Republic v. PLDT Co.

G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969

Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS
After its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government
offices to call private parties. Its application for
the use of these trunk lines was in the usual
form of applications for telephone service
among other things. The Bureau has extended
its services to the general public since 1948,
using the same trunk lines owned by, and
rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the
Bureau's) own schedule of rates.
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, complained to
the Bureau of Telecommunications that said
bureau was violating the conditions under which
their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to
the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used
the trunk lines not only for the use of
government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public, in competition
with the business of the PLDT. When the PLDT
received no reply, after giving notice, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by
the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had
proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that
both enter into an interconnecting agreement.
But because the parties could not agree on the
terms and conditions of the interconnection,
and of the defendant's refusal to fix the terms
and conditions therefor, the Republic, in its
complaint, seeks to compel the defendant to
enter into an interconnecting contract with it.
PLDT, in its counterclaim, denied any obligation
on its part to execute a contrary of services with
the Bureau of Telecommunications; and averred
that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines
heretofore
leased
to
the
Bureau
of
Telecommunications
under
the
existing
agreement because its facilities were being
used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed
that the Bureau was engaging in commercial
telephone operations in excess of authority, in
competition with, and to the prejudice of, the
PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles,
without proper accounting of revenues.
After trial, the lower court dismissed the
complaint and the counterclaim.
Both parties appealed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the court can compel the
defendant to enter into a contract.
HELD

The Court agree with the lower court that the

parties can not be coerced to enter into a
contract where no agreement is had between
them as to the principal terms and conditions of
the contract. But the court a quo has apparently
overlooked that while the Republic may not
compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,
the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of
the government telephone system and that of
the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation to be determined by the
court.
If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the
Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just compensation is
paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the
interconnecting service would be the users of
both
telephone
systems,
so
that
the
condemnation would be for public use.
People v. Fajardo
G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS
On August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of
defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of
the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7,
series of 1950 which provides that "Any person
or persons who will construct or repair a
building
should,
before
constructing
or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor."
Four years later, after the term of appellant
Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son inlaw, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request
with the incumbent municipal mayor for a
permit to construct a building adjacent to their
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by
a creek. On January 16, 1954, the request was
denied, for the reason among others that the
proposed building would destroy the view or
beauty of the public plaza. On January 18, 1954,
defendants reiterated their request for a
building permit, but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon,
appellants proceeded with the construction of
the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their
former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on
leased property.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged

before and convicted by the justice of the peace
court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of
the ordinance in question. The Court of First
Instance affirmed the conviction and ordered to
demolish the building in question.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals
but the latter forwarded the records to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950
is valid.

HELD
No. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to
set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by
requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions
for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not
merely a case of deficient standards; standards
are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers
upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, and it is a settled rule that such an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is
invalid.
Amigable v. Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972
Makalintal, J.
FACTS
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the
registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad
Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which
superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No
annotation in favor of the government of any
right or interest in the property appears at the
back
of
the
certificate.
Without
prior
expropriation
or
negotiated
sale,
the
government used a portion of said lot, with an
area of 6,167 square meters, for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote
the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court
a quo a complaint, which was later amended on
April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants,
against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas
Cuenca,
in
his
capacity
as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the
recovery of ownership and possession of the

6,167 square meters of land traversed by the

Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
The defendants filed a joint answer denying the
material allegations of the complaint, among
which are that the action being a suit against
the Government, the claim for moral damages,
attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis
since as to these items the Government had not
given its consent to be sued; and that inasmuch
as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated
and used the area involved in the construction
of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of
action against the defendants.
The trial court dismissed the complaint so they
appealed to the Court of Appeals. However they
were unable to secure a reconsideration. But
instead, the Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue
the government under the facts of the case.
HELD
Yes, where the government takes away property
from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation
or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government
without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its
consent.
Manosca v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996
Vitug, J.
FACTS
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P.
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila.
When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution
No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land
to be a national historical landmark.
Accordingly, the Republic, through the Office of
the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for
expropriation, at the same time, respondent
Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance
of an order to permit it to take immediate
possession of the property. The motion was
opposed by petitioners. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that
the intended expropriation was not for a public
purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2),
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
The trial court declared moot and academic the
motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of

the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection

of petitioners motion to dismiss. It also denied
the motion for reconsideration of the 20th
February 1990 order.
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not the public use requirement of
Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted
expropriation by the Republic.
HELD
Yes. The attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is
the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up
the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo
to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could
well be true but such a peculiar advantage still
remains to be merely incidental and secondary
in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does
not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use.
Black summarizes the characterization given by
various courts to the term; thus: For
condemnation purposes, public use is one which
confers same benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public.
It is measured in terms of right of public to use
proposed facilities for which condemnation is
sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of
public, a public advantage or public benefit
accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
Public
use,
in
constitutional
provisions
restricting the exercise of the right to take
private property in virtue of eminent domain,
means a use concerning the whole community
as distinguished from particular individuals. But
each and every member of society need not be
equally interested in such use, or be personally
and directly affected by it; if the object is to
satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is
sufficient.
Republic v. Lim
G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First

Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case

No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the
Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for
the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was
registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon,
while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
Denzon.
After depositing, the Republic took possession
of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the
CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic
to pay the Denzons just compensation.
The final judgment in the expropriation
proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on
April 5, 1948. In 1950, despite the benefits it
derived from the use of the two lots, the
National Airports Corporation denied knowledge
of the claim of respondents predecessors-ininterest. Even President Garcia, who sent a
letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration
and the Secretary of National Defense to
expedite the payment, failed in granting relief
to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the
lots, nothing happened.
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its
Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
holding that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over Lots 932 and
939 because of the Republics failure to pay.
However, in view of the annotation on their land
titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of
sale in favor of the Republic.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio
mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the
mortgage foreclosed in 1976.
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a
complaint for quieting of title with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against
General Romeo Zulueta, et al. On May 4, 2001,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC
Decision. Undaunted, petitioners, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging
that the Republic has remained the owner of Lot
932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs.
Republic.
The Supreme Court denied the petition outright
on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a reversible error. Petitioners repeatedly
filed for motion for reconsideration but were
also repeatedly denied with finality in their
Resolution of May 17, 2004. Until on October
29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion
for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of
our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with
prayer to refer the case to the En Banc). They

maintain that the Republics right of ownership

has been settled in Valdehueza.
ISSUE
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of
Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD
Yes. The Court ruled that the special
circumstances prevailing in this case entitle
respondent to recover possession of the
expropriated lot from the Republic. While the
prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that the
government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year
period limitation will encourage the government
to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is
the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will,
to facilitate the payment of just compensation.
(Republic v. Lim, shorter summary)
The final judgment in the expropriation
proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on
April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has
passed, yet the landowner, now respondent,
has remained empty-handed. Apparent from
Valdehueza is the fact that respondents
predecessors-in-interest were given a run
around by the Republics officials and agents. In
1950, despite the benefits it derived from the
use of the two lots, the National Airports
Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of
respondents
predecessors-in-interest.
Even
President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of
National Defense to expedite the payment,
failed in granting relief to them. And, on
September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay
the appraised value of the lots, nothing
happened.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965
Paredes, J.
FACTS

Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of

Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to
Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of
herein petitioner, for the construction of a new
Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount
was actually spent for the purpose intended.
Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an
assessment for donee's gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
of which petitioner was the priest.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment
and requested the withdrawal thereof. The
protest and the motion for reconsideration
presented to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 2,
1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among others, that at
the time of the donation, he was not the parish
priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or
juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish
Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should
not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also
asserted that the assessment of the gift tax,
even against the Roman Catholic Church, would
not be valid, for such would be a clear violation
of the provisions of the Constitution.
The Court of Tax Appeals affirmed the decision
of the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assessed donee's gift tax on
the P10,000.00 donated for the construction of
the Victorias Parish Church is constitutionally
exempted from taxes.
HELD
No. The exemption provided in Section 22 (3),
Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, is
only from the payment of taxes assessed on
such properties enumerated, as property taxes,
as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the
present case, what the Collector assessed was a
donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves. It did not rest upon
general ownership; it was an excise upon the
use made of the properties, upon the exercise
of the privilege of receiving the properties
Further, the Court held that the petitioner
should not be liable for the assessed donee's
gift tax on the P10,000.00 donated for the
construction of the Victorias Parish Church.
Rather, the Head of the Diocese to which the
parish of Victorias pertains, should not be
substituted in lieu of petitioner Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc it appearing that the Head of such
Diocese is the real party in interest.