GR No.

L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal
FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition. The accused admitted that on
September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and
the ammunition described in the complaint, without the
requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled
to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit,
he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of
his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal
on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.
Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on
the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs.
Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of
the courts rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the
MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant

made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of
Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such grants have
always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is
a gratuitous donation of public money or resources,
which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the
case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense
of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of
Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to
exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of
legislation.
5.

Tamayo v. Gsell

FACTS:
This is an action for damages against the Defendant for
personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son
of the Plaintiff. The injury was attributed to the boys
inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the
first time and without prior instruction.
ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under
the Employers Liability Act.
HELD:
Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in
personal injury cases brought under the Employers Liability
Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act
was taken, being of American origin.
6.

Molina vs. Rafferty

Facts:
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code
states that Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system .
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the
prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero
under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license
and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it
was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
4. Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 165
G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30,
1976)
Chapter VI, Page 264, Footnote No. 63
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila
Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta
extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the
property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set
aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease
or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a
portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner
sold the land, together with
all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation
(TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City
of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it
necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as

1. The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for

a trail court decision on Feb 1, 1918. The petition was granted
and oral argument of the motion was permitted.
2. Jacinto Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in
Bulacan. He was required to pay the merchants tax required
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
3. Molina protested that he was an agriculturist and not a
merchant and therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the
Internal Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants.
4. Point of contention- Plaintiff contends that the fish
produced by him are to be regarded as an agricultural
product within the meaning of the term used in paragraph (c)
of Section 41 of Act No. 2339 (Now section 1460 of the
Administrative Code of 1917), enforced when the disputed tax
was levied and that he is exempt from the percentage tax on
merchants sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339.
5. Paragraph (c) of Act No. 2339 sec. 41 reads:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the
following commodities shall be excluded:
(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner
of the land where grown, whether in their original state or not
6. In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in a carefully
prepared decision ordered defendant to refund the P71.81 paid
by plaintiff as internal-revenue taxes and penalties under
protest, with legal interest thereon from November 26, 1915,
the date of such payment under protest.
III. Issue:
1. WON fish produced as were those upon which the tax in
question was levied are an agricultural product
IV Decision:
Decision set aside. Judgment of lower court affirmed.
IV. Ruling:
1. Purpose of legislative in establishing the exemption
exempting agricultural products from the tax the farming
industry would be favored and the development of the
resources of the country encouraged.
2. As a consequence, it is fairly to be inferred from the statute
that the object and purpose of the Legislature was to levy the
tax in question (merchants tax) upon all persons engaged in

making a profit upon goods produced by others but to exempt

from the tax all persons directly producing goods from the
land. Products were grouped under agricultural products.
3. It is also the public interest to encourage the artificial
propagation of food. However, if the artificial production of
fish is held not to be included within the exemption of the
statute this conclusion must be based upon the inadequacy of
the language used by the Legislature to express its purpose,
rather than the assumption that it was actually intended to
exclude producers of artificially grown fish from the benefits
conferred upon producers of other substances brought into the
store of national wealth by the arts of husbandry and animal
industry.
4. Court held that the ponds where the fish were grown is
agricultural land within the definitions set by the Acts of
Congress, the Philippine Commission, and the Mapa vs.
Insular Govt case.
5. With regard to the question that that the fish artificially
grown and fed in a confined area are agricultural products and
therefore exempt, the Court looked deeper. It said that a man
might cultivate the surface of a tract of land patented to him
under the mining law, but the products of such soil would not
for that reason be any the less "agricultural products."
Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these
fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or
forest land, does not lead of necessity to the conclusion that
everything produced upon them is for that reason alone to be
deemed an "agricultural product" within the meaning of the
statute under consideration.
3. Courts and lexicographers are in accord in holding that the
term agricultural products is not limited in its meaning to
vegetable growth but includes everything which serves to
satisfy human needs which is grown upon the land, whether it
pertains to the vegetable kingdom or to the animal kingdom.
4. Purpose of agriculture obtain from the land the products to
which it is best adapted and through it will yield the greatest
return upon the expenditure of a given amount of labor and
capital. This is similar to the process of enclosing an area for
fish production and one of the diets of the products are marine
plants rooted at the bottom of the pond.
5. Another distinction was made between fishermen and the
people artificially growing fish in ponds so as to delineate the
scope of the occupation tax. Fishermen were made liable to
the occupation tax. The ones growing fish in ponds were not
included.
5. As the present case related to US vs Laxa, the court held
that Laxa wasnt controlling due to evidence that the fish
subsisted solely upon free floating algae in Laxa while in
Molina, the fish subsisted through plants which grow from
roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond,
thereby making Molinas fish in the real sense a product of the
land!
7. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
Case No. 317
G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925)
Chapter VI, Page 267, Footnote No. 78
FACTS:
Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being
written in a language other than English, Spanish, or a local
dialect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, was penalized for
keeping books written in Chinese. He and other Chinese
merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.
ISSUE:
Is Act 2972 constitutional?
HELD:
It is constitutional. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud
in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the
public good. This decision is consistent with the ruling in
Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, where laundrymen were
prohibited from issuing receipts written in Chinese. Class
legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. Instead

of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping

books in Chinese, it may be interpreted as a directory measure
that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in
English, Spanish, or a local dialect, or have a duplicate in any
of these languages. This liberal interpretation is reasonableand
it upholds constitutionality.
8. Arsenio Lacson vs Mariano Roque
Petitioner: Arsenio Lacson
Respondents: MARIANO ROQUE, as Acting Executive
Secretary, BARTOLOME GATMAITAN, as Vice-Mayor of
Manila and DIONISIO OJEDA, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila
G.R. No. L-6225
January 10, 1953
Facts:
The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some
allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain
judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against
Lacson. A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The
special prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson to
the President. The President, through acting Executive
Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against
Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the
president from his post.
HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional
provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove
municipal officials. It is true that the President shall . . .
exercise general supervision over all local governments, but
supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to
remove or suspend municipal officers is not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always
controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as
provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative
Code must be done conformably to law; and only for
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he may at any
time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
under the Government of the Philippines. Again, this power
of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case,
the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as
disloyalty.
9. Pastor Endencia vs Saturnino David
Petitioners: PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO
JUGO
Respondents: SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal
Revenue
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
Facts:
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue,
ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice
Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13
of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs
Meer, judges are exempt from taxation this is also in
observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the
executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate
from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is

independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished

by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries
is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9,
Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that
the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective
when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation
of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws.
Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13,
R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions
of the courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of which
[tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon
judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of
the phrase which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot
pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law
was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;
otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the
judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of
the land.
10. QUIMPO vs. MENDOZA
Petitioner: ANGEL R. QUIMPO,
Respondents: LEONCIO MENDOZA and JUDGE
BERNARDO TEVES
G.R. No. L-33052
August 31, 1981
Facts: Quimpo is the owner of a parcel of land in City of
Cagayan De Oro (CDO) City valued at 20,000 P in 1969. The
realty tax for this property is 400.00 pesos annually payable in
4 equal instalments. He paid on time for the first 3 installments
amounting to 300.00 but he defaulted with the last payment
and it was only on the 27th of August the next year that he
settled the last instalment. He tried paying to the City
Treasurer of CDO for 124.00 inclusive of the penalty however
the Treasurer declined payment saying that he ought to pay
196.00 (100 pesos for the unpaid tax and 96 pesos
representing the penalty). As such, Quimpo filed action for
mandamus with damages against the City Treasurer and
consigned 124.00 pesos before the Court of First Instance. He
asserts that he suffered mental anguish caused by the Treasurer
thereby praying for 12,000 Peso worth of Moral, Actual and
Exemplary damages.
Issue:
WON the basis for computing the tax penalty should be the
tax payable for the said year or only theinstallment unpaid

Held:
We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the
interpretation of tax statutes that such statutes are construed
most strongly against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer. Moreover, simple logic, fairness and reason cannot
countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done
incompliance with the law. Since petitioner is allowed by law
to pay his real estate tax in four equal installments due and
payable on four specified dates and having paid the first three
(3) instalments faithfully and religiously, it is manifest
injustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize
him for doing so when he fails to pay the fourth and last
installment.
Reasoning.
Padilla v. City of Pasay not applicable to the case as the said
case was decide before RA 5447took effect in January 1, 1969.
Petitioner was being assessed real property tax for 1969 so RA
5447 appliesto the petitioner already. RA 5447 amends city
charters by providing that real property tax is due andpayable
in 4 equal installments. Thus, each installment is due and
payable on or before a specifiedstatutory limit. Default in 1
installment, the penalty for delinquency should be computed
starting the dayafter the due date when the tax payer should
have paid
11. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued
Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in computing
premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof,
petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,
wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting
against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No.
7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and
bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees'
respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on
the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for lack of
publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections,
the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is
not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be
effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the
statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to
how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an
administrative rule or regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with
the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an
opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative
agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has
been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions

that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports

merely to advise employers-members of the System of what,
in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include
in determining the monthly compensation of their employees
upon which the social security contributions should be based,
and that such circular did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The
Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.

Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days

under 21 years and 3 months of age.

12. Resins vs. Auditor General

Petitioner: RESINS, INCORPORATED
Respondents: AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES
and THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. L-17888
October 29, 1968

Basis:
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States reads: All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

Facts:
Petitioner Resins Inc, as in Casco v. Gimenez, seeks a refund
from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt
from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of urea
and formaldehyde, as separate units, used for the production of
synthetic glue, of which it was a manufacturer.
Since the specific language of the Act speak of urea
formaldehyde and petitioner admittedly did import urea and
formaldehyde separately, it can be exempted if the law was
construed to read urea and formaldehyde.
Issue: WON Resins contention is with merit
Held:
No. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct from urea and formaldehyde as
separate articles. Resins contend that the approved Congress
bill contained the conjunction and and that Congress
intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately, citing
statements made on the floor of the Senate. Said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate,
much less of the House of Representatives. It is also well
settled that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill, the
remedy is by amendment or curative language not by judicial
decree.
Additionally, refund partakes of a nature of an exemption, it
cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and
categorical language. The Court has held that exemption from
taxation is not favored and never presumed, so that if granted
it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer (strictissimi
juris). Petition denied.
13. UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. AUDITOR
GENERAL
19. ROA vs INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
Petitioner: TRANQUILINO ROA, ,
Respondent: INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
Facts:
Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao,
Philippine Islands, on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa
Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia
Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were legally
married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The
father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and
died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in
May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his mother for
the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of
returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the
steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1,
1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the

Issue: Whether or not Tranquilino Roa was a citizen of the

Philippine Islands by birth?
Ruling: The nationality of the appellant having followed that
of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine
Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself,
he still remains a citizen of this country. The United States
follow the principle of Jus Soli or citizenship by place of birth.

The cession of the Philippine Islands definitely transferred the

allegiance of the native inhabitants from Spain to the United
States (articles 3 and 9 of Treaty of Paris). Filipinos remaining
in this country who were not natives of the Peninsula could
not, according to the terms of the treaty, elect to retain their
allegiance to Spain. By the cession their allegiance became
due to the United States and they became entitled to its
protection. The nationality of the Islands American instead of
Spanish. The appellant was, as we have stated, born in the
Philippine Islands in 1889. His father was a domiciled alien
and his mother a native of this country. His father died in
China about the year 1900 while he was still a minor. His
mother sent him to China for the sole purpose of studying and
on reaching his majority he returned to the country of his birth
and sought admission. From the date of his birth to the time he
returned to this country he had never in a legal sense changed
his domicile. A minor cannot change his own domicile. As
minors have the domicile. As minors have the domicile of
their father he may change their domicile by changing his
own, and after his death the mother, while she remains a
widow, may likewise by changing her domicile change the
domicile of the minor. The domicile of the children in either
case as follows the domicile of their parent. (Lamar vs. Miccu,
112 U.S., 452.) After the death of the father the widowed
mother became the natural guardian of the appellant. The
mother before she married was a Spanish subject and entitled
to all the rights, privileges and immunities pertaining thereto.
Upon the death of her husband, which occurred after the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, she, under
the rule prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired
the nationality of the Philippine Islands, being that of her
native country. When she reacquired the nationality of the
country of her birth the appellant was a minor and neither he
nor his mother had ever left this country
20. People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208
G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.50
FACTS:
Private Respondents were respectively charged with a
violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the
Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associations
and punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by

overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a

member of the CPP or any other organization subversive in
nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the
statute due to its constitutional violations. The lower court
declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were
dismissed, to which the Government appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on
bill titles.
HELD:
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of
its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a
valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow
and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will
be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the
legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act
fully satisfies these requirements.
21. Ichong vs. Hernandez
Petitioner: LAO H. ICHON.
Respondents: JAIME HERNANDEZ and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO.
Facts: Ichong vs. Hernandez, GR No. L-7995Facts: Republic
Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and

Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. In answer, the

Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend
that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2)
the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty
or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value
of the property is not impaired, and the institution of
inheritance is only of statutory origin.
Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports
to remedy really or actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from dominance and control.
Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future. Furthermore,
the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.