1.

2008
a. Violation of Art. 10, Sec. 10
b. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
i. Pendency not a material difference
2. 2009
a. No violation of Art. 10, Sec. 10 code means a law enacted by
Congress
b. No violation of Equal Protection Clause
c. Spirit of the Law shall prevail
d. Cityhood Laws and RA 9009 are different from LGC
e. Equal Protection clause
i. The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and
elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being
an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play.
ii. This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or
artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as
the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection
only insofar as their property is concerned.
iii. In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors
cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely
because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the
enactment of the cityhood laws.
iv. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of
the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee.
3. 2010
a. Violation of Art.10, Sec. 10 unambiguous
b. RA 9009 is not a law difference the LGC, since it expressly amends
section 450 of LGC
c. Pendency does not affect the level of income of the municipalities
d. Equal Protection Clause
i. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally
related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent
fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into
cities.
ii. That specific condition will never happen again. This
violates the requirement that a valid classification must
not be limited to existing conditions only.
iii. In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all
similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the
16 respondent municipalities can.
4. 2011
a. No violation of Art. 10, Sec. 10

i. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are

the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
ii. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and
capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of
trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation,
rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources,
and flourishing tourism spots.
iii. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true
that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood
Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore,
also amendments to the LGC itself.
b. Equal protection clause
i. Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws,
recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency
of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their
relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present