North American Philosophical Publications

The Essences of Spinoza's God

Author(s): Daniel E. Flage
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 147-160
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications
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of

History

Philosophy

Quarterly

Volume 6, Number 2, April 1989

THE ESSENCES
Daniel

OF SPINOZA'S GOD
E. Flage

Next, the third definition is not sufficientlyclear tous. I reportedwhat you,

that a Thing
Sir, said to me at the Hague,
either as it is in itself, or as it is in relation

not

see

clearly

what

?Letter

this

distinction

would

can be

considered

to something
.
be ...

else.

in two ways,
. . .But we do

toSpinoza from Simon de Vries, 24 February 1663

describes the essence of substance (1) as consisting of attri

SPINOZA
butes,1 (2) as expressed by attributes (E ld6, lplOs) and (3) as identical
with power (E lp34). Even though one might consistently maintain either
(1) and (2) or (2) and (3), (1) and (3) appear to be inconsistent, because
Spinoza does not take power to be an attribute of substance.2 Further,
the contention that God or God's essence is composed of a multiplicity of
is inconsistent with Spinoza's
attributes
(E lp9 and lpll)
apparent
commitment to the simplicity of God (KV 1,2, p. 70). Are these genuine
inconsistencies, or do they mark an implicit distinction between two
senses of "essence" in Spinoza's philosophy?
In this paper I argue that there are two senses of "essence" operative in
Spinoza's Ethics, and that these alternative notions reflect different rela
tions between a substance and its attribute(s).3 First, I show that in the
opening propositions of the Ethics Spinoza writes as ifattributes are con
stituents of substance and as if substances can be distinguished into kinds
on the basis of their attributes. Next, I show that in Propositions 9 and 10
there is a shift from discussions of attributes as constituents of substance
to discussions of attributes as expressions of substance, a shift that reflects
a dismissal of any metaphysically
significant notion of the constitutive
essence of substance. Finally, I show that following Proposition 10 Spinoza
was concerned with the nature of substance per se, and it is the essence of
substance per se that is expressed by the attributes. That discussion also
will make clear the sense inwhich the essence of Spinoza's God is simple.
Ifmy argument is sound, it explains why attempts to discover a single
relation between substance and attributes in Spinoza's philosophy have
proven

unsuccessful.4

In developing my case, I employ the following interpretative schema.

I distinguish between two ways of conceiving of substance that correspond
147

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

148

to the two kinds of real definitions between which Arnauld distinguishes

in the Port-Royal Logic.5 First, corresponding to a definition per genus
et differentiam is a conception of substance in terms of its essential form
or principal attribute, that is, a conception in which a thing in subsumed
under the genus substance and differentiated into a kind on the basis of
its form or attribute. Descartes's
clear and distinct ideas of substance are
conception of substance. Second, corre
examples of such a genus-species
sponding to what Arnauld called a "description," that is, a definition that
"gives some information about the nature of a thing by expressing the
proper accidents of any referent of the defined word,"6 is what I shall call
or relative conception of substance. Such a conception will
a mediate
a
out
subject or substratum per se, although it does not provide
single
one with knowledge of the nature of the substratum singled out. Such a
conception of substance seems to be found inDescartes,7 it is clearly found
in the works of John Locke and Thomas Reid,8 and there are several
that suggest that Spinoza also allowed relative conceptions of
passages
substance (compare Letters 9 and 10). As we shall see, this distinction
between two ways of conceiving of substance will help us understand how
Spinoza consistently can suggest that the attributes constitute the essence
of substance, while the essence ofGod or substances itself is power.
Given

this interpretive schema,

I. The

Constitutive

Essence

let us now turn to Spinoza's

of a Kind

Ethics.

of Substance

In the opening propositions of the Ethics, Spinoza begins to weave an

elaborate tapestry. As he slowly reveals it, he at first seems to be pre
senting a traditional theory of substance, a theory allowing that there is
an indefinitely large number of finite substances of various kinds. As
more strands are woven into the tapestry, of course, one discovers that
the picture differs significantly from what one had expected: there is no
are
more than one substance of a given kind (E lp5); all substances
infinite (E lp8); and there is but one substance (E lpl4). In this section
I examine some of the strands Spinoza initially weaves
into his tapestry.
I show that in the opening propositions of the Ethics Spinoza was con
cerned with what I call the "constitutive essence" of substance. This is
form9 and what Descartes
called
what Aristotle called the substantial
the principal attribute of a substance.10 As it functions in traditional
theories, the constitutive essence of a substance is that in
metaphysical
virtue of which a substance is a substance of a particular kind, that is,
substances
into kinds. As it
the ontological ground for distinguishing
essence is that
the
constitutive
functions in an epistemological
context,
which one knows regarding a substance of a kind. We shall see that
is
initially writes as if the constitutive essence of a substance
Spinoza
metaphysically
significant, but, as we shall see in the next section, he
concluded that the constitutive essence ismerely of epistemic significance.
There

can be no question

that the constitutive

essence

of a substance

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THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

149

plays a significant role in Spinoza's philosophy, for the notion of attributes

as constituents of substance comes to the fore in the definitions he offers
in Part I of the Ethics. The term "attribute" is defined as "what the
intellect perceives of substance, as [tanquam] constituting its essence"
(E ld4), and the term "God" is defined, in part, as "a substance consisting
(E ld6, emphasis added). To determine
of an infinity of attributes"
whether the constitutive essence plays a metaphysical
role in Spinoza's
or
philosophy, as it does in the philosophies of Aristotle and Descartes,
role, let us turn to the opening propositions
merely an epistemological
of the Ethics.
In Proposition 2 Spinoza writes, "Two substances having different attri
butes have nothing in common with one another" (E lp2). Although he
claims this evident from the definition of "substance"
(E lp2d), that is,
the claim that substance is "what is in itself and is conceived through
itself (E ld3), it is intelligible only in conjunction with the definition of
"attribute," for it is on the basis of its attributes that a substance is
conceivable (E ld4). If there were two substances having different attri
butes, then they would have nothing in common, for insofar as the attri
butes would be distinct, all the modes that fall under them also would
be distinct: no modes of these two (putative) substances would be of the
same kind. Given the notion of a constitutive essence, Spinoza can ask
whether and how distinctions can be drawn among substances.
In Proposition 4, Spinoza addresses this issue. He wrote, "Two or more
distinct things are distinguishable from one another, either by a difference
in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections" (E
open the possibility that there are numerically distinct
lp4). Leaving
substances, the proposition merely asserts that if there are two or more
substances, then they are distinguished from one another on the basis of
their attributes or affections (modes). The proposition suggests that
Spinoza allowed a plurality of substances and distinguished among them
on the basis of their constitutive essences: insofar as one knows which
attribute constitutes the essence of a substance of a particular kind, one
has grounds for drawing numerical distinctions among substances. This
suggests that Spinoza was using the notion of the constitutive essence of
a substance formetaphysical
purposes.
in the proposition Spinoza merely suggests a commitment to the
metaphysical notion of constitutive essence, in the demonstration he iden
tifies the attributes with the essence of substance. In his words, "There
fore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of
things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what
is the same (by D4), their attributes, and their affections" (E lp4d). In
claiming that a substance is "the same" thing as its attributes and affec
notion of the constitu
tions, Spinoza is concerned with the metaphysical
tive essence of substance: the attributes of substance are identical with
the essence of substance, indeed, he suggests, with the substance itself.
This also is suggested by Spinoza's definition of substance (E ld3), for it
While

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

150

seems that it is only if an attribute is an (improper) part of substance

that substance can be conceived through itself.11 If this is correct, then,
for purposes of classification, one can know what a substance is?one can
provide an explication of the nature of substance (compare E lp20d)?on
the basis of its attributes. This does not imply, however, that one is
conceiving of a substance as it is in itself, that is, that one is conceiving
of a substance as subject or substratum, as "that which is neither predic
able of a subject nor present in a subject."12
Spinoza's concern with the constitutive essence of substance continues
in the demonstration of Proposition 5, indeed, the intelligibility of the
demonstration depends upon the stronger thesis that every substance
has a principal attribute. In defending the proposition that "In the universe
there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute"
(E lp5), Spinoza wrote:
If there were

two or more

from one

guished

distinct

another

either

to be distin
have
substances,
they would
or by
in their attributes,
by a difference

a difference in their affections (byP4). If only by a difference of attributes,

then

it will

be

if by a difference

conceded

that

there

in their affections,

But
is only one of the same attribute.
is prior in nature
then since a substance

to its affections (by PI), if the affections are put to one side and [the sub
stance] is considered in itself, i.e. (by D3 and A6), considered truly, one
cannot

be

cannot

be many,

conceived
but

to be
only

distinguished
one [of the

from another,
i.e. (by P4),
there
or attribute],
nature
(E
q.e.d.

same

lp5d)13
that every substance has one attribute that constitutes its
Assuming
essence, Spinoza's proof is intelligible. If one accepts a version of the
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, then to deem two substances
different, there must be a discernible difference between them. A differ
ence in the principal attributes of substance would be a sufficient ground
for drawing this distinction. But if one assumes that one distinguishes
among substances solely on the basis of their principal attributes, then
if one assumes
that there were two substances each having A as its
principal attribute, then there would be no basis for drawing a numerical
distinction between those (putatively distinct) substances: the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles would commit one to claiming that there
is but one substance having A as its principal attribute, not two sub
stances. Notice, however, that apart from the notion of a principal attri
bute, the same conclusion cannot be drawn. If one allowed that the essence
of a substance might be composed of several attributes, then there could
be two substances having attribute A so long as there is at least one
other attribute that is not common to them, for example, one substance
might have the constitutive essence AB while the other has the constitu
tive essence AC.U
Up to this point we have seen that Spinoza uses the notion of the
constitutive essence of substance when raising questions regarding the
of substances. We also have noted that Spinoza appeals
distinguishability

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THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

151

to the constitutive essence of substance in offering an explication of the

essence (or existence) of substance (E lp20d). Prior to Proposition 10, the
only place Spinoza claims that the attributes express the essence of sub
stance is in the definition of "God" (E ld6 and E ld6e), and one might
well claim that attributes are self-expressive.15 In turning to Propositions
9 and 10, however, there is a shift from considerations of the grounds for
to a consideration
of the nature or
among substances
distinguishing
analysis of substance per se and a consequent shift from a consideration
of attributes as constituting the essence of substance to a consideration
of attributes as expressing the essence of substance. So let us turn to
these propositions.
II. Propositions

9 and

10: The

Shift

Proposition 9 reads, "The more reality or being each thing has, themore
attributes belong to if (E lp9), and the proof consists of nothing more
than the claim that "This is evident from D4" (E lp9d), that is, it is
evident from the claim that an attribute is "what the intellect perceives
of substance, as constituting its essence" (E ld4). The definition of sub
stance is neutral with respect to the number of attributes a substance
possesses. To the traditional substance theorist, both the proposition and
the proof are puzzling, since the traditional substance theorist assumes
that each substance has exactly one form or attribute that constitutes
its essence.16 Further, as we noted above, Spinoza seems to accept the
same view in his proof ofProposition 5. Thus, one asks whether Spinoza's
earlier arguments provide grounds that support Proposition 9. I believe
they do, but to see this we must briefly digress and consider the Cartesian
notion of "degrees of reality."
To the twentieth century reader, the notion of degrees of reality is
notion of degrees of reality cannot
puzzling. As Curley notes, Descartes's
occasional sugges
be equated with degrees of existence,17 and Descartes's
tion that the notions of reality and perfection are synonymous is of little
there is a theme Descartes occasionally sounds which is
help. Nonetheless,
somewhat more helpful, namely, that degrees of reality are to be identified
with degrees of independence. Thus, in the "Arguments for the Existence
in
of God and the Distinction between the Soul and the Body Arranged
Geometrical Fashion" Descartes
suggests there are but three degrees of
reality, namely, the reality of a mode, the reality of a finite substance, and
the reality of an infinite substance.18 IfSpinoza also understood degrees of
reality as degrees of independence, Proposition 9 follows from the proofs
Spinoza already had advanced. Remember that in Proposition 5, Spinoza
had argued that there is but one substance of a particular kind. Hence, if
there are both extended substances and thinking substances, there can be
no more than one substance of each kind. At that point, one assumes that
Spinoza is concerned with finite substances. But inProposition 8 he argues
that "Every substance is necessarily infinite" (E lp8), that is,while there
still might be a multiplicity of substances, each substance is infinite in its

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152

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

kind.19 Consider what this implies. Assuming

that there is a multiplicity
of substances, that there are but three degrees of reality, and that each
substance has but one constitutive attribute, the claim that every sub
stance is necessarily
infinite implies that each substance possesses the
same degree of reality possessed by every other, namely, the highest
degree of reality. Hence, if there were both an extended substance and a
thinking substance, each would be an independent infinite being, and each
would exist in a particular way (as defined by its attribute). But ifall sub
stances are infinite and one can still concern oneself with degrees of reality,
that is, independence, the only ground for deeming one substance more
real than another is on the basis of a multiplicity ofways in which it is
independent, that is, on the basis of a multiplicity of attributes. Thus, a
substance composed of two attributes would be "more real" than a sub
stance composed of but one attribute. It is this kind of consideration that
seems to be behind Spinoza's conclusion in Proposition 9 that "The more
reality or being each thing has" that is, the more respects in which it is
independent, "the more attributes belong to it."
But notice what this entails. One way to conceive of substance is on
the basis of the genus-species model of definition: substance is taken to
be a genus and attributes to be differentia among kinds of substances.
In contending that a substance can have more than one attribute, Spinoza
implicitly rejects the genus-species
conception of substance, for if a sub
stance can have more than one form or attribute, then no attribute is
to constitute the specific difference among substances.
guaranteed
Speaking of this in terms of its definitional correlates, Spinoza rejects a
genus and species real definition of substance in favor of a "description"
consisting of an enumeration of the attributes of a substance (compare
El, 39).20 If one knew all the attributes of substance, one's knowledge
would be adequate
(KV II, 22, p. 139).21 But even if one's knowledge of
substance is not adequate?that
is, even if one does not know all the
attributes constituting substance (compare KV II, 22, p. 139; compare
Letter 64)?Spinoza's
contention that there is but one substance allows
him to single out that being on the basis of any attribute (compare E
2p7s). Such a conception of substance ismediate or relative: it allows one
to single out the substance itself, but it provides one with no knowledge
of the

nature

of substance

per

se.22

Thus far, Spinoza has been concerned exclusively with the constitutive
essence of substance. In the scholium to Proposition 10, however, there
is a shift away from the claim that attributes constitute the essence of
substance to the claim that attributes express the essence of substance,
and the language of expression is used throughout the remainder of the
first book of the Ethics. As we shall see, this shift in usage corresponds
or
to a shift away from a concern with a kind of substance to a mediate
relative conception of substance per se. So let us turn to the scholium to
Proposition 10 and examine itwith some care.
Spinoza

wrote:

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THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

153

From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be

to be really
distinct
be conceived
conceived
without
the aid
(i.e., one may
infer from that that they constitute
of the other), still we cannot
two beings,
or two different
For
it is of the nature
substances.
that each
of substance

of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has

in it together,
and one could not be produced
been
always
by another,
or being
the reality,
of substance.
each expresses
to ascribe
it is far from absurd
to one substance.
attributes
So
many
in nature
is clearer
than that each being must
be conceived
Indeed,
nothing
or being
some attribute,
it has, the more
it has
and the more
under
reality,

have
but

attributes

which

sequently

there

express
necessity,
is also nothing
clearer

or

and
eternity,
than that a being

infinity.

And

con

infinite

absolutely

must be defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite

attributes,

each

of which

expresses

a certain

eternal

and

infinite

essence.

But if someone asks by what sign we shall be able to distinguish the

of substances,
let him read the following
which
propositions,
diversity
and that is absolutely
there exists
that in Nature
only one substance,
in vain.
nite. So that sign would
be sought
(E lplOs.)

We

shall consider each paragraph

of the scholium

show

infi

in its turn.

The first paragraph is little more than an explication of the implications

of Propositions 9 and 10. In Proposition 10 Spinoza claimed that "Each
attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself (E IplO), and
from this it follows that two attributes of a single substance are conceived
as really distinct: the conception of one does not involve the conception
of the other. In Descartes's
scheme, this would be sufficient to claim that
there are two distinct substances,23 but in (provisionally) retaining the
notion of degrees of reality with respect to substances while maintaining
that all substances are infinite, Spinoza rejects that notion of a principal
attribute, and, in so doing, he rejects the Cartesian grounds for drawing
distinctions among substances. With this, the metaphysical
notion of a
constitutive essence is abandoned. Here Spinoza does not claim that the
attributes constitute the essence of substance, rather he claims that each
attribute expresses the "reality, or being of substance." Since "It pertains
to the nature of substance to exist" (E lp7), an attribute expresses one
way in which a substance exists, and given the attribute, one can infer
that a substance of the relevant kind exists.
In the second paragraph of the scholium Spinoza continues to concern
himself with attributes as expressions of the "reality, or being of sub
stance." In claiming that "each being must be conceived under some
attribute" (E lplOs), Spinoza seems to be shifting away from a concern
with conceiving of the constitutive essence of a substance, that is, con
ceiving of the nature of a thing of a kind, to conceiving of the substance
per se: one conceives of the substance as the thing that expresses a certain
attribute (compare E 2p7s). One's conception of substance ismediate or
relative: one singles out a substance per se as opposed to the essence of
a substance of a kind.24 While
one might remain concerned with the
constitutive essence of a substance, Spinoza indicates in the third para

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154

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

graph of the scholium that that notion now becomes a purely epistemic
notion that can fulfill no metaphysical
purposes. While the adequacy of
one's idea of substance might increase as one knows more attributes, the
attributes are neither identical with substance per se nor do they ground
distinctions among kinds of substances. On the other hand, insofar as
one is concerned with the attributes as expressions of the essence of
substance, it is the essence of substance per se that is singled out. This
raises the question of the analysis of substance per se.
III. The Analysis

of the Essence

of Substance

Per

Se

Up to this point we have been concerned with the constitutive essence

of substance, that is, the grounds for drawing distinctions among sub
stances. The road from Proposition 4 to the scholium of Proposition 10 is
a road leading from the hypothesis that there are many substances to
the thesis that there is but one substance, and, consequently, a road
distinctions
leading away from the possibility of drawing numerical
notion of the constitutive
among substances. Hence, the metaphysical
essence of substance is replaced by a purely epistemological notion of the
constitutive essence of substance:
insofar as substance is conceived as
composed of attributes, this merely provides one with an explication of
the nature of substance.25 Beginning with the scholium to Proposition
10, however, Spinoza focuses on the contention that the attributes of
substance express the essence of substance. As we shall see, his concern
with the expressed essence of substance is a concern with the essence of
substance per se, and Spinoza analyzes the notion of substance per se in
terms of power, that is, the ability to exist (compare E lplld3).
Following Proposition 10, there are nine propositions, demonstrations,
corollaries, or scholia in the first part of the Ethics that allude to the
relation between substance and its attributes (E lpll,
lpl6d, lpl9d,
lp20d, lp25c, lp29s, lp31d, lp32d, and lp36d).26 In all but two of these
(E lpll, and lp20d), Spinoza uses exclusively the language of expression
either to indicate the relation between an attribute and the essence of
substance or to suggest that the attributes are self-expressive. In this
section I begin by examining the two passages
inwhich Spinoza suggests
that the attributes constitute (are components of) the essence of substance,
showing that the notion of the constitutive essence is a purely epistemic
notion. Second, I examine those passages
inwhich Spinoza suggests attri
butes are self-expressive, arguing that these provide a link between the
notions of the constitutive and expressed essence of substance. Finally,
I examine
in which Spinoza
the passages
claims that the attributes
express the essence of substance and show that the essence expressed is
power, that is, the ability to exist (E lplld3).
Beginning with his definition of "God" (E ld6), Spinoza occasionally
the claim that attributes are constituents of God or God's
juxtaposes
essence and the claim that attributes as expressions ofGod's essence. In

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THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

155

Proposition 11 Spinoza quotes his definition of "God," writing, "God, or

a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each ofwhich expresses eternal
and infinite essence, necessarily exists" (E lpll). Spinoza's claim that God
consists of infinite attributes is surprising, since in his definition of "attri
bute" he claimed that an attribute is "what the intellect perceives of sub
stance, as constituting its essence" (E ld4, emphasis added). Hence, one
would expect Spinoza to claim that the attributes constitute the essence of
God. Does Spinoza draw a distinction between substance itself and its
essence? There is some evidence that he does not, for, as we saw above, he
identifies substance with its attributes and affections in the demonstra
tion of Proposition 4. But if one identifies Spinoza's substance itself with
its essence, two puzzles arise. First, since God or substance consists of a
multiplicity of attributes, then either the essence of God is complex or
God consists of a multiplicity
of essences. The essential complexity of
is
with
God
inconsistent
the position defended in the Short Treatise (KV
while
the
I, 2, p. 70),
suggestion that God has a multiplicity of essences
seems to be inconsistent with the notion of an essence. Second, if one
grants that God is essentially complex,27 then the attributes reasonably
can be deemed parts of a substance. But if attributes are proper parts of
a substance, then they are ontologically prior to the whole (compare CM
II, 5, p. 324), which is contrary to Proposition 1 of the Ethics. Hence, if
Spinoza identifies substance itselfwith its constitutive essence, he seems
to be championing an inconsistent position.
On the other hand, if the interpretation forwhich I have been arguing is
correct and the constitutive essence of substance ismerely of epistemic sig
nificance, we might avoid these inconsistencies. Under this interpretation,
the attributes constitute the substance as it is known, but they are expres
sions of the essence of substance per se (compare E ld4). In this case, the
essence of substance per se might be simple, but insofar as the essence of
substance per se ismultiply expressed, substance is known in amultiplicity
of ways and conceived as if it were complex.28 This resolves the appar
ent inconsistencies we noted above. But if the constitutive essence of
substance (God) is only of epistemic significance, one should
Spinoza's
find evidence that this is so. Such evidence if found in the demonstration
of Proposition 20.
Defending the claim that "God's existence and his essence are one and
the same" (E lp20), Spinoza argued:
God (by P19) and all his attributes are eternal, i.e., (by D8), each of his
attributes
(by D4)

existence,
constitutes
same,

existence.
expresses
God's
eternal

explain

q.e.d.

the same attributes

of God which
Therefore,
essence
at the same
time explain
his eternal

constitutes
i.e., that itself which
So his existence
his existence.

God's
and

his

essence

essence

time
at the same
are one and the

(E lp20d.)

Spinoza here uses both the language of expression and of constitution.

Notice, however, that he is using the epistemological notion of explana
tion. The attributes, as constituents of the essence of God explain what

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

156

God is, that is, they allow one to know what God is. They also explain,
or allow one to know, the ways inwhich God exists. These same attributes
express the essence and existence of God. If one takes existence to be a
single property?is
expressed by each of the
property,29 then existence?a
attributes ofGod. Further, since Spinoza deemed God an absolutely infi
nite being, not merely a being that is infinite in its own kind (E ld6e),
each of the attributes must express this absolute infinity of both essence
and existence (compare E lpl9 and E lpl9d). Again, this suggests that
the essence of God that is expressed by the attributes is conceptually
distinct from those attributes.
But the evidence based on the demonstration of Proposition 20 might
that Spinoza oftenwrites
be deemed inconclusive, and it is unquestionable
as if the attributes are strictly self-expressive. In the demonstration of
Proposition 16, he writes that "the divine nature has absolutely infinite
attributes (by D6), each ofwhich also expresses an essence infinite in its
own kind" (E lpl6d). In the corollary to Proposition 25, he wrote, "Par
ticular things are nothing but affections ofGod's attributes, ormodes by
which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way"
(E lp25c). And in the demonstrations of Propositions 31 and 32, Spinoza
explicitly claims that modes of thought are expressions of the attribute
of thought. Do these attributes also express an essence of God that is
something distinct from the attribute itself? I believe they do, and to see
why this is plausible we should look briefly at Spinoza's discussion of
Natura

naturans.

In the scholium to Proposition 29, Spinoza formally introduces the

distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata. Of the former
he wrote:

From the preceding I think it is already established that byNatura naturans

we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through it self, or
such

attributes

(by P14C1

of substance

and

P17C2),

God,

as

an eternal
and
express
insofar as he is considered

infinite
as

essence,
a free cause.

i.e.

(E

lp29s.)
Ifmy interpretation is correct, the definition ofNatura
naturans?and,
(E
indeed, the definition of "substance" at the beginning of the Ethics
ld3)?is
intelligible. God as Natura naturans is conceived through himself
insofar as one conceives of the attributes of God. If there God and his
attributes are identical (compare E lp4d), then in conceiving of the attri
butes (constitutive essence) of God, one conceives of what God is qua
naturans. But God is conceived as Natura naturans only insofar
Natura
as God is conceived as a free cause, that is, a being whose nature and
actions are not determined by some other substance (compare E Ip8s2).
It is the nature of God as free cause, that is, as substance per se, that is
expressed by the attributes singularly and conjointly.
his concern with Natura
naturans, that is, God as free cause,
into
34
fits
nicely
Spinoza's system: it provides an analysis
Proposition
Given

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THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

157

of the nature of substance per se. As Spinoza wrote, "God's power is his
essence itself (E lp34; compare CM 2, 6, p. 152 and 2, 10, p. 167). His
proof reads as follows:
For

from the necessity

of himself (by Pll)

power,

by which

he

alone

of God's

essence

it follows

that God

is the cause

and (by P16 and P16C) of all things. Therefore, God's

and

all

(E lp34d.)

things

are

and

act,

is his

essence

itself,

q.e.d.

The power ofGod, that is, the ability to be and to act (compare E IplldS),
naturans. Insofar as God qua Natura
is the essence of God as Natura
naturata (E lp29s), they are
naturans is the cause of God qua Natura
conceived as distinct. Further, insofar as the attributes ofNatura naturans
express,

rather

than

constitute,

the

essence

o? Natura

naturans,

they

are

conceived as distinct from that essence. It is for this reason that Spinoza
must introduce something other than the attributes to provide his analysis
naturans. Insofar as God qua Natura
of the nature of God qua Natura
naturans is conceived as a cause of his own existence and of all other
things (as affections of substance) (compare E lp36 and E lp36d), and
insofar as power is the ability to exist (E lplld3),
power provides an
analysis of God or substance as it is in itself: it provides an explication
ofwhat itmeans to claim that God or substance is "that which is in itself

(E ld3).
One of the characteristics of an adequate analysis is that the terms in
are distinct from the terms in the analysans.
In the
the analysandum
can be expressed as "the thing
case of Spinoza's God, the analysandum
that is extended and thinks and . . . ,"where the ellipsis points would be
filled in with any attributes God possesses that are not known to human
beings (compare Letter 64), that is, it is an expression of an adequate or
idea of the constitutive essence ofGod. Such a conception
quasi-adequate
ismediate or relative, that is, it is not an adequate conception: it singles
out a particular object without providing one with knowledge
of the
on the other
inherent nature of the object singled out.30 The analysans,
hand, is power, and as such it is distinct from the analysandum.
Spinoza's
analysis of the nature ofGod or substance as power is formally adequate.
Thus, the initial puzzle regarding the apparent inconsistencies among
Spinoza's discussions of the relations between substance and its attributes
has been resolved. Spinoza is concerned with the constitutive essence of
substance when he claims that the attributes constitute the essence of
substance. Such a notion of the essence of substance might allow one to
draw distinctions among kinds of substances?if
there were such distinc
essence of Spinoza's
if
the
one's
of
constitutive
tions?and,
conception
substance contained all the attributes of substance, one's idea would be
adequate. Once Spinoza had shown that there is but one substance, allu
sions to the constitutive essence of substance could have merely epistemic
import: in knowing the constitutive essence of substance one merely has
an idea of the nature of God. On the other hand, power is the essence of

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

158

God or substance per se. Power is expressed by each of the attributes, but
on this conception of the essence of substance, the attributes do not con
stitute the essence of substance. In showing this, I have also shown that
insofar as there are two notions of the essence of substance in Spinoza's
philosophy, any attempt to discover a single and unique relation between
substance and its attributes is futile. Insofar as one is concerned with
the constitutive essence of substance or God, the relation between an
attribute and a substance is the relation of a part to a whole; insofar as
one is concerned with the expressed essence of substance or God, the
relation between an attribute and substance is the relation of effect to
cause. It also shows that insofar as one is concerned with the constitutive
essence, the essence of God is complex, but insofar as one is concerned
with the expressed essence, the essence of God is simple.31
The University

at Austin

of Texas

Received

15, 1988

January

NOTES
1. Benedict
sition

in The

vol.

1 (Princeton:

Princeton

will

be by Part,

definition

All

10, Scholium.
of abbreviations.
Man,

and His

PP; Cogitata
2. While

Metaphysica

(c). Thus,

works

are

extension

is an attribute

the only attributes

(E)

(d), scholium

(s),

'Principles

I, Proposition

the following set

on God,
Treatise

known

of Philosophy"

of God, his comments

of God

and will

Works,

in Letter

by humans

that is, the question

the ways

in which

whether
human

a subject of considerable
Ifmy
substance,
controversy.
it will show that there is a grain of truth in both interpretations:
has been

constituents

are subjective,

of substance

per se might

Philosophy

of Spinoza:

York:

Schocken

nition

of Attribute,"

Books,

be objective.
Unfolding

1972],

pp. 28-42;

1934],

vol.

osophical

Review,

Bowman,

"Spinoza's

Francis
59

attributes

as expressions

(On the controversy,

see Harry

the Latent

ofHis

Review,
S. Haserot,
reprinted

ofAttributes,"

Processes
152-56;

Francis

vol. 62 [1953],

ed. by S. Paul

[1950],

Doctrine

while

I, pp. 146 and

Philosophical
and Interpretive Essays,

Critical

be to the Collected

in accordance with
= El: Short
of the Intellect

status of Spinoza's
attributes,
ontological
an objective ontological
status or are merely

or classify
is correct,

Press,

will

Curley,

to the Ethics

Part

the text of the paper

3. The

substance

references

64

suggests

is not an attribute.

that power

have

Further

1, propo

trans, by E. M.

(p), and demonstration

lplOs" will denote Ethics,

"E

to Spinoza's

does not deny power

and

ed. and

on the Emendation
=
KV; Parts I and II ofDescartes'
= CM.

Treatise

Spinoza

1985).

Press,

6; and Part

1, definition

of Spinoza,

(d) or proposition

within

Weil-Being

that thought

Works

University

references

parenthetically

4; Part

1, definition

Collected

(e), or corollary

explication
be made

Part

Ethics,

Spinoza,

10, scholium,

Kashap

"Spinoza
in Studies
Southern

know

interpretation

S. Haserot,

and the Status

in Spinoza,

"Spinoza's

in Studies

of Universals,"

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

[New
Defi

in Spinoza:
of California

pp. 43-67;

ofPhilosophy,

of
The

Austryn Wolfson,
2 vols.
Reasoning,

reprinted

as

attributes

of the essence

[Berkeley: University

Journal

attributes

minds

Phil

Carroll

R.

vol. 5 [1967],

THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

p. 60; Warren

ed. by Maurice

Interpretation,
Court,

of Attribute,"
in Spinoza:
in
Essays
Concept
and Eugene
Freeman
Illinois: Open
[LaSalle,

Mandelbaum

E. M. Curley,

pp. 191-94;

1975],

on Spinoza's

"A Note

Kessler,

159

Spinoza's

An Essay

Metaphysics:

Harvard

in Interpretation
E.

Charles

pp.

Press,
1969],
16-18;
University
[Cambridge:
on the 'Objective' and 'Subjective'
Remarks
of Attributes,"
Interpretation
[1977], pp. 447-56;

C. Martens,

Stanley

on Attributes,"

"Spinoza

Jarrett,

"Some

Inquiry,

vol. 20

vol. 37 [1978],

Synthese,

Paul Wienpahl,
The Radical
[New York: New York University
Press,
Spinoza
to De Vries," Canadian
Journal
1979], pp. 72-88; Linda Trompetter,
"Spinoza: A Response

pp. 107-11;

11 [1981], pp. 525-38;

of Philosophy,

vol.

[Indianapolis,

Indiana:

[London:

Spinoza

4. Cf. Molke

Jonathan

Bennett,

A Study

S. Gram,

R. J. Delahunty,

1984], pp. 61-64;

Publishing
Company,
and Kegan
Paul,
1985], pp. 116-17.)

Routledge

and Predication,"

Substance,

"Spinoza,

Ethics

of Spinoza's

Hackett

vol. 34

Theoria,

(1968),

pp. 222-44.
5. Antoine
Patricia

The Art of Thinking:

Arnauld,

James

The Art

7. Cf. Ren?

Descartes,

Descartes,

P. Costabel,

Philosophical
Dugald

Cambridge

2 vols.

ofDescartes,

University

Press,

be abbreviated

be abbreviated

Verlag

Aalen,
Mind,

Locke

Vol.

1911),

1964-74),

Vol.

1, p. 240.
Further

(London:

to Descartes's

references
to the Oeuvres

references

to The Philosophical
to The Philosophical

and

1, p. 210; The

and G. R. T. Ross

Further

The

Stroothoff,

1985), Vol.

Haldane

de

ed. by B.

8A, pp. 24-25;

Robert

Press,

University

to the Right Reverend

(1823;

1963), Vol.

edition

reprint

4, pp. 21-22; Thomas

see also my Berkeley's

pp. 142-59;

Theory

de Descartes

will
ofDescartes
Writings
will be
Works of Descartes

Lord Bishop

Edward,

West

Darmstadt,

Reid,

10. Descartes,

Essays

The Worm's

(Norman:

12. Aristotle,

square

14. It should

brackets
be noted

D. Ross,

on the Active

Scientia
of the

Powers

1969),

pp. 07-10.

Ideas,"

Theoria,

A Reconstruction

I have
vol. 47
on

based

4.

Chapter

in The Basic

Z 6 1031al5-1032all,

32; cf.William

in Spinoza:

House,

vol. 45

trans, by E. M.
are Curley's.
this

See

Limited

(1985),

1941), pp. 789-91.

Spinoza,
with

"Spinoza

on Part

ed. by Robert W.

1978),

pp.

139-59,

Principles

and

Shahan

and William

in Spinoza,"

Philos

pp. 393-406.

5 lbll-12,

Edghill,

is consistent

Sacksteder,

Perspectives,
Press,

Parts:

and Complex
Research,

that

New

of Oklahoma

University

"Simple Wholes

Categories,
p. 9.

1987),

(New York: Random

and Letter

Eye View,"

ophy and Phenomenological

of Aristotle,

Helm,

ofNotions:

in

ofWorcester,

Germany:

I, 53 and 63.

I, 2, pp. 70-71

and J. I. Biro

Croom

ed. by Richard McKeon

Principles,

11. See KV,

Doctrine

trans, by W.

Metaphysics,

ofAristotle,

Sacksteder,

(London:

ofMeaning

9. Cf. Aristotle,

13. The

J. Vrin,

in Oeuvres

52,

Presentation,

ed. by Baruch
M.I.T.
Press,
Brody
(Cambridge:
account
in some detail
in "Locke's Relative
Locke's

examined

Whole:

Cambridge

further references

A Letter

of John

Human

Works

I, Section

Nouvelle

trans, by Elizabeth

further references

CSM;

Part

Tannery:

trans, by John Cottingham,

by Part and Section.

AT;

8. See John Locke,

The Works

His

(Paris:

1964),

HR.

abbreviated

(1981),

(London:

Works

will be made

Principles

11 vols.

Arts,

and

p. 165.

p. 165.

Logic,

& Paul

of Descartes,

Writings

of Liberal

of Philosophy,

Adams

trans, by James Dickoff

Logic,

Library

Port-Royal

The Principles

J. Beaude,

Murdoch,

Philosophical

will

of Thinking:

par Charles

publi?es

Rochot,

Bobbs-Merrill,

(Indianapolis:

6. Arnauld,

Port-Royal

Collected

inMcKeon,

Works,

Proposition

The Basic

1:411,

5 insofar

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

note

Works

10.

as Spinoza

is

160
concerned

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

the nature

with

singular

"attribute"

15. Cf. E

lpl6d

Second

53, 63; and Simon

17. E. M.
1978),

raises

and

lp21d,

16. Cf. Descartes,

Descartes

it is only his gloss

as the

of "nature"

this problem.
I shall

lp31d.

AT

Replies,

de Vries's

Curley,

of substance:

(essence)

which

discuss

these passages

CSM

7:132;

letter to Spinoza

2:95; HR

of 24 February

the Skeptics

Against

below.

2:32; Descartes,

Harvard

(Cambridge:

I,

Principles

(Letter

1663,

8).
Press,

University

p. 129.

18. Descartes,
Curley,

Second

Descartes

19. Notice

AT

Replies

distinction

Spinoza's

20. Cf. Arnauld,

The Art

21. Cf. Descartes,

Fourth

CSM

7:165;

the Skeptics,

Against

between

2:56;

cf. PP

infinity in kind and absolute

of Thinking:

Port-Royal

AT

Replies,

HR

2:117;

la4,

and

p. 243,

pp. 130-31.

7:220;

Logic,

CSM

infinity at E ld8e.

p. 165.
HR

2:155;

2:97; Descartes,

Principles,

I, 11.
22. Notice
and

that

"Jacob"

this

is analogous

to singling

out the same

an answer

it provides

9), and

(Letter

person

to de Vries's

by the names

query

"Israel"
two ways

regarding

a thing can be conceived

and others seem to
(Letter 8). This is a point Donagan
See Alan Donagan,
and the Distinction
"Essence
of Attributes,"
in Spinoza:

in which

have missed.
A Collection
Anchor

of Critical

Books,

23. Cf. Descartes,

Second

24. Conceiving

ed. by Majorie

Essays,

Grene

City, New

(Garden

York:

Doubleday

pp. 167-68.

1973),

Replies,

AT 7:132; CSM

in this manner

of substance

2:95; HR

2:32; Descartes,

assume

might

Principles
are

that attributes

1,60.

objective,

since one

singles out substance per se as the thing that has such and such an attribute.
the other hand, one could do equally well in singling out substance per se on the basis
of a finite mode,
viz., as the thing that has such and such a finite mode. Only substance

On

is sufficiently

to be properly

independent

25. There

is a sense

attributes.

See KV

in which

a thing.

substance

is conceived

as a complex

whole

26. Spinoza
also had a reductio ad absurdum
to show that thought
argument
the idea of God at E lp21d, but that issue is not germane
to our discussion.
27. Some
Curley,
28. Here

Spinoza's

of theHuman

31. Research

J. Glass

the essence

of God

complex.

Cf.

as

if they constitute

substance

per se: the attributes

AT

7:65; CSM

ofWorcester,

2:45; HR

inWorks,

1:180-181.

2:21-2; Reid, Essays

on the Active

pp. 07-10.

for this paper was

tute of the University

and Ronald

Five,

to theBishop
Mind,

considered

of substance.

Meditation

Letter

that Spinoza

constitutes

p. 18.

are conceived

constituents

29. Cf. Descartes,

30. Cf. Locke,

to hold

Metaphysics,

the attributes

are subjective

Powers

seem

scholars

of

composed

I, pp. 75-76.

I, Dialogue

of Texas

supported
at Austin.

for their helpful

by a grant

Research

I wish

A. P. Martinich

comments

from the University

to thank Edwin Allaire,

on an earlier

version

of this paper.

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Insti