Jennifer Hyman

Wittgenstein
December 12, 2010
Prof. Bob Guay
Against Winchgenstein and Methodological Exclusivism:
Winchs interpretation and development of Wittgensteins account of forms of life and rulefollowing lead him to conclude that social science must be interpretive. He argues that social inquiry has
to proceed from actors localized understandings in order to make their actions intelligible. An
observational and experimental approach to social science is impossible, he claims. Yet a behaviorist
interpretation of Wittgenstein throws Winchs position into doubt. Winchs view is that there is a fact of
the matter to meaning that is accessible by inquiry is further thrown into doubt by Roths argument for
meaning-indeterminacy. A behaviorist account of Wittgenstein and Roths argument for indeterminacy
undermines Winchs conclusion that social science must be a solely interpretive enterprise.

In Section I, I explain Winchs interpretation of Wittgenstein and how it supports his view
that social science must be an interpretive enterprise that elucidates actors own understanding of
localized rules. In Section II, I argue for a behaviorist interpretation of Wittgenstein, which
counters that of Winch. Finally Section III, I rely upon Roths use of the indeterminacy thesis to
argue that Winchs argument for a solely interpretivist approach to social science is untenable,
while a behaviorist interpretation of Wittgenstein is amenable to methodological pluralism.

Section 1: Winchs Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Social Science

Winchs interpretation of Wittgenstein rests on his two concepts of a form of life and
rule-following. To understand a speakers a language, and thus speaker-meaning, requires
understanding the form of life in which its speakers participate. Winch relies strongly upon
Wittgensteins claim that to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life1.
1

Wittgensteins view is that one cannot offer a formal, comprehensive picture of language outside
of ordinary linguistic practices. The significance of this claim for Winch is philosophy and social
inquiry are inimically bound to one another. For Winch, linguistic practices have an ontological
significance; they are constitutive of social reality. He writes, what we need to understand is the
context of practices and interests which gives the purely formal conception of an object some
sense in particular cases2 One can only speak of what is the case in terms of a shared idiom.
Understanding reality depends on the possession of such an idiom.He makes an even stronger
claim that the notion of meaning itself depends upon a social dimension. The very categories of
meaning [and that statements are capable of being true or false] are logically dependence for
their sense on social interaction between men3Rules are what govern the meaningfulness of a
language. Rule-following is the regularized direction of language usage or social practices by
means of publicly accessible criteria. Wittgenstein writes to follow a rule, to make a report, to
give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions)4. Following
Wittgenstein, Winch argues that the domain of rules is publicly accessible, that is to say that if
one is following a rule, another person could be able to discover what it is.5
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 19.
2
Winch, Peter. Studies in Witgensteins Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, p.
18.
3
Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science: And It's Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1958, p. 44.
4
Wittgenstein, 199.
5

Winchs interpretation of Wittgenstein has ramifications for his view of social science; he
argues that the exclusive aim of the social sciences is understanding human behavior. Social
science has this unique aim because (i) the social sciences are different in kind from the natural
sciences, (ii) social science cannot have the same methodology as the natural sciences, and (iii)
local standards of rationality are what governs meaningful behavior.
The social sciences differ in kind from the natural sciences.Winch argues that the
concepts which we apply to the more complex behavior are logically different from those we
apply to the less complex6 and that the notion of a human society involves a scheme of
concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in the natural
sciences7. The behavior of human beings is more complex than movement of physical objects.
The difference in degree of complexity engenders a difference in kind. Thus prior to empirical
investigation, we know that social science must use distinct concepts that adequate for the
description of social behavior.
A method of social science modeled after natural science is impossible .According to
Winch the core concerns of agency, rationality, and scientific methodology formed a logically
inconsistent triad8. The object of the social sciences is human behavior, which is not a natural

Winch, Peter. p. 34.

6
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 72.
7
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 42.
8
Turner, Stephen P. and Roth, Paul A. (Eds.) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003, p. 6.

kind.9 Human behavior is purposive; agents act for reasons. As MacIntyre explains, reasons are
distinct from causes for Winch. Causal accounts must be externally validated by observation.
Reasons do not require external validation by observation; they require understanding. Though one
may grasp causal regularities without understanding "understanding is grasping the point or meaning of
what is being done or said. This is far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws "

10

In

arguing for this strict distinction between social and natural science, Winch is a proponent of what Paul

A. Roth calls the impossibility argument; he claims that the social sciences cannot be
scientific, in the sense of using the observational and experimental methodology of the natural
sciences, because human behavior cannot be modeled using laws.11 The unique aim of social
science is understanding.
Social sciences must be based upon actors own understanding and the standards for
rationality are local. Social science elucidates the rule-governed behavior of actors within a
particular form of life. Winchpresumes that the sole or central task of social science is to
specify those rules, implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious, that members of a society
share and that give meaning or significance to their behavior12. He argues that the two
9
Roth argues that this entails a fact of the matter regarding meaning, which he dubs meaning
realism. This shows that meaning methodological non-naturalism entails that meaning is determinate
(Paul A. Roth Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. p.
312.)
10
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 115.
11
Paul A. Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987. p. 130.
12
Roth, p. 132

conditions for meaningful behavior are that (i) actions get their sense in accordance with a rule
and (ii) that the actor performs the behavior for a reason that is intelligible to him- or herself.13
Agency involves decision-making in applying a rule. Since a rule might be interpreted in a
number of ways, an observer cannot predict how it will be followed.14 An agents own reasoning
process must come in to play in determining whether he has applied a rule. Rule-following is
relative to social context. The agents rationality is bounded by this particular context. 15It is the
social scientists job to uncover the shared rules governing actors behavior and make them
intelligible to those that are not part of that culture. For Winch, the social scientist must make
his judgmentsin accordance with the rules governing the behaviour of those whom he
studies16. The researcher cannot impose his own standards of rationality upon the culture that
he is studying. Understanding the meaning of behavior within a given culture requires grasping
the rules from the participants perspective and translating them into the researchers language .17
Social science is solely an interpretive enterprise.

13
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 46-50.
14
MacIntyre, The Idea of a Social Science. Rationality, p. 115.
15
Turner and Roth, p.6-7.
16
MacIntyre, Alasdair. "The Idea of A Social Science". Rationality. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1977, p.118.
17
Roth, p. 133.

Section 2: Wittgenstein as a Behaviorist: The Muddle of Understanding and The Use

Theory of Meaning
Despite Wittgensteins denial that internal criteria determine meaning, Winch dismisses a
behaviorist interpretation of Wittgenstein as confusion18. Yet, Wittgenstein discounts views of
meaning which explain it in terms of mental processes. Views that explain meaning in terms of
mental processes generates philosophical pseudo-problems and paradoxes, none of which
elucidates the nature of meaning. To use Wittgensteins example, when a student says Now, I
understand it means that a sudden event has occurred in the speaker; before he didnt
understand, but now he does. Understanding also means that the speaker can apply rule at some
time in the future. Understanding appears to be an internal process that is grasped
instantaneously, yet also extends over time. This is the paradox of conceiving of understanding
as a mental process. A similar problem arises in explaining what it is to mean one thing rather
than another: because we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call pointing at the
shape (as opposed to color, for example), we say that a mental, spiritual activity corresponds to
these words19. But, Wittgenstein claims, this imposition of a mental realm behind linguistic use
or practices adds nothing. In the case of understanding, as in the case of to know or to mean,
we appeal to some hidden state for explanation. Yet precisely because it is hidden, we can never
hope to find it. Wittgenstein writes now we try to get hold of the mental process of
understanding which seems to be hidden behind those coarser, and therefore more readily visible,
concomitant phenomena Indeed, how can the process of understanding have been hidden,

18
Winch, Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 18.
19
Wittgenstein, 36.

given that I said Now I understand because I did understand? And if I say it is hidden then
how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a muddle20. Views of meaning that rely upon
mental processes for explanation adds little to our understanding of meaning and leads to
confusion. Wittgenstein is a behaviorist insofar as rejects using mental terms. Wittgenstein
anticipates, but does not rebut, the assertion that he is a behaviorist. In the Philosophical
Investigations, his imaginary interlocutor replies arent you nevertheless a behaviorist in
disguise? Arent you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a
fiction? If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction 21. Wittgenstein does not
claim that mental states as objects do not exist, but rather that they are a source of linguistic
confusion. Wittgenstein offers examples of using descriptions of actions and gestures in lieu of
mental terms. Yet none of the behavioral descriptions are the mental process. This leads
Wittgenstein to claim that meaning of such mental terms are just their use in the language.
Wittgenstein argues that meaning in accordance with a rule is just its use in the language.
His use theory of meaning indicates that meaning is reducible to its application within a
linguistic practice. Meaning cannot be psychologically or ontologically distinguished from what
actors do. He writes that for a large of class of cases of the employment of the word meaning
though not for all this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in
language22 His use theory of meaning is a weak semantic claim that meaning is just what actors
20
Wittgenstein, 153.
21
Wittgenstein, 307.
22
Wittgenstein, 43.

can do with words. The criteria for determining what someone may mean when they use a word
is their behavior. Wittgenstein writes that shared human behavior is the system of reference by
means of which we interpret an unknown language23. Furthermore, behavioral criteria suggests
that understanding a word means that an actor can use it and that not understanding means that
he cannot use it. Wittgenstein writes that there are criteria in a mans behaviour for his not
understanding a word: that it meaning nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it24.
The behaviorist account of Wittgensteins views undermines Winchs interpretation.
According to this behaviorist interpretation, learning a language is about coordinating behavior.
Language does not depend upon a theory of meaning that is shared by all speakers.25In
opposition to Winchs claim that interpretation is necessary for understanding what actors mean,
Wittgenstein writes every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets, and
cannot give it any support. Interpretations do not determine meaning26. The claim that meaning
is just its use in the language and that behavior is the criteria for intelligibility entails that
adhering to a rule is not following a shared script that must be interpreted, as Winch suggests.
Roth argues, without a shared something linking those studied, there is no mentality to

23
Wittgenstein, 206.
24
Wittgenstein, 269.
25
Roth, p. 143.
26
Wittgenstein, 198.

reconstruct, nothing for historicism [or other variants of interpretivist social sciences] to be
about27.

Section 3: The Case Against Winchs Methodological Exclusivism

Roth argues that a realist theory of meaning such as that offered by Winch is implausible.
Winch does assume that there is a theory of meaning shared by all actors participating within a
form of life. The assumption of a shared theory of meaning is engendered by his view that rules
constitute a collective reality for actors participating in a form of life. Yet Roth argues the very
assumption that people necessarily share a semantic theory by sharing a form of life is, in fact,
unreasonable28. There are no unique conditions that are necessary for acquiring a language;
such unique conditions would be sufficient for determining what words mean. But language
relies merely upon behavior for evidential support and intelligibility. Roth claims that Winch
hypostasizes social rules and talks of them as if they were an independent object of study29.
These hypostasized social rules are the condition for interpretation being the sole correct
approach to social science
Winchs non-naturalism and meaning realism entails methodological exclusivism in the
social sciences. Winchs position is a non-naturalist position because he claims that the social
sciences concern objects that are distinct from those of the natural sciences. Non-naturalism
suggests that there is an independent realm of social meaning. Roth demonstrated that non27
Turner and Roth, p. 315.
28
Roth, p. 143.
29
Roth, p. 134.

naturalism which entails that there is an object of understanding that is shared by people in a
particular time and place and interpretable by all actors participating in the same form of life
is incorrect.30 He explains that all forms of meaning realism engender a commitment to
methodological exclusivism since the realist assumptions entail that there is a fact of the
matter to the interpretation of beliefs31.
In contrast to meaning realism, Roth argues for the indeterminacy thesis, which entails
that methodological pluralism is a viable approach to social science.The indeterminacy thesis
posits that meaning rests upon behavior for evidence, but that behavior is not sufficient to
determine meaning. Roth writes we have no empirical support for the claim that people, in
learning a language, learn anything more than coordination of behavior given certain stimulus
cues32. A version of the indeterminacy thesis seems to be offered by Wittgenstein: he writes if
someone says, How am I to know what he means I see only his signs?, then I say, How is
he to know what he means, he too has only his signs?33. There are no semantic facts that fix
meanings; this is the case even for the speaker, whose meaning cannot determined by
introspection or some other mental process. One can appeal only to linguistic usage and
behavior. A behaviorist account of linguistic practice is compatible with the indeterminacy thesis.
If the indeterminacy this correct, then there is not a single set of correct rules for the study of
30
Turner and Roth, p. 313.
31
Roth, p. 131.
32
Roth, Meaning and Method, p. 136.
33
Wittgenstein, 504.

human behavior. This view of language and behavior entailed by the indeterminacy thesis
cannot settle semantic questions; yet it is a virtue for a pluralist approach to social science.
I have argued that Winchs interpretation of Wittgenstein, which supports his
commitment to an exclusively interpretivist method of social science, is incorrect. Winch relies
upon Wittgensteins account of rule-following and forms of life to explain the meaningfulness
of linguistic practices and behavior. Yet because of Wittgensteins denial that meaning is
ascertainable independently of what actors do and how they use their words is better interpreted
as a behaviorist. Wittgensteins behaviorism is complemented by Roths argument for meaningindeterminacy. With his that there is no semantic theory that shared speakers participating in a
form of life, Roth foils Winchs argument for methodological exclusivism. Wittgensteins
behaviorism and Roths case for methodological pluralism together imply that, contrary to
Winch, social science does not have to be an exclusively interpretivist enterprise.