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T
|
I. THELUCKPRINCIPLE
0022-362X/99/9605/217-40
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OF PHILOSOPHY
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and responsibility.LP
common intuitions about freedom
support
belief that indeterrelated principleslie behind the widespread and responsibility,
and
will
so far from being required for free
minism,
Dennett does
responsibility.
and
will
actuallyundermine free
would
sort, as I shall do in this padwell on the intuition pumps of this
not
in criticizingintuition
As a compatibilist,he is more interested his view) that freeper.
on
that lead people to think (mistakenly,
pumps
with determinism,
compatible
not
and responsibility are
dom
people to think freeintuition pumps that support LP lead
whereas
Yet inwith indeterminism.
and responsibilityare not compatible
dom
and
pervasive
are every bit as
tuitionpumps of the latter kind
and
upon;
dwells
in free-will debates as those Dennett
influential
signifia
play
since they
are as much in need of deconstruction,
they
and responsibilfreedom
that
believe
to
role in leading people
cant
must be compatiblewitll determinism.
ity
which is the reigning
I think the modern route to compatibilism goes through prinusually
among contemporaryphilosophers
view
experience, most ordimy
In
other.
or
like LP at some point
ciples
They believe there
persons startout as naturalincompatibilists.
llary
and determinism;and the
issome kind of conflict between freedom be compatiblewith determight
ideathat freedom and responsibility
"quagmireof evasion"(William
a
like
first
minismlooks to them at
(ImmanuelKant). OrdinaryperJames)or "awretched subterfuge"
natural incompatibilism by the
sonshave to be talked out of this
who, in the manner of their
cleverarguments of philosophers
to oblige. To weaken natural
mentor,Socrates,are only too happy
what we mean
instincts,philosophersfirst argue that
incompatibilist
whateverwe
do
or abilityto
byfreedom in everydaylife is the power
compulcoercion,
absence of
chooseor desire to do in short, an
our
upon
or constraints
sion, oppression, and other impediments be free in these everyday
we can
behavior.They then point out that
even if our choices and dedesire,
or
sensesto do what we choose
in our past.
siresare determinedby causesthat lie
usuallydispose of incompatinot
does
But this line of argument
persons might grant that many
bilist intuitions by itself. Ordinary
determinismand still wonder
everydayfreedomsare compatiblewith
tlle freedom to have an
if there is not also some deeper freedom do in the first place that
to
ultimatesayin whatwe choose or desire
argued elsewhere3that
have
(I
is incompatible with determinism.
meant by "free will.")
this deeper freedom is what was traditionally
step to their case an arguSo the philosophersmust add a second
;
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RESPONSIBILITY,
LUCK,D
CNCE
219
ment to the effect that any allegedly deeper freedom (of the will)
that is not compatiblewith determinismis no intelligiblefreedom at
all. And with this step, prillcipleslike LP come into the picture. For
any freedom not compatiblewith determinismwould require indeterminism;and what is undetermined, it seems, would happen by
chance or luck and could not be a free and responsibleaction. This
kind of argumentis the one that usuallyputs the final nail in the coft:lnot lncompatl91lStlnstlncts.
When philosophy professorsgo through this two-stageargument
in the modern classroom, they are replicating the standard case
against traditional (incompatibilistor libertarian)free will which is
one of the defining characteristicsof modernity.The goal is to COllsign incompatibilistfreedom to the dustbin of historywith other beliefs that a modern scientificage is encouraged to outgrow.Students
and ordinarypersonssubjectedto this argumentmayhave an uneasy
feeling they are being had by the clever argumentsof philosophers.
But, also seeing no obvious response, except an appeal to mystery,
manyof them become compatibilists.
II. INDETERMINISM,
THE BOGEYMAN
The second stage of this two-stageargumentin support of compatibilism will concern me here, the one that goes through LP and related principles in the attempt to show that indeterminism would
not enhance, but in fact would undermine,freedom and responsibility. What is at stake here is not merely the clever arguments of
philosophers;for it happens that the case for principleslike LP is a
powerful one. It is difficult to see how indeterminism alld chance
can be reconciled with freedom and responsibility. Philosophers
have tried to bring this out in a number of wayswhich will be addressed here. We may think of these as the varied intuition pumps
that supportLP and principleslike it.
(1) We are often asked to consider, for example, that whateveris
undetermined or happens by chance is not under the control of anything, and so is not under the control of the agent. But an action
that is not under the control of the agent could not be a free and responsible action. (Here it is evident that the notion of control is involved in the case for LP: indeterminismand chance imply lack of
control to a degree that implies lack of freedom and responsibility.)
(2) Another line of argumentoften heard is this:suppose a choice
occurred as the result of an undetermined event (say, a quantum
jump) in one's brain. Would that be a free choice? Being undetermined, it would appearto be more of a fluke or accident thall a free
and responsible action. Some twentieth-century scientists and
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RESPONSIBILITY,
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LUCK,AND CHANCE
RESPONSIBILIIY,
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JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY
THE
lt:)
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12-14.
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RESPONSIBILIIY,
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THEJOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY
of two minds. But they are not therefore two separatepersons. They
are not disassociated from either task.2lThe businesswomanwho
wants to go back and help the assaultvictim is the same ambitious
woman who wantsto go on to her meeting and close the sale. She is
a complex creature,like most of us who are often torn inside; but
hers is the kind of complexity needed for free will. And when she
succeeds in doing one of the things she is tryingto do, she will endorse that as herresolutionof the conflict in her will, voluntarilyand
intentionally,as LPt requires. She will not disassociatefrom either
outcome, as didJane (in (5) of section II), who wonderedwhat "happened to"her when she chose Colorado,or like the husbandand assassinwho did not also want to fail.22
But one may still object that the businesswoman makes one
choice rather than the other by chance,since it was undetermined
right up to the last moment which choice she would make. If this is
so, we may have the picture of her H1rst
Inaking an effort to overcome temptation (to go on to her meeting) and do the moral
thing, and then at the last minute "chance takes over"and decides
the issue for her. But this is the wrong picture. On the viewjust described, you cannot separate the indeterminism from the effort to
overcome temptation in such a way that first the effort occurs followedbychance or luck (or vice versa). One must think of the effort
and the indeterminismas fused; the effort is indeterminate and the
indeterminism is a property of the effort, not something separate
that occurs after or before the effort. The fact that the woman's effort of will has this propertyof being indeterminate does not make
it any less her effott.The complex recurrentneural networkthat realizes the effort in the brain is circulating impulses in feedback
loops and there is some indeterminacy in these circulating impulses. But the whole process is her effort of will and it persists
right up to the moment when the choice is made. There is no
point at which the effort stops and chance "takes over." She
21 I account for this elsewhere in terms of the notion of a "self-network"
( The Significance of Free Will, pp. 137-42), a more comprehensivenetworkof neural connec-
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RESPONSIBILITY,
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chooses as a resultof the effort, even though she might have failed
because of the indeterminism.
And just as expressionslike 'She chose bychance' can mislead us
in these contexts, so can expressionslike 'She got lucky'.Ask yourself this question:Whydoes the inference 'He got lucky,so hewasnot
responsible'
fail when it does fail, as in the cases of the husband and
the assassin?The first part of an answergoes back to the claim that
'luck', like 'chance', has question-beggingimplicationsin ordinary
language which are not necessarilyimplicationsof "indeterminism"
(which implies only the absence of deterministic causation). The
core meaning of 'He got lucky',which is implied by indeterminism,I
suggest,is that 'He succeeded despitetheprobability
orchanceoffailure';
and this core meaning does not implylack of responsibility,if he SUCceeds.
If 'He got lucky' had further meanings in these contexts often
associated with 'luck' and 'chance' in ordinary usage (for example, the outcome was not his doing, or occurred by merechance,
or he was not responsible for it), the inference would not fail for
the husband and assassin, as it clearly does. But the point is that
these further meanings of 'luck' and 'chance' do not followfrom
the merepresenceof indeterminism.Second, the inference 'He got
lucky, so he was not responsible' fails because what the assassin
and husband succeeded in doing was what they were trying and
wanting to do all along. Third, whenthey succeeded, their reaction was not "Oh dear, that was a mistake, an accident something that happenedto me, not something I did." Rather, they
endorsedthe outcomes as something they were trying and wanting
to do all along, that is to say, knowingly and purposefully, not by
mistake or accident.
But these conditions are satisfiedin the businesswoman'scase as
well, eitherwayshe chooses. If she succeeds in choosing to return to
help the victim (or in choosing to go on to her meeting) (i) she will
have "succeeded despite the probabilityor chance of failure";(ii)
she will have succeeded in doing what she was tryingand wantingto
do all along (she wantedboth outcomes verymuch, but for different
reasons,and was tryingto make those reasonsprevailin both cases);
and (iii) when she succeeded (in choosing to return to help) her reaction wasnot "Ohdear, that wasa mistake,an accident something
that happened to me, not something I did." Rather, she endorsed
the outcome as something she was trying and wanting to do all
along; she recognized it as her resolution of the conflict in her will.
And if she had chosen to go on to her meeting she would have en-
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With this in mind, let us return to the LP* version of the argument
from (a)-(e). I said that Mele clearlyintends this stronger LPt version of the argument, since the force of his argument depends on
the fact thatJohn's choice in his example is a SFA,like the businesswoman's,instead of being like the actions of the husbandand assassin. But if this is so, then John's situation will also be like the
businesswoman'son the account just given of SFAs.Since both of
them are sitnultaneouslytryingto do bothof the things they may do
(choose to help or go on, overcome the temptationto arrivelate or
not), they will do either with intent or on purpose, as a result of
wanting and trying to do it that is, intentionally and voluntarily.
Thus, their "failing"to do one of the options will not be a mistakeor
accident,but a voluntaryand intentionaldoing of theother.
Likewise,businesswomantandJohn* are simultaneouslytryingto
do both things in their respectiveworlds;and they will not "fail"to
act on moral or weak-willedmotives by mistake or accident, as the
case may be, but by voluntarilyand intentionallychoosing to act on
the opposing motives. The point is that in self-formationof these
kinds (SFAs),failing is neverjust failing;it is alwaysalso a succeeding
in doing something else we wanted and were trying to do. And we
found that one can be responsiblefor succeeding in doing what one
was tryingto do, even in the presence of indeterminism.So even if
we add the LP*requirementof more-than-one-way
voluntarinessand
intentionalityto the argumentof (a)-(e), the argument remains invalidfor caseslike the businesswoman'sand other SFAs,likeJohn's.
But one might argue further, as Mele does, thatJohn andJohn*
(and businesswomanand businesswoman*)not only had the same
capacities,motives,characters,and the like prior to choice, but they
made exactlythe same effortsas well. And this does seem to suggest
that the successof one and failure of the other was a matterof mere
luck or chance, so thatJohn and the businesswomanwere not responsible. But again the inference is too hasty.Note, first, that husband and husband*also made the same efforts (as well as havingthe
sal:necapacities,motives,and characters)up to the very moment of
breakingof the table.Yet it does not follow that the husband is not
responsible when he succeeds. And boththe businesswoman and
businesswoman*,andJohn andJohn*, are in the position of the husband in their respectiveworlds,since both will have succeeded in doing what theywere tryingto do.
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But one may still want to object: if the businesswomanand businesswomant, and John and John*, make exactly the sal:neefforts,
how can it not be a matter of chance that one succeeds and the
other does not, in a way that makes them not responsible? To
which I reply: But if they both succeeded in doing what they were
trying to do (because they were simultaneouslytrying to do both
things), and then having succeeded, they both endorsedthe outcomes of their respectiveefforts (that is, their choices) as what they
were tryingto do, instead of disowningor disassociatingfrom those
choices, how then can we not hold them responsible?It just does
not follow that, because they made exactly the same efforts, they
chose bychance.
To say something was done "bychance"usuallymeans (as in the
assassin and husband cases when they fail), it was done "by mistake" or "accidentally,""inadvertently,""involuntarily,"or "as an
unintended fluke."But none of these things holds of the businesswoman and John either way they choose. Unlike husband*, businesswoman* and John do not fail to overcome temptation by
mistake or accident, inadvertently or involuntarily. They consciously and willingly fail to overcome temptation byconsciously
and willinglychoosing to act in selfish or weak-willedways.So, just
as it would have been a poor excuse for the husband to say to his
wife when the table broke that "Luckor chance did it, not me," it
would be a poor excuse for businesswomantandJohn to say "Luck
or chance did it, not me" when they failed to help the assaultvictim or failed to arriveon time.
Worth highlighting in this argument is the point that we cannot
simply say the businesswomanand businesswoman* (or John and
John*) made exactlythe same effort(in the singular) in their respective possible worlds and one succeeded while the other failed. We
must say they made exactly the same efforts(plural) in their respective worlds. Mentioning only one effort prejudices the case, for it
suggeststhat the failure of that effort in one of the worldswas a mere
mistakeor accident, when the fact is that both of the agents (P and
P*) made bothefforts in bothworlds.In one world, one of the efforts
issued in a choice and in the other world,a differenteffort issued in
a different choice; but neither was merely accidentalor inadvertent
in either world. I would go even further and say that we may also
doubt that the efforts they were both makingreallywere exactlythe
same. Where events are indeterminate,as are the efforts they were
making, there is no such thing as exact sameness or difference of
events in differentpossibleworlds.Their effortswere not exactlythe
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and (3) of section II) and must now do so. For this may be the reason
why we may think the choices made by the businesswoman and businesswomant (or John and Johnt) could not be responsible, if they
were undetermined. We might deny that they had voluntary control
over what they chose, where voluntary control means being able to
bring about something in accordance with one's will or purposes (or,
as we often say, the ability to bring something about "atwill").
One thing does seem to be true about control which critics of indeterminist freedom have always maintained: indeterminism, wherever
it appears, does seem to diminishrather than enhance agents' voluntary control (consideration (3) of section II). The assassin's voluntary
control over whether or not the prime minister is killed (his ability to
realize his purpose or what he is trying to do) is diminished by the
undetermined impulses in his arm and so also for the husband and
his breaking the table. Moreover, this limitation is connected to another, which I think we must also grant that indeterminism, wherever it occurs, functions as a hindrance
or obstacle
to our purposes that
must be overcome by effort (consideration (3) ) .
But recall that in the businesswoman's case (and for SFAs generally, like John's), the indeterminism that is admittedly diminishing
her ability to overcome selfish temptation, and is indeed a hindrance
to her doing so, is coming from her own will from her desire and effort to do the opposite since she is simultaneously trying to realize
two conflicting purposes at once. Similarly, her ability to overcome
moral qualms is diminished by the fact that she also simultaneously
wants and is trying to act on moral reasons. If we could look at each
of the two competing neural networks involved separately, abstracting
from the other, the situation would look analogous to the situations
of the husband and the assassin. The agent would be trying to do
something while being hindered by indeterminism coming from an
external source. But, in fact, we cannot look at the two networks separately in this way because, in reality, they are connected and interacting. The indeterminism that is a hindrance to her fulfilling one is
coming from its interactions with the other. The indeterminism,
therefore, does not have an external source. It is internal to her will,
and hence to her self, since she identifies with both networks and will
identify with the choice reached by either of them as her choice.
The upshot is that, despite the businesswoman's diminished control over eachoption considered separately, due to a conflict in her
will, she nonetheless has what I call pluralvoluntarycontrolover the
two options considered as a set (ibid.,pp. 134-43). Having plural voluntary control over a set of options means being able to bring about
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THE
to do so,
whenyou will
of the options you will or most want,
whichever
coerced or compelled
being
the reasons you will to do so, without
for
has this power, be(orJohn)
doingso. And the businesswoman
in
(to help the victim or go
whichever of the options she chooses
cause
by her as wllat she wills or most
to her meeting) will be endorsed
on
it (though not necessarto do at the moment when she chooses
wants
the reasons she most wants to
beforehand);she will choose it for
ily
reasons, as the case may be);
on then and there (moral or selfish
act
anyone else into choosing one
need not have been coerced by
slle
be choosing either compulthan the other; and she will not
rather
she could not have chosen it
since neither choice is such that
sively,
to.25
and tllere, even if she most wanted
then
voluntary control is not
plural
such
One must add, of course, that
controWtheabilletermining
same as what may be called antece.dent
tlle
of a set of options will occur before
to determine or guarantee which
ity
to undetermined self-forming
occurs (ibid.,p. 144). With respect
it
or guarantee which choice
clloices(SFAs), agents cannot determine
for that could only be done by predeteF
outcomewill occur beforehand;
not follow that, because one cannot
miningthe outcome. But it does
will occur before it occurs, one
determinewhich of a set of outcomes
occurs whenit occurs. When tlle
doesnot determine which of them
are satisfied, agents exercise
conditionsof plural voluntary control
lives then and there by deciding.
controlover their present and future
indeterminism is involved, then
But can we not at least say that, if
grant that there is a sense in
option is chosen is ''arbitraly''?I
which
remains in all undeterwhichthis is true. An ultimate arbitrariness
in principle, be sufficient or overminedSFAs because tllere cannot,
set of competing reasons prevail
ridingpriorreasons for making one
such arbitrariness relative to prior
overthe other. But I argue that
about free will. It tells us, as I
reasons tells us something important
every undetermined self-forming
have elsewhere expressed it, that
a 'value experiment' whose justifichoice (SFA) "is the initiation of
fully explained by the past. [Makcation lies in the futureand is not
'Let's try this. It is not required
ing such a choice], we say in effect,
my past and is one branching pathby my past, but is consistent with
take. I am willing to take responway my life could now meaningfully
" (ibid.,pp. 145-46). To initiate
sibility for it one way or the other'
value experiments whose justificaand take responsibility for such
cllances'' without prior guarantees
tion lies in the future, is to "take
requires this sort of risk-taking
of success. Genuine self-formation
If there are persons who need to
and indeterminism is a part of it.
'>5
of these clailus.
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RESPONSIBILITY,
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decisive
priortoyourchoosingfor
them.
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relativeto prior reaIsaid a moment ago that such arbitrarinesswill-that every selffree
tells us something important about
sons
experiment whose
value
a
of
choice is the initiation
forming
explained by the
lies in the future and cannot be fully
justification
the term 'arbitrary'comes
It is worth adding in this regardthat
past.
arbiwhich means 'judgment'-as in liberum
the Latin arbitraum,
from
designathe medieval
voluntatis("freejudgment of the will")
trium
of a novel. The
middle
the
in
writer
a
for free will. Imagine
tion
has not yet developed
heroine faces a crisis and the writer
novel's
exactly how she will react.
character in sufficient detail to say
her
about how she will
author must make a "judgment"(arbitraum)
The
alreadyformed past,
that is not determined by the heroine's sense, the author's
react
this
does not give unique direction. In
which
not entirelyso. It has
but
"arbitrary,"
is
act
of how she will
judgment
in turn, gives input to
from the heroine's fictional past and,
input
projectedfuture.
her
free will are both authors
In a similarmanner,agentswho exercise
at once. By virtue of "selfof,and charactersin, their own stories
voluntatis),they are "arbiters"
judgments of the will ( arbitrza
forming"
for "makingthemselves"out
oftheir own lives, taking responsibility limit their future pathways
not
ofpast that, if they are trulyfree, does
with not having a sufficient
them
charge
toone. If someone should
as they did, they mayreplyas
orconclusiveprior reason for choosing
not mean I did not choosa,and it
follows:"Perhapsso. But that does
goodreasons,which I stand by
doesnot mean I did not choose for
I lackedsufficientor conclusive
andfor which I take responsibility.If
heroine of the novel, I was not
priorreasons,that is because, like the
and still am not, for that matafully formed person before I chose
I am in the process of writinga
ter.26Like the author of the novel,
my case, is myself). It is a heavy
storyand forming a person (who, in
burden,but an eminentlyhuman one."
KANE
ROBERT
Universityof Texas/Austin
Reand Phenomenological
Philosophy
Jan Branson (in "Alternativesof Oneself,"
here berelevant
is
that
distinction
search(forthcoming)) has made an important
and choosing "alternativesof oneself."
will
tween choosing "alternativesfor oneself"
for different courses of action that In
are
life
in
choices
Bransonnotes that some
in future.
become
will
chooser
the
person
of
but are
make a difference in what sort
choosing alternatives for themselves
such cases, agents are not merely ManySFAs,as I understandthem, would be of
choosing alternativesof themselves.
this kind.
2G
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