner, effective on November 30,
1981. It was stated in the individual notices that their contracts of employment
had expired and the project in which they were hired had been completed.
Public respondent found it to be, the fact, however, that at the time of the
termination of private respondents employment, the project in which they were
hired had not yet been finished and completed. Petitioner had to engage the
services of sub-contractors whose workers performed the functions of private
respondents.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice and non-payment of their legal holiday pay, overtime pay
and thirteenth-month pay against petitioner.
On December 19, 1984, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering
petitioner to reinstate private respondents and to pay them back wages
equivalent to one year or three hundred working days.
1
On October 29, 1986, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing
the sheriff to execute the Decision, dated December 19, 1984. The writ was
partially satisfied through garnishment of sums from petitioners debtor, the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, in the amount of
P81,385.34. Said amount was turned over to the cashier of the NLRC.
On February 1, 1989, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued by the Labor
Arbiter directing the sheriff to collect from herein petitioner the sum of
P117,414.76, representing the balance of the judgment award, and to
reinstate private respondents to their former positions.
On July 13, 1989, the sheriff issued a report stating that he tried to serve
the alias writ of execution on petitioner through the security guard on duty but
the service was refused on the ground that petitioner no longer occupied the
premises.
On September 26, 1986, upon motion of private respondents, the Labor
Arbiter issued a second alias writ of execution.
The said writ had not been enforced by the special sheriff because, as
stated in his progress report, dated November 2, 1989:
1. All the employees inside petitioners premises at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, claimed that they were employees of Hydro Pipes Philippines, Inc.
(HPPI) and not by respondent;
On the other hand, the General Information Sheet of HPPI revealed the
following:
1. Breakdown of Subscribed Capital
Name of Stockholder Amount Subscribed
Antonio W. Lim P400,000.00
Elisa C. Lim 57,700.00
AWL Trading 455,000.00
10
11
12
The conditions under which the juridical entity may be disregarded vary
according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and
fast rule can be accurately laid down, but certainly, there are some probative
factors of identity that will justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, to wit:
1. Stock ownership by one or common ownership of both corporations.
2. Identity of directors and officers.
3. The manner of keeping corporate books and records.
13
The SEC en banc explained the instrumentality rule which the courts have
applied in disregarding the separate juridical personality of corporations as
follows:
Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so
that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the
corporate entity of the instrumentality may be disregarded. The control necessary to
invoke the rule is not majority or even complete stock control but such domination of
finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no
separate mind, will or existence of its own, and is but a conduit for its principal. It
must be kept in mind that the control must be shown to have been exercised at the time
the acts complained of took place. Moreover, the control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for which the complaint is made.
The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction is as follows:
1. Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction
attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate
mind, will or existence of its own;
2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and
unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal rights; and
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or
unjust loss complained of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil. in
applying the instrumentality or alter ego doctrine, the courts are concerned with
reality and not form, with how the corporation operated and the individual defendants
relationship to that operation.
14
In this case, the NLRC noted that, while petitioner claimed that it ceased
its business operations on April 29, 1986, it filed an Information Sheet with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 15, 1987, stating that its office
address is at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On the other
hand, HPPI, the third-party claimant, submitted on the same day, a similar
information sheet stating that its office address is at 355 Maysan Road,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Furthermore, the NLRC stated that:
Both information sheets were filed by the same Virgilio O. Casino as the corporate
secretary of both corporations. It would also not be amiss to note that both
corporations had the same president, the same board of directors, the same corporate
officers, and substantially the same subscribers.
From the foregoing, it appears that, among other things, the respondent (herein
petitioner) and the third-party claimant shared the same address and/or premises.
Under this circumstances, (sic) it cannot be said that the property levied upon by the
sheriff were not of respondents.
16
Respondent courts findings that indeed the Claparols Steel and Nail Plant, which
ceased operation of June 30, 1957, was SUCCEEDED by the Claparols Steel
Corporation effective the next day, July 1, 1957, up to December 7, 1962, when the
latter finally ceased to operate, were not disputed by petitioner. it is very clear that
the latter corporation was a continuation and successor of the first entity x x x. Both
predecessors and successor were owned and controlled by petitioner Eduardo
Claparols and there was no break in the succession and continuity of the same
business. This avoiding-the-liability scheme is very patent, considering that 90% of
the subscribed shares of stock of the Claparols Steel Corporation (the second
corporation) was owned by respondent x x x Claparols himself, and all the assets of
the dissolved Claparols Steel and Nail Plant were turned over to the emerging
Claparols Steel Corporation.
It is very obvious that the second corporation seeks the protective shield of
a corporate fiction whose veil in the present case could, and should, be
pierced as it was deliberately and maliciously designed to evade its financial
obligation to its employees.
In view of the failure of the sheriff, in the case at bar, to effect a levy upon
the property subject of the execution, private respondents had no other
recourse but to apply for a break-open order after the third-party claim of HPPI
was dismissed for lack of merit by the NLRC. This is in consonance with
Section 3, Rule VII of the NLRC Manual of Execution of Judgment which
provides that:
Should the losing party, his agent or representative, refuse or prohibit the Sheriff or
his representative entry to the place where the property subject of execution is located
or kept, the judgment creditor may apply to the Commission or Labor Arbiter
concerned for a break-open order.
Furthermore, our perusal of the records shows that the twin requirements
of due notice and hearing were complied with. Petitioner and the third-party
claimant were given the opportunity to submit evidence in support of their
claim.
Hence, the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it
affirmed the break-open order issued by the Labor Arbiter.
Finally, we do not find any reason to disturb the rule that factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies supported by substantial evidence are binding on this
Court and are entitled to great respect, in the absence of showing of grave
abuse of a discretion.
18
November 1985, the NLRC dismissed the motion for reconsideration filed by CBI on the ground that the said
decision had already become final and executory.
On 16 October 1986, the NLRC Research and Information Department made the finding that Marabe, et. al.'s
back wages amounted to P199,800.00. On 29 October 1986, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
directing the sheriff to execute the Decision, dated 19 December 1984. The writ was partially satisfied through
garnishment of sums from CBI's debtor, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, in the amount of
P81,385.34. Said amount was turned over to the cashier of the NLRC. On 1 February 1989, an Alias Writ of
Execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter directing the sheriff to collect from CBI the sum of P117,414.76,
representing the balance of the judgment award, and to reinstate Marabe, et. al. to their former positions. On
13 July 1989, the sheriff issued a report stating that he tried to serve the alias writ of execution on petitioner
through the security guard on duty but the service was refused on the ground that CBI no longer occupied the
premises. On 26 September 1986, upon motion of Marabe, et. al., the Labor Arbiter issued a second alias writ
of execution. The said writ had not been enforced by the special sheriff because, as stated in his progress
report dated 2 November 1989, that all the employees inside CBI's premises claimed that they were employees
of Hydro Pipes Philippines, Inc. (HPPI) and not by CBI; that levy was made upon personal properties he found
in the premises; and that security guards with high-powered guns prevented him from removing the properties
he had levied upon. The said special sheriff recommended that a "break-open order" be issued to enable him to
enter CBI's premises so that he could proceed with the public auction sale of the aforesaid personal properties
on 7 November 1989. On 6 November 1989, a certain Dennis Cuyegkeng filed a third-party claim with the
Labor Arbiter alleging that the properties sought to be levied upon by the sheriff were owned by HPPI, of which
he is the Vice-President. On 23 November 1989, Marabe, et. al. filed a "Motion for Issuance of a Break-Open
Order," alleging that HPPI and CBI were owned by the same incorporator/stockholders. They also alleged that
petitioner temporarily suspended its business operations in order to evade its legal obligations to them and that
Marabe, et. al. were willing to post an indemnity bond to answer for any damages which CBI and HPPI may
suffer because of the issuance of the break-open order. On 2 March 1990, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order
which denied Marabe, et. al.'s motion for break-open order.
Marabe, et. al. then appealed to the NLRC. On 23 April 1992, the NLRC set aside the order of the Labor
Arbiter, issued a break-open order and directed Marabe, et. al. to file a bond. Thereafter, it directed the sheriff
to proceed with the auction sale of the properties already levied upon. It dismissed the third-party claim for lack
of merit. CBI moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution, dated 3
December 1992. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the NLRC was correct in issuing the break-open order to levy the HPPI properties located at
CBI amd/or HPPIs premises at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Held: It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from
its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. But, this separate and distinct
personality of a corporation is merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote justice. So, when
the notion of separate juridical personality is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws, this separate personality of the corporation may
be disregarded or the veil of corporate fiction pierced. This is true likewise when the corporation is merely an
adjunct, a business conduit or an alter ego of another corporation. The conditions under which the juridical
entity may be disregarded vary according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and
fast rule can be accurately laid down, but certainly, there are some probative factors of identity that will justify
the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, to wit: (1) Stock ownership by one or common
ownership of both corporations; (2) Identity of directors and officers; (3) The manner of keeping corporate
books and records; and (4) Methods of conducting the business. The SEC en banc explained the
"instrumentality rule" which the courts have applied in disregarding the separate juridical personality of
corporations as "Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it
is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the corporate entity of the
"instrumentality" may be disregarded. The control necessary to invoke the rule is not majority or even complete
stock control but such domination of instances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to
speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own, and is but a conduit for its principal. It must be kept in
mind that the control must be shown to have been exercised at the time the acts complained of took place.
Moreover, the control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for which the
complaint is made." The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction is as (1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity
as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have
been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive
legal duty or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) The aforesaid control
and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any one of
these elements prevents "piercing the corporate veil." In applying the "instrumentality" or "alter ego" doctrine,
the courts are concerned with reality and not form, with how the corporation operated and the individual
defendant's relationship to that operation. Thus the question of whether a corporation is a mere alter ego, a
mere sheet or paper corporation, a sham or a subterfuge is purely one of fact. Here, while CBI claimed that it
ceased its business operations on 29 April 1986, it filed an Information Sheet with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 15 May 1987, stating that its office address is at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On the other hand, HPPI, the third-party claimant, submitted on the same day, a similar information sheet
stating that its office address is at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Further, both information
sheets were filed by the same Virgilio O. Casio as the corporate secretary of both corporations. Both
corporations had the same president, the same board of directors, the same corporate officers, and
substantially the same subscribers. From the foregoing, it appears that, among other things, the CBI and the
HPPI shared the same address and/or premises. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
property levied upon by the sheriff were not of CBI's. Clearly, CBI ceased its business operations in order to
evade the payment to Marabe, et. al. of back wages and to bar their reinstatement to their former positions.
HPPI is obviously a business conduit of CBI and its emergence was skillfully orchestrated to avoid the financial
liability that already attached to CBI.
CORONA, J.:
as
security
guard
by
Enriquez
Security
and
Security
Services,
Inc.
(ESSI)
was
incorporated.
only
from
November
13,
1985
when
ESSI
was
incorporated.
Respondent consequently filed a complaint in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) seeking the payment of retirement
benefits under Republic Act No. (RA) 7641, otherwise known as the
Retirement Pay Law.[2]
On January 15, 1999, labor arbiter Eduardo Carpio decided in
respondents favor:
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters award of onemonth salary for every year of service for being excessive. It ruled
that under RA 7641, respondent Cabotaje was entitled to retirement
pay equivalent only to one-half month salary for every year of
service. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby set aside
and a new one entered ordering respondents to pay complainant
the amount of P76,710.60 representing his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The foregoing rules are clear that the whole 5 days of SIL are
included in the computation of a retiring employees pay.
Third. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the Supreme Court
does not pass upon questions of fact in an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45.[12] It is not our function to assess and evaluate the
evidence all over again[13] where the findings of the quasi-judicial
agency and the appellate court on the matter coincide.
The consistent rulings of the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the
appellate court should be respected and petitioners veil of corporate
fiction should likewise be pierced.These are based on the following
uncontroverted facts: (1) respondent worked with ESIA and
petitioner ESSI; (2) his employment with both security agencies was
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) both agencies were owned by the
Enriquez family and (4) petitioner ESSI maintained its office in the
same place where ESIA previously held office. [14]
The attempt to make the security agencies appear as two
separate entities, when in reality they were but one, was a devise to
defeat the law and should not be permitted.Although respect for
corporate personality is the general rule, there are exceptions. In
appropriate cases, the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced as
when it is used as a means to perpetrate a social injustice or as a
vehicle to evade obligations. Petitioner was thus correctly ordered to
pay respondents retirement under RA 7641, computed from
January 1979 up to the time he applied for retirement in July
1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
PANFILO V. PAJARILLO,
Petitioners,
-versus THE
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA NG PANFILO
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
V. PAJARILLO, ALFREDO
HOYOHOY,
HERMINIO
CASTILLO,
BERNARDO
ROCO, RODOLFO TORRES,
JULIAN JORVINA, LOURDES
ROCO,
FLORITA YAPOC,
MARLON
ALDANA,
PARALUMAN
ULANG,
TOLENTINO SANHI, JOHNNY
SORIANO,
ANDRES
CALAQUE,
ROBERTO
LAVAREZ,
FRANCISCO
MORALES,
SALVACION
PERINA, ANTONIO ABALA,
ROMEO SALONGA, AUGUR
M. MANIPOL, BIENVENIDA
TEQUIL,
MARIO
ELEP,
ALADINO
LATIGO,
BERNARDINE
BANSAL,
PEDRO
DE
BAGUIO,
RICARDO CALICA, LAURA
CO,
VICENTE
RECANA,
ELENA TOLLEDO, ALFREDO
PLAZA,
SR.,
HERMINIO
BALDONO, FELIPE YAPOC,
ARISTON NIPA, and ALFONSO
C. BALDOMAR,
Respondents.
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
IN
THE
LIGHT
OF
ALL
THE
FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the complaint should be as it is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT PVP LINER INC.
WAS PROPERLY MISPLEADED, WHICH IS A NON-EXISTING
CORPORATION.
II.
III.
IV.
Witness:
they
already
received
the
amount
of
SO ORDERED.
TOMAS LAO CONSTRUCTION, LVM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
THOMAS and JAMES DEVELOPERS (PHIL.), INC., petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MARIO O.
LABENDIA, SR., ROBERTO LABENDIA, NARCISO ADAN,
FLORENCIO GOMEZ, ERNESTO BAGATSOLON, SALVADOR
BABON, PATERNO BISNAR, CIPRIANO BERNALES, ANGEL
MABULAY,
SR.,
LEO
SURIGAO,
and
ROQUE
MORILLO, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
1990 at P3,200/month; (f) Paterno Bisnar, road grader operator, from January
1979 to October 1990 at P105/day; (g) Cipriano Bernales, instrument man,
from February 1980 to November 1990 at P3,200/month; (h) Angel Mabulay,
Sr., dump truck driver, from August 1974 to October 1990 at P90/day; (I) Leo
Surigao, payloader operator, from March 1975 to January 1978 atP100/day;
(J) Mario Labendia, Sr. surveyor/foreman, from August 1971 to July 1990
at P2,900/month; and, (k) Roque Morillo, company watchman, from August
1983 to October 1990 at P3,200/month.
[1]
[4]
services should not be terminated for violating company rules and warned that
failure to satisfactorily explain would be construed as disinterest in continued
employment with the company. Since the workers stood firm in their refusal to
comply with the directives their services were terminated.
NLRC RAB VIII dismissed the complaints lodged before it, finding that
private respondents were project employees whose employments could be
terminated upon completion of the projects or project phase for which they
were hired. It upheld petitioners contention that the execution of their
employment contracts was to forestall the eventuality of being compelled to
pay the workers their salaries even if there was no more work to be done due
to the completion of the projects or project phases. The labor court however
granted each employee a separation pay of P6,435.00 computed at one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, uniformly rounded at five (5)
years.
[6]
Petitioners now lay their cause before us and assign the following
errors: (a) NLRC erred in classifying the employees as regular instead of
project employees; (b) assuming that the workers were regular employees,
NLRC failed to consider that they were terminated for cause; (c) assuming
further that the employees were illegally dismissed, NLRC erred in awarding
back wages in excess of three (3) years; and, (d) assuming finally that the
decision is correct, NLRC erred when it pierced the veil of corporate
personality of petitioner-corporations.
The main thrust of petitioners expostulation is that respondents have no
valid cause to complain about their employment contracts since these
documents merely formalized their status as project employees. They cite
Policy Instruction No. 20 of the Department of Labor which defines project
employees as those employed in connection with a particular construction
project, adding that the ruling in Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. NLRC applies
squarely to the instant case because there the Court declared that the
employment of project employees is co-terminous with the completion of the
project regardless of the number of projects in which they have worked. And
as their employment is one for a definite period, they are not entitled to
separation pay nor is their employer required to obtain clearance from the
Secretary of Labor in connection with their termination. Petitioners thus argue
that their dismissal from the service of private respondents was legal since the
projects for which they were hired had already been completed. As additional
ground, they claim that Mario Labendia and Roberto Labendia had absented
themselves without leave giving management no choice but to sever their
employment.
[8]
While it may be allowed that in the instant case the workers were initially
hired for specific projects or undertakings of the company and hence can be
classified as project employees, the repeated re-hiring and the continuing
need for their services over a long span of time (the shortest, at seven [7]
years) have undeniably made them regular employees. Thus, we held that
where the employment of project employees is extended long after the
supposed project has been finished, the employees are removed from the
scope of project employees and considered regular employees.
[10]
While length of time may not be a controlling test for project employment,
it can be a strong factor in determining whether the employee was hired for a
specific undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions which are vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer. In the case at bar, private respondents had already gone through
the status of project employees. But their employments became noncoterminous with specific projects when they started to be continuously rehired due to the demands of petitioners business and were re-engaged for
many more projects without interruption. We note petitioners own admission -
[t]hese construction projects have been prosecuted by either of the three petitioners,
either individually or in a joint venture with one another. Likewise, these construction
projects have been prosecuted by either of the three petitioners, either simultaneously,
one construction project overlapping another and/or one project commencing
immediately after another project has been completed or terminated. Perhaps because
of their capacity to prosecute government projects and their good record and
performance, at least one of the three petitioners had an on-going construction project
and/or one of the three petitioners construction project overlapped that of another.
[11]
A work pool may exist although the workers in the pool do not receive
salaries and are free to seek other employment during temporary breaks in
the business, provided that the worker shall be available when called to report
for a project.Although primarily applicable to regular seasonal workers, this
set-up can likewise be applied to project workers insofar as the effect of
temporary cessation of work is concerned. This is beneficial to both the
employer and employee for it prevents the unjust situation of coddling labor at
the expense of capital and at the same time enables the workers to attain the
status of regular employees. Clearly, the continuous rehiring of the same set
of employees within the framework of the Lao Group of Companies is strongly
indicative that private respondents were an integral part of a work pool from
which petitioners drew its workers for its various projects.
In a final attempt to convince the Court that private respondents were
indeed project employees, petitioners point out that the workers were not
regularly maintained in the payroll and were free to offer their services to other
companies when there were no on-going projects. This argument however
cannot defeat the workers status of regularity. We apply by analogy the case
of Industrial-Commercial-Agricultural Workers Organization v. CIR which
deals with regular seasonal employees. There we held [13]
That during the temporary layoff the laborers are free to seek other employment is
natural, since the laborers are not being paid, yet must find means of support. A period
during which the Central is forced to suspend or cease operation for a time xxx should
not mean starvation for employees and their families (emphasis supplied).
Truly, the cessation of construction activities at the end of every project is
a foreseeable suspension of work. Of course, no compensation can be
demanded from the employer because the stoppage of operations at the end
of a project and before the start of a new one is regular and expected by both
parties to the labor relations. Similar to the case of regular seasonal
employees, the employment relation is not severed by merely being
suspended. The employees are, strictly speaking, not separated from
services but merely on leave of absence without pay until they are
reemployed. Thus we cannot affirm the argument that non-payment of
salary or non-inclusion in the payroll and the opportunity to seek other
employment denote project employment.
[14]
[15]
[18]
[19]
We agree with the NLRC that the execution of the project employment
contracts was farcical. Obviously, the contracts were a scheme of petitioners
to prevent respondents from being considered as regular employees. It
imposed time frames into an otherwise flexible employment period of private
respondents some of whom were employed as far back as 1969. Clearly, here
was an attempt to circumvent labor laws on tenurial security. Settled is the rule
[20]
that when periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial
security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public
morals, good customs or public order. Worth noting is that petitioners had
engaged in various joint venture agreements in the past without having to
draft project employment contracts. That they would require execution of
employment contracts and waivers at this point, ostensibly to be used for audit
purposes, is a suspect excuse, considering that petitioners enforced the
directive by withholding the salary of any employee who spurned the order.
[21]
withheld. They could not simply sit idly and allow their families to starve. They
had to seek employment elsewhere, albeit temporarily, in order to survive. On
the other hand, it would be the height of injustice to validate abandonment in
this particular case as a ground for dismissal of respondents thereby making
petitioners benefit from a gross and unjust situation which they themselves
created. Private respondents did not intend to sever ties with petitioner and
permanently abandon their jobs; otherwise, they would not have filed this
complaint for illegal dismissal.
[24]
[25]
x x x a project employee hired for a specific task also enjoys security of tenure. A
termination of his employment must be for a lawful cause and must be done in a
manner which affords him the proper notice and hearing x x x x To allow employers
to exercise their prerogative to terminate a project workers employment based on
gratuitous assertions of project completion would destroy the constitutionally
protected right of labor to security of tenure (emphasis supplied).
The burden of proving that an employee has been lawfully dismissed
therefore lies with the employer. In the case at bar, the assertions of
petitioners were self-serving and insufficient to substantiate their claim of
proximate project completion. The services of the employees were terminated
not because of contract expiration but as sanction for their refusal to sign the
project employment forms and quitclaims.
Finding that the dismissal was without just cause, we find it unnecessary
to dwell on the non-observance of procedural due process. Suffice it to state
that private respondents were not priorly notified of their impending dismissal
and that they were not provided ample opportunity to defend themselves.
Petitioners charge as erroneous the grant to private respondents by NLRC
of back wages in excess of three (3) years or, in the alternative, to an award of
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer feasible.
We disagree. Since the illegal dismissal was made in 1990 or after the
effectivity of the amendatory provision of RA No. 6715 on 21 March 1989,
private respondents back wages should be computed on the basis of Art. 279
of the Labor Code which states that (a)n employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
[28]
[29]
Finally, public respondent NLRC did not err in disregarding the veil of
separate corporate personality and holding petitioners jointly and severally
liable for private respondents back wages and separation pay. The records
disclose that the three (3) corporations were in fact substantially owned and
controlled by members of the Lao family composed of Lao Hian Beng alias
Tomas Lao, Chiu Siok Lian (wife of Tomas Lao), Andrew C. Lao, Lao Y. Heng,
Vicente Lao Chua, Lao E. Tin, Emmanuel Lao and Ismaelita Maluto. A
majority of the outstanding shares of stock in LVM and T&J is owned by the
Lao family. T&J is 100% owned by the Laos as reflected in its Articles of
Incorporation. The Lao Group of Companies therefore is a closed corporation
where the incorporators and directors belong to a single family. Lao Hian
Beng is the same Tomas Lao who owns Tomas Lao Corporation and is the
majority stockholder of T&J. Andrew C. Lao is the Managing Director of LVM
Construction, and President and Managing Director of the Lao Group of
Companies. Petitioners are engaged in the same line of business under one
management and use the same equipment including manpower
services. Where it appears that [three] business enterprises are owned,
conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
necessary to protect the rights of third persons, disregard the legal fiction that
the [three] corporations are distinct entities, and treat them as identical.
[30]
Consonant with our earlier ruling, we hold that the liability of petitioners
extends to the responsible officers acting in the interest of the corporations. In
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we disregard the separate
personalities of the three (3) corporations and at the same time declare the
members of the corporations jointly and severally liable with the corporations
for the monetary awards due to private respondents. It should always be
borne in mind that the fiction of law that a corporation as a juridical entity has
[31]
GENERAL
CREDIT G.R. No. 154975
CORPORATION (now PENTA
CAPITAL
FINANCE
Present:
CORPORATION),
Petitioner,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
versus -
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner General Credit Corporation, now known as
Penta Capital Finance Corporation, seeks to annul and set aside
the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] dated April 11, 2002 and August
20, 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 31801, affirming the November 8, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in its Civil Case No.
12707, an action for a sum of money thereat instituted by the
herein respondent Alsons Development and Investment
Corporation against the petitioner and respondent CCC Equity
Corporation.
The facts:
Some four years later, the Alcantara family assigned its rights and
interests over the bearer note to ALSONS which thenceforth
became the holder thereof. [7] But even before the execution of the
assignment deal aforestated, letters of demand for interest
payment were already sent to EQUITY, through its President,
Wilfredo Labayen, who pleaded inability to pay the stipulated
interest, EQUITY no longer then having assets or property to settle
its obligation nor being extended financial support by GCC.
For its part, GCC called only Wilfredo Labayen to testify. It stuck to its
underlying defense of separateness and presented documentary evidence detailing
the organizational structures of both GCC and EQUITY. And in a bid to negate the
notion that it was conducting its business illegally, GCC presented CB and SECissued licenses authoring it to engage in financing and quasi-banking activities. It
also adduced evidence to prove that it was never a party to any of the actionable
documents ALSONS and its predecessors-in-interest had in their possession and
that the November 27, 1985 deed of assignment of rights over the promissory note
was unenforceable.
Eventually, the trial court, on its finding that EQUITY was but an
instrumentality or adjunct of GCC and considering the legal consequences
and implications of such relationship, came out with its decision onNovember 8,
1990, rendering judgment for ALSONS, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [ALSONS]
and against the defendants [EQUITY and GCC] who are
hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff:
1.
2.
3.
4.
on
the following
Just like the first, the last three (3) arguments set forth in the
petition will not carry the day for the petitioner. In relation
therewith, the Court notes that these arguments and the issues
behind them were not raised before the trial court. This appellate
maneuver cannot be allowed. For, well-settled is the rule that
issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review
in higher courts.[14] Springing surprises on the opposing party is
antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due
process; hence, the proscription against a party shifting from one
theory at the trial court to a new and different theory in the
appellate level. On the same rationale, points of law, theories,
issues not brought to the attention of the lower court or, in fine,
not interposed during the trial cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.[15]
The Court agrees with the disposition of the appellate court on the
application of the piercing doctrine to the transaction subject of
this case. Per the Courts count, the trial court enumerated no less
than 20 documented circumstances and transactions, which,
taken as a package, indeed strongly supported the conclusion
that respondent EQUITY was but an adjunct, an instrumentality or
business conduit of petitioner GCC. This relation, in turn, provides
a justifying ground to pierce petitioners corporate existence as to
ALSONS claim in question. Foremost of what the trial court
referred to as certain circumstances are the commonality of
directors, officers and stockholders and even sharing of office
between petitioner GCC and respondent EQUITY; certain financing
and management arrangements between the two, allowing the
petitioner to handle the funds of the latter; the virtual domination
if not control wielded by the petitioner over the finances, business
policies and practices of respondent EQUITY; and the
establishment of respondent EQUITY by the petitioner to
circumvent CB rules. For a perspective, the following are some
relevant excerpts from the trial courts decision setting forth in
some detail the tipping circumstances adverted to therein:
It must be noted that as characterized by their business
relationship, [respondent] EQUITY and [petitioner] GCC
had common directors and/or officers as well as
stockholders. This is revealed by the proceedings
recorded in SEC Case No. 25-81 entitled Avelina Ramoso,
et al., vs. GCC, et al., where it was established, thru the
testimony of EQUITYs own President that more than 90%
of the stockholders of EQUITY were also stockholders of
GCC .. Disclosed likewise is the fact that when [EQUITYs
President] Labayen sold the shareholdings of EQUITY in
said franchise companies, practically the entire proceeds
thereof were surrendered to GCC, and not received by
EQUITY (EXHIBIT RR) xxx.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
1wph1.t
These certiorari proceedings stem from the award rendered against petitioner Telephone Engineering and
Services, Co., Inc. (TESCO) on October 6, 1967 by the Acting Referee of Regional Office No. 4, Quezon City
Sub-Regional Office, Workmen's Compensation Section, in favor of respondent Leonila S. Gatus and her
children, dependents of the deceased employee Pacifico L. Gatus. The principal contention is that the award
was rendered without jurisdiction as there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the
deceased.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing telephone equipment with
offices at Sheridan Street, Mandaluyong, Rizal. Its Executive Vice-President and General Manager is Jose Luis
Santiago. It has a sister company, the Utilities Management Corporation (UMACOR), with offices in the same
location. UMACOR is also under the management of Jose Luis Santiago.
On September 8, 1964, UMACOR employed the late Pacifica L. Gatus as Purchasing Agent. On May 16, 1965,
Pacifico L. Gatus was detailed with petitioner company. He reported back to UMACOR on August 1, 1965. On
January 13, 1967, he contracted illness and although he retained to work on May 10, 1967, he died
nevertheless on July 14, 1967 of "liver cirrhosis with malignant degeneration."
On August 7, 1967, his widow, respondent Leonila S. Gatus, filed a "Notice and Claim for Compensation" with
Regional Office No. 4, Quezon City Sub-Regional Office, Workmen's Compensation Section, alleging therein
that her deceased husband was an employee of TESCO, and that he died of liver cirrhosis. 1 On August 9,
1967, and Office wrote petitioner transmitting the Notice and for Compensation, and requiring it to submit
an Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness pursuant to Section 37 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Act No. 3428). 2 An "Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness" was thus submitted with UMACOR
indicated as the employer of the deceased. The Report was signed by Jose Luis Santiago. In answer to
questions Nos. 8 and 17, the employer stated that it would not controvert the claim for compensation, and
admitted that the deceased employee contracted illness "in regular occupation." 3 On the basis of this
Report, the Acting Referee awarded death benefits in the amount of P5,759.52 plus burial expenses of
P200.00 in favor of the heirs of Gatus in a letter-award dated October 6, 1967 4 against TESCO.
Replying on October 27, 1967, TESCO, through Jose Luis Santiago, informed the Acting Referee that it would
avail of the 15-days-notice given to it to state its non-conformity to the award and contended that the cause of
the illness contracted by Gatus was in no way aggravated by the nature of his work. 5
On November 6, 1967, TESCO requested for an extension of ten days within which to file a Motion for
Reconsideration, 6 and on November 15, 1967, asked for an additional extension of five days. 7 TESCO
filed its "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Petition to Set Aside Award" on November 18, 1967, alleging
as grounds therefor, that the admission made in the "Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness" was due
to honest mistake and/or excusable negligence on its part, and that the illness for which compensation is
sought is not an occupational disease, hence, not compensable under the law. 8 The extension requested
was denied. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order issued by the Chief of
Section of the Regional Office dated December 28, 1967 9 predicated on two grounds: that the alleged
mistake or negligence was not excusable, and that the basis of the award was not the theory of direct
causation alone but also on that of aggravation. On January 28, 1968, an Order of execution was issued
by the same Office.
On February 3, 1968, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion to Compel Referee to Elevate the Records to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission for Review." 10 Meanwhile, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on
and attached the properties of TESCO on February 17, 1968, and scheduled the sale of the same at
public auction on February 26, 1968. On February 28, 1968, the Commission issued an Order requiring
petitioner to submit verified or true copies of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Petition to Set Aside
Award and Order of December 28, 1967, and to show proof that said Motion for Reconsideration was filed
within the reglementary period, with the warning that failure to comply would result in the dismissal of the
Motion. However, before this Order could be released, TESCO filed with this Court, on February 22, 1968,
The present petition for "Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction" seeking to annul the award and to enjoin
the Sheriff from levying and selling its properties at public auction.
On February 29, 1968, this Court required respondents to answer the Petition but denied
Injunction. 11 TESCO'S Urgent Motion dated April 2, 1968, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of its properties was denied in our Resolution
dated May 8, 1968.
TESCO asserts:
1wph1.t
I. That the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission has no jurisdiction nor authority
to render the award (Annex 'D', Petition) against your petitioner there being no employeremployee relationship between it and the deceased Gatus;
II. That petitioner can never be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of respondent
commission especially considering that jurisdiction is never conferred by the acts or omission
of the parties;
III. That this Honorable Court has jurisdiction to nullify the award of respondent commission.
TESCO takes the position that the Commission has no jurisdiction to render a valid award in this suit as there
was no employer-employee relationship between them, the deceased having been an employee of UMACOR
and not of TESCO. In support of this contention, petitioner submitted photostat copies of the payroll of
UMACOR for the periods May 16-31, 1967 and June 1-15, 1967 12 showing the name of the deceased as one
of the three employees listed under the Purchasing Department of UMACOR. It also presented a
photostat copy of a check of UMACOR payable to the deceased representing his salary for the period
June 14 to July 13, 1967. 13
Both public and private respondents contend, on the other hand, that TESCO is estopped from claiming lack of
employer employee relationship.
To start with, a few basic principles should be re-stated the existence of employer-employee relationship is the
jurisdictional foundation for recovery of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law. 14 The lack of
employer-employee relationship, however, is a matter of defense that the employer should properly raise
in the proceedings below. The determination of this relationship involves a finding of fact, which is
conclusive and binding and not subject to review by this Court. 15
Viewed in the light of these criteria, we note that it is only in this Petition before us that petitioner denied, for the
first time, the employer-employee relationship. In fact, in its letter dated October 27, 1967 to the Acting Referee,
in its request for extension of time to file Motion for Reconsideration, in its "Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Petition to Set Aside Award," and in its "Urgent Motion to Compel the Referee to Elevate Records to the
Commission for Review," petitioner represented and defended itself as the employer of the deceased. Nowhere
in said documents did it allege that it was not the employer. Petitioner even admitted that TESCO and
UMACOR are sister companies operating under one single management and housed in the same building.
Although respect for the corporate personality as such, is the general rule, there are exceptions. In appropriate
cases, the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced as when the same is made as a shield to confuse the
legitimate issues. 16
While, indeed, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by acts or omission of the parties, TESCO'S denial at this stage
that it is the employer of the deceased is obviously an afterthought, a devise to defeat the law and evade its
obligations. 17 This denial also constitutes a change of theory on appeal which is not allowed in this
jurisdiction. 18Moreover, issues not raised before the Workmen's Compensation Commission cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.19 For that matter, a factual question may not be raised for the first time
on appeal to the Supreme Court. 20
This certiorari proceeding must also be held to have been prematurely brought. Before a petition for certiorari
can be instituted, all remedies available in the trial Court must be exhausted first. 21 certiorari cannot be
resorted to when the remedy of appeal is present. 22 What is sought to be annulled is the award made by
the Referee. However, TESCO did not pursue the remedies available to it under Rules 23, 24 and 25 of
the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, namely, an appeal from the award of the
Referee, within fifteen days from notice, to the Commission; a petition for reconsideration of the latter's
resolution, if adverse, to the Commission en banc; and within ten days from receipt of an unfavorable
decision by the latter, an appeal to this Court. As petitioner had not utilized these remedies available to it,
certiorari win not he, it being prematurely filed. As this Court ruled in the case of Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Del Rosario, 2 SCRA 462 (1961).
1wph1.t
not fan within any of these exceptions. WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
This petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul
the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 10014 affirming the decision
rendered by Branch 135, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The procedural
antecedents of this petition are as follows:
On January 23, 1985, petitioner filed a complaint [2] against private respondents to recover
three thousand four hundred twelve and six centavos (P3,412.06), representing the balance of the
jeep body purchased by the Manuels from petitioner; an additional sum of twenty thousand four
hundred fifty-four and eighty centavos (P20,454.80) representing the unpaid balance on the cost
of repair of the vehicle; and six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) for cost of suit and attorneys fees.
[3]
To the original balance on the price of jeep body were added the costs of repair. [4] In their
answer, private respondents interposed a counterclaim for unpaid legal services by Gregorio
Manuel in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) which was not paid by the incorporators,
directors and officers of the petitioner. The trial court decided the case on June 26, 1985, in favor
of petitioner in regard to the petitioners claim for money, but also allowed the counter-claim of
private respondents. Both parties appealed. On April 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals sustained the
trial courts decision.[5]Hence, the present petition.
For our review in particular is the propriety of the permissive counterclaim which private
respondents filed together with their answer to petitioners complaint for a sum of money. Private
respondent Gregorio Manuel alleged as an affirmative defense that, while he was petitioners
Assistant Legal Officer, he represented members of the Francisco family in the intestate estate
proceedings of the late Benita Trinidad. However, even after the termination of the proceedings,
his services were not paid. Said family members, he said, were also incorporators, directors and
officers of petitioner. Hence to counter petitioners collection suit, he filed a permissive
counterclaim for the unpaid attorneys fees.[6]
For failure of petitioner to answer the counterclaim, the trial court declared petitioner in
default on this score, and evidence ex-parte was presented on the counterclaim. The trial court
ruled in favor of private respondents and found that Gregorio Manuel indeed rendered legal
services to the Francisco family in Special Proceedings Number 7803- In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of Benita Trinidad. Said court also found that his legal services were not compensated
despite repeated demands, and thus ordered petitioner to pay him the amount of fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos.[7]
Dissatisfied with the trial courts order, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals,
posing the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS FAILURE ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT TO ANSWER THE ALLEGED PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM.[8]
Petitioner contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it because no
summons was validly served on it together with the copy of the answer containing the permissive
counterclaim. Further, petitioner questions the propriety of its being made party to the case
because it was not the real party in interest but the individual members of the Francisco family
concerned with the intestate case.
In its assailed decision now before us for review, respondent Court of Appeals held that a
counterclaim must be answered in ten (10) days, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 11, of the Rules of
Court; and nowhere does it state in the Rules that a party still needed to be summoned anew if a
counterclaim was set up against him. Failure to serve summons, said respondent court, did not
effectively negate trial courts jurisdiction over petitioner in the matter of the counterclaim. It
likewise pointed out that there was no reason for petitioner to be excused from answering the
counterclaim. Court records showed that its former counsel, Nicanor G. Alvarez, received the
copy of the answer with counterclaim two (2) days prior to his withdrawal as counsel for
petitioner. Moreover when petitioners new counsel, Jose N. Aquino, entered his appearance,
three (3) days still remained within the period to file an answer to the counterclaim. Having
failed to answer, petitioner was correctly considered in default by the trial court. [9] Even assuming
that the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner, respondent court also said, but having
filed a motion for reconsideration seeking relief from the said order of default, petitioner
was estopped from further questioning the trial courts jurisdiction.[10]
On the question of its liability for attorneys fees owing to private respondent Gregorio
Manuel, petitioner argued that being a corporation, it should not be held liable therefor because
these fees were owed by the incorporators, directors and officers of the corporation in their
personal capacity as heirs of Benita Trinidad. Petitioner stressed that the personality of the
corporation, vis--vis the individual persons who hired the services of private respondent, is
separate and distinct,[11] hence, the liability of said individuals did not become an obligation
chargeable against petitioner.
Nevertheless, on the foregoing issue, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
However, this distinct and separate personality is merely a fiction created by law for
convenience and to promote justice. Accordingly, this separate personality of the
corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction pierced, in cases
where it is used as a cloak or cover for found (sic) illegality, or to work an injustice, or
where necessary to achieve equity or when necessary for the protection of
creditors. (Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347) Corporations are
composed of natural persons and the legal fiction of a separate corporate personality is
not a shield for the commission of injustice and inequity. (Chemplex Philippines, Inc.
vs. Pamatian, 57 SCRA 408)
In the instant case, evidence shows that the plaintiff-appellant Francisco Motors
Corporation is composed of the heirs of the late Benita Trinidad as directors and
incorporators for whom defendant Gregorio Manuel rendered legal services in the
intestate estate case of their deceased mother. Considering the aforestated principles
and circumstances established in this case, equity and justice demands plaintiff-
compensating respondent Gregorio Manuel after the termination of the estate proceedings
despite his repeated demands for payment of his services. They cite findings of the appellate
court that support piercing the veil of corporate identity in this particular case. They assert that
the corporate veil may be disregarded when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, and defend crime. It may also be pierced, according to them, where the
corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of
the stockholders or of another corporate entity. In these instances, they aver, the corporation
should be treated merely as an association of individual persons.[16]
Private respondents dispute petitioners claim that its right to due process was violated when
respondents counterclaim was granted due course, although no summons was served upon
it. They claim that no provision in the Rules of Court requires service of summons upon a
defendant in a counterclaim. Private respondents argue that when the petitioner filed its
complaint before the trial court it voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. As a
consequence, the issuance of summons on it was no longer necessary. Private respondents say
they served a copy of their answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim on petitioners
former counsel, Nicanor G. Alvarez. While petitioner would have the Court believe that
respondents served said copy upon Alvarez after he had withdrawn his appearance as counsel for
the petitioner, private respondents assert that this contention is utterly baseless. Records disclose
that the answer was received two (2) days before the former counsel for petitioner withdrew his
appearance, according to private respondents. They maintain that the present petition is but a
form of dilatory appeal, to set off petitioners obligations to the respondents by running up more
interest it could recover from them. Private respondents therefore claim damages against
petitioner.[17]
To resolve the issues in this case, we must first determine the propriety of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction.
Basic in corporation law is the principle that a corporation has a separate personality distinct
from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. [18] However,
under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, the corporations separate juridical
personality may be disregarded, for example, when the corporate identity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. Also, where the corporation is a mere
alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled
and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or
adjunct of another corporation, then its distinct personality may be ignored. [19] In these
circumstances, the courts will treat the corporation as a mere aggrupation of persons and the
liability will directly attach to them. The legal fiction of a separate corporate personality in those
cited instances, for reasons of public policy and in the interest of justice, will be justifiably set
aside.
In our view, however, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil has no relevant application here. Respondent court erred in permitting the trial
courts resort to this doctrine. The rationale behind piercing a corporations identity in a given case
is to remove the barrier between the corporation from the persons comprising it to thwart the
fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for
undertaking certain proscribed activities. However, in the case at bar, instead of holding certain
individuals or persons responsible for an alleged corporate act, the situation has been reversed. It
is the petitioner as a corporation which is being ordered to answer for the personal liability of
certain individual directors, officers and incorporators concerned. Hence, it appears to us that the
doctrine has been turned upside down because of its erroneous invocation. Note that according to
private respondent Gregorio Manuel his services were solicited as counsel for members of the
Francisco family to represent them in the intestate proceedings over Benita Trinidads
estate. These estate proceedings did not involve any business of petitioner.
Note also that he sought to collect legal fees not just from certain Francisco family members
but also from petitioner corporation on the claims that its management had requested his services
and he acceded thereto as an employee of petitioner from whom it could be deduced he was also
receiving a salary. His move to recover unpaid legal fees through a counterclaim against
Francisco Motors Corporation, to offset the unpaid balance of the purchase and repair of a jeep
body could only result from an obvious misapprehension that petitioners corporate assets could
be used to answer for the liabilities of its individual directors, officers, and incorporators. Such
result if permitted could easily prejudice the corporation, its own creditors, and even other
stockholders; hence, clearly inequitous to petitioner.
Furthermore, considering the nature of the legal services involved, whatever obligation said
incorporators, directors and officers of the corporation had incurred, it was incurred in their
personal capacity. When directors and officers of a corporation are unable to compensate a party
for a personal obligation, it is far-fetched to allege that the corporation is perpetuating fraud or
promoting injustice, and be thereby held liable therefor by piercing its corporate veil. While there
are no hard and fast rules on disregarding separate corporate identity, we must always be mindful
of its function and purpose. A court should be careful in assessing the milieu where the doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil may be applied. Otherwise an injustice, although unintended, may
result from its erroneous application.
The personality of the corporation and those of its incorporators, directors and officers in
their personal capacities ought to be kept separate in this case. The claim for legal fees against
the concerned individual incorporators, officers and directors could not be properly directed
against the corporation without violating basic principles governing corporations. Moreover,
every action including a counterclaim must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.[20] It is plainly an error to lay the claim for legal fees of private respondent
Gregorio Manuel at the door of petitioner (FMC) rather than individual members of the
Francisco family.
However, with regard to the procedural issue raised by petitioners allegation, that it needed
to be summoned anew in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it, we agree with
respondent courts view to the contrary. Section 4, Rule 11 of the Rules of Courtprovides that a
counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within ten (10) days from service. Nothing in the
Rules of Court says that summons should first be served on the defendant before an answer to
counterclaim must be made. The purpose of a summons is to enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Although a counterclaim is treated as an entirely
distinct and independent action, the defendant in the counterclaim, being the plaintiff in the
original complaint, has already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Following Rule 9,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[21] if a defendant (herein petitioner) fails to
answer the counterclaim, then upon motion of plaintiff, the defendant may be declared in
default. This is what happened to petitioner in this case, and this Court finds no procedural error
in the disposition of the appellate court on this particular issue. Moreover, as noted by the
respondent court, when petitioner filed its motion seeking to set aside the order of default, in
effect it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. As well said by respondent court:
TIMOTEO H. SARONA,
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
PEREZ,
SERENO,
REYES, and
BERNABE, JJ.
CESAR S. TAN,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the May
29, 2008 Decision of the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 02127 entitled Timoteo H. Sarona v. National Labor Relations
Commission, Royale Security Agency (formerly Sceptre Security Agency) and Cesar
S. Tan (Assailed Decision), which affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commissions (NLRC) November 30, 2005 Decision and January 31, 2006
Resolution, finding the petitioner illegally dismissed but limiting the amount of his
backwages to three (3) monthly salaries. The CA likewise affirmed the NLRCs
finding that the petitioners separation pay should be computed only on the basis of
his length of service with respondent Royale Security Agency (Royale). The CA held
that absent any showing that Royale is a mere alter ego of Sceptre Security Agency
(Sceptre), Royale cannot be compelled to recognize the petitioners tenure with
Sceptre. The dispositive portion of the CAs Assailed Decision states:
1
SO ORDERED.
Factual Antecedents
On June 20, 2003, the petitioner, who was hired by Sceptre as a security guard
sometime in April 1976, was asked by Karen Therese Tan (Karen), Sceptres
Operation Manager, to submit a resignation letter as the same was supposedly
required for applying for a position at Royale. The petitioner was also asked to fill up
Royales employment application form, which was handed to him by Royales
General Manager, respondent Cesar Antonio Tan II (Cesar).
3
On September 17, 2003, the petitioner was informed that his assignment at
WWWE, Inc. had been withdrawn because Royale had allegedly been replaced by
another security agency. The petitioner, however, shortly discovered thereafter that
Royale was never replaced as WWWE, Inc.s security agency. When he placed a call
at WWWE, Inc., he learned that his fellow security guard was not relieved from his
post.
5
On September 21, 2003, the petitioner was once again assigned at Highlight
Metal, albeit for a short period from September 22, 2003 to September 30, 2003.
Subsequently, when the petitioner reported at Royales office on October 1, 2003,
Martin informed him that he would no longer be given any assignment per the
instructions of Aida Sabalones-Tan (Aida), general manager of Sceptre. This
prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal on October 4, 2003.
6
In his May 11, 2005 Decision, Labor Arbiter Jose Gutierrez (LA Gutierrez)
ruled in the petitioners favor and found him illegally dismissed. For being
unsubstantiated, LA Gutierrez denied credence to the respondents claim that the
termination of the petitioners employment relationship with Royale was on his accord
following his alleged employment in another company. That the petitioner was no
longer interested in being an employee of Royale cannot be presumed from his
request for a certificate of employment, a claim which, to begin with, he vehemently
denies. Allegation of the petitioners abandonment is negated by his filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal three (3) days after he was informed that he would no
longer be given any assignments. LA Gutierrez ruled:
There is abandonment when there is a clear proof showing that one has
no more interest to return to work. In this instant case, the record has no
proof to such effect. In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court ruled:
It may be true that the place where respondent Royale hold (sic)
office is the same office formerly used by SCEPTRE. Likewise, it may
be true that the same officers and staff now employed by respondent
Royale Security Agency were the same officers and staff employed by
SCEPTRE. We find, however, that these facts are not sufficient to
justify to require respondent Royale to answer for the liability of Sceptre,
which was owned solely by the late Roso T. Sabalones. As we have
stated above, the remedy is to address the claim on the estate of Roso T.
Sabalones.
8
The respondents appealed LA Gutierrezs May 11, 2005 Decision to the NLRC,
claiming that the finding of illegal dismissal was attended with grave abuse of
discretion. This appeal was, however, dismissed by the NLRC in its November 30,
2005 Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
9
1. Backwages - [P]15,600.00
2. Separation Pay - 5,200.00
3. 13th Month Pay - 583.34
[P]21,383.34 Attorneys Fees- 2,138.33
Total [P]23,521.67
SO ORDERED.
10
Backwages:
12
The petitioner, on the other hand, did not appeal LA Gutierrezs May 11, 2005
Decision but opted to raise the validity of LA Gutierrezs adverse findings with
respect to piercing Royales corporate personality and computation of his separation
pay in his Reply to the respondents Memorandum of Appeal. As the filing of an
appeal is the prescribed remedy and no aspect of the decision can be overturned by a
mere reply, the NLRC dismissed the petitioners efforts to reverse LA Gutierrezs
disposition of these issues. Effectively, the petitioner had already waived his right to
question LA Gutierrezs Decision when he failed to file an appeal within the
reglementary period. The NLRC held:
Consequently, the petitioner elevated the NLRCs November 30, 2005 Decision to the
CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, the respondents filed no appeal from the NLRCs finding that the
petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Nonetheless, the CA ruled against the petitioner and found the evidence he
submitted to support his allegation that Royale and Sceptre are one and the same
juridical entity to be wanting. The CA refused to pierce Royales corporate mask as
one of the probative factors that would justify the application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is stock ownership by one or common ownership of both
corporations and the petitioner failed to present clear and convincing proof that
Royale and Sceptre are commonly owned or controlled. The relevant portions of the
CAs Decision state:
Petitioner, who has been with Sceptre since 1976 and, as ruled by
both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, was illegally dismissed by Royale
on October 1, 2003, alleged that in order to circumvent labor laws,
especially to avoid payment of money claims and the consideration on
the length of service of its employees, Royale was established as an alter
ego or business conduit of Sceptre. To prove his claim, petitioner
declared that Royale is conducting business in the same office of
Sceptre, the latter being owned by the late retired Gen. Roso Sabalones,
and was managed by the latters daughter, Dr. Aida Sabalones-Tan; that
two of Royales incorporators are grandchildren [of] the late Gen. Roso
Sabalones; that all the properties of Sceptre are now owned by Royale,
and that the officers and staff of both business establishments are the
same; that the heirs of Gen. Sabalones should have applied for
dissolution of Sceptre before the SEC before forming a new corporation.
sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence. (citations omitted)
16
By way of this Petition, the petitioner would like this Court to revisit the computation
of his backwages, claiming that the same should be computed from the time he was
illegally dismissed until the finality of this decision. The petitioner would likewise
have this Court review and examine anew the factual allegations and the supporting
evidence to determine if the CA erred in its refusal to pierce Royales corporate mask
and rule that it is but a mere continuation or successor of Sceptre. According to the
petitioner, the erroneous computation of his separation pay was due to the CAs
failure, as well as the NLRC and LA Gutierrez, to consider evidence conclusively
demonstrating that Royale and Sceptre are one and the same juridical entity. The
petitioner claims that since Royale is no more than Sceptres alter ego, it should
recognize and credit his length of service with Sceptre.
17
18
The petitioner claimed that Royale and Sceptre are not separate legal persons
for purposes of computing the amount of his separation pay and other benefits under
the Labor Code. The piercing of Royales corporate personality is justified by several
indicators that Royale was incorporated for the sole purpose of defeating his right to
security of tenure and circumvent payment of his benefits to which he is entitled under
the law: (i) Royale was holding office in the same property used by Sceptre as its
principal place of business; (ii) Sceptre and Royal have the same officers and
employees; (iii) on October 14, 1994, Roso, the sole proprietor of Sceptre, sold to
Aida, and her husband, Wilfredo Gracia K. Tan (Wilfredo), the property used by
Sceptre as its principal place of business; (iv) Wilfredo is one of the incorporators of
Royale; (v) on May 3, 1999, Roso ceded the license to operate Sceptre issued by the
Philippine National Police to Aida; (vi) on July 28, 1999, the business name Sceptre
Security & Detective Agency was registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) under the name of Aida; (vii) Aida exercised control over the affairs
of Sceptre and Royale, as she was, in fact, the one who dismissed the petitioner from
employment; (viii) Karen, the daughter of Aida, was Sceptres Operation Manager
and is one of the incorporators of Royale; and (ix) Cesar Tan II, the son of Aida was
one of Sceptres officers and is one of the incorporators of Royale.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In their Comment, the respondents claim that the petitioner is barred from
questioning the manner by which his backwages and separation pay were computed.
Earlier, the petitioner moved for the execution of the NLRCs November 30, 2005
Decision and the respondents paid him the full amount of the monetary award
thereunder shortly after the writ of execution was issued. The respondents likewise
maintain that Royales separate and distinct corporate personality should be respected
considering that the evidence presented by the petitioner fell short of establishing that
Royale is a mere alter ego of Sceptre.
29
30
The petitioner does not deny that he has received the full amount of backwages
and separation pay as provided under the NLRCs November 30, 2005
Decision. However, he claims that this does not preclude this Court from modifying a
decision that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion or issued without jurisdiction.
31
32
ISSUES
OUR RULING
Before this Court proceeds to decide this Petition on its merits, it is imperative to
resolve the respondents contention that the full satisfaction of the award under the
NLRCs November 30, 2005 Decision bars the petitioner from questioning the
validity thereof. The respondents submit that they had paid the petitioner the amount
of P21,521.67 as directed by the NLRC and this constitutes a waiver of his right to file
an appeal to this Court.
The petitioners receipt of the monetary award adjudicated by the NLRC is not
absolute, unconditional and unqualified. The petitioners May 3, 2007 Motion for
Release contains a reservation, stating in his prayer that: it is respectfully prayed that
the respondents and/or Great Domestic Insurance Co. be ordered to RELEASE/GIVE
the amount of P23,521.67 in favor of the complainant TIMOTEO H. SARONA
without prejudice to the outcome of the petition with the CA.
33
In Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v. Villamater, et al., this Court ruled that
the prevailing partys receipt of the full amount of the judgment award pursuant to a
writ of execution issued by the labor arbiter does not
34
close or terminate the case if such receipt is qualified as without prejudice to the
outcome of the petition for certiorari pending with the CA.
The finality of the NLRCs decision does not preclude the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of
judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties receipt of its decision will
only give rise to the prevailing partys right to move for the execution thereof but will
not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations. In turn, the decision rendered by the
CA on a petition for certiorari may be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution, this Court has the power to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in x x x all cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved. Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court provides the remedy of an appeal by certiorari from decisions,
final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings
involved, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case. Since an appeal to this Court is not an original and independent action but a
36
37
38
continuation of the proceedings before the CA, the filing of a petition for review
under Rule 45 cannot be barred by the finality of the NLRCs decision in the same
way that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA cannot.
Furthermore, if the NLRCs decision or resolution was reversed and set aside for
being issued with grave abuse of discretion by way of a petition for certiorari to the
CA or to this Court by way of an appeal from the decision of the CA, it is considered
void ab initio and, thus, had never become final and executory.
39
40
As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must exclusively raise questions of
law. Moreover, if factual findings of the NLRC and the LA have been affirmed by the
CA, this Court accords them the respect and finality they deserve. It is well-settled
and oft-repeated that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the
CA.
41
Nevertheless, this Court will not hesitate to deviate from what are clearly
procedural guidelines and disturb and strike down the findings of the CA and those of
the labor tribunals if there is a showing that they are unsupported by the evidence on
record or there was a patent misappreciation of facts. Indeed, that the impugned
decision of the CA is consistent with the findings of the labor tribunals does not per
se conclusively demonstrate the correctness thereof. By way of exception to the
general rule, this Court will scrutinize the facts if only to rectify the prejudice and
injustice resulting from an incorrect assessment of the evidence presented.
In this respect, the NLRC cannot be accused of grave abuse of discretion. Under
Section 4(c), Rule VI of the NLRC Rules, the NLRC shall limit itself to reviewing
and deciding only the issues that were elevated on appeal. The NLRC, while not
totally bound by technical rules of procedure, is not licensed to disregard and violate
the implementing rules it implemented.
42
43
Nonetheless, technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Technical rules are not
binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the result would be
detrimental to the working man. This Court may choose not to encumber itself with
technicalities and limitations consequent to procedural rules if such will only serve as
a hindrance to its duty to decide cases judiciously and in a manner that would put an
end with finality to all existing conflicts between the parties.
44
Equally well-settled is the principle that the corporate mask may be removed or
the corporate veil pierced when the corporation is just an alter ego of a person or of
another corporation. For reasons of public policy and in the interest of justice, the
corporate veil will justifiably be impaled only when it becomes a shield for fraud,
illegality or inequity committed against third persons.
46
Hence, any application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should be
done with caution. A court should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied. It
must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice,
fraud, or crime was committed against another, in disregard of rights. The wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an
injustice that was never unintended may result from an erroneous application.
47
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas,
namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a
vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the corporate
entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego cases,
where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of
a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as
to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation.
49
In this regard, this Court finds cogent reason to reverse the CAs findings.
Evidence abound showing that Royale is a mere continuation or successor of Sceptre
and fraudulent objectives are behind Royales incorporation and the petitioners
subsequent employment therein. These are plainly suggested by events that the
respondents do not dispute and which the CA, the NLRC and LA Gutierrez accept as
fully substantiated but misappreciated as insufficient to warrant the use of the
equitable weapon of piercing.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it was Aida who exercised control
and supervision over the affairs of both Sceptre and Royale. Contrary to the
submissions of the respondents that Roso had been the only one in sole control of
Sceptres finances and business affairs, Aida took over as early as 1999 when Roso
assigned his license to operate Sceptre on May 3, 1999. As further proof of Aidas
acquisition of the rights as Sceptres sole proprietor, she caused the registration of the
business name Sceptre Security & Detective Agency under her name with the DTI a
few months after Roso abdicated his rights to Sceptre in her favor. As far as Royale is
concerned, the respondents do not deny that she has a hand in its management and
50
51
operation and possesses control and supervision of its employees, including the
petitioner. As the petitioner correctly pointed out, that Aida was the one who decided
to stop giving any assignments to the petitioner and summarily dismiss him is an
eloquent testament of the power she wields insofar as Royales affairs are concerned.
The presence of actual common control coupled with the misuse of the corporate form
to perpetrate oppressive or manipulative conduct or evade performance of legal
obligations is patent; Royale cannot hide behind its corporate fiction.
Aidas control over Sceptre and Royale does not, by itself, call for a disregard
of the corporate fiction. There must be a showing that a fraudulent intent or illegal
purpose is behind the exercise of such control to warrant the piercing of the corporate
veil. However, the manner by which the petitioner was made to resign from Sceptre
and how he became an employee of Royale suggest the perverted use of the legal
fiction of the separate corporate personality. It is undisputed that the petitioner
tendered his resignation and that he applied at Royale at the instance of Karen and
Cesar and on the impression they created that these were necessary for his continued
employment. They orchestrated the petitioners resignation from Sceptre and
subsequent employment at Royale, taking advantage of their ascendancy over the
petitioner and the latters lack of knowledge of his rights and the consequences of his
actions. Furthermore, that the petitioner was made to resign from Sceptre and apply
with Royale only to be unceremoniously terminated shortly thereafter leads to the
ineluctable conclusion that there was intent to violate the petitioners rights as an
employee, particularly his right to security of tenure. The respondents scheme reeks
of bad faith and fraud and compassionate justice dictates that Royale and Sceptre be
merged as a single entity, compelling Royale to credit and recognize the petitioners
length of service with Sceptre. The respondents cannot use the legal fiction of a
separate corporate personality for ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its
creation or which could not have been intended by law to which it owed its being.
52
53
54
Also, Sceptre and Royale have the same principal place of business. As early as
October 14, 1994, Aida and Wilfredo became the owners of the property used by
Sceptre as its principal place of business by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale they
executed with Roso. Royale, shortly after its incorporation, started to hold office in
the same property. These, the respondents failed to dispute.
57
The respondents do not likewise deny that Royale and Sceptre share the same
officers and employees. Karen assumed the dual role of Sceptres Operation Manager
and incorporator of Royale. With respect to the petitioner, even if he has already
resigned from Sceptre and has been employed by Royale, he was still using the
patches and agency cloths of Sceptre during his assignment at Highlight Metal.
Royale also claimed a right to the cash bond which the petitioner posted when
he was still with Sceptre. If Sceptre and Royale are indeed separate entities, Sceptre
should have released the petitioners cash bond when he resigned and Royale would
have required the petitioner to post a new cash bond in its favor.
Taking the foregoing in conjunction with Aidas control over Sceptres and
Royales business affairs, it is patent that Royale was a mere subterfuge for Aida.
Since a sole proprietorship does not have a separate and distinct personality from that
of the owner of the enterprise, the latter is personally liable. This is what she sought to
avoid but cannot prosper.
With respect to the petitioners backwages, this Court cannot subscribe to the view
that it should be limited to an amount equivalent to three (3) months of his salary.
Backwages is a remedy affording the employee a way to recover what he has lost by
61
64
Clearly, the law intends the award of backwages and similar benefits to
accumulate past the date of the Labor Arbiter's decision until the
dismissed employee is actually reinstated. But if, as in this case,
reinstatement is no longer possible, this Court has consistently ruled that
backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until the
date the decision becomes final. (citation omitted)
65
67
68
In fine, this Court holds Royale liable to pay the petitioner backwages to be
computed from his dismissal on October 1, 2003 until the finality of this decision.
Nonetheless, the amount received by the petitioner from the respondents in
satisfaction of the November 30, 2005 Decision shall be deducted accordingly.
a) full backwages and other benefits computed from October 1, 2003 (the date
Royale illegally dismissed the petitioner) until the finality of this decision;
b) separation pay computed from April 1976 until the finality of this decision at the
rate of one month pay per year of service;
c) ten percent (10%) attorneys fees based on the total amount of the awards
under (a) and (b) above;
This case is REMANDED to the labor arbiter for computation of the separation pay,
backwages, and other monetary awards due the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
WENSHA SPA CENTER,
INC. and/or XU ZHI JIE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
Promulgated:
LORETA T. YUNG,
Respondent.
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by an employer who was charged before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for dismissing an employee upon the advice of a Feng Shui
master. In this action, the petitioners assail the May 28, 2008 Decision [1] and
October 23, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) Francisco Robles dismissed Loretas complaint for
lack of merit. He found it more probable that Loreta was dismissed from her
employment due to Wenshas loss of trust and confidence in her. The LAs
decision[7] partly reads:
However, this office has found it dubious and hard to
believe the contentions made by the complainant that she was
dismissed by the respondents on the sole ground that she is a
mismatch in respondents' business as advised by an alleged Feng
Shui Master. The complainant herself alleged in her position
paper that she has done several improvements in respondents
business such as uplifting the morale and efficiency of its
employees and increasing respondents clientele, and that
respondent Co was very much pleased with the improvements
made by the complainant that she was offered twice a promotion
but she nevertheless declined. It would be against human
experience and contrary to business acumen to let go of someone,
who was an asset and has done so much for the company merely
on the ground that she is a mismatch to the business. Absent any
proof submitted by the complainant, this office finds it more
probable that the complainant was dismissed due to loss of trust
and confidence.[8]
This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC in its December 29, 2006 Resolution,
citing its observation that Wensha was still considering the proper action to take
on the day Loreta left Wensha and filed her complaint.The NLRC added that this
finding was bolstered by Wenshas September 10, 2004 letter to Loreta asking her
to come back to personally clarify some matters, but she declined because she had
already filed a case.
[9]
Loreta moved for a reconsideration of the NLRCs ruling but her motion was
denied. Loreta then went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. The
CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC on the ground that it gravely abused its
discretion in appreciating the factual bases that led to Loretas dismissal. The CA
noted that there were irregularities and inconsistencies in Wenshas position. The
CA stated the following:
We, thus, peruse the affidavits and documentary evidence of
the Private Respondents and find the following: First, on the
affidavits of their witnesses, it must be noted that the same were
Wensha and Xu now assail this ruling of the CA in this petition presenting
the following:
V.
GROUNDS
FOR
THE PETITION
THE
ALLOWANCE
OF
5.1 The following are the reasons and arguments, which are
purely questions of law and some questions of facts, which justify
the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, to this Honorable SUPREME
COURT of the assailed Decision and Resolution, to wit:
5.1.1 The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS gravely
erred in reversing that factual findings of the
Honorable Labor Arbiter and the Honorable
NLRC (Third Division) notwithstanding
recognized and established rule in our
jurisdiction that findings of facts of quasijudicial agencies who have gained expertise on
the employer: (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article
282, or for any of the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself. A just and valid cause for an employees dismissal must be
supported by substantial evidence, and before the employee can be dismissed, he
must be given notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard. [13] In the process, the
employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a
valid cause. Its failure to discharge this burden renders the dismissal unjustified
and, therefore, illegal.[14]
As a rule, the factual findings of the court below are conclusive on Us in a
petition for review on certiorari where We review only errors of law. This case,
however, is an exception because the CAs factual findings are not congruent with
those of the NLRC and the LA.
According to Wensha in its position paper,[15] it dismissed Loreta on August
31, 2004 after investigating the complaints against her. Wensha asserted that her
dismissal was a valid exercise of an employers right to terminate a managerial
employee for loss of trust and confidence. It claimed that she caused the
resignation of an employee because of gossips initiated by her. It was the reason
she was asked to take a leave of absence with pay for one month starting August
10, 2004.[16]
Wensha also alleged that Loreta was sowing intrigues in the company which
was inimical to Wensha. She was also accused of dishonesty, serious breach of
trust reposed in her, tardiness, and abuse of authority.[17]
In its Rejoinder, Wensha changed its position claiming that it did not
terminate Loretas employment on August 31, 2004. It even sent her a notice
requesting her to report back to work. She, however, declined because she had
already filed her complaint.[18]
As correctly found by the CA, the cause of Loretas dismissal is
questionable. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must
have basis and must be founded on clearly established facts.[19]
The Court finds the LA ruling that states, [a]bsent any proof submitted by
the complainant, this office finds it more probable that the complainant was
Although she was a little confused, Loreta did as she was instructed and did
not report for work for a month. She returned to work on September 10, 2004. This
is how Loreta recounted the events of that day:
On September 10, 2004, in the morning, complainant
reported to the office of respondents. As usual, she punched-in
her time card and signed in the logbook of the security
guard. When she entered the administrative office, some of its
employees immediately contacted respondent Xu. Respondent Xu
then contacted complainant thru her mobile phone and told her to
leave the administrative office immediately and instead to wait for
him in the dining area.
xxx
Complainant waited for respondent Xu in the dining
area. After waiting for about two (2) hours, respondent Xu was
nowhere. Instead, it was Jiang Xue Qin a.k.a Annie Co, the
Chinese wife of respondent Xu, who arrived and after a short
conversation between them, the former frankly told complainant
that she has to resign allegedly she is a mismatch to respondent
Xu according to the Feng Shui master and therefore she does not
fit to work (sic) with the respondents. Surprised and shocked,
complainant demanded of Jiang Xue Qin to issue a letter of
termination if it were the reason therefor.
Instead of a termination letter issued, Jiang Xue Qin
insisted for the complainant's resignation. But when complainant
stood her ground, Jian Xue Qin shouted invectives at her and told
to leave the office immediately.
Respondent Xu did not show up but talked to the
complainant over the mobile phone and convinced her likewise to
resign from the company since there is no way to retain her
because her aura unbalanced the area of employment according to
the Feng Shui, the Chinese spiritual art of placement. Hearing this
from no lees than respondent Xu, complainant left the office and
went straight to this Office and filed the present case
onSeptember 10, 2004. xxx[28]
Loreta also alleged that in the afternoon of that day, September 10, 2004, a
notice was posted on the Wensha bulletin board that reads:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF WENSHA SPA CENTER
WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT MS. LORIE TSE
YUNG,
FORMER
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICER
OF WENSHA SPA CENTER IS NO LONGER CONNECTED TO
THIS COMPANY STARTING TODAYSEPTEMBER 10, 2004.
ANY TRANSACTION MADE BY HER IS NO LONGER A
LIABILITY OF THE COMPANY.
(SGD.) THE MANAGEMENT [Italics were in red letters.][29]
within which to explain her side, and the second notice is the notice to the
employee that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, she is being
terminated from her employment.[30] This is a requirement of due process and
clearly, Loreta did not receive any of those required notices.
We are in accord with the pronouncement of the CA that the reinstatement of
Loreta to her former position is no longer feasible in the light of the strained
relations between the parties. Reinstatement, under the circumstances, would no
longer be practical as it would not be in the interest of both parties. Under the law
and jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs backwages and reinstatement, which are separate and distinct. If reinstatement
would only exacerbate the tension and further ruin the relations of the employer
and the employee, or if their relationship has been unduly strained due to
irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held
a managerial or key position in the company, it would be prudent to order payment
of separation pay instead of reinstatement. [31] In the case of Golden Ace Builders v.
Talde,[32] We wrote:
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of
separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or
viable. On the one hand, such payment liberates the employee
from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On
the other, the payment releases the employer from the grossly
unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it
could no longer trust.
In the case at bench, the CA, upon its own assessment, pronounced that the
relations between petitioners and the respondent have become strained because of
her dismissal anchored on dubious charges. The respondent has not contested the
finding. As she is not insisting on being reinstated, she should be paid separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.[33] The CA,
however, failed to decree such award in the dispositive portion. This should be
rectified.
Nevertheless, the Court finds merit in the argument of petitioner Xu that the
CA erred in ruling that he is solidarily liable with Wensha.
Elementary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it and from
that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock
of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate
corporate personality.[34]
In labor cases, corporate directors and officers may be held solidarily liable
with the corporation for the termination of employment only if done with malice or
in bad faith.[35] Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means
breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of
the nature of fraud.[36]
In the subject decision, the CA concluded that petitioner Xu and Wensha are
jointly and severally liable to Loreta. [37] We have read the decision in its entirety
but simply failed to come across any finding of bad faith or malice on the part of
Xu. There is, therefore, no justification for such a ruling. To sustain such a finding,
there should be an evidence on record that an officer or director acted maliciously
or in bad faith in terminating the services of an employee. [38] Moreover, the finding
or indication that the dismissal was effected with malice or bad faith should be
stated in the decision itself.[39]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decretal portion of
the May 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 98855, is
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Wensha Spa Center,
Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Loreta T. Yung her full backwages, other
privileges, and benefits, or their monetary equivalent, andseparation
pay reckoned from the date of her dismissal, September 1, 2004, up to
the finality of this decision, plus damages in the amounts of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; Twenty Five
Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages; and Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as attorneys fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
HI-CEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 132403
Petitioner,
-versus-
x----------------------x
Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Enrique Tan and Lilia Tan (spouses Tan) were the
controlling stockholders of E.T. Henry & Co., Inc. (E.T. Henry), a
company engaged in the business of processing and distributing
bunker fuel.[2]Among E.T. Henry's customers were petitioner HiCement Corporation (Hi-Cement),[3] Riverside Mills Corporation
(Riverside) and Kanebo Cosmetics Philippines, Inc. (Kanebo). For
their purchases, these corporations issued postdated checks to
E.T. Henry.
Hi-Cement
treasurer
[10]
(including
its
general
its
of
accrued
and
accruing
interests,
charges
and
Hi-Cement filed its answer alleging, among others, that: (1) its
general manager and treasurer were not authorized to issue the
postdated crossed checks in E.T. Henry's favor; (2) the deed of
assignment purportedly executed by Hi-Cement assigning them to
respondent only bore the conformity of its treasurer and (3)
respondent was not a holder in due course as it should not have
discounted them for being crossed checks. [13]
In their answer (with counterclaim against respondent and crossclaims against Hi-Cement, Riverside and Kanebo), [14] E.T. Henry
and the spouses Tan claimed that: (1) the drawers of the
postdated checks failed to honor them due to the adverse
economic conditions prevailing at the time respondent presented
them for payment; (2) the extra-judicial sale of the mortgaged
Sucat property was void due to gross inadequacy of the bid
price[15]and (3) their loans were subjected to a usurious interest
rate of 21% p.a.
1.
Tan,
Hi-Cement,
2.
3.
4.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In G.R. No. 132419, on the other hand, E.T. Henry and the spouses
Tan essentially contend that the lower courts erred in: (1) applying
the doctrine of piercing the veil of the corporate entity to make
the spouses Tan solidarily liable with E.T. Henry; (2) not ruling on
their cross-claims and counterclaims, and (3) not declaring the
foreclosure of E.T. Henry's Sucat property as void. [19]
AUTHORITY OF HI-CEMENTS
GENERAL
MANAGER AND TREASURER
TO
ISSUE
THE POSTDATED CROSSED C
HECKS
provides:
Absent any of the elements set forth in Section 52, the holder is
not a holder in due course. In the case at bar, the last two
requirements were not met.
postdated
checks
Respondent was all too aware that subject checks were crossed
and bore restrictions that they were for deposit to payee's
account only; hence, they could not be further negotiated to it.
The
records
likewise
reveal
that
respondent
completely
only
the
treasurer's
signature
appeared
on
the
deed
of
with
extraordinary
diligence
drawee bank was not proper, hence, the liability did not attach to
the drawer of the checks. We ruled that:
ruled
that
it
may
recover
from
the
party
who
At any rate, the issue has become moot in view of our ruling that
Hi-Cement is not liable for the checks.
In their petition, E.T. Henry and the spouses Tan argue that the
lower courts erred in applying the piercing the veil of corporate
entity doctrine to their case. They claim that both the trial and
appellate courts failed to cite the reasons why the doctrine was
relevant to them.
We agree with petitioners E.T. Henry and the spouses Tan in this
respect.
If any general rule can be laid down, it is that the corporation will
be looked upon as a legal entity until sufficient reasons to the
contrary appear. [33] It is only when the fiction or notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
perpetuate fraud or defend crime that the law will shred the
corporate legal veil and regard it as a mere association of
persons.[34] This is referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate entity.
First, the trial court failed to provide a clear ground why the
doctrine was used. It merely stated that it agreed with
respondents arguments but did not explain why the doctrine was
relevant to petitioner E.T. Henry's and the spouses Tans case. On
the other hand, the CA held:
It
did
not
also
state
what
act
demands
the
sale
if
there
(was)
no
obtained.[40]
Lastly, E.T. Henry and the spouses Tan call this Court's attention
to the alleged failure of the lower court to pass upon their
counterclaim against respondent or cross-claims against HiCement, Riverside and Kanebo. They ask us now to hold these
parties liable on the basis of said claims. We decline to do so.
First, E.T. Henry and the spouses Tan failed to implead HiCement, Riverside and Kanebo as parties in the case at bar. Under
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action, including a
counterclaim (or a cross-claim), must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest. [41] The term defendant
may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant or the third (fourth, etc.) party
defendant.[42] Hence, for this technical lapse, we are constrained
not to pass on E.T. Henry's and the spouses Tan's cross-claims.
Second, E.T. Henry and the spouses Tan filed the counterclaim
against respondent on the basis of an alleged void foreclosure
proceeding on E.T. Henry's Sucat property due to an inadequate
bid price. It is no longer necessary to delve into this matter in
view of our finding that the mere inadequacy of the bid price on
the property did not automatically render the foreclosure sale
irregular or void.
CV
No.
31600
is
of
Asia
and
America
(later
Philippine
Commercial
1.
2.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for the
proper computation of E.T. Henry's, Riverside's and Kanebo's
liabilities for the checks, attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
Costs against petitioners E.T. Henry and the spouses Enrique and
Lilia Tan.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147993
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to pay complainant the grand total
amount of P228,581.00 representing his retirement benefits and other money claims.
SO ORDERED.3
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters award of one-month salary for every year of service for being
excessive. It ruled that under RA 7641, respondent Cabotaje was entitled to retirement pay equivalent only to
one-half month salary for every year of service. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby set aside and a new one entered ordering respondents
to pay complainant the amount of P76,710.60 representing his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.4
On March 15, 2000, the NLRC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. 5
On May 25, 2000, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari 6 with the Court of Appeals.
On September 26, 2000, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC decision. 7 It also denied the motion for
reconsideration on May 8, 2001.8
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari9 on the following issues:
1. [w]hether or not the Retirement [Pay] Law has retroactive effect.
2. [w]hether the whole 5 days service incentive leave or just a portion thereof equivalent to 1/12 should
be included in the month salary for purposes of computing the retirement pay.
3. [w]hether or not the length of service of a retired employee in a dissolved company (his former
employer) should be included in his length of service with his last employer for purposes of computing
the retirement pay.10
We find no merit in the petition.
First. Petitioners contention that RA 7641 cannot be applied retroactively has long been settled in the
Guidelines for Effective Implementation of RA 7641 issued on October 24, 1996 by the Department of Labor
and Employment. Paragraph B of the guidelines provides:
In reckoning the length of service, the period of employment with the same employer before the
effectivity date of the law on January 7, 1993 should be included.
Thus, in Rufina Patis Factory v. Lucas, Sr.,11 we held:
RA 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure
and as a curative statute that absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary
grant from, an employer can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during
their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact that the
law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its
benefits can be reckoned not only from the date of the laws enactment but retroactively to the
time said employment contracts have started. (emphasis ours)
Second. Petitioners insistence that only 1/12 of the service incentive leave (SIL) should be included in the
computation of the retirement benefit has no basis. Section 1, RA 7641 provides:
x x x Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean
fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more
than five (5) days of service incentive leave. x x x
Section 5.2, Rule II of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code further clarifies what comprises the
"1/2 month salary" due a retiring employee:
5.2 Components of One-half (1/2) Month Salary. For the purpose of determining the minimum
retirement pay due an employee under this Rule, the term "one-half month salary" shall include all the
following:
(a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. x x x;
(b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leave;
(c) One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due an employee;
(d) All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon that should be included in the
computation of the employees retirement pay.
The foregoing rules are clear that the whole 5 days of SIL are included in the computation of a retiring
employees pay.
Third. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the Supreme Court does not pass upon questions of fact in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.12 It is not our function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over
again13 where the findings of the quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court on the matter coincide.
The consistent rulings of the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the appellate court should be respected and
petitioners veil of corporate fiction should likewise be pierced. These are based on the following
uncontroverted facts: (1) respondent worked with ESIA and petitioner ESSI; (2) his employment with both
security agencies was continuous and uninterrupted; (3) both agencies were owned by the Enriquez family and
(4) petitioner ESSI maintained its office in the same place where ESIA previously held office. 14
The attempt to make the security agencies appear as two separate entities, when in reality they were but one,
was a devise to defeat the law and should not be permitted. Although respect for corporate personality is the
general rule, there are exceptions. In appropriate cases, the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced as when it
is used as a means to perpetrate a social injustice or as a vehicle to evade obligations. Petitioner was thus
correctly ordered to pay respondents retirement under RA 7641, computed from January 1979 up to the time
he applied for retirement in July 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Theassailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
areAFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184517
October 8, 2013
SME BANK INC., ABELARDO P. SAMSON, OLGA SAMSON and AURELIO VILLAFLOR, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PEREGRIN T. DE GUZMAN,EDUARDO M. AGUSTIN, JR., ELICERIO GASPAR, , RICARDO GASPAR JR.,
EUFEMIA ROSETE, FIDEL ESPIRITU, SIMEONESPIRITU, JR., and LIBERATO MANGOBA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 186641
SME BANK INC., ABELARDO P. SAMSON, OLGA SAMSON and AURELIO VILLAFLOR, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ELICERIO GASPAR, RICARDO GASPAR, JR., EUFEMIA ROSETE, FIDEL ESPIRITU, SIMEONESPIRITU,
JR., and LIBERATO MANGOBA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Security of tenure is a constitutionally guaranteed right. 1 Employees may not be terminated from their regular
employment except for just or authorized causes under the Labor Code 2 and other pertinent laws. A mere
change in the equity composition of a corporation is neither a just nor an authorized cause that would legally
permit the dismissal of the corporations employees en masse.
Before this Court are consolidated Rule 45 Petitions for Review on Certiorari 3 assailing the Decision4 and
Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97510 and its Decision 6 and Resolution7 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97942.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent employees Elicerio Gaspar (Elicerio), Ricardo Gaspar, Jr.(Ricardo), Eufemia Rosete (Eufemia),
Fidel Espiritu (Fidel), Simeon Espiritu, Jr. (Simeon, Jr.), and Liberato Mangoba (Liberato) were employees of
Small and Medium Enterprise Bank, Incorporated (SME Bank).Originally, the principal shareholders and
corporate directors of the bank were Eduardo M. Agustin, Jr. (Agustin) and Peregrin de Guzman, Jr. (De
Guzman).
In June 2001, SME Bank experienced financial difficulties. To remedy the situation, the bank officials proposed
its sale to Abelardo Samson(Samson).8
Accordingly, negotiations ensued, and a formal offer was made to Samson. Through his attorney-in-fact, Tomas
S. Gomez IV, Samson then sent formal letters (Letter Agreements) to Agustin and De Guzman, demanding the
following as preconditions for the sale of SME Banks shares of stock:
4. You shall guarantee the peaceful turn over of all assets as well as the peaceful transition of management of
the bank and shall terminate/retire the employees we mutually agree upon, upon transfer of shares in favor of
our groups nominees;
xxxx
7. All retirement benefits, if any of the above officers/stockholders/board of directors are hereby waived upon
consummation [sic] of the above sale. The retirement benefits of the rank and file employees including the
managers shall be honored by the new management in accordance with B.R. No. 10, S. 1997. 9
Agustin and De Guzman accepted the terms and conditions proposed by Samson and signed the conforme
portion of the Letter Agreements.10
Simeon Espiritu (Espiritu), then the general manager of SME Bank, held a meeting with all the employees of
the head office and of the Talaveraand Muoz branches of SME Bank and persuaded them to tender their
resignations,11 with the promise that they would be rehired upon reapplication. His directive was allegedly done
at the behest of petitioner Olga Samson.12
Relying on this representation, Elicerio, 13 Ricardo,14 Fidel,15 Simeon, Jr.,16 and Liberato17 tendered their
resignations dated 27 August 2001. As for Eufemia, the records show that she first tendered a resignation letter
dated27 August 2001,18 and then a retirement letter dated September 2001. 19
Elicerio,20 Ricardo,21 Fidel,22 Simeon, Jr.,23 and Liberato24 submitted application letters on 11 September 2001.
Both the resignation letters and copies of respondent employees application letters were transmitted by
Espiritu to Samsons representative on 11 September 2001.25
On 11 September 2001, Agustin and De Guzman signified their conformity to the Letter Agreements and sold
86.365% of the shares of stock of SME Bank to spouses Abelardo and Olga Samson. Spouses Samson then
became the principal shareholders of SME Bank, while Aurelio Villaflor, Jr. was appointed bank president. As it
turned out, respondent employees, except for Simeon, Jr., 26 were not rehired. After a month in service, Simeon,
Jr. again resigned on October 2001.27
Respondent-employees demanded the payment of their respective separation pays, but their requests were
denied.
1wphi1
Aggrieved by the loss of their jobs, respondent employees filed a Complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. III and sued SME Bank, spouses Abelardo
and Olga Samson and Aurelio Villaflor (the Samson Group) for unfair labor practice; illegal dismissal; illegal
deductions; underpayment; and nonpayment of allowances, separation pay and 13th month
pay.28 Subsequently, they amended their Complaint to include Agustin and De Guzman as respondents to the
case.29
On 27 October 2004, the labor arbiter ruled that the buyer of an enterprise is not bound to absorb its
employees, unless there is an express stipulation to the contrary. However, he also found that respondent
employees were illegally dismissed, because they had involuntarily executed their resignation letters after
relying on representations that they would be given their separation benefits and rehired by the new
management. Accordingly, the labor arbiter decided the case against Agustin and De Guzman, but dismissed
the Complaint against the Samson Group, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Eduardo Agustin, Jr.
and Peregrin De Guzman to pay complainants separation pay in the total amount of P339,403.00 detailed as
follows:
Elicerio B. Gaspar = P 5,837.00
Ricardo B. Gaspar, Jr. = P11,674.00
Liberato B. Mangoba = P64,207.00
Fidel E. Espiritu = P29,185.00
Simeon B. Espiritu, Jr. = P26,000.00
Eufemia E. Rosete = P202,510.00
All other claims including the complaint against Abelardo Samson, Olga Samson and Aurelio Villaflor are
hereby DISMISSED for want of merit.
SO ORDERED.30
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the labor arbiter, respondent employees, Agustin and De Guzman brought
separate appeals to the NLRC. Respondent employees questioned the labor arbiters failure to award
backwages, while Agustin and De Guzman contended that they should not be held liable for the payment of the
employees claims.
The NLRC found that there was only a mere transfer of shares and therefore, a mere change of management
from Agustin and De Guzman to the Samson Group. As the change of management was not a valid ground to
terminate respondent bank employees, the NLRC ruled that they had indeed been illegally dismissed. It further
ruled that Agustin, De Guzman and the Samson Group should be held jointly and severally liable for the
employees separation pay and backwages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Respondents are
hereby Ordered to jointly and severally pay the complainants backwages from 11 September 2001 until the
finality of this Decision, separation pay at one month pay for every year of service, P10,000.00 and P5,000.00
moral and exemplary damages, and five (5%) percent attorneys fees.
Other dispositions are AFFIRMED
SO ORDERED.31
On 28 November 2006, the NLRC denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Agustin, De Guzman and the
Samson Group.32
Agustin and De Guzman filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97510.
The Samson Group likewise filed a separate Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 97942. Motions to consolidate both cases were not acted upon by the appellate court.
On 13 March 2008, the CA rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.97510 affirming that of the NLRC. The fallo
of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 8, 2006,
and Resolution dated November 28, 2006 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No.
043236-05 (NLRC RAB III-07-4542-02) are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.33
Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP No. 97942 was disposed of by the appellate court in a Decision dated 15 January
2008, which likewise affirmed that of the NLRC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is denied, and the herein assailed May
8, 2006 Decision and November 28, 2006 Resolution of the NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.34
The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the parties in Resolutions dated 1
September 200835 and 19 February 2009.36
The Samson Group then filed two separate Rule 45 Petitions questioning the CA Decisions and Resolutions in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97510 and CA-G.R. SP No. 97942. On 17 June 2009, this Court resolved to consolidate both
Petitions.37
THE ISSUES
Succinctly, the parties are asking this Court to determine whether respondent employees were illegally
dismissed and, if so, which of the parties are liable for the claims of the employees and the extent of the reliefs
that may be awarded to these employees.
THE COURTS RULING
The instant Petitions are partly meritorious.
I
Respondent employees were illegally dismissed.
As to Elicerio Gaspar, Ricardo Gaspar, Jr., Fidel Espiritu, Eufemia Rosete and Liberato Mangoba
The Samson Group contends that Elicerio, Ricardo, Fidel, and Liberato voluntarily resigned from their posts,
while Eufemia retired from her position. As their resignations and retirements were voluntary, they were not
dismissed from their employment. 38 In support of this argument, it presented copies of their resignation and
retirement letters,39 which were couched in terms of gratitude.
We disagree. While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the employees were not
coerced into resignation,40 this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they intelligently, freely and voluntarily
resigned. To rule that resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are, by themselves, conclusive proof that
the employees intended to relinquish their posts would open the floodgates to possible abuse. In order to
withstand the test of validity, resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing the
office, coupled with an act of relinquishment. 41 Therefore, in order to determine whether the employees truly
intended to resign from their respective posts, we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignation letters, but
must take into consideration the totality of circumstances in each particular case.
Here, the records show that Elicerio, Ricardo, Fidel, and Liberato only tendered resignation letters because
they were led to believe that, upon reapplication, they would be reemployed by the new management. 42 As it
turned out, except for Simeon, Jr., they were not rehired by the new management. Their reliance on the
representation that they would be reemployed gives credence to their argument that they merely submitted
courtesy resignation letters because it was demanded of them, and that they had no real intention of leaving
their posts. We therefore conclude that Elicerio, Ricardo, Fidel, and Liberato did not voluntarily resign from their
work; rather, they were terminated from their employment.
As to Eufemia, both the CA and the NLRC discussed her case together with the cases of the rest of
respondent-employees. However, a review of the records shows that, unlike her co-employees, she did not
resign; rather, she submitted a letter indicating that she was retiring from her former position. 43
The fact that Eufemia retired and did not resign, however, does not change our conclusion that illegal dismissal
took place.
Retirement, like resignation, should be an act completely voluntary on the part of the employee. If the intent to
retire is not clearly established or if the retirement is involuntary, it is to be treated as a discharge. 44
In this case, the facts show that Eufemias retirement was not of her own volition. The circumstances could not
be more telling. The facts show that Eufemia was likewise given the option to resign or retire in order to fulfill
the precondition in the Letter Agreements that the seller should "terminate/retire the employees [mutually
agreed upon] upon transfer of shares" to the buyers. 45 Thus, like her other co-employees, she first submitted a
letter of resignation dated 27 August 2001. 46 For one reason or another, instead of resigning, she chose to retire
and submitted a retirement letter to that effect.47 It was this letter that was subsequently transmitted to the
representative of the Samson Group on 11 September 2001.48
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,49 we have explained that involuntary retirement is tantamount to dismissal,
as employees can only choose the means and methods of terminating their employment, but are powerless as
to the status of their employment and have no choice but to leave the company. This rule squarely applies to
Eufemias case. Indeed, she could only choose between resignation and retirement, but was made to
understand that she had no choice but to leave SME Bank. Thus, we conclude that, similar to her other coemployees, she was illegally dismissed from employment.
The Samson Group further argues50 that, assuming the employees were dismissed, the dismissal is legal
because cessation of operations due to serious business losses is one of the authorized causes of termination
under Article 283 of the Labor Code.51
Again, we disagree.
The law permits an employer to dismiss its employees in the event of closure of the business
establishment.52However, the employer is required to serve written notices on the worker and the Department of
Labor at least one month before the intended date of closure. 53 Moreover, the dismissed employees are entitled
to separation pay, except if the closure was due to serious business losses or financial reverses. 54 However, to
be exempt from making such payment, the employer must justify the closure by presenting convincing
evidence that it actually suffered serious financial reverses.55
In this case, the records do not support the contention of SME Bank that it intended to close the business
establishment. On the contrary, the intention of the parties to keep it in operation is confirmed by the provisions
of the Letter Agreements requiring Agustin and De Guzman to guarantee the "peaceful transition of
management of the bank" and to appoint "a manager of [the Samson Groups] choice x x x to oversee bank
operations."
Even assuming that the parties intended to close the bank, the records do not show that the employees and the
Department of Labor were given written notices at least one month before the dismissal took place. Moreover,
aside from their bare assertions, the parties failed to substantiate their claim that SME Bank was suffering from
serious financial reverses.
In fine, the argument that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause holds no water.
Petitioner bank also argues that, there being a transfer of the business establishment, the innocent transferees
no longer have any obligation to continue employing respondent employees, 56 and that the most that they can
do is to give preference to the qualified separated employees; hence, the employees were validly dismissed. 57
The argument is misleading and unmeritorious. Contrary to petitioner banks argument, there was no transfer of
the business establishment to speak of, but merely a change in the new majority shareholders of the
corporation.
There are two types of corporate acquisitions: asset sales and stock sales. 58 In asset sales, the corporate
entity59sells all or substantially all of its assets60 to another entity. In stock sales, the individual or corporate
shareholders61 sell a controlling block of stock62 to new or existing shareholders.
In asset sales, the rule is that the seller in good faith is authorized to dismiss the affected employees, but is
liable for the payment of separation pay under the law.63 The buyer in good faith, on the other hand, is not
obliged to absorb the employees affected by the sale, nor is it liable for the payment of their claims. 64 The most
that it may do, for reasons of public policy and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified separated
personnel of the selling firm.65
In contrast with asset sales, in which the assets of the selling corporation are transferred to another entity, the
transaction in stock sales takes place at the shareholder level. Because the corporation possesses a
personality separate and distinct from that of its shareholders, a shift in the composition of its shareholders will
not affect its existence and continuity. Thus, notwithstanding the stock sale, the corporation continues to be the
employer of its people and continues to be liable for the payment of their just claims. Furthermore, the
corporation or its new majority share holders are not entitled to lawfully dismiss corporate employees absent a
just or authorized cause.
In the case at bar, the Letter Agreements show that their main object is the acquisition by the Samson Group of
86.365% of the shares of stock of SME Bank.66 Hence, this case involves a stock sale, whereby the transferee
acquires the controlling shares of stock of the corporation. Thus, following the rule in stock sales, respondent
employees may not be dismissed except for just or authorized causes under the Labor Code.
Petitioner bank argues that, following our ruling in Manlimos v. NLRC, 67 even in cases of stock sales, the new
owners are under no legal duty to absorb the sellers employees, and that the most that the new owners may
do is to give preference to the qualified separated employees. 68 Thus, petitioner bank argues that the dismissal
was lawful.
We are not persuaded.
Manlimos dealt with a stock sale in which a new owner or management group acquired complete ownership of
the corporation at the shareholder level.69 The employees of the corporation were later "considered terminated,
with their conformity" 70 by the new majority shareholders. The employees then re-applied for their jobs and were
rehired on a probationary basis. After about six months, the new management dismissed two of the employees
for having abandoned their work, and it dismissed the rest for committing "acts prejudicial to the interest of the
new management."71 Thereafter, the employees sought reinstatement, arguing that their dismissal was illegal,
since they "remained regular employees of the corporation regardless of the change of management." 72
In disposing of the merits of the case, we upheld the validity of the second termination, ruling that "the parties
are free to renew the contract or not [upon the expiration of the period provided for in their probationary
contract of employment]."73 Citing our pronouncements in Central Azucarera del Danao v. Court of
Appeals,74 San Felipe Neri School of Mandaluyong, Inc. v. NLRC, 75 and MDII Supervisors & Confidential
Employees Association v. Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs,76 we likewise upheld the validity of the
employees first separation from employment, pronouncing as follows:
A change of ownership in a business concern is not proscribed bylaw. In Central Azucarera del Danao vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court stated:
There can be no controversy for it is a principle well-recognized, that it is within the employers legitimate
sphere of management control of the business to adopt economic policies or make some changes or
adjustments in their organization or operations that would insure profit to itself or protect the investment of its
stockholders. As in the exercise of such management prerogative, the employer may merge or consolidate its
business with another, or sellor dispose all or substantially all of its assets and properties which may bring
about the dismissal or termination of its employees in the process. Such dismissal or termination should not
however be interpreted in such a manner as to permit the employer to escape payment of termination pay. For
such a situation is not envisioned in the law. It strikes at the very concept of social justice.
In a number of cases on this point, the rule has been laid down that the sale or disposition must be motivated
by good faith as an element of exemption from liability. Indeed, an innocent transferee of a business
establishment has no liability to the employees of the transfer or to continue employer them. Nor is the
transferee liable for past unfair labor practices of the previous owner, except, when the liability therefor is
assumed by the new employer under the contract of sale, or when liability arises because of the new owners
participation in thwarting or defeating the rights of the employees.
Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith, the transferee is under no legal duty to absorb the
transferors employees as there is no law compelling such absorption. The most that the transferee may do, for
reasons of public policy and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified separated employees in the
filling of vacancies in the facilities of the purchaser.
Since the petitioners were effectively separated from work due to a bona fide change of ownership and they
were accordingly paid their separation pay, which they freely and voluntarily accepted, the private respondent
corporation was under no obligation to employ them; it may, however, give them preference in the hiring. x x x.
(Citations omitted)
We take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Manlimos insofar as it applied a doctrine on asset sales to a
stock sale case. Central Azucarera del Danao, San Felipe Neri School of Mandaluyong and MDII Supervisors
&Confidential Employees Association all dealt with asset sales, as they involved a sale of all or substantially all
of the assets of the corporation. The transactions in those cases were not made at the shareholder level, but at
the corporate level. Thus, applicable to those cases were the rules in asset sales: the employees may be
separated from their employment, but the seller is liable for the payment of separation pay; on the other hand,
the buyer in good faith is not required to retain the affected employees in its service, nor is it liable for the
payment of their claims.
The rule should be different in Manlimos, as this case involves a stock sale. It is error to even discuss transfer
of ownership of the business, as the business did not actually change hands. The transfer only involved a
change in the equity composition of the corporation. To reiterate, the employees are not transferred to a new
employer, but remain with the original corporate employer, notwithstanding an equity shift in its majority
shareholders. This being so, the employment status of the employees should not have been affected by the
stock sale. A change in the equity composition of the corporate shareholders should not result in the automatic
termination of the employment of the corporations employees. Neither should it give the new majority
shareholders the right to legally dismiss the corporations employees, absent a just or authorized cause.
The right to security of tenure guarantees the right of employees to continue in their employment absent a just
or authorized cause for termination. This guarantee proscribes a situation in which the corporation procures the
severance of the employment of its employees who patently still desire to work for the corporation only
because new majority stockholders and a new management have come into the picture. This situation is a
clear circumvention of the employees constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure, an act that cannot
be countenanced by this Court.
It is thus erroneous on the part of the corporation to consider the employees as terminated from their
employment when the sole reason for so doing is a change of management by reason of the stock sale. The
conformity of the employees to the corporations act of considering them as terminated and their subsequent
acceptance of separation pay does not remove the taint of illegal dismissal. Acceptance of separation pay does
not bar the employees from subsequently contesting the legality of their dismissal, nor does it estop them from
challenging the legality of their separation from the service.77
We therefore see it fit to expressly reverse our ruling in Manlimos insofar as it upheld that, in a stock sale, the
buyer in good faith has no obligation to retain the employees of the selling corporation; and that the dismissal of
the affected employees is lawful, even absent a just or authorized cause.
As to Simeon Espiritu, Jr.
The CA and the NLRC discussed the case of Simeon, Jr. together with that of the rest of respondentemployees. However, a review of the records shows that the conditions leading to his dismissal from
employment are different. We thus discuss his circumstance separately.
The Samson Group contends that Simeon, Jr., likewise voluntarily resigned from his post. 78 According to them,
he had resigned from SME Bank before the share transfer took place. 79
Upon the change of ownership of the shares and the management of the company, Simeon, Jr. submitted a
letter of application to and was rehired by the new management. 80 However, the Samson Group alleged that for
purely personal reasons, he again resigned from his employment on 15 October 2001. 81
Simeon, Jr., on the other hand, contends that while he was reappointed by the new management after his letter
of application was transmitted, he was not given a clear position, his benefits were reduced, and he suffered a
demotion in rank.82 These allegations were not refuted by the Samson Group.
We hold that Simeon, Jr. was likewise illegally dismissed from his employment.
Similar to our earlier discussion, we find that his first courtesy resignation letter was also executed involuntarily.
Thus, it cannot be the basis of a valid resignation; and thus, at that point, he was illegally terminated from his
employment. He was, however, rehired by SME Bank under new management, although based on his
allegations, he was not reinstated to his former position or to a substantially equivalent one. 83 Rather, he even
suffered a reduction in benefits and a demotion in rank.84 These led to his submission of another resignation
letter effective 15 October 2001.85
We rule that these circumstances show that Simeon, Jr. was constructively dismissed. In
Peaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, 86 we have defined constructive dismissal as follows:
Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation by the employee due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable
conditions set by the employer and which arises when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer exists and has become unbearable to the employee. 87
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because "continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and other
benefits.88
These circumstances are clearly availing in Simeon, Jr.s case. He was made to resign, then rehired under
conditions that were substantially less than what he was enjoying before the illegal termination occurred. Thus,
for the second time, he involuntarily resigned from his employment. Clearly, this case is illustrative of
constructive dismissal, an act prohibited under our labor laws.
II
SME Bank, Eduardo M. Agustin, Jr. and Peregrin de Guzman, Jr. are liable for illegal dismissal.
Having ruled on the illegality of the dismissal, we now discuss the issue of liability and determine who among
the parties are liable for the claims of the illegally dismissed employees.
The settled rule is that an employer who terminates the employment of its employees without lawful cause or
due process of law is liable for illegal dismissal. 89
None of the parties dispute that SME Bank was the employer of respondent employees. The fact that there was
a change in the composition of its shareholders did not affect the employer-employee relationship between the
employees and the corporation, because an equity transfer affects neither the existence nor the liabilities of a
corporation. Thus, SME Bank continued to be the employer of respondent employees notwithstanding the
equity change in the corporation. This outcome is in line with the rule that a corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from that of its individual shareholders or members, such that a change in the
composition of its shareholders or members would not affect its corporate liabilities.
Therefore, we conclude that, as the employer of the illegally dismissed employees before and after the equity
transfer, petitioner SME Bank is liable for the satisfaction of their claims.
Turning now to the liability of Agustin, De Guzman and the Samson Group for illegal dismissal, at the outset we
point out that there is no privity of employment contracts between Agustin, De Guzman and the Samson Group,
on the one hand, and respondent employees on the other. Rather, the employment contracts were between
SME Bank and the employees. However, this fact does not mean that Agustin, De Guzman and the Samson
Group may not be held liable for illegal dismissal as corporate directors or officers. In Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane
Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC,90 we laid down the rule as regards the liability of corporate directors and
officers in illegal dismissal cases, as follows:
Unless they have exceeded their authority, corporate officers are, as a general rule, not personally liable for
their official acts, because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers, stockholders and members. However, this fictional veil may be pierced whenever the corporate
personality is used as a means of perpetuating a fraud or an illegal act, evading an existing obligation, or
confusing a legitimate issue. In cases of illegal dismissal, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable
with the corporation, where terminations of employment are done with malice or in bad faith. 91 (Citations
omitted)
Thus, in order to determine the respective liabilities of Agustin, De Guzman and the Samson Group under the
afore-quoted rule, we must determine, first, whether they may be considered as corporate directors or officers;
and, second, whether the terminations were done maliciously or in bad faith.
There is no question that both Agustin and De Guzman were corporate directors of SME Bank. An analysis of
the facts likewise reveals that the dismissal of the employees was done in bad faith. Motivated by their desire to
dispose of their shares of stock to Samson, they agreed to and later implemented the precondition in the Letter
Agreements as to the termination or retirement of SME Banks employees. However, instead of going through
the proper procedure, the bank manager induced respondent employees to resign or retire from their
respective employments, while promising that they would be rehired by the new management. Fully relying on
that promise, they tendered courtesy resignations or retirements and eventually found themselves jobless.
Clearly, this sequence of events constituted a gross circumvention of our labor laws and a violation of the
employees constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. We therefore rule that, as Agustin and De
Guzman are corporate directors who have acted in bad faith, they may be held solidarily liable with SME Bank
for the satisfaction of the employees lawful claims.
As to spouses Samson, we find that nowhere in the records does it appear that they were either corporate
directors or officers of SME Bank at the time the illegal termination occurred, except that the Samson Group
had already taken over as new management when Simeon, Jr. was constructively dismissed. Not being
corporate directors or officers, spouses Samson were not in legal control of the bank and consequently had no
power to dismiss its employees.
Respondent employees argue that the Samson Group had already taken over and conducted an inventory
before the execution of the share purchase agreement. 92 Agustin and De Guzman likewise argued that it was at
Olga Samsons behest that the employees were required to resign from their posts. 93 Even if this statement
were true, it cannot amount to a finding that spouses Samson should be treated as corporate directors or
officers of SME Bank. The records show that it was Espiritu who asked the employees to tender their
resignation and or retirement letters, and that these letters were actually tendered to him. 94 He then transmitted
these letters to the representative of the Samson Group.95 That the spouses Samson had to ask Espiritu to
require the employees to resign shows that they were not in control of the corporation, and that the former
shareholders through Espiritu were still in charge thereof. As the spouses Samson were neither corporate
officers nor directors at the time the illegal dismissal took place, we find that there is no legal basis in the
present case to hold them in their personal capacities solidarily liable with SME Bank for illegally dismissing
respondent employees, without prejudice to any liabilities that may have attached under other provisions of law.
Furthermore, even if spouses Samson were already in control of the corporation at the time that Simeon, Jr.
was constructively dismissed, we refuse to pierce the corporate veil and find them liable in their individual
steads. There is no showing that his constructive dismissal amounted to more than a corporate act by SME
Bank, or that spouses Samson acted maliciously or in bad faith in bringing about his constructive dismissal.
Finally, as regards Aurelio Villaflor, while he may be considered as a corporate officer, being the president of
SME Bank, the records are bereft of any evidence that indicates his actual participation in the termination of
respondent employees. Not having participated at all in the illegal act, he may not be held individually liable for
the satisfaction of their claims.
III
Respondent employees are entitled to separation pay, full backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
The rule is that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay
if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. 96
Courts may grant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement when the relations between the employer and the
employee have been so severely strained; when reinstatement is not in the best interest of the parties; when it
is no longer advisable or practical to order reinstatement; or when the employee decides not to be
reinstated.97 In this case, respondent employees expressly pray for a grant of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Thus, following a finding of illegal dismissal, we rule that they are entitled to the payment of
separation pay equivalent to their one-month salary for every year of service as an alternative to reinstatement.
Respondent employees are likewise entitled to full backwages notwithstanding the grant of separation pay. In
Santos v. NLRC,98 we explained that an award of backwages restores the income that was lost by reason of the
unlawful dismissal, while separation pay "provides the employee with 'the wherewithal during the period that he
is looking for another employment." 99 Thus, separation pay is a proper substitute only for reinstatement; it is not
an adequate substitute for both reinstatement and backwages. 100 Hence, respondent employees are entitled to
the grant of full backwages in addition to separation pay.
As to moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, we uphold the appellate court's grant thereof
based on our finding that the forced resignations and retirement were fraudulently done and attended by bad
faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petitions for Review are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97510 dated 13 March 2008
and 1 September 2008,respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it held Abelardo P.
Samson, Olga Samson and Aurelio Villaflor, Jr. solidarily liable for illegal dismissal.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97942 dated 15 January
2008 and 19 February 2009,respectively, are likewise REVERSED and SETASIDE insofar as it held Abelardo
P. Samson, Olga Samson and Aurelio Villaflor, Jr. solidarily liable for illegal dismissal.
We REVERSE our ruling in Manlimos v. NLRC insofar as it upheld that, in a stock sale, the buyer in good faith
has no obligation to retain the employees of the selling corporation, and that the dismissal of the affected
employees is lawful even absent a just or authorized cause.
SO ORDERED.