TORTS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2075

November 29, 1949

MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-appellees.
Nicolas P. Nonato for appellant.
Gellada, Mirasol and Ravena for appellees.
REYES, J.:
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now
deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed
compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as
a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that
plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of action, and
the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even
if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

El articulo 1905 del codigo Civil no consienta otra interpretacion que la que, clara y evidentemente, se
deriva de sus terminos literales, bastando, segun el mismo, que un animal cause perjuicio para que
nasca la responsibilidad del dueno, aun no imputandose a este ninguna clase de culpa o negligencia,
habida,sin duda, cuenta por el lgislador de que tal concepto de dueno es suficiente para que arrastre las
consecuencias favorables o adversas de esta clase de propiedad, salvo la exception en el mismo
contenida. (12 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish CivilCode, 573.)
This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or
third person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person injured was the caretaker of
the animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person
liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody
and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work
as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of
the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the death of
an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said
tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than under
article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action, however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, there being no allegation that, among other things, defendant's business, whatever that might be, had a gross
income of P20,000. As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but
action under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on
article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as
owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.
There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view
of the financial situation of the appellant.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.
The question presented is whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.
The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the
owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that
the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between
damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. For
authority counsel cites the following opinion which Manresa quotes from a decision of the Spanish Supreme
Court:

G.R. No. L-9010

March 28, 1914
J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.

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JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.
Wolfson & Wolfson for appellant.Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a single-track street-car line running
along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these switches
was located at the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose house the accident
happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila.
Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the
gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being
from the front or the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not
reached it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to
come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the
defendant's automobile.
The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent
driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being
immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it.
Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch that is, went
off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant no longer
followed that the street car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit
to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction
to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff
attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the
right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as above described.
The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly,
for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures
a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in
the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his
own.
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of
the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct
the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and
pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with
the negligence of the driver.
Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be responsible, whether present
or not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of a business enterprise, and was being
driven at the time of the accident in furtherance of the owner's business, we do not now decide.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Trent, J., concurs in the result.

A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence
in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in
common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon
him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the
law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car.
He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to
pass upon that side of the street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of
this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the
list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were
committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver
are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom.
An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law
by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that
the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits
his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him,

G.R. No. L-20392

December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN
CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad
litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for

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defendants-appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were
injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the
sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the
plaintiffs
is
hereby
ordered
dismissed,
for
lack
of
merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the
plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total amount of the
plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was
defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the first
question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable
with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos
Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in
Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the
car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai,
with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack for his
regular round of golf.

The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of
traffic the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56
kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same
direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of
a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian
Bautista.

oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however,
decided to take a gamble beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else
squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite
obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it
was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and
so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the
wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the
collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the
scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must
be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as
owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver.
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who
was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The
rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman
vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such
a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away.
This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side,
and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not
notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from
afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60
miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes
himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other
hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile,
although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the
owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of
slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to
pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel,
wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible
of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or
damage.

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In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937,
and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During
that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at
all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the
accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of
the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as
has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that
early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver.
He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his
failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did
see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left
side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such
that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only
make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence
of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective.
Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many
cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because
they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the
relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a
negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how
to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly
equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum
level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners
who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next
question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moral
damages is itemized as follows:
1. Marcial Caedo

P 20,000.00

2. Juana S. Caedo

15,000.00

3. Ephraim Caedo

3,000.00

4. Eileen Caedo

4,000.00

5. Rose Elaine Caedo

3,000.00

6. Merilyn Caedo

3,000.00

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual or compensatory
damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that the
amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side.
The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries, other than expenses
for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven.
Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not
actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:
MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture; Subparieto-plaural
hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital
EILEEN CAEDO:
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third,
anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third

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C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral
damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe
Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against
the latter.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.

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COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company
and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?
This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt
Lancers, cruising northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic
accident. The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the
highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR
Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other
vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting
the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's
license. 1
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the
latter P25,382.20.
By way of subrogation,2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance
Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address; in
fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.
On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of
subrogation.3
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on another
ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent
FILCAR.4 In other words, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasidelict.
In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third
persons
although
the
vehicle
is
leased
to
another.

We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done . Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . "

about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the
center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered
by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176
shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. 7 Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is
hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen.
As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in
any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.

To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. 6

We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap,
the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180
are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of masterdriver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action
against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can
neither prosper.

We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought

Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein.

In that case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to
several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the

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defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and,
that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true
nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself
of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint
and several liability of the corporation with its driver.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1995
sustaining the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
Vitug,
Panganiban
and
Quisumbing,
JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Traffic Accident Investigation Report; Records, p. 130.
2 Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or
right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its
rights, remedies, or securities (Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 57 Idaho 670, 69 P. 2d 122, 126). Subrogation
denotes the exchange of a third person who has paid a debt in the place of the creditor to whom he has paid it, so
that he may exercise against the debtor all the rights which the creditor, if unpaid, might have
done. . . . Insurance companies, guarantors and bonding companies generally have the right to step into the shoes
of the party whom they compensate and sue any party whom the compensated party could have sued (Black's
Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., p. 1427).
3 Decision penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos, RTC-Br. 65, Makati City, Records, pp. 204-205.

G.R. No. 162987

May 21, 2009
SOFIA M. GUILLANG, represented by SUSAN GUILLANG-CABATBAT, REYNALDO, GERARDO,
BIENVENIDO, DAWNA, and NELLIE, all surnamed GUILLANG, GENARO GUILLANG, JOSE
DIGNADICE, and ALVIN LLANILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
RODOLFO BEDANIA and RODOLFO DE SILVA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 of the 3 June 2003 Decision 2 and the 23 March 2004 Resolution 3 of the Court of

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Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. The 3 June 2003 Decision set aside the 5 December 2000 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila (trial court). The 23 March 2004 Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his
brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway
(highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin
Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, Dasmarias, Cavite, and were on their way to Manila.
At the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo
truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de
Silva (de Silva).
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the
truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the right portion of the truck. The truck dragged
Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road.
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical Center in
Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to the Philippine
General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision.
The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.
On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero 5 instituted a complaint for
damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva.
On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania
grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due
regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in
the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. The dispositive portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Rodolfo A. Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs, as follows:
1. The sum of P508,566.03 representing the damage/repair costs of the Toyota to plaintiff Genaro M. Guillang.
2. The sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Antero Guillang plus P185,000.00 for his burial expenses, to the heirs
of Antero Guillang.
3. For hospital and medical expenses as reflected in Exhibits E, E-1 to E-30 to plaintiffs Genaro M. Guillang,
Jose Dignadice and Alvin Llanillo.
4. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages for the heirs of the deceased Antero Guillang.
5. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages each to plaintiffs Jose Dignadice, Alvin Llanillo and Genaro
Guillang.
6. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
7. The sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fess.
8. The costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.6
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 3 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the

decision provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
the herein appellees in Civil Case No. 95-73666 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The appellants counterclaims
in the instant case are likewise DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On 23 March 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
According to the trial court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. 8 In this case, the trial court found that the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report (report), 9 corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses, showed that the truck
committed a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal lights. The trial court also declared that
Bedania violated Sections 45(b), 10 48,11 and 5412 of Republic Act No. 413613 when he executed the sudden U-turn.
The trial court added that Bedania violated another traffic rule when he abandoned the victims after the
collision.14
The trial court concluded that Bedania was grossly negligent in his driving and held him liable for damages.
Moreover, the trial court found that Bedania did not make the U-turn at an intersection. According to the trial
court, vehicles trying to maneuver to change directions must seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver
and not recklessly make a U-turn in a highway. The trial court said Bedania should have observed extreme
caution in making a U-turn because it was unexpected that a long cargo truck would execute a U-turn along the
highway.
The trial court also said that Bedanias gross negligence raised the legal presumption that de Silva, as Bedanias
employer, was negligent in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court said that, under Articles
217615 and 218016 of the Civil Code, de Silvas liability was based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer
primarily liable for tortious acts of his employees, subject to the defense that he exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court ruled that de Silva failed
to prove this defense and, consequently, held him liable for damages.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and said that the trial court overlooked substantial facts
and circumstances which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and alter the results of the
case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the testimonies of the witnesses and declared that they were "contrary to human
observation, knowledge and experience." The Court of Appeals also said that the following were the physical
evidences in the case:
1. It was not yet dark when the incident transpired;
2. The four-lane highway the appellees were cruising on was wide, straight, dry, relatively plain and with no
obstructions to the drivers vision;
3. The point of impact of the collision is on the lane where the car was cruising and the car hit the gas tank of the
truck located at its right middle portion, which indicates that the truck had already properly positioned itself and
had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred;
4. Genaro Guillang was not able to stop the car in time and the cars front portion was totally wrecked. This
negates appellees contention that they were traveling at a moderate speed; and

TORTS
5. The sheer size of the truck makes it improbable for the said vehicle to negotiate a U-turn at a sudden and fast
speed as appellees vigorously suggest without toppling over on its side. 17 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals concluded that the collision was caused by Genaros negligence. The Court of Appeals
declared that the truck arrived at the intersection way ahead of the car and had already executed the U-turn when
the car, traveling at a fast speed, hit the trucks side.
The Court of Appeals added that considering the time and the favorable visibility of the road and the road
conditions, Genaro, if he was alert, had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road. The Court of
Appeals found no reason for Genaro not to be prudent because he was approaching an intersection and there was
a great possibility that vehicles would be traversing the intersection either going to or from Orchard Golf Course.
The Court of Appeals said Genaro should have slowed down upon reaching the intersection. The Court of
Appeals concluded that Genaros failure to observe the necessary precautions was the proximate cause of
Anteros death and the injuries of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the testimony of Police Traffic Investigator Efren Videna (Videna) that the
car was running at a fast speed and overtook another vehicle just before the collision occurred. 18 The Court of
Appeals concluded that Genaro did not see the truck as the other vehicle temporarily blocked his view of the
intersection. The Court of Appeals also gave weight to Videnas testimony that it was normal for a ten-wheeler
truck to make a U-turn on that part of the highway because the entrance to Orchard Golf Course was spacious. 19
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals decide a question of substance in this case in a way probably not in accord with law
or with the applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court?
2. Did the Court of Appeals depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings particularly when
it revised, and recast the findings of facts of the trial court pertaining to credibility of witnesses of which the trial
court was at the vantage point to evaluate?
3. Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it rendered
the palpably questionable Court of Appeals Decision that tampered with the findings of fact of the trial court for
no justifiable reason?
4. Is the Court of Appeals judgment and resolution reversing the decision of the trial court supported by the
evidence and the law and jurisprudence applicable? 20
The issue in this case is who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. The trial court held Bedania and de
Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn executed
by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision
and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaros failure to stop the car despite
seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.
The Ruling of the Court
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding
on this Court.21
However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court. 22 Findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may also be set
aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts conclusions are based on a
misapprehension of facts.23 Such is the situation in this case and we shall re-examine the facts and evidence
presented before the lower courts.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.24
There is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of the collision. However, the issues on negligence
and proximate cause are disputed.
On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In Picart v. Smith,25 we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence on record. In
ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to Videnas testimony.
However, we find that Videnas testimony was inconsistent with the police records and report that he made on the
day of the collision. First, Videna testified that the car was running fast and overtook another vehicle that already
gave way to the truck.26 But this was not indicated in either the report or the police records. Moreover, if the car
was speeding, there should have been skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the
collision. But the sketch of the accident showed no skid marks made by the car.27
Second, Videna testified that the petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to smell liquor. 28 But
in the report,29 Videna indicated that the condition of Genaro was "normal." Videna did not indicate in the report
that Genaro "had been drinking liquor" or that Genaro "was obviously drunk." Third, Videna testified that when
he arrived at the scene, Bedania was inside his truck. 30 This contradicts the police records where Videna stated
that after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims. 31 The police records also showed that Bedania
was arrested by the police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned over to the police only on 26
October 1994.32
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report33 showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic
rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and
his truck.34 This is another violation of a traffic regulation. 35 Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was
negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck
had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred.
If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear. 36 If the truck had already negotiated
even half of the turn and is almost on the other side of the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the
middle portion of the trailer or cargo compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals
even declared, that the car hit the trucks gas tank, located at the trucks right middle portion, which disproves the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by the car.

TORTS
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car was cruising.
Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck that was
making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is not supported
by the evidence on record. The police sketch 37 does not indicate an intersection and only shows that there was a
road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are generally not
advisable particularly on major streets. 38 Contrary to Videnas testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make a Uturn on a highway. We agree with the trial court that if Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an
intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck.
Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from
the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.

Manila South Cemetery Association, Inc., aggregating P135,000. We reduce the trial courts award of funeral and
burial expenses from P185,000 to P135,000.
As to hospitalization expenses, only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the hospitalization of the victims will be recognized in court. 49 In this case,
the trial court did not specify the amount of hospitalization expenses to be awarded to the petitioners. Since
petitioners presented receipts for hospitalization expenses during the trial, we will determine the proper amounts
to be awarded to each of them. We award hospitalization expenses of P27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero,50
P10,881.60 to Llanillo,51 P5,436.77 to Dignadice,52 and P300 to Genaro53 because these are the amounts duly
substantiated by receipts.
We affirm the trial courts award of P508,566.03 for the repair of the car. The Court notes that there is no dispute
that Genaro was driving a brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan and that, after the collision, the car was a total
wreck. In this case, the repair order presented by Genaro is sufficient proof of the damages sustained by the car. 54

The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred is also not supported by
the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of the collision was "darkness." 39
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not make it improbable for the
truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial courts decision did not state that the truck was traveling at a fast
speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a "sudden" U-turn, meaning the U-turn was
made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the trucks signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and
injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 40 The
cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.

Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. 55 However, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 each to Llanillo,
Dignadice, and Genaro since they only suffered physical injuries brought about by the collision. 56
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 57 While the
amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded.58 In this case, Bedania was grossly negligent in suddenly making a U-turn in the highway
without signal lights. To serve as an example for the public good, we affirm the trial courts award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.
Finally, we affirm the trial courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000. Under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in this case, exemplary damages are awarded.

The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to
prevent or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and,
ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is also liable for the damages suffered by
petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employees.
On the Award of Damages and Attorneys Fees
According to prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict is pegged at P50,000.41
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is also awarded to the heirs of the deceased taking into consideration
the pain and anguish they suffered. 42 Bienvenido Guillang (Bienvenido), Anteros son, testified that Sofia,
Anteros wife and his mother, became depressed after Anteros death and that Sofia died a year after. 43
Bienvenido also testified on the pain and anguish their family suffered as a consequence of their fathers death. 44
We sustain the trial courts award of P50,000 as indemnity for death and P50,000 as moral damages to the heirs
of Antero.
As to funeral and burial expenses, the court can only award such amount as are supported by proper receipts. 45
In this case, petitioners proved funeral and burial expenses of P55,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1082, 46
P65,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1146 47 and P15,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1064, 48 all issued by the

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the 3 June 2003 Decision and 23 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. We REINSTATE with MODIFICATIONS the 5 December 2000 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. We ORDER Rodolfo Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva, jointly and
severally, to pay the following amounts:
1. Funeral and Burial Expenses of P135,000 to the heirs of Antero Guillang;
2. Hospitalization Expenses of P27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero Guillang, P10,881.60 to Alvin Llanillo,
P5,436.77 to Jose Dignadice, and P300 to Genaro Guillang; and
3. Moral damages of P30,000 each to Alvin Llanillo, Jose Dignadice, and Genaro Guillang.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice4 Decision penned by Justice Jaime M. Lantin with the concurrence of Justices Alicia AustriaMartinez and Conrado M. Vasquez Jr.; Rollo, p. 18.
5 G.R. No. 57298, 7 September 1984, 132 SCRA 10.
6 Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 6 November 1990, 191 SCRA 195.
7 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992, Ed., Vol. V,
p. 611.

10

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23052

January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After
waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from
the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine

11

TORTS
General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated
wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and
the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption
caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a
private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a
complaint which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and
quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor
at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine
Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the
Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack
Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the
Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary
occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to
work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates
and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the
welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has
obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain
Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a
catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same
was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported
missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office
of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not
covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is
charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that
whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is
immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin
with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron
catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court
resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks
with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been
undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision
sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of
Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this
appeal by the City of Manila.

The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special
law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of thedefective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving
him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection
therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the
defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept
in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective
functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and isunder its control and supervision.

12

TORTS
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of
fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much
less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City
of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which
were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are
not subject to our review.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would
not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact
Section 18(x) thereof provides:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of
Manila. It is so ordered.1wph1.t

Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and toregulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves,
piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of
streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the
openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of
tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the
stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for
the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the
construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and
regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using
the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and
other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate
the lightsused on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade,
and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such
provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof,
to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair
ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the
streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113,
dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway
funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and
streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said
Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides
that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers
under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as
may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."

Dingcong vs Kanaan
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria rented a room in the
upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above the store occupied by the Kanaan brothers
who are also tenants of the hotel. One night, Echevarria carelessly left his faucet open thereby flooding his room
and it caused water to drip from his room to the store below. Because of this, the articles being sold by Kanaan
were damaged. Apparently also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from Echevarrias room was
defective hence the flooding and the dripping.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by Echevarria.
HELD: Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest of his hotel (Echevarria). It was
not shown that Dingcong exercised the diligence of a good father in preventing the damage caused. The pipe
should have been repaired prior and Echevarria should have been provided with a container to catch the drip.
Therefore, Dingcong is liable to pay for damages by reason of his negligence.

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G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a consequence of the big drop
in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. The
interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability,
as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must therefore be filed within six months from the
delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public
respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft
drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public;
on or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks
sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; he then went over her stock of
softdrinks and discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke
bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles to the

14

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Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for examination; subsequently,
she received a letter from the Department of Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are
adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks
severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from
P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989; she became
jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30% of the
damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
prescription. Anent the latter ground, the petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of warranty
under Article 1561 of the said Code. In her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is
one for damages which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is based on an
injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code;
hence, the complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties. 5
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the existing administrative remedy is not adequate. It
also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the
complaint should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 17 April
1991, 7 the private respondent came to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari which we referred to the
public respondent "for proper determination and disposition. 8 The public respondent docketed the case as CAG.R. SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the questioned orders of the RTC
and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it
ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of warranty as respondent contends, the
applicable prescriptive period is four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action or damages arising from
respondent's act of "recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold or public
consumption" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an action are the
facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in the defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v.
Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code, the existence of contractual relations
between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against the other for quasi-delict arising from
negligence in the performance of a contract.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor

. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that) although the relation between a passenger and a
carrier is "contractual both in origin and in nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was taken, the authorities are one in
saying that he availability of an action or breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective
goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public respondent in its Resolution of
14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It alleges in its petition that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE WHEN THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES
UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
II.
CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF
ACTION HAD PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the primary legal basis for private
respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict for the complaint does not
ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's
implied warranties under the law on sales.
It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the
application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of
implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks
pursuant to Article 171 of the Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the seller's implied warranties, the vendee
may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between withdrawing from the contract or demanding a
proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either case. She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is
neither an action for rescission nor for proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from a quasidelict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a contract did not preclude the
action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the private respondent insists that since her cause of action
is based on quasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the
Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four
(4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes
reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances

15

TORTS
upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing
from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages either
case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the
ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud
is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from
negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based
thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties
may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this
view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, 19
involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages
from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger
and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasidelict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana,
culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, 26
which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should by no means be
understood as suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal
basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5932

February 27, 1912

DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL A. REYES, FAUSTINO
AGUILAR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous
publication. The complaint was in the following language:
COMPLAINT.
I.
That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
II.
That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M.
Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners,
directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known

16

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as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which newspaper during all the time mentioned in this
complaint was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of
Manila, having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.
III.
That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said
newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October, 1908, with the malicious intention of injuring the
plaintiff, who on said date was, and still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the honesty and reviled the
fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an official of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the
public, printed, wrote (redactaron), and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the 30th
of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel which was injurious (injurioso) to the plaintiff,
said libel reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and
devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of
things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times
they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in the majority of
cases they did not obtain but a change of name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation between the ones and the
others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creatures'
expense.
"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon. And for
some psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the
fiercest and most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the
serpent. Some have done so by a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of
simulation, of infatuated vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor ever
can be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts. And
men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird
in order to triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and
the vampire.

"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots and
study and civilize them and to espy in his flight, with the eye of the bird of prey, where are
the large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amidst the lonely mountains, to appropriate
them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for
his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order
to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn
by virtue of his official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes
his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is
confined o dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were
less nourishing and less savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species
coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindoro, in Mindanao,
and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the
pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data
and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense properties registered under he names of others.
"Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of worthless land at
fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not refuse, from fear of displeasing the one who is
behind the motion, and which they do not refuse for their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the prospects of enormous profits,
at the expense of the blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and
devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a
petulent omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves
it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too weak to raise a voice of protest. And
others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."

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IV.
That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to public in
general, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of
the Interior, and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms and language used in said defamation
and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and
that should be understood, as in effect they were understood, by the public officials of the Government
and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the
publicly known fact that said plaintiff in compliance with his duties in his position as such member of
the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands,
ascended on a previous occasion the mountains of the Province of Benguet to study the native tribe
known as Igorot, residing in said region; by reason of the publicly known fact that in the said
mountains of Benguet there exist large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines, which is the legislative body of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiff
takes part in the enactment and repealing of laws in said Islands; by reason furthermore of the fact,
publicly known, that the plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has had
under his direction and control the enforcement of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances
of the city of Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by reason furthermore of the fact, publicly
known that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had under his
direction and control the Bureau of Science of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and he is
generally known as a man devoted to the study of science; by reason furthermore of the publicly known
fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, at a previous time,
caused the importation into the Philippine Islands of fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the
mountain streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-hatcheries; by reason furthermore of the publicly
known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has journeyed
to and explored the Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao, and other regions of the Philippine Archipelago; by
reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, at one time investigated and prepared a report for the Civil Commission of the
Philippines in regard to a certain proposition for the purchase of a parcel of land for the city of Manila;
by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as member of said Civil
Commission of the Philippines together with the other members of said legislative body, once opened
negotiations with a certain firm engaged in the hotel business in regard to the location of a prospective
hotel on one of the filled-in lands of the city of Manila.
That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with
wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws
of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal
combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object of gain for himself and for others;
and lastly with being "a bird of prey;" and that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was
understood, by the public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in
general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all of which
allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false
and without any foundation whatsoever.

That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy
type, and every effort made by said defendants to see that said defamation and libel should attract the
attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
V.
Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing
the said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the
plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this
reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this
way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties,
and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned newspaper,
have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff and to incite the
people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which
the plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a
public official in every one of the Departments.
VI.
And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity
for the additional work to which he has been put, by the said defendants, in the compliance of his
duties, both in the past and the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, and besides this said amount he is entitled
to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency,
in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.
Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:
(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.
(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated, and the
costs of the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the following demurrer to the said complaint:
DEMURRER.
Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney, and demur to the complaint filed herein,
upon the following grounds:
First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.

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Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause or right of action.

On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented their amended answer, which was as follows:

Third. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff and several of the defendants for the
same cause; and

ANSWER.

Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously included therein.

The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their undersigned attorney, by their answer to the
complaint, state:

Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.

That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the complaint.

On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled said demurrer in the
following decision, to which the defendants duly excepted:

As a special defense, the defendants allege:

First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as it clearly appears from the
allegations of the complaint and which the defendants hereby deny.

ORDER.
The defendant demur upon several grounds:
(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible and this is directed principally to
paragraph 2, in which it is alleged that the defendants were "dueos, directores, redactores", etc., but it
is not alleged that they were such simultaneously. If this were the sole averment of the defendants'
connection with the alleged libel, the objection might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of the complaint
alleges that the defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron", etc., the article complained of.
Under section 2 of Act 277 "every person" who "publishes or procures to be published any belief is
made responsible. (Cf. U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 752.) We think, therefore, that the connection of the
defendants with the publication complained of is sufficiently charged.
(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to state a cause of action and it is urged in
support of this that the article complained of and which is copied in the complaint, fails to mention the
plaintiff or to show on its face that it refers to him. It is, however, specifically alleged in paragraph 4
that the article was intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so understood by the public, and this
allegation is admitted by the demurrer. Under the rule announced in Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep.,
155), where the words complained of do refer to the plaintiff "an action for libel may be maintained
even though the defamatory publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."
(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending between the parties for the same cause. This,
it is true, is made a ground for demurrer by the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3), but like all
grounds therein mentioned, it must "appear upon the face" of the pleading objected to, and where it
does not so appear "the objection can only be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There is no
averment in the complaint which indicates that there is no another action pending.
The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by law (Code C. P., sec. 91) nor do we find
anything in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which would necessitate any change in the views
already expressed.

Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of action in the complaint, are insufficient to
constitute such cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason that there is now pending in the
Court of First Instance of this city a criminal cause, No. 4295, for the crime of libel against the
defendants herein, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and
civil, being based upon the same facts which the plaintiffs herein, who is also a party to the said
criminal action, now alleges as the basis of his action.
Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been extinguished for the reason that
plaintiff did not expressly reserve the right to enforce the same in the aforesaid cause 4295, for the
crime of libel, after the said criminal cause had been finally disposed of.
Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were
erroneously included in the complaint for the simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said
criminal cause No. 4295, for libel, the third was used as a witness for the prosecution in the said
criminal cause, and the others have no interest, either directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El
Renacimiento" in which it is alleged by the plaintiff the editorial, which is the basis of the complaint,
and which it is claimed to be libelous, was published.
Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the complaint, with the costs against the
plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the arguments if the respective attorneys, the
Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January, 1910, rendered the following decision:
DECISION.

The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given the usual five days to answer.

19

TORTS
This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000 for an alleged libel of the plaintiff
by the defendants.

have done so by a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of
infatuated vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor ever will be.

The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine
Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of Insular Government. The defendants are twelve persons
designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers
(redactores), editors (editores), and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as the plaintiff, are residents of the
city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts. And
men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird
in order to triumph in the plundering if their fellow-men.

It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of October, 1908, the
defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said daily newspaper, and
that said newspaper, during all the time mentioned in the complaint, was published and circulated daily
in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the
Philippine Islands.

"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots and
study and civilize them, and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey, where are
the large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely mountains, to appropriate
them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for
his own benefit.

It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the
plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious intention of injuring the
plaintiff who then was still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled the reputation of
the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as an official of the Government of the Philippine
Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they
wrote, printed, and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the said 30th of October,
1908, a malicious defamation and false libel, which was injurious to the plaintiff, said libel, as
translated from the Spanish, reading as follows:

"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order
to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn
by virtue of his official position.

"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and
devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of
things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former. At times
they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in a majority of cases
they do not obtain anything but a change of name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the relation between the ones and the
others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creature's
expense.
"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon. And for some
psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and
most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some

"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and
the vampire.

"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes
his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is
confined to dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were
less nourishing and savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species
coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao, in Mindoro,
and in other virgin regions of the archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the
pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data
and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of others.
"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the city worthless land at fabulous
prices which the city fathers dare not refuse from fear of displeasing the one who is behind
the motion, and which they do not refuse to their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the prospects of enormous profits,
at the expense of the blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and
devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a
petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves
it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are never thwarted.

20

TORTS
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to raise a voice to protest. And
others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff was on the date of
said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public generally, personally as well as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as a Secretary of the Interior; and the
defamation and libel, and the words, terms, and language used in said defamation and libel were
employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should
be understood, as in fact they were understood, by the public officials of the Government and the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for
saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the public understood it as referring to him.)
The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with
wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; and with the violation of the
laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal
combination of the purpose of robbing the people, with the object of gain for himself and for others;
and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was
understood by the public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in
general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all of which
allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false
and without any foundation whatever. That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants
under a heading in large and showy type, and every effort was made by said defendant to see that said
defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said
newspaper and the readers of the same.
In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling
the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious
intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person,
unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose of his administration of the office
in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous
difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he
would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary
of the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said
mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the
plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official
duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have
increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.

And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all these reasons has
been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put by said
defendants in compliance with his duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as for the injuries to
his reputation and feelings, in the sum, of P50,000, and that besides this said amount he is entitled to
collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in the way of punitive damages,
as a warning to the defendants.
The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendants to pay the damages as above stated and the costs of the action; and is dated and signed,
Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909, Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and Hurd, attorneys for plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants, through their attorney, Sr. Felipe Agoncillo,
which demurrer was heretofore heard and overruled by the Court, and the defendants required to
answer. Accordingly, the defendants within the prescribed time, filed their answer; and on November
16, 1909, through their attorney, filed and amended answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):
The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their undersigned attorney, answering
the complaint, state: That they make a general denial of the allegations in the complaint, and
as a special defense allege:
"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the complaint in question, as evidently
appears from the allegations in the same, and which the defendants deny;
"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are insufficient to constitute a cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law, criminal case No. 4295, for libel, against
the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court of First Instance
of this city, being still pending, inasmuch as both causes, criminal and civil, are based upon the same
facts which the plaintiff, who is also interested in said criminal cause, considers a cause of action;
"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been destroyed as a consequence of the fact
that the plaintiff did not expressly reserve his right to the same in the said mentioned cause No. 4295
for libel, in order to exercise it after the termination of said criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit have been erroneously
included in the complaint, for the simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said cause No. 4295
for libel, the third was used as a witness by the prosecution in the same cause, and the latter ones have
no interest, directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes,
was published the editorial which forms the basis of the complaint, and which is said to be libelous; and
concluding with a prayer to the court to dismiss the case, with cost against the plaintiff."
The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing other than a general demurrer to the
complaint, which has been overruled, as already stated.

21

TORTS
The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as meaning a simple denial that the
plaintiff is the person referred to in the alleged libelous article "Birds of Prey," which issue is
sufficiently raised by the general denial of the allegations in the complaint.
The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple reason that section 11 of Act 277 of the
Philippine Commission, under which this suit is brought, especially provides for a separate civil action
for damages, as well as for a criminal prosecution. (See Mr. Justice Johnson's recent decision.) This
third paragraph is therefore without merit; and the same may be said of the fourth paragraph thereof. As
to paragraph five, it contains no material averment which could not have been set up and insisted upon
under the general issue.
One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer already and adjudicated, another part is
covered by the general issue, and the residue is without merit as a legal defense, and might have been
stricken out. The defense is therefore tantamount to the general issue only, there being no special plea
that these charges are true, nor any plea of justification.
The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and ended December 10, 1909, and the
proceedings and evidence introduced are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic notes taken by the
court's official reporter. At the trial Judge Kincaid said Major Hartigan appeared for the plaintiff and
Seores Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and Ferrer for the defendants.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a due consideration of the case, the court
finds the following facts established by the admissions and a decided preponderance of the evidence:
That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in number, are the proprietors and owners of the said
daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," and that "El Renacimiento" and
"Muling Pagsilang," are one and the same newspaper, owned, managed, printed and published by the
same persons; that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos were the editors in chief of directors of this
paper on the 30th of October, 1908, and that said nine defendants named were the owners, editors,
proprietors, managers and publishers of said newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908, for a long time
prior thereto, and during all the time mentioned in the complaint.
As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from the evidence to have been editors
of said paper, but in subordinate position to the chief editors or directors, Kalaw and Santos, and to
have acted under the direction of their latter two defendants.
The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of the complaint is true substantially
as therein stated, with the exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete,
and as may be hereinafter indicated. The case is therefore dismissed as to these three defendants.
The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial "Birds of Prey" does not refer to a
determinate person; and (2) that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of the defendants,
except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous
article of the damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.

In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to the plaintiff, and was so easily and well
understood by the readers of said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it would be an act of
superrogation to elaborately discuss the evidence adduced in support of or against the proposition. It is
as clear to the court from the evidence adduced as the noonday sun, that the plaintiff is the identical and
only person meant and referred to in said article "Birds and Prey;" and it requires no argument to prove
that it does mean and refer to him and was so intended by the writer, and therefore by said nine
defendants, and could not have been otherwise understood by any intelligent reader or subscriber of
said paper, in view of the reasons assigned in the complaint, which reasons are clearly disclosed and
fully established by the evidence. And it may be added that much valuable time was needlessly
consumed by the defense at trial in an effort to establish the contrary.
It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the subscribers and readers of "El
Renacimiento" to contend that this editorial was not well understood by them as referring to the
plaintiff, and as fully as if his name had been mentioned in every paragraph thereof. And assuredly the
omission of his name from the editorial has made the libel less hurtful and disastrous in its results to the
reputation and feelings of the plaintiff.
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants were
the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally
contributed their money as a partriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply
held the money and property of the paper as trustees for this people, and that the paper was being
devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo and Lichauco had agreed to
contribute to the same ends, but had not done so.
This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any, serious
consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and
common sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as
shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901 for their own personal benefit and
profit is fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and
was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of
said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors
thereof, and were such on said 30th of October, 1908.
Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven founders, and that
Lichauco contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco promised to contribute an
amount which he (the witness) did not remember but that Lichauco did not keep his promise. (See pp.
107, 108, and 231 of the evidence.)
The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate Arcadio Arellano, and the court is
constrained to believe that Arellano told the truth and Ocampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy of "El
Renacimiento" containing the article "Infamy Among Comrades," page 87 of the evidence, in which
there was published that these seven persons named are the shareholders of the paper.
Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as to enlighten the court as to which
witness, Arellano or Ocampo, told the truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his authority to publish
in said paper, as he did in November 22, 1907, that he, Galo Lichauco, was one of the shareholders.

22

TORTS
The presumptions are therefore against Galo Lichauco. See S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36 C.
C. A., 136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor or director of the Spanish
section of said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was the chief editor or director of the Tagalog section on
said 30th of October, 1908, and that the Spanish and Tagalog sections are, and then were, one and the
same newspaper, but printed and published in different languages.
It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, and was
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila. Not only are
these allegations true, but it is also true that said newspaper has a daily circulation and subscribers in
other parts of the world, notably in the United States and Spain; and it has subscribers numbering in
toto not less than 5,200, and a daily issue of 6,000 copies.
It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the year 1906 to said 30th of October, 1908,
these nine defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in their said
newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of October, 1908 with the malicious intention of injuring the
plaintiff, who on said date was and still is a member of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the
Interior in the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the odium,
contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its
ordinary number of said 30th of October, 1908, the malicious defamation and false libel of and
concerning the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded to as the editorial "Birds of Prey," which libel was
and is highly injurious to the plaintiff and from which the plaintiff has sustained serious damage.
This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the lines, means, besides other things, and
was intended by the writer to mean and be understood by the readers thereof as meaning substantially
the following:
That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the globe to eat and devour, like a bird
of prey, and that others, born to be eaten and devoured, are the prey and the food of the insatiable
voracity of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff had a desire to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird, the
eagle, in order to triumph in plundering his fellowman; that the plaintiff besides being an eagle, has the
characteristics of thevulture, the owl, and the vampire.
That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots,
and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey the large deposits
of gold-the prey concealed amidst the mountains-and to appropriate them to himself afterwards, and
that to this end the plaintiff had the legal facilities, made and unmade at his own will, and that this is
always done for his own benefit.
That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances, the illegal slaughtering is diseased cattle in
order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meant which he himself was obliged to condemn by
virtue of his official position; that while the plaintiff presents himself on all occasions with the wrinkled
brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, his whole
scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects and importing fish eggs.

That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao
and Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people, under the
pretext of the public good, as a strict matter of truth his object was to possess all the data and the key to
the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, and that this is shown by his acquisition of
immense properties registered under the names of others.
That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of Manila of
worthless land at fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared not refuse from fear of displeasing the
plaintiff, who was behind the project, and which they did not refuse for their own good; that the
plaintiff favored concessions for hotels in Manila on filled-in land; with the prospect of enormous
profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.
That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same time an eagle that surprises and
devours, a vulture that gorges his self on deed and rotten meats, an owl that affects a petulant
omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. And this
libelous article concludes with the asseveration in substance that the plaintiff has been "weighed in the
balance and found wanting" "Mane, Tecel, Phares."
That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying. Almost every line thereof teems with
malevolence, ill will, and wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff; and
from the very nature and the number of the charges therein contained the editorial is necessarily very
damaging to the plaintiff.
That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants, tends to impeach the honesty and
reputation of the plaintiff and publishes his alleged defects, and thereby exposes him to public hatred,
contempt, and ridicule is clearly seen by a bare reading of the editorial.
It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in support of these malicious,
defamatory and injurious charges against the plaintiff; and there was at the trial no pretense whatever
by the defendants that any of them are true, nor the slightest evidence introduced to show the truth of a
solitary charge; nor is there any plea of justification or that the charges are true, much less evidence to
sustain a plea.
In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and considered in its relation to and connection
with the other articles libelous and defamatory in nature, published of and concerning the plaintiff by
these nine defendants anterior and subsequent to the publication of this article, and having reference to
the same subject matter as shown by the evidence, is one of the worst libels of record. It is safe to say
that in all the court reports to the Philippine Islands, or of Spain, or the United States, there is not to be
found a libel case in which there is a more striking exemplification of the spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil
motive, mischievous intent, actual malice, nefarious purpose, base malignity, or gross malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this attack on the plaintiff in the year 1906 down
almost to the present time, so far from there being any apology, retraction, or effort to repair the injury
already done as far as lay in the power of the defendants, the persecution, wrong, and tortious injury to
the plaintiff had been steadily kept up and persisted in, without the slightest abatement of the
malevolent spirit.

23

TORTS
There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per contra, the libel has been repeated,
reiterated, and accentuated, and widely and extensively propagated by these nine defendants through
the columns of their said paper and otherwise; and it appears from the evidence that especial effort has
been made by these same defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the libelous and
defamatory words used of and concerning the plaintiff in said editorial.
Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and reasserting its truth, this diabolical libel
has been spread broadcast over the Philippine Islands and to other parts of the world. In said criminal
case No. 4295 some of these nine defendants pleaded the truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q is to
be found this language: "The defense will adduce its evidence demonstrating the truth of every one of
the facts published."
In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is published statement:
"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of the counsel, to gather
evidence which we are to adduce in our effort to demonstrate the truth of the accusation that
we have formulated in the article which is the subject of the agitation against us, having
expired, the trial of the case against our director had been resumed." (See pp. 63 and 67 of the
evidence.)

The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the
plaintiff, said nine defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting
the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was despotic and corrupt and unworthy of the position
which he held, and for this reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary
of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office
as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel, and other like false statements in
their said newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the
plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties,
in consequence of which the plaintiff has met with many difficulties which have greatly increased his
labors as a public official.
It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort been made by these nine defendants to
give as much publicity as possible to the charges, but in order that said defamation should attract the
attention of the public, they published the same under a heading in large, bold and showy type, so that it
might be easily seen and read by all the subscribers and readers of said paper.

And about the same time they also declared in their said paper that "there is more graft than fish in the
rivers of Benguet." And this in the year of our Lord 1909! the persecution having begun in 1905; thus
indicating that there is to be no "let-up" or cessation of the hostile attitude toward the plaintiff or the
vilification of his name and assaults upon his character, much less a retraction or an apology, unless
drastic means and measures are made use of to the end that there may be no further propagation of the
libel, or asseveration, or reiteration of its truth.

In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every essential allegation of the
complaint is true substantially as therein claimed, and that the whole of the said editorial relating to the
misconduct and bad character of the plaintiff is false and without the slightest foundation in fact. Not a
scintilla of evidence was introduced in support of any injurious charge made therein against the
plaintiff, to say nothing of the plaintiff's evidence that each and every charge of malfeasance therein
contained is false, and without reference to whether a failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the
charge.

This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with malfeasance in office and criminal acts, and is
therefore libelous per se. It in substance charges the plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands and Secretary of the Interior of said Islands
for personal ends. It is charged also substantially that plaintiff in his official capacity wasted the public
funds for the purpose of promoting his own personal welfare, and that he violated the laws of the
Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila.

The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary damage," and none is alleged in the complaint.
Two other kinds of damages, however are claimed, to wit, general damages for injuries to the feelings
and reputation of the plaintiff and additional work to which he has been put by the conduct of the
defendants, which are laid in the sum of P50,000, and "punitive," exemplary, or vindictive damages, "as
a warning to the defendants," or as expressed in Act 277 of the Philippine Commission, as a just
punishment to the libelers and an example to others," which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.

In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the
people with the object of gain for himself and for others; with being a bird of prey, a vulture (buzzard),
an owl, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim (meaning the people) until he leaves it
bloodless, that is to say, robs the people, until he leaves them wretched and poverty-stricken, deprived
of all worldly possessions; and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like Belshazzar, has been weighed in the
balance and found wanting as a high Government functionary; all of which charges are false and
malicious and without and foundation whatever in fact, as the evidence fully demonstrates.

The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the next question to be decided is what
amount of damages should be awarded the plaintiff for the injury to his reputation and feelings and his
being a proper case for punitive damages, the further question is, what sum shall be awarded as a just
punishment to these nine libelers and as an example to others. In neither of these cases is there any
precise measure of damages.

It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation was written and published that it
might be understood, and it was understood, by the public officials of the Government and the people
of the Philippine Islands in general, and wherever else said newspaper may have circulated and been
read, as charging the plaintiff with the tortious and criminal acts and conduct charged in said editorial
as hereinbefore specified and interpreted.

In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it is proper to consider the previous
character, influence, reputation, standing, official position, hope of advancement, prospect of
promotion, and social status of the plaintiff and his family, and all the circumstances connected with the
case.
The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has held for the last ten years an important,
responsible, lucrative, high and exalted position of trust and honor in the service of the Government of

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the United States, in the Philippine Islands, without a blotch on his family escutcheon, so far as the
evidence shows, and with an untarnished reputation as a man, as a citizen, and as a Government
official.
He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position; a man of learning, famous as a scientist, and
scientific achievements and scholarly attainments, a man of industrious habits, genuine worth, and
intellectual force. He has read, studied, traveled and learned much, and is an author of merit and
distinction. He was for a long while a professor in one of the largest and most renowned institutions of
learning in the world; he is a man of vast experience, broad and liberal views, and an extensive
acquaintanceship, not only in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States and other countries of the
world. He was well and favorably received by the people wherever he journeyed previous to this
atrocious libel upon his integrity and reputation.
He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a manner that reflects credit upon himself
as well as the Government which he represents, and apparently with entire satisfaction to all of his
superiors in office and the people generally; and but for this pernicious, outrageous, and highly
reprehensible assault upon his good name, fame and reputation, there were prospects of promotion to
higher honors. And so far as his personal and private record is concerned it was without a blemish
anterior to the time when these unfounded and dastardly aspersions were cast upon it by these nine
defendants.
Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense itself to ascertain that the plaintiff
is an honorable man, and without a stain upon his character, officially or otherwise. It would be
interesting to note here in parallel columns and compare the charges made in "Birds of Prey" and the
testimony of one of the witnesses for the defendants.
Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in his testimony (p. 240) when asked the
question, Do you know Mr. Worcester?" he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as an honorable man. I also
know him as anhonest, honorable public official." In answer to another question he says, "As I have
said, I know Mr. Worcester as a private citizen and as a public official, and my opinion of him is that of
honorable man and an upright official." And no other witness testified anything to the contrary.
"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving favor rather than silver of
gold."
"Who steals my purse steals trash;
xxx

xxx

xxx

But he that filches from me my good name,

Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."
The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty
or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole scheme of
human civilization.

"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a well-spent life
vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their
possession the solace of later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen and
known of his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed
a great character and an unblemished reputation, has secured a possession more useful, and
more valuable than lands, or houses, or silver, or gold . . .
"The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly strives to give redress for
its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words, or libelous publication, a
liability to make full compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame and
obloquy, and for the injury to the feelings of the owner, which are caused by the publication
of the slander or the libel.
"It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is made, with the intent to injure
the victim, or with the criminal indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as a
jury (in this case the judge), in view of all the circumstances of the particular case adjudge
that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public, to deter others from committing
like offenses, and as a punishment for the infliction of the injury.
"In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil intent, or hatred, while it
is legal signification is defined to be "a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal
justification." (36 C. C. A., 475.)
Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act done intentionally and without the
semblance of justification or excuse, or proof that the libelous charges against the plaintiff were
"published and good motives and justifiable ends."
But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these Islands have spoken in no uncertain
words with regard to the rights of the plaintiff in this case; and we need not necessarily turn to the law
of libel elsewhere, or the decision of the courts in other jurisdictions to ascertain or determine his
rights.
In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine Commission) is to be found the
law of these Islands especially applicable to this case. Section 1 thereof defines libel. Section 2
provides that every person who willfully and with a malicious intent to injure another publishes, or
procures to be published, any libel shall be punished as therein provided. Section 3 provides that an
injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive for making it is
shown. Section 4 provides, among other things, that in all criminal prosecutions the truth may be given
in evidence; but to establish this defense, not only must the truth of the matter charged as libelous be
proven, but also that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends; and the presumptions,
rules of evidence, and special defenses are equally applicable in civil and criminal actions, according to
section 11 of said Act.
Section 6 is as follows:

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"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of such book or number of
each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."
And section 11 provides as follows:
"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth shall have a
right to a civil action against the person libeling him for damages sustained by reason of such
libel, and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action not only the
actual pecuniary damages sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the court may think will be a just
punishment to the libeler and an example to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction of the parties. The presumptions, rules or evidence and special
defenses provided for in this chapter for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in
civil actions under this section."
"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing a libel. According to the legal
doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing
libelous matter is liable for the same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep.,
757.) But said section 6 plainly fixes the liability of editors and proprietors of newspapers,
and is clear enough for all the purposes of this case.
Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our Supreme Court, says:
"When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory words used refer to the
plaintiff, and it is proven that the words do in fact refer to him and are capable of bearing
such special application, an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory
publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."

"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers and candidates for public
office is specially reprehensible and is an offense most dangerous to the people and to the
public welfare.
"The interest of society require that immunity should be granted to the discussion of public
affairs, and that all acts and matters of a public nature may be freely published with fitting
comments and strictures; but they do not require that the right to criticise public officers shall
embrace the right to base such criticism under false statements of fact, or attack the private
character of the officer, or to falsely impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office."
And there are almost numberless English and American authorities in perfect harmony with these
decisions of our Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be cited here; and it is not necessary.
Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is that of Scott vs. Donald (165 U.S., 58) and
cases therein cited. In this case the court says: "Damages have been defined to be the compensation
which law will allow for an injury done, and are said to be exemplary and allowable in excess of the
actual loss when the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression,"
which is in entire harmony with Justice Willard's decision hereinbefore cited.
And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the same high court says:
"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross or
outrageous, courts permit juries (here the court) to add to the measured compensation of the
plaintiff which he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted without
design or intention, something further by way of punishment or example, which has
sometimes been called "smart money." "
It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at bar are more than sufficient to bring it
within the rule of law here laid down by the highest judicial authority.

And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high authority, says:
"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and reputation may be recovered though
no actual pecuniary damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual
malice, deliberate violence or oppression."
That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or deliberate violence, or oppression then punitive
damages, or "smart money," may be recovered.
And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338), also says:
"Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be inferred from
the style and tone of the publication.

Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages; and Mr. Justice Willard, in Macleod vs.
Philippine Publishing Company,3 says:
"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not for mental suffering alone,
but they are allowed for injury to the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the
common law of England and America presumed that such damages existed without proof
thereof from the mere fact of publication of the libel."
In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the power of a jury in
certain actions in tort to assess against the tort feasor punitive damages. Where the injury has been
inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely, or indignity, the judge or jury,
as the case may be, is not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong
committed against the aggrieved person.

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"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government, and the evil example of
libels, are considerations with the jury (here the judge) for increasing damages."
(Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3 Johns, 56.)

It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is too well established to be seriously
affected by the defamatory words used of and concerning him in "Birds of Prey," but it would not be
proper to gravely consider this suggestion.

"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on the matter of the extent
of damages." (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41, 311.)

The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds, thoughts, and opinions of the people are easily
molded, and the public is credulous and perhaps frequently too ready to believe anything that may be
said in derogation of an American official, especially when it is published and vouched for by the
editorial and business management and proprietors if a newspaper of the prominence, pretensions,
circulation and influence if "El Renacimiento," which paper is everlastingly proclaiming in its columns
that it is being conducted and published solely in the interests of the Filipino people pro bono
publico. There is stronger disposition to give credence to what is said in a newspaper here in the Islands
the elsewhere, and when abuse, vilification, and defamation are persistently practiced for a period of
several years, without modification or retraction, but with renewed emphasis, the people naturally come
to believe in its verity and authenticity.

"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was made with malice
technical, legal malice, but not malice in fact and the amount of damages depends in a
large degree upon the motives which actuated the defendants in its publication; and in such
cases the law leaves it to the jury (here the judge) to find a return such damages as they think
right and just, by a sound, temperate, deliberate, and reasonable exercise of their functions as
jurymen." (Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)
"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary damages, and the law of
principal and agent, are controlled by the same rules as are other actions of tort. The right of a
plaintiff to recover exemplary damages exists wherever a tortious injury has been inflicted
recklessly or wantonly, and it is not limited to cases where the injury resulted from personal
malice or recklessness of the defendant. It follows that the owner of a newspaper is as
responsible for all the acts of omission and commission of those he employs to edit it and
manage its affairs, as he would be if personally managing the same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C.
C.) 15 Fed., 371.)
"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any attempt to ascertain its
correctness is sufficient to justify a finding that defendant committed libel client with a
wanton indifference, and with actual malice sufficient to sustain exemplary damages." (Van
Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App. Div., 429, 37 N.Y., 114.)
"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an action for libel, where it
appears that plaintiff was persistently persecuted in the columns of defendant's newspaper,
and that he and his family were held up to public contempt and ridicule, and defendants
withdraw from the case after failing to establish a plea of justification." (Smith vs. Times Co.,
(Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)
"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on this account (exemplary
damages) the turpitude of his conduct and his financial ability are only considered; and such
consideration is not in view of the injury or distress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of the
public; the wrongful act is regarded as an indication of the actor's vicious mind an overt
deed of vindictive or wanton wrong, offensive and dangerous to the public good. This is the
view of those damages which generally prevails." (Sutherland on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092.
title Exemplary Damages.)
"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff, but solely to punish the
defendant. This legal motive would suffer defeat if punitive damages could not be given for a
malicious attack on a reputation too well established to receive substantial injury at the hands
of a libeler." (Judge Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)

It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution of the plaintiff by "El
Renacimiento" and the libel published in its columns, the minds of the major part of the Filipino people
have been poisoned and prejudiced against the plaintiff to such an extent that he is regarded by these
people as odious, dishonest, unscrupulous and tyrannical.
It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with those of his own race, but when it is
considered that his vocation has tenfold more to do with the Filipinos than with his own people, that his
official duties place him in constant contact with them, and that his success in his chosen career is
largely dependent upon their good will and support, it is manifest that the damage to his reputation has
been very great and that a large sum of money should be awarded to indemnify him, as far as money
can indemnify, for the loss of his good name with the Filipino people.
The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of hope and ambition. Since his
arrival he has devoted himself incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of the inhabitants of the
Archipelago and to the faithful performance, as far as he was able, of the pledges and promises of the
Government to the Filipino people. The duties of his particular office were such as brought him in more
immediate and constant contract with the people than any other official of the same category in these
Islands.
It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform, and did efficiently perform, all of
these duties, doing everything that he could in an unselfish and disinterested manner of the welfare and
development of the country and its people, knowing full well that his career, as well as his
advancement, depended largely upon the good will of these people, and that by incurring their censure
or displeasure he would have little hope of success in his chosen work.
Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental suffering, and distress, and
perturbation of spirit that would necessarily be occasioned him when he discovered that through the
nefarious, studied, and practiced persecution of the paper in question, these high hopes were blasted,
and that, instead of having gained the respect and gratitude of the people for the assiduous labors
devoted to their uplifting, they had been made to believe that, instead of being a benefactor, he was a
vampire that was sucking their life blood, a corrupt politician who was squandering the money wrung

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from the people by means of taxation, in schemes for his own personal aggrandizement and
enrichment.
That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he was taking up all the rich veins and
appropriating them in the names of subservient tools, to his own personal use, benefit and profit. That
instead of protecting the people from disease, he was, by means of infected meat and for his own
personal gain, spreading contagion among them.
That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and the vampire; that, in
short, he was a "bird of prey," with all that is implied in that term in its worst acceptation; that he was a
corrupt tyrant, who never lost an opportunity to do the people hurt; that instead of wishing them well
and seeking their advancement, he was their enemy, who never lost an opportunity to degrade and
humiliate them; that instead of preferring them for office and positions of official trust, he treated them
with all sorts of contempt and indifference.
It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its contemplation of a result so disastrous, so
unjust, and so unmerited.
It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands a young scientist he had already
won fame in his own country; that he is a fellow of the important scientific associations in the world.
His election as a fellow or member of these scientific bodies shows that his labors in the Philippines
were the object of solicitude by the prominent scientific and learned men not only of his own race, but
in many other civilized countries of the world. Important results were evidently expected of him by
them, and it can not be doubted that they expected of him of life honestly devoted to the conscientious
discharge of his duties as a trusted public functionary of the American Government in the Philippine
Islands.
And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said newspaper to his fellows of these societies as a
man who is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish and avaricious that he has not considered for a
moment the duties incumbent upon him; that he has been oblivious to every obligation of trust and
confidence, and that he is unworthy of the respect of honest men.
One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of the city of Boston. It is furthermore
shown that copies of this paper went to Spain, England, and to different parts of the United States; and
inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man of prominence in the scientific world, it is to be inferred that his
fellows became more or less aware of these heinous charges.
Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with disappointed ambition and frustrated hopes, and
placed in the humiliating attitude of having to explain to his fellows that the charges are untrue, of
adducing evidence to clear himself, perhaps never with complete success, of the stain that has been cast
upon his reputation by the libelous and defamatory declarations contained in "Birds of Prey."

thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he is entitled to recover this sum of the nine defendants
named, as being responsible for having written, printed, and published said libel; and that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover of them the further sum of twenty-five thousand (P25,000) pesos, as punitive
damages, which the court thinks will be a just punishment to these nine libelers and an example to
others.
Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, have and recover of the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano,
Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, the sum of
sixty thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit, for which execution may issue.
It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.
From said decision the defendants appealed and made the following assignments of error in this court:
I.
The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of this case, in its present state, until final
judgment should be rendered in criminal case No. 4295 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
pending appeal in the Honorable Supreme Court, for libel based also on the editorial, "Birds of Prey."
II.
The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion adduced by counsel for the plaintiff with the
intention of demonstrating to whom the editorial, alleged to the libelous, refers.
III.
The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of the witnesses for the plaintiff than to
the expert testimony of the defense.
IV.
The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is based to be libelous per se and to
refer necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.
V.
The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco to be owners of "El Renacimiento."

In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the case and the law applicable thereto,
VI.
It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff has sustained damages on account
of wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of

The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel for the defendants.

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VII.

With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we find that this court has already decided the
question raised thereby, in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1).

The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants.

VIII.
The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and severally" to pay to the plaintiff, Dean C.
Worcester, the sum of P60,000.
IX.
The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment to be confined to the business known as
"El Renacimiento" and to the defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw, without extending to property of the
alleged owners of said newspaper which was not invested therein by them at its establishment.
X.
The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment rendered against the
defendants.
XI.
The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive damages against the alleged owners of "El
Renacimiento," admitting the hypothesis that said editorial is libelous per se and refers to the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of error, is that the civil action could not proceed until
the termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions of the Penal Code in support of such theory.
This court, however, has decided in the case of Ocampo et al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a
criminal prosecution for libel, under the provisions of Act 277 of the Civil commission, constitutes no bar or
estoppel in a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason most often given for this doctrine
is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rule as to the competency of witnesses and
the weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always exist. As between civil and
criminal actions under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other.
A judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act, can not be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action.
(Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178; Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U. S., 616, 634; Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480;
U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep., 100; U.S. vs.Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87 Fed.
Rep., 420; Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.), 318, 13 American Decisions, 288; Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn.,
185.)
In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant,
beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by a
preponderance of evidence only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra); Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306;
Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27 American decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore
on Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)

During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of showing that the statements
made in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to apply to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of
the Interior. The defendants duly objected to these questions and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting
them.
In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same question was raised and the court, in its decision,
said:
The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the slanderous words to the
plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by the testimony of
witnesses who knew the parties and circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion upon
the application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that where the words are
ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be applied, the judgment and opinion of
witnesses, who from their knowledge of the parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusion as
to the defendant's intention and application of the libel is evidence for the information of the jury.
Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:
The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the circumstances, to state
that, in reading the libel, they at once concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff. It is not necessary that all
the world should understand the libel. It is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that
he is the person meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)
The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is supported by every
consideration of justice and sound policy. The lower court committed no error in admitting the opinion of
witnesses offered during the trial of the cause. One's reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions
spontaneously made by him from time to time, and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances.
The effect of a libelous publication upon the understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the identity of
the person libeled is of the very essence of the wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of the
publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person referred to. The correctness of
the opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in the libelous publication may always be
tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417;
Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing (Mass.), 71.)
It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however, that a large preponderance
of the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in favor of the doctrine which we have announced
here.
We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered together, the question
being whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court shows, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the said editorial was libelous in its character. Here again we find that this
question has been passed upon by this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem
it unnecessary to discuss this question again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause was

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practically the same, or at least to the same effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et
al.It is sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause shows, by a large
preponderance of the evidence, that said editorial was one of the most pernicious and malicious libels upon a
just, upright and honorable official, which the courts have ever been called upon to consider. There is not a
scintilla of evidence in the entire record, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from time to time attempted
to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the statements made in said editorial, which in any way reflects
upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the administration of his department of the
Government.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that the defendants, Martin
Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo
Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the lower court said:
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants were
the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally
contributed their money as a patriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply
held the money and property of the paper as trustee for this people, and that the paper was being
devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco had agreed to
contribute to the same ends but had not done so.

During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in other cause were true.
It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long before the
commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which was published in "El
Comercio," published the following statement:
They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El Renacimiento") "is
sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal personages. We declare that this, besides
being false, is calumnious. The shareholders of this company are persons well known by the public, and
never at any moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks for which "El
Comercio" seems to have so great an affection. They are, as the public knows: Seores Martin
Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio
Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed P750 to the establishment
of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500; that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto
and Angel Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and
that Manuel Palma contributed P3,000.

Q.

Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?

A.

I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo Lichauco.

During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified as witnesses,
relating to the ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They testified that whatever money they
gave for the purpose of establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation, and that they were neither the
owners nor coowners of said periodical. The defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower court. No reason is given
for their failure to appear and give testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the
declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they were made,
were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as
the reply to "El Comercio," above noted. Proof of said declarations and publication was adduced during the trial
of the cause in the present case, and the attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect
of such evidence, if not disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that said declarations and publication were
presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of the purpose of
such proof, the defendants, Palma, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as witnesses for the purpose
of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule of evidence, that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the
inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the
court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454;
Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295; People vs.McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)

Q.

Who else?

Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:

A.

No one else.

Q.

And Rafael Palma is not so?

A.

No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.

"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if
any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and
common sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the
evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and
unmistakably established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but
that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six
persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th of October,
1908."
Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime before the
commencement of the present action and before any question was raised with reference to who were the owners
of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil.
Rep., 338), testified upon that question as follows:

It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the
power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have contradicted.
Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:

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The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the subject matter in dispute,
which is within his power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently offers
occasion for presumptions against him, since it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if
adduced, would operate to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A.
Reports, 136, 153.)
At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time of the said
publication in reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything except the truth: neither does
there seem to have been any reason for publishing the fact that the defendants were the owners of "El
Renacimiento" unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and public benefactors only.
They seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners. The editors, publishers, and managers of "El
Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the
public who its owners were. It ("El Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one; that it had
been born into the community without percentage; that it had been created a terrible machine for the purpose of
destroying the good character and reputation of men without having any one to respond for its malicious damage
occasioned to honorable men; that it was a cast-off, without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be
kicked and buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed without any one to protect it; that its former friends and
creators had scattered hither and thither and had disappeared like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath,
that they did not know their offspring and were not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been a
Moses found in the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among the Filipino people, in teaching
them to respect the rights of persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by reason of its
lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in the State, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens
and to take from them their honor and reputation, which neither it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his
wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does
not make the robber richer and leaves the person robbed poor indeed.
The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the establishment of "El Renacimiento"
was a pure donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino people. They do not state, however, or
attempt to show what particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the donation
was made. A donation must be made to definite persons or associations. A donation to an indefinite person or
association is an anomaly in law, and we do not believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A
donation must be made to some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained or
ascertainable person or association.
A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very nature of things, to some
definite person or association. A donation made to no person or association could not be regarded as a donation in
law. It could not be more than an abandonment of property. Of course where a donation is in fact made, without
reservation to a particular person or association, the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor
responsible, in any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation was made, was legal. A
person does not become an owner or part owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has
made a donation; neither is he responsible for the use to which said edifice may be applied. No one disputes the
fact that donations may be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite persons or associations, to
be administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift.

We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at the time they presented
the defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable hope that their declarations as to
said donation, given in the manner alleged, would be believed by the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into consideration the failure of the
other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a preponderance of such evidence shows that the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the coowners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time of the
publication of the said alleged libel.
With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the lower court committed an error in
not admitting in evidence the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope K. Santos, rendered in the criminal
cause, we are of the opinion that the refusal to admit said evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The fact
that the evidence in the criminal cause was insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty of the crime
charged, in no way barred the right of the person injured by said alleged libel to maintain the present civil action
against him. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.) The criminal action had to be sustained by evidence
showing the culpability of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is sufficient to
show that the defendants injured the plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by a preponderance of the
evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306;
Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)
In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the supreme court of Louisiana
said:
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be given in evidence in a civil action.
In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr. Justice Ellsworth said (in a case where a
judgment in a criminal case was offered in evidence):
A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which the judgment was rendered, when
those facts come up in a civil case, for this evidence would not be material; and so the law is perfectly
well settled. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 536, 524; 1 Phillips on Evidence, 231;
Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543;
McDonald vs. Stark, 176 Ill., 456, 468.)
While we believe that the lower court committed no error in refusing to admit the sentence acquitting Lope K.
Santos in the criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the record brought to this court,
that it is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was responsible, in any way, for the publication of the alleged
libel, and without discussing the question whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of "El Renacimiento" and
"El Renacimiento" constituted one and the same newspaper, we find that the evidence is insufficient to show that
Lope K. Santos is responsible in damages, in any way, for the publication of the said alleged libel.
The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim that the lower court
committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants and in allowing an
execution against the individual property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes
in support of their contention. The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that

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the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is
not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The
defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been sued jointly
and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law Reports), 558.) If several
persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties
jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey,
Common Law Pleadings, 86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give
an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law all are
principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way he commission of a wrong. Under the
common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a
principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am.
Dec., 312 and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb.
(N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of
them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly
liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful
act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343;
Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505;
Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313;
Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)

Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part . . . or
number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the
defendants and allowing an execution against their individual property. The provisions of the Civil and
Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and appellants have no application whatever to the question presented
in the present case.
The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the amount of damages suffered on account of
wounded feelings, mental suffering and injury to the good name and reputation of Mr. Worcester, by reason of the
alleged libelous publication. The lower court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester amounted to
P35,000. This assignment of error presents a most difficult question. The amount of damages resulting from a
libelous publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize
that the damage thus done is great and almost immeasurable. The specific amount the damages to be awarded
must depend upon the facts in each case and the sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be
laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult to include all of the facts and
conditions which enter into the measure of such damages. A man's good name and reputation are worth more to
him than all the wealth which he can accumulate during a lifetime of industrious labor. To have them destroyed
may be eminently of more damage to him personally than the destruction of his physical wealth. The loss is
immeasurable. No amount of money can compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding the great loss which he,
from his standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some tangible basis upon which to estimate such damages.

A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might
exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by
agreement, generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson
(N.Y.), 290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387;
Turner vs.Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)

In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, who tried the present
case in the court below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional
right as the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society, that
underlie the whole scheme of human civilization. The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest
rewards of a wellspent life vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth and its
possession is a solace in later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen known by his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a great character and an
unblemished reputation, has secured a possession more useful and more valuable than lands or houses or silver or
gold. The law recognizes the value of such a reputation and constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It
imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words or libelous publications, the liability to make full
compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for the injury to the feelings of its
owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander or libel. The law goes further. If the words are spoken
or the publication is made with the intent to injure the victim or with criminal indifference to civil obligation, it
imposes such damages as the jury, in view of all the circumstances of the particular case, adjudge that the
wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter others from doing likewise, and for punishment
for the infliction of the injury."

Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liable and that others
are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort
feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson
(N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)

As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to his good name and reputation are most difficult of
ascertainment. The attorney for the appellants, in his brief, lends the court but little assistance in reaching a
conclusion upon this question. The appellants leaves the whole question to the discretion of the court, without any
argument whatever.

This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6 provides that:

After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of the judgment of the lower court relating to the
damages suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be modified, and that a judgment should be

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the full amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind.,
417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)

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rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of
P15,000, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909.
With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the court erred in imposing punitive
damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the evidence, and in view of
all of the facts and circumstances and the malice connected with the publication of said editorial and the
subsequent publications with relation to said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No.
277 of the Philippine Commission, was justified in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render a judgment for punitive damages, in
an amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendant or defendants are actuated
by malice. In the present case there was not the slightest effort on the part of the defendants to show the existence
of probable cause or foundation whatever for the facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will
against the plaintiff are seen throughout the record. The said editorial not only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a
villain, but upon every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.
Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the damages which should be imposed upon
the defendants for the purpose of punishment. Upon this question the courts must be governed in each case by the
evidence, the circumstances and their sound discretion. Taking into consideration the fact that some of the
defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have been sentenced, and considering that fact as a part of the
punitive damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court should be modified, and
that a judgment should be rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per cent from the
23d day of January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in the record and the errors assigned by the
appellants in this court, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be modified and that a
judgment should be rendered in favor of Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro
M. Kalaw, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, jointly and severally, for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909,
with costs, and that a judgment should be entered absolving Lope K. Santos from any liability under said
complaint. So ordered.
Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
For these reasons it follows in our opinion that justice requires that the judgment appealed from with regard to the
defendants Galo Lichauco, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit
should be reversed and that they should be absolved from the complaint entered against them for damages, with
no special finding as to six-ninths of the costs in both instances. I concur in the decision of the majority with
reference to the others Kalaw, Ocampo, and the rest of the defendants.

FACTS: Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting from an alleged libelous
publication against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino
Aguilar, et al, as the owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily newspaper El
Renacimiento (Spanish version) and Muling Pagsilang (tagalong version). Worcester alleged that
the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the newspapers for a long time
and they published an editorial entitled Birds of Prey with the malicious intent of injuring Worcester,
both as a private person and as a government official as the editorial obviously referred to him.
Worcester alleged that he was likened to birds of prey in the following manner: Such are the
characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant omniscience and a
vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
TC: In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for the P60k total damages.
ISSUE: WON the defendants individual properties can be made jointly and severally liable for the
damages under the civil and commercial codes,
HELD: Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved.
The present action is a tort.
Universal doctrine: each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he
participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors.
If several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the
parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH
INDIVIDUAL.
It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal act- e.g. assault and battery committed
by various persons, under the common law, they are all principals.
Under common law, he who aided or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much
a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.
General Rule: Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.
Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except
among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies any claim which might exist against
the others. The release of one of the joint tortfeasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all.

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The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and which
are not, even if they are charged jointly and severally.

G.R. No. L-41767 August 23, 1978

MR. AND MRS. ROMEO FERRER and ANNETTE FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII, MR. AND MRS. FRANCIS PFLEIDER and DENNIS PFLEIDER,
respondents.
Delano F. Villaruz for petitioners.
Porderio C. David for private respondents.
ANTONIO, J:
Mandamus to compel the immediate execution of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch XVIII, presided over by respondent Judge, in Civil Case No. Q-19647, dated July 21, 1975. The pertinent
facts are as follows:
In a complaint for damages against respondents, dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975
(Civil Case No. Q-19647), and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge, it was alleged that defendants Mr. and
Mrs. Francis Pfleider, residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car;
that at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1970, in the streets of Bayawan, Negros Oriental,
their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only sixteen (16) years of age, without proper official
authority, drove the above-described vehicle, without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without
taking the necessary precaution to prevent injury to persons or damage to property, and as a consequence the
pickup car was overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger
therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for
more than two (2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable
physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock and spent a
considerable sum of money for her treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them for
actual expenses as well as other damages.
In due time, defendants filed their answer, putting up the affirmative defense that defendant Dennis Pfleider
exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle aforementioned and alleging that Annette Ferrer
and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely joy
riders and that, consequently, defendants had no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.
At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were present. Consequently,
defendants-private respondents were declared in default and the plaintiff petitioners were allowed to present their
evidence ex parte. On May 21, 1975, petitioners moved that they be granted an extension of ten (10) days from
May 22, 1975 to present her evidence, which was granted by the court a quo.
The presentation of petitioners' evidence was later continued by the trial court to June 16, 1975, when the
deposition of Annette Ferrer was submitted by petitioners and admitted by the trial court.
On June 26, 1975, private respondents filed a motion to "set aside the order of default and subsequent pleadings"
on the ground that "defendants' failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect." This was
opposed by petitioners on the ground that the said pleading was not under oath, contrary to the requirements of

Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules, and that it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing that the defendants
have a good defense. In view of this, the motion of private respondents was denied by respondent Judge on July
21, 1975. On the same date, respondent Judge rendered judgment against private respondents, finding that the
minor Dennis Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to operate a Ford pick-up car and because of his reckless
negligence caused the accident in question, resulting in injuries to Annette, and ordering the defendants, as a
result thereof, to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following amounts: (1) P24,500.00 for actual
expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; (2) P24,000.00 for actual expenses for the care, medicines of
plaintiff Annette for helps from December 31, 1970 to December 31, 1974; (3) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
(4) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; (5) P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (6) costs of suit.
On September 1, 1975, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the decision and of the order
denying the motion to set aside order of default, based on the following grounds: (1) the complaint states no
cause of action insofar as Mr. and Mrs. Pfleider are concerned because it does not allege that at the time of the
mishap, defendant Dennis Pfleider was living with them, the fact being that at such time he was living apart from
them, hence, there can be no application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which parents' liability is
premised; and (2) that tile complaint shows on its face "that it was filed only on January 6, 1975, or after the
lapse of MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from the date of the accident on December 31, 1970", likewise appearing
from the complaint and, therefore, the action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 was subsequently filed by defendants-private respondents on
September 10, 1975, alleging that their defense of prescription has not been waived and may be raised even at
such stage of the proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as well as from the plaintiff's evidence, their
cause of action had already prescribed, citing as authority the decision of this Court in Philippine National Bank
v. Pacific Commission House, 3 as well as the decisions quoted therein. The Opposition 4 to the above
supplemental motion interposed by plaintiffs-petitioners averred that: (a) the defense of prescription had been
waived while the defense that the complaint states no cause of action "is available only at any time not later than
the trial and prior to the decision"; (b) inasmuch as defendants have been declared in default for failure to appear
at the pretrial conference, they have lost their standing in court and cannot be allowed to adduce evidence nor to
take part in the trial, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court; and (c) the motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration are pro forma because the defenses raised therein have been previously
raised and passed upon by respondent court in resolving defendants' motion to set aside order of default. Being
pro forma, said motion and supplemental motion do not suspend the running of the thirty-day period to appeal,
which was from August 5, 1975, when defendants received a copy of the decision, to September 4, 1975, and
hence the decision has already become final and executory. Plaintiffs-petitioners accordingly prayed that a writ of
execution be issued to enforce the judgment in their favor.
On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving
defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action because it does not
allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of
prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of the accident,
and the action to recover damages based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant petition
for mandamus.
The basic issue is whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private respondents' failure to
allege the same in their answer.
As early as Chua Lamko v. Dioso, et al., 5 this Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of

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TORTS
prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff. Thus, this Court held that where
the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his
failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription.
It was explained that the defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not
deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.
In Philippine National Bank v. Perez, et al., 6 which was an action filed by the Philippine National Bank on March
22, 1961 for revival of a judgment rendered on December 29, 1949 against Amando Perez, Gregorio Pumuntoc
and Virginia de Pumuntoc pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the rules of court the defendants were declared in
default for their failure to file their answer.
There upon, the plaintiff submitted its evidence, but when the case was submitted for decision, the court a quo
dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action had already prescribed under Articles 1144
and 1152 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff in said case, contending that since prescription is a defense that can only
be set up by defendants, the court could not motu proprio consider it as a basis for dismissal, moved to reconsider
the order, but its motion was denied. When the issue was raised to this Court, We ruled:
It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of
the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been
declared in default, but such rule does riot obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which
plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations. (Emphasis supplied.)
Again, in Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commission House, 7 where the action sought to revive a judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila on February 3, 1953 and it was patent from the stamp appearing
on the first page of the complaint that the complaint was actually filed on May 31, 1963, this Court sustained the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer,
overruling the appellants' invocation of Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that "defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in tile answer are deemed waived." We held therein that "... the fact
that the plaintiff's own allegation in tile complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had
prescribed removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same."
In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff
Annette Ferrer occured on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages was only filed on
January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four
years. 8 The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident. 9
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.

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