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AWAKENINGS
INTOLERABLE DAMAGE
http://www.iasa.com.au http://www.iasa-intl.com/
Fall 2001
Awakenings
The Magazine of the International Aviation Safety Association
Contents
TSB Wiring Recommendations ……………………. 3
“the inadequacy of aircraft wire certification testing”
Intolerable Damage…………………………………….……………. 9
Martin Aubury discusses damage tolerance and the need for timely inspections.
Wire Recommendations
By John Sampson IASA Australia
August 28, 2001: ``A specific spark, Stringent flammability regulations are
whatever the location, should not bring applied to materials in the passenger
down an airplane with 229 people on compartments of aircraft, but Gerden
board,'' Daniel Verreault, the board's said there are fewer restrictions on
director of air investigations, told a materials used in inaccessible areas of
news conference releasing the report. planes. The board is particularly
``There should be defenses in place to concerned about the qualification
prevent this, and that is an objective testing of aviation wiring that examines
that we have and that is the way that only individual wires, not live wire
we believe we can contribute to bundles, and inexplicably does not look
advancing aviation safety.'' Of the 2 at how wires carrying an electrical
million pieces of aircraft recovered from current can ignite a fire. Some types of
the Atlantic seabed in their efforts to aromatic polyimide wiring (such as
determine the cause of the crash, Kapton) are known to arc-track. Arc
Conclusion
The TSB is concerned that there
remain safety deficiencies in the
material flammability standards, and Previous Recommendations
that these pose an unacceptable risk
to the flying public. January 1999: FAA is asked to inspect cockpit
wiring on all MD-11s.
First, in a series of aviation safety
recommendations issued in March 1999: The Canadian board recommends
flight recorders have independent power sources
December 2000 and entitled In-Flight and be able to record up to two hours rather than
Firefighting, the Board stated that 30 minutes.
material flammability standards for
aeronautical products are an integral August 1999: Advisory issued that Mylar use be
component of any in-flight firefighting reduced or eliminated. FAA orders metallized Mylar
"system". The Board is concerned blanket insulation be replaced after it is found to be
flammable.
that the flammability standards for
certain materials used in the September 1999: FAA bans the in-flight
pressurized portion of aircraft are entertainment system used on Flight 111, calling it
inadequate. "not compatible with the design concept of the MD-
11."
Second, despite many ongoing
initiatives to mitigate electrical wire April 2000: FAA orders map-reading lights on MD-
11s inspected or shut off. In inspections of about 12
discrepancies, the Board believes aircraft, flammable Mylar blanket insulation was
that the certification test criteria for found pressed against many of the lights and
aircraft wires do not adequately showed signs of heat damage.
address the potential for wire failures
to ignite or propagate fires. April 2000: The Federal Aviation Administration
issues eight safety orders concerning MD-11
electrical systems, bringing to over 30 the number
Third, indications that the failure of of airworthiness directives released since the
certain aircraft systems, such as crew crash.
oxygen, could exacerbate a fire in
progress suggest that current December 2000: The Canadian board issues five
requirements for conducting system safety recommendations aimed at detecting and
safety failure analysis may be suppressing in-flight fires. Also recommends
revising cockpit crew's emergency checklist to save
inadequate. time in event of fire
Useful Links:
Although nearly 13 years have passed Please note that the International
since it was published its importance to Aviation Safety Association (IASA) is
the wider debate is perhaps finally being not responsible for the material and/or
given the credit it deserves. How? One of content of the sites to which it provides
the non-governmental projects for wire Internet links.
system safety cited in the WSSIWG’s
Final Report is being undertaken by NRC Information Notice No. 88-89:
EPRI who “Evaluated the polyimide Link 1
(Kapton®) problems identified in naval
aircraft with respect to nuclear plant EPRI Report “Review of Polyimide
applications”. Their report, titled “Review Insulated Wire in Nuclear Power
of Polyimide Insulated Wire in Nuclear Plants”: Link 2
Power Plants”, was published on
February 1, 1991. In the abstract to the WSSIWG Final Report: Link 3
report reference is made to the
“Problems due to handling damage of Committee on Aging Avionics in
Kapton wire recently led the NRC to Military Aircraft Report: Link 4
issue an Information Notice (No. 88-89)”.
LINKS
1 http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/GENACT/GC/IN/1988/in88089.txt
2 http://www.epri.com/OrderableitemDesc.asp?product_id=NP-7189
3 http://scitech.dot.gov/polplan/wirerpt/index.html
4 http://books.nap.edu/books/0309074495/html/R11.html
Contributed by AOPIS.ORG
With incidents of smoke and or fumes New oils being introduced (MJO291)
entering into aircraft cabins due to are not phosphate free.
leakage by oils & hydraulic fluids
ongoing for at least 20 years, a recent Along with strong evidence of under-
Australian Senate Inquiry revealed reporting, the Inquiry recognised the
the problem is a major concern for presence of fumes and associated
the safe operation of aircraft and crew effects conflicted with the
health of crews. Regulations and recommended that
when fumes occurred the aircraft
While the focus was on the BAe146, should be immediately withdrawn
other aircraft including B757, A320 & from service until fully rectified.
MD80 have experienced incidents of
crew exposure, around the world, A range of health effects experienced
with varying levels of incapacitation. by crew and linked to aircraft fumes
are sufficiently consistent to indicate
Crews inhaling bleed air the possibility of a discrete
contaminants at altitude are exposed occupational health condition termed
to a range of substances including aerotoxic syndrome with numerous
organophosphates, hydrocarbons, C0 flight crew having lost their flight
& C02. Mobil Jet Oil II containing medicals and no longer able to fly.
Tricresyl phosphate (TCP) at 3% was
always known to include a low level The growing list of incidents
of the neurotoxic ortho isomer TOCP demonstrates there is a significant
but Mobil revealed to the Senate risk of a serious incident occurring.
Inquiry that it included higher Many feel the long term welfare of
quantities of the isomers MOCP & crews and the safety aspects of
DOCP having a significantly higher potential crew contamination must be
toxicity than TOCP. Industry reliance taken more seriously and that a crew
that the oil contains low levels of testing procedure be introduced to
TOCP underestimates the toxicity by assess what crews are being
a factor of at least 30,000. The oil can exposed to, whilst a full and
label states “Prolonged or repeated independent investigation takes place
breathing of oil mist, or prolonged or into the toxic nature of hydraulic fluids
repeated skin contact can cause and oils such as MJOII.
nervous system effects”
There was a time when the mere The FAA requested $22 million for fiscal
mention of flaws in aircraft wiring would year 2001 for aging aircraft research, the
be greeted with derision and disbelief. bulk of which it spends on methods to
However, now that there is a predict and detect fatigue cracking and
widespread acceptance that aircraft corrosion of aircraft structures. According
wiring deserves its place under the to the Office of the Inspector General the
proverbial microscope, attention has FAA “needs to rethink its planned
now shifted to methods of inspection investments in aircraft safety research to
and technological aids in detection of determine the correct mix of structural and
wiring flaws. But do these apparent non-structural research”
advances in acceptance of the central
problem herald a more sinister The FAA has often been criticised for
problem? Are we investing so heavily concentrating too much of its efforts on
in Prevention that we have abandoned data collation to the detriment of a
Cure? concerted effort in the form of “action”.
Even this is now further eroded, by the
The Office of the Inspector General recognition that even the all-important data
Audit Report, Observations On Efforts is incomplete and unreliable. The Office of
to Address Concerns About Aircraft the Inspector General found that
Wiring (Report No. AV-2001-004 “meaningful analysis could not be
Issued October 27, 2000), echoes our performed because coding to specifically
concerns. The report stresses the identify wiring problems is not available”.
“need for action by various parties” and
identifies three specific areas where The acceptance of the central problem has
improvements are needed: exposed the fundamental flaws in the
infrastructure that is now charged with the
1. Improved Maintenance task of solving it. An industry that can be
Practices prone not to report a problem, a system
2. Better Training for Maintenance that cannot as yet properly record an event
Personnel & FAA Inspectors for trend analysis, a regulator that does not
3. New Technologies for Detecting allocate resources adequately and that
& Preventing Problems makes decisions on incomplete and
misleading data.
But the Report also asks, “when
improvements in these areas can be Is the flying public justified in its concerns
made” and equally critical, has the FAA that aircraft wiring is as much a
allocated resources appropriately in compromise to their safety as those whose
addressing this complex issue? mandate it is to make flying safer?
More automatic, pilot- response. The not so good Also developed during the
friendly Avionics features was that the higher early years were the power
mean more computing voltages and distribution systems we see
power is required. accompanying higher on both Military and
power levels made Commercial aircraft.
Computer “power” depends miniaturization difficult if not Evolving gradually from
largely on the clock speeds impossible. A second years of flight, the systems
at which the CPU cycles issue was the speed began as battery systems
are timed. Also a factor is restriction imposed by the using Direct Current (DC).
the level of voltages used higher logic levels. Digital DC aircraft systems
for the data bus operations. switching is not generally used a single
Years ago +28 Volts Direct instantaneous, it takes a wire to provide power to a
Current (VDC) was and is finite amount of time for a load. The airframe was
still used today. Being a transistor to slew between used as a return current
digital circuit, the +28 VDC path back to the battery.
logic line was either “true”
(+28VDC) or “false (0VDC). The maturing need for
The voltage tolerances more sophisticated
were very forgiving, often Avionics drove the need for
“true” was considered an Alternating Current
anything greater than system. Today, aircraft AC
+24VDC, “false” was systems use a grounded
considered anything less WYE, 200 volt three phase
than +5VDC. 400 Hertz generator and
distribution system as
Early Avionics Test specified by MIL-STD-704.
systems of the 1970’s used Aircraft AC systems today
18VDC for logic operations, a “0” and a +28VDC level. are allowed to use the
with correspondingly This limitation served to airframe for the return of
reduced thresholds. Any restrict the system clock AC currents to the
voltage in-between the speeds and thus generator, thus eliminating
“false” and “true” realm was throughput. the weight and volume
a “no-operation”, i.e., required for a Neutral
disregarded. The higher Modern logic levels are conductor. MIL-STD-761
voltage data systems much lower, some systems authorizes the use of the
offered good and not so use +5VDC and even airframe for AC and DC
good benefits. A good +2.2VDC for extremely return currents.
benefit was the noise high-speed parallel
immunity. It was very processors. Logic system noise margin
difficult for a random requirements and aircraft
electrical noise pulse to The available noise margin power system practices
“false trigger” a “true” is essentially gone. meet head-on at the
Truth &
Reconciliation
One of the aviation safety benefits of flammable (but not inflammatory)
the Internet is that research can give oxygen canisters in its hold but it also
fresh insights into the past, enable had defective electrics and a type of
new perspectives on old accidents wiring (PVC) that is no longer
and disclose underlying trends approved - and for good reason.
against the backdrop of more recent TWA800 theorists have run the full
events. Ever since the 27 Nov 87 gamut of criminal, terrorist and
crash of an SAA 747 Combi off conspiracy /cover-up scenarios yet
Mauritius, rumour and speculation the top contender is once again not
about the cause of its onboard fire one of the preferred "usual suspects";
has been rife. Last year the South it is proven defective wiring. June 85
African Truth and Reconciliation and Air India 182 suffered a sudden
Commission decided to address this explosive decompression at altitude,
festering sore with a view to laying it the prime suspects automatically
all to rest. Those good intentions becoming Sikh Terrorists - simply
backfired. On the IASA web site there because of the politics of the time,
are 18 pages packed with the various and because Canadian Sikhs could
facts and potential fictions about "the be woven into the pre-flight chain of
Helderberg", including "fresh events. Although they are two very
evidence" as to its real cargo (from a distinctly different forensic events (see
May 2000 scientifically enhanced later), the "explosive" decompression
CVR tape). It's recommended reading gradually found its definitive
because there is an underlying development into "there needing
lesson, one that has emerged therefore to have been a bomb". The
repeatedly in accidents such as RCMP doggedly pursued this line of
TWA800, Valujet 592 and AI182 (to inquiry for decades and two
name but three). In the aftermath of individuals (Sikhs of course) will soon
those accidents, certain conclusions face trial. It is human nature to
could be drawn from particular facts, assume that there is a culprit and that
but always the proof positive was blame must be laid. Foul play is
lacking. VJ592 had a cargo of always suspected if there's any lack