Future

Air and
Space
Operational
Concept

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THE FUTURE AIR AND SPACE
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 1
This Environmental Operational Concept2 (EOC) sets the boundaries of,
and defines the beacon for, the UK’s future air and space capability

INTRODUCTION
1. This Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FASOC) describes,
principally at the operational level, how the UK’s air and space power capability will
operate in the 20-year timeframe. The Agile Air Force is the core of the capability,
encompassing Air Power (AP)3 elements from all 3 Services integrated to deliver
future air and space power. Agile air power will be fundamental to the UK’s future
Military Capability.

AIM
2. The aim of this paper is to present the EOC for UK air and space
power, in order to inform concept, force and capability development4.

CONTEXT
3. The FASOC describes the potential development of the UK’s air and
space contribution to Joint and coalition operations. Policy direction derives from the
Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the New Chapter, Defence Strategic Guidance
2003 (DSG03) and the Defence White Papers 03 and 04 (DWP 03/04). It is guided
by the UK Joint Vision (JV), the Joint High Level Operational Concept (Jt HLOC) and
the UK Military Effects-Based Operations Concept, and informed by other emerging
concepts. It is consistent with, and links to, the Future Maritime Operational Concept
(FMOC), the Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC) and developing Future
Logistics Operational Concept.

4. Defence planning acknowledges the increased likelihood of deploying

forces beyond the core regions5, typically to deliver a small scale military response
across the globe to counter fleetingly available and asymmetric threats6. As a more
closely defined force for good, our humanitarian efforts may well also be needed
world-wide7.
1
JDCC has advised that space should be included within the Air Concept.
2
The Environmental Operational Concepts sit below Jt HLOC and provide authority and provenance for all
sub-concepts.
3
Air power is: ‘The ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above
the surface of the earth. Air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned air vehicle’.
JWP 0-01.1.
4
Capability and Force Development encompasses: other analytical and applied concepts; procurement; resource
and programmes staff; force development departments and associated research, experimentation and analysis
staffs.
5
The original SDR core regions, Europe, the Near East, North Africa, and the Gulf, have now been expanded to
include sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia - DWP04, para 1.2.
6
‘Global’ references within FASOC acknowledge policy direction that ‘to tackle asymmetric forms of attack,
including from international terrorism and WMD, at source – wherever that may be - or in transit … requires
the capability to deliver a military response globally’. The core regions are likely to continue to have the most
significant bearing on our interests as force drivers, though these may, of course, change over time. DWP 03,
paras 2.8 – 2.14.
7
DWP03 (para 2.15) notes that, for example, Sub-Saharan Africa (now a core region) has those conditions likely
to perpetuate a situation of recurring humanitarian disasters.
2

SCOPE
5. The FASOC informs the MoD’s force development and definition
processes through 4 mechanisms. At the conceptual level, the core attributes of
air power are developed, while, at the operational level, the Core Air and Space
Power Roles are defined. However, because this will not include the totality of air
and space power, the Defence Capability Framework (DCF) will describe supporting
and enabling requirements. Lastly, 2 supporting essays describe the core roles
in greater detail and outline the exploitation of space, as a rapidly expanding and
increasingly indispensable medium for modern and future Joint operations.
THE DEFENCE AIM
6. The UK’s air and space capability contributes to the Defence Aim:
‘To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and Overseas
Territories8 by defending them, including against terrorism, and to act as a
force for good by strengthening international peace and security’.

7. The UK achieves the Defence Aim by being able to meet 18 Military

Tasks (MT) which are grouped under the headings of Standing Strategic Tasks,
Standing Home Commitments, Standing Overseas Commitments and Contingency
Operations Overseas (COO). Air power underpins the delivery of Joint capability
across the majority of MT. Because of air power’s attributes, it will continue to offer
operational choice without, necessarily, any commitment to action or to deploy
troops on the ground.

8. Owing to their unpredictable nature, COO are likely to be the most

challenging of the MT groups. Consequently, the FASOC primarily focuses on the
determinants driven by COO to determine the environmental boundaries and to
provide the direction for air and space capability development.

9. The RAF Development Strategy, owned by the Air Force Board, also
uses COO as the basis for delivering a relevant future force construct – the Agile
Air Force. The Naval Strategic Plan similarly develops a Versatile Maritime Force,
which, amongst its roles, provides air power delivered from the sea for use on land
and at sea. The Army Plan develops Land capabilities, such as those incorporating
tactical UAVs, ISTAR platforms and AH assets in order to contribute to agile air
power.
THE BEACON
10. To meet the demands of the future strategic environment, the UK’s air
power capability must be strategically, operationally and tactically agile. In this
specific sense, agility has 4 attributes: responsiveness, robustness, flexibility and
adaptability9. Agility is also an essential human attribute describing the ability of
humans to use and adapt structures, processes and equipment in innovative ways
to achieve the desired Effects10. To deliver agility affordably, these structures,
processes and equipment must be utilised across the widest range of roles and
sufficient personnel must be trained to support and exploit the breadth of air
power’s capability.
8
Noting that the UK still has responsibilities for 13 overseas territories. DWP03, para 2.1.
9
Jt HLOC, Capping Paper, para 2. Note that the ‘robustness’ element encapsulates both physical resilience
and the ability to conduct multiple missions with one capability, ie multi-roling.
10
In accordance with the ‘UK Military View of Effects’: Actions, Objectives and Effects.
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11. The pervasive nature of air power means that it must be effectively integrated
with Joint Force operations across all environments. Although air power’s persistence
is increasing, it will probably not be able to provide total continuous coverage.
Consequently, it must be accurately and efficiently directed; this is the driving force
behind the doctrine of Centralised Control. However, at the tactical level, actors must be
sufficiently agile to take swift tactical decisions and act – the doctrine of Decentralised
Execution. For this they need the right information, projected to be most effectively
provided by NEC, and the delegated authority to act with initiative – the idea of Mission
Command.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF AIR AND SPACE POWER

AIR POWER
12. Historically, the core attributes of air power, indeed air vehicles in general11,
have been defined as height, speed, reach and ubiquity. These attributes, together
with a century of operational experience, have resulted in the airman’s perspective,
characterised by: assurance and competence in a demanding environment, an instinctive
aptitude for problem-solving and exploitation of opportunities, and a broad perspective of
the battlespace. Advances can still be made in the ability of air power to exploit further
the basic attributes, but it would be reasonable to say that notable step changes are not
envisaged in the timeframe of this paper, although developments in unmanned vehicles,
hypersonic speed and trans-atmospheric envelopes may alter traditional perspectives.
13. Over the last 50 years, other characteristics have been developed to allow
air power the ability to achieve specific tasks. The FASOC gathers together these
attributes under the headings of Combat Power, Survivability and Agility. Combat Power
encompasses payload, potency, precision and discrimination; Survivability includes low
probability of detection, self-protection and stand-off; and Agility encapsulates flexibility,
adaptability and also interoperability. In the last 15 years, precision, in conjunction with
space-based positioning aids and existing laser technologies, has dominated air power
development and has become a core attribute12. In the near future, incorporating low
probability of detection and operational agility13 as core air power attributes will dominate
our conceptual thinking. In the longer term increasing persistence, greater payload
(including non-kinetic tasks) and significantly improving sensor discrimination (to the level
of being able to detect and even locate an individual person) are probable headmarks.
Themes in the development of air power attributes are detailed within the attached
Supporting Essay 1.
SPACE POWER
14. The core attributes of Space Power are continuity, dispersion, timeliness,
height, reach, ubiquity and pervasiveness. Analysis of these attributes reveals the
following strengths: global presence, relative immunity from political sensitivities,
legal over-flight, influence at all levels of warfare and over all types of conflict, vehicle
sovereignty and appropriate positions14. The weaknesses of Space Power are its
inflexibility and limited manoeuvre, characterised as predictability, and expense. Based
on current proven capabilities, future calculations will have to take into account the likely

11
An aeroplane, helicopter, or other machine capable of flight. COD definition.
12
The quality, condition, or fact of being precise, CoD. Precision is further taken to mean accuracy in time as well
as position.
13
HQ STC Vision 2015.
14
Geo-synchronous, semi-synchronous and sun-synchronous orbits are all key locations – AP3000.
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emergence of anti-satellite technologies and systems15. Many of these strengths

and weaknesses are dictated by the physics of the space environment and are,
therefore, largely beyond our control. However, some niche opportunities exist in
adopting a more forward-leaning approach in areas of specific UK expertise.

15. The expense of so-called ‘big space’ (large, expensive satellites) is

being overcome by the commercially driven development of much smaller, more
affordable satellites. Small satellites (some as small as a drinks can) are already
being used16, merging commercial off the shelf technology with innovative control
techniques17. Few nations can afford multi-million pound large satellites, but small
satellites can be built and launched for a fraction of the time and cost18 and used in
conjunction with commercially available space-based services. In addition, small
satellites offer greater operational flexibility. They are simple and quick to develop
and the gap between their capability and that of the traditional ‘big space’ satellites
is rapidly closing. Consequently, space capability could usefully contribute as
an operational asset rather than a strategic one, limited to a few space-capable
countries. Commanders could call on responsive, gap-filling communications
and novel space-based surveillance capabilities, such as wide-area coverage,
multi-spectral imaging19 and change detection techniques, to help visualise the
battlespace and provide situational awareness to aid decision-making. Such
capabilities would bring many of the advantages of space-based capability to the
operational level. This, in turn, would serve to limit the predictability, vulnerability
and risk to capability of the larger, less responsive, satellites. Indeed, this is the
essence of the US’ new initiative ‘Operationally Responsive Space’. It is noteworthy
that UK-based industry is a world leader in small satellite technology ahead of
the US; significant potential exists for influence with allies as the UK could offer a
national and complementary space capability.

CORE AIR AND SPACE POWER ROLES

16. Based on current thinking, the Effects Based Approach (EBA), facilitated
by NEC, will shape the future conduct of air and space operations. Effects Based
Operations (EBO)20, either wholly or in part, will drive the core aspects of force
development, from individual training through to equipment. Air and space ISTAR
contributes to emerging threat detection and environmental awareness. We
must understand the nature of the threats we face, our adversaries’ value sets21,

15
Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China’ (Report
to Congress) released July 12, 2002 at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf
accessed 8 Feb 05
16
SNAP 1, launched in 2000, was a 6.5Kg Nanosatellite equipped with communications and an optical
camera which manoeuvred to photograph another satellite and relay the picture to a ground station.
A similar capability is now available on a 1Kg satellite the size of a drinks can (Palmsat).
17
Using steam as a propellant is a cheap, safe technology that is currently under development, awaiting
flight.
18
RAPIDEYE, a German/Canadian constellation of 5 multi-spectral, 7m resolution, imaging satellites
providing global coverage, cost a total of $180m.
19
Acquiring optical images in more than one spectral band of the same physical area and in the same scale.
20
FASOC is aligned with the ‘UK Military Effects-Based Operations – An Analytical Concept’ JDCC paper,
JDCB endorsed version dated 3 Feb 05.
21
Those values held by an individual, group, organisation, regime or nation, which form the basis of their
strategic Centre of Gravity (CoG). This involves understanding an actor’s psychology, plus formative factors
(cultural, religious, ideological, historical, economical and political) that drive his intentions, objectives and
modus operandi. JDCC Potential Generic Adversary project.
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intentions and capabilities, and the nature of our area of interest. In coercive
operations, there will be a need, when required, to engage an adversary’s decision-
making apparatus proportionately and precisely, using kinetic and non-kinetic
means to affect his understanding and will, inducing courses of action that we
desire22. We must also be aware of the possible second-order, and potentially
undesirable, Effects of our Actions in the wider situation. Forces should be
optimised for the core regions, be flexible and able to cope with their expansion.
While land basing offers maximum weight of effort, tempo and efficiency, sea basing
offers flexibility, sustainability, access and a comparable range of Actions. Air power
will invariably be vital to the success of the Maritime component’s Theatre Entry,
Littoral Manoeuvre and Maritime Strike roles, and Land’s Theatre Entry23 and Air
Manoeuvre roles. It will also be critical to the emerging Medium Weight Capability.
17. The FASOC vision of agile air power encapsulates 6 enduring core air
and space power roles (CASPR):
a. AirC2.
b. Counter-Air Operations.
c. Air Operations for Strategic Effect.
d. Integrated Air Operations.
e. Rapid Global Mobility.
f. ISTAR.
The 6 roles, either individually or in combination, must achieve or contribute to the
achievement of enabling and decisive Effects, for which there are 2 fundamental
enablers: force protection (FP) and combat service support (CSS)24. These
are discussed within the DCF components later. The UK’s exploitation and
development of space25 products is also fundamental to all 6 roles. Although
FASOC details all of the attributes of air power that are sought in the 20 year
timeframe, the CASPR provide coherence as a migration path for future
development.
18. Defence Planning Assumptions identify the type and scale of operations
that must be met concurrently, in addition to the Standing Home Commitments and
Standing Strategic Tasks which must continue to be met. Current guidance26 is
that an adaptive force structure must be developed that can routinely and rapidly
meet the most likely, and frequent, scenarios while retaining the ability to generate
appropriate forces for the most demanding and deliberate, but less likely and less
frequent, operations. The resulting structures, processes and equipment must be
scalable, versatile and capable of achieving the full range of desired Effects.
19. In the FASOC timeframe, such structures, processes and equipment
must also be designed to be sufficiently flexible so as to be able to respond as
threats, technology and alliances evolve. The greatest risk to UK security is that the
strategic environment will change faster than the UK can or will acquire and apply
resources to meet that threat27.
22
JV states that, increasingly, the Main Effort and intent will be to avert unwanted Effects from crises beyond
our control, to avoid an escalation to conflict, and, where conflict cannot be averted, provide the Joint Force
Commander with swift, potentially decisive Effect. JV, p.3-3.
23
The Airborne Task Force.
24
Whilst CSS is currently termed as such, ‘Operational Service Support’ more properly reflects the diverse
nature of such a role and may therefore be adopted in the future.
25
Space Exploitation encompasses capabilities such as missile warning, navigation services,
communications, environmental monitoring, electronic support and battle damage assessment.
26
DWP03, para 5.24.
27
JDCC Strategic Trends, Mar 03.
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AIRC2 – operations which ensure the efficient planning and execution of air power
operations.

20. Effective C2 of air and space assets is vital if we are to maximise the
contribution to operations28 of scarce, high-value systems. AirC2 could be ground, sea
or air based, employing a balance of forward-based and reachback capabilities, and
capability must be matched in tempo to the very high-readiness character of air power.
As such, AirC2 must be able to orchestrate air operations over long periods, providing
continuity as subordinate assets rotate through the battlespace, must be capable
during all types and phases of an operation, and must provide the reach, possibly
by being air based, to control assets throughout the area of responsibility. At home,
or where we control the surface, such C2 may be ground or sea based, where it is
more persistent at less cost. Wherever it is based, AirC2 must be well connected at
both the tactical and operational levels, functioning as a critical command node in the
exercise of centralised control, and also as a significant distribution node for tactical
information.
21. Future AirC2 should, as far as possible and affordable, be interoperable
with potential coalition air C2 systems and structures, in particular those of the US.
It must also be interoperable with coalition assets across the environmental divides,
network-enabled to reach back to the information storage domain and with sufficient
electronic reach to project out to the forward edge of the air battlespace. Because
AirC2 assets are often decisive assets, they must be persistent. Because they are
high-value, they must be survivable, achieved through off-board force protection,
deception and airspace control processes, as well as their self-defence robustness.

COUNTER-AIR OPERATIONS – operations conducted to achieve a required degree

of control of the air29.
22. Counter-Air Operations (CAO) must enable the commander to deploy,
employ, sustain and recover forces effectively without prohibitive interference by an
adversary from the air.
23. Standing Home Commitments (SHC). Air power’s principal SHC MT is
the protection of UK sovereignty and security at home30. The UK Airspace Security
task objective is ‘to provide a continuous recognised air picture (RAP) and an
air policing capability, providing for the interception and possible destruction
of rogue and hostile aircraft, to maintain the integrity of the UK’s airspace’31.
The task is co-ordinated by the Home Office and involves critical military support to,
and close co-ordination between, Other Government Departments (OGDs) and both
military and civilian airspace control agencies, including those of neighbouring nations.
The speed with which a threat to the UK’s airspace security can emerge drives the
need to develop highly responsive, well co-ordinated C2 structures, processes and
people capable of an integrated, time-critical and appropriate response. A responsive,
flexible, potentially lethal counter-air capability cued by persistent surveillance
of the air, and realised through a networked capability across the military/civilian
interface, will be vital to ensure protection, especially from an asymmetric threat, and,
importantly, to provide effective deterrence.

28
See para 11 for the concept of centralised control.
29
This may vary in degree of application and in time and space.
30
DWP03, Supporting Essay 2; air power will also contribute to MT 2.3 - Integrity of UK Waters, and MT 2.5
- Public Duties and VIP Transport.
31
Ibid, para 2.4.
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24. Expeditionary Operations.

a. Protection of the Deployed Joint Force. Given the trend away

from classic force-on-force confrontations to asymmetric engagements,
our counter-air capability must be more responsive, more discriminatory
and more ubiquitous in order to protect the Joint Force. Such protection
will be realised through wider, more persistent surveillance and improved
threat identification and recognition. The ‘system of systems’ approach
should combine persistent surface based air defence (SBAD)32, reactive
defensive counter-air (DCA) cued through persistent ISTAR, swifter
decision-making processes and robust C2 arrangements. To reduce
the potential for fratricide, robust and reliable combat identification (CID)
capabilities across coalitions, environments and platforms must be
developed.

b. Force Projection. Whilst a DCA capability may be all that is

required for initial access to the operational area, an offensive counter-air
(OCA) capability will also be required in order to employ the Joint Force.
To allow air power and other missions to succeed, an agile, interoperable
OCA capability must achieve an acceptable degree of control of the air in
opposed environments. Such a capability must suppress adversary air
defence systems to an acceptable degree and ensure a permissive air
environment, if only on a temporary basis, at an acceptable level of risk.
The Joint Combat Aircraft’s stealth capability will offer significant utility in
such tasks, including from the sea base where Carrier Strike is a Joint
Force early entry capability. The OCA/DCA balance will shift throughout
the campaign but the employment of resilient aircraft will allow both OCA
and DCA roles to be fulfilled with the minimum footprint.

AIR OPERATIONS FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT - operations directly aimed at

reducing or eliminating an enemy’s ability and/or will to continue fighting.

25. In offering a range of choices for the Joint and coalition commander,
the goal of Air Operations for Strategic Effect (AOSE) is to conduct timely, precise
Actions, sufficiently early to achieve coercive or potentially decisive Effect. AOSE
can have both physical and cognitive effects. AOSE embody air power’s ability
to elicit potentially decisive Strategic Effect from tactical Actions, either working
autonomously or cued by other forces, including ISTAR, Special Forces (SF)
and OGD. The requirement to combat global terrorism and WMD, including
their delivery means, at source or in transit33, also requires a high degree of
responsiveness. However, our methods must be proportionate, discriminate,
humane and subject to military necessity34; they must also cause the minimum
practicable level of collateral damage in accordance with international law.

32
The term SBAD is introduced here as a way of describing both land and sea-based air defence systems.
33
DWP03, paras 2.11 – 2.14.
34
Geneva Convention Additional Protocol 1, 1977 & JSP 383 dated 29 Nov 2004.
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26. AOSE are conducted by both land and sea-based35 offensive,

penetrating air power assets36, working together with persistent, cueing ISTAR
assets to achieve the full range of coercive Actions and cognitive Effects. In
future, more pervasive ISTAR and swifter, more accurate Effects Based Planning
(EBP)37 should allow more precise targeting of critical nodes and linkages in the
adversary’s decision making cycle. Advanced non-kinetic or, where necessary,
more precise, lower yield, kinetic Actions should make the realisation of decisive
Effects more assured. UCAVs may have potential in this area. For non-offensive
Actions, especially humanitarian, which largely relate to airlift, maritime surveillance,
and rotary capabilities, the ability to reach inaccessible places and deliver relief,
matched with swift and responsive structures and platforms, will be important.
To achieve a deterrent Effect, the means must be credible; a potential opponent
must be convinced that survivable platforms and potent weapons are capable of
reaching into the adversary’s Centre of Gravity and conducting precise, potentially
lethal Actions with both tempo and persistence. The platforms must also be flexible
enough to surprise the adversary by reaching deep into his domain with minimum
support in order to target his critical nodes directly; thus, the means to coerce,
disrupt and destroy must be immediately and credibly available if deterrence fails.
For the highest risk missions, more survivability (stealth, self-protection, stand-off)
or more expendable aircraft (including unmanned), more discriminate sensors, more
precise weapon systems, and access to the best possible information will minimise
risk and offer realistic choices to commanders.

INTEGRATED AIR OPERATIONS – Air power operations integrated with other

Joint Force capabilities to ensure integrated, synchronised cross-component force
actions.

27. The Integrated Air Operations (IAO) role encapsulates air power’s
contribution to Joint Engagement38 and, drawing on all land and sea-based
offensive air power and enabling assets, adds weight of effort to the Joint scheme
of manoeuvre by providing a highly responsive, flexible element of integrated cross-
component engagement. Air power systems must be able to contribute to the full
range of kinetic and non-kinetic Actions, to complement the land and maritime
component’s particular capabilities, in support of Joint campaign objectives.
With increased focus on Littoral and Land Manoeuvre, especially in complex or
urban terrain, air power offers flexible, highly responsive, powerful, precise and,
increasingly, persistent capabilities in these environments, across the spectrum of
engagement.

28. Because air power ranges over land and sea, its proponents must fully
understand the culture and doctrine of the other Components. At the tactical level,
this requires a working understanding, by the commanders and staffs, of the other
Components’ methods, strengths and vulnerabilities. Only then can networked
communities enjoy a shared, rather than single Service or single environmental,
understanding of a situation. Subsequently, properly networked cross-component
Communities of Interest (CoI) should completely understand command intent and
the complementary methods of achieving any desired Effect. Critically, networks

35
For example land or CVF-based JCA, perhaps UCAVs in the future, or a non-kinetic weapon, and TLAM
provided by the Versatile Maritime Force’s (VMF) MarStrike role.
36
For example JCA with Stormshadow, perhaps UCAVs in the future, or a non-kinetic weapon, and TLAM
provided by the Versatile Maritime Force’s (VMF) MarStrike role.
37
Refer to: ‘UK Military Effects Based Operations – An Analytical Concept’, 2* Draft 29 Nov 04.
38
Actions taken to achieve Effects, on identified targets or target audiences. JDCC Draft Definition.
 9

will enable Actions to be both integrated and synchronised, but only if the actors
understand the consequences of their decisions and actions. Agile Mission Groups
(AMG)39 within such CoI will allow collaborative planning to permit synchronised
activity in pursuit of appropriate Effects. In operations, high levels of shared
awareness across the AMG elements should maximise agility, both of command
and execution, and also allow tactical self-synchronisation40.

29. IAO comprise a broad range of tasks, from tactical mobility, provided
by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, to Close Air Support by fast jet and attack
helicopters, from tactical reconnaissance, air interdiction and Joint Personnel
Recovery (JPR), to elements of Influence Activity41. In the maritime sphere, it can
include surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft and rotary ISTAR/Attack platforms.
Rapid Global Mobility assets permit offensive, air assault42 and enabling operations
to be launched not only from over the horizon43 but even directly from the homeland,
creating shock and surprise, whilst enhancing FP. Demonstrating the inherent
flexibility of air power, assets may be switched rapidly from one task to another in
the same sortie, although there are limits to the extent of this flexibility; multi-role
options are thus becoming increasingly important, as is the effectiveness of AirC2.

30. In future, the IAO role will demand better education and training of
personnel, especially in relation to cross-component training, to achieve successful
Joint Engagement and close integration, based on improved, common C2 systems
and processes. Moreover, CID and IFF systems understood by all environmental
actors, adequate sensor discrimination abilities and accurate situational awareness
delivered by low latency networks will be critical capabilities in the chaos of a
contact battle. Because component battle rhythms are so different, persistence will
be an increasingly important requirement. IAO aircraft and systems, including AMG
elements on the ground, and at sea, must be interoperable and networked with
common tools, processes, protocols and languages.

RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY – operations to move and support men, materiel and
assets at speed over strategic distances.

31. RGM complements the FMOC’s Flexible Global Reach (FGR) and,
together, they form the back-bone of the UK’s expeditionary capability. Air power’s
core attributes of very high-readiness, speed and long reach - the ability to transit
over land and sea44 - offer operational responsiveness and vast flexibility but with
limited capacity, balancing FGR’s greater capacity, access, poise and sustainability.
It is envisaged that, for most operations, RGM will be used in conjunction with FGR.
The maritime force’s potentially global footprint can offer strategic mobility for an
initial yet credible element of agile air power. RGM air transport (AT) aircraft must
be able to position people, equipment or stores when and where required, across

39
Jt HLOC introduces AMGs: re-configurable, cross-component force elements, achieving Effects throughout the
strategic environment. Jt HLOC, Operate, p.3-8.
40
Jt HLOC, Capping Paper, p.2-3.
41
Influence Activity comprises any activity whose primary purpose is to influence will, and is achieved by the
promotion of identified themes to target audiences through messages. Influence Activity seeks to predispose,
persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce target audiences to adopt a particular Course of Action or
to assist, encourage and reassure those that are following a desired Course of Action. JWP 0-01.1
42
For example the Airborne Task Force, see CONOPS for the ABTF dated 25 Aug 04.
43
For example the Airborne Task Force (see CONOPS for the ABTF dated 25 Aug 04) and the Littoral
Manoeuvre capability
44
With, importantly, appropriate diplomatic clearances.
10

the core regions to achieve Effect45. AT capacity must be such that it can deliver
credible, air-transportable early-entry elements of an intervention force, with sufficient
rapidity. It must then also be able to deliver essential materiel fast enough to sustain
theatre forces, especially in the early stages of an urgent intervention operation. RGM
assets should be able to reach the core regions and transfer between one theatre and
another, ideally without staging. These assets, whilst primarily strategic in nature, are
evidently flexible and therefore capable of retasking to enhance intra-theatre mobility
capacity if so required. A continued policy of ‘Global Engagement’, through wider and
better Defence Diplomacy, must be developed that affords air power more flexible
basing and over-flight (ABO) with minimum restrictions.

32. Air-to-air refuelling (AAR) assets, in extending range, reach and

persistence and supporting ubiquity, are an invaluable Joint and coalition force
multiplier, that has invariably increased the UK’s influence within coalitions 46. AAR
decreases deployment times, mitigates ABO restrictions, increases weight of effort
and increases other platforms’ persistence once in theatre. It follows that AAR assets
will be required throughout the FASOC timeframe and that as many receiver aircraft
as practicable should be interoperable with the maximum number of AAR assets.

33. Survivability of RGM platforms is closely integrated with CAO, which

provide protection of the air lines of communication. However, in order to be
deployed, and deployable, into areas of potentially significant risk, RGM assets must
be survivable, protected by on-board and, perhaps increasingly, off-board warning
and countermeasure, CID and IFF systems. This risk is especially high during take-
off and landing when aircraft will be vulnerable to IR weapons, especially MANPADS,
and high volume conventional weapons. RGM platforms must be network compatible
and may also provide critical nodes, extending the range of the information network to
platforms operating at the network extremities.

ISTAR - Air power’s contribution to: the co-ordinated acquisition, processing and
dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information and intelligence
which supports the planning and conduct of operations, targeting and the integration
of Effects and enables commanders to achieve their goal throughout the Spectrum
of Conflict47.

34. Air and space-based ISTAR systems are ideally placed to gather data
to inform all recognised environmental pictures, contributing to comprehensive
Combined and Joint Operational Pictures (C/JOP). In particular, air and space ISTAR
systems will both contribute to, and depend upon, the RAP and recognised space
picture (RSP). The ISTAR role spans capabilities as diverse as threat warning, IMINT,
COMINT, SIGINT and very high-resolution reconnaissance, playing a significant role
in homeland defence, maritime operations and counter terror operations, as well as
major combat operations. With appropriate doctrinal, organisational and individual
processes, ISTAR will also participate in shared situational awareness (SSA)48, which

45
Noting that a Focused Intervention task will require a limited, global capability and Humanitarian Assistance
may require significant strategic and/or tactical AT tasking, perhaps also beyond the Core Regions.
46
For example during Op ALLIED FORCE 85% of RAF tanker fuel was passed to non-RAF aircraft – DOC Audit
03/00 AAR.
47
JWP 0-01.1.
48
DCDS(EC)’s NEC pamphlet also describes ‘Shared Understanding’; there is no differentiation made in the
FASOC between the two terms.
 11

will facilitate Knowledge Superiority49 and Decision Superiority50.

35. It is accepted that the quality of battlespace resolution will be variable.

Consequently, the Joint Commander must be able to call upon operationally
responsive air and space-based sensor systems51 to provide specific intelligence
needs. ISTAR systems must be able to cue reconnaissance sensors to focus
on an area of interest in order to enable coherent risk assessment and decision-
making52. Data fusion and analysis processes increase intelligence value, but must
be swift enough to allow the output to be operationally and tactically useful. In
order not to overload the human element, ISTAR displays and the HMI design must
allow sufficient access, fidelity, resolution and control to mitigate ‘data-overload’
and to ensure optimum efficiency53. In time-sensitive cases, initial analysis may
be completed in the air and outputs may be fed directly to AMG through point-to-
point or relayed communications. In such cases, the ISTAR capability may form
an integral part of an AMG, so that the AMG is able to respond rapidly and achieve
decisive Effect. Less time-critical data may be analysed by forward Operational
Intelligence Support Groups (OISG) balanced by home based analysis (reachback)
using highly skilled, well-trained intelligence analysts, targeting and support staffs.
Communications bandwidth, exploitation facilities and available expertise may,
however, dictate where and when such data can be analysed, exploited and then
disseminated.

36. Currently, many ISTAR sensors are organic and/or their output is
not widely available. All sensors should contribute to the COP/JOP so that the
resolution of the battlespace is improved and decision-makers can access the
information they require; this is fundamental to the realisation of NEC. It is essential
that control of ISTAR assets is held at the appropriate level, in order to maximise
the coverage and contribution of invariably scarce assets in an area or theatre of
interest.

37. Some ISTAR assets already operate at range and with some
persistence. Future improvements in ISTAR capability must be in the areas of:
increasing endurance; increasing resolution (to improve discrimination); increasing
the range of available perspectives on an object (more than a vertical view and
extending to multi-spectral views); decreasing the time for exploitation, analysis and
targeting; extending analysis beyond the physical domain and improving its overall
fidelity; using a common, 4-dimensional frame of reference; improving our capability
in complex and urban terrain; and improving the responsiveness of sensors and
processing systems to inputs. Outputs must be available to the full range of tactical
actors to improve the realisation of Effects.

49
The gaining, disseminating and maintaining of a greater level and quality of useful knowledge than that held by
an adversary. JV.
50
Individuals who mentally manoeuvre at best speed – relative to their adversary – through the OODA cycle. Jt
HLOC Inform, p5-1.
51
This theme has recently been formally instigated in the US with the Office of Force Transformation’s
‘Operationally Responsive Space’ concept, recognising that small and micro satellite assets could provide a
highly responsive capability at the operational level; UK industry is a world leader in such technology.
52
There is a strong linkage here to ‘sensor-to-shooter’ or ‘kill-chain’ operations which, it is envisaged, will in the
future encompass much broader Actions such as Directed Energy and soft kill techniques and new capabilities to
influence the cognitive domain more directly.
53
This applies equally to AirC2 systems.
12

THE AIR COMPONENTS OF JOINT CAPABILITY

38. Analysis of the DCF components permits DLOD owners to develop future
capability and thus deliver their contributing element of Military Capability. Analysis
of the CASPR allows DCF component considerations to be articulated.
PREPARE
39. Each Service will contribute versatile, high quality54 teams and efficient,
responsive structures. In order to maximise the benefits of air power derived from
networks and SSA, they will need an instinctive ‘air perspective’ and an ability to
exercise mission command and initiative.
40. Deep Preparation. Deep55 preparation is the core of the moral
component of fighting power, in providing individuals capable of ensuring
success. While developing the necessary attributes and specialist techniques,
individuals must gain the requisite skills and knowledge to integrate air power
into the Joint Force scheme of manoeuvre. Other attributes should include a
thorough understanding of the other environments and Service cultures, a broad
range of expeditionary skills, and, increasingly, expertise in operations in a
networked environment. As unmanned systems proliferate and more space-based
applications are exploited, more individuals will require specialist training and
experience in these areas. Battlestaffs and commanders, in particular, will require
good interpersonal and team-working characteristics and access to language
skills or facilities, especially in more frequent coalition operations. Strength of
character, innovation, quick thinking and sound decision-making will be key
command attributes if agile control and execution, and successful outcomes, are
to be realised. The precise selection, training and development of leaders will be
important in harmonising a complex human/technology interface.
41. Functional Preparation. This preparation will be focused on forming
and maintaining force elements – held at very high and high readiness - that have
recently been trained to exploit their likely mission group capabilities. Coordinated,
progressive and iterative Joint collective training will be imperative if the full
potential of networked Joint Force capabilities is to be realised. Training to operate
within the AMG construct should ensure a common conceptual and doctrinal
framework across the components and must ensure that skill fade is mitigated or
avoided. Effectiveness must be further developed through experimentation and
the routine embedding of new techniques and technologies within training. The
dispersed nature and scarcity of cross-component assets during peacetime should
mean that a balanced mix of synthetic and live training is likely to be most efficient.
42. Immediate Preparation. Force elements will need to be prepared to
different levels of readiness for different tasks. For instance, some pre-configured
AMGs will need to be fully prepared for no-notice homeland defence tasks and to
strike against terrorism when a fleeting opportunity appears. For less urgent or
compelling tasks, immediate preparation can take place56 as part of a pre-planned
approach.
54
Achieved through education, training and experience.
55
The formative levels of preparation are considered to be: deep – bringing an individual to combat ready
standard; functional – performance driven as opposed to event, unit or process-driven; and immediate – the
mission-focused work-up of the force, to ensure functional groups are fit for task. Jt HLOC, Capping paper, p.6.
56
For example, acclimatisation and theatre familiarisation, force integration training with allies/coalition partners,
and mission rehearsal.
 13

PROJECT

43. Air power’s ability to operate at range or to be forward based, either on

land or at sea57, offers significant political and military choice in expeditionary and
collaborative operations. These operations depend substantially on the provision
of Combat Service Support .

44. Flexible, Joint logistics processes, organisational rigour and adaptive

approaches are central to air power force projection. Air power facilities at main
or deployed Joint operating bases require Operational Maintenance and Repair
(OMAR), in many cases at locations, both established and austere, which are both
the materiel point of arrival and the point of use. As long as the available space
and facilities are not overloaded, this can substantially improve efficiency and sortie
rates, as can recourse to Joint sea-based OMAR58. Sea-basing can also assist
during force drawdown, in-theatre re-deployment or withdrawal, but, usually, the
lighter Joint Force (and most air power) elements can usefully be extracted or re-
deployed by air.

45. Combat Service Support (CSS)59. Within theatre, life and equipment
support, technical facilities and domestic accommodation, systems support
and maintenance, strategic and tactical lines of communication, personnel
administration, medical support, and welfare require establishment to ensure
both the physical and the moral components of air power are properly addressed.
Other necessary expeditionary facilities are: Joint Personnel Administration (JPA)
and a comprehensive expeditionary medical capability, including AEROMED and
MEDEVAC, as well as improved civilian (contractor/OGD) and military personnel
tracking, especially in the forward area, integrated if possible within the JLP.

COMMAND

46. Policy directs that, whilst UK Joint interoperability is paramount, UK

forces must be capable of operating at one command level down from, but fully
integrated with, the US command structure, and that the UK should retain the ability
to field deployable HQs capable of lead nation status in multinational operations up
to Medium Scale. Sufficient interoperability (in doctrine, training and equipment) to
integrate fully with the US, other NATO forces and future coalition partners, needs
to be developed and extended, particularly to include less familiar, but more likely,
coalition partners.

47. The Air Component Commander, either UK or coalition, should direct the
UK’s air power within Joint and multi-national operations, exploiting his very high
readiness C2 element to enable early planning, either at home or deployed. His
staff, with external linkages at every level, will need to exercise centralised control
and coordinate horizontally with coalition and Joint Force command structures to
secure the advantages conferred by congruous, complementary and synchronous
operations. At the same time, the air HQ must have the most direct vertical line
possible to its field commanders without undue interference by other authorities or
extraneous nodes; such nodes decrease responsiveness, increase confusion and

57
For example CVF-based or a Littoral Manoeuvre support helicopter mobility force.
58
As witnessed during Operation TELIC.
59
See footnote 25.
14

decrease effectiveness. At the tactical level, actors must be empowered to exploit

Mission Command and use their initiative in fulfilling the requirements of higher
command. This, in turn, requires the clear articulation, widespread dissemination
and comprehensive understanding of ‘command intent’ and its associated logic and
risks. The operational C2 structure has to be sufficiently responsive and supple
to redirect the employment of tactical assets to tasks, as the campaign unfolds or
events dictate, without excessive personal control60.

INFORM

48. The fundamental principle of EBO lies in the more precise targeting of
Effects in both the physical and cognitive domains. This philosophy emphasises the
exploitation of Knowledge Superiority and Influence Activity in order to affect events
and decisions. The full potential of EBO can only be unlocked by NEC, as networks
share and exploit information more efficiently and quickly, allowing individuals to
improve the quality and timeliness of decisions, and increasing operational tempo
and agility across all Defence Lines of Development (DLODs).

A robustly networked Information Sharing

Force
Quality of Information and
Information Sharing Shared Situational
and Collaboration Awareness
Shared Situational Collaboration and Self-
Awareness synchronisational

These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness

Diagram 2: The Basic Advantages of NEC61.

49. Consequently, the network must be a resilient information infrastructure,

capable of engaging all nodes and participants across air power, AMGs, all the
environments and coalitions. Collaborative civil-military co-operation will also
shape the architecture and requirements of networks across broader CoI. National,
coalition, OGD and possibly even NGO integration will require multi-level security
protocols and conventions, ‘plug and operate’ elements and data compatability.

PROTECT

50. Friendly control of the air aims to restrict an adversary’s ability to use his
air power against friendly forces - air denial - and to protect our ability to employ
air power as we wish - air freedom. Access to timely and useful space-derived
information must also be secured, based around effective space surveillance,
adequate coverage and control capabilities. A degree of air and space control is
therefore an essential prerequisite for Theatre Entry and all subsequent Joint Force

60
Command interference; there is a risk that, because commanders are likely to possess a significantly broader
and more detailed picture (than hitherto) of the battlespace, there may be, on the basis of past experience and
lessons, an inclination to overcontrol.
61
Extract from Power to the Edge, Alberts & Hayes, DoD CCRP Jun 2003.
 15

operations, but, depending on the balance of forces, may only be achievable for
limited times and spaces. Homeland security is a vital, enduring task, protecting
against asymmetric, conventional and unconventional threats, especially where
rare, specialist disciplines, expertise and training, such as in combating CBRN, are
required.
51. Adversary ISTAR and conventional and/or novel systems62 may pose
specific, significant or even prohibitive threats to Joint Forces, especially in the early
stages of a deployment when forces are in transit or attempting entry into theatre.
In the CAO Role, OCA and DCA assets, together with other Joint elements, will
normally be required to protect air lines of communication (ALOC), maritime
assets and the sea lines of communication (SLOC), long-range penetrating forces,
and Joint Forces in an area of interest against a range of possible threats that,
increasingly, will include unusual air options. Force dispersal, while offering a
degree of protection, also can make FP more difficult.
52. Protection of air power capabilities has developed from merely dealing
with the physical aspects to a more comprehensive approach to FP which includes
countering and mitigating the threat from adversaries, natural and human hazards,
and fratricide63 to all elements of air power capability. In these circumstances,
air power needs to maintain sufficient resilience and effectiveness to continue
functioning even in the face of potentially debilitating threats and events. In
particular, CBRN defence measures must contain the potential effects of the threat
and use of these weapons, in order to survive and expedite recuperation times.
Sea-basing air power also offers opportunities to reduce risk, disperse valuable
assets and increase CBRN protection.
53. In addition, vulnerability reduction - comprising physical resilience,
redundancy, survivable information networks and protecting information and people
- will reinforce air power robustness. FP robustness will in future demand both
inherent physical resilience and emerging information-centric solutions, which might
incorporate enhanced signature control measures, deception, and other advanced
EW techniques which recognise the very high readiness requirements of air power
and the diverse features of the future threat environment.
SUSTAIN
54. Air power represents both a consumer of sustainability whilst also
providing a high-speed, but low volume component of the support network. The
latter will be provided through a combination of commercial and military AT assets,
deploying from home and foreign bases, including the use of aircraft, facilities and
personnel from other nations. The military AT assets must contribute a reliable,
highly responsive supply chain, conduct rapid force build-up and satisfy urgent
logistics demands that cannot be met from in-theatre stocks. During later stages
of operations, AT complements and supplements the slower, but higher capacity,
sea and land lift capabilities. For expeditionary operations, air and sea points of
disembarkation (APODs and SPODs) and suitably provisioned forward based
logistics sites (FBLS) will facilitate bulk movement and distribution. Defence-
wide engagement activity in the core regions has an important role in creating a
favourable environment for their establishment and rapid clearance for use.

62
For example, low-cost, remotely operated air vehicles could be employed by asymmetric adversaries to deliver
a variety of threats, including, potentially, CBRN agents.
63
Avoidance of fratricide – (blue-on-blue attacks) incorporates the 3 pillars of Combat ID: Target Identification,
Situational Awareness and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, each suffused with Human Factors.
16

55. Networked Logistics, supported by the Recognised Theatre Logistics

Picture (RTLP)64, and subsequently the JLP, will play an important role in
maximising the effectiveness of scarce resources and in helping minimise the
deployed logistics footprint. As a result, improved situational awareness and
prediction, through equipment-embedded technology and accurate asset tracking,
should allow a tailored, selective pull into and out of theatre. It is important that
Networked Logistics are fully integrated with collaborative operational planning to
ensure that the operational tempo is not slowed by the logistics tempo.

CONCLUSION

56. The FASOC describes how the UK seeks to develop both the core
attributes of air power and the revised CASPR in order to conduct Actions to
achieve, or contribute to, desired decisive campaign Effects. At home, air and
space capabilities, working closely with OGDs, environments and agencies,
will maintain national security, by securing our airspace and countering novel
asymmetric and conventional threats. Further afield, developing crises and the
need to neutralise emerging terrorist and WMD threats around the globe will require
rapid intervention by Very High Readiness forces, notably air power elements.
Air power will offer speed, deployability, reach and sustainability, and the ability to
exploit the benefits of NEC, precision and EBO, both independently and in concert
with other forces. Consequently, more streamlined Joint training and development
of ‘the airman’s perspective’ in relation to the new operational environment will
be fundamental, not only to maximising the utility and impact of air power, but
also in making the best of the assets that we have. Similarly, affordable small
satellite technology is a realisable aspiration for the UK, which would provide both
a significant operational enhancement and a significant influence in relation to
coalition allies. Properly coordinated and resourced, agile air power will have the
potential to deliver a range of highly relevant physical and, increasingly, cognitive
Effects as part of a coherent EBA to the problems and opportunities of a distinctly
diverse and challenging future environment.

Enclosures:

Supporting Essay 1: Themes in the Development of Air Power Attributes.

Supporting Essay 2: Space Exploitation.
Glossary of Terms

64
The JLP is Defence-wide whilst the RTLP is the JOA-specific sub-set of the JLP.
 17

SUPPORTING ESSAY 1: THEMES IN THE DEVELOPMENT

OF AIR POWER ATTRIBUTES
BASIC ATTRIBUTES
1. Height. Air power is already able to reach the outer atmosphere and
many combat aircraft can operate in the stratosphere (where they are unhindered
by weather). The potential of solar power and even the improved efficiency
of engines at height (8-50km), mean that exploitation of the potential of the
stratosphere should continue. However, because aircraft manoeuvrability and
performance, and therefore survivability, decreases with height65, either systems
should be less costly, or capabilities must be developed to ensure their protection
in this environment. Unmanned aircraft can offer a decrease in cost and risk
by removing the human element and associated life support systems (this also
enhances their endurance and, therefore, their reach and persistence).

2. Speed. High speed permits surprise, avoidance of threat systems and

low transit times and mission durations. It also allows more agile synchronisation
and re-tasking in the face of unexpected events and new missions. When
combined with unity of effort and concentration of force, it can also generate high
tempo with which to overwhelm an adversary or dominate a situation. Similarly,
high speed can reduce overall reaction times, support ubiquity and, combined with
reach and depending on basing distance, can partly make up for poor persistence.
Hypersonic speeds are theoretically achievable, and while currently unaffordable
in terms of fuel use and technological development, may not always be so. At the
other end of the spectrum, the exploitation of low speed can be efficient, increasing
endurance and, thus, persistence. Platforms that embrace a wide speed range are
often particularly flexible and persistent. Air power’s speed and short endurance
create an air power battle rhythm, which has to be harmonised with the Maritime
and Land environments.

3. Reach. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK’s areas of military
interest have expanded in line with HMG’s Policy guidelines, to the extent that air
power is now deployed on a global basis. In the FASOC timeframe, improving
the global reach of air power will be a necessary enabling capability, particularly
for Focused Intervention and Power Projection tasks, and to allow air power to
deploy rapidly to crises and for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
Effective diplomacy will be of enormous importance in setting the conditions to
allow air power to reach out across the globe directly from the UK or our sovereign
territories.

4. Ubiquity. It is distinctly advantageous for platforms and systems to

be able to cover the whole battlespace, especially as potential adversaries use
asymmetric and dispersed techniques to avoid detection and engagement. As the
threat becomes more asymmetric, the ability to accept cues at short notice from
networked ISTAR and to exploit fleeting opportunities will benefit considerably
from air power’s ubiquity. To be ubiquitous, assets will need to be survivable,
reliable and with sufficient capacity to remain for operationally significant periods
(persistence) in a position to influence within the area of interest.

This is mitigated to some degree with the reduced effectiveness of threat systems against targets flying at
65

altitude and, typically, with high speed over the ground.

18

5. Persistence. As assets become both more costly and, typically, their

numbers decrease, persistence, endurance and sustainability have to be improved
if increased capability and utility is to be fully exploited. In addition, the delivery of
Effects-Based solutions implies increased loiter times and sortie lengths, especially
in order to maximise the benefits of NEC. Across the full range of capabilities,
individual aircraft must be as persistent as is practicable and affordable.

THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE

6. An airman, when airborne, is trained to think intuitively and operate

simultaneously in 4 dimensions, often whilst travelling at high speed. Typically
employing a long-range scan, anticipation and swift reactions, he/she understands
that the Effects induced by air power may be impermanent without the coherent
integration of wider Effects. Above all, he/she recognises at first hand that
operational flying is a human activity, with all the attendant risks, expectations
and anxieties associated with war and danger. In the future, with the progressive
emergence of airmen as system operators, in addition to flying aircrew, the Airman’s
perspective may change, particularly as a result of the view an operator has of the
battlefield (through sensors), of the systemic nature of networked processes and of
personal risk (reduced through being at distance from danger).

COMBAT POWER

7. Payload. Although today’s AT aircraft are able to lift impressive

payloads, their capacity is unlikely ever to match operational pull in terms of
demand. Owing to their decisive strategic and tactical lift capabilities across all
areas of operation, it is likely that increased payload capacity will be required.
This implies a need for more capable, possibly larger capacity, airframes66 to
sustain the UK’s expeditionary credentials, as well as C2 processes and structures
that optimise their employment.

8. Potency. The hard edge of air and space combat power varies from
conventional kinetic sub-munitions to long-range stand-off missiles67, but potency
relies overwhelmingly on the ability to strike the right target accurately at a time of
choice, if necessary on multiple occasions. Accuracy has been enabled by the
acquisition and consistent, highly visible use of precision technologies, including
space-enabled navigation and guidance systems, and a variety of technically
advanced homing and targeting devices to enhance munition lethality and precision.
As a result, bombs in particular have become smaller (allowing more to be carried)
and the potential concomitant collateral damage has been minimised (so increasing
their utility)68. Although these weapons have (despite the constraints imposed by
payload limits and times of flight) a decisively kinetic, and also a distinctly cognitive,
Effect, we will wish to develop and undertake a fuller spectrum of kinetic and non-
kinetic Actions in future, in order to influence more sophisticated battle-spaces and
opponents. Also, it is reasonable to anticipate that directed energy weapons will

66
These might include traditional multi-engine FW aircraft, rotorcraft, wing-in-ground-effect technologies and
airship derivatives.
67
Although ballistic missiles use space as a medium for accessing targets and reducing vulnerability to counter-
measures, they are not included in this analysis.
68
A vital element in reducing collateral damage is effective tools to enable accurate planning and assessment of
the Effects weapons will cause. Programs such as the US ‘Bugsplat’ software tool are increasingly employed by
planning staffs but are presently limited to kinetic Effects.
 19

transform the nature of kinetic applications, both for friendly forces and in giving
opportunities for opponents to challenge our control of the air.

9. Precision. In stressing precision, two important areas - understanding

the target and optimising the Effect – need more detailed examination and
improvement. The Effects-Based Approach demands that all Effects should
be precisely realised, in collaboration with other partners as part of a carefully
orchestrated campaign. Only then can the overall package of Effects be measured
and assessed69, intended consequences be exploited and unintended Effects
mitigated.

10. Discrimination. Closely linked to precision and to potency is our ability

to discriminate between objects to find a target. Discrimination extends from
improving non-cooperative target recognition, CID, active and passive identification
capabilities, to improving airspace control measures (developing integration to
replace deconfliction), and optimising our sensors. Once again, this feature will be
essential to the success of EBO.

SURVIVABILITY

11. Almost without exception, air power assets need to be survivable,

although it must be accepted that if assets are not ‘lose-able’, they may not be
‘usable’. UAVs and UCAVs could be ‘disposable’ although they, and their payloads,
are increasingly valuable in their own right. The trend away from force packaging
to more persistent overflight presence reflects both the passive nature of our recent
adversaries in the face of overwhelming, and in some cases dominant, air power,
the proliferation of precision weaponry, and the movement towards total battlespace
visibility and control. However, there is a minimum CAO capability that the UK has
to maintain to ensure that Joint Forces have ‘freedom from attack’70. Platforms that
will fly through ‘dangerous regions’, especially ‘day 1 assets’, must be adequately
protected, with a balance of collective air defence, off-board protection systems
and on board self-protection, all of which have to deal with ever more sophisticated
threats. However, all airborne platforms remain vulnerable to traditional small arms
(especially high volume and high impact), support weapons and man-portable IR
and guided missiles, in addition to asymmetric, terrorist attack when on the ground.
Therefore security on the ground will continue to be required, in the form of shelters
and force protective elements.

a. Low Probability of Detection. Low probability of detection includes

camouflage, small radar and visual cross-sections, low noise signature, use of
terrain screening techniques and low and disguised emissions. In recent decades,
stealth technologies and design have been employed to hide aircraft from modern
radar. These techniques have allowed surprise and enhanced survivability, but,
as lessons from the Kosovo campaign showed, counter-technologies are being
developed by potential opponents. Continued Research and Development and
innovative design will be required, if the electronic, Low Probability of Detection and
low-observable window of advantage is to be maintained.

Desired, undesired, intended and unintended Effects all need to be assessed.

69

This is especially the case where the UK may be lead or framework nation and at scales of operation
70

where we cannot be reliant on US capability in this role.

20

b. Standoff. Standoff confers a degree of surprise and

survivability because the traditional need to fly over or near a target and
its defences to create an Effect may no longer be required. The standoff
capabilities of weapons increasingly allow valuable air power assets to
remain in lower risk areas and within a wider defensive pattern whilst still
creating the desired Effect. Standing-off whilst remaining effective also
reinforces ubiquity and enhances reach and responsiveness.

AGILITY

12. Agility. The FASOC definition of agility is described under ‘the Beacon’
(main body para 10). Encompassing platform and human aspects, its essence
lies in creating an overall air power capability able to achieve the broadest range
of Effects from a number of robust, highly capable aircraft. Individually, the aircraft
should ideally be highly effective, should be survivable and also increasingly multi-
role, able to deliver the full range of capabilities either itself, or as part of systems
of systems or AMGs. Air power operators must be similarly agile, able to ensure
that capability supports command intent and, potentially, has a decisive Effect.
Considerable combat power will be vested in the hands of a very small number
of people so their agility must be carefully nurtured through appropriate selection,
training and exercising.

13. Flexibility. Air power assets are individually potent and ubiquitous.
Their firepower and precision have increased significantly over the past 90 years,
so that a small formation can now realise the equivalent Effect, or better, to that
achieved by a World War II ‘Thousand Bomber Raid’. Equally, AT and RW aircraft
offer a wide range of capabilities and can be quickly re-roled. The scalability in
weight of effort that can be used to achieve Effects gives air power exceptional
flexibility. While aircraft numbers may reduce, we must be careful not to erode
the ‘critical numerical mass’ below that which air power, and its associated combat
power, will not survive as a coherent or credible approach, with the increasing range
of potential tasks assigned to too few platforms71.

In essence, engineering and operational risk mean that ‘too many eggs in too few baskets’ is a less than
71

credible way of providing air power in the modern world.

 21

SUPPORTING ESSAY 2: THE SPACE CONTRIBUTION

INTRODUCTION

1. Space-based capabilities increasingly influence and dominate every

aspect of life, most notably with regard to communications and data-stream
technologies. In particular, space exploitation permeates all aspects of modern
warfare to the extent that the Secretary of State has said, ‘If you are not in Space,
you are not in Defence’. Recent operations in Iraq have confirmed that a coherent,
structured approach to space capability enhances operational capability and
increases operational tempo, security and agility. The growth in capacity and use
of satellite communications has been rapid. During Operation DESERT STORM,
a force of 542,000 exploited the 99 megabits per second of bandwidth available;
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) a reduced force of some 350,000 had
3,200 megabits per second of bandwidth allocated. It allowed unprecedented
shared awareness, enabled synchronised engagements and allowed operational
and tactical commanders to implement sophisticated campaign plans based on
lethality, boldness and speed of manoeuvre.

2. On a broader front, much of the operational advantage enjoyed by the

US and her allies and partners relies on unfettered access to and exploitation of
space-based technologies. Maintaining this advantage in the face of competition
from potential opponents and counter-measures will mean continuing investment
in advanced projects. The development of NEC will also present significant
challenges and opportunities, especially in coalition contexts. Finally, it must be
considered, and experience has shown, that counter-measures to space-based
applications and networks will be acquired, developed and deployed, not only by
states (especially those with a space capability themselves), but also by asymmetric
actors.

SPACE OPERATIONS

3. The core attributes of space power are height, global reach, ubiquity,
continuity, dispersal, political immunity, legal over-flight and pervasiveness. These
attributes naturally complement the projection of maritime, land and air power.
As such, the requirement for missile warning, missile defence, communications,
navigation and timing, meteorological and high definition multi-spectral intelligence
and surveillance will remain and most likely grow.

4. Space Based Wide-Area Surveillance. The prevailing trend away from

force-on-force engagements has seen a consequent shift from massed kinetic
power to reliance on information as a necessary enabler in every type of military
venture. The more dispersed, less defined battlespace makes intensive demands
on information and knowledge superiority and their bearers. Wide area, persistent,
global surveillance using the unobtrusive exploitation of space assists in visualising
the battlespace, in order to determine Courses of Action (CoA) and to cue other
ISTAR platforms and sensors. In every respect, the capability represented by
space-based systems are becoming an invaluable and increasingly indispensable
tool in the conduct of present and emerging tasks. In particular, these systems
are the central enabler for the Joint Operational Picture (JOP). As noted in the
22

Main Paper, adaptable, affordable small satellite technology providing wide area
coverage is a realisable UK aspiration, an area in which the UK has the world
technological lead. Development and investment in this emerging area would lead
to a significant enhancement to operational capability and could buy significant
influence with coalition allies.
5. Space C2. As noted above, if we are to embrace the capabilities offered
by the exploitation of the space environment, we must also accept the need to
protect our advantage72. An essential pre-requisite of space control is space
situational awareness. Access to the means by which detecting and tracking
objects, characterising the space systems they represent and understanding the
environment in which they exist, remains a vital Allied and coalition requirement.
Furthermore, space awareness and integration are fundamental to Effects-Based
Operations, not only to provide early warning of any threat, but also to de-conflict,
de-risk and de-clutter the requirements and activities of the other environments.
In space, a coherent picture would then allow synchronisation and prioritisation
of requirements and actions, including space-specific defensive or even offensive
measures. While such measures present a military and technological challenge,
there will be an even greater political hurdle, associated with the militarisation of
space, to overcome before offensive military action in space is realised.
6. Cognitive Effects. In seeking to influence the less tangible aspects of
operations, particularly to achieve Effects in an adversary’s cognitive domain, the
ability to exploit his perception using his own space-based capability is a growing
area; significantly, space can realise Effect without physical encroachment.
Understanding and exploiting this potential is already a growing mission area for
the US (in USSTRATCOM) and the UK will wish to share and understand the
expanding capability and dynamics relating to Effects delivered from, through, or in
space.
7. Personnel and Training. To satisfy commanders’ decision-support
requirements, and to integrate and exploit all available space-related information, a
cadre of space expertise needs to be evolved, both as a centre of excellence and
within command structures, in order to integrate space into all relevant stages of
operational planning and execution. This implies producing a pool of space-literate
operators and actors who can service the front-line, headquarters and reachback
elements, either directly or through accessible networks. From this pool, the space
component contribution to any future coalition might be drawn, especially in view of
the stand-up of a functional space component in the US73, which extends beyond
the existing establishment of an operational Director Space Forces74.
8. Structures. Provision of missile warning is a primary responsibility
in relation to the UK Home Base and a fundamental element of FP. Extending
existing capabilities to enable the monitoring of Effects and battlespace resolution is
achievable if intelligently and resourcefully adapted for use. Parallel with this will be
the need to establish suitable structures, possibly using the model of the US NSSI/
NSSA75.

72
Recent efforts to deny coalition forces space-based capability have included GPS and communications
jamming.
73
US Doctrine (Space functional command and DirSpaceFor are established in US doctrine).
74
OIF currently has a Dir Space Forces.
75
National Security Space Integrator and Architect respectively. A US initiative to integrate military and national
agency space capability.
 23

FUTURE CHALLENGES

9. Experience in OIF has reinforced the important role played by space-

based assets. Communications76, timing, and targeting, together with full
spectrum intelligence to support operations have all proved their considerable and
indispensable worth. Space has also proven its utility in CSAR77, blue-force tracking
(including logistics tracking) and missile warning. In the future, some airborne sensor
capabilities might be moved into space, providing direct downlink to units in the field,
as well as horizontal integration to generate maximum situational awareness78.
The goals to meet this aspiration are: to grow bandwidth availability through
technology, to exploit and share available bandwidth more intelligently, and to ensure
that the space capability is protected. As seen above, the latter requires a robust
space picture in order to secure and maintain space superiority, throughout the
constellation, its sensors, communications and ground stations. Generating and
developing enough suitable people, as well as growing structures and processes to
achieve the goals will, similarly, be a demanding challenge.

76
If we are to depend on commercial communications providers for part of this capability we must ensure sufficient
bandwidth is secured, recognising the competition from commercial operators (e.g. CNN).
77
Gen Jumper – “space has taken the search out of search and rescue”.
78
Gen Smith – Dep Cdr USCENTCOM at US Strategic Space Conference.
24

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AAR Air-air refuelling

ABO Access, Basing and Overflight
AirC2 Air Command and Control (CASPR)
ABTF Airborne Task Force
ALOC Air Lines of Communication
AMG Agile Mission Groups
AOSE Air Operations for Strategic Effect (CASPR)
CAO Counter-Air Operations (CASPR)
CASPR Core Air and Space Power Roles
CID Combat Identification
CoA Course of Action
CoI (networked) Communities of Interest
COO Contingent Operations Overseas (group of Military Tasks)
COP Combined Operational Picture
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSS Combat Service Support
DCA Defensive Counter Air
DCF Defence Capability Framework
DSG Defence Strategic Guidance
DWP Defence White Paper
EBA Effects Based Approach
EBO Effects Based Operations
EBP Effects Based Planning
EOC Environmental Operational Concept i.e. FMOC, FLOC and
FASOC at present
FBLS Forward Based Logistics Sites
FGR Flexible Global Reach (FMOC Role)
FLOC Future Land Operational Concept
FMOC Future Maritime Operational Concept
FP Force Protection
IAO Integrated Air Operations (CASPR)
IFF Identification, Friend-or-foe
JLP Joint Logistics Picture
JOP Joint Operational Picture
JPA Joint Personnel Administration
JPR Joint Personnel Recovery
Jt HLOC Joint High Level Operational Concept
 25

MT Military Tasks (see DWP03)

NGO Non-Government Organisation
OCA Offensive Counter Air
OGD Other Government Departments
OISG Operational Intelligence Support Groups
OMAR Operational Maintenance and Repair
RAP Recognised Air Picture
RGM Rapid Global Mobility (CASPR)
RSP Recognised Space Picture
RTLP Recognised Theatre Logistics Picture
SBAD Surface Based Air Defence
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SH Support Helicopter
SHC Standing Home Commitments (group of Military Tasks)
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
SSA Shared Situational Awareness
UCAV Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle
 Future
Air and
Space
Operational
Concept

Enquiries:
Directorate of Air Staff:
0207 218 6259
http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/documents/fasoc.pdf
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by No1 AIDU, RAF Northolt