In December of 1979, the Soviet Union launched a lightning-fast military offensi

ve against
the backward nation of Afghanistan. It was after this invasion that President Ji
mmy Carter
admitted publicly that it had taught him more about the intentions of the Soviet
s than
everything he had ever learned. Never again would he kiss the cheeks of Premier
Brezhnev
before the television cameras of the West. The Democrat-controlled Senate even r
efused to
ratify his SALT II treaty. (By the way, President Reagan has been honoring its t
erms
unofficially, and he already has ordered the destruction of several Poseidon sub
marines,
including the U.S.S. Sam Rayburn, the dismantling of which began in November of
1985,1
and which cost a staggering $21 million for the destruction of that one ship.2 T
he Nathan
Hale and the Andrew Jackson are scheduled for destruction in 1986.3 To comply wi
th
SALT II, we will have to destroy an additional 2,500 Poseidon submarine warheads
. "Good
faith," American diplomatic officials argue. ("Good grief," you may be thinking.
)
The invasion of Afghanistan was a landmark shift in Soviet military tactics. Dep
arting from
half a century of slow, plodding, "smother the enemy with raw power" tactics, th
e Soviet
military leadership adopted the lightning strike. Overnight, the Soviets had cap
tured the
Kabul airfield and had surrounded the capital city with tanks.4
Tanks? In an overnight invasion? How did 30-ton Soviet tanks roll from the Sovie
t border
to the interior city of Kabul in one day? What about the rugged Afghan terrain?
The answer is simple: there are two highways from the Soviet Union to Kabul, inc
luding
one which is 647 miles long. Their bridges can support tanks. Do you think that
Afghan
peasants built these roads for yak-drawn carts? Do you think that Afghan peasant
s built
these roads at all? No, you built them.
In 1966, reports on this huge construction project began to appear in obscure U.
S.
magainzes. The project was completed the following year. It was part of Lyndon J
ohnson's
Great Society. Soviet and U.S.' engineers worked side by side, spending U.S. for
eign aid
money and Soviet money, to get the highways built. One strip of road, 67 miles l
ong, north
through the Salang Pass to the U.S.S.R., cost $42 million, or $643,000 per mile.
John W.
Millers, the leader of the United National survey team in Afghanistan, commented
at the
time that it was the most expensive bit of road he had ever seen. The Soviets tr
ained and
used 8,000 Afghans to build it.5
If there were any justice in this world of international foreign aid, the Soviet
tanks should
rave rolled by signs that read: "U .S. Highway Tax Dollars at Work."
Nice guys, the Soviets. They just wanted to help a technologically backward nati

on. Nice
guys, American foreign aid officials. They also just wanted to help a technologi
cally
backward nation... the Soviet Union.