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Author(s): T. D. J. Chappell
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182424 .
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'We should at least consider the possibility that justice is not a virtue. This
suggestion was taken seriously by Socrates in The Republic, where it was
assumed by everyone that if Thrasymachus could establish his premise that injustice was more profitable than justice - his conclusion would
follow: that a man who had the strength to get away with injustice had
reason to follow this as the best way of life. It is a striking fact about modern
moral philosophy that no one sees any difficultly in accepting Thrasymachus' premise and rejecting his conclusion, and it is because Nietzsche's
position is at this point much closer to that of Plato that he is remote from
academic moralists of the present day.'
(Philippa Foot: 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
59 (1958-1959), 99-100)
Thrasymachus' statement of an alternative to standard views about justice
in Republic Bk.I sets the challenge which Republic Bks. II-X must answer.
If this is not a serious challenge, if Thrasymachus' alternative view of justice
is not interesting, plausible or coherent, it is not clear why moral philosophers should bother with The Republic at all. Here I will offer an interpretation of Thrasymachus' alternative view of justice which does make
his view out to be interesting, and plausible, and coherent. My interpretation differs in one way or other from some very well known interpretations;
I hope it will become clear what, if anything, my interpretation achieves
that these others do not.
A. qud yCE ?yO EvaM t6o 8xaLov oiUx akko Tt - T toIO XQErTiOVo;
upEQov - 'I say that justice is nothing other than the interest of the
stronger.' (338c)
B. TLOETat&e yE toiig v6'ovU ?xaoTNTIrXl rtleo; t6o CMtl tpovQOV
...
EWVaL& Ct3E
W11VaVTOUTO bLXXaLOV T0L5 aQXoEvoL; Ecvat
- 'Each kind of government makes laws in its own interest, and, by so
enacting, proclaims to its subjects that this is justice. . . (338e)
C. TOf)T' OVUV ?xrLuV, J
PE'XTLOTE, O XEyO
'This then, my good sir, is what I say is one and the same justice in all
states: the interest of the government in power.' (338e)
D. i1 jiEv 6xaton3v1
xTo t6 &'xaLov CXXOTQLovayaOOv T4) 6VTL 'Justice and the just are in reality the other person's good.' (343c)
A-D all look incompatible. A will not square with B or C: it is not obviously
a necessary truth that 'the stronger' is always going to be the ruler, or (a
member of) the government in power. (Unless we define 'stronger' to mean
'more politically powerful'; but who says we have to do that?) Socrates
points out at an early stage that B and C are not consistent with each other,
either: those in power might be wrong about what was in their interest, and
so make laws intended to be in their own interests, but not actually in their
own interests (339e). As for D, this undermines all the other theses. If
justice is, with D, the other's good, then how can the stronger, or a
government, or the rulers, be just in pursuing their own interest - as A, B
and C require?
So this evidence could easily be taken to support Macguire's claim (1)
that Thrasymachus is simply lost in these perplexities. But in fact these
perplexities can be solved. This is the question to ask: Is Thrasymachus'
thesis a descriptive thesis about justice, or a prescriptive thesis?
For my purposes here, this distinction between the 'prescriptive' and the
'descriptive' might as well be exhaustive. It is not, of course: there are
plenty of other interesting things to do with words besides prescription and
description (cp. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1,23). But I have
been unable to think how any of those other activities could be relevant to
the elucidation of Thrasymachus' thesis (though naturally I welcome suggestions). Therefore I will proceed upon the basis that, if Thrasymachus'
thesis about justice says anything worth hearing, and does not fit the one of
these two alternatives, then it must fit the other.
This is how I shall be using the distinction. If Thrasymachus' project
regarding the social practice called LxaLoru'v1 is simply to observe and
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describe it, I will say that he has a descriptive thesis about justice. Whereas,
if Thrasymachus' project regarding justice is to make reference to justice in
order to offer us reasons to behave or live in a certain way, I will say that
Thrasymachus has a prescriptive thesis about justice. I shall argue that
Thrasymachus does not have a prescriptive thesis about justice, and does
have a descriptive thesis about justice.
One important complication which will appear in this. Although Thrasymachus does not hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, he does hold a
prescriptive thesis about a character trait which is, very often though not
always, coextensive with the character trait of justice. This fact makes it
look at times almost as if Thrasymachus does hold a prescriptive thesis
about justice itself, rather than about the other character trait with which it
very often coincides. But I shall argue that this appearance is deceptive. if
Thrasymachus ever prescribes justice or just behaviour, he does so, as
and not essentially.
Aristotle would say, only xaxa oaufP3E0Pxo6;,
II
If Thrasymachus did hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, what form
could it take? Note first that neither Thrasymachus nor Socrates thinks, as
we are often inclined to think, that 'a just person' means pretty much the
same as 'a good person' and that the word 'justice' is, or can be, simply a
(rough) synonym for the phrase 'moral rightness'. Many modern moral
philosophers, for example Professor Hare, have tended to talk as if 'It
would be just to do F' were often or even usually a straightforward equivalent to 'It would be morally right to do F'. But however this may be for us,
it cannot have been so for Socrates and Thrasymachus, for the reason noted
by Mrs. Foot in my epigraph. The modern moral philosophers suppose that
someone who is told that it would be 'morally right' to do something cannot
go on to question this without making a mistake. It is, they say, merely
incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I have to do what is morally right?'.
If, tacitly or openly,they accept the rough-synonym view of the meaning of
'justice', they must presumably think that 'What reason do I have to do
what is just?' is similarly incoherent. But Thrasymachus and Socrates
apparently do not think it merely incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I
have to do what is just?'. However else Socrates may try to meet Thrasymachus' attack on justice, it is not by accusing him of this kind of incoherence. It follows, as Mrs. Foot notes, that Thrasymachus and Socrates must
mean something rather different from these modern theorists when they
talk of 'justice'. Their concept is more specific, less grandiosely all-embrac4
348dl-2:
SOCRATES: Thrasymachus, do the unjust seem to you to be intelligent
and good (aEyaOo0)?
(PQ6vLlVLoL)
THRASYMACHUS: Yes - those who are able to be completely unjust ...
348e 1-4:
SOCRATES: ... But this is what made me wonder: that you put injustice
in the class of virtue and wisdom, but justice in the opposite classes.
THRASYMACHUS: But that is just what I do.
348e7-349a3:
SOCRATES: Now it is clear that you are going to say that [what is unjust] is
good (xakcov)and strong, and that you will render to it all the additions that
we rendered to what is just - since you have dared to put it [sc. what is
unjust] in [the class of] virtue and wisdom (rEL&bi yFexai Ev &'eETi aiT'o
xait oopqt eloPX&oAagOrEvat).
THRASYMACHUS: What a good prophet you are.
The first and simplest way to defend IV would be to say this: that if
Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue, then he must for that very
reason hold that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue. But at 348c, where
Thrasymachus certainly asserts that justice is not a virtue, he also denies
that justice is a vice:
SOCRATES: Then what do you mean?
THRASYMACHUS: The opposite.
SOCRATES: What, that justice is a vice?!
THRASYMACHUS: Well, no. . (oi)x...
So Thrasymachus does not think that justice is a vice, and injustice is a
virtue, simply because justice is not a virtue. But might he not hold that
justice is a vice and injustice a virtue on other grounds? A second, and more
subtle, line of argument for IV might point to what comes next at 348c:
THRASYMACHUS: Well, no - but it is naive simplicity (3navicyEvvatcav
vIOEMav).
SOCRATES. You mean then that injustice is duplicity (xaXoiOELav)?
THRASYMACHUS. No: injustice is practical intelligence (EvBouXkLav).
Here, it can be argued, Thrasymachus identifies justice and naive simplicity, and injustice and practical intelligence. Now he clearly holds that naive
simplicity is a vice, and that practical intelligence, as opposed to duplicity, is
a virtue. In which case Thrasymachus must, surely, hold that justice is a vice
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10
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character trait which we need to obtain this sort of good life is practical
intelligence. For practical intelligence involves knowning how to use the
device justice; and so what is prescribed for us about justice is that we
should use it, as the device it truly is, to help us achieve just these sorts of
good things. But this recommendation, that by putting practical intelligence to work we use justice as a device, is not a prescriptive thesis about
justice, but about practical intelligence.
Thirdly, and consequent to this, Thrasymachus' stated or implicit view of
human flourishing may even suggest that he has a list of four cardinal virtues
to rival Plato's. At 344c he mentions three of these virtues: 'Thus, Socrates,
when it comes to the full, injustice is stronger and more unrestrained and
more imperious than injustice . . '. Why is injustice to be preferred to
justice? As we have seen, not because it is itself a virtue; rather because it is,
in general and as a rule, more in accordance with the Thrasymachean
virtues of Strength ('ioxtU3),
of Unrestraint(XEvuOEQcta;
for the justification of my translation cp. Gorgias 492c), and of Imperiousness (bEoloWhat is the fourth Thrasymachean virtue? It is not Injustice, for
tEa).
reasons we have already seen. It is rather that quality of mind which,
Thrasymachus says, discerns the realities of the social institution of justice,
and of which he sees unjust behaviour as being, normally, a manifestation:
namely Practical Intelligence, cv3ouVXca.
IV
The fourth consequetice of this descriptive understanding of Thrasymachus' thesis about justice is that we can now reconcile his remarks about
justice, A-D, with which we began, and also sort out the sheep from the
goats among the commentators' opinions about Thrasymachus, 1-7.
First, then, his observation that justice is 'another's good' (D) means that
going in for justice entails doing like Beorhtnoth, entails being persuaded
or duped by the other person into giving up all your advantages over her. So
when Thrasymachus says that justice is 'the interest of the government in
power' (C), he will mean that whatever government is in power, it will,
wittingly or not, be playing exactly this confidence trick of justice on its
subjects. In persuading them or legislating for them to act justly, it will be
causing them to do what is in fact in its own interest. If the Thrasymachean
account of virtue is right, perhaps the citizens would do much better for
themselves, and for their own interests, if they did not generally act justly by
(to take one prominent example) 'obeying the laws' (B). But they are being
deluded by their rulers into thinking that they have some good reason to act
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justly. And in being so deluded, they are in truth acting as weaklings, not in
their own interest, but 'in the interest of the stronger' (A). Here 'the
stronger' could mean either 'those who (already) have the strength of
character to see through the trick of justice', or 'those who by seeing
through the trick of justice, and seeing how to use it as a device or weapon,
have become the stronger'; or perhaps it could refer to both groups.
As for the commentators: (1) Evidently we do not have to think, with
Maguire, that Plato's Thrasymachus is just confused. (2) So far from his
being a political revolutionary, Thrasymachus' view is that all political
structures tend to have the same effect (338b). The only way in which they
influence human flourishing is that those at the top of political structures
flourish, and those at the bottom do not. The ideal situation, because it
maximises one's power over others, is to be a tyrant (344a). That he
believes this, however, does not mean that Thrasymachus is arguing that
such a situation exemplifies 'Natural Justice' (a good thing) as opposed to
'Conventional Justice' (a bad thing), or that a tyrannical constitution is the
best one. Thrasymachus' question is: 'Best for whom?'. Your justice is good
for me and bad for you, and my justice is good for you and bad for me; but
there is for Thrasymachus no interesting sense in which any old justice,
yours or mine indifferently, is either good or bad without qualification.
(That is the point of his rejection of the prescriptive theses, and of the
assertion that justice is neither a virtue or a vice, but a device.) So likewise,
a tyranny is the best constitution for the ruler and the worst for the ruled; but
there is no sense in Thrasymachus' eyes, in calling tyranny a good or bad
state of affairs without reference to some person's good or bad. In short
Thrasymachus is neither a revolutionary nor a fascist; he's an opportunist.
(3) No doubt Thrasymachus's remarks do bear comparison with, e.g., the
speeches of the Athenian envoys to Melos (Thucydides 5.84-116) - speeches which express just the kind of belief in 'Naturrecht' which Pauly-Wissowa foists on Thrasymachus. (So for example Thuc. 5.89: 'Justice, in human
affairs, is judged according to the balance of compulsion: those with an
advantage do whatever they are able to, those at a disadvantage suffer
whatever they have to'.) On the other hand, Maclntyre seems wrong to say
that Thrasymachus would agree with the 'Thucydidean' thesis that aQETin is
one thing, practical intelligence quite another'. For of course Thrasymachus rejects Plato's conceptions of &QETf and of practical intelligence,
and so must also reject the Platonic ways of connecting them. But Thrasymachus' reason for rejecting these Platonic views is precisely that Thrasyand practical intelligence
machus has his own conceptions of what a'QEnT
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mon.
On the other hand, consider Nietzsche's words in the section of Also
SprachZarathustra,entitled 'Of the Virtue that makes small':
'I have found this hypocrisythe worstamongthem:that even those who
15
command affect the virtues of those who obey. "I serve, you serve, we
serve" - so here even the hypocrisy of the rulers intones - and alas, if the
first ruler is only the first servant!'
Nietzsche deplores the 'hypocrisy' of the ruler in pretending to the virtues
of his subjects (like the Pope, who is Servus servorum Dei). He deplores
this kind of behaviour because he thinks that it stunts and warps the
development of the Ubermensch. Thrasymachus, by contrast, would applaud this sort of hypocrisy as a piece of riU3ouXta;as Glaucon says in his
xaLov [01 OVTa, 'the height of injustice is to seem just without being just'
(361a). The person in this situation, in fact, gets the best of both worlds: for
she gets all the good repute and honour of justice, without having to suffer
any of its disadvantages. Thrasymachus would no doubt agree with
Nietzsche that, if one is foolish enough to think justice a virtue, then one can
damage one's soul. But provided justice is recognised to be a device and not
a virtue, and used accordingly, it can be a very useful thing to the superior
person on Thrasymachus' view. In short: Nietzsche thinks that the so-called
virtue of Justice, and indeed all 'slave morality', is a device of the weak for
preventing the strong from getting too great an advantage over them;
whereas Thrasymachus, on the contrary, thinks that Justice is a device of
the strong for keeping the weak in their place.
(6) Houranian conventionalism is disposed of by my remarks about the
compatibility of A-D in Section I. And lastly (7) the Kerferd/Foot view,
that Thrasymachus argued from the premise 'that injustice was more profitable than justice' to the conclusion 'that a man who had the strength to get
away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', is also,
if I am right, to be rejected. For my view has the consequence that injustice,
as such, will not be Thrasymachus' 'best way of life'; for considerations of
justice and injustice will not feature at all in Thrasymachean practical
reasoning, or not at least (to borrow a phrase from Aristotle) as supplying
'premisses of the good'. Hence, though it might on my interpretation of
Thrasymachus' view be true 'that a man who had the strength to get away
with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', such a
Thrasymachean agent's reason to live some form of the unjust life could not
be: 'Because this life is unjust'. The injustice of his preferred life is not
central, but incidental, to the practical reasoning on account of which he
chooses to live that way. For it is true that the person of Thrasymachean
virtue does, typically but not always, do what is unjust; but he does not do
what is unjust under the description 'act of injustice', but under the description 'act of ci4ouXv(a'. His reasons for living like that would be given, not
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' I am grateful to Malcolm Schofield and Roger Crisp for written comments on earlier
drafts. In conversation, Steven Everson and David Charles gave useful criticisms.
Elizabeth Telfer, RichardStalley and MaryHaight made valuable points when I presented one form of the paper at Glasgow University, as did Roger Trigg at Warwick
University. I am also indebted to my pupils David Kensinger and James MacLain of
Williams College, Massachussetts, U.S.A., for obliging me, in Trinity Term 1992, to
think harderabout Thrasymachus.
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