Round WPCP vs Phoinex

1NC

1NC
The risk of a successful attack on the homeland is high in the status quo.
Domestic surveillance capabilities are absolutely vital to deterrence and
disruption.
Etzioni 15 [Amitai. Elliott School faculty member specializing in Sociological analysis of international
relations, civil society, and transnational norms at George Washington University. NSA: National
Security vs Individual Rights Intelligence and National Security, Vol 30 N1. Winter 2015. Available via
the University of Michigan Libraries]

Those who hold that terrorism has much subsided can draw on President Obama's statements.

The President announced in May 2013 that the core of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time
thinking about their own safety than plotting against us,21 and echoing this sentiment in August when he stated that core Al Qaeda is on its heels, has been
decimated.22 Administration officials have been similarly optimistic regarding the diminished terror threat.23 And he pivoted US foreign policy away from a focus
on the Middle East in favor of a focus on East Asia.24 However, since then there has been a steady stream of reports that suggest that much remains to be done in

Core Al Qaeda is
regrouping under the banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Ayman al-Zawahiri has taken over Osama bin Laden's vacated position. It
has expanded from 200300 members in 2009 to over 1000 today.25 This group was behind the most specific and
credible threat since the attacks on 9/11, which led to the closure of dozens of American embassies across the Middle East.26 And it managed to capture
and control significant territory in Yemen.27 Al Qaeda affiliates are growing in strength and spreading into
additional nations.28 Al Qaeda increasingly is relying on a decentralized network of collaborating terrorist affiliates.29 Affiliates include groups in
facing terrorism, indeed that Al Qaeda is rebuilding its strength and that the pivot to the Far East may well have been premature.

Africa (a network that spans Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Libya),30 the Caucasus, Syria, and Somalia.31 Taken together, Al Qaeda franchises and fellow
travelers now control more territory and can call on more fighters, than at any time since Osama bin Laden created the organization 25 years ago.32 Al Qaeda in Iraq

The group has transformed Iraq into a staging point

has recently started a bombing campaign that killed over 1000 people.
for incursions into the Syrian civil war.33 At the same time, Syria is turning into a haven and breeding ground for terrorists: an even more powerful variant of what
Afghanistan was more than 30 years ago.34 It is estimated that there are as many as 17,000 foreign fighters in the country, most from Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.35

Al Qaeda and its

subsidiaries have shown that they are agile and able to adapt as revealed in their use of ink cartridges as a bomb
Western intelligence officials worry that Syria is developing into one of the biggest terrorist threats in the world today.36

and implanted explosives undetectable by airport scanners. Finally, terrorists have been trying to get nuclear weapons. Both Russia and Pakistan have less-thanfully-secured nuclear arms within their borders,37 and Pakistan has experienced at least six serious terrorist attempts to penetrate its nuclear facilities.38 A rule that

if the disutility of a particular event is very high, some carefully-designed

security measures are justified even if the probability is very low. This point requires some elaboration.
There is a tendency to assume that if it is very unlikely that one will face a given risk, that
it is rational to ignore it. It makes little sense to carry an umbrella if the likelihood that it will rain is 1 in a 1000, let alone 1 in 10,000. However,
this rule of thumb ignores the magnitude of the risk. The larger the risk even if the probability remains
unchanged and low the more security measures it justifies. In short, given the level of risk
posed by terrorists in general, and in particular if they acquire WMDs, this risk provides justification for some
enhancements of security measures, a core element of the liberal communitarian balance especially, we shall see, if they
are minimally intrusive or not intrusive at all. That is, they do not diminish the other core
element: individual rights. B. Terrorists Cannot Be Handled Like Criminals Critics
applies here is that

argue that terrorists could be handled like other criminals and hence no special counterterrorism programs are needed.39 There are, however, strong counter-

terrorists should be treated as a distinct category. First and foremost, dealing

with terrorists requires a focus on preventing attacks before they occur . This point is particularly evident in
arguments that suggest that

light of the concern that terrorists may acquire WMDs. Whatever deterrent benefit their punishment might have,40 bringing terrorists to trial after they turn part of a

there
is little reason to think that those willing to commit suicide during their attack can be
deterred at all; such people have little to lose. None of the 19 people who attacked the US homeland in 2001, terrorized a nation, and left a deep mark on
major city into a radioactive desert, even if they merely use a dirty bomb, is vastly outweighed by the magnitude of the harm already done.41 In any case,

American psyche, can be brought to trial. Even terrorists not bent on committing suicide attacks are often true believers who are willing to proceed despite whatever
punishments the legal system may throw at them.42 Law enforcement assumes that punishment after the fact serves to deter future crimes (the intent is not to
eliminate them but to keep them at a socially acceptable level),43 a premise that does not hold when it comes to acts of terror or bringing justice to terrorists because
the first priority of counterterrorism is to thwart their designs rather than to try in vain to capture and prosecute terrorists in the aftermath of an attack that often is

Affording terror suspects the right to legal counsel prior to undergoing

imposes a severe cost: information that can no longer be acquired through
questioning. One may suggest that a terrorist could refuse to talk, even if not granted this privilege. However, adhering to the regular law enforcement
much more damaging than most criminal acts.
interrogation

procedures would require that, if a terrorist asks for a legal counsel, the authorities no longer talk to him, offer deals, or give incentives, let alone apply pressure.

Given that terrorists often act in groups and pose more harm than most criminals, the
notion of legally binding investigators such that they cannot adequately question a terrorist who has been caught at least until an
attorney is found tilts too far from protecting the common good. 44 One may say there is already a public safety exception

that applies to emergency situations. When dealing with transnational terrorists, this should be the rule, not the exception.45 In addition, the criminal procedures of
open arrest records, charging suspects within 48 hours under most circumstances, and the guarantee of a speedy trial all undermine the fight against terrorism.

Counterterrorism requires time to capture other members of the cell before

they realize that one of their members has been apprehended , to decipher their records, and to
prevent other attacks that might be underway. Also security demands that authorities do not reveal their means
and methods, hence often one cannot allow terrorists to face their accusers. (Imagine having to bring in a CIA agent or Muslim collaborator that the United
States succeeded in placing high in the Al Qaeda command in order to have him testify in open court in the United States.) Next, the nature of the evidence likely
to be presented in a terrorist trial is problematic. Much of it is classified and highly sensitive, which puts the government in the position of having to choose between
jeopardizing national security in order to gain a conviction or letting terrorists off easy, if not completely, lest they give away vital sources and methods. To avoid all
these traps, the government, when forced to deal with civilian courts, often turns to plea bargaining. It is estimated that over 80 per cent of the guilty terrorist
convictions achieved in civilian courts since 2001 have been the result of plea bargains.46 Although guaranteeing a guilty verdict, plea deals result in light

there seem to be strong arguments as to why curbing terrorism justifies

additional and, above all, different security measures than those employed in going after criminals .
sentences.47 In short,

These arguments do not justify any particular security measure or surveillance program but, rather, support the category of extraordinary public safety measures to

A
common claim against the NSA programs under discussion and other national security programs is that they are not
effective.48 The government argues that PRISM and the collection of phone company metadata
disrupted 54 terrorist plots, one-fifth of which were to be carried out within the borders of the United States.49 However, critics have
which they belong. An examination of the two specific programs under consideration, the phone surveillance program and PRISM, follows. C. Not Effective

questioned these statistics, expressing skepticism regarding the reliability of government officials' testimony50 and the adequacy of the thwarted plots as a metric of
efficacy.51 The question how to ensure the validity of these and other government claims is addressed below in Part IV. Critics especially wonder about phone
surveillance.52 Some point out that the program was not the primary tool in averting any terrorist attack.53 However, this criticism can be leveled against any
program or instrument used by law enforcement authorities or national security agencies. Surely police cruisers or FBI files or even the whole Air Force are often but

There are scores of situations in which

phone records would obviously be of much help, even if they alone were not sufficient in preventing an attack or in finding
one instrument that, in conjunction with others, bring about the required outcomes.

those who committed acts of terror. To illustrate: when the authorities caught one of the two Tsarnaev brothers (the pair responsible for the Boston Marathon

It
does not take a qualification in counterterrorism to realize that under those circumstances it was very
useful to know who they were previously in contact with over the phone . The same holds for the efforts to
find out if they acted on their own or were supplied, guided, or financed from overseas, and if so by whom. One telling piece of evidence
regarding the effectiveness of the electronic surveillance programs is the way they hobbled
bin Laden. He found out that he was unable to use any modern communication device to run his terror organizations that had branches in three
continents.54 He was reduced to using the same means of communication employed 5000 years ago a messenger, a very
slow, low-volume, cumbersome, and unreliable way of communication and command; in effect, preventing
bombing), there was reason to suspect that they were cooperating with others, and certainty that they planned more attacks, specifically in New York City.

bin Laden from serving as an effective commander-in-chief of Al Qaeda. Moreover, once the CIA deduced that using a messenger was the only way left for him to

the NSA programs forced

terrorists to limit their communications is gleaned from reports that following the revelation that the United States intercepted
the communications of Ayman al-Zawahiri, there was a sharp decline in Al Qaeda's
electronic communications.56 In short, we have seen that there continues to be a serious threat of
terrorism to national security; that terrorists cannot be handled like other criminals and to
counter them distinct measures are best employed; and that surveillance programs like PRISM
and the phone surveillance programs make a significant contribution to curbing terrorism . In short
these programs do enhance one core element of the liberal communitarian
balance. The next question the article addresses is the extent they undermine the other core element. Part III: Phone Surveillance of Americans The
NSA's phone surveillance program is a scheme involving the bulk collection of metadata
communicate tracking the messenger led to bin Laden's downfall.55 Additional evidence publically available that

from major telephone providers. These records collected from at least three major phone companies57 include the numbers dialed by Americans and the duration
of each call, but not the content of the calls.58 The phone surveillance program has been deemed as violating individual rights on several different grounds, which are
next reviewed. A. Third-Party Doctrine The collection of phone records has been justified on the basis of the third-party doctrine. It holds that once a person
voluntarily discloses a fact to another party, he or she forfeits all Fourth Amendment protection when it comes to the disclosed information, as he or she no longer has
a reasonable expectation of privacy once that information has been disclosed.59 Relevant cases include United States v. Miller (1976) wherein the Supreme Court
ruled that bank depositors forfeit their reasonable expectation of privacy when they hand over personal information to a bank. And in Smith v. Maryland (1979) the
Court held that the voluntary disclosure of information to telephone companies entailed the forfeiture of a reasonable expectation of privacy.60 According to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence General Counsel Robert Litt: as a result, the government can get this information without a warrant, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.61 Though the third-party doctrine is the accepted law of the land, it is controversial62 and does not serve as the basis for the following defense
of government surveillance. My main reason for moving away from the third-party doctrine is that in the cyber age much of our private lives are lived in a cyber world
of cloud computing operated by third parties like Google and Facebook. As a result, a massive amount of information that once resided in the private sphere is now in
the hands of third parties. If one accepts the third-party doctrine as the basis for a defense of government surveillance, one leaves very little in terms of what is
considered reasonably private information protected from search.63 B. Traffic vs. Content Analysis Many critics of the phone records collection program refer to it
explicitly or implicitly as if the government was listening to American phone calls and hence violating the privacy of millions of people. For example, Glenn Greenwald
claims that the NSA frequently eavesdrops on Americans calls and reads their emails without any individualized warrants exactly that which NSA defenders,
including Obama, are trying to make Americans believe does not take place'.64 According to one survey, 39 percent of respondents still erroneously believe (after
consistently hearing otherwise from intelligence officials) that the NSA's bulk telephone metadata program includes call content'.65 A total of 27 per cent of all

given the massive amount of

communications content that is generated every day, it would be impossible for the NSA to
examine even a small portion of that content unless its employees numbered in the millions. According to one source, It
would take 400 million people to listen and read through all of the global
communications traffic.67 Actually, the program collects phone records that show who called
Americans believe that the government is listening to their phone calls or reading their emails.66 However,

what other number, the times the calls were placed, and their duration but no more . (Note that

even the various leakers did not claim that the content of the messages, the voice transmissions, were collected.) This is akin to collecting the cover envelope of mail
Americans send to each other as opposed reading their mail a practice that is, in fact, regularly carried out in bulk by the United States Postal Service. Indeed, the
Postal Service photographs the exterior of every piece of paper mail that is processed in the United States, and saves the recorded data for an unknown amount of

The government reports that it collects and stores phone records in order to have rapid
access when needed, and to stitch together various data; for some reason neglecting to mention that the phone companies keep the records only for
time.68

only short periods of time69 while security concerns require longer storage,70 a rather weighty consideration. (See below re requiring the phone companies to keep

given the security that comes

with gains engendered by ready access to this information and the fact that storing this
information intrusiveness is low phone surveillance, like mail surveillance, passes this part of the
liberal communitarian test. It is justified on both prudential (pragmatic,
technical) grounds and on legal ones. C. General Search and Individualized Suspicion Privacy advocates
often argue before the government searches anyone, it should be required indeed is required, according to the Constitution to
present, to a court of law, evidence demonstrating that there exists strong reason (enough to convince a judge) for believing that the particular person is
the records for longer periods so that they are kept in private hands rather than the government.) In short,

likely to be a criminal or a terrorist. Only then, according to these advocates, can said person can be subjected to surveillance.71 The phone surveillance program
violates this rule on the face of it, because it collects records of millions for whom no particularized suspicion has been articulated, nor has a search been approved by
a court. Thus, the ACLU filed a lawsuit seeking to halt the program on the grounds that the surveillance carried out is warrantless and unreasonable.72 However,

the courts have long established (employing, in effect, a rather similar line of analysis to the liberal communitarian one outlined above)
that when there is both a clear public interest and the privacy intrusion is small,
administrative searches (i.e., searches that are executed without either a warrant or probable cause) are legal and are
needed.73 One important subset of administrative search is the dragnet search where some agent of the

government searches or seizes every person, place, or thing in a specific location or involved in a specific activity based only on a showing of a generalized
government interest.74 They include checkpoints where drivers are stopped to check for the purposes of investigating a crime,75 sobriety checkpoints,76 and airport
screening.77 In Camara v. Municipal Court the court held that routine government inspections of homes to ensure they were in compliance with housing code was
permissible this despite the fact that such searches covered every house in a particular area without any sort of particularized suspicion.78 In Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court approved of a sobriety checkpoint where every vehicle was stopped (at which point drivers demonstrating visible signs of
impairment were pulled aside for further screening) on the grounds that the state has a strong interest in curbing drunk driving while the degree of intrusion involved

General search was further legitimized by section 215 of the Patriot Act
and the National Security letters that it authorizes. This legislation allows the government to conduct surveillance without first identifying
in a brief traffic stop is minor.79

some individual as a suspected terrorist while also granting it the authority to search through third-party databases without notifying suspects as long as the
information is relevant to a terrorism investigation.80 Specifically, Section 215 of the Patriot Act stripped FISA's business records provision of the requirement that
requests for such records involve specific and articulable facts, if these records pertain to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.81 However, it provides
communications providers with an option for judicial review whereby they might contest the legality of a records request as well as any associated non-disclosure
orders.82 Section 215 has been cited in a ruling by a FISC court upholding the legality of the NSA's phone records collection program.83 Section 215 also prohibits
designating a person an agent of a foreign power and thus, opening them up to electronic surveillance under FISA based solely on the basis of a protected First
Amendment activity. A US person cannot be the subject of NSA surveillance simply because of what that person says or believes.84 No evidence has been presented,
even following all the leaks, that this section has been violated by NSA, in contrast to reports that the IRS has targeted Tea Party groups. Most important, often

phone surveillance program does follow the Fourth Amendment

rule of particularized search. Although the government collects and stores phone records, the calls of no person can be legally scrutinized
ignored by critics, is that the

until it has been established that there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the number to be searched is associated with a foreign terrorist
organization.85 The basis for that suspicion has to be documented in writing and approved by one of 22 highly-vetted NSA officers.86 Far from granting many such
searches, in 2012, fewer than 300 proposed searches met the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard.87 On 16 December 2013, federal district judge Richard J.
Leon ruled that the phone records collection program most likely violates the Constitution. With the ruling, the judge ordered that the government halt its collection
of metadata on two individuals and destroy their previously-collected records. In response, former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker told the BBC [same day] that:

as
long as it is not established that phone surveillance violates the constitution or the law , and its
intrusiveness is low, it should be tolerated. (The term tolerated is used to remind that one need not be enamored
with such programs to consider them necessary and legitimate.) Given this cardinal observation, the
this is the opinion of one district judge and you can find a district judge in America who will say almost anything.88 The ruling is sure to be appealed. In short,

paper next asks whether collecting and storing records in computers amounts to a search, general or otherwise a point next discussed. D. Computers Don't Search

the phone surveillance program

merely stores the records

A critical feature of
, ignored by many critics, is that it
and
that in order to access them and examine the records of any individuals (and those they called), particularized suspicion and a court order is required. Indeed,
according to a recently declassified report, metadata would never even be seen by any human being unless a terrorist connection were first established, with only

computers per se do
not violate privacy, although they vastly increase the risk that it might be violated. (How to best address and mitigate that risk is discussed in
Part V.) Computers do not gossip, do not leak information to the press, or sell information to
commercial interests. Hence, those who are concerned with finding a reasonable balance between security and privacy should focus on the interface
approximately one in every four million call records collected being viewed by an actual person.89 It is hence important to note

between computers and human agents. That is, they ought to seek to ensure that once the computers flag particular individuals, this information is revealed only to

Critics argue that

the government should wait until it has a particularized

law enforcement authorities and used by them in legal and accountable ways. (More about this below.) E. Keep in Private Hands?
rather than collect and store phone records in bulk,

suspicion and a court order and then collect the relevant records of that person from the phone companies.90 However, both prudential and principled
reasons favor the government position on this point. Most important, currently phone companies are not required to
keep these records and keep them for only a short period of time.91 That is, if the government will not store these records, they very often will not be

available. This alone justifies the NSA collection program. One may argue that we could have our privacy and gain all the security we need if, instead of collecting the

terrorists and, more generally,

use a large variety of phones, including landlines and cell phones, managed by different phone companies.

records, the phone companies would be required to keep them say for seven years. But this idea raises two problems: First,
criminals

If the government needs to rapidly trace the

calls of a terrorist who has been apprehended to find their partners, it would have to approach different
companies, put together different databases, and input them into its computers all in short order. Anybody who has combined large databases from
several different sources can attest to the fact that such combinations are time-consuming and challenging . There are
(Indeed, some carry pocketfuls of cell phones so as to rapidly switch among them.)

strong reasons to have these combinations take place before searches actually need to be carried out. (In addition, these large bases are needed for attempts to find

if the phone companies were to keep the records for as long as the government
might need them and to make them available whenever the government comes calling, the difference between such an
arrangement and the status quo would be largely cosmetic. Indeed, I have shown elsewhere that, while privacy
patterns.) Second,

advocates strongly oppose (for good reason) the possibility of the government maintaining dossiers with detailed and private information about most Americans
including those not charged with anything these advocates seem much less agitated when such databases are kept by private companies. And, too often these
advocates ignore that these private databases are merely a click (and a check) away from government agencies (including the Department of Justice, the IRS, and the
INS), which have scores of contracts to this effect.92 This is far from a hypothetical idea. Currently, major private corporations keep very detailed dossiers on most
Americans, hundreds of millions of dossiers.93 And they make them available to the government for a fee, without any court order or review.94 We are so
conditioned to hold that private sector and privacy go hand in hand while the public sphere is closely associated with the violation of privacy. Actually, in the cyber
age, these boundaries have been blurred.95

If the government has ready access to private data banks, they do not by
they hinder counterterrorism

definition provide extra privacy protection, and if they are not readily accessible,
drives. One may
say that the phone companies could review the government requests and, thus, serve as a sort or privacy-protecting screen. However, on what basis could a phone
company lawyer deny government access in the face of government claims that protecting national security requires such access? Should the government reveal to
company lawyers who would lack security clearance and the relevant experience and training when it comes to such matters why it is interested in particular set of
records? Should the phone companies set up their own FISA-like courts to second-guess the government? The answer seems clear: the companies are not in a

the phone surveillance

program's correction to the liberal communitarian balance between individual rights
especially privacy and national security is (1) limited and not excessively intrusive, (2) abides by
the constitution and prevailing law, (3) is structured in a reasonable manner (compared to the alternative of leaving the records only in private hands),
and (4) contributes to the protection of national security . Whether it is subject to the level of oversight and
position to second-guess the government. In taking into account all of these considerations, it seems that

accountability necessary for ensuring that it is not abused to in the form of spying on people because of their political views, wantonly ensnaring innocent people, or

This question deserves separate treatment, which is provided below where it can be applied to
the PRISM program as well.
any other variety of misuse is less clear.

Terrorist attacks escalate killing billions

Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief
technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action;
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directiveit empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when
bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of

our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with
much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain
access to weapons that are as destructive asor possibly even more destructive than those
held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the
ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man,
woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the
concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any
degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe
occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing

nation-stateslike North Koreawhich

possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the
possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The
newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent
on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we
now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate
response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they
know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible.
As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in
many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists

often hope to provoke reprisal

attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in
point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive
overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S.
would go so far as to invade Afghanistan . Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the
organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success
against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually ,

the world will recognize that

stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield
weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited
themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the
internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

1NC
A. Interpretation: Domestic means physically within the U.S. borders.
DOD 82 (Department of Defense, regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of DoD
intelligence components that affect United States persons, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS,
December 1982, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5240_1_r.pdf)
C10.2.1. Domestic

activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not
involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization or person . C10.2.2. The term
organization includes corporations and other commercial organizations, academic institutions, clubs, professional societies,
associations, and any other group whose existence is formalized in some manner or otherwise functions on a continuing basis.
C10.2.3. An organization within

the United States means all organizations physically located within the
geographical boundaries of the United States whether or not they constitute a United States
persons. Thus, a branch, subsidiary, or office of an organization within the United States, which is
physically located outside the United States, is not considered as an organization within
the United States.

B. Violation: The aff has restricted forms of surveillance that effect foreign
powers
Vote neg
1. Limits They justify an infinite number of foreign embassy and cablebased monitoring affs shifting the topic base and exploding limits.
2. Topic Education they shift the focus of the topic away from the way
surveillance affects us to how it impacts foreign entities.

1NC
Boosting U.S. internet freedom credibility signals a strategic shift towards
democracy promotion in Obamas foreign policy---that destroys U.S.
relations with authoritarian powers---its unique because Obama
downplays internet freedom and democracy now
Theodore Kahn 10, PhD candidate in International Relations @SAISHopkins,
Summer-Fall 2010, Internet Freedom and the Challenge of a Principled Foreign
Policy, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2
Ross offers a
of a U.S. foreign policy grounded in the principles of freedom and individual rights. In
his vision, a proactive State Department would monitor and report violations of Internet freedom by
foreign governments and actively counter their efforts by spreading the technology and skills needed to circumvent
censorship. Behind the scenes, U.S. officials would engage in diplomacy to encourage Internet repressors
to change their ways . Such a policy could have a powerful impact on the state of democracy and human
rights around the world. Unfortunately, the Obama administration does not seem especially
interested in pursuing it . The Internet freedom agenda Ross outlines falls under the rubric of
democracy promotion . As the article points out, democracy promotionthe idea that the United States
should encourage the development of plural, democratic governments abroad has a long
history in U.S. foreign policy. While most presidents and top diplomats have embraced the principle in their rhetoric,
U.S. support for democracy has a mixed record in practice. The Bush years provide a case in point. The
In his article Internet Freedom: Historic Roots and the Road Forward, State Department innovation advisor Alec
compelling vision

administration couched many of its aggressive foreign policy actionsmost notably the invasion of Iraq in the language of
democracy promotion. This association with the foreign policy milieu of the Bush years, and the Iraq War in particular, has seriously
damaged democracy promotions reputation in Washington. Indeed, many of its day-to-day practitioners in the development field
avoid using the term, preferring the more technocratic democracy assistance. Undoubtedly aware

of this sentiment,

President Obama has not made democracy promotion a foreign policy priority of his administration. There
have been encouraging words, such as his speech in Cairo last June where Obama expressed his commitment to governments that
reflect the will of the people, but few actions to reflect that commitment.1 Instead, the

administration has embraced a

variety of authoritarian regimes for strategic reasons . We have continued our close ties with Arab autocrats such
has embraced Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev, even as the Putin protg and his mentor increasingly monopolize political power and abet a
disturbing crackdown on civil society; and most glaringly, the [End Page 17] administration has studiously avoided
provoking Chinas leadership on issues surrounding rights and political freedoms. The anecdote in
as Hosni Mubarak, who has ruled Egypt for three decades, and the Saudi royal family; Obama

Alec Ross piece neatly makes the point: Obamas tepid endorsement of openness was promptly censored by the Chinese, with no
objection on the part of the U.S. administration. Of course, the

reasoning behind these policy choices is

straightforward. In each of the instances mentioned above, the United States maintains a strategic relationship
with the government in question that the administration deems more valuable than promoting
human rights or civil liberties in those countries. In the case of Egypt, for example, President Mubarak has been a willing
partner in U.S. security initiatives in the region. The United States has been loath to risk jeopardizing that cooperation by pushing
Mubarak to expand political freedomsa process that could, of course, bring about his replacement by a less friendly government.
But it is unclear whether the assumptions underlying this strategic calculus are correct. During his second term, President Bush did
make a push for political openness in the Middle East; Mubarak responded at the time with unprecedented reforms but quickly
backtracked after an Islamist group did well in elections. The Bush administration did not press the issue, but the point remains that
the United States has the leverage to prod our allies on issues such as human rights and political freedoms while maintaining a
cooperative, strategic relationship. Indeed, Egypt watchers have pointed out that security relations with the United States remained
strong throughout this period.2

Obamas prioritizing cooperative relations with great powers over

emphasizing democracy---the plan flips that strategy---causes great power
conflict
Jakub Grygiel 11, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and the
George H.W. Bush Associate Professor of International Relations at Johns HopkinsSAIS, October 3, 2011, Great Powers and Democracy Promotion, online:
http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=319
Over the past few months, spurred

by the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, U.S.

President Barack Obama has seemingly realigned himself with a stronger pro-democracy stance. He indicated as
much in his May speech at Westminster Hall in the UK, when he said that the United States stands squarely on the side of those
who long to be free. The challenge is that such support is

likely to lead to more tense relations with

authoritarian Great Powers, contradicting in many cases this Administrations desire to
engage or reset relations with them. Whether consciously or not, the Obama Administration
recognizes this tension. The Presidents insistence that he would pursue a different foreign policy from that of his
predecessor has in practice meant that Washington is seeking better relations with Great Powers (as
exemplified by the reset with Russia) and is pushing less vigorously to challenge oppressive
regimes abroad (remember the Green revolution in Iran?). The atmospherics in some cases (Russia in particular) have
improved, in part precisely because Washington chose to ignore blatant violations of human rights in those countries. The choice
was between polite and pleasant relations with non-democratic great powers or a clearer prodemocracy posture. One cannot have both, and in his opening gambit Obama chose the
former. Now that the President is, at least tepidly and rhetorically, supporting democratization efforts in the Middle East and
Belarus, is his Administration ready for less cordial relations with rival Great Powers, from Russia, Iran and China? The Causes of
Our Naivet The belief that support for democracy does not preclude good relations with rival authoritarian great powers is deeply
ingrained in our intellectual and bureaucratic genetic code. Recent history is partly to blame for the tendency to underestimate the
linkage of Great Power competition with democratization. The 1989 spring of nations in Central and Eastern Europe succeeded at
least in part because one Great Power, the Soviet Union, retreated from the chessboard, effectively ending a decades-long struggle
for control and influence in Europe. It was the outcome of this clash the defeat and collapse of Soviet power that preceded and
thus enabled the restoration of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, many academics and policy wonks argue

that democracy is a win-win game on the international scene. Democracy, the argument goes, brings strategic
benefits not just to the people of the state in question, but also to neighboring powers because it is a source of political stability and
an engine of economic growth. Hence,

a Great Power conflict over a democratizing state is a

misunderstanding and an aberration that should and can be avoided through negotiation; it is simply natural to share the
goal of democratization. Finally, the intellectual and policy communities that deal with democratization
and those that deal with Great Power competition tend to function in separate realms . Academically,
students of democracy promotion usually focus on the internal dynamics of the nascent democracy, whereas those preoccupied with

the U.S.
government is organized favors seeing democratization in terms of development and negotiations
(USAID and the State Department) and Great Power competition in terms of conflict (the
Department of Defense). This is certainly a simplification, but I doubt many at USAID would think of their actions in terms
of a Great Power game. Alas, reality is different. Democratization does not occur in a vacuum, but in the
shadow of Great Power competition. The Opponents of Democratization A quick look at the world map makes
geostrategic and security issues pay more attention to the foreign policies of the states in question. Similarly, the way

apparent that in many of the regions where the United States and its allies are promoting democracy, other powers are vying for
influence by either undermining our efforts or by trying to hijack the outcome. In Eastern Europe, along a belt stretching from
Belarus to Moldova and then farther south to the Caucasus, Russia has been carefully watching U.S. and EU calls for
democratization. In Ukraine, the so called Orange revolution of a few years back, greeted in Europe as a step toward a stronger
democracy, was seen by Moscow as a loss of influence that needed to be thwarted and rolled back. In Africa and Asia, China is
striking deals with all types of autocratic regimes, regardless of their human rights record, with the purpose of expanding its
commercial and strategic reach. Promoting democracy in countries like Burma or Sudan would put Chinese investments at risk or
at least that is how Beijing is likely to perceive it. Finally, in the worlds most volatile region the

Middle East and North

Africa the processes of democratization that may emerge in the wake of the Arab Spring will likely be
regarded with suspicion and trepidation by many of the powers with regional interests there .

American, European and Israeli political leaders will fear Iranian meddling and the ascendance of pro-Tehran groups or individuals
in some of these states a repeat of the Gaza scenario. Iran, on the other side, may fear the exact opposite, and a Western push to
strengthen liberal democratic parties in the region will only exacerbate tensions with Tehran. The outcome is one of competing
interests between the two powers or rather, between Iran and the West, led by the United States and it will have a significant
impact on the timid democratization efforts of the countries in the region. Whether we want it to or not, democratization

cannot be separated from Great Power competition . In order to be successful in promoting the
establishment of democratic states, we need to factor in the likely active opposition of other powers, such as Russia, China and Iran.
Indeed, if

we are to support democratization efforts, we must be prepared for a heightened

competition with non-democratic Great Powers. For such powers, the establishment of
truly democratic states in their neighborhood represents a risky development as it would
jeopardize their ability to exercise influence. It could encourage their own populations to seek
greater freedoms; and it would directly challenge the ideological foundation of their regimes .

Cooperative relations with rising great powers require the U.S. to tolerate
non-democracies---Western norm-promotion shreds global cooperation
Charles Kupchan 11, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and
Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2011, The
false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American power, Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 165-173
norms and rules
constrain the exercise of US power. They focus exclusively on the costs to the United States of its own failure to comply
with the institutions and rules that Washington took the lead in crafting after the close of World War II. But in the aftermath
of the global nancial crisis that began in 2008 and amid the ongoing ascent of China, India, Brazil, and
other rising states, change in ordering norms may well be driven by the preferences and
policies of emerging powers, not by those of the United States. Moreover, the impressive economic
performance and political staying power of regimes that practice non-democratic brands of
capitalismsuch as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabiacall into question the durability of the
normative order erected during Americas watch. Well before emerging powers catch up with
Americas material resources, they will be challenging the normative commitment to open
markets and liberal democracy that has dened the Western order. The substantive gap
between the norms of the Western order and those that inform the domestic and foreign policies
of rising powers has not gone unnoticed (Kupchan and Mount 2009). Nonetheless, many scholars have
offered an illusory response: that the United States and its democratic allies should dedicate
the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing Western norms. According to G
John Ikenberry (2008, 37, 25), the United States global position may be weakening, but the international system the United
States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-rst century. The West should sink the roots of this
order as deeply as possible to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance
wanes. Such condence in the universality of the Western order is, however, based on
wishful thinking about the likely trajectory of ascending powers, which throughout history
have sought to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their own interests.
Presuming that rising states will readily embrace Western norms is not only unrealistic, but also
dangerous, promising to alienate emerging powers that will be pivotal to global
stability in the years ahead (Gat 2007). Brooks and Wohlforth do not address this issuepresumably because they believe that
These examples aside, Brooks and Wohlforth also fail to address another important pathway through which

US preponderance is so durable that they need not concern themselves with the normative orientations of rising powers. But facts on
the ground suggest otherwise. China

is, as of 2010, the worlds second largest economy, holds massive

amounts of US debt, and is strengthening its economic and strategic presence in many quarters of the
globe; the G-8 has given way to the G-20; the prime minister of democratic India has called for
new global rules of the game and the reform and revitalization of international institutions (Mahbubane 2008, 235);
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have increased the voting weight of developing countries; and the United

Nations Security Council is coming under growing pressure to enlarge the voices of emerging powers. All

of these
developments come at the expense of the inuence and normative preferences of the U nited States
and its Western allies. By the numbers, Brooks and Wohlforth are correct that unipolarity persists. But rising
powers are already challenging the pecking order and guiding norms of the
international system. If the next international system is to be characterized by normgoverned order rather than competitive anarchy, the West will have to make room
for the competing visions of rising powers. A new order will have to be based on greatpower consensus and toleration of political diversity rather than the normative
hegemony of the West.

Extinction
Chas W. Freeman 14, served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and
Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, past
president of the Middle East Policy Council, co-chair of the U.S. China Policy
Foundation and a Lifetime Director of the Atlantic Council, 9/13/14, A New Set of
Great Power Relationships, http://chasfreeman.net/a-new-set-of-great-powerrelationships/
We live in a time of great strategic fluidity. Borders are shifting. Lines of control are blurring. Longestablished spheres of influence are fading away. Some states are decaying and dissolving as others germinate and
take root. The global economic order is precarious. New economic and geopolitical fault lines are
emerging. The great powers of North and South America are barely on speaking terms. Europe is again riven by
geopolitical antagonisms. Ukraine should be a prosperous, independent borderland between the European Union and
Russia. It has instead become a cockpit of strategic contention. The United States and Russia have
relapsed into hostility. The post-Ottoman borders of West Asia and North Africa are being erased. Neither Europeans, nor
Russians, nor Americans can now protect or direct their longstanding clients in the Middle East. Brazil, China, and India are
peacefully competing for the favor of Africa. But, in the Indo-Pacific, China

and Japan are at daggers drawn and

striving to ostracize each other. Sino-American relations seem to be following US-Russian relations
into mutual exasperation and intransigence. No one surveying this scene could disagree that the world would
benefit from recrafting the relationships between its great powers. As President Xi Jinping has
proposed, new types of relations might enable the great powers to manage their interactions to
the common advantage while lowering the risk of armed conflict . This is, after all, the
nuclear age. A war could end in the annihilation of all who take part in it. Short of that,
unbridled animosity and contention between great powers and their allies and friends have high opportunity costs and foster the
tensions inherent in military posturing, arms races, instability, and impoverishment.

1NC
The 1ac deploys one of disaster capitalisms favorite tactics: impacts
describing senseless horror quickly fade as we catch our breath and return
to a state of normalcy. However, a trace of that horror remains affectively
embedded within us, and voting aff sanitizes a continuous, low-level fear of
everything that hidden by the 1ac. Prefer the affective alter-politics
produced by the 1nc
Massumi 11 [Brian, political theorist, writer, and philosopher, Professor of Critical Empiricism at the
European Graduate School, Professor in the Department of Communication Sciences at the University of
Montral, April 15, 2011, The half-life of disaster, The Guardian]

The world watched in horror as the northeast coast of Honshu was shaken by an earthquake of
unimaginable magnitude, then razed by a tsunami of monstrous force. The natural disaster struck with a
suddenness defying comprehension. It is as if a body blow to Japan had knocked the wind out of the world. The hit was
so sudden as to leave one speechless. One minute, a city; the next, twisted metal and rubble. Life one minute; death the next. The
media images showed all there was to say: the horror. The breathtaking, senseless horror of it,
surpassing the human scale of understanding. Then amid the rubble, life began to stir again. The
media lens zooms in to the human scale. Language regains its descriptive traction . A family finds a
loved one against all odds. A volunteer doctor travels 18 hours each way to spend a few precious hours of his weekend days off

The
human stories apply a narrative balm to shock-raw nerves. The shock is soon alloyed with admiration
for the Japanese people's calm and fortitude in the face of the disaster. An affective corner starts to be turned: from
horror to heart warming. Of course, nothing can ever expunge the horror. It will be archived.
The images of the disaster will be held indefinitely in store. For as long as there is an
internet, they will remain available for recirculation. It is not so much that the horror is replaced by
human warmth and its accompaniments. It is rather that it "decays" in the media. The horror transmutes into a different
affective element, its intensity halved, then halved again, eventually reducing to trace levels. Globally, the event settles back
into a more stable range of the periodic table of collective emotion. What is the half-life of disaster in today's global
media? At most two weeks. The suffering on the ground continues, and will continue
for decades. World attention quickly shifts elsewhere. The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami were soon displaced from media
attention by a next unforeseen shock: upheaval in Libya. This progression is familiar by now. Hurricane in
Louisiana, tsunami in the Indian Ocean, flooding in Germany, flooding in Pakistan, fires in Greece, earthquake in Haiti.
Terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, London, Moscow. Natural disaster and terrorism define the poles of
disaster. In between stretches a continuum of disaster , a plenum of frightful events of infinite
variety, at every scale, coming one after the other in an endless series. The media plays its role of affective
conversion with a regularity that is as predictable as each event in the series, taken separately, is shockingly unforeseen. First the
affective strike of the event is instantaneously transmitted, cutting a shocked-and-awed hole of
horror into the fabric of the everyday. The ability to make sense of events is suspended in a momentary hiatus
of humanly unbearable, unspeakable horror. Then comes the zoom-in to the human detail. Stories get human
traction. The horror is alloyed, its impact archived . Another event has been affectively conveyed with
irruptive, interruptive force, only to subside into the background of everyday life. What remains is a continuous,
low-level fear. This fear doesn't stand out clearly as an emotion. It is more like a habitual
posture, an almost bodily bracing for the next unforeseen blow, a tensing infusing every move and every moment
with a vague foreboding. This trace-form anticipation this post-shock pre-posturing becomes the very
ministering to the traumatised and wounded. A last survivor is pulled from the rubble days after all were feared dead.

medium of everyday life. The environment of life is increasingly lived as a diffuse and foreboding "threat
environment". It is almost a relief when the next hit comes. It is only another bout of disaster that will
enable the narrative balm to calm again the collective nerves of a humanity permanently on low-level boil. This fear defies
a collective response. When response is re-enabled, it is on the individual scale of the personal actions of "everyday
heroes" carrying out small deeds of voluntaristic support. At this becalming pole of the affective conversion circuit, human agency is
reasserted, but in the exemplary figure of individual actors exercising personal choice. By contrast, the out-of-scale strike of the
unforeseen event seems utterly inhuman, an "act of God' by which is meant "nature". Any event that strikes like fate with a speed
or at a scale beyond the ken of human sense-making takes on the aspect of an uncontrollable force of nature. This applies even to
wholly human-caused events, such as terrorist attacks. An association is established between "natural disaster" and "national
security threat", which discourages any response other than the cyclic, media-driven return to the voluntaristic, individual human
scale. That

affective pattern becomes second nature. The association between natural

disaster and national security becomes almost automatic. Shortly after Barack Obama's election as US
president, his staff sent out a press release announcing the appointment of his national security team. It contained a tell-tale
typographic error. The American public was assured of the dedication and competence of its new "natural security" team. Three
points stand out: 1) Collective

response does, of course, go on. But it takes the privileged form of a growing
state security apparatus. The anti-terrorism doctrine of the US explicitly includes emergency
response to natural disaster in its purview. All suddenly striking, unforeseen events that defy human
logic and thus seem to substract themselves from the political sphere in its everyday functioning are
lumped together in the same category, and together fall under the jurisdiction of a security apparatus that is continually growing
new arms and extending old ones, weaving itself into a complex, tentacular network. The

network is designed to enable

seamless relay from civilian emergency response to military response . Hurricane Katrina, for example, was
used by the Bush administration to break down the historical prohibition against the domestic deployment of national military force
in America. A US National Guard was recalled from Iraq for service in Louisiana. When the fires were ravaging Greece in the
summer of 2009, the Greek government declared the senseless, unforeseen disaster a terrorist threat, because it could not be ruled
out that it had been the result of terrorist-connected arson. The army was called in. Tendencies such as these blur

the
boundary between the policing of civil society and the military sphere, and between
natural activity, criminal activity, and acts of war. The distinction between civil society and the
state of exception that is war is operationally blurred by the exercise of a "full-spectrum force"
that is every much as diffuse and protean as the "threat environment" it purportedly secures. Measures suspending civil
and political rights are extended and multiplied, and increasingly applied preemptively. The
right to peaceful dissent suffers (witness the preemptive military-style tactics mobilised against peaceful demonstrators who had

Collective action is
the state of exception becomes the norm. The threat environment becomes
an open field for autocratic intervention and arbitrary exercises of power operating on a continuum with
broken no law in Copenhagen at the climate talks in 2009 and at the G20 meeting in Toronto in 2010).
further restrained as

military force. True to form, the nuclear disaster unfolding at the Fukushima reactor as a consequence of the earthquake and
tsunami became "an opportunity for this pacifist nation to rely on its military at a level unseen since world war two," as the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces are mobilised for civilian duty. Crucially, these developments are no longer legitimated in terms of political
reason or reason of state. The blurring of the boundaries between war and peace, and the full-spectrum potential militarisation it
fosters, is legitimated affectively, through the media-driven affective conversion circuit just described. In that affective logic, against
the all-encompassing background of low-level fear, the tentacularly extending security apparatus appears as "natural" and as fateful
as the events it is designed to respond to or preempt. 2) The periodic heartwarming return to the personal level and human scale
obscures the reality that there is, in fact, a strange complicity at work between the human-caused and the naturally occurring.
Hurricane Katrina was a "natural" disaster only if you fail to note the effects of climate change on the water temperatures of the Gulf
of Mexico, and the environmentally ruinous "management" by the US Corps of Engineers of the Mississippi River floodplain. A
similar complicity between causal factors of different orders, natural and human, was at work at Fukushima: tectonic shift meets
nuclear energy infrastructure. The natural and the human are everywhere co-factors in disaster. They co-compose disaster in a way
that can be fiendishly complex. But they are not simply in fusion or confusion. The media-borne affective conversion circuit upon
which political power increasingly relies for its legitimation obscures the actual dynamics of this interlinkage. The return to the
human personal level short-circuits any collective response that is not already either inscribed in the same logic of exploitative
development that has brought the world to this juncture, or in complicity with the national/natural security apparatuses of fullspectrum force that move forcefully against those enacting alternate strategies of collective action in the name of alternate collective
futures. 3) The

actual dynamics of the disaster-prone interlinking of the complex systems just

described involves a third complex system: the global economy. As the crisis of 2008 illustrated once
again, capitalism itself is a far-from-equilibrium system eminently capable of generating its own endemic disasters. The

financialisation of the capitalist economy has taken it to a level of complexity defying logic or description
not to mention regulation. It is as if capitalism has extruded its own, dedicated threat environment, in

the form of abstract financial instruments operating on the edge of chaos , permanently under the pall of
the spectre of debt crisis. A portion of finance capital, of course, still comes down to earth as investment capital. But this is always
done with a view to maximising

fluidity, in ways that fuel a perpetual self-destructuring of the

economy, compensated for by a continual, quasi-chaotic remodelling of it. This is the aspect of
capitalism that Schumpeter called its drive to "creative destruction", and which Naomi Klein has suggestively
named "disaster capitalism". The quasi-chaos of the process only further feeds such
phenomena as the movements of migrant labour, which the nation-states are finding so
destabilising. It also gives rise, in angry reaction, to movements of contestation which
sometimes adopt, in desperation, exactly the kind of "asymmetrical warfare" that national/natural
security apparatuses categorise as "terrorist", and which they fear above all things. As a
counterweight to the conditions of precariousness fostered by disaster capitalism itself, certain key
economic sectors are allowed to consolidate through mergers. These quasi-monopolistic movements
are tolerated, or even encouraged, in the name of securing the economy's future stability. This has been significantly the
case in the energy sector, with policies friendly to centralised production and quasi-monopolistic
ownership designed, for example, to revive the nuclear power industry or to kick-start capitalintensive pseudo-green "alternatives" like biofuels and the mythical "clean" coal precisely the kinds of choices
that will render the global situation even more precarious in the long run by making a mockery of
attempts to rein in global warming, and by setting the stage for future generations'
Fukushimas. As long as disaster capitalism reigns which no doubt will be as long as capitalism itself
reigns the world will be caught in a vicious circle: that of responding by increasingly
draconian and ill-advised means to a threat environment whose dangers the response
only contributes to intensifying. The only way out is to militate for an alternate
interlinkage: between global anticapitalist political contestation and a renascent
environmental movement with opposition to nuclear power at its heart . A political ecology up to
the task would embrace the human-nature hybridity, in all its complexity, but toward a new
alliance designed to step outside the vicious circle. Also required is a realisation that the
affective turn in the functioning of political legitimation that has come with the media
saturation of global culture is likely irreversible. An ecological alter-politics must also be
an alter-politics of affect.

The simulacra of the law inculcates the perfection of the necropolitical state
of total lawfare imposition of control onto an unbounded space,
maintaining the false distinction of law and disorder which the foundation
of a liberal war on difference
Comaroff and Comaroff 7 John Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of
Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean Comaroff, Professor of African and
African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies also at Harvard, Law and
disorder in the postcolony, Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144

the past, too, is being fought out in the

courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for
having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated territory from one African people to another, and so on.33 By these means is
colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the scales of
justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the official tender of
damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of
lawfare: the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its
charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal
by its own sovereign word. Also, to commit its own ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare the resort to legal
Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier,

instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) is equally
marked in postcolonies. As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who serve

the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe
regime has consistently passed laws to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, Drive Out Trash, which
has forced political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of slum clearance has recently taken this practice to
unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the law of the land to raze dangerous

may be limited or it may reduce people to bare life; in Zimbabwe, it has

mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count . But it always seeks to launder visceral
power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries
of capital. Hence Benjamins (1978) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the
legal and the lethal animate one another . Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the
illegal structures. Lawfare34

possibility that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims
for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of

legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are
postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The
turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about lawlessness. But this does
not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever
greater range of wrongs. The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the
very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is undergoing an epochal
move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity: a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity
(Anderson 1983). The rise of neoliberalism with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on
geographies of production and accumulation has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected from the first

heterodoxy, legal instruments

appear to offer a means of commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of
standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across
otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage. Hence the flight into a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces
heterogeneity in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less and
less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative
discourse. But there is something else at work too. A well-recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the
on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because, with growing

outsourcing by states of many of the conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the
conduct of war, integral to the management of life itself. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course.

But most 21st century governments have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the
market and delegating ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of actor,
social or legal. Under these conditions, especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law
presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between .
Which, in turn, exacerbates the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which
human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends . This, once again, is
particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity

of the law seems over-determined.

Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with
others, are communities within the nation-state: cultural communities, religious communities, corporate
communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities. Everything,
it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law. Which also makes it unsurprising that a culture of legality
had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this together and the fetishism

should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime
appropriates, re-commissions and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in
Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the national economy (Standing
2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions of government, not least security provision. Illicit
corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders
against the persons, property and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either
has stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even structured as franchises and,
significantly, are said to offer alternative citizenship to their members.35 Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that
modern states operate much like organised crime. These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently, the

counterfeiting of a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder .
After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw
organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself
becomes like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of

discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties. We said a moment ago that communities of all kinds have become
ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing , in fact, that they become
communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies their will to sovereignty,
which we take to connote the exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of
existence of those who fall within its purview and the extension over them of the
jurisdiction of some kind of law. Lawmaking, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet again, is power
making. But power is the principal of all lawmaking. In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority,
power demands an architecture of legalities . Or their simulacra.

Thus we propose study of power from the lens of the queer suicide bomber
a disarticulation of the self and the other that understands the possibility
for violence
Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of womens and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press:
Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in contrast to how we approach
the violence of colonial domination, indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our
understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage,
"'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without
being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a "morally suspicious person" because "only unqualified condemnation will do." He asserts. "There

is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide

bombings."33 With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of
these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In

pondering the modalities of this

kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and
flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the
Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that
obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate
form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic
self enabled through the "highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of
political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life." As Hage notes, in this limited
but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are "a sign of life" emanating from the
violent conditions of life's impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces
a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse habitation of
contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty
that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life
and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to
the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a
corporeal experiential of "ballistics," he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body
(especially the wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a
temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological
body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break
apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual
interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped
onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body
reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the
body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The
ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom
transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon.

carried in the shape of the body is invisible.

Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its
Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon

detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The

is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical

sense but in a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as
death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's body becomes the mask, the
weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid
of visual cues marking its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own
penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as
metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What
kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming,
blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing
knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective
body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body

information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in
mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the
multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak," reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is

modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the
stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood,
body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both
execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no

matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing.
No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor

the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides
are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing,
unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to
the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which
way. As a queer assemblage- distinct from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality
are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the
fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into
others and other into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and others in the war
on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean
rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body
in such shared and innocent death. 36 We have

when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the
irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions
flourish. Organic

and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and

perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or
condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for the Irreverent,
distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the
full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking
it out, of the turbaned Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?) as
a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully modern, animated through
technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to
borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body. Contagion,

meaning.

infection, and transmission reign, not

India
No chance war goes nuclear
Enders 2 (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, Experts say nuclear war still unlikely, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely, mrs)
* Ashutosh Varshney Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan
* Paul Huth Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland
* Kenneth Lieberthal Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council

Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between
India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The
assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S.
or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be
warranted." The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. " The
decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the
evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth
said. Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.
"India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first
strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous." Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant
to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level
that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "American
intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since
September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands." But the low
University political science Prof. Ashutosh

probability of nuclear war does not mean tensions between the two countries who have fought three wars since they were created in 1947 will not erupt. "The possibility of
conventional war between the two is higher. Both sides are looking for ways out of the current tension," Lieberthal said.

The plan cant set a precedent---Roberts is a sly dog

William D. Araiza, Law Prof @ Brooklyn, Summer 2012, PLAYING WELL WITH
OTHERS-BUT STILL WINNING, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 1059, ln
How can a judge undermine precedent while still following it ? This Essay considers the methods by which
Supreme Court Justices may weaken precedent without explicitly overruling cases by
strategically adopting an approach to stare decisis that is less explicitly aggressive than their
colleagues'. Adding to the literature of "stealth overruling," this Essay considers examples of such methods from Chief Justice
Roberts's first five years on the Supreme Court. These examples indicate that Chief Justice Roberts

knows how to engage

in stealth overruling and, more broadly, how to use his colleagues' preferences to maintain a formal
commitment to judicial humility while achieving jurisprudential change . As such, they reveal important
insights about how Justices can operate strategically to achieve their preferences within both the opportunities and the confines
inherent in a multi-judge court. After five years, many have accused the Roberts Court of aggressively attacking precedent. No less a
figure than Justice O'Connor, whose retirement marked the effective start of that Court, has expressed concern about the Roberts
Court's willingness to overrule prior decisions. n1 Then-Judge Roberts's famous confirmation hearing analogy of judging to
umpiring n2 and his professed respect for stare decisis n3 make for a dramatic narrative in which a nominee piously describes a
humble role for judges but then, once safely confirmed, sets out with a wrecking ball. The charge may have merit, but a short essay is
not the vehicle to make that determination. Simply pointing to a few high-profile [*1061] overrulings, as critics sometimes do, proves
little. n4 Rather, an in-depth examination of the issue requires considering the situations where the overruling dog did not bark-that
is, where the Court could have overruled a prior case but declined to do so. n5 Such an investigation also calls for both historical
perspective and nuance. n6 Reaching interesting conclusions about the Roberts Court's treatment of stare decisis requires that we
identify a baseline of how previous Courts have treated that principle. If impressionistic conclusions based on a few dramatic
examples are enough to consider the charge proven, then the Rehnquist n7 and Warren n8 Courts are presumably guilty also.
Moreover, not all overrulings are created equal. Determining the extent of the Roberts Court's alleged disregard of precedent also
requires considering the importance of the precedents the Court has in fact rejected. Consider Justice White's dissent in INS v.
Chadha. n9 White characterized the majority's rejection of the legislative veto as effectively striking down hundreds of statutes and
eliminating a then-major feature of the modern administrative state. n10 Chadha was not a case where the Court overruled

precedent. Justice White's complaint about the far-reaching nature of the Court's decision, however, reminds us that identifying
judicial aggressiveness, whatever its form, requires [*1062] more than simply adding up the number of cases where the Court has
acted aggressively. n11 This Essay considers the Roberts Court and stare decisis from a different angle. It examines several methods
by which Chief Justice Roberts arguably has

used the multi-judge nature of the Supreme Court to his advantage in

undermining precedent without explicitly calling for its overruling. n12 These examples do not prove that
the Court as a whole, or the Chief Justice in particular, is bent on undoing the work of prior Courts. Instead, they illustrate the ways
in which a

Justice can work within the formal confines of precedent to achieve fundamentally
different results, either in the short or long term. n13 The methods described below depend in part on the
distinction between the result a court reaches in a case and the reasoning it employs. The nature of the Supreme Court as a multijudge court makes this distinction possible: often times, the Court may agree on a result but split sharply on its reasoning. n14 This
opens up room for a creative Justice to undermine precedent, even as the Justice expresses reasons that appear moderate-in
particular, more moderate than those who are more inclined to overrule explicitly. In so doing, the Justice may create the conditions
for the ultimate rejection of that precedent, even while publicly counseling restraint-indeed, even while voting to uphold that [*1063]
precedent. n15 In short, this Essay considers methods by which Justices can play well with others-both those that came before (via
respect for stare decisis) and current colleagues (by strategically positioning themselves among them)-and still achieve their ultimate
goal. n16 This Essay situates itself at the intersection of two ongoing debates about judicial behavior. The first examines the concept
of stealth

overruling-the practice of limiting or even eviscerating a precedent while ostensibly

remaining faithful to it. n17 This phenomenon has become a major topic of scholarly discussion during the last five years,
n18 as scholars have identified and analyzed examples of the Roberts Court engaging in such conduct-conduct generally thought to
have resulted from the replacement of a sometimes centrist Justice O'Connor with a more reliably conservative Justice Alito. n19
The examples in this Essay illustrate instances where the Court or a plurality thereof arguably has engaged in such conduct. n20 The
lessons one can draw from these examples will help shape an understanding of the stealth overruling phenomenon, and the extent to
which the Roberts Court performs it. Second, this Essay engages the debate about the implications of the Supreme Court's character
as a collegial body. Scholars long have acknowledged that critiques of the Court must account for its collegial nature rather than
simply treating it as a purposive [*1064] individual. n21 This Essay contributes to that debate by considering how Chief Justice

Roberts may in certain cases strategically use his colleagues' calls for more explicit overruling of precedent as a
tool in maintaining his and the Court's reputation as faithful to stare decisis while nevertheless
pushing the law away from precedents.

Also the other branches all will circumvent the aff---several reasons--a) Congress---Congress will backlash against aggressive court decisions in
the area of surveillance---they will bar the court from hearing the cases.
Vladeck 11 Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law, American University Washington
College of Law, 2011 (Why Klein (Still) Matters: Congressional Deception and the War
on Terrorism, Journal of National Security Law, Volume 5, Version from June 16 th,
9:38AM, Available Online at http://jnslp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/08_Vladeck.pdf, Accessed 06-06-2015)
At least thus far, Congresss

track record in the major policy debates arising out of the war on terrorism
has been uneven, at best. By far, the most significant legislative enactment over the past decade came one week after the
September 11 attacks, when Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which, in sweeping language,
empowered the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.33 Six weeks later, Congress

enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, which included a series of

controversial revisions to immigration, surveillance, and other law enforcement authorities.34 But it would be over
four years before Congress would again pass a key counterterrorism initiative, enacting the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(DTA)35 after and largely in response to the Supreme Courts grant of certiorari in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.36 In the five years
since, Congress had enacted a handful of additional antiterrorism measures, including the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of
2006,37 as amended in 2009,38 the Protect America Act of 2007,39 and the 2008 amendments40 to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, known in shorthand as the FAA.41 And yet, although Congress has spoken in these statutes both to the
substantive authority for military commissions and to the scope of the governments wiretapping and other surveillance powers, it

has otherwise left some of the central debates in the war on terrorism completely unaddressed .42
Thus, Congress has not revisited the scope of the AUMF since September 18, 2001, even as substantial questions have been raised
about whether the conflict has extended beyond that which Congress could reasonably be said to have authorized a decade ago.43
Nor has Congress intervened, despite repeated requests that it do so, to provide substantive, procedural, or evidentiary rules in the

at the
same time as Congress has left some of these key questions unanswered, it has also attempted to keep
courts from answering them. Thus, the DTA and the MCA purported to divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by individuals detained at Guantnamo and
elsewhere.45 Moreover, the 2006 MCA precluded any lawsuit seeking collaterally to attack the
proceedings of military commissions,46 along with any other action against the United States or its agents relating to
habeas litigation arising out of the military detention of noncitizen terrorism suspects at Guantnamo.44 As significantly,

any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United
States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.47 And although the Supreme Court in Boumediene invalidated the habeas-stripping provision as applied to the
Guantnamo detainees,48 the same language has been upheld as applied elsewhere,49 and the more general non-habeas

legislative efforts
to forestall judicial resolution of the merits can also be found in the telecom immunity
provisions of the FAA,51 which provided that telecom companies could not be held liable for
violations of the Telecommunications Act committed in conjunction with certain
governmental surveillance programs.52 Thus, in addition to changing the underlying substantive
law going forward, the FAA pretermitted a series of then-pending lawsuits against the telecom
companies.53 Analogously, Congress has attempted to assert itself in the debate over civilian trials versus military commissions
jurisdiction-stripping section has been repeatedly enforced by the federal courts in other cases.50 Such

by barring the use of appropriated funds to try individuals held at Guantnamo in civilian courts,54 and by also barring the
President from using such funds to transfer detainees into the United States for continuing detention or to other countries, as
well.55 Rather

than enact specific policies governing criteria for detention, treatment, and trial,
Congresss modus operandi throughout the past decade has been to effectuate policy
indirectly by barring (or attempting to bar) other governmental actors from exercising their
core authority, be it judicial review or executive discretion. Wasserman views these developments as a period of what
Professor Blasi described as constitutional pathology, typified by an unusually serious challenge to one or more of the central
norms of the constitutional regime. Nevertheless, part of how Wasserman defends the Kleinvulnerable provisions of the MCA and
FAA is by concluding that the specific substantive results they effectuate can be achieved by Congress, and so Klein does not stand in
the way. But if Redish and Pudelskis reading of Klein is correct, then the fact that Congress could reach the same substantive results
through other means is not dispositive of the validity of these measures. To the contrary, the question is whether any of these
initiatives were impermissibly deceptive, such that Congress

sought to vest the federal courts with jurisdiction to

adjudicate but simultaneously restrict the power of those courts to perform the adjudicatory
function in the manner they deem appropriate.56

No solvency
A. Court solvency takes years.
Powers and Rothman, Research Associate for the Center for Social and Political Change at Smith
College and Professor of Gov and Director of the Center for Social and Political Change at Smith College,
2k2
[Stephen and Stanley, The Least Dangerous? Consequences of Judicial Activism, p179]

when courts
intervene, they do not merely point out a constitutional or statutory violation that must be corrected. They typically dictate a
detailed set of remedies to address the issue. This type of intervention has generated a notoriously rigid
approach to institutional reform. The judiciary was not designed to legislate or to execute the laws, only to
A recurrent problem with the judiciarys extension of fundamental rights to the institutions we have studied is that

interpret their meaning. It lacks the accountability required of a policy-making body. Judges are only accountable to the public
under the most rare and extreme circumstances. Yet in the wake of elaborate court orders, prisons, mental hospitals, schools, police
departments, and corporations must all continue to balance individual rights against group or societal interests. Unfortunately,

judges do not have the expertise, the time, or the inclination to make the kind of long-term incremental
adjustments that may be critical to institutional stability and progress. That is why court-ordered
remedies rarely work as planned and have so many unanticipated consequences. Moreover, as we have seen , modification or
reversal of court rulings adversely impacting social and political institutions generally takes years.

B. No enforcement or funding
Pacelle, poli sci prof and legal studies coordinator at the univ of Missouri at St. Louis, 2k2
[Richard, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Politics: The Least Dangerous Branch?, p81]
Even if the Supreme Court was to carve out some sphere of power for itself, there would be significant
limitations. Any Court decision has to be enforced, but enforcement power is the province of the president
and the executive branch. Thus, the Court is at their mercy. If the president does not like the decision, he
does not have to enforce it. Indeed, history books report that Andrew Jackson, upset at the Worcester v. Georgia (1832)
decision, growled that John Marshall made his decision, now let him enforce it. There was concern that Dwight Eisenhower would
not back the Brown decision when the Southern states resisted. Ultimately, though quite reluctantly, Eisenhower sent troops to
Little Rock to support the decision. What if the Courts decision requires active policy intervention and the

allocation of resources to help carry out the directives? If the courts determine that prisons are overcrowded or schools
are substandard, will the legislature, which has the taxing and spending power, be willing to raise and spend money to correct the
problem? It took a decade before serious legislative support for the Brown decision was provided. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 empowered the government to cut off federal funds to school districts that did not comply with the desegregation directive
(Halpern 1995, 3059). The bottom line is the adage the Court lacks the sword and the purseit lacks the

ability to enforce its decisions and the power over the resources to do so. This places a limitation on the
justices. If they stray too far from the acceptable boundaries set by Congress or the president, they risk a
negative response from the branches with the real power. If the Court can safely be ignored by the other
branches and the public, the cost is its institutional legitimacy.

Internet
Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and
Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p.
403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate
new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a
steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a

worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce

greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor
economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could
be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not
so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states that were more
internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more
extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited , it is
hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to
believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will
not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this
argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis , an optimist could reply
(correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn
without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring
about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

Growth causes war

Trainer 2 Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You
Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO)
If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are
clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production
and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another
8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is

more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if
we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories
can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third
World must increase, for example, as development under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export
markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war
between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much highsounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israels invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of
East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the worlds leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is
doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central
Asia over terrorism. Few would doubt that a collateral outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West
access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich
world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ... US military priorities just be shifted towards
insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World. Taylor referred to fierce competition among industrial powers
for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States and growing hostility displayed by have-not nations
towards their affluent counterparts.62 Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over
their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets.63 That

more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in
historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.64
The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to
war in order to secure supplies. President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the
Persian Gulf would lead to war. It would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.65 The US
is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence,
Mr Brown, said yesterday.66 Klares recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming

significance of water as a source of international conflict. Global demand for many key materials is

growing at an
unsustainable rate. the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. The wars
of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. resource wars
will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.67 Much of the rich worlds
participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then
look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, The rich prize that is Shaba, Breeze begins, Increasing rivalry
over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco Belgian
paratroop airlift to Zaire. These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the Wests extended
diplomatic courtship 68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most
dependent on securing large quantities of resources. The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in
nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.69 Struggles are taking
place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world
over their share of industrial resources and markets 70 Growth, competition, expansion and war Finally, at the most
abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. warfare

appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. world wars
regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. 71 War is an inevitable result of the
struggle between economies for expansion.72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic
growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between
nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial
grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of
the world within its empire which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! Finite resources in a world of expanding
populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.74 Ashley
focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a
world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of
differential

growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or

later carry major powers into war.75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to
seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money,
resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige
you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not
possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth
that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global
resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their
unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war . If we insist on continuing to
take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then
we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which
we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice , and
that is not possible unless rich countries move to The Simpler Way.

Extinction
Chase-Dunn 96 Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on
World-Systems at the University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World-System Cycles and
Trends, 23 January 1996, http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c-d&hall/warprop.htm)
Note-figure omitted

Late in

the K-wave upswing (i.e. in the 2020s), the world-system schema predicts a window of
world war. This is when world wars have occurred in the past.
Intensified rivalry and competition for raw materials and markets will coincide with a multipolar
distribution of military power among core states. The world-system model does not predict who the next hegemon will
vulnerability to another round of

be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy.
Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it
were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war
would be the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting
global "leadership" in the past, the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the future will be a disaster
that our species may not survive . It is my concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to
understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next
decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The worldsystem model is presented in Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the
probability of war among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle,
hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that reduce the

probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political
integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's
(1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year) in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fiftyyear cycle of core wars. Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff
long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I
am trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variables
into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability.
There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive effect on the probability of war among core
powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides
evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A-phase (upswing).
Earlier research by Thompson and Zuk (1982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the
end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (1991) analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world-system
theorists have argued that core wars occur primarily during K-wave B-phases. This disagreement over timing is related to a
disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein states are war machines that always have a desire to utilize

military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to refrain from going to war when state
revenues are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to engage in warfare when state
revenues are high (because the states can then afford the high costs of war). Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource
theory of war."

Short-term collapse of the global economy is the only way to avoid

catastrophic warming---delay locks in catastrophic emissions
David Holmgren 13, founder of Holmgren Design Services, an environmental design and consulting
firm, inventor of the Permaculture system for regenerative agriculture, 2013, Crash on Demand:
Welcome to the Brown Tech Future, Simplicity Institute report, http://simplicityinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/CrashOnDemandSimplicityInstitute.pdf
Many climate

policy professionals and climate activists are now reassessing whether there is anything
more they can do to help prevent the global catastrophe that climate change appears to be. The passing of the
symbolic 400ppm CO2 level certainly has seen some prominent activists getting close to a change of strategy. As the Transition
Town movement founder and permaculture activist Rob Hopkins says, the shift in the mainstream policy circles from mitigation to
adaptation and defence is underway (i.e. giving up).13
While political deadlock remains the most obvious obstacle, I believe at least some of that deadlock

stems from widespread

doubt about whether greenhouse gas emissions can be radically reduced without economic contraction
and/or substantial wealth redistribution. Substantial redistribution of wealth is not generally taken seriously perhaps because it
could only come about through some sort of global revolution that would itself lead to global economic collapse. On the other hand,
massive economic contraction seems like it might happen all by itself, without necessarily leading to greater equity.

The predominant focus in the "climate professional and activist community" on policies, plans and projects for
transition to renewable energy and efficiency has yet to show evidence of absolute reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions that do not depend on rising greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the
global economy. For example, the contribution of renewable technology installation to reduced GGE in some European
countries appears to be balanced by increased GGE in China and India (where much of the renewable technologies are
manufactured).
The Jevons'

paradox14 suggests than any gains in efficiency or tapping of new sources of energy will
simply expand total consumption rather than reduce consumption of resources (and therefore GGE).
Richard Eckersley in his article 'Deficit Deeper Than Economy' identifies the improbability of ever decoupling economic growth from
resource depletion and green house gas emissions. He states "Australia's material footprint, the total amount of primary resources
required to service domestic consumption (excludes exports and includes imports) was 35 tonnes per person in 2008, the highest
among the 186 countries studied. Every 10 per cent increase in gross domestic product increases the average national material
footprint by 6 per cent. By 2050, a global population of 9 billion people would require an estimated 270 billion tonnes of natural
resources to fuel the level of consumption of OECD countries, compared with the 70 billion tonnes consumed in 2010."15

Time seems to be running out for any serious planned reductions in GGE[Greenhouse Gas Emissions]
adequate to prevent dangerous climate change without considering a powerdown of the growth
economy . The ideas of degrowth16 are starting to get an airing, mostly in Europe, but the chances of these ideas being adopted
and successfully implemented would require a long slow political evolution if not revolution. We don't have time for the first, and the
second almost certainly crashes the financial system, which in turn crashes the global economy.
IS TIME RUNNING OUT FOR BOTTOM UP ALTERNATIVES?
Like many others, I have argued that the bottom up creation of household and community economies, already proliferating in the
shadow of the global economy, can create and sustain different ways of well-being that can compensate, at least partly, for the
inevitable contraction in centralised fossil fuelled economies (now well and truly failing to sustain the social contract in countries
such as Greece and Egypt). When the official Soviet Union economy collapsed in the early '90s it was the informal economy that
cushioned the social impact. Permaculture strategies focus on the provision of basic needs at the household and community level to
increase resilience, reduce ecological footprint and allow much of the discretionary economy to shrink. In principle, a

major
contraction in energy consumption is possible because a large proportion of that consumption is
for non-essential uses by more than a billion middle class people. That contraction has the potential to switch

off greenhouse gas emissions but this has not been seriously discussed or debated by those currently working very
hard to get global action for rapid transition by planned and co-ordinated processes. Of course it is more complicated because the
provision of fundamental needs, such as water, food etc., are part of the same highly integrated system that meets discretionary
wants.
However, the time available to create, refine and rapidly spread successful models of these bottom-up solutions is running out, in the
same way that the time for government policy and corporate capitalism to work their magic in converting the energy base of growth
from fossil to renewable sources.17 If

the climate clock is really so close to midnight what else could be

done?
Economic crash as hell or salvation
For many decades I have felt that a

collapse of the global economic systems might save humanity and

many of our fellow species great suffering by happening sooner rather than later because the
stakes keep rising and scale of the impacts are always worse by being postponed . An important
influence in my thinking on the chances of such a collapse was the public speech given by President Ronald Reagan following the
1987 stock market crash. He said "there won't be an economic collapse, so long as people don't believe there will be an economic
collapse" or words to that effect. I remember at the time thinking; fancy the most powerful person on the planet admitting that faith
(of the populous) is the only thing that holds the financial system together.
Two decades on I remember thinking that a

second great depression might be the best outcome we could

hope for. The pain and suffering that has happened since 2007 (from the more limited "great recession") is
more a result of the ability of the existing power structures to maintain control and enforce harsh
circumstances by handing the empty bag to the public, than any fundamental lack of resources to provide all with
basic needs. Is the commitment to perpetual growth in wealth for the richest the only way that everyone else can hope to get their
needs met? The economy is simply not structured to provide all with their basic needs. That

growth economy is
certainly coming to an end ; but will it slowly grind to a halt or collapse more rapidly?

The fact that the market price for carbon emissions has fallen so low in Europe is a direct result of stagnating growth. Past
economic recessions

and more serious economic collapses, such as faced by the Soviet Union after its oil
production peaked in the late 1980's,18 show how greenhouse gas emissions can and have been reduced, then
stabilizing at lower levels once the economy stabilized without any planned intention to do so. The
large number of oil exporters that have more recently peaked has provided many case studies to show the correlation with political
upheaval, economic contraction and reductions in GGE. Similarly many of the countries that have suffered the greatest economic
contraction are also those with the greatest dependence on imported energy, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The so-called
Arab Spring, especially in Egypt, followed high food and energy prices driven by collapsed oil revenues and inability to maintain
subsidies. The radical changes of government in Egypt have not been able to arrest the further contraction of the economy.
The effects of peak oil and climate change have combined with geopolitical struggles over pipeline routes to all but destroy the Syrian
economy and society.19

Slow Contraction or Fast Collapse

The fragility of the global economy has many unprecedented aspects that make some sort of rapid collapse of
the global economy more likely . The capacity of central banks to repeat the massive stimulus
mechanism in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, has been greatly reduced, while the faith
that underpins the global financial system has weakened , to say the least. Systems thinkers such as David
Korowicz20 have argued that the inter-connected nature of the global economy, instantaneous communications
and financial flows, "just in time" logistics, and extreme degrees of economic and technological specialisation, have increased
the chances of a large scale systemic failure, at the same time that they have mitigated (or at least reduced) the
impact of more limited localised crises.
Whether novel factors such as information technology, global peak oil and climate change have increased the likelihood of more
extreme economic collapse, Foss and Keen have convinced me that the

most powerful and fast-acting factor that

could radically reduce greenhouse gas emissions is the scale of financial debt and the longsustained growth of bubble economics stretching back at least to the beginnings of the "Thatcherite/Reaganite
revolution" in the early 1980s. From an energetics perspective, the peak of US oil production in 1970, and the resulting global oil
crises of 73 and 79, laid the foundations for the gigantic growth in debt that super accelerated the level of consumption, and
therefore GGE.
Whatever the causes, all economic bubbles follow a trajectory that includes a rapid contraction, as credit evaporates, followed by a
long-sustained contraction, where asset values decline to lower levels than those at the beginning of the bubble. After almost 25
years of asset price deflation in Japan, a house and land parcel of 1.5ha in a not too isolated rural location can be bought for
$25,000. A contraction in the systems that supply wants are likely to see simultaneous problems in the provision of basic needs. As
Foss explains, in a deflationary contraction, prices of luxuries generally collapse but essentials of food and fuel do not fall much.
Most importantly, essentials become unaffordable for many, once credit freezes and job security declines. It goes without saying that
deflation rather inflation is the economic devil that governments and central banks most fear and are prepared to do almost
anything to avoid.
Giving credence to the evidence for fast global economic collapse may suggest I am moving away from my belief in the more gradual
Energy Descent future that I helped articulate. John Michael Greer has been very critical of apocalyptic views of the future in which a
collapse sweeps away the current world leaving the chosen few who survive to build the new world. In large measure I agree with his
critique but recognise that some might interpret my work as suggesting a permaculture paradise growing from the ashes of this
civilisation. To some extent this is a reasonable interpretation, but I see that collapse, as a long drawn-out process rather than
resulting from a single event.21
I still believe that energy descent will go on for many decades or even centuries. In Future Scenarios I suggested energy

descent
driven by climate change and peak oil could occur through a series of crises separating relatively
stable states that could persist for decades if not centuries. The collapse of the global financial system
might simply be the first of those crises that reorganise the world . The pathways that energy descent could take
are enormously varied, but still little discussed, so it is not surprising that discussions about descent scenarios tend to default into
ones of total collapse. As the language around energy descent and collapse has become more nuanced, we

start to see the

distinction between financial, economic, social and civilisational collapse as potential stages in
an energy descent process where the first is fast changing and relatively superficial and the last is slow moving and more
fundamental.
In Future Scenarios I suggested the more extreme scenarios of Earth Steward and Lifeboat could follow Green Tech and Brown Tech
along the stepwise energy descent pathway. If

we are heading into the Brown Tech world of more severe

climate change, then as the energy sources that sustain the Brown Tech scenario deplete , and
climate chaos increases, future crises and collapse could lead to the Lifeboat Scenario. In this scenario, no matter
how fast or extreme the reductions in GGE due to economic collapse, we still end up in the
climate cooker , but with only the capacity for very local, household and communitarian organisation.
If the climate crisis is already happening, and as suggested in Future Scenarios, the primary responses to the crisis increase rather
than reduce GGE, then it

is probably too late for any concerted effort to shift course to the more benign
Green Tech energy descent future. Given that most of the world is yet to accept the inevitability of Energy Descent and
are still pinning their faith in "Techno Stability" if not "Techno Explosion", the globally cooperative powerdown processes needed to
shift the world to Green Tech look unlikely. More fundamental than any political action, the resurgent rural and regional economies,

based on a boom for agricultural and forestry commodities, that structurally underpins the Green Tech scenario, will not eventuate if
climate change is fast and severe. Climate change will stimulate large investments in agriculture but they are more likely to be energy
and resource intensive, controlled climate agriculture (greenhouses), centralised at transport hubs. This type of development simply
reinforces the Brown Tech model including the acceleration of GGE.

While it may be too late for the Green Tech Scenario, it still may be possible to avoid more
extreme climate change of a long drawn out Brown Tech Scenario before natural forcing factors lock

humanity into the climate cooker of 4-6 degrees and resource depletion leads to a collapse of the centralised
Brown Tech governance and a rise of local war lords (Lifeboat Scenario).
The novel structural vulnerabilities highlighted by David Korowicz, and the unprecedented extremity of the bubble economics

severe
global economic and societal collapse could switch off GGE enough to begin reversing
climate change ; in essence the Earth Steward scenario of recreated bioregional economies based

highlighted by Nicole Foss suggest the strong tendencies towards a Brown Tech world could be short lived. Instead,

on frugal agrarian resources and abundant salvage from the collapsed global economy and defunct
national governance structures.

2NC

Democracy DA

2NC Overview
The link independently turns the case---respect for pluralism in governing
models is the best way to spread democracy---means it gets emulated on its
own, not because of U.S. support---the plan makes that impossible
Charles Kupchan 9, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam Mount, doctoral candidate
in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Spring 2009, The
Autonomy Rule, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, online:
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf
Americas adherence

to the Autonomy Rule by no means precludes the promotion of

democracy as an objective of U.S. statecraft. Americans have every reason to remain confident that
liberal democracy represents the best form of government, both morally and materially. Accordingly, the United States should
continue to use political and economic incentives to encourage democratization. However, the

spread of
democracy should remain one component of a long-term vision , and not serve as
a central objective defining Americas approach to international governance. If
Americans are right about the merits of liberal democracy, it will spread of its
own accord as a consequence of its superior attributes and performance. In the
meantime, observation of the Autonomy Rule, humility about the strengths and
weaknesses of the Western way, and respect for alternative systems of
government offer the most promise of providing the favorable international
conditions in which democracy will be able to demonstrate its virtues.

2NC Link Wall---Internet Freedom

U.S. internet freedom credibility is perceived as a direct attack on emerging
authoritarian powers like China---its perceived as an attempt to build a
global democratic alliance to contain them
Fergus Hanson 12, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution,
10/25/12, Internet Freedom: The Role of the U.S. State Department,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson-internetfreedom
Promoting and facilitating internet freedom is among the most radical uses ediplomacy is
being put to at State. Its starting point is that Americas traditionally strong advocacy for civil liberties should apply fully
and without exception to the online world. Thus, if a government seeks to restrict these freedoms
online, the U.S. government will oppose it both rhetorically and in practice including by
directly funding the development and rollout of tools that will subvert restrictive
internet policies. The use of technology to overcome censorship and empower individuals in exercising their human rights
online is a forward-leaning aspect of U.S. policy that views human rights online the same as it does in the physical world. The United
States does not condone or seek to support illegal online activity (such as transnational crime) but leaves it to itself to be the arbiter
of when and what type of monitoring and filtering is acceptable. It

is a policy that has been framed in epic

proportions . In October 2011, Secretary Clintons Senior Adviser for Innovation Alec Ross was reported by the Washington Post
as saying: If the great struggles of the 20th century were between left and right, he said, the conflict of the 21st century will be
between open and closed. The president and the secretary of state have made it clear where they stand on this, he said. For
openness, with an open Internet at its core. Unsurprisingly, this

is a hugely controversial foreign policy . It

positions (p. 24) the United States in direct opposition to important emerging powers like China
as well as other authoritarian states the United States more commonly treats as partners
(such as Vietnam and Bahrain ). The policy also implies a call on all democratic societies to
join it in countering censorship and monitoring. However, even some very close allies such as Australia
and the United Kingdom have, at times, pursued inimical policies and even the United States has found it
hard to live up to its own policy (see challenges below).

Terror DA

2NC AT: No Nuke Terror

ISIS can get Pakistani nukesempirically leaks info and ISIS has monetary
capabilityrapid response is key
Farhan 14- graduate of Kabul University and holds a Master degree from Japan in Public Policy and
Economics, Afghan analyst and commentator on political and socioeconomic affairs in Afghanistan
(Ahmad Hasib, The World Must Prevent ISIS from Obtaining Pakistani Nukes, Khaama Press, 11/20/14,
http://www.khaama.com/the-world-must-prevent-isis-from-obtaining-pakistani-nukes-8782)
The global

leaders certainly understand that the extreme threat to global security is the risk that
terrorists could get a hold of nuclear weapons and start new terrorism. Although world leaders especially
Americans hold several international conferences on addressing this immediate and extreme threat,
there is no guarantee that terrorist organization such as ISIS won't acquire nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda
struggled for several years to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons but they failed. However, ISIS is
much stronger than Al-Qaeda and was able to hold some sort of chemical weapons in Iraq which
they used against the Kurds. In the 16 years since Pakistan emerged as an active nuclear weapons state in 1998, there has
been no reliable report of a terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the risk that terrorists could
acquire new weapons in Pakistan cannot be ignored. Among all the new clear stats Pakistan is
the only country that leaked and transferred nuclear technology to the countries that are still under
UN and US sanctions. It is also the only nuclear state that shelters and protect terrorist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Haqani Network and many others. The Pakistani
nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, leaked nuclear secrets to North Korea, Libya and Iran. Abdul Qadeer
Khan not only accepted the full responsibility for transferring sensitive technology to mentioned stats but he also revealed in 2004,
that the

former military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf was involved neck-deep in nuclear
proliferation. However, after that incident Pakistan enhanced protection of its nuclear weapons, but still ISIS will strive
for acquiring nuclear weapons in Pakistan. This means even if ISIS don't fight for it, there are
elements in Pakistan that may sell either nuclear technology or nuclear weapons to ISIS. If ISIS
obtains nuclear weapons in Pakistan a new chapter of terrorism will emerge, and ISIS will turn into an invincible force.
This time the world will have to deal with nuclear terrorism in Pakistan which will be fueled by
drug money from Afghanistan and oil money from Iraq . It will certainly have severe consequence not only for
Pakistan but for the region and international community. It is important for world leaders to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons and
make sure ISIS never gets hold of them. This bears considerable weight on the United States because America is a pioneer of the
nuclear technology, and a close ally of Pakistan. Moreover,

Qaeda and ISIS.

the US is a prime target of terrorism from Al-

2NC Surveillance Good

Current surveillance techniques are effective and disrupt/deter terrorist
attacks - new programs are emerging daily
Rothkopf 14 (David J., a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endoent as well as CEO and editor of
Foreign Policy. National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear, PublicAffairs, p. 337-8, ES)
For all of the questions raised by some of the sweeping programs revealed by Snoweden, the

surveillance programs of the US

government include some targeted efforts that are widely regarded within the intelligence and
policy communities as extremely helpful. And new capabilities are emerging daily. Although these
will require vigilance to avoid future violations of civil liberties, there is also a sense that on the cyber
side, as with drones and the development of light-footprint approaches for combating terror,
important steps have been taken that actually enhance the security of the American people and
reduce the likelihood of future attacks like those that ushered in this era. Those tools have made such a
marked difference in US counterterrorism efforts that intelligence community leaders are
becoming comfortable with the idea of relaxing other controversial practices. Mike Hayden noted that
one reason he was willing to empty the prisons and scale back on the authorized interrogation
techinques is that he was not nearly as desperate as [Director of Central Intelligence] George [Tenet] was back
in 2002, 2003. Ive got agent networks. Ive got penetrations. Ive built up a strong human
intelligence collection efforts. [sic] Im less dependent on capturing and questioning than I was in 2002. More sources.
Better electronic intelligence. Youre hitting on all cylinders now. And with the requisite intelligence, it enables
your orthoscopic stuff (meaning surgical or light-footprint activities). Lisa Monaco asserts, I think the US
government has done a good job of creating a counterterrorism structure and apparatus-operationally
and policy-wise to learn the lessons of 9/11 and have an ability to meet the threats that we
face, share information, apply the right kind of military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law
enforcement tools today. As an example, say we know a terrorist is transiting Germany. We have an
apparatus to reach out: The FBI will talk to its German counterparts, share information, get
their assistance within the bounds of the rule of law to try and detail that person . So, we have a
process. We share intelligence. We try and disrupt that threat. Although she acknowledges the systems are not quite
as evolved on the cybersecurity side, the point is that despite metastasizing terror threats worldwide, and
confusion and ill-conceived programs of the US government is in a number of important ways
fulfilling its core mission of helping to make America and Americans safer.

Metadata collection is effective

Stone 14, (Geoffrey R. Stone is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, Has won the National Book Award, the Los Angeles Times Book Prize for the Best
Book of the Year in History, the Political Science Association's Award for the Best Book of the Year in
Political Science, and Harvard University's Award for the Best Book in the Year in Public Affairs, January
19th 2014, The President and the NSA, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-presidentand-the-nsa_b_4625829.html )
In his January 17 speech on the NSA, President Obama observed that, " In

our rush to respond to a very real and novel set

of threats" after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "the risk of government overreach -- the possibility" that we might
inadvertently "lose some of our core liberties in pursuit of security -- became more pronounced ."
He explained that now that we are more than a decade past that event, it is time for the nation to review the programs that
were adopted in the wake of those attacks and "to make some important decisions about how to
protect ourselves ... while upholding the civil liberties and privacy protections that our
ideals -- and our Constitution -- require." "This effort," the president cautioned, "will not be completed overnight," but he emphasized that it is
important for "the American people to know that the work has begun." To that end, he announced "a series of concrete and substantial reforms" that he
intended either to adopt himself under his authority as president or, where appropriate, to call upon Congress to enact through legislation. How good a

beginning has he made? I am in a reasonably good position to weigh in on that question, because I had the privilege of serving as one of the five
members of the Review Group that President Obama appointed in August to advise him on these issues. The Review included individuals with a widerange of divergent experiences, values, and expertise. It included, for example, both a card-carrying member of the ACLU (myself) and a former Deputy
and Acting Director of the CIA (Michael Morell). After months of grueling work, the Review Group produced a 300-page report ("Liberty and Security
in a Changing World") that included 46 unanimous recommendations. Those recommendations -- or at least some of the most important of them -provided the foundation for the president's address. After offering an important and valuable framing of the challenge our nation faces in attempting to
reconcile our deep commitments to both liberty and security, the president turned his attention to several specific recommendations. I will comment on
three of them. First, as the president noted, the

most controversial surveillance program at present is the

Section 215 telephone metadata program. Under this program, the NSA collects metadata on millions of
Americans' phone calls every day from their telephone providers . Metadata refers to the specific
phone numbers with which a particular phone number is in contact . It does not include any
information about the identities of the callers or the contents of the conversations. The
NSA holds this vast amount of metadata in its own computers. When NSA analysts find that
there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a particular phone number is associated with
terrorism, the NSA is permitted to "query" the database to find out if that number
(usually belonging to a foreign person) has been in touch -- directly or indirectly -- with any phone number in the United States that is
independently believed to be connected to a possible terrorist. In 2012, the last year for which a full year's records
were available, the NSA queried the database for 288 different numbers. In 16 instances, the suspect number was found to be in touch with another
suspect number in the United States. In those 16 instances, the information was then passed on to the FBI for further investigation. For In the seven
years since this program was created, it has not provided any link that has proved necessary to prevent a pending terrorist attack.that reason, some
critics have argued that the program should be abandoned. Our judgment was that, in a world in which "connecting the dots" and "finding needles in

abandoning the program would be like throwing

out your fire alarm because you haven't had a fire in seven years.
haystacks" are apt metaphors,

India

2NC No Spillover
The court will functionally nullify the affs precedent without overruling
it---even when future cases are almost identical
Michael J. Gerhardt, Assoc. prof @ William and Wary, Nov. 1991, The Role Of
Precedent, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68, p ln
Sometimes, however, the

Court can destroy a precedent without overruling it by distinguishing

precedents in ways that practically nullify them, thereby obscuring the differences between distinctions and
implicit overrulings. 169 The Court's decisions on proportionality of punishment present such a
quandary. In 1980, Rummel v. Estelle 170 held by a 5-4 vote that Texas' statutory requirement of
mandatory life sentence for a defendant convicted of three felonies, consisting in that case of fraudulent practices
cumulatively depriving people of property totaling less than two hundred dollars, did not violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. But this holding cast doubt on the validity of
the Court's prior practice of applying, beyond the death penalty context, the standard that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. 171 Subsequently, the Court by
a 5-4 vote in Solem v. Helm 172 struck [*109] down a punishment scheme almost identical to Rummel,
except that Solem involved a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Justice Blackmun was the swing vote in
Solem, but he did not write an opinion. Rather, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Solem was virtually identical to his Rummel
dissent, prompting the dissenters in Solem to claim that Rummel was being overruled sub silentio. 173 In Harmelin v. Michigan, 174
the Court recently tried to resolve the confusion Rummel and Solem had generated. The five-member majority upheld Michigan's
imposition of a mandatory life sentence without parole for drug possession but split over how to deal with Solem. While Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia argued that Solem should be overruled because it embodied an unworkable standard and was
inconsistent with prior decisions and original intent, 175 Justice Kennedy in a separate concurrence (joined by Justices Souter
and O'Connor) refused the entreaty to

overrule Solem and instead tried to reconcile Solem and Harmelin

on the ground that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate to the crime.'" 176

2NC Delay
No Impact: The Supreme Court isnt modeled anymore
New York Times 9-18-8 (U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations)
But now American legal

influence is waning. Even as a debate continues in the court over whether its
decisions should ever cite foreign law, a diminishing number of foreign courts seem to pay attention to the
writings of American justices. One of our great exports used to be constitutional law , said Anne-Marie
Slaughter, the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. We are losing one of the
greatest bully pulpits we have ever had. From 1990 through 2002, for instance, the Canadian Supreme Court cited
decisions of the United States Supreme Court about a dozen times a year, an analysis by The New York Times found. In the six years

since, the annual citation rate has fallen by half, to about six. Australian state supreme courts cited
American decisions 208 times in 1995, according to a recent study by Russell Smyth, an Australian economist. By
2005, the number had fallen to 72. The story is similar around the globe, legal experts say, particularly in
cases involving human rights. These days, foreign courts in developed democracies often cite the rulings of
the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning equality, liberty and prohibitions against cruel treatment, said
Harold Hongju Koh, the dean of the Yale Law School. In those areas, Dean Koh said, they tend not to look to the rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court. The rise of new and sophisticated constitutional courts elsewhere is one reason for the

Supreme Courts fading influence, legal experts said. The new courts are, moreover, generally more liberal than
the Rehnquist and Roberts courts and for that reason more inclined to cite one another.
.

1NR

Line by line

2NC---No War
Empirics
Ferguson, 06 M.A., Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, Resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg
Center for European Studies, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford
University (Niall, The Next War of the World, Foreign Affairs, September-October 2006, May 21 st 2010, KONTOPOULOS)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern
historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that
simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had
recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did
all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is
discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than
the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

And, economic crisis doesnt cause warprefer statistical studies over

abstract IR theories
Miller, PhD in economics, 2kPhD in economics from McGill U, MSc in economics from the London School of Economics, fmr
adjunct professor at U of Ottawa, fmr executive director of the World Bank in Washington D.C. (Morris, August 2000, Poverty as a Cause of Wars?,
University of Ottawa Center on Governance, http://www.management.uottawa.ca/miller/poverty.htm, AL)

It seems reasonable to believe that a powerful "shock" factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the
part of the people or on the part of the political leadership. The leadership, finding that this sudden adverse economic and social
impact destabilizing, would possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in
train the process leading to war. There would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis according to a study
undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After studying 93 episodes of
economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that
Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ..The severity
of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes.
(or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violenceIn the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites
responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.)

Overview
Green capitalism still causes massive environmental overshoot
Richard Smith 13, economic historian, has written on capitalism and the environment for The
Ecologist, the International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics, Real-World Economics
Review, and others, and has a PhD in economic history from UCLA. Capitalism and the Destruction of
Life on Earth: Six Theses on Saving the Humans, truth-out.org/opinion/item/19872-capitalism-and-thedestruction-of-life-on-earth-six-theses-on-saving-the-humans
Same with Resource Depletion

in the industrialized "consumer economies" are not just overconsuming fossil fuels. We're overconsuming everything.
From fish to forests, minerals to metals, oil to fresh water, we're consuming the planet like
there's no tomorrow.[24] Ecological "footprint" scientists tell us that we in the industrialized nations are now
consuming resources and sinks at the rate of 1.5 planets per year. That is, we're using natural
resources like fish, forests, water, farmland and so on at half-again the rate that nature can
replenish them.[25] According to the World Bank, the wealthiest 10 percent of the world's people accounts for almost 60 percent of consumption expenditures and
the top 20 percent accounts for more than 76 percent of global consumption, whereas the bottom 40 percent of the world's population account for just 5 percent. Even the
bottom 70 percent of the world's population accounts for barely 15.3 percent of global consumption expenditures.[26] Needless to say, the
70 percent wants and deserves a higher material standard of living. Yet if the whole world were to achieve
this by consuming like Americans, we would need something like five more planets of natural
resources and sinks for all of that.[27] Think what this means.
We

Take the case of China. Columbia University's Earth Policy Institute predicts that if China keeps growing by around 8 percent per year, it's current rate, Chinese average per

to provide the natural resources for China's 1.3 billion-plus to

consume like America's 330 million, the Chinese, roughly 20 percent of the world's population, will
consume as much oil as the entire world consumes today. They also will consume 69
percent of current world grain production, 62 percent of the current world meat production, 63
percent of current world coal consumption, 35 percent of current world steel consumption, 84
percent of current world paper consumption. (See Table 1.) Well, where on earth are the Chinese going to find the resources (not to mention
capita consumption will reach current US level by around 2035. But

sinks) to support all this consumption? China certainly doesn't have the resources. That's why the Chinese are buying up the planet. And that's just China. What about the other
four-fifths of humanity? What are they going to consume in 2035?

around the world existing reserves of oil,

minerals and other resources "are being depleted at a terrifying pace and will be largely
exhausted in the not-too-distant future." This is driving miners and drillers to the ends of the earth, the bottom of oceans, to the arctic. We're
Already, as resource analyst Michael Klare reviews in his latest book, The Race for What's Left,

running out of planet to plunder so fast that serious people like Google's Larry Page and Eric Schmidt have partnered with film director James Cameron to make life imitate art,
to explore the possibility of mining asteroids and near planets. Avatar - the perfect capitalist solution to resource exhaustion (but the Marines will be Chinese). [28]

Biggest threat for extinction---bypasses their answers

John Harte 12, Professor of Ecosystem Sciences at the University of California, Berkeley,
September/October 2012, Alarmism is Justified, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 169-175

Lomborg begins by criticizing the notion that the primary constraint on economic
growth is the finiteness of resources, as if that remains the belief of the scientific community. Environmental
scientists have long recognized, however, that the main limit to growth is not running out of
resources but rather running out of space for the byproducts of that growth . Humans are filling
the world's atmosphere with greenhouse gases, tainting its aquifer and surface water with deadly
pollutants, eroding its soils, and allowing damaging toxics to build up in human bodies.
In his essay, Bjrn

Obsessed with the numerical accuracy of projections made decades ago in The Limits to Growth, Lomborg ignores the importance of
that study's qualitative insights, still valid today, concerning the interconnections between humanity and the natural world. The
book illustrated the many ways in which increases

in the human population and consumption levels

undermine the sustainability of human society , including through pollution, the depletion of both
renewable and nonrenewable resources, and industrial production. Lomborg also ignores some of the
study's accurate quantitative insights: recent analyses by scientists show that The Limits to Growth was eerily correct in at least
some of its most important projections. In a reexamination of the study, the ecologists Charles Hall and John Day showed that if a
timeline were added to the book's predictions with 2000 at the halfway point, "then the model results are almost exactly on course
some 35 years later in 2008."
The Limits to Growth countered the blissful ignorance of many economists and business magnates who wanted to believe in the
convenient pipe dream of unlimited growth, denying the finiteness of the natural environment. Many policymakers did understand
the value of the study, however, and tried to inculcate its basic concepts into our civilization, but without success. The scientific
community thus still has educational work to do, and finishing it is essential to securing a future for our civilization.
WHAT THE SCIENCE SAYS
Lomberg promotes numerous misconceptions in his essay. Bemoaning The Limits to Growth's results as neither "simple nor easy to
understand," Lomborg fails to grasp what many reputable scientists and policymakers have long known: that predicting the details
of complex phenomena is difficult. In that light, The Limits to Growth was just a first stab at analyzing the elaborate dynamics that
cause continued economic growth to threaten the sustain-ability of human society.
Lomborg further displays scientific ignorance when he talks about pesticides. His estimate of 20 U.S. deaths annually from
pesticides ignores both the ecological harm they cause and the human health problems, including cancer, hormone disruption, and
neurological effects, associated with pesticide exposure. His argument that DDT is a cheap, effective solution to malaria overlooks
the ability of mosquitoes, like other pests, to evolve resistance. Pesticides can be valuable tools when used as scalpels, but when they
are used as bludgeons, the evolution of resistance often undoes their efficacy. This is why many epidemiologists fear that society is
regressing from the happy era of working antibiotics.

Lomborg also perpetuates the denial of the multiple ways in which civilization is underpinned by
a healthy environment . Yes, we can continue to expand into previously untapped arable land, but
only at the cost of undermining the giant planetary ecosystems that assure humanity will have
clean air, clean water, and a sustainable and benign climate . Yes, we can forgo recycling and grow
plantations for paper, but only at the expense of biodiversity. Indeed, as increasing population
growth and overconsumption degrade the environment, none of the economic growth that
Lomborg hopes for will be possible . Moreover, the capacity of society and its institutions to
maintain, let alone improve, the quality of life -- a capacity that Lomborg takes for granted -- will be at risk.
Lomborg retells the story of how the biologist Paul Ehrlich, the physicist John Holdren, and one of us
lost a bet in 1990 after the economist Julian Simon wagered that the prices of a number of
commodities would drop over a ten-year period. But had the bet been extended a few more years,
the scientists would have won , because the prices of those commodities had, on average, risen. Simon
later challenged ecologists to a new set of bets on the future; Ehrlich and the climatologist Stephen
Schneider accepted the challenge and picked 15 environmentally significant trends, such as the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the amount of biodiversity on the planet.
To our surprise, once he recognized the trends, Simon saw the writing on the wall and promptly
backed out of the bet ; he would have lost more than $10,000. Indeed, the limitations on the human
enterprise extend beyond minerals. World hunger is increasing, as is the cost of basic food
staples. The temporary advances of the environmental movement, such as the creation of more
ecological reserves to protect biodiversity, are proving less and less effective faced with the sheer
weight of further population growth and increasing consumption .

2NC Growth Unsustainable

compound growth is mathematically impossible
George Monbiot 14, columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the
universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes
(planning), and East London (environmental science). The Impossibility of Growth,
www.mesastewardship.org/the-impossibility-of-growth-why-collapse-and-salvation-are-hard-todistinguish-from-each-other/

Ignore if you must climate

change, biodiversity collapse, the depletion of water, soil, minerals, oil; even if all these
issues were miraculously to vanish, the mathematics of compound growth make
continuity impossible. Economic growth is an artefact of the use of fossil fuels. Before large amounts of coal were extracted, every
To succeed is to destroy ourselves. To fail is to destroy ourselves. That is the bind we have created.

upswing in industrial production would be met with a downswing in agricultural production, as the charcoal or horse power required by industry
reduced the land available for growing food. Every

prior industrial revolution collapsed, as growth could not be

sustained(3). But coal broke this cycle and enabled for a few hundred years the phenomenon we now call sustained growth. It was neither
capitalism nor communism that made possible the progress and the pathologies (total war, the unprecedented concentration of global wealth, planetary
destruction) of the modern age. It was coal, followed by oil and gas. The meta-trend, the mother narrative, is carbon-fuelled expansion. Our ideologies
are mere subplots. Now, as the most accessible reserves have been exhausted, we must ransack the hidden corners of the planet to sustain our
impossible proposition. On Friday, a few days after scientists announced that the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet is now inevitable(4), the
Ecuadorean government decided that oil drilling would go ahead in the heart of the Yasuni national park(5). It had made an offer to other governments:
if they gave it half the value of the oil in that part of the park, it would leave the stuff in the ground. You could see this as blackmail or you could see it as
fair trade. Ecuador is poor, its oil deposits are rich: why, the government argued, should it leave them untouched without compensation when everyone
else is drilling down to the inner circle of hell? It asked for $3.6bn and received $13m. The result is that Petroamazonas, a company with a colourful
record of destruction and spills(6), will now enter one of the most biodiverse places on the planet, in which a hectare of rainforest is said to contain
more species than exist in the entire continent of North America(7). The UK oil company Soco is now hoping to penetrate Africas oldest national park,
Virunga, in the Democratic Republic of Congo(8); one of the last strongholds of the mountain gorilla and the okapi, of chimpanzees and forest
elephants. In Britain, where a possible 4.4 billion barrels of shale oil has just been identified in the south-east(9), the government fantasises about
turning the leafy suburbs into a new Niger delta. To this end its changing the trespass laws to enable drilling without consent and offering lavish bribes
to local people(10,11). These new

reserves solve nothing. They do not end our hunger for resources; they
exacerbate it. The trajectory of compound growth shows that the scouring of the planet has only
just begun. As the volume of the global economy expands, everywhere that contains something concentrated, unusual, precious will be sought out
and exploited, its resources extracted and dispersed, the worlds diverse and differentiated marvels reduced to the same grey stubble. Some
people try to solve the impossible equation with the myth of dematerialisation: the claim that as processes
become more efficient and gadgets are miniaturised, we use, in aggregate, fewer materials. There is no
sign that this is happening. Iron ore production has risen 180% in ten years(12). The
trade body Forest Industries tell us that global paper consumption is at a record high level and
it will continue to grow.(13) If, in the digital age, we wont reduce even our consumption of paper, what hope is there for other
commodities? Look at the lives of the super-rich, who set the pace for global consumption. Are their yachts getting smaller?
Their houses? Their artworks? Their purchase of rare woods, rare fish, rare stone? Those with the means buy ever bigger houses to store the
growing stash of stuff they will not live long enough to use. By unremarked accretions, ever more of the surface of the planet is used to extract,
manufacture and store things we dont need. Perhaps its unsurprising that fantasies about the colonisation of space which tell us we can export our
problems instead of solving them have resurfaced(14). As the philosopher Michael Rowan points out, the

inevitabilities of
compound growth mean that if last years predicted global growth rate for 2014 (3.1%) is sustained, even if
we were miraculously to reduce the consumption of raw materials by 90% we delay
the inevitable by just 75 years(15). Efficiency solves nothing while growth continues. The
inescapable failure of a society built upon growth and its destruction of the Earths
living systems are the overwhelming facts of our existence. As a result they are mentioned almost
nowhere. They are the 21st Centurys great taboo, the subjects guaranteed to alienate your friends and neighbours. We live as if trapped inside a Sunday
supplement: obsessed with fame, fashion and the three dreary staples of middle class conversation: recipes, renovations and resorts. Anything but the
topic that demands our attention.

Monbiots wrong---transitions inevitable, doing it sooners key to avoid

extinction
Paul Kingsnorth 9, writer, founder of the Dark Mountain Project, 8/18/9, Is There Any Point in
Fighting to Stave off Industrial Apocalypse?, The Guardian,
http://www.alternet.org/story/142051/is_there_any_point_in_fighting_to_stave_off_industrial_apocal
ypse?page=0%2C2&paging=off&current_page=1#bookmark
[George = Monbiot, he and Kingsnorth are writing to each other in a debate]
Dear

George

You say that you detect in my writing a yearning for apocalypse. I detect in yours a paralysing fear.

You have convinced yourself that there are only two possible futures available to humanity. One we
might call Liberal Capitalist Democracy 2.0. Clearly your preferred option, this is much like the world we live in now, only
with fossil fuels replaced by solar panels; governments and corporations held to account by active citizens; and growth
somehow cast aside in favour of a "steady state economy".
The other we might call McCarthy world, from Cormac McCarthy's novel The Road which is set in an impossibly
hideous post-apocalyptic world , where everything is dead but humans, who are reduced to eating children.
Not long ago you suggested in a column that such a future could await us if we didn't continue "the fight".

Your letter continues mining this Hobbesian vein. We have to "fight on" because without modern
industrial civilisation the psychopaths will take over, and there will be "mass starvation and
war". Leaving aside the fact that psychopaths seem to be running the show already, and millions are suffering today from
starvation and war, I think

this is a false choice . We both come from a western, Christian culture with a deep apocalyptic

tradition. You seem to find it hard to see beyond it. But I

am not "yearning" for some archetypal End of Days,

because that's not what we face.

We face what John Michael Greer, in his book of the same name, calls a "long descent": a series of ongoing crises
brought about by the factors I talked of in my first letter that will bring an end to the all-consuming
culture we have imposed upon the Earth. I'm sure "some good will come" from this, for that culture is a
weapon of planetary mass destruction .
Our civilisation will not survive in anything like its present form, but we can at least aim for a
managed retreat to a saner world . Your alternative to hold on to nurse for fear of finding
something worse is in any case a century too late . When empires begin to fall, they build their own momentum. But
what comes next doesn't have to be McCarthyworld. Fear is a poor guide to the future.

AT: Growth Solves 2NC

Increases in consumption outstrip efficiency gains and green technology
Richard Smith 14, economic historian, has written on capitalism and the environment for The
Ecologist, the International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics, Real-World Economics
Review, and others, and has a PhD in economic history from UCLA. Green Capitalism: The God That
Failed, truth-out.org/news/item/21060-green-capitalism-the-god-that-failed
Given the enormous dangers that such a high target implies, critics have asked why Stern is so reluctant to aim for a safer target? Marxist ecologist
John Bellamy Foster and his colleagues suggest that the answer is to be found in Stern's economics, not the science:
The Stern Review is very explicit, however, that such a radical mitigation of the problem should not be attempted. The costs to the world economy of
ensuring that atmospheric COe stabilized at present levels or below would be prohibitive, destabilizing capitalism itself. "Paths requiring very rapid
emissions cuts," we are told, "are unlikely to be economically viable." If global greenhouse gas emissions peaked in 2010, the annual emissions
reduction rate necessary to stabilize CO2e at 450 ppm, the Stern Review suggests, would be 7 percent, with emissions dropping by about 70 percent
below 2005 levels by 2050. This is viewed as economically insupportable.(39)

if the
science is right that we need to keep emissions below 400 ppm, or even get them back below 350 ppm, then
more growth is out of the question. Indeed, we would have to make radically deeper cuts in GDP than even the 7 percent
reduction per year that Stern calculates would be necessary just to get us down to 450 ppm. Because, under capitalism, a
contraction of economic output on anything like that scale would mean economic collapse and
depression, it is difficult to see how we can make the reductions in greenhouse gases we have to
make to avoid climate catastrophe unless we abandon capitalism. This is the dilemma. So far most scientists have
Stern asserted that "the world does not have to choose between averting climate change and promoting growth and development."(40) But

tended to avoid getting into the contentious economic side of the question. But with respect to the issue of growth, the science is unequivocal: Neverending growth means the end of civilization, if not humanity itself - and in the not-so-distant future. For a summary of the peer-reviewed science on
this subject, read a few chapters of Mark Lynas' harrowing Six Degrees.(41)

Global warming is surely the most urgent threat we face, but it is far from the only driver of global ecological
collapse. For even if we switched to clean renewable electric power tomorrow, this would not stop
the overconsumption of forests, fish, minerals, fresh water. It would not stop pollution or solve
the garbage crisis or stop the changes in ocean chemistry. Indeed, the advent of cheap, clean energy
could even accelerate these trends.(42) Numerous credible scientific and environmental
researchers back up what the climate scientists have been telling us, to demonstrate why
perpetual growth is the road to collective social suicide. For example:
In 2005 the

United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment team of 1,300 scientists from

95 countries issued a landmark report on humanity's overconsumption of "nature's services." The scientists
reported that 60 percent (15 of 24) of the ecosystems examined that are critical for human survival
are being "degraded or used unsustainably," including fresh water, capture fisheries, coral reefs,
wetlands, drylands and forests. Around the world, many of these are deteriorating or on the verge of
collapse. Thus nature's ability to provide the resources for growing future populations is very much
in doubt unless radical steps are taken soon.
In its Living Planet Report 2010, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) similarly concluded that people

are plundering the

world's resources at a rate that far outstrips the planet's capacity to sustain life. As of 2007, the
world's 6 billion-plus people were using up 50 percent more natural resources per year than can be
naturally regenerated (and many resources, like oil, cannot be replenished at all). Put another way, humanity's current
"global footprint" is equal to 1.5 planets. Under a business-as-usual scenario, even with modest projections for
population growth, consumption and climate change, the UN predicts that by 2030 humanity will need the capacity
of two Earths to absorb CO2 waste and support natural resource consumption. Of course we don't all
consume equally: The footprint of high-income countries is three times that of middle-income countries and five times that of low-income countries.
Americans have the biggest footprint of all, consuming the most energy and producing the most waste. If everyone lived like Americans do, we would
need 5.3 planets to support all this. James Leape, director general of WWF, says, "The implications are clear. Rich nations must find ways to live much
more lightly on the Earth - to sharply reduce their footprint, in particular their reliance on fossil fuels. The rapidly growing emerging economies must
also find a new model for growth - one that allows for them to improve the well-being of their citizens in ways the Earth can actually sustain."(43)

And in its own 2010 State of the World Report, the World Watch Institute says that:
As consumerism has taken root in culture upon culture over the past half-century, it has become a powerful driver of the inexorable increase in demand
for resources and production of waste that marks our age. ... More than 6.8 billion human beings are now demanding ever greater quantities of material

Despite
a 30-percent increase in resource efficiency, global resource use has expanded 50
percent over the past three decades. And those numbers could continue to soar for decades to come as more than 5 billion people who currently
resources, decimating the world's richest ecosystems, and dumping billions of tons of heat-trapping gases into the atmosphere each year.

consume one tenth as many resources per person as the average European try to follow the trail blazed by the world's affluent.(44)

2NC Growth = War

Prefer our models ---only historical analysis --- k-wave means growth
causes extinction
Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 99 [Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems,
Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociol006Fgy and Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College
Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College Christopher and
Bruce, The Future of Global Conflict, ed. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, pg 43]
While the onset of a period of hegemonic rivalry is in itself disturbing, the picture becomes even grimmer when the influence
of long-term economic cycles is taken into account. As

an extensive body of research documents (see

been in
synchronous operation on an international scale for at least the last two centuries. Utilizing data
gathering by Levy (1983) on war severity, Goldstein (1988) demonstrates that there is a corresponding 50 to 60
year cycle in the number of battle deaths per year for the period 1495-1975. Beyond merely
showing that the K-wave and the war cycle are linked in a systematic fashion, Goldsteins research suggests that
severe core wars are much more likely to occur late in the upswing phase of the Kwave. This finding is interpreted as showing that, while states always desire to go to war, they can
afford to do so only when economic growth is providing them with sufficient resources.
especially Van Duijn, 1983), the 50 to 60 year business cycle known as the Kondratieff wave (K-wave) has

Modelski and Thompson (1996) present a more complex interpretation of the systemic relationship between economic and
war cycles, but it closely resembles Goldsteins hypothesis. In their analysis, a first economic upswing generates the
economic resources required by an ascending core state to make a bid for hegemony; a second period of economic growth
follows a period of global war and the establishment of a new period of hegemony. Here, again, specific economic upswings
are associated with an increased likelihood of the outbreak of core war. It is widely accepted that the

current K-wave, which entered a downturn around 1967-73, is probably now in the process of beginning a new
upturn which will reach its apex around 2025. It is also widely accepted that by this period US
hegemony, already unraveling, will have been definitively eroded. This convergence of a
plateauing economic cycle with a period of political multicentricity within the core should, if history
truly does repeat itself, result in the outbreak of full-scale warfare between the declining
hegemon and the ascending core powers. Although both Goldstein (1991) and Modelski and Thompson
(1996) assert that such a global war can (somehow) be avoided, other theorists consider that the possibility of
such a core war is sufficiently high that serious steps should be taken to ensure that
such collective suicide does not occur .

2NC Disease
Failure to dedevelop ensures global pandemics and extinction
Frank Ryan, M.D., 1997, virus X, p. 366

How might the human race appear to such an aggressively emerging virus? That
teeming, globally intrusive species, with its transcontinental air travel,
massively congested cities, sexual promiscuity, and in the less affluent regions
where the virus is most likely to first emerge a vulnerable lack of hygiene
with regard to food and water supplies and hospitality to biting insects' The virus is

best seen, in John Hollands excellent analogy, as a swarm of competing mutations, with each individual strain subjected to
furious forces of natural selection for the strain, or strains, most likely to amplify and evolve in the new ecological habitat.3 With
such a promising new opportunity in the invaded species, natural selection must eventually come to dominate viral behavior. In
time the dynamics of infection will select for a more resistant human population .

Such a coevolution takes rather longer in "human" time too long, given the
ease of spread within the global village. A rapidly lethal and quickly spreading
virus simply would not have time to switch from aggression to coevolution . And
there lies the danger. Joshua Lederbergs prediction can now be seen to be an altogether logical one.
Pandemics are inevitable. Our incredibly rapid human evolution, our
overwhelming global needs, the advances of our complex industrial society, all
have moved the natural goalposts. The advance of society , the very science of
change, has greatly augmented the potential for the emergence of a pandemic

strain. It is hardly surprising that Avrion Mitchison, scientific director of Deutsches Rheuma Forschungszentrum in Berlin, asks
the question: "Will we survive! We have invaded every biome on earth and we continue to destroy other

species so very rapidly that one eminent scientist foresees the day when no life
exists on earth apart from the human monoculture and the small volume of
species useful to it. An increasing multitude of disturbed viral-host symbiotic cycles are provoked into self-protective
counterattacks. This is a dangerous situation. And we have seen in the previous chapter how ill-prepared the
world is to cope with it. It begs the most frightening question of all: could such a
pandemic virus cause the extinction of the human species?