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Christosmilitaryand
intelligencecorner

MilitaryandintelligencehistorymostlydealingwithWorldWarII.

Sunday,August5,2012

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Enigmasecuritymeasures
TheplugboardEnigmawasusedbytheGermanarmedforcespriorandduringWWII.It
wasamodificationofthecommercialversion.Itsplugboardgaveitahugesecurityboost
comparedtothestandardversion.

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Abwehr (25) AFV (22) Agents

codes (28) Allied codes

(33)Axiscodebreakers
(37) BDienst (7) Bletchley
ParkvsBerlin(44) Book
review (24) British codes (25)
ciphony

(6)

Eastern

disinformation

front

(7)

(41)

Enigma (17) Forschungsamt

(14)France1940(15)German
codebreakers (14) German
TheGermansusedtheEnigmaextensivelyandtheywerealwaysworriedaboutthe
securityoftheirmainciphersystem.Theircryptologicsecuritydepartments,scattered

communications (5) GRU (8)

Hagelin(7) index (1) Italian codes (5)
Japan(12)KGB(11)Luftwaffe(10)

acrosstheircryptologicagencies,researchedwaystobreaktheEnigmaandbasedon
theirobservationschangesweremadeinoperatingprocedures.
HereIwillonlylookintothemainsecuritymeasurestheytookpriorandduringthewar.
Fromchangesinkeyingandindicatorprocedurestothemechanicalmodifications.
AlmostalltheinformationcomesfromTheHistoryofHut6vol1whichisaBritish
postwarreportdeclassifiedin2006.OfcoursethebestsourcewouldbeaGermanreport
detailingtheirsecuritymeasuresandthereasoningbehindthembutIdontknowifsuch
adocumentexistedorifitsurvivedthewar.

TheplugboardEnigmaandtheGermanarmedforces
In1934theArmyandNavyagreedtousetheplugboardEnigmaastheirmaincipher
system.In1935theAirforcefollowed.AtthestartofWWIIGermanywastheonly
countryintheworldtouseaciphermachineforallitsmidandhighleveltraffic.
DuringWWIItensofthousandsofEnigmamachineswereusedbytheGermans.It
seemsthatnooneknowsforsurehowmanyEnigmamachineswerebuilt.Agood
estimateseemstobethatmorethan40.000wereconstructed.

M138 strip (39)

M209
(19) MI5(2) MI6 (6) movie review (2)
mystery machine (3)
N.Africa
campaign (17) Neutrals codes
(13) Normandy 1944 (27)

NSA (35) OKH/GdNA

(50) OKL Chi Stelle (18)
OKW/Chi (49) OSS (16)
Panther (3) partisan codes (8) Pers

Z(20)Polishcodes(16) Purple
machine (7) RAF (11) Referat 12
(13) Rote Kapelle (6) Russian
FISH (21) SD (12) SOE (10)

Soviet Codes (39) Soviet

weapons(6) Spies (41) T34
(17)TICOM(11)Typex(10) USA
codes (50) Wa Pruef 7 (8)
What If (10) ww2 stats (42)
WWIIMyths(49)

Enigmarotorsandkeysettings
Initiallyonlythreerotorswereused(I,II,III).InDecember1938rotorsIVandVwere
introduced.Thesewereusedbyallthreeservicesthroughoutthewar.Allthestandard
rotorshadonenotch.
TheNavyintroducedthreemorerotorsforitsownnetworksintheperiod193839.These
hadtwonotches.
Uptotheendof1935thekey(wheelorderandstecker)changedeverythreemonths.
FromJanuary1936everymonthandfromOctober1936everyday.
Kenngruppen

Greatsites

USArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory
U.S.StrategicBombingSurvey
EuropeanWar
TopLevelTelecommunications
Ticomarchive
TheWarNerd
TheNurembergTrialsCollection
TheLuftwaffe,193345
TheCrusaderProject
StateDepartmentFOIA

Inorderforthereceivingpartytoidentifythespecifickeyuseditwasnecessarytosend
afivelettergroupcalledBuchstabenkenngruppe(letteridentificationgroup)togetherwith
themessage.Theletteridentificationgroupwascomposedofoneoftheavailable3letter
kenngruppenplustworandomlettersinordertocreatea5lettergroup(Enigmatraffic
wassentin5lettergroups).
Thenavyusedadifferentsystem.Thekenngruppenwastakenfromabook
(Kenngruppenbuch)andthenencipheredwithabigramsubstitutiontable,beforebeing
sentwiththemessage.

SASundChiffrierdienst
OperationBarbarossa
NumberedUSAFHistorical
Studies
Nizkorproject
MatthewM.Aid'ssite
MarkJ.Blair'sM209Group
KurfurstBf109data
Katkryptolog

Indicatorprocedures

JeanFranoisBouchaudycrypto
site

TheEnigmawasusedinthefollowingway.Firstthemachinewassetupaccordingto
thedailykeywhichspecifiedthewheelorder,ringsettingsandplugboardsettings.Then
thecipherclerkchoseadifferentstartingpositionofthewheelsforeachmessage.

JapanCenterforAsianHistorical
Records
Intelnews
GermanRadioIntelligence

Inordertocommunicatethispositiontothereceivingpartyhehadtofirstencipherit.The
startingpositionwasinitiallyencipheredatastandardsettingcalledGrundstellung.Upto
1940thepracticewastoenciphertheindicatortwice(calledthrowonbyBP).
ForexampleiftheGrundsettingisAAKandweencipheredourmessagewiththewheels
atOFWthenweencodeOFWatpositionAAKandgetVNZ,thenpressOFWonemore
timeandgetBLD.TheindicatoratthebeginningofthemessagewillbeVNZBLD.The
receivingpartywillsettheirmachineatAAKandenterVNZBLDwhichwillgivethem
OFWOFW.TheywillthensettherotorsatOFWandproceedtodecipherthemessage.

FrodeWeierud'sCryptoCellar
EuropeanAxisSignalIntelligence
inWorldWarII
Ellsbury.com
Dirk'sWeblog
Cryptome
CryptoCrack
CryptoCellarTales
CryptoMuseum

FromSeptember1938theGrundsettingwasdroppedandthecipherclerkchosea
randomstartingpositionforencipheringthemessageandenciphereditatanotherrandom
position.InourexampleitwouldmeanthatinsteadofAAKthecipherclerkchooses
threerandomletterssayTGMandenciphersOFWatthatsettingthusgivingXYUand
againHLS.TheindicatorwiththenewsystemwillbeTGMXYUHLS.
InMay1940thedoubleenciphermentoftheindicatorwasdropped.
TheNavyinitiallyfollowedtheArmyAirforceprocedureofrandomindicatorselection.
HoweverthischangedinMay1937whentheystartedtouseanindicatorbook
(kennbuch)toselecttheindicatorwhichwasthenencipheredontheGrundstellungand
theoutputwasusedasthemessagekey.Thiswasthencommunicatedtotheother
partyafterfirstencipheringitwithasubstitutiontable.BothKennbuchandsubstitution
tableswerechangedseveraltimesduringthewar.
Thisprocedureavoidedoperatormistakesandnonrandomindicators.HoweverNaval

CIAFOIA
C.G.McKaysIntelligencePast
AxisHistoryForum
AnatolyKlepov'smk.rublog

Followers

keyscontinuedtouseaGrundsettingthroughoutthewar.ForsomereasonsomeNaval
keyscontinuedtouserepeatingindicatorsafter1940.
InApril1945theNavyintroducedachangeintheirprocedurebyhaving228Grund
settingsvalidforonemonthinsteadofadifferentoneforeachday.

Jointhissite
withGoogleFriendConnect

Members(40) More

Plugboardconnections
Initially68steckerconnectionswereused.FromJanuary194010wereusedandthis
remainedstandardproceduretilltheendofthewar.Afewkeys,forwhateverreason,
continuedtousefewersteckers.
General,OfficersandStaffkeys
Alreadyamember?Signin

Navalkeyshadthreesettings:General,Officers,Staff.TheGeneralkey(wheelorder,
ringsettings,stecker)wasnotchangedeverydaybutwaspairedfortwoconsecutive
days.Thatmeantthattheseconddayhadthesamewheelorderandringsettingsbut
differedinthestecker.
TheOfficersmessageswereencipheredfirstontheOfficerskeythathadidentical
settingswiththeGeneralkeybutdifferedinthestecker.Thenitwasencipheredonce
moreontheGeneral.Officerssettingswerechangedevery10days.TheOfficerskey
wasmuchhardertobreakthantheGeneralkey.

BlogArchive

2016(9)
2015(59)
2014(96)
2013(132)
2012(143)

Staffkeyshadtheirownsettings(wheelorder,ringsettings,stecker)andwere
encipheredoncemoreontheGeneralkey.Withthetechnologyofthattimetheywere
moreorlessunbreakable.

December(8)

Armykeyschangedeveryday.CertaintypesofArmykeys(Armee,Heeres,Wehrmacht)
hadseveralversions.TheGeneralM/S(Maschinenschlssel)keyforGeheim(secret)
traffic,theStabM/SkeyforGeheimkommandosache(topsecret)andOKHorOfficers
forthehighestlevelmessages.

September(11)

November(12)
October(8)

August(13)
ItaliancodebreakersofWWII
BookreviewBruteForce

Airforcekeysalsochangedeveryday.TherewasageneraladministrativekeyRedthat
wasusedbyallunitsonallfronts,ahighlevelkeyPinkplusofcoursedifferentkeysfor
differentgeographicareasanddifferentlevelsofcommand.

Germandisinformation
operationsThe1930s
cris...

Overviewofsecuritymeasures

MemoirsofGerman
intelligenceofficers

Proliferationofkeys
In1942allthreeservicesintroducedmorekeystocoverdifferentgeographicareas
(Easternfront,Med,Westetc)andoperationalcommands(Fliegerkorps,Luftflotte,etc)

Sovietcipherteleprintersof
WWII

Germanfuelreserve
Normandy1944
Update
InterviewwithNSA
whistleblowers

ThearmybrokeitsEasternkeyintoseveral.TheLuftwaffeintroducedseparatekeysfor
higherlevelsofcommandandtheNavyintroducedaseparatekeyfortheAtlanticU
boats.

WWIIMythsGermanlackof
standardization

Fromthenonthenumberofkeyscontinuedtoincrease.

Enigmasecuritymeasures

Effectsonbreaking:

DetailsontheSoviet
diplomaticcode

Specializedcryptanalytic
machinesofWWII

TheAbwehrneversleeps.
ExceptonSundays.

MorekeysmeantmoreworkforBPormorerealisticallythatmanykeyswerenot
attackedatall.Ontheotherhandtrafficbetweendifferentnetworksoftenledto
reencodementsasthesamemessagepassedthroughdifferentkeys.ThisallowedBPto
usereencodementsfromeasykeys(likeRed)inordertobreakintoharderones.

July(10)

AlsoitseemsthattheneedtoconstructmorekeysledtheGermancipherofficersin
chargeofconstructingEnigmakeystotakeashortcut

April(13)

Partsofolderkeyswerereusedinordertocreatenewones.Forexamplethewheelorder

February(12)

from22May1941wouldbecoupledwiththesteckersettingsforFerbruary2nd 1939in
ordertoproduceanewkey.

January(16)

ThisGermantrickmostlyoccurredin1942andinLuftwaffenetworks.TheBritscalledit
Parkerismusafterthepersonwhohaddiscoveredit.

June(12)
May(13)

March(15)

2011(59)

AboutMe

ChristosT.

EnigmaUhr
In1944theLuftwaffeintroduced,onsomenets,theUhrdevicewhichchangedthe
steckercombinationsautomaticallybyturningaknob.

Asimpleeconomistwithan
unhealthyinterestinmilitaryand
intelligencehistory.
Viewmycompleteprofile

Onemajoreffectofthedevicewasthatitgotridofthereciprocalenciphermentofthe
plugboard(althoughthereciprocityoftheEnigmaasawholewasnotaffected).
AdescriptionoftheUhrdeviceisgiveninTICOMreportI20Interrogationof
SonderfuehrerDr.FrickeoftheSignalIntelligenceagencyoftheSupremecommand
Armed,Forces(OKW/Chi),p3
(a)SteckerUhr.Thiswasasmalldevicetochangetheplugging.Itgave40variations.
Theyknewthatthestrengthofthemachinelayinthesteckerandthereforewishedto
dividethetrafficloadpersteckerby40.ThemachinewasusedonlybytheLuftwaffe,
whichhadonly1.000orsomachinesforhigherechelons.
Operationaluse:
ItwasfirstusedinJuly1944.Originallyitwasusedontwokeys,lateritwasextendedto
cover15Luftwaffekeys.
SomekeysusedUhrandUKWD.
Effectsonbreaking:
TheHistoryofHut6saysUhralonehadonthewholelittleinfluenceonourbreakingof
keysthoughitdidmeanthattherewassometimesalotoftechnicalworktobedone
afterthebasickeywasbroken.Seriouscomplicationsaroseonlywhenitwasnecessary
tobreakakeyonanUhrmessageorwhenUhrwascombinedwithD.
UmkehrwalzeD

UKWDwasanewrewirablereflectorusedonthemilitaryEnigma.Thepeopleof
BletchleyParkcalleditUncleD.

AweekbeforeitwasintroducedBPinterceptedmessagesmentioningit.Astheofficial
historyputsitthestoutestheartsmighthavequailedinthoselastdaysof1943hadit
beenpossibleforustorealizethehydraheadeadnatureofourveiledantagonist.
ThereflectorDwasusedprincipallybytheLuftwaffeandin2or3armykeys.Anaval
versionwasbuiltbutnotused.
Operationaluse:
FromJanuary1944theRedkeystartedtousereflectorDforsomeofthetraffic.The
wiringwaschangedevery10days.FromAugust44UKWDwasgreatlyexpandedand
somekeysuseditexclusively.

WesternEurope
August1st1944markedthefirstuseofreflectorDonLuftwaffekeysusedbyunitsin
Germany.AccordingtotheHistoryofHut6thisradicallyaffectedtheirexploitation.
Duringthesecondhalfof44theGermanairkeyswentovertoreflectorD.
TheGermanarmysHomeAdministration(Wehrkreis)networkGreenshankusedreflector
Dsince1943(dateofintroductionnotknownbutaccordingtotheBPhistoryprobablyin
January1943).ThiskeyusedadifferentUKWDwiringeachday.Greenshankprovedto
beBPsnemesisasitresistedattackforyears.Thefinalscoreshowsonly13daysread
duringthewar.ThereweretwomoreWehrkreiskeysidentifiedbyBPthatusedreflector
Dandthusprovedsecure.

Italianfront
InNovember1944Puma(armyairforceliaisonkeyItaly)changedovertoUKWDand
theperiodofregularsustainedbreakingwasatanend.PumaalsousedtheUhrdevice.
Leopard(LuftwaffeItaly)usedUKWDin1945.

Easternfront
FromSeptember1944reflectorDwasusedinsomeLuftwaffenetworks.ByJanuary
1945UKWDusewasextensive.
Effectsonbreaking:

SeveralDkeysweresolvedbecausetheLuftwaffeoftenusedreflectorsBandDonthe
samekey(callednearlyDbyBP).Newcryptanalyticequipmenthadtobedeveloped
andproduced.TheseweretheAmericanDuennaandAutoscritcherandtheBritishGiant.
Thesedeviceswereintroducedinlate1944.
Eventhiseffortdidnotpreventadropinthesuccessrate.ForexamplethePumakey
wentfrom100%to35%read.
UncleDprovedtobeBletchleyParkstoughestopponent.

Lckenfllerwalze

TheGermansunderstoodthatoneofthegreatestweaknessesoftheEnigmawasthe
uniformmovementoftherotors.Inordertocounterthistheybuiltanewrotorthathad26
notchesthatcouldbesetinactiveorinactiveposition.

DetailsabouttheLckenfllerwalzearegiveninTICOMI20Interrogationof
SonderfuehrerDr.FrickeoftheSignalIntelligenceagencyoftheSupremecommand
Armed,Forces(OKW/Chi),p4
(b)Becauseoftheuniformmotionoftheenigma,theyconsideredthatifmessagesof
600or700lettersweresent,theycouldbebroken.Iftheinstructionsonmaximum
messagelengthwerefollowed,theykneweverythingwouldbeallright,buttheyfeltsure
thattheirinstructionswerenotfollowed.Sotheydevelopedanewwheelwith26notches
whichcouldbefilledinasdesired.ThesewerecalledLckenfllerwalze.Theywishedto
avoidcertainnumbersofnotchesperwheel,andparticularlyconsecutivenotches,for
withthelatteritwasdifficulttopredictthecycleexceptinspecialcases.Consequently
theyorderedthatwheelsshouldbeusedwithone,five,seven,orninenotchesonlyand
neverwithconsecutivenotches.SomeofthosewheelswereactuallybuiltinBerlinby
HEIMSOETH&RINCKE,whobuilttheenigma.Theyweretobeproducedinnumbers
bythisfirmandbySiemensHalske,andwereexpectedtobereadyon1May1945.
Theywerenotready,however.
Operationaluse:
Itwasnotintroducedduringthewar.ItwouldhaveprobablydefeatedBPasitattacked
thegreatestweaknessoftheEnigma,theuniformmovementoftherotors.
EnigmaM4

The4rotorM4machinewasknowntohavebeendistributedintheHomeWatersareain
1941.TheAtlanticUboatsgottheM4inFebruary1942.Othercommandstooklongerto
introduceit.

Effectsonbreaking:
TheM4wasanorderofmagnitudemoresecurethanthe3rotorversion.
InordertosolvetheM4keysanew4rotorbombewasneeded.
DuetoconstantdelaysintheproductionofaBritish4rotorbombetheAmericans
decidedtobuildtheirownversionandthiswasoperationalinSeptember1943.Bylate
194395bombeswereusedandin1944160.
ThankstothenewbombetheUboatkeywasbrokenusuallywithin2448hours.
HoweverduringtheperiodFebruary1942toSeptember1943solvingtheUboatkeywith
existingmethodswasahugeproblem.
KeysofnavalcommandsthatusedtheM4withrepeatingindicatorswerebroken
withouttheneedfora4rotorbombe.
ImportantM4keyslikethoseusedbysurfaceships(Aegir,Neptun)resistedBPattack.

Sonderschlssel
Inthesummerof1944UboatsstartedcarryingindividualEnigmakeys.
Operationaluse:
TheywerefirstusedinNovember1944andbyFebruary1945theycarriedpracticallyall
theoperationaltrafficofUboatCommand.
Effectsonbreaking:
Theywerepracticallyunbreakable.AstheCryptographichistoryofworkontheGerman
NavalEnigmaputsit:The"Sonders"areabouttheonlytypeofkeywhichmakeone
feeltheneedforastatisticalattackonEnigmainsteadofthenormalmethodofcribbing.
Notschluessel
Notschluesselwereemergencykeysusedwhentherewasnowaytoissuenewkeysto
aspecificunitorwhencompromisewassuspected.AnewEnigmakeywasgenerated
fromakeyword(schlsselwort)andadiscriminant(kenngruppe)fromanotherword
(kennwort).
Operationaluse:
TheLuftwaffefirstusedNOTkeysinAugust1944.
Effectsonbreaking:
NOTswerebrokenthroughknowledgeofthecipherinstructions,throughreencodements
andcryptanalytically.
TheHistoryofHut6saysThosesystemswereonlyintendedbytheGermansforuse

inemergency.However,NOTkeyshaveactuallycertainadvantagesoverkeysmadeup
inthenormalwayowingtotheirfreedomfromrulesofkeyswhichmayhelptheenemy
cryptographer.Theywouldhavehowever,thefatalobjectionforregularusethatifthe
keyisgeneratedfromonewordthenumberofpossiblekeysislimitedsodrasticallythat
somekindofkeyindexbecomespossibleforinstance,onthesecondsystemthe
numberofkeysisdeterminedbythenumberofGermanwordsatleast12letterslong
whichmustsurelybemuchlessthan100,000.

Randomindicators
AfterabolishingtheGrundstellungsystemtheArmyandAirforceallowedtheEnigma
operatortochoosebotharandommessagekeyandarandomsettingwithwhichto
encipherit.
Howeverthekeyschosenbyoperatorswerenotalwaysrandom.Thiseffect(called
cillies)wasusedbyBPonitsattackontheEnigmatraffic.

TheGermansintroducedanewproceduretocounterthis.Thisprocedurewasasfollows:

1).Thecipherclerkhadtochoosearandomtexteitherfromabook,apoem,asongetc
2).SethisEnigmaatwheelorderI,II,III,ringsettings01,01,01andconnect10
steckersatrandom.
3).ChoosearandomGrundsetting.
4).EnterthetextintheEnigmaandwritedowntheoutput,thendivideitinto6letter
groups
Each6lettergroupcomprisesaGrundsettingandmessagekey.Theoperatorthenused
thenewkeysbysettingtheEnigmaatthefirstthreelettersandenciphering(onthedaily
key)thelastthreeletters.Theoutputwouldbeusedasamessagekey.

Operationaluse:
HardtoestablishbyBletchleyParkastherewasnoexternalindicationofthisnew
procedure(apartfromafallincillies).ItmayhavebeenusedextensivelybyArmyand
SSkeys.
AccordingtothereportnderungenbeimSchlsselnmitMaschinenschlsselthenew
indicatorprocedurewastobecomeeffectiveinAugust44.


Effectsonbreaking:
Astheofficialhistoryputsit:Itisimpossibletointerpret"RandomIndicators"as
anythingbutananticillideviceafarmoreradicalonethanCY.Itdoesindeedkillcillies
anditisclearthattheGermanshadatlastbecomeconsciousofthispossibledanger.
Theanswertheynowfoundtothedangerofcillieswasaseffectiveasanythingthat
couldhavebeendevisedshortofacompletechangeoftheindicatingsystemandit
didloseusOrange.TheonlypossiblecriticismwecanmakeoftheGermanactionisthat
(assooften)itwastoolate:cilliesweredyingwhentheywerekilled.ThehistoryofHut
6wouldhavebeendifferenthadtheGermansinthefullflushoftheir1940triumphsbeen
abletospareathoughtforthesuppressionofcillies.

Wahlworts(nonsensewords)
Insteadofstereotypedbeginningsrandomwordswereinsertedatthebeginningandend
ofthemessageasananticribdevice.Wahlwortswerefrom414letterslong.
Operationaluse:
ThiswasorderedintheN.AfricaarmykeysinDecember1942.Nonsensewordswere
usedextensivelybyN.African,BalkanandEasternkeysbutnottosuchadegreeinthe
West.
LuftwaffeunitsinsideGermanyalsousedwahlworts.

Effectsonbreaking:
Cribingonaddresseswasnolongerpossibleastheofficialhistoryadmitsbreakingon
straightaddresseswasnowoutofthequestion.ThegeneraleffectonN.Africankeys
waslimitedsinceatthattimetheBritsreliedonreencodements.
AgainstLuftwaffekeystheproblemwasmoreseriousbutagainreencodementswere
used.
AstheofficialhistoryputsitItcannotbedeniedthatinwahlwortstheGermanshitona
simpleandeffectivemethodofmakingcribbingmoredifficult.Itwouldhavebeenstill
moreeffectivebutfortheeternalGermanblunderof"toolittleandtoolate",introducedin
1940onawholesalescale,wahlwortsmighthaveknockedouttheinfantCribRoom
beforeithadgotproperlyonitsfeet:butinfacttheGermansdidnotusethesystematall
tillhalfwaythroughthewarandnotuntilthelastfewmonthsuseditonanything
approachingauniversalscale.

Mossecode
TheMossecodewasacommercialcode(5letter)adoptedwithmodificationsbythe
Luftwaffe.
Operationaluse:
UsedbytheLuftwaffesinceearly1944.

Effectsonbreaking:
Itbecameaproblemasananticribdevicein1945.Whenlongaddresseswerechanged
intoa5lettercodethisstoppedcribbing.Howeverincaseswereseveralregularly
occurringphraseswerereplacedbyacodewordthisprovidedausefulcrib.
OveralltheBritsrateditasasoundsecuritymeasure.

Doubleencoding
OntheRavenandGadflykeyssomemessageswereencipheredtwice.Firstwiththe
standardprocedureandthenonceagainbyusingthesettingsoftheEnigmaattheendof
themessagewithoutresettingtherotors.
Effectsonbreaking:
AstheBPhistorysaysDoubleEncodingwasusedontoosmallascaletohawany
effectworthmentioningonHut6breaking.Onthescaleonwhichitwasuseditmust
havebeennolessanuisancetotheGermancipherclerksthanitwastoHut6.

Burying

Stereotypedbeginningswereasecurityrisk.Inordertocounterthisburyingwasused.
Buryingmeantthatthecipherclerkinsertedthebeginningandendofthemessageinthe
middleofthetextbeforeencodingit.
Operationaluse:
ThisprecautionwasintroducedintheArmyinDecember1942.
Effectsonbreaking:
Itwasaneffectiveanticribmethod.

CYprocedure
ThemovementofthestandardEnigmarotorswaspredictableduetotheirhavingonly
onenotch.Thefastrotormovedwitheverycharacter,themiddlerotormovedonceevery
26keydepressionsandtheslowrotor(theleftone)movedonlyonceevery676key
strokes(26x26).Sincemessageswerelimitedto250charactersthismeantthattheslow
rotorwasstationaryduringencodement.InordertocounterthiseffecttheGermanshad
thecipherclerkmovetherotorbyhandinthemiddleofthemessage.After70to130
letterstheclerkchosearandomletterandmovedtheslowrotorbyhandtothatposition
(thenewpositionmustbeatleast5stagesremovedfromtheoriginalone).Thenhe
wroteinthemessageCYfollowedbytheletterthatrepresentedthenewslowrotor
positionandtheletterfollowingitinthealphabet.ForexampleifhechoseJthenhe
wouldtypeCYJKandcontinuetherestofthemessagewiththeslowrotorinthenew

positionJ.
Operationaluse:
IntroducedinSeptember1944insomeLuftwaffekeys.ByOctoberusedonallArmy
keysandtheSSones.
ThereportnderungenbeimSchlsselnmitMaschinenschlsselsaysthatthenew
procedureforresettingwheelswithinmessageswouldbecomeeffectiveon15
September44.

Effectsonbreaking:
CYstoppedcillyingandaffectedcribsandreencodements.Ontheotherhandit
occasionallyprovidedashortcuttotheringsetting.
ItdidnotstopBPsuccessbutitwasaseriousefforttocounterthepredictabilityofthe
Enigmarotormovement.

Zusatzstecker
InMay1944theLuftwaffeintroducedachangeintheplugboardconnectionsevery8
hours.TheGermansdidnotintroducethreedifferentsteckerkeys.Onlyafewofthe
connectionswerechangedeachtime.
ThisprocedurecreatedmanyproblemsanditwasdiscontinuedinmidJune.

Effectsonbreaking:
Practicallynone.Theofficialhistorycallsitthemostsillyandtrivialoftheirsecurity
devices

Wheelorderpermutations
FromOctober1941Luftwaffekeysreversedtheirwheelorderat12noon.
TheArmyusedasimilarmethodfromJuly1942.Every8hourstherotorsweremoved
forwardonestep.ForexampleifthedailykeyspecifiedrotorsI,IVandIIIinthatorder
thenafter8hoursitwouldbeIII,I,IVandfinallyIV,III,I.
FromSeptember1942theLuftwaffeadoptedthethreewheelordersystem.
SomeArmykeys(likeGreenshank)used6permutations.
Effectsonbreaking:
ThiswasaneffectiveantidepthmeasurebuttheBritsdidnotusedepthsinanylarge
degreesotheywerenotaffectedonthisfront.Howevertheunintendedconsequence
wasthatBanburismuswasnolongerpractical.

Conclusion

DespiteallthetalkabouttheGermanshavingcompletefaithinthesecurityofthe
Enigmatherealityisthattheyintroducedmanynewproceduresinordertoimproveits
security.
Newrotorswereintroducedprewar.
TheindicatorprocedurewaschangedbydroppingtheGrundstellungandstoppingthe
doubleenciphermentofthemessagekey.
Wheelpermutationswereusedtocounterdepths.
Randomindicatorswereusedasananticillidevice.
Nonsensewordsandburyingwereusedagainstcribbing.
TheuniformmovementofthewheelswascounteredwiththeCYprocedure.
Trafficwassplitintomanydifferentkeys.
EvenmechanicalmodificationswereemployedtoupgradetheEnigmaliketheUhr
device,theUKWDreflectorandthe4rotorM4.
ThesemeasuresshowthattheGermansunderstoodthemainproblemsoftheEnigma.
HadtheybeentakentogetherandonallnetworkstheycouldhavedefeatedBletchley
Park.
ThereweretwomainreasonswhytheGermansdidnotdefeatBPthroughtheirsecurity
measures.
ThefirstonewasthatduetothehugenumberofEnigmamachinesinuseitwasnot
logisticallypossibletotakesimplemeasuressuchasrewiretherotorsorintroducenew
ones.
Theotherproblemwasthefragmentationoftheircryptologicsecuritydepartments.The
Germanshad6maincryptologicagencies.
Outofthese4weremilitary(Army,Navy,AirforceandOKW/Chi).Eachhadacrypto
securitydepartment.Itwasthejobofthatdepartmenttopreparecodesandciphersfor
theserviceandmakesurethattheseweresecure.Thereweregoodcryptanalystsin
thesedepartmentsandthankstotheireffortsthesecurityoftheEnigmawasupgraded
duringthewar.Howevertheydidnothaveclosecontactwiththeircounterpartsinother
agenciesandsocouldnotshareontheirresearchandfindings.
Thisledtoeachservicehavingadifferentstandardofsecurity.ForexampletheNavy
continuedtousetheGrundsettingevenaftertheArmyandAirforcehadabandonedit
andthesamethinghappenedwithrepeatingindicators.TheUhrdevicewasusedonlyby
theLuftwaffe,theUKWDonthesamekeysasthereflectorBandsoonandsoforth
Itshouldalsobementionedthatthesecuritydepartmentswerehamperedbythe
resistanceoftheservicestochangesinoperationalprocedures.Theirreasoningwasthat
thefightingtroopsshouldnotbeoverloadedwithnewcodesandproceduresthatwereof

questionablevalue.
Aunifiedcryptologicsecuritydepartmentwouldhaveensuredthatallthreeservices
followedthesameproceduresandinstitutedsecuritychangesatthesametime.
Stillthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatacentralizeddepartmentwouldhavedefeated
BP.AfterallBPscentralizationdidnotsaveBritishhighlevelcodesintheperiod1939
43.
Timelines

Year

1936

1937

Month

Measure

January

wheelorderandsteckerchangedeverymonth

October

wheelorderandsteckerchangedeveryday

May

NavyintroducesKennbuchbigramsystem

1938

NavalrotorsVIandVIIintroduced
September

Newarmyairforceindicatorprocedure

December

RotorsIVandVintroducedforArmyAirforce

1939

NavalrotorVIIIintroduced

1940

May

Doubleenciphermentoftheindicatorstopped

1941

October

wheelorderreversedbymiddayonLuftwaffekeys

1942

Newkeysforallthreeservices
February

EnigmaM4usedbyAtlanticUboats

July

3dailywheelorderchanges

December

nonsensewordsandburyingintroduced

1943

UKWDonGreenshank
September

ArmydropsuseofKenngruppen

November

LuftwaffedropsuseofKenngruppen

1944

RandomindicatorsusedbyarmyandSS
MossecodeusedbytheLuftwaffe

1945

January

UKWDintroducedonREDkey

May

3dailysteckerchanges

July

Uhrdevice

August

Notschluessel

September

CYprocedure

November

SonderschlsselusedbyUboats

April

newindicatorprocedurebyNavy

Sources:HW43/70TheHistoryofHut6,VolumeI,BritishintelligenceintheSecond
WorldWarvol2andvol3part2,Decryptedsecrets:methodsandmaximsofcryptology,
HW25/1CryptographichistoryofworkonGermanNavalENIGMAbyCHO'D
Alexander,HW25/2TheHistoryofHut8byAPMahonCryptologiaarticle:Enigma
MessageProceduresUsedbytheHeer,LuftwaffeandKriegsmarine,Cryptologiaarticle:
ENIGMAUHR,cryptomuseum(forthepics),Wikipedia,EuropeanAxisSignal
IntelligenceinWorldWarIIvol2,TICOMI20InterrogationofSonderfuehrerDr.Frickeof
theSignalIntelligenceagencyoftheSupremecommandArmed,Forces(OKW/Chi)
Acknowledgments:IhavetothankFrodeWeierudandRalphErskineforansweringmy
questionsonaspectsoftheEnigmahistory.

ForthoseofyouwhowanttoactuallyusetheEnigmacheckthissimulator
PostedbyChristosT.at11:46PM

Recommend this on Google

Labels:BletchleyParkvsBerlin,Enigma,Germancodebreakers

1comment:
Anonymous 8/24/13,9:15AM
Brilliant!
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