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A.M.Turing(1950)ComputingMachineryandIntelligence.Mind49:433460.

COMPUTINGMACHINERYANDINTELLIGENCE
ByA.M.Turing
1.TheImitationGame
Iproposetoconsiderthequestion,"Canmachinesthink?"Thisshouldbeginwith
definitionsofthemeaningoftheterms"machine"and"think."Thedefinitionsmight
beframedsoastoreflectsofaraspossiblethenormaluseofthewords,butthis
attitudeisdangerous,Ifthemeaningofthewords"machine"and"think"aretobe
foundbyexamininghowtheyarecommonlyuseditisdifficulttoescapethe
conclusionthatthemeaningandtheanswertothequestion,"Canmachinesthink?"
istobesoughtinastatisticalsurveysuchasaGalluppoll.Butthisisabsurd.
InsteadofattemptingsuchadefinitionIshallreplacethequestionbyanother,
whichiscloselyrelatedtoitandisexpressedinrelativelyunambiguouswords.
Thenewformoftheproblemcanbedescribedintermsofagamewhichwecall
the'imitationgame."Itisplayedwiththreepeople,aman(A),awoman(B),and
aninterrogator(C)whomaybeofeithersex.Theinterrogatorstaysinaroom
apartfronttheothertwo.Theobjectofthegamefortheinterrogatoristo
determinewhichoftheothertwoisthemanandwhichisthewoman.Heknows
thembylabelsXandY,andattheendofthegamehesayseither"XisAandYis
B"or"XisBandYisA."TheinterrogatorisallowedtoputquestionstoAandB
thus:
C:WillXpleasetellmethelengthofhisorherhair?
NowsupposeXisactuallyA,thenAmustanswer.ItisA'sobjectinthegameto
tryandcauseCtomakethewrongidentification.Hisanswermightthereforebe:
"Myhairisshingled,andthelongeststrandsareaboutnineincheslong."
Inorderthattonesofvoicemaynothelptheinterrogatortheanswersshouldbe
written,orbetterstill,typewritten.Theidealarrangementistohaveateleprinter
communicatingbetweenthetworooms.Alternativelythequestionandanswers
canberepeatedbyanintermediary.Theobjectofthegameforthethirdplayer
(B)istohelptheinterrogator.Thebeststrategyforherisprobablytogivetruthful
answers.Shecanaddsuchthingsas"Iamthewoman,don'tlistentohim!"toher
answers,butitwillavailnothingasthemancanmakesimilarremarks.
Wenowaskthequestion,"WhatwillhappenwhenamachinetakesthepartofA
inthisgame?"Willtheinterrogatordecidewronglyasoftenwhenthegameis
playedlikethisashedoeswhenthegameisplayedbetweenamanandawoman?
Thesequestionsreplaceouroriginal,"Canmachinesthink?"
2.CritiqueoftheNewProblem
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Aswellasasking,"Whatistheanswertothisnewformofthequestion,"onemay
ask,"Isthisnewquestionaworthyonetoinvestigate?"Thislatterquestionwe
investigatewithoutfurtherado,therebycuttingshortaninfiniteregress.
Thenewproblemhastheadvantageofdrawingafairlysharplinebetweenthe
physicalandtheintellectualcapacitiesofaman.Noengineerorchemistclaimsto
beabletoproduceamaterialwhichisindistinguishablefromthehumanskin.Itis
possiblethatatsometimethismightbedone,butevensupposingthisinvention
availableweshouldfeeltherewaslittlepointintryingtomakea"thinkingmachine"
morehumanbydressingitupinsuchartificialflesh.Theforminwhichwehaveset
theproblemreflectsthisfactintheconditionwhichpreventstheinterrogatorfrom
seeingortouchingtheothercompetitors,orhearingtheirvoices.Someother
advantagesoftheproposedcriterionmaybeshownupbyspecimenquestionsand
answers.Thus:
Q:PleasewritemeasonnetonthesubjectoftheForthBridge.
A:Countmeoutonthisone.Inevercouldwritepoetry.
Q:Add34957to70764.
A:(Pauseabout30secondsandthengiveasanswer)105621.
Q:Doyouplaychess?
A:Yes.
Q:IhaveKatmyK1,andnootherpieces.YouhaveonlyKatK6andRatR1.
Itisyourmove.Whatdoyouplay?
A:(Afterapauseof15seconds)RR8mate.
Thequestionandanswermethodseemstobesuitableforintroducingalmostany
oneofthefieldsofhumanendeavourthatwewishtoinclude.Wedonotwishto
penalisethemachineforitsinabilitytoshineinbeautycompetitions,nortopenalise
amanforlosinginaraceagainstanaeroplane.Theconditionsofourgamemake
thesedisabilitiesirrelevant.The"witnesses"canbrag,iftheyconsideritadvisable,
asmuchastheypleaseabouttheircharms,strengthorheroism,butthe
interrogatorcannotdemandpracticaldemonstrations.
Thegamemayperhapsbecriticisedonthegroundthattheoddsareweightedtoo
heavilyagainstthemachine.Ifthemanweretotryandpretendtobethemachine
hewouldclearlymakeaverypoorshowing.Hewouldbegivenawayatonceby
slownessandinaccuracyinarithmetic.Maynotmachinescarryoutsomething
whichoughttobedescribedasthinkingbutwhichisverydifferentfromwhata
mandoes?Thisobjectionisaverystrongone,butatleastwecansaythatif,
nevertheless,amachinecanbeconstructedtoplaytheimitationgame
satisfactorily,weneednotbetroubledbythisobjection.
Itmightbeurgedthatwhenplayingthe"imitationgame"thebeststrategyforthe
machinemaypossiblybesomethingotherthanimitationofthebehaviourofaman.
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Thismaybe,butIthinkitisunlikelythatthereisanygreateffectofthiskind.In
anycasethereisnointentiontoinvestigateherethetheoryofthegame,anditwill
beassumedthatthebeststrategyistotrytoprovideanswersthatwouldnaturally
begivenbyaman.
3.TheMachinesConcernedintheGame
Thequestionwhichweputin1willnotbequitedefiniteuntilwehavespecified
whatwemeanbytheword"machine."Itisnaturalthatweshouldwishtopermit
everykindofengineeringtechniquetobeusedinourmachines.Wealsowishto
allowthepossibilitythananengineerorteamofengineersmayconstructamachine
whichworks,butwhosemannerofoperationcannotbesatisfactorilydescribedby
itsconstructorsbecausetheyhaveappliedamethodwhichislargelyexperimental.
Finally,wewishtoexcludefromthemachinesmenbornintheusualmanner.Itis
difficulttoframethedefinitionssoastosatisfythesethreeconditions.Onemight
forinstanceinsistthattheteamofengineersshouldbeallofonesex,butthiswould
notreallybesatisfactory,foritisprobablypossibletorearacompleteindividual
fromasinglecelloftheskin(say)ofaman.Todosowouldbeafeatofbiological
techniquedeservingoftheveryhighestpraise,butwewouldnotbeinclinedto
regarditasacaseof"constructingathinkingmachine."Thispromptsusto
abandontherequirementthateverykindoftechniqueshouldbepermitted.Weare
themorereadytodosoinviewofthefactthatthepresentinterestin"thinking
machines"hasbeenarousedbyaparticularkindofmachine,usuallycalledan
"electroniccomputer"or"digitalcomputer."Followingthissuggestionweonly
permitdigitalcomputerstotakepartinourgame.
Thisrestrictionappearsatfirstsighttobeaverydrasticone.Ishallattemptto
showthatitisnotsoinreality.Todothisnecessitatesashortaccountofthenature
andpropertiesofthesecomputers.
Itmayalsobesaidthatthisidentificationofmachineswithdigitalcomputers,like
ourcriterionfor"thinking,"willonlybeunsatisfactoryif(contrarytomybelief),it
turnsoutthatdigitalcomputersareunabletogiveagoodshowinginthegame.
Therearealreadyanumberofdigitalcomputersinworkingorder,anditmaybe
asked,"Whynottrytheexperimentstraightaway?Itwouldbeeasytosatisfythe
conditionsofthegame.Anumberofinterrogatorscouldbeused,andstatistics
compiledtoshowhowoftentherightidentificationwasgiven."Theshortansweris
thatwearenotaskingwhetheralldigitalcomputerswoulddowellinthegamenor
whetherthecomputersatpresentavailablewoulddowell,butwhetherthereare
imaginablecomputerswhichwoulddowell.Butthisisonlytheshortanswer.We
shallseethisquestioninadifferentlightlater.
4.DigitalComputers
Theideabehinddigitalcomputersmaybeexplainedbysayingthatthesemachines
areintendedtocarryoutanyoperationswhichcouldbedonebyahuman
computer.Thehumancomputerissupposedtobefollowingfixedruleshehasno
authoritytodeviatefromtheminanydetail.Wemaysupposethattheserulesare
suppliedinabook,whichisalteredwheneverheisputontoanewjob.Hehas
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alsoanunlimitedsupplyofpaperonwhichhedoeshiscalculations.Hemayalso
dohismultiplicationsandadditionsona"deskmachine,"butthisisnotimportant.
Ifweusetheaboveexplanationasadefinitionweshallbeindangerofcircularity
ofargument.Weavoidthisbygivinganoutline.ofthemeansbywhichthedesired
effectisachieved.Adigitalcomputercanusuallyberegardedasconsistingofthree
parts:
(i)Store.
(ii)Executiveunit.
(iii)Control.
Thestoreisastoreofinformation,andcorrespondstothehumancomputer's
paper,whetherthisisthepaperonwhichhedoeshiscalculationsorthatonwhich
hisbookofrulesisprinted.Insofarasthehumancomputerdoescalculationsin
hisbeadapartofthestorewillcorrespondtohismemory.
Theexecutiveunitisthepartwhichcarriesoutthevariousindividualoperations
involvedinacalculation.Whattheseindividualoperationsarewillvaryfrom
machinetomachine.Usuallyfairlylengthyoperationscanbedonesuchas
"Multiply3540675445by7076345687"butinsomemachinesonlyverysimple
onessuchas"Writedown0"arepossible.
Wehavementionedthatthe"bookofrules"suppliedtothecomputerisreplaced
inthemachinebyapartofthestore.Itisthencalledthe"tableofinstructions."Itis
thedutyofthecontroltoseethattheseinstructionsareobeyedcorrectlyandinthe
rightorder.Thecontrolissoconstructedthatthisnecessarilyhappens.
Theinformationinthestoreisusuallybrokenupintopacketsofmoderatelysmall
size.Inonemachine,forinstance,apacketmightconsistoftendecimaldigits.
Numbersareassignedtothepartsofthestoreinwhichthevariouspacketsof
informationarestored,insomesystematicmanner.Atypicalinstructionmightsay
"Addthenumberstoredinposition6809tothatin4302andputtheresultback
intothelatterstorageposition."
NeedlesstosayitwouldnotoccurinthemachineexpressedinEnglish.Itwould
morelikelybecodedinaformsuchas6809430217.Here17sayswhichof
variouspossibleoperationsistobeperformedonthetwonumbers.Inthiscase
the)eoperationisthatdescribedabove,viz.,"Addthenumber...."Itwillbe
noticedthattheinstructiontakesup10digitsandsoformsonepacketof
information,veryconveniently.Thecontrolwillnormallytaketheinstructionstobe
obeyedintheorderofthepositionsinwhichtheyarestored,butoccasionallyan
instructionsuchas
"Nowobeytheinstructionstoredinposition5606,andcontinuefromthere"
maybeencountered,oragain
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"Ifposition4505contains0obeynexttheinstructionstoredin6707,otherwise
continuestraighton."
Instructionsoftheselattertypesareveryimportantbecausetheymakeitpossible
forasequenceofoperationstobereplacedoverandoveragainuntilsome
conditionisfulfilled,butindoingsotoobey,notfreshinstructionsoneach
repetition,butthesameonesoverandoveragain.Totakeadomesticanalogy.
SupposeMotherwantsTommytocallatthecobbler'severymorningonhisway
toschooltoseeifhershoesaredone,shecanaskhimafresheverymorning.
Alternativelyshecanstickupanoticeonceandforallinthehallwhichhewillsee
whenheleavesforschoolandwhichtellshimtocallfortheshoes,andalsoto
destroythenoticewhenhecomesbackifhehastheshoeswithhim.
Thereadermustacceptitasafactthatdigitalcomputerscanbeconstructed,and
indeedhavebeenconstructed,accordingtotheprincipleswehavedescribed,and
thattheycaninfactmimictheactionsofahumancomputerveryclosely.
Thebookofruleswhichwehavedescribedourhumancomputerasusingisof
courseaconvenientfiction.Actualhumancomputersreallyrememberwhatthey
havegottodo.Ifonewantstomakeamachinemimicthebehaviourofthehuman
computerinsomecomplexoperationonehastoaskhimhowitisdone,andthen
translatetheanswerintotheformofaninstructiontable.Constructinginstruction
tablesisusuallydescribedas"programming."To"programmeamachinetocarry
outtheoperationA"meanstoputtheappropriateinstructiontableintothe
machinesothatitwilldoA.
Aninterestingvariantontheideaofadigitalcomputerisa"digitalcomputerwitha
randomelement."Thesehaveinstructionsinvolvingthethrowingofadieorsome
equivalentelectronicprocessonesuchinstructionmightforinstancebe,"Throw
thedieandputtheresultingnumberintostore1000."Sometimessuchamachine
isdescribedashavingfreewill(thoughIwouldnotusethisphrasemyself),Itisnot
normallypossibletodeterminefromobservingamachinewhetherithasarandom
element,forasimilareffectcanbeproducedbysuchdevicesasmakingthe
choicesdependonthedigitsofthedecimalfor.
Mostactualdigitalcomputershaveonlyafinitestore.Thereisnotheoretical
difficultyintheideaofacomputerwithanunlimitedstore.Ofcourseonlyafinite
partcanhavebeenusedatanyonetime.Likewiseonlyafiniteamountcanhave
beenconstructed,butwecanimaginemoreandmorebeingaddedasrequired.
Suchcomputershavespecialtheoreticalinterestandwillbecalledinfinitive
capacitycomputers.
Theideaofadigitalcomputerisanoldone.CharlesBabbage,LucasianProfessor
ofMathematicsatCambridgefrom1828to1839,plannedsuchamachine,called
theAnalyticalEngine,butitwasnevercompleted.AlthoughBabbagehadallthe
essentialideas,hismachinewasnotatthattimesuchaveryattractiveprospect.
Thespeedwhichwouldhavebeenavailablewouldbedefinitelyfasterthana
humancomputerbutsomethinglikeI00timesslowerthantheManchester
machine,itselfoneoftheslowerofthemodernmachines,Thestoragewastobe
purelymechanical,usingwheelsandcards.
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ThefactthatBabbage'sAnalyticalEnginewastobeentirelymechanicalwillhelp
ustoridourselvesofasuperstition.Importanceisoftenattachedtothefactthat
moderndigitalcomputersareelectrical,andthatthenervoussystemalsois
electrical.SinceBabbage'smachinewasnotelectrical,andsincealldigital
computersareinasenseequivalent,weseethatthisuseofelectricitycannotbeof
theoreticalimportance.Ofcourseelectricityusuallycomesinwherefastsignalling
isconcerned,sothatitisnotsurprisingthatwefinditinboththeseconnections.In
thenervoussystemchemicalphenomenaareatleastasimportantaselectrical.In
certaincomputersthestoragesystemismainlyacoustic.Thefeatureofusing
electricityisthusseentobeonlyaverysuperficialsimilarity.Ifwewishtofindsuch
similaritiesweshouldtookratherformathematicalanalogiesoffunction.
5.UniversalityofDigitalComputers
Thedigitalcomputersconsideredinthelastsectionmaybeclassifiedamongstthe
"discretestatemachines."Thesearethemachineswhichmovebysuddenjumpsor
clicksfromonequitedefinitestatetoanother.Thesestatesaresufficientlydifferent
forthepossibilityofconfusionbetweenthemtobeignored.Strictlyspeakingthere,
arenosuchmachines.Everythingreallymovescontinuously.Buttherearemany
kindsofmachinewhichcanprofitablybethoughtofasbeingdiscretestate
machines.Forinstanceinconsideringtheswitchesforalightingsystemitisa
convenientfictionthateachswitchmustbedefinitelyonordefinitelyoff.There
mustbeintermediatepositions,butformostpurposeswecanforgetaboutthem.
Asanexampleofadiscretestatemachinewemightconsiderawheelwhichclicks
roundthrough120onceasecond,butmaybestoppedbya]everwhichcanbe
operatedfromoutsideinadditionalampistolightinoneofthepositionsofthe
wheel.Thismachinecouldbedescribedabstractlyasfollows.Theinternalstateof
themachine(whichisdescribedbythepositionofthewheel)maybeq1,q2orq3.
Thereisaninputsignali0.ori1(positionof]ever).Theinternalstateatany
momentisdeterminedbythelaststateandinputsignalaccordingtothetable
(TABLEDELETED)
Theoutputsignals,theonlyexternallyvisibleindicationoftheinternalstate(the
light)aredescribedbythetable
Stateq1q2q3
outputo0o0o1
Thisexampleistypicalofdiscretestatemachines.Theycanbedescribedbysuch
tablesprovidedtheyhaveonlyafinitenumberofpossiblestates.
Itwillseemthatgiventheinitialstateofthemachineandtheinputsignalsitis
alwayspossibletopredictallfuturestates,ThisisreminiscentofLaplace'sview
thatfromthecompletestateoftheuniverseatonemomentoftime,asdescribed
bythepositionsandvelocitiesofallparticles,itshouldbepossibletopredictall
futurestates.Thepredictionwhichweareconsideringis,however,rathernearerto
practicabilitythanthatconsideredbyLaplace.Thesystemofthe"universeasa
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whole"issuchthatquitesmallerrorsintheinitialconditionscanhavean
overwhelmingeffectatalatertime.Thedisplacementofasingleelectronbya
billionthofacentimetreatonemomentmightmakethedifferencebetweenaman
beingkilledbyanavalancheayearlater,orescaping.Itisanessentialpropertyof
themechanicalsystemswhichwehavecalled"discretestatemachines"thatthis
phenomenondoesnotoccur.Evenwhenweconsidertheactualphysicalmachines
insteadoftheidealisedmachines,reasonablyaccurateknowledgeofthestateat
onemomentyieldsreasonablyaccurateknowledgeanynumberofstepslater.
Aswehavementioned,digitalcomputersfallwithintheclassofdiscretestate
machines.Butthenumberofstatesofwhichsuchamachineiscapableisusually
enormouslylarge.Forinstance,thenumberforthemachinenowworkingat
Manchesterisabout2165,000,i.e.,about1050,000.Comparethiswithour
exampleoftheclickingwheeldescribedabove,whichhadthreestates.Itisnot
difficulttoseewhythenumberofstatesshouldbesoimmense.Thecomputer
includesastorecorrespondingtothepaperusedbyahumancomputer.Itmustbe
possibletowriteintothestoreanyoneofthecombinationsofsymbolswhichmight
havebeenwrittenonthepaper.Forsimplicitysupposethatonlydigitsfrom0to9
areusedassymbols.Variationsinhandwritingareignored.Supposethecomputer
isallowed100sheetsofpapereachcontaining50lineseachwithroomfor30
digits.Thenthenumberofstatesis10100x50x30i.e.,10150,000.Thisisaboutthe
numberofstatesofthreeManchestermachinesputtogether.Thelogarithmtothe
basetwoofthenumberofstatesisusuallycalledthe"storagecapacity"ofthe
machine.ThustheManchestermachinehasastoragecapacityofabout165,000
andthewheelmachineofourexampleabout1.6.Iftwomachinesareputtogether
theircapacitiesmustbeaddedtoobtainthecapacityoftheresultantmachine.This
leadstothepossibilityofstatementssuchas"TheManchestermachinecontains64
magnetictrackseachwithacapacityof2560,eightelectronictubeswitha
capacityof1280.Miscellaneousstorageamountstoabout300makingatotalof
174,380."
Giventhetablecorrespondingtoadiscretestatemachineitispossibletopredict
whatitwilldo.Thereisnoreasonwhythiscalculationshouldnotbecarriedoutby
meansofadigitalcomputer.Provideditcouldbecarriedoutsufficientlyquickly
thedigitalcomputercouldmimicthebehaviorofanydiscretestatemachine.The
imitationgamecouldthenbeplayedwiththemachineinquestion(asB)andthe
mimickingdigitalcomputer(asA)andtheinterrogatorwouldbeunableto
distinguishthem.Ofcoursethedigitalcomputermusthaveanadequatestorage
capacityaswellasworkingsufficientlyfast.Moreover,itmustbeprogrammed
afreshforeachnewmachinewhichitisdesiredtomimic.
Thisspecialpropertyofdigitalcomputers,thattheycanmimicanydiscretestate
machine,isdescribedbysayingthattheyareuniversalmachines.Theexistenceof
machineswiththispropertyhastheimportantconsequencethat,considerationsof
speedapart,itisunnecessarytodesignvariousnewmachinestodovarious
computingprocesses.Theycanallbedonewithonedigitalcomputer,suitably
programmedforeachcase.It'illbeseenthatasaconsequenceofthisalldigital
computersareinasenseequivalent.
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Wemaynowconsideragainthepointraisedattheendof3.Itwassuggested
tentativelythatthequestion,"Canmachinesthink?"shouldbereplacedby"Are
thereimaginabledigitalcomputerswhichwoulddowellintheimitationgame?"If
wewishwecanmakethissuperficiallymoregeneralandask"Aretherediscrete
statemachineswhichwoulddowell?"Butinviewoftheuniversalitypropertywe
seethateitherofthesequestionsisequivalenttothis,"Letusfixourattentionon
oneparticulardigitalcomputerC.Isittruethatbymodifyingthiscomputertohave
anadequatestorage,suitablyincreasingitsspeedofaction,andprovidingitwith
anappropriateprogramme,CcanbemadetoplaysatisfactorilythepartofAin
theimitationgame,thepartofBbeingtakenbyaman?"
6.ContraryViewsontheMainQuestion
Wemaynowconsiderthegroundtohavebeenclearedandwearereadyto
proceedtothedebateonourquestion,"Canmachinesthink?"andthevariantofit
quotedattheendofthelastsection.Wecannotaltogetherabandontheoriginal
formoftheproblem,foropinionswilldifferastotheappropriatenessofthe
substitutionandwemustatleastlistentowhathastobesaidinthisconnexion.
ItwillsimplifymattersforthereaderifIexplainfirstmyownbeliefsinthematter.
Considerfirstthemoreaccurateformofthequestion.Ibelievethatinaboutfifty
years'timeitwillbepossible,toprogrammecomputers,withastoragecapacityof
about109,tomakethemplaytheimitationgamesowellthatanaverage
interrogatorwillnothavemorethan70percentchanceofmakingtheright
identificationafterfiveminutesofquestioning.Theoriginalquestion,"Canmachines
think?"Ibelievetobetoomeaninglesstodeservediscussion.NeverthelessI
believethatattheendofthecenturytheuseofwordsandgeneraleducated
opinionwillhavealteredsomuchthatonewillbeabletospeakofmachines
thinkingwithoutexpectingtobecontradicted.Ibelievefurtherthatnouseful
purposeisservedbyconcealingthesebeliefs.Thepopularviewthatscientists
proceedinexorablyfromwellestablishedfacttowellestablishedfact,neverbeing
influencedbyanyimprovedconjecture,isquitemistaken.Provideditismadeclear
whichareprovedfactsandwhichareconjectures,noharmcanresult.Conjectures
areofgreatimportancesincetheysuggestusefullinesofresearch.
Inowproceedtoconsideropinionsopposedtomyown.
(1)TheTheologicalObjection
Thinkingisafunctionofman'simmortalsoul.Godhasgivenanimmortalsoulto
everymanandwoman,butnottoanyotheranimalortomachines.Henceno
animalormachinecanthink.
Iamunabletoacceptanypartofthis,butwillattempttoreplyintheologicalterms.
Ishouldfindtheargumentmoreconvincingifanimalswereclassedwithmen,for
thereisagreaterdifference,tomymind,betweenthetypicalanimateandthe
inanimatethanthereisbetweenmanandtheotheranimals.Thearbitrarycharacter
oftheorthodoxviewbecomesclearerifweconsiderhowitmightappeartoa
memberofsomeotherreligiouscommunity.HowdoChristiansregardtheMoslem
viewthatwomenhavenosouls?Butletusleavethispointasideandreturntothe
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mainargument.Itappearstomethattheargumentquotedaboveimpliesaserious
restrictionoftheomnipotenceoftheAlmighty.Itisadmittedthattherearecertain
thingsthatHecannotdosuchasmakingoneequaltotwo,butshouldwenot
believethatHehasfreedomtoconferasoulonanelephantifHeseesfit?We
mightexpectthatHewouldonlyexercisethispowerinconjunctionwithamutation
whichprovidedtheelephantwithanappropriatelyimprovedbraintoministerto
theneedsofthissort[.Anargumentofexactlysimilarformmaybemadeforthe
caseofmachines.Itmayseemdifferentbecauseitismoredifficultto"swallow."
ButthisreallyonlymeansthatwethinkitwouldbelesslikelythatHewould
considerthecircumstancessuitableforconferringasoul.Thecircumstancesin
questionarediscussedintherestofthispaper.Inattemptingtoconstructsuch
machinesweshouldnotbeirreverentlyusurpingHispowerofcreatingsouls,any
morethanweareintheprocreationofchildren:ratherweare,ineithercase,
instrumentsofHiswillproviding.mansionsforthesoulsthatHecreates.
However,thisismerespeculation.Iamnotveryimpressedwiththeological
argumentswhatevertheymaybeusedtosupport.Suchargumentshaveoftenbeen
foundunsatisfactoryinthepast.InthetimeofGalileoitwasarguedthatthetexts,
"Andthesunstoodstill...andhastednottogodownaboutawholeday"(Joshua
x.13)and"Helaidthefoundationsoftheearth,thatitshouldnotmoveatany
time"(Psalmcv.5)wereanadequaterefutationoftheCopernicantheory.With
ourpresentknowledgesuchanargumentappearsfutile.Whenthatknowledge
wasnotavailableitmadeaquitedifferentimpression.
(2)The"HeadsintheSand"Objection
Theconsequencesofmachinesthinkingwouldbetoodreadful.Letushopeand
believethattheycannotdoso."
Thisargumentisseldomexpressedquitesoopenlyasintheformabove.Butit
affectsmostofuswhothinkaboutitatall.WeliketobelievethatManisinsome
subtlewaysuperiortotherestofcreation.Itisbestifhecanbeshowntobe
necessarilysuperior,forthenthereisnodangerofhimlosinghiscommanding
position.Thepopularityofthetheologicalargumentisclearlyconnectedwiththis
feeling.Itislikelytobequitestronginintellectualpeople,sincetheyvaluethe
powerofthinkingmorehighlythanothers,andaremoreinclinedtobasetheir
beliefinthesuperiorityofManonthispower.
Idonotthinkthatthisargumentissufficientlysubstantialtorequirerefutation.
Consolationwouldbemoreappropriate:perhapsthisshouldbesoughtinthe
transmigrationofsouls.
(3)TheMathematicalObjection
Thereareanumberofresultsofmathematicallogicwhichcanbeusedtoshow
thattherearelimitationstothepowersofdiscretestatemachines.Thebestknown
oftheseresultsisknownasGodel'stheorem(1931)andshowsthatinany
sufficientlypowerfullogicalsystemstatementscanbeformulatedwhichcanneither
beprovednordisprovedwithinthesystem,unlesspossiblythesystemitselfis
inconsistent.Thereareother,insomerespectssimilar,resultsduetoChurch
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(1936),Kleene(1935),Rosser,andTuring(1937).Thelatterresultisthemost
convenienttoconsider,sinceitrefersdirectlytomachines,whereastheotherscan
onlybeusedinacomparativelyindirectargument:forinstanceifGodel'stheorem
istobeusedweneedinadditiontohavesomemeansofdescribinglogicalsystems
intermsofmachines,andmachinesintermsoflogicalsystems.Theresultin
questionreferstoatypeofmachinewhichisessentiallyadigitalcomputerwithan
infinitecapacity.Itstatesthattherearecertainthingsthatsuchamachinecannot
do.Ifitisriggeduptogiveanswerstoquestionsasintheimitationgame,therewill
besomequestionstowhichitwilleithergiveawronganswer,orfailtogivean
answeratallhowevermuchtimeisallowedforareply.Theremay,ofcourse,be
manysuchquestions,andquestionswhichcannotbeansweredbyonemachine
maybesatisfactorilyansweredbyanother.Weareofcoursesupposingforthe
presentthatthequestionsareofthekindtowhichananswer"Yes"or"No"is
appropriate,ratherthanquestionssuchas"WhatdoyouthinkofPicasso?"The
questionsthatweknowthemachinesmustfailonareofthistype,"Considerthe
machinespecifiedasfollows....Willthismachineeveranswer'Yes'toany
question?"Thedotsaretobereplacedbyadescriptionofsomemachineina
standardform,whichcouldbesomethinglikethatusedin5.Whenthemachine
describedbearsacertaincomparativelysimplerelationtothemachinewhichis
underinterrogation,itcanbeshownthattheansweriseitherwrongornot
forthcoming.Thisisthemathematicalresult:itisarguedthatitprovesadisabilityof
machinestowhichthehumanintellectisnotsubject.
Theshortanswertothisargumentisthatalthoughitisestablishedthatthereare
limitationstothePowersIfanyparticularmachine,ithasonlybeenstated,without
anysortofproof,thatnosuchlimitationsapplytothehumanintellect.ButIdonot
thinkthisviewcanbedismissedquitesolightly.Wheneveroneofthesemachines
isaskedtheappropriatecriticalquestion,andgivesadefiniteanswer,weknow
thatthisanswermustbewrong,andthisgivesusacertainfeelingofsuperiority.Is
thisfeelingillusory?Itisnodoubtquitegenuine,butIdonotthinktoomuch
importanceshouldbeattachedtoit.Wetoooftengivewronganswersto
questionsourselvestobejustifiedinbeingverypleasedatsuchevidenceof
fallibilityonthepartofthemachines.Further,oursuperioritycanonlybefelton
suchanoccasioninrelationtotheonemachineoverwhichwehavescoredour
pettytriumph.Therewouldbenoquestionoftriumphingsimultaneouslyoverall
machines.Inshort,then,theremightbemenclevererthananygivenmachine,but
thenagaintheremightbeothermachinesclevereragain,andsoon.
Thosewhoholdtothemathematicalargumentwould,Ithink,mostlyhewillingto
accepttheimitationgameasabasisfordiscussion,Thosewhobelieveinthetwo
previousobjectionswouldprobablynotbeinterestedinanycriteria.
(4)TheArgumentfromConsciousness
Thisargumentisvery,wellexpressedinProfessorJefferson'sListerOrationfor
1949,fromwhichIquote."Notuntilamachinecanwriteasonnetorcomposea
concertobecauseofthoughtsandemotionsfelt,andnotbythechancefallof
symbols,couldweagreethatmachineequalsbrainthatis,notonlywriteitbut
knowthatithadwrittenit.Nomechanismcouldfeel(andnotmerelyartificially
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signal,aneasycontrivance)pleasureatitssuccesses,griefwhenitsvalvesfuse,be
warmedbyflattery,bemademiserablebyitsmistakes,becharmedbysex,be
angryordepressedwhenitcannotgetwhatitwants."
Thisargumentappearstobeadenialofthevalidityofourtest.Accordingtothe
mostextremeformofthisviewtheonlywaybywhichonecouldbesurethat
machinethinksistobethemachineandtofeeloneselfthinking.Onecouldthen
describethesefeelingstotheworld,butofcoursenoonewouldbejustifiedin
takinganynotice.Likewiseaccordingtothisviewtheonlywaytoknowthata
manthinksistobethatparticularman.Itisinfactthesolipsistpointofview.It
maybethemostlogicalviewtoholdbutitmakescommunicationofideasdifficult.
Aisliabletobelieve"AthinksbutBdoesnot"whilstBbelieves"BthinksbutA
doesnot."insteadofarguingcontinuallyoverthispointitisusualtohavethepolite
conventionthateveryonethinks.
IamsurethatProfessorJeffersondoesnotwishtoadopttheextremeandsolipsist
pointofview.Probablyhewouldbequitewillingtoaccepttheimitationgameasa
test.Thegame(withtheplayerBomitted)isfrequentlyusedinpracticeunderthe
nameofvivavocetodiscoverwhethersomeonereallyunderstandssomethingor
has"learntitparrotfashion."Letuslistenintoapartofsuchavivavoce:
Interrogator:Inthefirstlineofyoursonnetwhichreads"ShallIcomparetheetoa
summer'sday,"wouldnot"aspringday"doaswellorbetter?
Witness:Itwouldn'tscan.
Interrogator:Howabout"awinter'sday,"Thatwouldscanallright.
Witness:Yes,butnobodywantstobecomparedtoawinter'sday.
Interrogator:WouldyousayMr.PickwickremindedyouofChristmas?
Witness:Inaway.
Interrogator:YetChristmasisawinter'sday,andIdonotthinkMr.Pickwick
wouldmindthecomparison.
Witness:Idon'tthinkyou'reserious.Byawinter'sdayonemeansatypical
winter'sday,ratherthanaspecialonelikeChristmas.
Andsoon,WhatwouldProfessorJeffersonsayifthesonnetwritingmachinewas
abletoanswerlikethisinthevivavoce?Idonotknowwhetherhewouldregard
themachineas"merelyartificiallysignalling"theseanswers,butiftheanswerswere
assatisfactoryandsustainedasintheabovepassageIdonotthinkhewould
describeitas"aneasycontrivance."Thisphraseis,Ithink,intendedtocoversuch
devicesastheinclusioninthemachineofarecordofsomeonereadingasonnet,
withappropriateswitchingtoturnitonfromtimetotime.
Inshortthen,Ithinkthatmostofthosewhosupporttheargumentfrom
consciousnesscouldbepersuadedtoabandonitratherthanbeforcedintothe
solipsistposition.Theywillthenprobablybewillingtoacceptourtest.
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IdonotwishtogivetheimpressionthatIthinkthereisnomysteryabout
consciousness.Thereis,forinstance,somethingofaparadoxconnectedwithany
attempttolocaliseit.ButIdonotthinkthesemysteriesnecessarilyneedtobe
solvedbeforewecananswerthequestionwithwhichweareconcernedinthis
paper.
(5)ArgumentsfromVariousDisabilities
Theseargumentstaketheform,"Igrantyouthatyoucanmakemachinesdoallthe
thingsyouhavementionedbutyouwillneverbeabletomakeonetodoX."
NumerousfeaturesXaresuggestedinthisconnexionIofferaselection:
Bekind,resourceful,beautiful,friendly,haveinitiative,haveasenseofhumour,tell
rightfromwrong,makemistakes,fallinlove,enjoystrawberriesandcream,make
someonefallinlovewithit,learnfromexperience,usewordsproperly,bethe
subjectofitsownthought,haveasmuchdiversityofbehaviourasaman,do
somethingreallynew.
Nosupportisusuallyofferedforthesestatements.Ibelievetheyaremostly
foundedontheprincipleofscientificinduction.Amanhasseenthousandsof
machinesinhislifetime.Fromwhatheseesofthemhedrawsanumberofgeneral
conclusions.Theyareugly,eachisdesignedforaverylimitedpurpose,when
requiredforaminutelydifferentpurposetheyareuseless,thevarietyofbehaviour
ofanyoneofthemisverysmall,etc.,etc.Naturallyheconcludesthattheseare
necessarypropertiesofmachinesingeneral.Manyoftheselimitationsare
associatedwiththeverysmallstoragecapacityofmostmachines.(Iamassuming
thattheideaofstoragecapacityisextendedinsomewaytocovermachinesother
thandiscretestatemachines.Theexactdefinitiondoesnotmatterasno
mathematicalaccuracyisclaimedinthepresentdiscussion,)Afewyearsago,
whenverylittlehadbeenheardofdigitalcomputers,itwaspossibletoelicitmuch
incredulityconcerningthem,ifonementionedtheirpropertieswithoutdescribing
theirconstruction.Thatwaspresumablyduetoasimilarapplicationoftheprinciple
ofscientificinduction.Theseapplicationsoftheprincipleareofcourselargely
unconscious.Whenaburntchildfearsthefireandshowsthathefearsitby
avoidingit,fshouldsaythathewasapplyingscientificinduction.(Icouldofcourse
alsodescribehisbehaviourinmanyotherways.)Theworksandcustomsof
mankinddonotseemtobeverysuitablematerialtowhichtoapplyscientific
induction.Averylargepartofspacetimemustbeinvestigated,ifreliableresults
aretobeobtained.Otherwisewemay(asmostEnglish'Childrendo)decidethat
everybodyspeaksEnglish,andthatitissillytolearnFrench.
Thereare,however,specialremarkstobemadeaboutmanyofthedisabilitiesthat
havebeenmentioned.Theinabilitytoenjoystrawberriesandcreammayhave
struckthereaderasfrivolous.Possiblyamachinemightbemadetoenjoythis
deliciousdish,butanyattempttomakeonedosowouldbeidiotic.Whatis
importantaboutthisdisabilityisthatitcontributestosomeoftheotherdisabilities,
e.g.,tothedifficultyofthesamekindoffriendlinessoccurringbetweenmanand
machineasbetweenwhitemanandwhiteman,orbetweenblackmanandblack
man.
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Theclaimthat"machinescannotmakemistakes"seemsacuriousone.Oneis
temptedtoretort,"Aretheyanytheworseforthat?"Butletusadoptamore
sympatheticattitude,andtrytoseewhatisreallymeant.Ithinkthiscriticismcan
beexplainedintermsoftheimitationgame.Itisclaimedthattheinterrogatorcould
distinguishthemachinefromthemansimplybysettingthemanumberofproblems
inarithmetic.Themachinewouldbeunmaskedbecauseofitsdeadlyaccuracy.
Thereplytothisissimple.Themachine(programmedforplayingthegame)would
notattempttogivetherightanswerstothearithmeticproblems.Itwould
deliberatelyintroducemistakesinamannercalculatedtoconfusetheinterrogator.
Amechanicalfaultwouldprobablyshowitselfthroughanunsuitabledecisionasto
whatsortofamistaketomakeinthearithmetic.Eventhisinterpretationofthe
criticismisnotsufficientlysympathetic.Butwecannotaffordthespacetogointoit
muchfurther.Itseemstomethatthiscriticismdependsonaconfusionbetween
twokindsofmistake,Wemaycallthem"errorsoffunctioning"and"errorsof
conclusion."Errorsoffunctioningareduetosomemechanicalorelectricalfault
whichcausesthemachinetobehaveotherwisethanitwasdesignedtodo.In
philosophicaldiscussionsonelikestoignorethepossibilityofsucherrorsoneis
thereforediscussing"abstractmachines."Theseabstractmachinesare
mathematicalfictionsratherthanphysicalobjects.Bydefinitiontheyareincapable
oferrorsoffunctioning.Inthissensewecantrulysaythat"machinescannever
makemistakes."Errorsofconclusioncanonlyarisewhensomemeaningis
attachedtotheoutputsignalsfromthemachine.Themachinemight,forinstance,
typeoutmathematicalequations,orsentencesinEnglish.Whenafalseproposition
istypedwesaythatthemachinehascommittedanerrorofconclusion.Thereis
clearlynoreasonatallforsayingthatamachinecannotmakethiskindofmistake.
Itmightdonothingbuttypeoutrepeatedly"O=I."Totakealessperverse
example,itmighthavesomemethodfordrawingconclusionsbyscientific
induction.Wemustexpectsuchamethodtoleadoccasionallytoerroneous
results.
Theclaimthatamachinecannotbethesubjectofitsownthoughtcanofcourse
onlybeansweredifitcanbeshownthatthemachinehassomethoughtwithsome
subjectmatter.Nevertheless,"thesubjectmatterofamachine'soperations"does
seemtomeansomething,atleasttothepeoplewhodealwithit.If,forinstance,
themachinewastryingtofindasolutionoftheequationx240x11=0one
wouldbetemptedtodescribethisequationaspartofthemachine'ssubjectmatter
atthatmoment.Inthissortofsenseamachineundoubtedlycanbeitsownsubject
matter.Itmaybeusedtohelpinmakingupitsownprogrammes,ortopredictthe
effectofalterationsinitsownstructure.Byobservingtheresultsofitsown
behaviouritcanmodifyitsownprogrammessoastoachievesomepurposemore
effectively.Thesearepossibilitiesofthenearfuture,ratherthanUtopiandreams.
Thecriticismthatamachinecannothavemuchdiversityofbehaviourisjustaway
ofsayingthatitcannothavemuchstoragecapacity.Untilfairlyrecentlyastorage
capacityofevenathousanddigitswasveryrare.
Thecriticismsthatweareconsideringhereareoftendisguisedformsofthe
argumentfromconsciousness,Usuallyifonemaintainsthatamachinecandoone
ofthesethings,anddescribesthekindofmethodthatthemachinecoulduse,one
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willnotmakemuchofanimpression.Itisthoughtthattilemethod(whateveritmay
be,foritmustbemechanical)isreallyratherbase.Comparetheparenthesesin
Jefferson'sstatementquotedonpage22.
(6)LadyLovelace'sObjection
OurmostdetailedinformationofBabbage'sAnalyticalEnginecomesfroma
memoirbyLadyLovelace(1842).Initshestates,"TheAnalyticalEnginehasno
pretensionstooriginateanything.Itcandowhateverweknowhowtoorderit
toperform"(heritalics).ThisstatementisquotedbyHartree(1949)whoadds:
"Thisdoesnotimplythatitmaynotbepossibletoconstructelectronicequipment
whichwill'thinkforitself,'orinwhich,inbiologicalterms,onecouldsetupa
conditionedreflex,whichwouldserveasabasisfor'learning.'Whetherthisis
possibleinprincipleornotisastimulatingandexcitingquestion,suggestedby
someoftheserecentdevelopmentsButitdidnotseemthatthemachines
constructedorprojectedatthetimehadthisproperty."
IaminthoroughagreementwithHartreeoverthis.Itwillbenoticedthathedoes
notassertthatthemachinesinquestionhadnotgottheproperty,butratherthatthe
evidenceavailabletoLadyLovelacedidnotencouragehertobelievethattheyhad
it.Itisquitepossiblethatthemachinesinquestionhadinasensegotthisproperty.
Forsupposethatsomediscretestatemachinehastheproperty.TheAnalytical
Enginewasauniversaldigitalcomputer,sothat,ifitsstoragecapacityandspeed
wereadequate,itcouldbysuitableprogrammingbemadetomimicthemachinein
question.ProbablythisargumentdidnotoccurtotheCountessortoBabbage.In
anycasetherewasnoobligationonthemtoclaimallthatcouldbeclaimed.
Thiswholequestionwillbeconsideredagainundertheheadingoflearning
machines.
AvariantofLadyLovelace'sobjectionstatesthatamachinecan"neverdo
anythingreallynew."Thismaybeparriedforamomentwiththesaw,"Thereis
nothingnewunderthesun."Whocanbecertainthat"originalwork"thathehas
donewasnotsimplythegrowthoftheseedplantedinhimbyteaching,orthe
effectoffollowingwellknowngeneralprinciples.Abettervariantoftheobjection
saysthatamachinecannever"takeusbysurprise."Thisstatementisamoredirect
challengeandcanbemetdirectly.Machinestakemebysurprisewithgreat
frequency.ThisislargelybecauseIdonotdosufficientcalculationtodecidewhat
toexpectthemtodo,orratherbecause,althoughIdoacalculation,Idoitina
hurried,slipshodfashion,takingrisks.PerhapsIsaytomyself,"Isupposethe
Voltagehereoughttohethesameasthere:anywaylet'sassumeitis."NaturallyI
amoftenwrong,andtheresultisasurpriseformeforbythetimetheexperimentis
donetheseassumptionshavebeenforgotten.Theseadmissionslaymeopento
lecturesonthesubjectofmyviciousways,butdonotthrowanydoubtonmy
credibilitywhenItestifytothesurprisesIexperience.
Idonotexpectthisreplytosilencemycritic.Hewillprobablysaythathsurprises
areduetosomecreativementalactonmypart,andreflectnocreditonthe
machine.Thisleadsusbacktotheargumentfromconsciousness,andfarfromthe
ideaofsurprise.Itisalineofargumentwemustconsiderclosed,butitisperhaps
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worthremarkingthattheappreciationofsomethingassurprisingrequiresasmuch
ofa"creativementalact"whetherthesurprisingeventoriginatesfromaman,a
book,amachineoranythingelse.
Theviewthatmachinescannotgiverisetosurprisesisdue,Ibelieve,toafallacyto
whichphilosophersandmathematiciansareparticularlysubject.Thisisthe
assumptionthatassoonasafactispresentedtoamindallconsequencesofthat
factspringintothemindsimultaneouslywithit.Itisaveryusefulassumptionunder
manycircumstances,butonetooeasilyforgetsthatitisfalse.Anatural
consequenceofdoingsoisthatonethenassumesthatthereisnovirtueinthemere
workingoutofconsequencesfromdataandgeneralprinciples.
(7)ArgumentfromContinuityintheNervousSystem
Thenervoussystemiscertainlynotadiscretestatemachine.Asmallerrorinthe
informationaboutthesizeofanervousimpulseimpingingonaneuron,maymakea
largedifferencetothesizeoftheoutgoingimpulse.Itmaybearguedthat,this
beingso,onecannotexpecttobeabletomimicthebehaviourofthenervous
systemwithadiscretestatesystem.
Itistruethatadiscretestatemachinemustbedifferentfromacontinuousmachine.
Butifweadheretotheconditionsoftheimitationgame,theinterrogatorwillnotbe
abletotakeanyadvantageofthisdifference.Thesituationcanbemadeclearerif
weconsidersonicothersimplercontinuousmachine.Adifferentialanalyserwilldo
verywell.(Adifferentialanalyserisacertainkindofmachinenotofthediscrete
statetypeusedforsomekindsofcalculation.)Someoftheseprovidetheir
answersinatypedform,andsoaresuitablefortakingpartinthegame.Itwould
notbepossibleforadigitalcomputertopredictexactlywhatanswersthe
differentialanalyserwouldgivetoaproblem,butitwouldbequitecapableof
givingtherightsortofanswer.Forinstance,ifaskedtogivethevalueof(actually
about3.1416)itwouldbereasonabletochooseatrandombetweenthevalues
3.12,3.13,3.14,3.15,3.16withtheprobabilitiesof0.05,0.15,0.55,0.19,0.06
(say).Underthesecircumstancesitwouldbeverydifficultfortheinterrogatorto
distinguishthedifferentialanalyserfromthedigitalcomputer.
(8)TheArgumentfromInformalityofBehaviour
Itisnotpossibletoproduceasetofrulespurportingtodescribewhataman
shoulddoineveryconceivablesetofcircumstances.Onemightforinstancehavea
rulethatoneistostopwhenoneseesaredtrafficlight,andtogoifoneseesa
greenone,butwhatifbysomefaultbothappeartogether?Onemayperhaps
decidethatitissafesttostop.Butsomefurtherdifficultymaywellarisefromthis
decisionlater.Toattempttoproviderulesofconducttocovereveryeventuality,
eventhosearisingfromtrafficlights,appearstobeimpossible.WithallthisIagree.
Fromthisitisarguedthatwecannotbemachines.Ishalltrytoreproducethe
argument,butIfearIshallhardlydoitjustice.Itseemstorunsomethinglikethis.
"ifeachmanhadadefinitesetofrulesofconductbywhichheregulatedhislifehe
wouldbenobetterthanamachine.Buttherearenosuchrules,somencannotbe
machines."Theundistributedmiddleisglaring.Idonotthinktheargumentisever
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putquitelikethis,butIbelievethisistheargumentusednevertheless.Theremay
howeverbeacertainconfusionbetween"rulesofconduct"and"lawsof
behaviour"tocloudtheissue.By"rulesofconduct"Imeanpreceptssuchas"Stop
ifyouseeredlights,"onwhichonecanact,andofwhichonecanbeconscious.
By"lawsofbehaviour"Imeanlawsofnatureasappliedtoaman'sbodysuchas
"ifyoupinchhimhewillsqueak."Ifwesubstitute"lawsofbehaviourwhichregulate
hislife"for"lawsofconductbywhichheregulateshislife"intheargumentquoted
theundistributedmiddleisnolongerinsuperable.Forwebelievethatitisnotonly
truethatbeingregulatedbylawsofbehaviourimpliesbeingsomesortofmachine
(thoughnotnecessarilyadiscretestatemachine),butthatconverselybeingsucha
machineimpliesbeingregulatedbysuchlaws.However,wecannotsoeasily
convinceourselvesoftheabsenceofcompletelawsofbehaviourasofcomplete
rulesofconduct.Theonlywayweknowofforfindingsuchlawsisscientific
observation,andwecertainlyknowofnocircumstancesunderwhichwecould
say,"Wehavesearchedenough.Therearenosuchlaws."
Wecandemonstratemoreforciblythatanysuchstatementwouldbeunjustified.
Forsupposewecouldbesureoffindingsuchlawsiftheyexisted.Thengivena
discretestatemachineitshouldcertainlybepossibletodiscoverbyobservation
sufficientaboutittopredictitsfuturebehaviour,andthiswithinareasonabletime,
sayathousandyears.Butthisdoesnotseemtobethecase.Ihavesetuponthe
Manchestercomputerasmallprogrammeusingonly1,000unitsofstorage,
wherebythemachinesuppliedwithonesixteenfigurenumberreplieswithanother
withintwoseconds.Iwoulddefyanyonetolearnfromtheserepliessufficient
abouttheprogrammetobeabletopredictanyrepliestountriedvalues.
(9)TheArgumentfromExtrasensoryPerception
Iassumethatthereaderisfamiliarwiththeideaofextrasensoryperception,and
themeaningofthefouritemsofit,viz.,telepathy,clairvoyance,precognitionand
psychokinesis.Thesedisturbingphenomenaseemtodenyallourusualscientific
ideas.Howweshouldliketodiscreditthem!Unfortunatelythestatisticalevidence,
atleastfortelepathy,isoverwhelming.Itisverydifficulttorearrangeone'sideasso
astofitthesenewfactsin.Onceonehasacceptedthemitdoesnotseemavery
bigsteptobelieveinghostsandbogies.Theideathatourbodiesmovesimply
accordingtotheknownlawsofphysics,togetherwithsomeothersnotyet
discoveredbutsomewhatsimilar,wouldbeoneofthefirsttogo.
Thisargumentistomymindquiteastrongone.Onecansayinreplythatmany
scientifictheoriesseemtoremainworkableinpractice,inspiteofclashingwith
ESPthatinfactonecangetalongverynicelyifoneforgetsaboutit.Thisisrather
coldcomfort,andonefearsthatthinkingisjustthekindofphenomenonwhere
ESPmaybeespeciallyrelevant.
AmorespecificargumentbasedonESPmightrunasfollows:"Letusplaythe
imitationgame,usingaswitnessesamanwhoisgoodasatelepathicreceiver,and
adigitalcomputer.Theinterrogatorcanasksuchquestionsas'Whatsuitdoesthe
cardinmyrighthandbelongto?'Themanbytelepathyorclairvoyancegivesthe
rightanswer130timesoutof400cards.Themachinecanonlyguessatrandom,
andperhapsgets104right,sotheinterrogatormakestherightidentification."
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Thereisaninterestingpossibilitywhichopenshere.Supposethedigitalcomputer
containsarandomnumbergenerator.Thenitwillbenaturaltousethistodecide
whatanswertogive.Butthentherandomnumbergeneratorwillbesubjecttothe
psychokineticpowersoftheinterrogator.Perhapsthispsychokinesismightcause
themachinetoguessrightmoreoftenthanwouldbeexpectedonaprobability
calculation,sothattheinterrogatormightstillbeunabletomaketheright
identification.Ontheotherhand,hemightbeabletoguessrightwithoutany
questioning,byclairvoyance.WithESPanythingmayhappen.
Iftelepathyisadmitteditwillbenecessarytotightenourtestup.Thesituation
couldberegardedasanalogoustothatwhichwouldoccuriftheinterrogatorwere
talkingtohimselfandoneofthecompetitorswaslisteningwithhiseartothewall.
Toputthecompetitorsintoa"telepathyproofroom"wouldsatisfyall
requirements.
7.LearningMachines
ThereaderwillhaveanticipatedthatIhavenoveryconvincingargumentsofa
positivenaturetosupportmyviews.IfIhadIshouldnothavetakensuchpainsto
pointoutthefallaciesincontraryviews.SuchevidenceasIhaveIshallnowgive.
LetusreturnforamomenttoLadyLovelace'sobjection,whichstatedthatthe
machinecanonlydowhatwetellittodo.Onecouldsaythatamancan"inject"an
ideaintothemachine,andthatitwillrespondtoacertainextentandthendropinto
quiescence,likeapianostringstruckbyahammer.Anothersimilewouldbean
atomicpileoflessthancriticalsize:aninjectedideaistocorrespondtoaneutron
enteringthepilefromwithout.Eachsuchneutronwillcauseacertaindisturbance
whicheventuallydiesaway.If,however,thesizeofthepileissufficiently
increased,tiredisturbancecausedbysuchanincomingneutronwillverylikelygo
onandonincreasinguntilthewholepileisdestroyed.Isthereacorresponding
phenomenonforminds,andisthereoneformachines?Theredoesseemtobeone
forthehumanmind.Themajorityofthemseemtobe"subcritical,"i.e.,to
correspondinthisanalogytopilesofsubcriticalsize.Anideapresentedtosucha
mindwillonaveragegiverisetolessthanoneideainreply.Asmallishproportion
aresupercritical.Anideapresentedtosuchamindthatmaygiverisetoawhole
"theory"consistingofsecondary,tertiaryandmoreremoteideas.Animalsminds
seemtobeverydefinitelysubcritical.Adheringtothisanalogyweask,"Cana
machinebemadetobesupercritical?"
The"skinofanonion"analogyisalsohelpful.Inconsideringthefunctionsofthe
mindorthebrainwefindcertainoperationswhichwecanexplaininpurely
mechanicalterms.Thiswesaydoesnotcorrespondtotherealmind:itisasortof
skinwhichwemuststripoffifwearetofindtherealmind.Buttheninwhat
remainswefindafurtherskintobestrippedoff,andsoon.Proceedinginthisway
doweevercometothe"real"mind,ordoweeventuallycometotheskinwhich
hasnothinginit?Inthelattercasethewholemindismechanical.(Itwouldnotbea
discretestatemachinehowever.Wehavediscussedthis.)
Theselasttwoparagraphsdonotclaimtobeconvincingarguments.Theyshould
ratherbedescribedas"recitationstendingtoproducebelief."
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Theonlyreallysatisfactorysupportthatcanbegivenfortheviewexpressedatthe
beginningof6,willbethatprovidedbywaitingfortheendofthecenturyand
thendoingtheexperimentdescribed.Butwhatcanwesayinthemeantime?What
stepsshouldbetakennowiftheexperimentistobesuccessful?
AsIhaveexplained,theproblemismainlyoneofprogramming.Advancesin
engineeringwillhavetobemadetoo,butitseemsunlikelythatthesewillnotbe
adequatefortherequirements.Estimatesofthestoragecapacityofthebrainvary
from1010to1015binarydigits.Iinclinetothelowervaluesandbelievethatonlya
verysmallfractionisusedforthehighertypesofthinking.Mostofitisprobably
usedfortheretentionofvisualimpressions,Ishouldbesurprisedifmorethan109
wasrequiredforsatisfactoryplayingoftheimitationgame,atanyrateagainsta
blindman.(Note:ThecapacityoftheEncyclopaediaBritannica,11thedition,is
2X109)Astoragecapacityof107,wouldbeaverypracticablepossibilityeven
bypresenttechniques.Itisprobablynotnecessarytoincreasethespeedof
operationsofthemachinesatall.Partsofmodernmachineswhichcanberegarded
asanalogsofnervecellsworkaboutathousandtimesfasterthanthelatter.This
shouldprovidea"marginofsafety"whichcouldcoverlossesofspeedarisingin
manyways,Ourproblemthenistofindouthowtoprogrammethesemachinesto
playthegame.AtmypresentrateofworkingIproduceaboutathousanddigitsof
progratiirneaday,sothataboutsixtyworkers,workingsteadilythroughthefifty
yearsmightaccomplishthejob,ifnothingwentintothewastepaperbasket.Some
moreexpeditiousmethodseemsdesirable.
Intheprocessoftryingtoimitateanadulthumanmindweareboundtothinka
gooddealabouttheprocesswhichhasbroughtittothestatethatitisin.Wemay
noticethreecomponents.
(a)Theinitialstateofthemind,sayatbirth,
(b)Theeducationtowhichithasbeensubjected,
(c)Otherexperience,nottobedescribedaseducation,towhichithasbeen
subjected.
Insteadoftryingtoproduceaprogrammetosimulatetheadultmind,whynot
rathertrytoproduceonewhichsimulatesthechild's?Ifthiswerethensubjectedto
anappropriatecourseofeducationonewouldobtaintheadultbrain.Presumably
thechildbrainissomethinglikeanotebookasonebuysitfromthestationer's.
Ratherlittlemechanism,andlotsofblanksheets.(Mechanismandwritingarefrom
ourpointofviewalmostsynonymous.)Ourhopeisthatthereissolittlemechanism
inthechildbrainthatsomethinglikeitcanbeeasilyprogrammed.Theamountof
workintheeducationwecanassume,asafirstapproximation,tobemuchthe
sameasforthehumanchild.
Wehavethusdividedourproblemintotwoparts.Thechildprogrammeandthe
educationprocess.Thesetworemainverycloselyconnected.Wecannotexpect
tofindagoodchildmachineatthefirstattempt.Onemustexperimentwith
teachingonesuchmachineandseehowwellitlearns.Onecanthentryanother
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andseeifitisbetterorworse.Thereisanobviousconnectionbetweenthis
processandevolution,bytheidentifications
Structureofthechildmachine=hereditarymaterial
Changesofthechildmachine=mutation,
Naturalselection=judgmentoftheexperimenter
Onemayhope,however,thatthisprocesswillbemoreexpeditiousthanevolution.
Thesurvivalofthefittestisaslowmethodformeasuringadvantages.The
experimenter,bytheexerciseofintelligence,shouldheabletospeeditup.Equally
importantisthefactthatheisnotrestrictedtorandommutations.Ifhecantracea
causeforsomeweaknesshecanprobablythinkofthekindofmutationwhichwill
improveit.
Itwillnotbepossibletoapplyexactlythesameteachingprocesstothemachineas
toanormalchild.Itwillnot,forinstance,beprovidedwithlegs,sothatitcouldnot
beaskedtogooutandfillthecoalscuttle.Possiblyitmightnothaveeyes.But
howeverwellthesedeficienciesmightbeovercomebycleverengineering,one
couldnotsendthecreaturetoschoolwithouttheotherchildrenmakingexcessive
funofit.Itmustbegivensometuition.Weneednotbetooconcernedaboutthe
legs,eyes,etc.TheexampleofMissHelenKellershowsthateducationcantake
placeprovidedthatcommunicationinbothdirectionsbetweenteacherandpupil
cantakeplacebysomemeansorother.
Wenormallyassociatepunishmentsandrewardswiththeteachingprocess.Some
simplechildmachinescanbeconstructedorprogrammedonthissortofprinciple.
Themachinehastobesoconstructedthateventswhichshortlyprecededthe
occurrenceofapunishmentsignalareunlikelytoberepeated,whereasareward
signalincreasedtheprobabilityofrepetitionoftheeventswhichleduptoit.These
definitionsdonotpresupposeanyfeelingsonthepartofthemachine,Ihavedone
someexperimentswithonesuchchildmachine,andsucceededinteachingitafew
things,buttheteachingmethodwastoounorthodoxfortheexperimenttobe
consideredreallysuccessful.
Theuseofpunishmentsandrewardscanatbestbeapartoftheteachingprocess.
Roughlyspeaking,iftheteacherhasnoothermeansofcommunicatingtothepupil,
theamountofinformationwhichcanreachhimdoesnotexceedthetotalnumber
ofrewardsandpunishmentsapplied.Bythetimeachildhaslearnttorepeat
"Casabianca"hewouldprobablyfeelverysoreindeed,ifthetextcouldonlybe
discoveredbya"TwentyQuestions"technique,every"NO"takingtheformofa
blow.Itisnecessarythereforetohavesomeother"unemotional"channelsof
communication.Iftheseareavailableitispossibletoteachamachineby
punishmentsandrewardstoobeyordersgiveninsomelanguage,e.g.,asymbolic
language.Theseordersaretobetransmittedthroughthe"unemotional"channels.
Theuseofthislanguagewilldiminishgreatlythenumberofpunishmentsand
rewardsrequired.
Opinionsmayvaryastothecomplexitywhichissuitableinthechildmachine.One
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mighttrytomakeitassimpleaspossibleconsistentlywiththegeneralprinciples.
Alternativelyonemighthaveacompletesystemoflogicalinference"builtin."'In
thelattercasethestorewouldbelargelyoccupiedwithdefinitionsand
propositions.Thepropositionswouldhavevariouskindsofstatus,e.g.,well
establishedfacts,conjectures,mathematicallyprovedtheorems,statementsgiven
byanauthority,expressionshavingthelogicalformofpropositionbutnotbelief
value.Certainpropositionsmaybedescribedas"imperatives."Themachine
shouldbesoconstructedthatassoonasanimperativeisclassedas"well
established"theappropriateactionautomaticallytakesplace.Toillustratethis,
supposetheteachersaystothemachine,"Doyourhomeworknow."Thismay
cause"Teachersays'Doyourhomeworknow'"tobeincludedamongstthewell
establishedfacts.Anothersuchfactmightbe,"Everythingthatteachersaysistrue."
Combiningthesemayeventuallyleadtotheimperative,"Doyourhomeworknow,"
beingincludedamongstthewellestablishedfacts,andthis,bytheconstructionof
themachine,willmeanthatthehomeworkactuallygetsstarted,buttheeffectis
verysatisfactory.Theprocessesofinferenceusedbythemachineneednotbe
suchaswouldsatisfythemostexactinglogicians.Theremightforinstancebeno
hierarchyoftypes.Butthisneednotmeanthattypefallacieswilloccur,anymore
thanweareboundtofalloverunfencedcliffs.Suitableimperatives(expressed
withinthesystems,notformingpartoftherulesofthesystem)suchas"Donotuse
aclassunlessitisasubclassofonewhichhasbeenmentionedbyteacher"can
haveasimilareffectto"Donotgotooneartheedge."
Theimperativesthatcanbeobeyedbyamachinethathasnolimbsareboundto
beofaratherintellectualcharacter,asintheexample(doinghomework)given
above.importantamongstsuchimperativeswillbeoneswhichregulatetheorderin
whichtherulesofthelogicalsystemconcernedaretobeapplied,Forateach
stagewhenoneisusingalogicalsystem,thereisaverylargenumberofalternative
steps,anyofwhichoneispermittedtoapply,sofarasobediencetotherulesof
thelogicalsystemisconcerned.Thesechoicesmakethedifferencebetweena
brilliantandafootlingreasoner,notthedifferencebetweenasoundanda
fallaciousone.Propositionsleadingtoimperativesofthiskindmightbe"When
Socratesismentioned,usethesyllogisminBarbara"or"Ifonemethodhasbeen
provedtobequickerthananother,donotusetheslowermethod."Someofthese
maybe"givenbyauthority,"butothersmaybeproducedbythemachineitself,e.g.
byscientificinduction.
Theideaofalearningmachinemayappearparadoxicaltosomereaders.Howcan
therulesofoperationofthemachinechange?Theyshoulddescribecompletely
howthemachinewillreactwhateveritshistorymightbe,whateverchangesitmight
undergo.Therulesarethusquitetimeinvariant.Thisisquitetrue.Theexplanation
oftheparadoxisthattheruleswhichgetchangedinthelearningprocessareofa
ratherlesspretentiouskind,claimingonlyanephemeralvalidity.Thereadermay
drawaparallelwiththeConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.
Animportantfeatureofalearningmachineisthatitsteacherwilloftenbevery
largelyignorantofquitewhatisgoingoninside,althoughhemaystillbeableto
someextenttopredicthispupil'sbehavior.Thisshouldapplymoststronglytothe
latereducationofamachinearisingfromachildmachineofwelltrieddesign(or
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programme).Thisisinclearcontrastwithnormalprocedurewhenusingamachine
todocomputationsone'sobjectisthentohaveaclearmentalpictureofthestate
ofthemachineateachmomentinthecomputation.Thisobjectcanonlybe
achievedwithastruggle.Theviewthat"themachinecanonlydowhatweknow
howtoorderittodo,"'appearsstrangeinfaceofthis.Mostoftheprogrammes
whichwecanputintothemachinewillresultinitsdoingsomethingthatwecannot
makesense(ifatall,orwhichweregardascompletelyrandombehaviour.
Intelligentbehaviourpresumablyconsistsinadeparturefromthecompletely
disciplinedbehaviourinvolvedincomputation,butaratherslightone,whichdoes
notgiverisetorandombehaviour,ortopointlessrepetitiveloops.Another
importantresultofpreparingourmachineforitspartintheimitationgamebya
processofteachingandlearningisthat"humanfallibility"islikelytobeomittedina
rathernaturalway,i.e.,withoutspecial"coaching."(Thereadershouldreconcile
thiswiththepointofviewonpages23and24.)Processesthatarelearntdonot
produceahundredpercentcertaintyofresultiftheydidtheycouldnotbe
unlearnt.
Itisprobablywisetoincludearandomelementinalearningmachine.Arandom
elementisratherusefulwhenwearesearchingforasolutionofsomeproblem.
Supposeforinstancewewantedtofindanumberbetween50and200whichwas
equaltothesquareofthesumofitsdigits,wemightstartat51thentry52andgo
onuntilwegotanumberthatworked.Alternativelywemightchoosenumbersat
randomuntilwegotagoodone.Thismethodhastheadvantagethatitis
unnecessarytokeeptrackofthevaluesthathavebeentried,butthedisadvantage
thatonemaytrythesameonetwice,butthisisnotveryimportantifthereare
severalsolutions.Thesystematicmethodhasthedisadvantagethattheremaybe
anenormousblockwithoutanysolutionsintheregionwhichhastobeinvestigated
first,Nowthelearningprocessmayberegardedasasearchforaformof
behaviourwhichwillsatisfytheteacher(orsomeothercriterion).Sincethereis
probablyaverylargenumberofsatisfactorysolutionstherandommethodseems
tobebetterthanthesystematic.Itshouldbenoticedthatitisusedintheanalogous
processofevolution.Buttherethesystematicmethodisnotpossible.Howcould
onekeeptrackofthedifferentgeneticalcombinationsthathadbeentried,soasto
avoidtryingthemagain?
Wemayhopethatmachineswilleventuallycompetewithmeninallpurely
intellectualfields.Butwhicharethebestonestostartwith?Eventhisisadifficult
decision.Manypeoplethinkthataveryabstractactivity,liketheplayingofchess,
wouldbebest.Itcanalsobemaintainedthatitisbesttoprovidethemachinewith
thebestsenseorgansthatmoneycanbuy,andthenteachittounderstandand
speakEnglish.Thisprocesscouldfollowthenormalteachingofachild.Things
wouldbepointedoutandnamed,etc.AgainIdonotknowwhattherightanswer
is,butIthinkbothapproachesshouldbetried.
Wecanonlyseeashortdistanceahead,butwecanseeplentytherethatneedsto
bedone.

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