Journal of Church and State Advance Access published September 9, 2009

Religious Ideology That Attempts

to Ease the Conflict between
Religion and State: An Analysis
of the Teachings of Two Leading
Religious-Zionist Rabbis in the State
of Israel
Moshe Hellinger
This essay aims to highlight the contribution of two outstanding
religious leaders towards moderating the religious and political
conflict in a society driven by a highly complex identity. In
todays Western-liberal world, there is a growing tendency to
exclude religious language from the political discourse. This
article argues for the opposite view. In a society divided into two
camps, religious and secular, a significant contribution towards
easing the tensions can be made through the efforts of religious
authorities who are highly influential in their communities, are
open to modern realities, and believe that it is possible to interpret
classical religious texts in a way that strives to establish harmony,
or at least to ease tensions, between religion and the institutions
of the state.
In order to examine this thesis, this essay explores the teachings of two very significant figures, both in terms of their
thought and legal decisions, among the religious-Zionist rabbis
in Israel: Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel (born Jerusalem, 1880;
MOSHE HELLINGER (BA, Open University, Israel; MA, PhD, Bar-Ilan University) is
lecturer in political science and law, Bar-Ilan University, and is head of Schwartz
Institute for Judaism, Ethics, and Democracy, Beit Morasha, Jerusalem. His
articles have appeared in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion,
Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Democratic Culture, Jerusalem
Research in Jewish Thought, Review of Rabbinic Judaism, and Jewish Political
Studies Review. Special interests include Jewish political thought, liberal
theory, and religion and politics. This essay is translated from the original
Hebrew by Ruth Bar-Ilan. I want to thank the anonymous readers for their
comments.
Journal of Church and State; doi:10.1093/jcs/csp004
# The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. Dawson
Institute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:
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Journal of Church and State

died Jerusalem, 1953), the first Sephardi (oriental) chief rabbi
after the establishment of the State of Israel, and his disciple,
Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi (born Jerusalem 1924; died Tel-Aviv
1998), the Sephardi chief rabbi of Tel-Aviv from the 1970s to
the 1990s.
The persistent confrontation between religion and state in Israeli
society has recently intensified as an outcome of the disengagement
plan initiated by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the dismantling of all Jewish settlements there has triggered strong religious opposition among
broad circles in the national-religious or religious-Zionist camp.1
The premise underlying the position of various religious and political leaders in the national-religious camp against withdrawal from
any of the territories of Greater Israel, goes beyond the relationship
between religion and state. It draws on a particularistic Jewish
approach that underlines the uniqueness of the Jewish people and
the Land of Israel. In the opinion of these leaders, there is no
room for moral considerations that exceed the norms that emerge
from the Torah and its halakhic (religio-legal) interpretations.2
These positions do not lend themselves to a broad protection of
human rights in general, and the Palestinians rights in particular,
even in the absence of any intention to deprive them of their
humanity and deliberately harm them. Furthermore, government
moves aimed at restricting Israeli settlement in the territories of
Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza strip are deemed inappropriate,
since they do not accommodate the Jewish character of Israels
democracy.
It is precisely against this background that a reconsideration of
the teachings of R. Uziel and R. Halevi, along with their universal
premises and their attempt to reduce the tension between religion and the state, may uncover other possibilities inherent in a
Jewish religious commitment. It may well be that their approach
has valuable relevant implications that go beyond the Jewish
faith.

1. For the various responses within religious Zionism towards the disengagement see Etta Bick, Rabbis and Rulings: Insubordination in the Military and
Israeli Democracy, Journal of Church and State 49, no. 2 (2007): 305 28;
Motti Inbari, Fundamentalism in Crisis: The Response of the Gush Emunim
Rabbinical Authorities to the Theological Dilemmas Raised by Israel Disengagement Plan, Journal of Church and State 49, no. 4 (2007): 697 717.
2. For the various positions on the relationship between religious commandments and universal morality in general and in Jewish tradition, see Avi Sagi
and Daniel Statman, Religion and Morality, trans. Batya Stein, Value Inquiry
Series 26 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995).

Conflict between Religion and State

The Background of the Discussion

Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, the relationship
between religion and the state has been one of the significant
issues on its social and political agenda. David Ben-Gurion, the
first prime minister (1948 63, except for a short period) and the
major figure in shaping Israeli political identity, worked out
status quo arrangements with the religious parties in an
attempt to reach a compromise between the religious and secular
Jewish communities. The recent weakening of the status quo
arrangements reflects not only a change in the attitudes of the political, religious, and judicial elites but also considerable changes of
identity experienced by Israeli individuals and by the various ethnic
communities living in Israel. One of the major results of this state of
affairs is the exacerbation of the divisions between the religious and
the secular sectors of the population. Conflicts over keeping shopping centers open on the Sabbath (Saturday), the importation of
nonkosher foodstuffs such as pork, the sale of forbidden leavened
food (hametz) during Passover, the introduction of civil marriages,
and legalizing the status of homosexualsall of these highlight the
severity of the religious-secular divide in Israel at the beginning of
the twenty-first century.3
Undoubtedly, the major threat to the stability of the democratic
regime in Israel, against the background of this conflict between
religion and state, derives from the close connection between religious and normative (i.e., socio-economic) political cleavages
within the Jewish population. As is well known, the overlap
between various societal divides weakens the legitimacy of a democratic system and undermines its stability.4 In the 1990s, the Oslo
peace process increased the overlap of the religious and political
opposition to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabins coalition government.
This convergence reached its climax in the assassination of Rabin by
a member of the religious-Zionist camp. Although the assassin is
generally believed to have acted alone, he was obviously affected
by the public atmosphere surrounding the Oslo process. Various
religious leaders claimed that Rabins government had lost its legitimacy once it had decided to surrender parts of the Biblical Land of
Israel in exchange for making a peace agreement with the Palestinians. They further claimed that this government bore
3. On the nature of the status quo arrangements and on their recent breakdown,
see Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity:
The Secular-Religious Impasse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2000).
4. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., 1960), ch. 3.

Journal of Church and State

responsibility for weakening the Jewish identity of the State of
Israel. Recently, in response to the disengagement plan initiated
by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, voices in the national-religious
camp have protested that withdrawal from any territories of Israel
is contrary to the divine Torah (the Mosaic Law), so that a soldier
bound by religious commitment must necessarily refuse an order
to evacuate Jewish settlements.
In view of these challenges to the stability of Israels democratic
system, it is important to explore whether other voices, striving purposefully to reduce the conflict between religion and state, can be
associated with some of the halakhically authoritative rabbinical
figures who were affiliated with the national-religious camp. The
thesis on which this article is grounded is this: If the political
culture in Israel were more influenced by the religious tradition of
the Oriental Jews in general and by the outlook of Sephardi
religious-Zionist rabbis in particular, it would be possible to ease
this conflict significantly. What characterizes Sephardi (oriental)
religious Zionism in the last fifty years is the tendency of many of
its leaders, though not of all of them, to adopt tolerant attitudes
and compromise positions directed towards what is common to
observant and nonobservant Jews, and even to all humans created
in the image of God.5 The teachings of Rabbi Ben Zion Meir Hai
Uziel and Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi illustrate the possibilities of
easing this conflict.
Throughout their lives, both R. Uziel and R. Halevi strove to stress
the importance of peaceful, tolerant relations among Jews and
between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel. For both of them,
the strong connection between religion and state in Jewish tradition
suggests the unique value of Jewish national identity as well as the
universal basis common to Jews and non-Jews in general, and to the
Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel in particular. Consistent with
their religious-Zionist positions, both strongly opposed the separation between religion and state on the grounds that it was contrary
to the Jewish tradition and harmful to the State of Israel as a Jewish
state. In their view, the Jewish political ideal is not democratic, at
least not in the accepted meaning of the term, but this perception
did not prevent them from making a valuable practical contribution
towards strengthening the democratic system in Israel. The models
proposed by R. Uziel and R. Halevi to reduce the religion-state
5. Zvi Zohar, The Luminous Faces of the East: Studies in the Legal and Religious
Thought of Sephardic Rabbis of the Modern Middle East (in Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv:
Hakibbutz ha-Meuchad, 2001); Marc D. Angel, Seeking Good, Speaking Peace:
Collected Essays, ed. Hayyim J. Angel (Hoboken: Ktav, 1994). On R. Uziel, see
Marc D. Angel, Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of
Rabbi Benzion Uziel (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1999).

Conflict between Religion and State

conflict seem to be far removed from the recent trends in the State
of Israel. Nonetheless, they may be presented to public figures, and
specifically to rabbinical figures and educators of the religiousZionist camp, as a possible alternative to a future divide between
the state authorities and the religious-Zionist public in case of
Israels further evacuation of territories.

Religion and State in Comparative Perspective: A

Framework for Discussion
By its very nature, the relationship between religion and state is not
an easy one. Religion may serve as a valuable factor in establishing
personal, family, and public norms that contribute to the stability of
the political order. On the other hand, the believers religious commitment and the strength of the religious establishment may
impinge upon the concentration of government power in a
modern state just as the state, in demanding civil obedience, may
impinge upon the freedom of religion and the functioning of its
institutions.6 As far as the connection between religion and state
is concerned, one has to distinguish between three aspects: (1)
freedom of religion; (2) freedom from religion; and (3) the institutionalization of religion. The notion of religious tolerance, as developed in the West, demonstrates that it is possible to protect
religious freedom even without simultaneously protecting the
freedom from religion.7 One must also bear in mind that there
might emerge a contradiction between the principle of religious
freedom and the principle that prohibits the institutionalization
of religion. In the United States, for example, the increasing tendency to form a wall of separation between religion and state,
which has struck roots in the dominant liberal interpretation, was
based on the First Amendment of the Constitution, according to
which Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion. This approach is predicated on the premise that religion is a private matter between the believer and God and must
be excluded from the public domain. Some critics of this liberal
approach believe that absolute separation infringes on the religious
freedom of various religious denominations and is contrary to real
pluralism.8 Moreover, it reflects a secular approach disguised as
6. On the complex relations between religion and state, see Charles S. Liebman,
Religion, Democracy and Israeli Society (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), ch. 1.
7. This is the direction that John Locke developed in his theory. See John Locke,
A Letter Concerning Toleration (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 1 22.
8. For an opposite presentation of the given positions put forward by two
central thinkers who are involved in this discourse, see Robert Audi and

Journal of Church and State

state neutrality in relation to religion. Other critics of the liberal
approach argue that excluding religious issues from public discourse and the separation of religious and civil commitment may
be detrimental to the democratic system itself.9
Religious involvement in politics may assume either a priestly or
a prophetic nuance. In the former case, the institutional representatives of religion see themselves as part of the political order even
if they strive to strengthen their institutional power, and hence they
tend to encourage the citizens commitment to national symbols
carrying religious meaning and to help strengthen the legitimacy
of civic values such as making a contribution to the community,
maintaining the stability of the family unit, and so forth. Prophetic tendencies, on the other hand, offer an emotional and conceptual alternative to the notions held by the leaders of the state. In
this case, the autonomy of religion from the state is reinforced.10
Classic sociological research has been highly instrumental in formulating the argument that the weight of religion in public and political life is becoming increasingly weaker.11 Indeed, in West
European countries, the process of modern secularization has
been on the rise, at least as far as the level of commitment to religious tradition and to positions identified with the religious establishment is concerned. The secularization process is also
intensifying in the post-modern Western reality, in which there is
a growing personal search for spiritual directions that would
provide meaning for individuals who find themselves alienated by
Western, affluent society.12
In the last two decades, however, various scholars have questioned the correctness of the overall secularization thesis in the
global world.13 Even in the West, the United States offers a model
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in The Public Square: The Place of Religious Conviction in Political Debate (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997).
9. Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in
America, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1986).
10. Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, Religion: The One, the Few, and the Many, in
Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ted G. Jelen and Clyde
Wilcox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1 24.
11. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, the founders of modern sociology, contributedeach in his own wayto the claim of the relationship between modernity
and secularization. On secularization see, e.g., David Martin, A General
Theory of Secularization (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1978); Bryan Wilson, Religion
in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
12. Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990), ch. 6.
13. Peter L. Berger, A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity
(New York: The Free Press, 1992); Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the
Modern World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Conflict between Religion and State

of Western-liberal society in which religion gradually intensifies,
thereby increasing its weight in political life despite the separation
between church and state.14 As for Israeli society, it seems that the
secularization trends, as fostered and steered by the political elite
under the leadership of the previously dominant Mapai (Labor)
Party, which ruled the State of Israel during the period 1948 77,
have been largely restrained. Religious tradition and the way it is
interpreted by the rabbis has great political weight in the current
public discourse.
Both Rabbi Uziel and Rabbi Halevi belong to the priestly model
by virtue of their institutional role as prominent chief rabbis, of the
State of Israel and of a major city (Tel Aviv), respectively. Rabbi Uziel
envisioned an organic connection between the religious and the political domains. In contrast to him, R. Halevi tended to recognize the
religion-state dualism. However, like other religious-Zionist thinkers, he believed in the unifying ideal of a national-religious identity
and expected the future, ideal messianic state to strengthen the ties
between religion and the state. Be that as it may, in dealing with the
practical arrangements between religion and state in the State of
Israel, R. Halevi introduced unique mechanisms aimed at reinforcing the compartmentalization between the political and the religious authorities. In this respect, his approach is in line with the
core Christian tradition of separating the sacred from the profane
and setting apart a religious authority that is independent of the
civic one, while sanctioning separate obedience to both systems of
government. In contrast, R. Uziels approach conforms to the
Muslim tradition, which favors the integration of the religious and
political frameworks under the single leadership of a spiritual
figure who also holds the reins of political power.15

Rabbi Uziel: An Organic Connection between Religion

and State
Rabbi Uziel served as the Sephardi chief rabbi of the Land of Israel
in the decade preceding the establishment of the State of Israel and
during the first years afterwards. He was both the leading halakhic
figure among the Sephardic rabbis and one of the outstanding spiritual leaders of Judaism in his time. According to R. Uziel, the connection between religion and state in Israel is based on three
14. Mitchell Corbett, Politics and Religion in the United States (New York: Gerald
Publishers, 1999).
15. On the early Christian concepts see Hugo Rahner, Church and State in Early
Christianity, trans. Leo Donald Davis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). On
Islam, see Nazih N. M. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab
World (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 1.

Journal of Church and State

major focal points: (1) The contribution of religion to the shaping of
a morally oriented Jewish nation-state, which is sensitive to the
dignity of anyone born in the image of God, especially if he or she
is an Israeli citizen; (2) Opposition to a separation between religion
and state that stems from a thoroughly individualistic sense of identity, with the state perceived as an artificial creature; (3) Legitimizing the democratic regime in the State of Israel on the basis of the
prevailing norms of the halakhic world. By insisting on these
points, R. Uziel demonstrates that in themselves, religious language
and tradition are capable of supporting and enhancing a democratic
system. Each of these areas will be examined separately.

Religion and Nationality in the Jewish State:

Strengthening Jewish Uniqueness and Universality
Alike
One of the basic assumptions that runs through the entire political
ideology of R. Uziel is the organic unity of being. As he puts it, the
entire Creation is one single entity, its beginning lies in its end and
its end is contained in its beginning.16 The fact that the individuals reality is not separated and isolated but rather forms an
organic part of the entire being. Human reality in its totality is
one single organic body, expresses this unity.17 Human solidarity,
R. Uziel maintains, derives from an awareness of the Unique One of
the World, which acknowledges His existence and absolute unity, to
the extent that everything is united in His unity. . . . Therefore it is
said, Love thy neighbor as thyself: I am the Lord (Lev. 19:18). It
is in reference to this that Hillel the elder said [Babylonian
Talmud, Shabbat, 31a], What is hateful to you, do not do unto
your neighbor. That is the whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary thereof; go and learn it.18 Thus, according to R. Uziel,
true universalism is nurtured by the belief in the unity of God.
The prophets words Have we not all one father, has not one God
created us (Mal. 2: 10) capture this notion. The first to apprehend
this profound truth was Abraham.19 The organic unity of humanity,
however, is inseparable from, and dependent on, the particular
national identity of the diverse human societies.
16. Michmanei Uziel [Uziels Treasures] [MCU], Essays and Public Addresses on
the Revival of Israel and the Rebuilding of Its Country, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem,
19952004), I: 18687. Henceforward, after the first full reference to any of
the Hebrew written works by R. Uziel and R. Halevi, the titles will be abbreviated.
17. Hegyonei Uziel [Uziels Meditations] [HU] (Jerusalem, 1992), 2: 23.
18. HU, part 2, p. 94.
19. HU, part I, p. 88.

Conflict between Religion and State

Precisely by virtue of the strong connection in Judaism between
religion and nationality, the organic nationality of the people of
Israel is both spiritually and universally oriented. Abraham is the
progenitor of the Jewish people and is the father of the monotheistic Jewish faith. Thus Abraham handed down to the people of Israel
the profound affinity between a religion that has a universal commitment to anyone born in the image of God, on the one hand,
and a unique national identity, on the other hand. The People of
Israel is eternal despite all the disasters it has encountered in the
course of its history precisely because its nationality is both spiritual and universal.20 In contradistinction to the notion of imperialistic nationality, says R. Uziel, Judaism bases its worldview on
the foundation of the unity of the world and the unity of man,
who is the crown of creation and the one responsible for cosmic
unity . . . Judaism says: There is no king saved by the multitude of
a host; a mighty man is not delivered by great strength (Ps.
33:19). If, however, necessity compels you to wage war on your
enemies, your war should not be for the purpose of conquest and
dominion, but for the sake of peace and truth.21
The main Jewish national holidays, too, nurture a universally
oriented national-religious approach. For instance, Rosh Ha-Shanah,
the Jewish New Year, and Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, both
of which call for self-examination and repentance, carry with them
the message of tearing down all the separating partitions and discriminations between people, nations and states.22 The religious
practice of leaving ones house to dwell in a temporary, flimsy
booth during Sukkot (the festival of Tabernacles) is designed to
reinforce human trust in divine Providence and is contrary to the
notion that the world has no owner and that might is right.23
It is precisely because of its affinity with its religious identity that
a just Jewish state must be enlightened enough to treat all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike, as equals. R. Uziel clung to this
approach consistently. Addressing the members of the international commission that visited Palestine in 1918 he stated:
Our aspirationthe aspiration of all Israelitesto establish our national
home in this ancestral land, is not motivated by a passion for dominion
and governance. Rather, this aspiration has been buried deep in our
heart ever since God took us out of our country with a mighty hand and
up to this very day . . . Once again, we want to conduct our political and
spiritual life in our country, to make the land blossom, to fulfill the
20. Ibid., part 2, pp. 120 7.
21. MU, Essays and public addresses on the revival of Israel and the rebuilding
of its country, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem, 2004), 2: 205 6.
22. Ibid., p. 60.
23. Ibid., part I, pp. 210 1.

Journal of Church and State

laws of the Hebrew Torah (Bible), which is full of compassion and mercy
for everyone created in the image of God, which grants equal civil law to
all its inhabitants, as it is said: One Torah and one code shall there be
for you and for the stranger that sojourns with you. (Num. 15:17)24

Thirty years later, at the time when the State of Israel was established, R. Uziel outlined his program for the character of the
Jewish State in his essay: The Torah and the State:
Neither we nor our children and our childrens children to the end of generations would consider imposing the laws of the Torah on the [members
of other] nations, along with their different religions, who dwell in our
land and state. We shall not discriminate against them nor shall we restrict
their freedom or offend their religious sentiments and the places sacred
to them, whether those of the past or those that would become so in
future time. This is not only because of the terms and conditions
imposed on us by the Assembly of Nations, but out of our own conviction
and in accordance with our conscience, as ingrained in our ancestral heritage, and because of the commandment of the Torah that is binding upon
us: Love and respect, equality of rights, and religious and national
freedom for every nation and every individual who dwell in our country
peacefully and loyally.25

Religions-Messianic Zionism and Preventing

the Separation between Religion and State
As a religious-Zionist, Rabbi Uziel associated the national revival
with messianic aspirations. He believed that during his lifetime
the process of redemption was already on its way. He articulated
this messianic outlook in the statements he made following the
(British governments) Balfour Declaration of 1917 (which guaranteed a National Home for the Jewish people in the Land of
Israel), reaching its peak after the establishment of the State of
Israel. For R. Uziel, the victorious result of Israels War of Independence (1948), and the ingathering of exiles that followed it were
clear signs of redemption. It is within this frame of reference that
one must understand his position on the relationship between religion and state. In a comprehensive essay devoted to this issue,
R. Uziel states emphatically that as far as the State of Israel is concerned, separating religion from the state is not a possible option,
for the sovereignty of the state is closely connected to the sovereignty of the Torah.26
24. Ibid., pp. 4367.
25. Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah (The Torah and the State) [HTM], Sinai 22 (1948):
119.
26. HTM, p. 122.

10

Conflict between Religion and State

Chapter 17 of the Book of Deuteronomy, which deals with Torahbased governance, presents us with the institutions of kingship, the
priesthood, and the courts of law.27 In R. Uziels view, the religious
establishment, as embodied in the crown of priesthoodwhich is
also the legislative authorityand the political establishment, as
embodied in the crown of kingship, are necessarily complementary:
The kingship preserved the safety of the nation from its enemies
on the outside and the domestic welfare of the people . . . while
the priesthood preserved the soul of the nation . . . These two
organs headed the leadership of the nation. One is called the legislature and the other is kingship.28
In a most important passage in his writings, R. Uziel presents
three different views concerning the relationship between religion
and state. He rejects all of them, though not to the same extent:
Concerning how to resolve this profound question, which pierces and descends to the very abyss, there are three opinions. One of them frivolously
suggests separating the state from the Torah, just as the nations of the
world separated church from state, or, what is worse, pushing the
church into a corner so that whoever wants it may drop in. In this way,
the state would be free to determine its own legislation and act accordingly without let or hindrance. The second group suggests separating
the Torah from the state: let them be busy with their affairs and us with
ours. The third group suggests solving all problems superficially and
according to an individual opinion. All three opinions are wrong. Far
from building the state, they threaten to destroy it completely. How so?
Separating the state from religion will never take place in Israel. For the
House of Israel is unlike other nations, among which the state has priority
over divine teaching. Rather, the Torah and the state, the Torah and kingship, were pronounced in one single word. . . . And now when the time
comes to rebuild the state, it is our duty . . . to erect the Torah that maintained and united us throughout the Diaspora. . . . It would be an unpardonable sin to sever the ties between these inseparable twins, for only
their union will bring us stable peace and everlasting existence in the
land of our inheritance. . . . To the third group Im saying: Halakhic
decisions concerning the community and the nation are not subject to
the authority of the individual or even of several individuals.29

Thus R. Uziel identifies a common denominator that brings

together the secular position (separating the State from the
Torah) and the anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox position, which sees
no holiness in the state of Israel (separating the Torah from the
27. On these institutions in Jewish life, see Sol Roth, Halakhah and Politics: The
Jewish Idea of the State (New York & Hoboken: Ktav, Yeshiva University Press,
1988); Stuart A. Cohen, The Three Crowns: Structures of Communal Politics in
Early Rabbinic Jewry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
28. MU, part 1, p. 319.
29. Ibid., p. 122.

11

Journal of Church and State

State). Both positions envision a secular Jewish state that excludes
religion from the public domain, relegating it to the private life of
individuals and to the way of life of the religious communities.
This position, says R. Uziel, weakens religion, pushing the church
into a corner. Even worse, it is contrary to the very nature of a
Jewish state. Since religion and nationality are inseparable in
Judaism, this unity must be the foundation of the Jewish state.
Now, the third approach attempts to offer a solution to the conflict
between the Torah and the modern Jewish state by making changes
in the Halakhah itself. R. Uziel is less critical of this approach than
of the two previous ones. In his opinion, the appropriate solution
involves engaging in halakhic rulings, but such an endeavor
should be pursued by a competent institutional body: the high rabbinical court of justice. Here he develops his messianic religiousZionist vision: strengthening the power of a central court of law
that will act according to Jewish law and will serve as infrastructure
for reviving the supreme religious institution that operated during
the period of the Second Temple, namely the great Sanhedrin.30
This was also the opinion of Rabbi Uziels senior partner, the wellknown Rav Kook, who served as the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi
of pre-state Israel. Nonetheless, R. Uziel recognizes the need to
establish civil judiciary systems for dealing with monetary and
criminal matters as well as autonomous Christian and Moslem religious systems.31
According to R. Uziel, the key to a worthwhile religious ruling is a
large measure of openness and flexibility that goes hand in hand
with a strong commitment to the rules of the Halakhic system
itself and shuns any revolutionary moves:
The Torah is a teaching of life. As the questions of life are numerous, one
has to infer one thing from the other by adopting a broad perspective that
would make it possible to find a just solution and a straightforward and
honest way by which to conduct our conduct in life. . . . In making
choices by using his mind and judgment, man must choose a straight
and sound bridge through which he can pass . . . for his own good and
for the good of humanity as a whole.32

This approach sanctions the decisors boldness and activism by

invoking a broad social, national, and universal vision that highlights his most important quality: common sense.33 Familiarity
30. Ibid., pp. 1245.
31. Ibid., p. 121.
32. HU, part 2, pp. 103 4.
33. The major halakhic codex in the last five centuries is the Shulhan Arukh
(composed by R. Joseph Karo in the sixteenth century). The book consists of
four parts dealing with various matters. According to a popular saying, the

12

Conflict between Religion and State

with the conditions of life in all their depth is required when the
decisor is unable to say, Let us take a book and see, namely,
when there is no pertinent text upon which to rely.34 The decisor
must be guided by broad-mindedness and composure.35 In practice,
Rabbi Uziel issued his rulings in accordance with the judicial criteria he demanded from others.36
Loyal to his moderate approach, R. Uziel adopts a pluralistic position on the relations between the various religions practiced in
Israel, even though the official religion in Israel is Orthodox
Judaism. In this respect, his approach closely mirrors the British
model of the established church. As to intra-religious pluralism,
he prefers commitment to a religious-national Jewish framework
over freedom from religion.37
The organic connection between religion and state, as proposed by
R. Uziel, clashes with a major liberal value: the freedoms of the individual. An analysis of R. Uziels teaching suggests that for a messianic
religious-Zionist thinker, however moderate and universally oriented,
legitimizing Jewish ways of life that are incompatible with the Halakhah involves considerable difficulties. Moreover, R. Uziels ideal of
integrating religion and the state poses a real challenge to the recognition of the State of Israel, which is not bound by the laws of the
Torah but rather operates by virtue of its own democratically elected
institutions. It is precisely with regard to this point that R. Uziel surprises us, by finding a way to grant broad legitimacy to Israeli parliamentary democracy, as will be clarified in the following section.

The Government in a Jewish State: between

Maimonides Monarchic Ideal and the Recognition of a
Democratic State on the Basis of Communal Ordinances
R. Uziels political views are highly influenced by the teaching of Maimonides, one of the great Jewish thinkers and
most important part is the fifth, which is not written at all. This is common
sense, without which none of the four parts has any value.
34. Mishpetei Uziel (Uziels Halakhic Rulings) [MSU], Responsa, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv,
1935), IX.
35. MIU, introduction to the second part: Even ha-Ezer, p. VII.
36. For his significant rulings on such matters as milking on Saturday (a prohibited Sabbath labor), proselytizing members of mixed families, womens suffrage
and their right to serve in judicial roles, and so forth, see Piskei Uziel bi-Shelot
ha-Zeman (R. Uziels Rulings on Contemporary Issues) [PU], collected from the
halakhic teaching of Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel (Jerusalem: Mossad Ha-Rav
Kook, 1977).
37. MU, part 2, pp. 2627.

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Journal of Church and State

decisors. R. Uziel considers Maimonides statement that man is a
political animal by nature as the bedrock of anthropology.38,39
Just like Maimonides, R. Uziel views the relation of the individual
to the community as analogous to the relations of the limbs to the
body as a whole.40 Maimonides used this analogy to establish the
importance of the leader, the head of all the other organs, in
human society.41 Hence it is not surprising that as far as the issue
of appointing a king is concerned, Rabbi Uziel supports Maimonides pro-monarchic position. According to Maimonides, Thou
may appoint a king over thee (Deut. 17:15) is a commandment.42,43
The role of monarchy in Israel is to strengthen the organic,
religious-political unity of the community.44
In these statements, one can discern the influence of Maimonides
ideal model of messianism. Maimonides notion of the KingMessiah combines two models: realistic-political on the one hand
and utopian-spiritual on the other hand.45 The character of the
King-Messiah in Maimonides teaching is the highest point of his
overall approach concerning the appropriate relationship between
religion and the state in a future Jewish state. Aviezer Ravitzky
points to the unifying model of religion and state that emerges
from Maimonides teaching: Maimonides grasped politics in
thoroughly religious terms, yet to the same degree he grasped religion in thoroughly political terms. In this manner, a mutual symbiosis, irrevocable in nature, is formed.46
The ideal of the righteous monarch introduced by R. Uziel belongs
to the unifying model, which emerges from the totality of his
teaching. Indeed, the character of the religious-political system
he proposes contains emphatic utopian features, in contrast
to Maimonides characteristic combination of utopia and
realism. R. Uziel bases his perception in politics no longer on
38. Guide of the Perplexed, II, ch. 40.
39. HU, part I, p. 84.
40. Ibid., part 2, p. 93.
41. Guide, I, ch. 72.
42. Hilkhot Melakhim, I, 3.
43. On Maimonides moderate theory of the monarchy see Gerald J. Blidstein,
Political Concepts in Maimonidean Halakha (in Hebrew), (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan
University Press, 2001).
44. MCU, part 1, p. 367.
45. Aviezer Ravitzky, To the Utmost Human Capacity: Maimonides on the days
of the Messiah, in History and Faith: Studies in Jewish Philosophy (Amsterdam:
J. C. Gieben Publishers, 1996), 73112. On Maimonides messianism as a fusion
of realism and utopia see Amos Funkenstein, Maimonides: Nature, History and
Messianic Beliefs, trans. Shmuel Himelstein (Tel-Aviv: MOD Books, 1997).
46. Aviezer Ravitzky, Religion and State in Jewish Philosophy: Models of Unity,
Division, Collision and Subordination (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute,
2002), 27.

14

Conflict between Religion and State

power struggles, but on love. This is apolitical politics just as by
kingship he means spiritual rather than monarchic leadership.
Apparently, these notions account for the fact that a monarchic
thinker like R. Uziel was one of those who paved the way for legitimizing the democratic regime that exists in the State of Israel in
practice. Precisely by subscribing to a notion of the just kingship,
R. Uziel offered a mechanism that grants recognition to the
decisions of the democratic public. Here we touch upon the
central religious-political principle that figures in his discussions
on the Israeli democratic system: public consent.
Already the biblical description of how Saul was appointed to be
the first king of Israel suggests the central role of the will of the
people in establishing the monarchy (I Sam. 8). The same thing happened when King David attempted to consolidate his rule and it collapsed in the course of Absaloms rebellion (II Sam. 15 18).
Maimonides himself attaches great weight to public consent
though this has nothing to do with democratic electionsin maintaining a legitimate monarchy to which the principle of dina
de-malkhuta dina (the law of the kingdom is the law) is applicable.47 R. Uziel elaborates on the notion of the consent of the
people and the social harmony necessary to maintain the monarchy
in Israel.48 It thus emerges that the will of the people determines the
type of the chosen regime.
R. Uziel adopts the democratic principle of public consent as a
basic principle fostered when he sets out to grant legitimacy to
the regime abiding in the modern State of Israel. In a very important
article entitled The Foundations of the Law of the Monarchy in
Israel and among the Nations (YDM), he supports the approach
of Rabbi Nissim Gerondi (fourteenth century). According to
Gerondi, Dina de-malkhuta dina, the halakhic rule that requires
obedience to the laws of the state, applies only to a non-Jewish
state and not to a Jewish state that is committed to the Torah.49
Within the ultra-Orthodox world, some groups rely on R. Nissims
view and infer from it that the religious legitimacy of the Israeli
system, which is not wholly based on the Torah, is highly
47. As is well known, the main source in his writings for this principle is the
importance he attaches to the acceptance of the kings currency by the subjects
(Hilkhot Gzeilah va-Avedah, V, 18). With this criterion Maimonides concludes his
general discussion on the issue of dina de-malkhuta dina. Shmuel Shilo, in his
well-known study on this topic, associates Maimonides with a certain group of
thinkers who see in public consent the basis of dina de-malkhuta dina. See
Shmuel Shilo, Maimonides on Dina de-Malkhuta Dina (The law of the state
is law), Jewish Law Annual 1 (1978): 146 67.
48. MCU, part I, p. 422.
49. See his commentary to Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Nedarim, 28a.

15

Journal of Church and State

questionable. In contrast to this position, R. Uziel makes a distinction between Dina de-malkhuta dina that is based on the kings ownership of the land, as commonly held in Jewish medieval thought,
and the right of the agreed-upon government to legislate laws that
are binding upon the public, as advocated by the democratic
system. This distinction entails critical implications for the ability
to predicate Israeli democracy on a religious halakhic basisquite
a daring move for a normative orthodox thinker. As far as R. Uziel
is concerned, far from harming the modern State of Israel, religion
actually works in its favor. It is difficult to exaggerate the weight of
the following words:
Now we are faced by a grievous question, one that pierces and descends to
the very abyss. For in our days, how is it possible for the State of Israel to
exist if the law of the state does not bind every man and every woman in
Israel to obey the laws of the state that impose taxes or penalties. It is
inconceivable that the State of Israel will be something optional rather
than obligatory and that every man will do that which is right in his
own eyes. It should be added that what R. Nissim Gerondi says in the
name of the Tosafists is that the law of the kingdomin the sense of
the sovereignty of the kingis not applicable to the kings of Israel. For
the Torah did not grant the kings of Israel the right to issue decrees and
impose them on the individual, and all the more so on the public, by
virtue of their kingship. However, the state as a whole has the right and
the obligation to designate a supreme governmental leadership for the
purpose of regulating its economic, social, and political affairs, which
are the very foundation of its existence. Therefore the decisions of the
state administration require everybody to comply with them and those
who refuse to do so must be punished, as stated in the Gemara that the
townspeople are entitled to make provisions concerning the measures
and prices in the marketplace.50,51

Significantly, two democratic principles that are vital for the existence of a democratic state, namely, the sovereignty of the people
and the rule of law, are presented here as backed by the religious
law. Furthermore, the third democratic principle that is vital for
the existence of a modern state, the decision of the majority, also
gains religious approval in view of the centrality of public consent
in the halakhah. According to R. Uziel, The townsmen that are
elected by every man and woman of the public to serve in the
50. Ben-Zion M. H. Uziel, Yesodot Din ha-Malkhut be-Yisrael u-ba-Amim (The
Foundations of the Law of the Kingdom in Israel and among the Nations), in
Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah (The Torah and the State) 5 6, ed. Shaul Yisraeli,
(1953/54): 15. For the various approaches to Dina de-malkhuta dina, see Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. from the Hebrew by
Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Skyes (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication
Society, 1994), 1: 6474.
51. BT, Baba Batra, 5b.

16

Conflict between Religion and State

state administration, it is as if it was interpreted that they are
granted explicit authority [to impose] the very law that will be
accepted by those elected and by a majority of votes.52 Here
R. Uziel refers to a basic principlethe communal ordinances
which emerged in Jewish medieval law. According to this principle,
the community members have the authority to make provisions
even contrary to the halakhic normsas long as these enactments
concern public issues and are designed for the proper functioning
of the community.53
R. Uziel also innovatively expands the reliance on communal ordinances for the purpose of legitimizing the legislation by the Israeli
parliamentthe Knesset, even though in contrast to the medieval
Jewish community, the Knesset mostly consists of secular Jews,
who do not conduct their life according to the Jewish law.54 This
position epitomizes Uziels notion of the organic connection
between the religious establishment (the priesthood) and the political establishment (kingship) in a Jewish state. At this point, we no
longer deal with an ideal model of a king who is subservient to the
Torah law but with the reality of life in the State of Israel, where reciprocal relations must be maintained between religion and politics in
a Jewish and democratic state. Here the connection between a profound universal basis and extensive legitimacy of the rule of law
establishes a foundation for accepting the decisions of the government and the Knesset in political matters, even when such decisions
concern the religious commandment to populate the Land of Israel.
This is because as far as public issues relating to the stability and
security of the state are concerned, the elected representatives of
the people are deemed competent to legislate laws, even in cases
where these laws initially would not have won the consent of the
rabbis.

Rabbi Halevi: A Feeble Relation between Religion

and the State
R. Hayyim David Halevi saw himself as Rabbi Uziels disciple,
according to his own testimony.55 His halakhic works are taught
in various religious frameworks as part of the curriculum. To a
large extent he followed in the footsteps of R. Uziel in the SephardiZionist halakhic world, and yet there are also differences between
52. YDM, p. 17, emphasis in the original.
53. On the communal ordinances, see Elon, Jewish Law, vol. 2, ch. 19.
54. Cited in Zohar, The Luminous Faces of the East, 281.
55. Hayyim David Halevi, Toldotav u-Mifalo ha-Sifruti shel Maran Ha-Rav
Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel (Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziels biography and literary
enterprise) (Jerusalem, 1979), 21.

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Journal of Church and State

the two. The ensuing comparison will proceed along parallel
subsections.

Religion and Nationality in the Jewish State:

Strengthening Both Its Unique Spiritual Identity
and Its Basic Universal Identity
R. Halevi is a thinker with strong universal ideals. A basic anthropological assumption underlying his religious-political teaching is the
positive potential inherent in human nature: the natural aspiration
to do good.56 Following Maimonides, R. Halevi believes that Gods
image in man accounts for his reason, which makes it possible for
him to exercise free choice. And since it is self-evident that the
entire human race was created in the image and likeness of God,
Halevi concludes that every human being can attain superior spiritual levels by virtue of the breath of life that God breathed into the
nostrils of Adam, the progenitor of humanity.57 R. Halevi adopts
Maimonides version, according to which whosoever destroys a
single soul of mankind [as opposed to another version: a single
soul of Israel], it is as if he has destroyed a whole world.58 Nevertheless, he does not disapprove of the existence of national identity
in general and Jewish national identity in particular. In his view, just
as the individual has a natural reality, so does the nation.59 As far as
national identity is concerned, one must distinguish between external and internal features. Territory, a common origin, self-rule, and
the like are external features. Common language and culture are
internal features, which are more important. If we contemplate
56. Bein Yisrael la-Amim (Between Israel and the Nations) [BYL], Clarifications
of the Halakhic Rulings concerning non-Jewish Residents in the land of Israel
(Jerusalem, 1954), 108 9. On Rabbi Halevis universalism, see Zvi Zohar,
Sephardic Religious Thought in Israel: Aspects of the Theology of Rabbi
Haim David Halevi, in Critical Essays on Israeli Society, Religion, and Government, ed. Kevin Avruch and Walter P. Zenner (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1997).
57. Torat Hayyim (Torah of Life) [TRH]: Contemplations, Thoughts, and Homiletic Interpretations on the Weekly Portions of the Pentateuch, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv,
1992), on Genesis, 2829.
58. Nezah Moshe (The Eternity of Moses Law) [NM]: Contemplations, Thoughts
and Homiletic Interpretations on the Weekly Portions of the Pentateuch (Tel
Aviv, 1996), 41522. For the source of the rabbinical saying see Mishnah, Sanhedrin IV, 5. For Maimonides version, see Hilkhot Sanhedrin, XII, 3.
59. Approaches such as Eric Hobsbawms invention of tradition or Benedict
Andersons Imagined communities, which are widespread in current academic discourse, are alien to R. Halevis notion of natural nationality. On
the other hand, he is far removed from national approaches marked by mystical
features.

18

Conflict between Religion and State

history, we find that nations perish through intermingling and
assimilation; not by military conquest and physical destruction
but rather through spiritual conquest.60 Hence it is the spiritual
qualities that determine the character and future of a nation.
The basis of Jewish national identity is its Torah. R. Halevi interprets the major particularistic command in the Torah, And you
shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation (Ex. 19:6)
as expressing spiritual holiness through cleaving to God rather
than some immanent, quasi-biological holiness of the Jewish
people.61 R. Halevi shares the view of his teacher, R. Uziel, yet,
unlike R. Uziel, R. Halevi sees the individuals connection to the
nation in terms of a spiritual-cultural, rather than spiritual-organic,
affiliation. The emphasis on the unique universally oriented spiritual identity of the people of Israel contrasts with certain attitudes
that smack of racism, which have recently struck root among certain
groups of the Jewish religious public. According to the latter
outlook there is an immanent holiness in the Jewish nation that
makes it superior to other nations in deeper ways than merely the
Jewish way of life.
R. Halevi suggests several points that prove that Jewish tradition
was against racist biases. Among other things, he mentions that
the Torah begins by describing the creation of Adam and the life
of his descendents; that King Solomons prayer on the occasion of
the inauguration of the Temple assigned it as a place of worship
for all nations; that the last prophets delivered universal messages
in their prophecies; that the Sabbath is a national symbol of the
exodus but also a universal symbol of the creation of the world;
and that the Jewish festivals, such as Rosh ha-Shanah, and even
more so the Day of Atonement, are meaningful to Jews and
non-Jews alike.62 Even Gods choice of the Hebrew Patriarchs,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob was based on their purity, on their
inner loyalty to God. There is no racism here, because this choice
could also involve other, similarly suitable, figures. The choice of
their children follows from the same reason; Anyway, this idea
does not imply racism.63 R. Halevis ideological position has
halakhic, egalitarian implications for treatment of non-Jews in the
State of Israel. The entire relationship between Jews and
non-Jews, he states, must be conducted out of a human, moral
duty.64
60. BYL, pp. 9091.
61. Ibid., pp. 9293.
62. Aseh lekha Rav (Attach yourself to a Rabbi) [ALR], Responsa, vol. 8 (Tel Aviv,
1988), 195 203.
63. ALR, part 8, pp. 200 1.
64. Ibid., part 9, p. 73.

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Journal of Church and State

Like Rabbi Uziel, Rabbi Halevi presents us with an approach that
sees the connection between religion and state in the State of
Israel as strengthening Jewish spiritual uniqueness while providing
a halakhic basis for its moral commitment to all citizens of the
Jewish state. The model that both of them offer suggests how religious language can contribute to public discourse on civil issues.
Ignoring religious tradition and religious language not only harms
Jewish national identity, for the sake of which the Jewish state
was established; it can also hold back the emergence of strong
roots from which a just, egalitarian society in the Jewish state can
grow and flourish.

Messianic Religious Zionism and the

Compartmentalization between Religion and State
R. Halevi, like R. Uziel, is an avowed religious-Zionist. Like other religious Zionists who preceded him, he believes that there is a connection between religion and society, between tradition and modernity,
and between the Torah and Zionism. In his eyes the dissociation
(whether secular or ultra-orthodox) between the sacred and the
mundane is artificial and carries destructive consequences: Apparently, we are found in a world that is entirely holy; we withdrew into
ourselves, and this seclusion is actually a hermetically closed spiritual ghetto, where we increasingly shut ourselves off with our own
hands.65
R. Halevis religious Zionist teaching is clearly messianic. This
strain runs throughout his writings. In his opinion, Only the mentally blind can view the entire phenomenon of political Zionism,
ever since its inception until this day, as nothing but a successful
chain of chance events. The believer, whose eyes are wide open
and see things correctly, understands that this coincidence that
created the political and military background against which the
State of Israel was established is nothing but the last miracle in a
long period marked by the concealment of Gods face, and, therefore, it happened exactly in this way, prefiguring the revelation of
the complete redemption.66 As most other religious Zionists,
Halevi considers the Six-Day-War of June 1967, a clear
65. BLA, pp. 114 5.
66. Mekor Hayyim ha-Shalem (The Complete Source of life), Elucidations of
basic Halakhic rulings concerning daily life, vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 1976), 367 68.
On R. Halevis Messianism, see Dov Schwartz, Changes in the Messianic
Thought Of Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi, in A Living Judaism: Essays on the
Halakhic Thought of Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi (in Hebrew), ed. Avi Sagi and
Yedidia Z. Stern (Jerusalem: The Shalom Hartman Institute and Bar-Ilan University, 2007), 331 56.

20

Conflict between Religion and State

manifestation of the process of redemption. Nonetheless, he does
not experience a sense of apocalyptic redemption. Moreover, in contrast to many others who belong to the religious-Zionist camp, he
does not embrace particularistic positions in response to it. Loyal
to his own system, R. Halevi stresses the universal elements of the
redemption process. In an article he wrote in 1990, he interprets
the collapse of the Soviet Union as a pivotal stage of a world-wide
process after which there would no longer be any world power
based on conquest and colonialism.67 All of these factors have a
bearing on his positions as a religious Zionist in matters of religion
and state.
Whoever reads Halevis Religion and the State (DMD), published in
1969, two years after the Six-Day war, must be struck by the huge
gap between the general, redemption-oriented approach that
emerges from most of its chapters, and pragmatism regarding the
major points of collision between religion and the state.68 It must
be borne in mind that this work is a collection of various articles
published in the course of several years and compiled by the
author. The articles dealing with problems of religion and state in
Israel were mostly written before the Six-Day war, but the pragmatic
position of the writer has remained the same throughout his public
career.
The way in which Halevi combines the religious-Zionist notion of
the inward spiritual character of the State of Israel and its outward
appearance, still tarnished by darkness, is far removed from the
interpretations offered by Gush Emunim (The Bloc of the Faithful)
after the Six-Day War.69 Loyal to the status quo arrangements,
Halevi outlines only three areas in which an alliance between religion and the state is necessary: (1) maintaining the purity of the
Israeli family through the religious legality and purity of marriage
and divorce as a safeguard against the disintegration of the
Jewish people; (2) maintaining the public character of the Sabbath
day and the holidays because of their importance to Jewish national
identity; (3) observing the ritual laws regarding kosher food in the
public domain.70
A comparison between R. Uziel and R. Halevi elicits remarkable
differences in historical analysis as well as in reading the political
reality in Israel. First, unlike Rabbi Uziel, R. Halevi thinks that in
67. TH, Genesis, pp. 149 56.
68. Hayyim David Halevi, Dat u-Medinah [Religion and State] [DMO], Explorations of Basic Issues, Tel-Aviv, 1969.
69. On this see Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious
Radicalism, trans. Michael Swirsky and Jonathan Chipman, Chicago studies in
the history of Judaism (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1996), ch. 3.
70. BLA, p. 105.

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Journal of Church and State

ancient times, kingship and priesthood did not go hand in hand in
the Jewish state. Secondly, as opposed to R. Uziels optimistic expectations from the harmonious blending of religion and state in the
renewed Jewish state, Halevis approach one generation later is
much more sober. Compulsive religious legislation will not only
be futileit may even alienate many Israelis. Relying on the
halakhic rule that any decree should not be issued unless the
majority of the community is able to abide by it, Halevi argues
that meaningful achievements can result only from persuasion.71
He thus introduces a compartmentalizing approach that places
the key focus for strengthening religion with the individual and
the local community and not in the national political realm.
According to Halevis position, The Torah contains only foundations and principles, whereby various forms of life can be established at different periods and under varying and changing
conditions.72 Hence the Talmudic scholars are entitled to exercise
flexibility in coping with social and political issues. All that is
required is that the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, does not legislate laws that explicitly contradict the Halakhah. This being the
case, it is possible to come up with a new definition of the State
of Israel: A law-abiding state in accordance with the Halakhah.73
Redemption develops in an evolutionary manner and the way to
strengthen the Jewish character of the State of Israel is through education and not by resorting to political conflict.74
Concerning this issue too, it seems that Halevi develops a more
individualistic approach than does R. Uziel, who is inclined
toward more collectivistic tendencies. According to Halevis
interpretation, the Torah laws are oriented toward the personal
freedom of every citizen in Israel.75 The decisor, too, has considerable freedom in making a decision in accordance with the Torah.
This can be designated as halakhic neutrality. Halevis basic conception is that Gods Torah is a teaching of life. Whoever is well
versed in the modes of halakhic rulings knows the extent to which
it is flexible, suitable to the spirit of the times and to all circumstances.76 The philosophy of the Halakhah teaches us that there
are certain overarching principles, such as sheat hadehak (time of
emergency), hefsed Merubeh (a great loss), and especially pikuah
nefesh ( preservation of life) according to which a responsible
71. DM, p. 47.
72. Ibid., p. 49.
73. Ibid., p. 57.
74. Ibid., p. 47.
75. Devar ha-Mishpat (The Word of the Law) [DMS], Clarifications of the
Halakhic laws concerning the Sanhedrin, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv, 1963), 174.
76. DM, p. 30.

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Conflict between Religion and State

decisor is supposed to resolve complex issues.77 The primary principle that must guide the decisor is this: His judgment must be
based only on the depth of his understanding of the halakhic
issue at stake and he is not bound by any legal precedent, even if
it is the ruling of higher courts, even that of his masters. . . . This
is not just a permission granted to the religious judge to rule contrary to his masters; it is also his duty.78
Halevis position has broad implications for the highly controversial issue of Israels withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and the
future of the Jewish settlements in these territories. In 1967,
several months after the Six-Day War, a group of religious-Zionist
youth asked R. Halevi: Are we allowed to surrender even an inch
of our claim to the Land of Israel? In his written response, Halevi
states that even though it is forbidden to surrender any territories
of the Land of Israel without good reason, once international
pressure is put on Israel, the rule of preserving life takes precedence
and requires giving up parts of the land.79
R. Halevis intricate position on political questions is completely
different from those of other decisors, who pronounce Daat
Torah, the view of the Torah, on political issues without exercising
the caution recommended by Halevi. In fact, Halevis position leaves
ample latitude for a government that relies on the judgment of
experts on foreign affairs and matters of national security. In this
way, Halevis position strengthens the stability of democratic governance in actual practice. In his eyes, It is self-evident that the
guiding principle in all of this is to safeguard the security of the
nation in any framework of negotiation, perhaps by adopting
every broad notion of the Torahs command and he shall live in
them (Lev. 18:5). This is an unwritten religious law, and it certainly
does not derive from the rule of the preservation of life, but rather
from common sense, which need not be imposed by any decree.80
It follows that R. Halevi systematically develops a doctrine making
it possible to separate the religious sphere from the political one
while increasing the weight of the latter in the public domain.
This compartmentalization emerges as a result of combining
three positions: (1) opposing religious compulsion, except in
minimal basic issues that establish the common denominator
most vital to a Jewish people in a Jewish state (kosher food in
public institutions, marriage and divorce according to Jewish law);
(2) coining the term a law-abiding state according to the Halakhah,
77.
78.
79.
80.

Ibid., p. 30.
Medinat Hok u-Medinat Halakhah [MH], in DM, 246.
MH, vol. 2, pp. 3031.
ALR, part 3, pp. 371 2.

23

Journal of Church and State

while expanding the autonomous political domain acknowledged
by religion; (3) abstaining from pronouncing binding halakhic
rulings on intricate public questions, while adopting a position of
neutral halakhic ruling on issues such as surrendering parts of
the land of Israel when life is at stake, agreements to exchange terrorists in return for captives, and so on. Here we already touch upon
R. Halevis position on the State of Israel as a democracy. We shall
now examine this issue in more detail.

A Jewish State: Between the Non-Democratic Ideal and

Granting Recognition to the Democratic State of Israel
on the Basis of the Kings Law
R. Halevi shares R. Uziels opinion that the ideal Jewish state is not a
democracy. He too agrees with Maimonidess monarchic stand, as
formulated in the Laws of Kings.81 In practice, however, when
R. Halevi deals with the actual reality of our time, his approach is
much more pragmatic. A connecting link in the transition between
the anti-democratic ideal and the realization of democracy in practice is his basic idea that precisely in regard to political issues, one
cannot extrapolate from the Torah an unequivocal position because
of the dynamic nature of political and economic issues. The divine
Torah, being eternal, abstains from making absolute statements
and concentrates instead on formulating principles.82 In contemporary reality, democracy should be viewed as the best form of government in our time, in our conditions of life, for it is obvious that
there is no better way.83
Like Rabbi Uziel, R. Halevi, too, relies on communal ordinances as
they developed (over many centuries) in various Jewish communities in the Diaspora and from them he draws implications for
the decision-making process of the democratic institutions in
modern Israel. Moreover, he opposes referendums and prefers
entrusting complicated decisions to the elected representatives of
the public.84 He thus supports the strengthening of representative,
rather than direct, democracy. In view of the public debate about the
fate of Judea and Samaria and the opposition to the Gaza disengagement plan, which once again was led by rabbis and public figures of
the religious-Zionist camp, R. Halevis approval of representative
democracy is highly valuable.
81.
82.
83.
84.

24

MH, part 3, par. 52, pp. 288 90.

ALR, part 3, pp. 288 9; TH, Leviticus, pp. 95 ff.
MH, part 3, p. 288.
MH, part 2, par. 83.

Conflict between Religion and State

Yet in contrast to R. Uziel, the reliance on communal ordinances
as a basis for giving legitimacy to democratically elected representatives of the public is not the major principle established by R. Halevi
in his approval of the current democratic regime in Israel. He
prefers to adopt another approach, one initiated by R. Nissim
Gerondi and developed in the halakhic world of the Middle Ages.
Yedidia Stern observes that in the course of Jewish history, in parallel to the rulings of the Talmudic scholars, Jewish law was also
applied by the lay leadership.85 In the halakhic tradition, it was
R. Nissim Gerondi, the outstanding thinker, who established the
concept of two parallel systems: the legislative and the judicial. In
his eleventh published discourse, R. Nissim considerably expanded
the kings duties to work toward tikkun olam, promoting public
welfare. He did so by ascribing political-pragmatic objectives to
the Kings Law, compared to the spiritual-ideal objectives of Torah
Law. R. Nissims approach envisions a dual system that separates
religion from the state, and as such is more in line with practice in
the Christian world.86
In his article, A Law Abiding State and a Halakhic State, R. Halevi
relies on R. Nissims position.87 Following the decisors who were the
precursors of this position, R. Halevi believes that once a Jewish
monarchy ceased to exist, the authority of state legislation was
extended to any competent leadership.88 His conclusion is as
follows: A king, or a secular authority that derives its power from
the sovereignty traditionally associated with the kings rule, is
entitled to issue permanent ordinances not prescribed by the
Torah, provided that this is done in order to regulate proper
social life.89 From this derives the notion that even though the
State of Israel is not directly based on the Torahs laws, it is
crucial to abide by its rule of law.
85. Yedidia Z. Stern, State, Law and Halakha, part 1: Civil Leadership as
Halakhic Authority, trans. Batya Stein, Position Paper No. 2 (Jerusalem: The
Israel Democracy Institute, December 2001), 5 75.
86. R. Nissim b. Reuven of Gerona, Derashot ha-RaN (The Sermons of R. Nissim
of Gerona), the Eleventh Sermon (Jerusalem: Shalem Institute, n.d.). See
Ravitzky, Religion and State in Jewish Philosophy; Menachem Lorberbaum, Politics and the Limits of Law: Secularizing the Political in Medieval Jewish
Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
87. MHH.
88. R. Hayyim David Halevi, Medinat Hok u-Medinat Halakhah, in Dat
u-Medinah (Religion and State) [MHH], (Tel Aviv, 1969), 49 60. The decisor
who began this move is Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865 1935). The first Ashkenazi chief Rabbi of the land of Israel, Rav Kook was a major figure in religious
Zionist halakhic ruling and thought in the twentieth century. See his Mishpat
Cohen (Jerusalem: Mossad Ha-Rav Kook, 1993), 144.
89. Ibid., p. 52.

25

Journal of Church and State

Recently, voices from within the religious-Zionist camp called for
soldiers to refuse legal orders to evacuate any settlements on the
grounds that these orders contradict the Torahs command to
populate the Land of Israel. R. Halevis approach avoids such a conflict between religion and state. In response to the question what is
the extent of the duty to obey military orders?90 he draws on the
peoples words to Joshua: Whoever rebels against your commandment and will not hearken to your words in all that you command
him, he shall be put to death (Josh. 1:18). From this biblical verse
the sages learn the duty to obey the king.91 R. Halevi cites various
decisors who state that it is possible to apply this to any leader
who wins the consent of the people of Israel.92 He therefore concludes: Undoubtedly, in a democratic state in which the government is elected by the people through general elections, the
government has the same authority as the king, so that the same
obligation to obey its orders and directives equally applies to its citizens.93 Nonetheless, it emerges from the Talmud and from the
Code of Maimonides that one should not obey an order that contradicts a law of the Torah.94 But when it is questionable whether the
governmental decree clearly conflicts with Jewish Law or when
peoples lives may be at stake, the order must be obeyed.95 Thus,
R. Halevi reduces to a minimum the possibility of religious
dissension.

Summary and Conclusions

The teachings of R. Uziel and of his disciple, R. Halevi, on the
relations between religion and state in Israel have a lot in common
but maintain some notable distinctions. On the one hand, both
R. Uziel and R. Halevi strive to strengthen the universally oriented
religious dimension in Jewish national identity and aspire for the
unification of religion and state in the future Jewish state of the
messianic era. On the other hand, they view the current reality in
the state of Israel in different ways. R. Uziel believes in a rapid
strengthening of the unity between religion and state. R. Halevi
acknowledges the discrepancies between the two domains and is
in favor of a certain compartmentalization. Nonetheless, both
teachings propose mechanisms that allow for a far-reaching recognition of the authority of the State of Israel and its governing
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

26

ALR, part 7, par. 68.

Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, p. 49.
ALR, part 7, par. 68, p. 270.
ALR, part 7, par. 68., p. 272.
TB Sanhedrin 49a b; Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim, III, 9.
ALR, part 7, par. 68, p. 273.

Conflict between Religion and State

powers as representative of a democratic regime. In this way, they
make a significant contribution toward reducing the conflict
between religion and state in Israel, provided that this goal is considered sufficiently important. Against the background of the
serious threats to the stability of Israeli democracy from within, in
view of the clash between religion and state in various matters,
and especially against the background of the political processes
leading to a withdrawal from parts of the Land of Israel, it would
be hard to overstate the value of these opinions.

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