SUFFRAGE DIGESTS

NOLASCO v COMELEC
275 SCRA 763 (1997)
FACTS:
2 cases merged.
In the election for Mayor in Meycauayan, Bulacan, Blanco won over Alarilla, while
Nolasco was elected vice-mayor.
Alarilla, 2nd placer filed a disqualification case against Mayor-elect Blanco for
alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus
Election massive vote buying, bribery, terrorizing the people, spending in excess
of that allowed under election code.
Nolasco intervened, saying as the vice-mayor, he should be declared as mayor
when Blanco was finally disqualified citing Sec 44 of the Local Government Code,
viz:
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice
governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor x x x a
permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
ISSUE:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla
as the duly elected mayor
RULING:
1. NO. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum quantum of
evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation.
2. YES. Nolasco should be adjudged as the Mayor. Candidate with the second
highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind
of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the
elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the
condition would have substantially changed. (Reyes v COMELEC).
3. SC said that the current involves more than the mayoralty but also concerns the
right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism. Its the means by which our
people express their sovereign judgment. Its free exercise must be protected
especially against the purchasing power of the peso.

PEOPLE VS. SAN JUAN

G.R. No. L-22944 February 10, 1968
FACTS:
The abovenamed accused CLAUDIA SAN JUAN and SEVERO SAN JUAN,
conspiring, cooperating, confabulating and helping with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with the use of force, prevent the
complaining witness GENEROSA PILAPIL from exercising her right to freely enter
the polling place of Precinct No. 1 in order to vote.
Sec 133 of the Revised Election Code reads:
The voters shall have the right to vote in the order of their entrance into the polling place. The
voters shall have the right to freely enter the polling place as soon as they arrive unless there
are more than forty voters waiting inside x x x

Succinct to the point of curtness the one-sentence order appealed from decree that
"As the facts charged do not constitute an offense, pursuant to the ruling of our
Supreme Court in the case of U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, this case is hereby
dismissed".
ISSUE:
Whether the indictment sufficiently avers all the essential elements of the
prescribed act.
RULING:
Yes, Upon the foregoing disquisition, SC holds that the information here satisfies
the requirements for the legal sufficiency of an indictment lodged under section 133
of the Revised Election Code.
Indeed, each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign
will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will
must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every
assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the
unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice.
For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the
right of suffrage is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process. As
numerous as they are insidious are long-standing techniques of terror and
intimidation that have been conceived by man in derogation of the right of
suffrage which we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned.
When the legislature provided in section 133 of the Revised Election Code an
explicit and unequivocal guarantee of a voter's free access to the polling place, it
could have intended no purpose other than to maintain inviolate the right to vote by
safeguarding the voter against all manner of unauthorized interference and travesty
that surveyors of fear can devise.
Every unlawful obstacle, by whatever means or method, interposed to the free entry
of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at the very heart of the right
of suffrage.
In the phrase of Mr. Justice Jose Laurel
As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded,
suffrage, whatever be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the
means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into receptacular
agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good
government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the

enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source

of the established authority.
MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003
FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the
said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can
be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
RULING:
No.There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee
voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election
laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return
to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
An absentee is not a resident and vice versa. However, under existing election laws
and the countless jurisprudence, an absentee remains attached to his residence in
the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile, unless he
has abandoned his domicile of origin. Sec 2 is an exception to the residency
requirement in Sec 1.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress
to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vicepresidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation
of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and
was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

YRA VS ABANO
52 Phil 380
FACTS:
Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the
proper age, he transferred to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily
residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a
member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan
to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has considered himself a
resident of Meycauayan.
When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made an application for
cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated April 3, 1928, but this
application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited
in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano presented himself as a
candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was
elected by popular vote to that office.
Respondent won the elections and was declared as municipal president of
Meycauayan.
Petitioner assailed the eligibility of the respondent alleging that he had not been a
resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election. Petitioner
adds at least since May 19, 1927, Abano has been a resident of Meycauayan or
more than the one-year period fixed by the law as a prerequisite to election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is legible to hold a municipal office given he was not a
"qualified voter in his municipality" not a "qualified elector therein."
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court rules in favor of the respondent and declared complaint
as without merit.
Election Law, as amended, in section 404 provides that "No person shall be
eligible . . . for any elective . . . municipal office unless, within the time fixed by law,
he shall file a duly sworn certificate of candidacy. Said certificate shall declare . . .
that he is a resident of the . . . municipality, . . . in which his candidacy is offered;
that he is a duly qualified elector therein, and that he is eligible to the office." The
Administrative Code in section 2174, in giving the qualifications of elective officers,
also provides that "An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be
a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least
one year . . . ." Section 431 of the Election Law prescribes the qualifications for
voters, section 432 the disqualifications.
The Committee of the Philippine Assembly reached the conclusion that the words
"qualified elector" meant a person who had all of the qualifications provided by law
to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list.
Senator Jose P. Laurel in his Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, pages 32,
33, summarizes the law on the subject in the following language:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his
candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau

has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a
qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is
sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431
and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a
candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive
him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.
It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly one of first impression in this
jurisdiction, we would be more impressed with the potent points made by the
appellant. In view, however, of the authorities herein- before mentioned, we are
loath to depart from them, particularly as the language which goes to make up
these authorities, on close examination, is found to rest on reason. The distinction is
between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified
elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
such right.
It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their
choice to be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate
should be respected.

To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment
of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as
to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:

AKBAYAN YOUTH VS COMELEC

355 SCRA 318
FACTS:
Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act
No. 8189.
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco,
Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and Peoples
Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a
public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of
voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC
deadline.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the
petition.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II(YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposedDecember 27, 2000-deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
RULING:
The petitions are bereft of merit.

SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE

PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT
LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED
IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE
WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY,
PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.
Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others,
speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion
of voters from the permanent voters list, provides:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List Any registered voter,
representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred
(100) days prior to a regular election xxx.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others,
the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental
charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996, continuing
registration to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of
the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its
Comment: x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration
since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying
voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other
hand serves the purpose of securing the voters substantive right to be included in
the list of voters.
In real-world terms, this means that if a special voters registration is conducted,
then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted
to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voters list since we
would already be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a
flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this would open the registration

process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the voters list, and
consequently, that of the entire election.
x x x It must be remembered that the period serve a vital role in protecting the
integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC
would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We
would be obliged to simply take them at face value. If we compromise on these
safety nets, we may very well end up with a voters list full of flying voters,
overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts x x x.
x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of
registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of
whom might not even be qualified to vote. x x x the very possibility that we shall be
conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of
doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown
the results of the elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many
courts validate our own results. x x x
Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be
denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right
to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then
enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet
generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the
duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times. Considering the circumstances where the writ of
mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief
that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are
entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.
For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of
voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual
date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled
by mandamus.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST v. COMELEC
G.R. No 189868, Dec 15, 2009
FACTS:
The country prepares to elect its next set of leaders on May 10, 2010, the Court
upholds this primordial right.
On November 12, 2008, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 8514
COMELEC Resolution No. 8514 set December 2, 2008 to December 15, 2009 as
the period of continuing voter registration using the biometrics process in all areas
nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585
COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 adjusts the deadline of voter registration to
October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution
No. 8514.

The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline
notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing
mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for the automated elections.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null
and void, and that the COMELEC be accordingly required to extend the voter
registration until January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive
period starting on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains that Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA 6646) and
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA 8436) 5 authorize it to fix other dates for
preelection acts which include voter registration
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is valid.
RULING:
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. Preserving the
sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the
consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function
of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional
declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them, bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter
registration in Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days
before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for
the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming
elections including:
(1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of
official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia;
(2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the determination of
the precincts to which they shall be assigned;
(3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List;
(4) supervision of the campaign period; and
(5) preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voter's Information Sheet.
Such determination of Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative power,
which this Court is bound to respect. And the COMELEC's rule-making power
should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the
COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if
the same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law.

 In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of
continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided
by RA 8189, Sec. 8. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its
power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
In said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion
in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of the December
27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day
prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189,
and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001,
clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
had the therein petitioners filed their petition and sought an extension date that
was before the 120-day prohibitive period, their prayer would have been granted
pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189.
In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition
(October 30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the
120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to the
extension prayed for.
The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of
voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared
null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010
elections on October 31, 2009.
ROMUALDEZ v. RTC
226 SCRA 406
FACTS:
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines
the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and
nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision
to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the
construction of his residential house therein.
He soon thereafter also served as a Barangay Captain of the place.
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were
about to come to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President,
fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country.
Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate family, left the
Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.)
government granted.
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to
run for a congressional seat in Leyte but the flight was somehow aborted.
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb,
District Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him
that he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992
Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines,
arriving on 23 December 1991 apparently without any government travel document.

When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his
residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
During the registration of voters conducted by the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized National and Local
Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at
Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
private respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal
Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of
voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166.
Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that
his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in
the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the
Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as
a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
ISSUE:
WON Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
RULING:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention".
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early
1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi . The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have
truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern
over the safety and welfare of the members of their immediate families. Their going
into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable.
Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as
"voluntary", or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these
terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us
that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and
established his domicile elsewhere.

WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE; the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be
a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter
thereat. Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the
list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED
and petition DISMISSED

COMELECS RULING:

in the whole town of Tapul, out of the 11,575 votes cast, only 13 were definitely
established as cast by the registered voters.
In Parang, where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67 precincts, it was made
to appear that 11,083 votes were cast. An examination of the thumbprints of those
who voted compared with the corresponding thumbprints of the registered voters
appearing in their registration record showed that only 39 thumbprints were of
registered voters. 1,573 signatures were found to be by persons other than the
registered voters and only 83 were found to be identical with those of the registered
voters. The evidence also showed that in a number of precincts in Parang armed
men had entered the polling places and prepared the ballots.
In Luuk where there were 13,124 registered voters, 12,263 votes were cast. 281
persons who were not registered voters in this precinct were able to vote illegally
without even using the names of the registered voters. The thumbprints of those
who voted appearing in their voting record compared with the thumbprints of the
registered voters appearing in the voter's registration record showed that only 22 of
the thumbmarks of those who voted were identical with the thumbmarks of the
registered voters, while 6,021 were found to be different from those of the
registered voters.
In the light of the above and finding no need to determine how the election was in
fact conducted as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan, Panamao, South Ubian, Balimbing,
Bongao and Tandubas, it was the holding of the Commission in the resolution of
May 14, 1971: "1. To rule by unanimous vote that the returns from the 107 precincts
of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk are
spurious and/or manufactured returns or no returns at all and as such should be
excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone congressional
district of the province of Sulu;

conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the Commission is of the opinion that
the elections in said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections
in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said
municipalities as the voting was done by persons other than the registered voters
while armed men went from precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated
how the election returns were to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled
the Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns
as no returns at all or spurious or manufactured returns compelling us with much
greater justification to find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are
spurious returns or manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections
in said municipalities are sham."
In Siasi where there were 21,688 registered voters it was made to appear that
20,970 had voted. However, the result of the examination of the thumbmarks and
signatures of those who voted compared with the fingerprints of the registered
voters appearing in their registration record showed that only 460 of the registered
voters had been definitely established to have actually voted, 131 identified through
the thumbmarks and 329 by their signatures.
In Tapul where there were 12,223 registered voters it appeared that 11,575 votes
were cast. 197 persons were able to vote without CE Form No. 1 without using the
names of registered voters in the precinct. When the thumbprints corresponding to
the 11,575 votes cast were examined only 3 were found to be identical with the
thumbprints of the registered voters in their registration record. It also appeared that

RULING:
It is the decision of this Court, after a careful study of the pleadings and in the light
of our decision last month in Usman v. Commission on Elections, that the
challenged resolution of respondent Commission of May 14, 1971 is in accordance
with law. The petition must therefore fail.
1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of
power to disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56
precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being
spurious or manufactured.
It goes without saying that what is contemplated in the law is that the electors
in the exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of
suffrage, with the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes
duly obtained after an honest count. It is on that basis that election returns are to
be made. Where no such election was in fact held as was found by respondent
Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear
duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and
therefore bereft of any value.
Nor is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject returns of such a character
has been exercised most judiciously. Even a cursory perusal of the mode and
manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission resulting in the
challenged resolution should suffice to remove any doubt as to the absence of
any impropriety or improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative. Clearly,
there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective of

PUNGUTAN VS ABUBAKAR
G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972
FACTS:
Respondent Abubakar and the other candidates alleged that in the towns of Siasi,
Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections for the 1970 Constitutional Convention were
in effect held in view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud.
Petitioner Pungutan answered that the elections were duly held in the abovementioned municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive
fraud, terrorism and serious irregularities.
Petitioner disputes the power of respondent Commission to exclude such returns as
a result of oral testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and
signatures of those who allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no election
in fact did take place.

COMELEC ruled that with respect to the manner in which the elections were

insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly
there is a frustration of such an ideal.
2. The right to vote is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in
the people becomes nugatory. 2
How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. 22 Its
enforcement under the Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent
Commission. Such a power, however, is purely executive or administrative. As
characterized by the Chief Justice in Abcede v. Imperial, it is a branch of the
executive department although independent of the President to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.' ...."
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find
redress in the judiciary as the guardian of constitutional rights, is excluded from
the authority vested in respondent Commission. If the exclusion of the returns
from the four towns in Sulu involved a question as to such a right, then, clearly,
what the Commission did was beyond its competence. Such is not the case
however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of whether
or not a person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage.
Thus, the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly
judicial. 24
As to whether or not an election has been held is a question of a different type.
It is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of respondent Commission. If,
as is our decision, no such voting did take place, considering the massive
irregularities that attended it in the four towns, then the exclusion of the alleged
returns is not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second issue raised by
petitioner that in so acting the respondent Commission exceeded its
constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote
being involved, is likewise to be resolved against him. At any rate, what was set
forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Diaz v. Commission on Elections 25 would
likewise dispose of such a contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is pleaded
by respondents that the rejection of the Sagada returns would result in the
disfranchisement of a large number of legitimate voters. But such
disfranchisement would only be provisional, subject to the final determination of
the validity of the votes at the protest that may be filed with the Constitutional
Convention." 26
3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that in the event that the challenged
resolution of May 14, 1971 as to the power of respondent Commission is
sustained, a special election be called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four
municipalities of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk. We see no reason to order such
a special election.
DISMISSED.
DOMINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999
FACTS:
Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of

his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected
for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.[3]
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy alleging that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration
in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations,
private respondents presented several documents as evidence: Certificate of
Candidacy, Voters Registration Record indicating precinct at Old Balara, Quezon
City, Community Tax Certificate, etc.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January
1997, presenting the following in support of the said contention: Contract of Lease
of certain properties, transfer of registration from QC to Sarangani, etc.
COMELECS RULING
COMELEC 2nd Division declared Domino disqualified as candidate for the position
of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on
the basis of the following findings:

Dominos Voters Registration Record dated June 22, 1997 shows that his
address is at Old Balara, QC. This negates his claim that he already established
his residence at Sarangani as early as January 1997.
COMELEC en banc denied his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring
petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and
binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
RULING:
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province
of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC
cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the
COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence
of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of
voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the
COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass
upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are
summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant
conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in
the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the

COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass

upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the
inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to
inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said
authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being
excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings
had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.[13] In this sense, it does
not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the
subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding
would neither be conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.[15]
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar[16] we ruled that:
xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in
question has become final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of
the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and
intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in
such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of
persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellants
petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a
Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been
left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of
Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voters registration from
Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial
court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of
another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is
limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to
declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he
is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification. The trial court has
no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence
to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under
Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. [17] The only effect of the decision of the lower court
excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration
Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters registration record
from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and
thereafter place the record in the inactive file.[18]
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action are indispensable requirements for the
application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR,
is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by
DOMINO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the
Voters List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents
against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For
the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential
that there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties,

identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action. [19] In the present case, the
aforesaid essential requisites are not present.

UTUTALUM VS COMELEC
181 SCRA 335
FACTS:
Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes
out of the 39,801 voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner would have
lead of 5,301 votes.
Petitioner filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they
appear to be tampered with or falsified owing to the great excess of votes
appearing in the said returns.
Petitioner claimed there were ghost voters double the actual electorate population
in Siasi and asked Comelec to reject the election returns therein and to annul
private respondents proclamation.
Comelec resolved that there was no failure of elections in Siasi.
Meanwhile, another person petitioned that Comelec to annul the list of voters of
Siasi, re: Local govt officials.
Comelec annulled the same due to massive irregularities committed in the
preparation thereof and for being statistically improbable, ordering a new
registration of voters. However, Comelec refused to apply its resolution annulling
the Siasi returns in the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of
the results since the original List of Voters had been finally annulled.
RULING:
The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List
of Voters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could have been
legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out of the 39,801
voters.
Petitioners cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation
controversy. To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower it
to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a questioned
registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who
could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of a
voters list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation
controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not
the Board of Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to specified
election returns against which the petitioner should have made verbal elections

 The subsequent annulment of the voting list in a separate proceeding initiated motu
proprio by the Commission and in which the protagonists here were not parties,
cannot retroactively and without due process result in nullifying accepted election
returns in a previous election simply because such returns came from municipalities
where the precinct books of voters were ordered annulled due to irregularities in
their preparation. The List of Voters used in the 1987 Congressional elections was
then a validly existing and still unquestioned permanent Registry List. Then, it was
the only legitimate roster which could be used as basis for voting. Also, there was
no res judicata. Moreover, the preparation of a voter's list is not a proceeding before
the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to challenges
directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election, and such
challenges should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner
should have made specific verbal objections, but did not. That the padding of the
List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election Inspectors may
have fraudulently conspired in its preparation, would not be a valid basis for a preproclamation controversy either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are
asserted, the proper course of action is an election protest. Lastly, where the
winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation controversies
cease. The remedy of the petitioner lies with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
SARANGANI VS COMELEC
334 SCRA 379
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of several
precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur.
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City was to conduct a rigorous incisive
investigation on the alleged ghost precincts in the 12 barangays and thereafter
submit a report on the investigation conducted. Among the brgys was PadianTorogan, which came out to mean a cemetery, the area of which only had 2
structures erected a concrete house w/o a roof, and a wooden structure w/o walls
and roof.
The report showed such and basing on it, Comelec issued an Order finding Padian
Torogan a ghost precinct.
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.
RULING:
NO.
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least
one precinct per barangay. In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually
refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain
election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said
precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored
precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Upon review of the
records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the

facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place,
hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a
fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the
place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the
fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a
unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition
of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the case of a
barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be
done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned
subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebisciteconducted for the purpose in
the political units affected.
The findings of Comelec cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari when no
significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded which when considered would have substantially affected the outcome
of the case. The Comelec has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an
election by means available to it. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled
for. No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exists. Suffrage is conferred
by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise
disqualified by law.
On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the
validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage
because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of
some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will
of the people