Hoover Digest, 2016, No. 1, Winter

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ON THE COVER
A British poster from World War I highlights
a young woman working in a munitions
factory. Munitions work was indeed highly
dependent on womens labor, as were many
other civilian jobs in the warring nations.
Such jobs gave women a salary, a sense of
purposeand in some cases chronic health
problems. Some of the so-called munitionettes or canary girls, so named because
the chemicals in shells turned their skin
orange-yellow, also died in explosions in huge
arms factories. See story, page 196.
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Winter 2016
HOOVER D I G E ST
T HE ECONOM Y
9
Avoiding Greeces MistakesWhile We Still Can

The United States can avoid the errors that savaged the Greek
economy, but only if Washington makes a concerted effort to
do so. By John B. Taylor
13
Too Strong to Fail

Dodd-Franks selective scrutiny wont prevent the next
meltdown. What would? Insisting that financial institutions
hold more capital. By Edward Paul Lazear
16
Wheres the Productivity?

Despite predictions, theres little sign that automation is
making economies more productive. How come? By Michael
Spence
20
A Few Trillion Short

Public employee pensions are in a deeper financial hole than
states admita much, much deeper hole. By Joshua D. Rauh
P O L IT IC S
25
Myths of Redistribution
Decrying the income gap may make for stirring political
rhetoric, but we dont need rhetoric. We need growth. By
Allan H. Meltzer
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2016 3
29
Heres Mud in Your Eye

Politics in democracies have always been rough and tumble,
and were better off because of it. By Bruce S. Thornton
R E F UGE E S
37
The American Way of Refuge

Offering sanctuary to Syrian exiles is both compassionate and
wiseand just might give the United States a chance for a
regional reset. By Kori N. Schake
HE A LT H CA R E
41
Rescuing ObamaCare
The best cure? High-deductible plans and health savings
accounts. By Scott W. Atlas and John F. Cogan
IN T E L L IGE NC E A N D SEC URI TY

44
China as an Ally in Cyberspace?

How Washington and Beijing could make common cause
toward a secure online world. By Herbert Lin
49
The Future of Violence

Coming to grips with dizzying change and vanishing borders.
By Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum
H O O VER DIGEST Wi n ter 201 6
55
Foiling the Dirty Bomb

How to head off the threat of a radiological weapon before its
too late. By Sam Nunn and Andrew Bieniawski
E DUCAT ION
58
Whose Standards?
Parents of schoolchildren certainly support standardized
tests; the Common Core, not so much. Highlights of the
latest Education Next poll. By Michael B. Henderson, Paul E.
Peterson, and Martin R. West
70
Fight for the Bright

Our highest-achieving students have needs, tooand were
failing to meet them. By Chester E. Finn Jr. and Brandon L.
Wright
78
Bad News Is Good News

Low test scores may be unwelcome, but theyre entirely
necessary. Parents shouldnt shoot the messenger. By Michael
J. Petrilli and Robert Pondiscio
R USS I A
82
Red Tide Ebbing

Although he may appear to have outmaneuvered Washington,
Vladimir Putin has made misstepsand given the United
States a chance to press for a democratic, responsible Russia.
By Michael A. McFaul
GR E EC E
86
Poorer, Yes. But Wiser?

Political regimes in Greece used to be nasty, brutish, and
short-lived. Has the country grown up at last? By Niall
Ferguson
IS RA EL
89
A Rare Win-Win
By improving the lives of Palestinians, Israelis could improve
their own. By Stephen D. Krasner
IRA N
97
A Chance for Iranian Reform

The Obama administrations nuclear deal, many Iranians
believe, could encourage changes in Iran itself. By Abbas
Milani and Michael A. McFaul
106
And Now, the Fallout

Regardless of what Iran gets out of the nuclear deal, its proxy
Hezbollah clearly gainsand Israel clearly loses. By Peter
Berkowitz
R E L IG IO U S FR E E DOM
111
The Tyranny of Secular Faith

Progressivism marches relentlessly toward its destination: the
one true secular kingdom. By Peter Berkowitz
CON S C R IP T ION
115
Dont Bring Back the Draft

Abolishing military conscription was a great victory for
freedom. Heres why the volunteer military should remain just
that. By David R. Henderson
CA L IFORNIA
120
Beating the Drought, Aussie Style

The lesson California should learn from Australia: create a
robust market to swap water. By Carson Bruno
IN T E RVIE W
126
The Exceptional Rupert Murdoch

The media mogul reflects on luck, and on making ones own
luck. By Peter Robinson
IN M EMORIA M : R OB E RT CO NQ UEST
134
The Man Who Was Right

The late Hoover fellow Robert Conquest detailed communist
horrors when nobody believed them, or wanted to believe. By
John B. Dunlop and Norman M. Naimark
144
This Be His Verse

As a poet, Robert Conquest could be subtle, blunt, or blueor
all three at once. A brief testament to a great talent. By John
OSullivan
HE R OISM
151
The Heroic Heart

Heroes still walk among us, but no longer must they kill to
win glory. Instead the hero for our time is a healer. By Tod
Lindberg
161
Heroes and Villains

If we start pulling down heroes who are imperfect, we should
pull them all down. History is tragedy, and the players always
human. By Victor Davis Hanson
T HE COL D WA R
164
Long Telegram, Long Shadow

Seventy years have passed since diplomat George Kennan
offered his penetrating advice. The story of one of the most
important documents in American history. By Bertrand M.
Patenaude
HISTORY A ND C ULT URE

181
Sakharov and the Moral Imperative

The truth is never simple, said the celebrated Soviet
dissident. His was indeed a complex life in complicated times.
By Serge Schmemann
HOOV E R A R C HIVE S
189
War Is . . . Soccer?
Historic posters show how World War I combatants wove
the beautiful game into images, and memories, of a far-frombeautiful war. By Jean McElwee Cannon
196
On the Cover
T H E ECON OM Y
Avoiding Greeces
MistakesWhile
We Still Can
The United States can avoid the errors that
savaged the Greek economy, but only if
Washington makes a concerted effort to do so.
By John B. Taylor
ast summer I addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation about the
lessons the United States can learn from the Greek financial
crisis. One obvious lesson is that the United States needs to take
actions to prevent its own federal debt from exploding, as is forecast by the
Congressional Budget Office in its alternative fiscal scenario. But I chose to
emphasize a broader set of economic policy issues.
First, note that while the Greek economy has been performing terribly
recently (real GDP has declined by an average of 5 percent per year for
the past five years), over the longer term economic growth has also been
poor. Real GDP growth averaged only 0.9 percent per year and productivity
growth (on a total factor basis) averaged only 0.1 percent per year since 1981.
John B. Taylor is the George P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Economics at the Hoover
Institution, the chair of Hoovers Working Group on Economic Policy and a member of Hoovers Shultz-Stephenson Task Force on Energy Policy, and the Mary and
Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at Stanford University.
Note also that Greeces economic policiesregulatory, rule of law, budget, taxeshave also been very poor, according to many outside observers.
According to the Heritage Foundations Index of Economic Freedom, Greece
ranks 130 among the countries of the world, the worst policy performance
in Europe and on a
par with many poor
sub-Saharan African
The United States has been slipping on
countries. According
measures of good economic policy.
to the World Banks
Doing Business indicator, Greece ranks 61, which is well below Portugal, Italy,
Spain, and Ireland; and on two important pro-growth measures in the Doing
Business indicator it ranks 155 on enforcing contracts and 116 on registering
property. And, according to yet another measure, the Fraser Institutes Index
of Economic Freedom, Greece ranks 84 in the world.
These factors alone explain much of Greeces poor economic performance,
and for this reason in its recent report on Greece the IMF concludes that
to achieve [productivity] growth that is similar to what has been achieved
in other euro area countries, implementation of structural [supply side]
[Taylor Jonesfor the Hoover Digest]
10
reforms is therefore critical. No quantitative measure is perfect and there

are exceptions, but there is a general association between these economic
policy measures and economic performance.
Of course, US economic policy scores higher according to these quantitative measures, and one must be careful in drawing analogies and lessons.
Nevertheless there is a problem: the United States has been declining in
recent years on all of these
measures of good economic
I find a connection between the
policy. On the Fraser index,
recent US problem of low economic
the United States ranked
growth and this deviation from
2 in the year 2000 and
sound policy.
it ranks 14 today. On the
Heritage index it ranked 5 in
2008 and it ranks 12 today. On the World Banks Doing Business indicator it
ranked 3 in 2008 and it ranks 7 today.
I have also noticed such a deviation from good economic policy in the
United States in recent years and I wrote about it in my book First Principles.
I find a connection between the recent US problem of low economic growth
and this deviation from sound policy principles. In the United States, adherence to the principles of good economic policy has ebbed and flowed over the
years, creating waves of bad economic times and good economic times.
Of course, there are implications for Greece: the best policy for Greece
would be to radically change economic policy in a pro-growth direction. This
would move Greece up in the economic policy indexes and, more important,
start productivity and economic growth.
For the United States, the policy implications are similar, though their
purpose is to accelerate the slow upward pace of the economysay from a 2
percent growth rate to 4 percentand avoid another economic crisis, rather
than to stop a precipitous downward drop in the economy and stop an ongoing crisis, as in the case of Greece.
Reprinted from John B. Taylors blog Economics One (http://economicsone.
com).
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Puzzles,

Paradoxes, Controversies, and the Global Economy,
by Charles Wolf Jr. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
www.hooverpress.org.
12
T H E ECON OM Y
Too Strong to Fail

Dodd-Franks selective scrutiny wont prevent
the next meltdown. What would? Insisting that
financial institutions hold more capital.
By Edward Paul Lazear
ecently large market declines and increased volatility have

prompted concerns that we may be headed again toward financial chaos. The 2010 Dodd-Frank law was supposed to prevent
that from happening, but as Milton Friedman cautioned, the
government solution to a problem is usually as bad as the problem and very

often makes the problem worse.
Case in point: Dodd-Franks Financial Stability Oversight Council has
subjected several US banks and nonbank financial institutions to special
regulatory scrutiny based on the idea that their failure could lead to another
crisis. But the theory behind so-called systemically important financial
institutions, or SIFIs, is fundamentally flawed. Financial crises are pathologies of an entire system, not of a few key firms. Reducing the likelihood of
another panic requires treating the system as a whole, which will provide
greater safety than having the government micromanage a number of private
companies.
The risks to a system are most pronounced when financial institutions borrow heavily to finance investments. If the value of the assets falls or becomes
Edward Paul Lazear is the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at
the Hoover Institution, co-chair of Hoovers Conte Initiative on Immigration Reform, and the Jack Steele Parker Professor of Human Resources Management and
Economics at Stanford Universitys Graduate School of Business.
highly uncertain, creditorswho include depositorswill rush to pull out

their money. The institution fails when it is unable to find a new source of
funds to meet these obligations.
The collapse of Bear Stearns and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy are
prime examples. Before the 2008 crisis, some firms had leverage ratios of 25
to 1 or higher, meaning that
for every $26 of investment,
Financial crises are pathologies of an the firm needed to borrow
$25. This required banks
entire system, not a few key firms.
to obtain large amounts
daily to pay off previous creditors. But when the value of their investments
fellwhich in the last crisis included a large share of mortgage and other
asset-backed securitiesthe banks could not borrow and had to raise money
quickly by selling their assets, sometimes at fire-sale prices. This turned
seemingly solvent firms into insolvent ones.
A banks inability to pay off its creditors can be transmitted to others. The
mechanism can be direct: the debtor bank defaults, and its creditors cannot
repay their creditors, etc. But the mechanism can be indirect. The suspicion
that similar assets held by other institutions are subject to the same downward pressure can start a run at even an unrelated financial institution.
However, this domino effect has less to do with the so-called interconnectedness of the financial institutions than with weaknesses in the system itself.
To understand why, consider the contrast between the 2008 financial crisis
and the dot-com crash in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
The bursting of the dot-com bubble and subsequent failure of many
Internet-based companies had serious repercussions for investors, but not
for the financial sector. Thats because the failed firms were financed primarily through equity, not borrowed money. Investors took big losses when the
value of tech companies fell precipitously. But there were no runs.
Mutual funds are similar. Many are large and hold assets that may be risky,
but they dont fail when the value of their assets falls. The liabilities move
one-for-one with the value of the assets because the fund does not promise to
pay off any fixed amount to its investors. There is no reason for a run: getting
money out first serves no purpose to investors nor does withdrawal of funds
cause significant distress. The fund simply sells the assets at the market
price and returns that amount to investors.
These factors suggest that instead of trying to divine which firms are
systemically important, banks should be required to get a larger share of the
funds they invest by selling stock. Bank investment funded by equity avoids
14
the danger of a run: if the value of a banks assets falls, so too does the value
of its liabilities. There is no advantage in getting to the bank before others do.
Using higher equity requirements to reduce systemic risk has been suggested by Hoover distinguished visiting fellow Allan Meltzer, and in The
Bankers New Clothes: Whats Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It,
a recent book by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig that has received much
attention.
This reasoning also implies that depositsthe checking and saving
accounts that are bank liabilitiesshould be invested only in short-maturity
secure assets, like Treasury bills. A banks long-term investments, in mortgages or stocks, can then experience big losses or even fail. Bad for the bank
and its investors, but not for the financial system or for depositors, whose
deposits are backed by virtually risk-free assets.
Bank investment funded by equity
The Federal Reserve
seems to be wising up, and
avoids the danger of a run.
may require higher equity
capital for the SIFIs and place less emphasis on regulation. Fed Chair Janet
Yellen told the Senate Banking Committee last July that she was open to
raising the threshold on the asset level warranting SIFI status and scrutiny.
Additionally, the international Financial Stability Board announced last
summer that it would set aside work on designating funds or asset managers as systemically important to focus instead on whether their activities or
products were systemically important.
Dodd-Franks method of protecting the financial system is based on a
misdiagnosis of what led to the 2008 financial crisis. A more rules-based
approach that focuses primarily on equity and leverage would provide better
certainty and a higher cost-benefit ratio than designating firms as SIFIs.
Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. 2015 Dow Jones &
Co. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is NAFTA

at 20: The North American Free Trade Agreements
Achievements and Challenges, edited by Michael J.
Boskin. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.
hooverpress.org.
T H E ECONOMY
Wheres the
Productivity?
Despite predictions, theres little sign that
automation is making economies more
productive. How come?
By Michael Spence
t seems obvious that if a business invests in automation, its workforcethough possibly reducedwill be more productive. So why do
the statistics tell a different story?
In advanced economies, where plenty of sectors have both the money
and the will to invest in automation, growth in productivity (measured by value

added per employee or hours worked) has been low for at least fifteen years.
And, in the years since the 2008 global financial crisis, these countries overall
economic growth has been meager, toojust 4 percent or less on average.
One explanation is that the advanced economies had taken on too much
debt and needed to deleverage, contributing to a pattern of public sector
underinvestment and depressing consumption and private investment as
well. But deleveraging is a temporary process, not one that limits growth
indefinitely. In the long term, overall economic growth depends on growth in
the labor force and its productivity.
Michael Spence is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of economics at New York Universitys Stern School of Business, and the Philip H.
Knight Professor Emeritus of Management in the Graduate School of Business at
Stanford University. He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001.
16
Hence the question on the minds of politicians and economists alike: is the
productivity slowdown a permanent condition and constraint on growth, or
is it a transitional phenomenon?
There is no easy answer, not least because of the wide range of factors
contributing to the trend. Beyond public sector underinvestment, there is
monetary policy, which, whatever its benefits and costs, has shifted corporate use of cash toward stock buybacks, while real investment has remained
subdued.
Meanwhile, information technology and digital networks have automated
a range of white- and blue-collar jobs. One might have expected this transition, which reached its pivotal year in the United States in 2000, to cause
unemployment (at least until the economy adjusted), accompanied by a rise
in productivity. But in the years leading up to the 2008 crisis, US data show
that productivity trended downward; and, until the crisis, unemployment did
not rise significantly.
One explanation is that employment in the years before the crisis was
being propped up by credit-fueled demand. Only when the credit bubble
bursttriggering an abrupt
adjustment, rather than the
The pressing question: is the progradual adaptation of skills
ductivity slowdown permanent or
and human capital that would
have occurred in more normal
transitional?
timesdid millions of workers
suddenly find themselves unemployed. The implication is that the economic
logic equating automation with increased productivity has not been invalidated; its proof has merely been delayed.
But there is more to the productivity conundrum than the 2008 crisis. In
the two decades that preceded the crisis, the sector of the US economy that
produces internationally tradable goods and servicesone-third of overall
outputfailed to generate any increase in jobs, even though it was growing
faster than the nontradable sector in terms of value added.
Most of the job losses in the tradable sector were in manufacturing industries, especially after the year 2000. Although some of the losses may have
resulted from productivity gains from information technology and digitization, many occurred when companies shifted segments of their supply chains
to other parts of the global economy, particularly China.
By contrast, the US nontradable sectortwo-thirds of the economy
recorded large increases in employment in the years before 2008. However,
these jobs, often in domestic services, usually generated lower value added
WORKING SMARTER: People watch an industrial robot at a manufacturing

expo in Weifang, China. As developing economies become richer, they will
invest in technology to cope with rising labor costs, a trend already evident in
China. [Guo XuleiXinhua]
than the manufacturing jobs that had disappeared. This is partly because the
tradable sector was shifting toward employees with high levels of skill and
education. In that sense, productivity rose in the tradable sector, although
structural shifts in the global economy were surely as important as employees becoming more efficient at doing the same things.
Unfortunately for advanced economies, the gains in per capita value
added in the tradable sector were not large enough to overcome the effect of
moving labor from manufacturing jobs to nontradable service jobs (many of
which existed only because of credit-fueled domestic demand in the halcyon
days before 2008). Hence the muted overall productivity gains.
Meanwhile, as developing economies become richer, they, too, will invest in
technology to cope with rising labor costs, a trend already evident in China.
As a result, the high-water mark for global productivity and GDP growth
may have been reached.
The organizing principle of global supply chains for most of the postwar
period has been to move production toward low-cost pools of labor, because
labor was and is the least mobile of economic factors (labor, capital, and
18
knowledge). That will remain true for high-value-added services that defy
automation. But for capital-intensive digital technologies, the organizing
principle will change: production will move toward final markets, which will
increasingly be found
not just in advanced
The dot-com bubble of the late 1990s
countries but also in
was a misestimate of the timing, not the
emerging economies
as their middle classes magnitude, of the digital revolution.
expand.
Martin Baily and James Manyika recently pointed out that we have seen
this movie before. In the 1980s, Robert Solow and Stephen Roach separately
argued that IT investment was showing no impact on productivity. Then the
Internet became generally available, businesses reorganized themselves and
their global supply chains, and productivity accelerated.
The dot-com bubble of the late 1990s was a misestimate of the timing, not
the magnitude, of the digital revolution. Likewise, Manyika and Baily argue
that the much-discussed Internet of things is probably some years away
from showing up in aggregate productivity data.
Organizations, businesses, and people all have to adapt to the technologically driven shifts in our economies structure. These transitions will be
lengthy, rewarding some and forcing difficult adjustments on others, and
their productivity effects will not appear in aggregate data for some time.
But those who move first are likely to benefit the most.
Reprinted by permission of Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.
org). 2015 Project Syndicate Inc. All rights reserved.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Inequality and

Economic Policy: Essays in Memory of Gary Becker,
edited by Tom Church, Chris Miller, and John B. Taylor.
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org.
T H E ECONOMY
A Few Trillion
Short
Public employee pensions are in a deeper
financial hole than states admita much, much
deeper hole.
By Joshua D. Rauh
heres a huge financial hole in state-sponsored retirement plans

for public employees, a hole that states will eventually have to fill
with tax increases and spending cuts.
How big is this government debt owed to public employees? In
July 2015, the Pew Charitable Trusts released its latest issue brief, reporting
that as of 2013, the nations state-run retirement systems had a $968 billion
funding gap, not far from the trillion dollar gap Pew reported in 2010.
As serious as this sounds, the true magnitude of unfunded pension promises for the systems tracked by Pew is much larger. The system of measurement and budgeting for public pension promises has fallen prey to one of the
fundamental fallacies in financial economics: undervaluing a risk-free stream
of promised cash flows by assuming that the promises can be met with high,
anticipated returns on smaller pools of risky assets.
WHERE THE NUMBERS WENT WRONG
When I correct the calculations to reflect the expectation of public
employees that these promises will be honored, the market value of
Joshua D. Rauh is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Ormond
Family Professor of Finance at Stanford Universitys Graduate School of Business.
20
unfunded liabilities proves to be far larger: $3.28 trillion (as of 2013). Moreover, this figure excludes local government obligations such as those of US
cities and counties.
Pew collects its information from state government disclosures. Its 2013
data suggest that, across 237 state-level pension systems, there were $3.43
trillion in liabilities backed by $2.47 trillion in assets. In other words, this
implies a net gap of around $1 trillion.
These liability measures are far
too low. They are based on state
States assume they can meet
assumptions of high assumed
their promises with high, anticireturns on risky asset portfolios:
pated returns on small pools of
the median assumed return was
risky assets.
7.75 percent (and the liabilityweighted average 7.66 percent).
The funding gap amounts to a mere $1 trillion only if the public plans can
achieve these high compound annualized returns over the horizon during
which these benefits must be paid. Yet governments have promised to pay
the pensions regardless of what happens to the pension investments. As
such, pension promises should be treated like the senior government debt
they are, akin to default-free government bonds.
For a proper financial market valuation, the promised pensions should
first be adjusted to reflect only accrued benefits, or retirement payments
that employees would be entitled to receive under their current salary and
years worked. This is not how governments do it today, but my 2011 paper
with Robert Novy-Marx did this recomputation for most of the plans in the
Pew study.
Using the Treasury yield curve and assuming the pension payouts have an
average maturity of fourteen years, the correct fourteen-year discount rate is
2.8 percentimplying a whopping
$5.77 trillion in total state pension liabilities for these accrued
Market interest rates have conbenefits only.
tinued to fall, raising the cost
What about the assets backing
of making good on pension
these promises? The Pew report
promises.
relies on asset values smoothed
over a period of years. To correct for the artificial smoothing, we collected actual market values for the
majority of the Pew-included plans. The resulting numbers indicated assets
in 2013 were only about 1 percent larger than the smoothed values, still just
under $2.50 trillion. Total unfunded state pension promises using market
values were therefore $3.28 trillion, or the difference between $5.77 trillion in
accrued liabilities versus a little less than $2.50 trillion in assets.
Moreover, state court decisions in California and recently in Illinois suggest that even prospective benefits for current workers are inviolate under
the law of some states. If states cannot even slow the rate of future benefit
accruals, then the true magnitude of the liability to which states have committed is even larger that the liabilities formally accrued at present.
LACK OF PROGRESS
Its remarkable that despite strong investment performance over the 200913
period, the states unfunded pension liabilities have hardly declined. Though
assets have grown, liabilities have continued to move steadily upward, as
plans continue to make new promises faster than they pay off their old
22
H O O V ER DIGEST Wi n ter 201 6
ones. Public pensions have also had to re-evaluate their assumptions about
longevity. Meanwhile, market interest rates have continued to fall, raising the
cost of making good on these promises. For all of these reasons, unfunded
liabilities on a market-value basis will likely be even larger this year when the
data become available.
The Governmental Accounting Standards Boards Statement 67 began,
in 2014, to impose some stricter reporting requirements on systems that
project their plans net assets to be insufficient for meeting all benefit payments to current plan members. The trouble is that few states are recognizing that their assets will be insufficient because they expect to achieve their
high returns on invested assets.
Most systems will therefore
continue to budget for pensions exactly as they have in the past: by hoping
that good returns on their financial assets will bail them out of trouble and
marking down the value of their liabilities as though such returns were a
certainty.
US governmental accounting standards should be replaced with a more
transparent standard, one that measures the true financial cost of public
pension promises. This would be an important step toward ending the use of
pension systems as a way for state and local governments to run off-balancesheet budget deficits.
Special to the Hoover Digest.
Forthcoming from the Hoover Institution Press is

Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform
Can End Too Big to Fail, edited by Kenneth E. Scott,
Thomas H. Jackson, and John B. Taylor. To order,
call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
24
POLI T I C S
Myths of
Redistribution
Decrying the income gap may make for stirring
political rhetoric, but we dont need rhetoric. We
need growth.
By Allan H. Meltzer
o topic recurs in political discussions more often than income

distribution. It came up frequently in Alexis de Tocquevilles
book about our republics early years, Democracy in America. And
it was very much in James Madisons thoughts when he wrote
about factions in Federalist No. 10 at the time the Constitution was ratified.
We now refer to interest groups instead of Madisons factions. Madison
believed factions were impotent. Opposing ones, he thought, would cancel
each other out in a democracy. But he was terribly wrong about the power
of interest groups: they dominate our politics. In every election, parties offer
rewards to groups of voters. The Democrats tend to offer benefits to black
voters, young women, and Hispanics. The Republicans, like President George
W. Bush, do so to religious groups.
Voters are often swayed by the benefits offered. Sometimes a majority
choose a leader who eschews redistribution and promises growth in living
standards achieved by lowering tax rates. Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald
Reagan are US examples; Margaret Thatcher is an example from Britain.
Allan H. Meltzer is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution,

chair of Hoovers Regulation and the Rule of Law Initiative, and a professor of political economy at Carnegie Mellon University.
Taking another approach, presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson won smashing election victories by offering benefits to selected interest
groups using the rhetoric of redistribution.
PERILS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
Redistribution is again a major political issue as we approach the presidential election. One of the most controversial forms of redistribution is a
doubling of the statutory minimum wage to about $15 an hour. Proponents
of this policy do not mention that anyone who earns only the current minimum wage receives the earned-income tax credit. Instead of paying federal
income tax, low-income people who work receive payments to supplement
their earnings. For example, a married worker with three children under
nineteen who earns the current minimum wage receives $6,143 a year if he or
she works all year. That payment drops to $4,726 if the hourly minimum wage
rises to $15. Other government benefits are an additional form of assistance.
The higher minimum wage will reduce employment, especially for unskilled
youth. Although they claim to be friends of the poor, advocates of a higher
minimum wage usually knowingly adopt policies that keep young workers from
finding jobs that will train them in ways that permit them to advance along a
career path. Politicians who approve minimum-wage hikes know that the many
who gain will know the source of their gain, while the many who lose will not.
The argument against the minimum wage lies in good economics and common sense. In a well-functioning market economy, a worker will receive a
wage equal to the value that he or she produces. That will be true on average
over time, but it is rarely true all of the time. Sometimes the wage will be
higher than the value of the workers product, sometimes lower. Employers
cannot accurately measure worker productivity. The employer learns about
the relation between wages and productivity by watching what happens to the
companys earnings over time. If the employer pays more than the workers
produce, profits fall and firms go out of business. Owners deploy their capital
where it earns the best return. Only then will the business thrive. Only then
will owners be able to compensate their employees well and hire new recruits.
FOREVER UNEQUAL, FOREVER UNFAIR?
What about certain candidates claims that fairness requires higher tax rates
for the highest earners to finance bigger transfers to the poorest? Like the efforts
to redistribute income by raising the minimum wage, that claim is wrong.
First, since the War on Poverty began fifty years ago, many billions of dollars have been redistributed from taxpayers to those who receive transfers.
26
There has been no evidence of reduced poverty rates. Nor has there been
evidence that people now believe the system is fairer. Fair is a subjective
notion based on a term that cannot be defined objectively.
Has the constant appeal to fairness worked to benefit the disadvantaged?
For the first time in the postwar years, we have young working-age people
leaving the labor force to live on the benefits they receive from the welfare
system supplemented by occasional earnings in the underground economy.
The unfortunate long-term consequence is that these workers never develop
job skills and never receive the on-the-job training that increases their
productivity and wages. They will remain unskilled and the rest of us will not
benefit from their increased productivity.
The Obama administrations efforts to increase corporate regulation and
income redistribution have produced large negative consequences. For the
first time in the postwar years, median income fell during the recovery.
Median households earned $54,059 in 2009 but only $51,939 in 2013. (Later
years are not available.) We know that the top income earners gained income,
so the losses were borne by the rest of us.
Second, we are suffering from government
Billions have already been transferred
policies that reduced
productivity and ignored from the wealthy to the poor, but cries
its costs. Instead of
of unfair continue. Fairness, it seems,
helping people get better cant be defined.
jobs, regulation raises
business costs and discourages expansion. A massive increase in the regulation of industry discourages business investment. The recovery that began
in 2009 has had the lowest rate of business investment of any recovery since
World War II. One consequence is that productivity growth has remained low
in this recovery. Low productivity growth prevents wage growth for workers.
Workers who do not produce more cannot permanently earn more. Companies cannot permanently raise wages for middle-income workers unless those
workers earn higher wages by increasing their productivity. More investment
brings new methods that require additional training. Thats a major source of
productivity growth that is largely absent in this recovery.
The clamor on the left about the widening difference between the top 1
percent or 5 percent of income earners and the rest of the population almost
always compares earnings before the incomes of the top earners are taxed
and that money transferred to the bottom earners. When these adjustments
are made, as they should always be, the difference narrows.
HARD WORK AND INNOVATION

Another major oversight is the role of recent policy. The Federal Reserve has
held interest rates at very low levels. This has pushed up asset prices, including prices of most common stocks and bonds, adding greatly to the income of
the top 1 percent and 5 percent of income recipients. This increases incomes
at the top and expands the
difference between top
Workers who do not produce more
earners and everyone else.
Of course, the rise in stock
cannot permanently earn more.
prices adds to the value
of worker pensions, but we do not count that as income when we compare
earned incomes.
Still another omission is the threat of higher tax rates on high incomes. The
best research shows that tax increases reduce innovation, investment, and
productivity growth. A pro-growth policy of reduced regulation and lower tax
rates, if enacted, would eventually increase productivity and therefore reduce
the gap between the highest earned incomes and the rest.
Americans did not become wealthy by redistributing income. They became
wealthy by innovating, learning, and working hard. Most of the immigrants who
came to the United States were unskilled. So, too, were the workers who came
from the farms to industry. They began at the bottom, learned by doing on-thejob training, and earned higher wages. This model seems to be breaking down.
Politicians can promise to narrow the income gap. They can pass legislation that redistributes more. But they cannot permanently reduce the spread
between the top and the rest unless they adopt policies that encourage
growth, innovation, learning, and productivity. There is no other way.
Reprinted from Defining Ideas (www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas), a Hoover Institution journal. 2015 by the Board of Trustees of
the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Ronald

Reagan: Decisions of Greatness, by Martin and
Annelise Anderson. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or
visit www.hooverpress.org.
28
POLI T I C S
Heres Mud in
Your Eye
Politics in democracies have always been rough
and tumble, and were better off because of it.
By Bruce S. Thornton
he presidential campaign started with a bang. Donald Trump

accused Mexico of sending rapists and other criminals to the
United States and denied that Senator John McCain is a war
hero. Senator Ted Cruz, on the floor of the Senate, accused Sen-
ate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of telling a simple lie regarding legislation renewing the Export-Import Bank. Mike Huckabee accused President
Obama of signing a deal with Iran that would march [Israelis] to the door of
the oven. And the president accused Republicans who opposed the deal with
Iran of making common cause with the Iranian hard-liners chanting death
to America.
Such comments elicited the usual condemnations of the incivility that
presumably degrades the political process. Washington Post pundit Dana
Milbank attributed it to the growing polarization of both parties and to the
obvious reality that the Republican Party has gone particularly bonkers.
Milbanks comments, with their own uncivil name-calling and partisan
scapegoating of Republicans, remind us that the calls for civility and bipartisanship, usually linked to some imagined political golden age of bipartisan
Bruce S. Thornton is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, a member of
Hoovers Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict,
and a professor of classics and humanities at California State University, Fresno.
comity and cooperation, are often rhetorical tactics for gaining partisan
advantage and delegitimizing opposition.
They also reflect a belief that the purpose of the federal government is
primarily what the organization No Labels, dedicated to restoring civility to
government, vaguely calls the business of solving the problems facing the
nation, a duty compromised by all the petty infighting, party-first agendas,
and hyper-partisan wheel-spinning.
Rather than reflecting some recent decline in political decorum, however,
the incivility these comments lament is as old as the ideological conflicts
that have defined democracy since its origins in ancient Athens. A dislike of
political rancor is at heart a dislike of democracy, and a misunderstanding of
the constitutional structure and its purpose.
CUT EM DOWN TO SIZE
Starting in ancient Athens, democracy has given the vote and equal participation in policy deliberation to citizens regardless of wealth, status, or
30
knowledge. Given the wide variety of conflicting interests, ideologies, and

character among the citizenry, the public deliberation at the heart of democratic policy making has always been rough, vulgar, and insulting, often at a
level far beyond what we today call the politics of personal destruction.
In Athens, politicians were publicly insulted and humiliated, on the comic
stage or in public speeches delivered in the assembly, the equivalent of our
Congress. As classicist K. J. Dover writes of comedy in the fifth and fourth
centuries BC, just about every Athenian politician we know of was accused
of being ugly, diseased, prostituted perverts, the sons of whores by foreigners who bribed their way into citizenship. Political debate in the Athenian
assembly was not much better. Sordid sexual practices, disreputable parentage, and taking foreign bribes were standard charges.
Political debate in early America seldom reached Athenian sexual coarseness but still was brutal, reflecting a similar diversity of interests and
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inter 2016 31
religious beliefs in the thirteen colonies. Particularly when political parties

began to coalesce in the second term of George Washington, political rhetoric
was as personal and insulting as the comments we decry today. John Adams,
a Federalist suspected of scheming to concentrate power in the federal
government, was called His Rotundity by his antifederalist rivals, mocking
both his alleged aristocratic pretensions and his ample girth. James Madison,
calling on the class-warfare rhetoric many decry today, accused Adamss
party of being partial to the opulent, seeking to rule by the pageantry of
rank [and] the influence of money and emoluments, and desiring power so
that the government is narrowed into fewer hands, and approximated to an
hereditary form.
The Federalists responded in kind, one editorial writer calling the Democratic-Republican
clubs, incubators of Madisonian-Jeffersonian
32
democracy, that horrible sink of treason, that hateful synagogue of anarchy,

that odious conclave of tumult, that hellish school of rebellion. Indeed, the
charge that Thomas Jefferson fathered children by his slave Sally Hemings
began as a political smear in the 1800 election.
The tumultuous decades leading up to the Civil War saw an explosion of
such invective, sparked by the intense conflict over slavery. In 1851 Representative Preston Brooks stormed the Senate floor to cane and seriously injure
Charles Sumner, who had characterized anti-abolitionist fellow senator Stephen Douglas as a noisome, squat, and nameless animal. Later, Abraham
Lincoln was called the missing link and the original gorilla. The New York
Timess Paris correspondent called for an embargo on portraits of Lincoln,
for the person represented in these pictures looks so much like a man
condemned to the gallows, that large numbers of them have been imposed on
the people here by the shopkeepers as Dumollard, the famous murderer of

servant girls, lately guillotined near Lyons. And the Times was a supporter
of Lincoln.
Every decade of American history has been filled with political speech
of the sort we now decry. Jingles about Warren G. Hardings illegitimate
daughter, rumors that FDR was scheming to become a dictator, caricatures
of Tricky Dick Nixon as a
used-car salesman, Ronald Reagan mocked as an
That horrible sink of treason, that
amiable dunce, Bill Clinton
hateful synagogue of anarchy, that
nicknamed Slick Willy,
odious conclave of tumult, that hellGeorge W. Bush slandered
ish school of rebellion.
as BushitlerAmerican
political speech has always
used insult and personal attacks in partisan disputes over power and policy.
This fierce verbal combat would not have surprised the founders. As
James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 10, citizens are motivated not by the
rational study of ideas, empirical evidence, and cool debate over the issues
but by interests and passions, the former comprising property, the latter
religion. Out of these arise the conflicting factions and parties, each seeking to protect and advance its interests, and all inflamed . . . with mutual
animosity, and rendered . . . much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other, than to cooperate for their common good.
Assuming that these phenomena reflected permanent flaws sown in the
nature of man, the architects of the Constitution sought not to eliminate
such factional struggle but to limit the excessive power of any faction by
dividing the federal government into three powers,
The public heart of democratic policy each checking and balancing the other, and empowermaking has always been rough, vuling the state governments
gar, and insulting.
to counterbalance the
federal government. The primary aim was to protect freedom and autonomy
by keeping any ambitious factional power from growing strong enough to tyrannize the people. Thus solving the problems facing the nation was not as
important as protecting political freedom and the sovereignty of the states.
As for the tone and quality of public discourse, if the citizenry comprises
multiple factions free to seek their interests and express their passions,
one would expect political speech to be spirited, angry, and brutal, for
34
passionately held beliefs in fundamental principles, which seldom can be reconciled with conflicting beliefs and principles, frequently form the substance
of political speech. Such passionate public expression of partisan conflict
and division is a small price to pay for checking the aggrandizement of one
factions power that a more bipartisan and unified government might seek.
After all, bipartisan legislation and Congress members reaching across the
aisle created the Leviathan entitlement state that is on track to bankrupt
the government.
CIVILITY IS OVERRATED
But shouldnt we expect our elected officials to be better than the rough
and rude discourse of ordinary citizens and their organs of communication?
Madison hoped so, positing that the indirect election of senators and the
president would allow filtrations of politicians so that the virtuous and wise
would end up in office.
Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in 1835 during the flourishing of Jacksonian
democracy, cherished the same hope and found much of American democracy wanting. He disagreed
that the people always
wish the welfare of the state Madison saw that parties and factions were more disposed to vex
and instinctively designate
those who are animated by
and oppress each other, than to coopthe same good will and who
erate for their common good.
are the most fit to wield the
supreme authority. On the contrary, he continues,
I was surprised to find so much distinguished talent among the
citizens and so little among the heads of the government. It is
a constant fact that at the present day the ablest men in the
United States are rarely placed at the head of affairs; and it must
be acknowledged that such has been the result in proportion as
democracy has exceeded all its former limits.
Tocqueville was particularly hard on the most democratic federal institution, the House of Representatives, in which one is struck by the vulgar
demeanor of that great assembly. Often there is not a distinguished man in
the whole number. But in Tocquevilles view the Senate, at that time still
chosen by the state legislatures, was very different, a more distinguished and
accomplished body. The direct election of senators established in 1913 by the
Seventeenth Amendment brought the Senate to the level of the House, as
well as drawing the federal government farther from its republican origins
and closer to the direct democracy that the founders feared.
So we shouldnt be surprised that the level of discourse in both houses
is, with some exceptions, more on a par with that of the citizens. But in the
end, that is not as important as maintaining the constitutional mechanisms
for protecting individual
freedom from the encroachIn the end, calls for civility or deco- ing power of a hypertrophied federal government.
rum to police clashing beliefs often
In this context, trying to
try to limit the freedom to express
moderate or police, based on
those beliefs.
some subjective notions of
civility or decorum, the clashing expressions of passionate beliefs often is
an attempt to limit the freedom to express those beliefs, and a way to benefit
one faction at the expense of others.
As Craig Shirley, biographer of Ronald Reagan, said recently, The last
thing we need in American politics is more civility. Civility is often the camouflage for hiding challenges to the big-government faction and concealing
the collusion of bipartisan elites that has created the redistributionist entitlement state. After all, the First Amendment does not protect merely decorous
or genteel speech, but as the political rhetoric of American history shows, all
manner of speech no matter how rude or uncivil. Thats because our political ancestors knew something we should never forgetthat as the Athenian
Sophocles said, free men have free tongues.
Reprinted from Defining Ideas (www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas), a Hoover Institution journal. 2015 by the Board of Trustees of
the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is The New

Deal and Modern American Conservatism: A Defining
Rivalry, by Gordon Lloyd and David Davenport. To order,
36
R E F UG E E S
The American
Way of Refuge
Offering sanctuary to Syrian exiles is both
compassionate and wiseand just might give the
United States a chance for a regional reset.
By Kori N. Schake
mericans are mere spectators to the drama of Syrias refugees

teeming into Europe. We are taking no responsibility for our
part in the tragedy. Worse yet, we are missing an opportunity
to reset our relations with the peoples of the Middle East by
showcasing one of our core values, which is also one of our great domestic and
international advantages: we are a country of, and welcoming to, refugees.
Americans pride ourselves on being a sanctuary for people fleeing violence, injustice, and political and religious persecution. We have a proud
history of sheltering those who fear remaining in their homelands, and it
has strengthened our country in myriad waysbringing us immigrants
courageous enough to start anew in a foreign land; testing and rewarding
our tolerance; reinforcing our sense of ourselves as a community devoted
to opportunity and individual liberty; infusing our culture with new influences and the malleability that comes from accommodating them; and
creating a brand that gives us competitive advantages in the global
competition for talent.
Kori N. Schake is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of
Hoovers Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict.
We are so accommodating that Fidel Castro included thousands of prison

inmates among the Cuban refugees of the 1980 Mariel boatlift to spite our
harboring of people fleeing his despotism. But our history has also had sad
failures to admit the desperate. When we have averted our eyes, it is typically
either the result of overt racism (prohibitions on Asian immigrants in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), our fear of being drawn into an
ongoing war (denying Jews admission in the 1930s), our inability to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants (interdicting Haitian boats
teeming with people fleeing first the Duvalier butchery then the junta that
came after in the 1990s), or our alarm at a sudden rush of would-be immigrants (Central Americans fleeing murderous violence in 2014).
None of these conditions applies in the case of the Syrian refugees clawing
their way to Europe. The only remotely applicable reason for reluctance is
the notion that we might be drawn into a war, but Bashar al-Assads Syria is
not the great power Hitlers Germany was. Moreover, as the past four bloody
years of Syrias agony demonstrate, we can choose not to fight in Syria.
Which makes the dilatory response of our government to the plight of Syrias
suffering all the more shameful.
Our policies have fueled the conflict in Syria in at least six ways: being
apologists for Assad (recall Hillary Clinton saying that he was a reformer);
creating the expectation we would usher him from power (recall President
Obama saying Assad must go); fecklessly arming and training moderate
Syrian rebels; permitting Irans direct involvement to prop up Assad; drawing but not enforcing the red line on chemical weapons use by Assada
practice he has
continued; and
now watching as
We have a proud history of sheltering those
Russia escalates its
who fear staying in their homelands.
involvement. And
lets not forget the State Departments disgraceful hashtag diplomacy, a
futile social-media gesture that added insult to injury. Our governments callousness is buying us generations of resentment.
And where are the Republican hopefuls, those calling for a better American foreign policy? Carly Fiorina thinks America has already done its fair
share. Jeb Bush, who speaks so movingly about immigration in other
contexts, and Marco Rubio, whose family members are Cuban refugees, both
agreed in principle that the United States should accept some Syrians, but
couched their vague support in the context of preventing jihadis. Neither
spoke up until Donald Trump made news saying, Theyre living in hell, and
38
ON THE MOVE: Syrian refugees crowd a fence at the main rail station of Budapest, Hungary, last September. Tens of thousands of Syrian migrants continue
to seek shelter in Europe and North America amid the ongoing violence and
chaos in their homeland. [Mstyslav ChernovCreative Commons]
something has to be done. John Kasichs faith may drive his views on Medicare expansion, but Syrian refugees are evidently Europes problem. Mike
Huckabee and Ted Cruz, so strident in their proclamations of faith, have no
room at the inn. Conservatives need to do some soul-searching.
The United States of America is failing at the central tenet of leadership:
that of setting an example for others to follow. We have given money$4
billion at last countmuch of it to assist Turkey and Jordan, neighboring
countries that are amazingly and nobly helping the four million displaced
Syrians. But checkbook diplomacy is no substitute for solutions, as we so
often tell other countries.
Jordans central political dilemma since 1945 has been devising a balance
to accommodate the two million Palestinian refugees it accepted with the
creation of the state of Israel; yet it has still admitted at least 650,000 Syrian
refugees (and more likely double that, since many have been absorbed into
Jordanian cities). The fourth-largest city in the country is the Zaatari refugee
camp. Germany expected to receive 800,000 asylum-seekers in 2015, opening its borders while Hungarys government verged on xenophobia. Sweden
admitted 80,000 refugees in 2014and it is a more homogenous country than

the United States, so its difficulties will likely be greater in fostering civic
cohesion in this new mix. If the United States met the standard by population
that Sweden has set, we would admit two million Syrians. We have admitted
1,500 since the war began, and the additional 10,000 that President Obama
promised last fall to take in would be but a drop in the bucket.
Do Syrian refugees have economic reasons to emigrate? Of course they do
their country is a bombed-out wreck. But economics are not what put families
with small children perilously to sea.
Are we at risk of jihadis slipping in
Checkbook diplomacy is no
among the refugees to threaten our
societies? Of course we are, but they
substitute for solutions.
are slipping into our countries even
without the cover of a torrent of refugees. In fact, we are likelier to have cooperation in finding and managing threats from people grateful to be resettled
here (as has proved the case with the more than 100,000 Iraqis admitted since
2003 and 20,000 Afghans since 2001).
True, countries accepting refugees from the Syrian war are creating longterm problems for themselves: problems of assimilation, problems of employment, and problems of political backlash. But they are also gaining the traditional advantages America has long benefited from, both domestically and
internationally. Most important of those advantages is the justifiable pride at
looking difficulties in the face and choosing to be a society that lifts its lantern
to the tired, the poor, and the huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
Reprinted by permission of Foreign Policy (www.foreignpolicy.com).
2015 Foreign Policy Group LLC. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is State of

Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State
Department, by Kori N. Schake. To order, call (800)
888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
40
H E A LT H CA R E
Rescuing
ObamaCare
The best cure? High-deductible plans and health
savings accounts.
By Scott W. Atlas and John F. Cogan
ith the end of the Obama administration on the horizon,

Republican presidential candidatesand members of
Congressare proposing ways to replace or repair the
Affordable Care Act. Undoing the damage of ObamaCare
may finally become a realistic possibility.

For now, Americans are experiencing the laws natural consequences: rising
health insurance premiums and limitations on individuals choice of physicians
and hospitals. Further consolidation in the insurance industry and among
providers will probably drive health care costs even higher. To reverse these
trends, any replacement for ObamaCare should include two essential elements:
high-deductible insurance coverage and health savings accounts.
Well-designed high-deductible insurancein which the individual pays a
few thousand dollars for most health care services before the plan kicks in
to cover claimsrestores the fundamental purpose of health insurance: to
reduce the financial risk of large and unanticipated medical expenses. Health
Scott W. Atlas, MD, is the David and Joan Traitel Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution. John F. Cogan is the Leonard and Shirley Ely Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution and a member of the Shultz-Stephenson Task Force on Energy
Policy and Hoovers working group on economic policy.
savings accounts, or HSAs, allow individuals to set aside money tax-free for
out-of-pocket expenses, including routine care. These accounts are owned by
individuals and are not dependent on their place of employment.
When consumers pay directly for their care, as they would from HSAs,
they have an incentive to choose wisely, and to demand that the prices
charged by providers become visible. A study by Carnegie Mellon Universitys Amelia Haviland and colleagues, published in July by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, confirmed previous research by these authors
(and others) showing that
high-deductible plans signifWell-designed high-deductible
icantly reduce health spendcoverage restores the fundamening without later increases
in emergency-room visits or
tal purpose of health insurance: to
hospitalizations. When these
reduce the risk of large, unanticipathigh-deductible plans were
ed expenses.
paired with HSAs, health
care spending reductions averaged at least 15 percent annually.
High-deductible plans and HSAs continue to grow despite the restrictions
in the Affordable Care Act. In 2014, according to Devenir Research, the number of HSAs increased 29 percent and reached a record high of 14.5 million
as of mid-2015. Nearly one-third of all employers (31 percent) now offer some
type of HSA, up from 4 percent in 2005. HSA account holders deposited $21
billion in 2014. HSA assets increased by 34 percent over one year and, as of
June 30, 2015, averaged $14,654 per account. By increasingly choosing HSAs,
American consumers are approving their value.
Consumer-empowering shifts toward high-deductible coverage and HSAs
are crucial to making health care more affordable while maintaining health
care excellence and innovation. According to a 2012 study in Health Affairs,
annual health expenditures would fall by an estimated $57 billion if only half
of those Americans with employer-sponsored insurance enrolled in consumer-directed plans with deductibles as low as $1,000. Additional evidence from
studies of MRI and outpatient surgery show that introducing price visibility
and defined-contribution benefitswhere the employer provides an amount
of money and the employee chooses how to use itinduces patients to shop.
The issue now is how to increase the number of people who would choose
to buy HSAs in combination with high-deductible plans. Some steps should
be taken immediately. For example, the maximum allowable annual contribution should be raised from $3,350 to at least equal an individuals maximum
annual IRA contribution ($5,500 if you are under age fifty, $6,500 if you are
42
age fifty or older). The health care services and products that can be purchased with HSAs should be expanded to include scientifically therapeutic
over-the-counter medications. Money remaining in HSAs should be allowed
to roll over to surviving family members.
ObamaCares current legal requirement that an individual or family have
coverage with government-specified deductibles in order to open an HSA
is counterproductive. It eliminates the possibility of HSAs with other, more
tailored plans that could cover necessary care subject to a lower deductible
for particular services and medicines, especially for chronically ill people.
ObamaCare restrictions on eligibility for high-deductible plans and broad
coverage mandates should also be eliminated to allow individuals greater
flexibility to purchase high-deductible plans that best suit their needs.
Health savings accounts and well-designed high-deductible health plans
are also important reforms for Medicare and Medicaid. A Census Bureau
study notes that four million Americans reach age sixty-five every year and,
after age sixty-five, live 25 percent longer than in 1972. Todays seniors need
to save money for decades, not years, of future health care.
Our analysis of actuarial data from HealthView Services, which indicates
a tripling of health expenses for a sixty-five-year-old by 2030, makes HSAs
even more important. The current ban on HSA participation by seniors on
Medicare should be abolished. States should be encouraged to experiment
with plans that allow Medicaid enrollees to opt for HSA contributions, as
Michigan and Indiana have done, and high-deductible coverage.
Expanded health savings accounts and high-deductible plans alone are not
necessarily a panacea for the countrys health care system. But they are critically important and necessary steps.
Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. 2015 Dow Jones &
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is In

Excellent Health: Setting the Record Straight on
Americas Health Care, by Scott W. Atlas. To order, call
(800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
I N TEL L I GENC E AN D SECURIT Y
China as an Ally
in Cyberspace?
How Washington and Beijing could make common
cause toward a secure online world.
By Herbert Lin
ow that Presidents Xi and Obama have had their summit, its

fair to ask what is different now regarding the China-US relationship in cyberspace.
Perhaps the most important outcome is what did not hap-
penthe summit did not break down in mutual recriminations regarding

cyberspace. Indeed, Chinas president Xi Jinping was willing to say things,
in Chinese and for the record, that the Chinese government has never said
before. For example, Xinhua, the Chinese news agency, printed a statement
from the summit saying that China and the United States agree that neither
countrys government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft
of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. This language perfectly mirrors the White
House formulation on its fact sheet about the summit.
Of course, these are just words, and many skeptics about Chinese behavior in
cyberspace will continue to call for a more forceful retaliation to show the Chinese that the United States wont allow cost-free hacking against its interests.
Herbert Lin is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior research
scholar for cyber policy and security at Stanford Universitys Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
44
The China-US relationship has both cooperative and confrontational

aspects. Retaliation against Chinese interests stresses the confrontational
aspects, and making such a decision requires answering three questions.
First, who should be the target of the retaliation? Second, what action does
the retaliation entail? Finally, what do we expect to be the Chinese reaction
to such an action?
WHERE, AND HOW, TO STRIKE BACK
The first question is the well-known problem of attribution in cyberspace.
Many people believe such attribution is impossible. This belief is rooted in
the idea that a careful attacker could erase all the clues that might identify
him, and any ostensible clues found by an investigator could have been deliberately planted by the attacker in order to mislead the investigator.
While not entirely wrong, this belief ignores a number of realities. Many
attackers are not as careful as they should be, and often they do leave behind
useful identifying clues. Also, attribution judgments are based not only on
information found on the attacked computer but also on other sources, such
as human agents, monitored phone calls, previous attacks, and so forth.
Although some of these sources are secret and thus may not be revealed
publicly, information from secret sources can be helpful for a government
making attribution judgments. Taken together, information from all these
sources often adds up to sufficient and reasonable confidence in attribution
judgments.
What action should be taken to retaliate? One course would be retaliation in kind. But the United States is today surely conducting cyber espionage operations against China. Indeed, Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper expressed grudging admiration for the hack, revealed last
year, on the Office of Personnel Management, saying you have to kind
of salute the Chinese for
what they did and further
Indicting a handful of governmentacknowledged that if we
employed hackers didnt seem to
had the opportunity to do
that, I dont think wed hes- inflict any pain at all on China.
itate for a minute. What
US policy does not do is allow espionage, cyber or otherwise, for the purpose of benefiting US companiesand almost no one in Congress or the
executive branch wants to change that policy any time soon. So responses
in kind amount to a continuation of the US policy status quohardly a
way to impose further costs.
BLURRED LINES: Retired general Keith B. Alexander, the first head of the US
Cyber Command and former chief of the National Security Agency, talks to
an expert audience at the International Security Conference in Beijing last
September. [Li XinXinhua]
In May 2014, the United States indicted five officers in the Peoples Liberation Army for industrial cyber espionage against US corporations. In retrospect, it is hard to see how the indictment of these individuals might have
imposed a significant cost on China. Nothing seems to indicate they were
special to China in any way. Mainland Chinese often note that even if you are
one in a million, there are 1,500 more just like you. So even if these individuals were permanently removed from the playing field, its pretty clear that
others would step in to take their places.
The administration is also considering imposing economic sanctions against
Chinese companies that benefit from industrial cyber espionage. Since there
are not a huge number of successful Chinese companies, sanctions on such
companies could really begin to impose serious costs on the Chinese economy.
This leads to the last questionhow would China react to the imposition
of sanctions on its companies? Some supporters of sanctions dismiss the
46
possibility that China might act against US companies seeking to do business in China, apparently believing that Chinese discrimination against US
companies is already so great that there is not much left to lose. On this
last point, they are almost
certainly wrongno matter
In the long term, placing more
how bad things are today,
emphasis on the cooperative aspects
there is always a way to
of the US-China relationship may
make them worse tomorrow. Punitive fees and
prove the most valuable course.
tariffs could be imposed
on individual US companies. Sensitive personal information made available
from other hacks, such as the Ashley Madison incident, could be used to
cause personal discomfort to officials from US companies. Those officials
also could be subject to arbitrary detention when traveling in China. China
could further devalue its currency to the detriment of the US economy. And
all such moves would lead those affected to pressure the US government to
desist from such actions.
THE PATH OF COOPERATION
Retaliation has the best chance of working if the United States is willing to
go to the mat. It would require the United States to regard the cyber issue
as more important than all other aspects of the US-China relationship and
to be willing to endure the additional pain that would inevitably follow from
a Chinese reaction, at least in the short term. But given the many important
US-Chinese interests, going to the mat is highly implausible.
That leaves two other possibilities for making progress. In the short term,
the United States may find a way to respond strongly enoughin cyberspace
or elsewhereto impose
significant costs on
China but not so strongly Tracking down the originator of a cyber
that it leads to a painful
attack may not be as hard as it seems.
Chinese response. But in
the long term, placing more emphasis on the cooperative aspects of the USChina relationship may well prove more valuable.
For example, both nations have a common interest in maintaining the
stability of the international financial system against hostile activity in
cyberspace originated by a malevolent third party. And there are many
other common interests: fighting cyber-enabled financial crime, de-escalating a cyber conflict amidst hostilities, or assisting one another in the
event of a cyber disaster or a high-consequence cyber attack by a third

party.
Even agreement on broad principles about behavior in cyberspace would
be helpful, and indeed Presidents Xi and Obama welcomed the July 2015
report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cybersecurityincluding Chinese and US expertswhich addressed some of these principles
under the rubric of recommended norms of behavior.
Progress along any of these lines would also help to create an atmosphere
more conducive to addressing cyber issues that divide the two countries
today. As both sides get to work after the summit, a first step should be identifying promising areas of common ground.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Speaking

the Law: The Obama Administrations Addresses
on National Security Law, by Kenneth Anderson and
Benjamin Wittes. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
48
INT E LLIGEN C E A N D SEC UR I T Y
The Future of
Violence
Coming to grips with dizzying change and
vanishing borders.
By Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum
here will be new ways to kill people, to steal from people, and
to spy on peopleand these new ways of doing these very old
things will be available to more and more of us. Meanwhile, each
passing year also brings new ways to exploit the vulnerabilities
embedded in the mosaics of people and institutions. And each passing day
sees the market for those exploitations growing, along with the number of
people participating in that market.
In such a world, the idea of security, national and personal, changes radically. True, the human aspiration for security has not changed. People still
seek protection from states, organizations, and individuals who would harm
them. And they seek assurance that their governments will stop these entities and people if they try to do harm and punish them if they succeed. It was
the wish to preserve security that led people to seek and adopt legal codes in
the first place. In that sense, nothing has changed.
Benjamin Wittes is co-chair of the Hoover Institutions Jean Perkins Working Group on National Security, Technology, and Law and a senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution. Gabriella Blum is the Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School. They are the co-directors
of the Harvard Law School/Brookings Project on Law and Security.
Yet when we speak of security today, we invoke threats that are more
ubiquitous and omnidirectional than in the pastand with greater potential to cause catastrophe. At some point, these differences become far more
significant than the theoretical similarity between past and future threats. In
a world in which you have to worry about the vicious strain of flu accidentally
released from a lab in Missouri, the virus that a chicken farmer is synthesizing in Indonesia to kill the birds of his competitors in China, the unmanned
aerial vehicles your neighbors are flying over your house, surveillance
equipment and cameras popping up everywhere, the 3D printers of the local
animal rights activists, and the disruption of the street lamps on your block
thanks to a fourteen-year-old having fun in another hemisphere, the concept
of security is so broad as to seem almost hopeless.
All of humanity, inasmuch as it has access to empowering technologies,
now touches both our national security and our personal safety, which in
turn are becoming hard to separate from one another. And, of course, you
too are part of the problema potential threat to the security of countless
people and entities around
the worldor at least many
Civilizations do end. Once, all roads
people have to act as though
you could be.
led to Rome. Now the most imporNot all the threats involve
tant roads lead elsewhere.
malice. As we were finishing
our new book, The Future of Violence, a series of dramatic biosecurity events
took placeall involving accidents or naturally occurring outbreaks. Ebola
began ravaging large swaths of West Africa. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) reported that no fewer than seventy-five of its workers had been potentially exposed to anthrax. Shortly thereafter, it emerged
that vials of smallpox had been sitting around a National Institutes of Health
laboratory unnoticed for the past fifty years. A CDC lab also mingled a lethal
bird flu strain with a comparatively benign strain and then shipped it all to
another government lab. We live in a worldwide polity of superempowered
governments, citizens, and subjectssome of them evil, many more of them
careless or not very brightand that is a pretty hard place to govern.
Indeed, some people believe it is an impossible place to govern. The former
British astronomer royal, astrophysicist and cosmologist Martin Rees, in a
provocative book titled Our Final Hour, boldly states, I think the odds are
no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilization on Earth will survive
to the end of the present century. Our choices and actions could ensure the
perpetual future of life (not just on Earth, but perhaps far beyond it, too). Or
50
in contrast, through malign intent, or through misadventure, twenty-firstcentury technology could jeopardize lifes potential, foreclosing its human
and posthuman future.
Is our situation really as dire as Rees believes? Perhaps. Civilizations do
end, after all. The ancient
Egyptians and Mayans built
All humanity now touches both our
the great pyramids; the
national security and our personal
Greeks gave birth to phisafety. And you too are part of the
losophy and much of mathematics; and the Spanish
problem.
invaders stood in awe of the
Aztec city of Tenochtitln when they came to conquer it. Yet nobody today
thinks of native Mexico or Greece or Egypt as drivers of innovation or great
creators of wealth. The roads the Romans built all led to Rome, but over the
past fifteen centuries or so, the most important roads have led elsewhere. It
is a plausible hypothesis that our modern state system of governance is just
not up to the task of preventing a globally supercharged state of nature.
Species end too. The brontosaurus, the giant ground sloth, the saber tooth
cat, and the megalodon all cut quite a swath in their days. Modern humans
have been around only thirty-five thousand years or sowhich is to say about
0.000008 percent of the Earths history.
It is therefore perhaps tempting to respond to the task of governing the
world of many-to-many threats with instinctive despair. In Woody Allens
Annie Hall, the child Alvy Singer sinks into depression because he learns that
the universe is expanding.
As Alvy sullenly explains to
The greater the real or perceived
the family doctor to whom
his mother drags him, Well, threat of Armageddon, the greater
the universe is everything,
the justificationsometimes just the
and if its expanding, then
excusefor elevating security above
someday it will break apart,
all other values.
and that will be the end of
everything. His mother interjects, What is that your business? She barks
at the doctor, Hes stopped doing his homework! Alvy asks, Whats the
point?
Every generation proclaims the end of everything. And so far, every
generation has been wrong, at least with regard to the everything part.
Most likely, the current generations apocalyptic anxiety is also wrong. In any
event, the project of governance cannot proceed on the assumption of its
EYELESS IN DOHA: An airman walks alongside an RQ-4 Global Hawk drone

on the flight line at Al-Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar. As the world moves
toward universal technological empowerment, there will be enhanced capacity for attack, enhanced vulnerability to attack, and enhanced capacity for
defense for countless people and entities. [Tech. Sgt. Christopher BoitzUS Air Force]
own futility. Just as Alvy has to keep doing his homework knowing that the
expanding universe might some day break apart, we have to try to govern on
the theory that the threat environment is manageable.
We are also not ready to give up on the state as the major instrument for
governing such a world of heightened risk. No, it is not a perfect instrument. The Leviathan is missing some teeth. It is getting older now. And it
may be that ultimately some other beast will come along and supplant it
as king of the deep. Maybe this will be some larger superstate structure or
some more local one that gets all the little fish to swim togetheror maybe
both at the same time. But for now, at least, the Leviathan is still the best
friend weve got. We still need it even with full awareness of its flaws and
decrepitude.
There is a converse risk, one just as counterproductive as despair:
overreaction.
Any attack and any threat environment becomes much more devastating if
it leads to a hysterical or disproportionate response that exacerbates conflict
52
and magnifies the secondary effects of the initial attack. Neither resilience
nor maturity is a given; both are taught and learned. The focus in our book
is on threats, but the net consequences of new technologies have so far been
wildly positive for human health and prosperity. Political leadership has a
responsibility to encourage and cultivate the benefits of technology even
while discouragingand preparing the public forterrible abuses.
Unlike the end of the human species, which always remains a theoretical
possibility, governmental overreaction, or misdirected reaction, to threats
is much more than a possibility; it is omnipresent, and its consequences are
often grave. In the name of national security, governments curtail human
rights, trade away important freedoms, and can be quick to sacrifice human
welfare, especially of those people with lesser political power. The greater
the real or perceived threat of Armageddon, the greater the justificationor
sometimes just the excusefor elevating security above all other values.
This is why John Lockes refinement of Thomas Hobbes is so important:
Locke more accurately assessed risk than Hobbes did. He understood that
the Leviathan, even in protecting you, might turn out to be just as big a
threat as any of the harms it is meant to keep us from. In other words, while
we need the Leviathan, we need to keep it in chains.
The world has not exhausted the trend toward universal technological
empowerment, a trend that carries with it enhanced capacity for attack,
enhanced vulnerability
to attack, and enhanced
The Leviathan is still the best friend
capacity for defense for
we have. But as Locke pointed out,
countless people and entiwe must keep it in chains.
ties on the planet. This
trend necessitates serious, sustained, and careful thinking about how we organize nations and
how the nations of the world move to organize the larger international
systemwhether one believes that our approaches to those questions are
sensible or not.
In the first few pages of the book of Genesis, God faces two bold challenges
to his rule from superempowered individuals. The first is Adam and Eves
defiance of his instruction not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge. God is
content for his creation to eat from the Tree of Life, as long as Adam and Eve
lack access to the knowledge of good and evil. But the moment they eat from
the Tree of Knowledge, God can no longer afford to have them eating from
the Tree of Life too. Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good
and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life,
and eat, and live forever. . . Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the
garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. The expulsion
from Eden, in other words,
flows directly from the sovJust as children need to keep doing
ereigns need to preserve his
their homework knowing that the
capacity to govern. Man can
be immortal or he can be
universe might someday end, we
wise, but he cannot be both
have to try to govern as if threats are
without threatening Gods
manageable.
relative power.
A few leaves of parchment later, humanity once again threatens Gods
power to rule, this time by building the Tower of Babel. Behold, God worries, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to
do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined
to do. By imposing different languages on mankind, God once again retains
his own sovereign power, making subservient the would-be superempowered
individual, who now cannot live forever and cannot communicate with all of
his fellow men to plot to attain the power of gods.
Like Adam and Eve, we have now eaten from the Tree of Knowledge,
and we have also built a tower of dazzling height unmolested by any higher
power. As democratic societies, we arein a political sense at leastour
own sovereign power. And so, somewhat like God in Genesis, we must ask
ourselves, what new rules do we now impose? And what powers do we, in our
capacity as sovereigns, exercise against ourselves as upstart pretenders to
the godly powers we each now wield?
Excerpted from The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers
and DronesConfronting a New Age of Threat, by Benjamin Wittes and
Gabriella Blum. Available from Basic Books, a member of The Perseus
Books Group. Copyright 2015.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is The

Nuclear Enterprise: High-Consequence Accidents:
How to Enhance Safety and Minimize Risks in Nuclear
Weapons and Reactors, edited by George P. Shultz and
Sidney D. Drell. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
54
INT E LLIGEN C E A N D SEC UR I T Y
Foiling the Dirty

Bomb
How to head off the threat of a radiological weapon
before its too late.
By Sam Nunn and Andrew Bieniawski
mid a campaign of terror that has

included beheadings and suicide
bombings, recent reports from
the Middle East that Islamic State
extremists may now have stolen enough material

for a radioactive dirty bomb are chillingbut
should not be shocking.
This new threat originates overseas, but
the potential for disaster posed by dangerous
radiological materials at home is just as serious.
Radiological materials used in medical equipment
and scientific research are at risk. Concerns have
been brewing for years because the very same
isotopes that can make life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments possiblesuch as
cesium-137, cobalt-60, and iridium-192could
Key points
Certain dangerous
isotopes are no longer
necessary. Hospitals
can stop using them.
A bomb made with
stolen radiological
materials could cause
huge liabilities for
medical providers.
Rules for securing
radiological materials
are too broad and must
be focused.
Security demands
global cooperation
among countries that
hold dangerous materials.
be used to build a bomb that would spread

Sam Nunn is an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is co-chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Andrew Bieniawski is vice president for material security and minimization at NTI.
radioactive material and contaminate significant portions of a major US city.

We are exposed, and the clock is ticking.
Unlike a nuclear weapon, a radioactive dirty bomb would not cause catastrophic levels of death and injury, but depending on its chemistry, form, and
location, it could cause billions of dollars in damage because of the costs of
evacuation, relocation, and
cleanupand the inevitable
Even if an American state wanted
follow-on threats could
have severe economic and
tighter security for its radiological
sources, federal regulations wouldnt psychological repercussions.
Buildings would likely have
allow it.
to be demolished and the
debris removed. Access to a contaminated area could be denied for years as a
site is cleaned well enough to meet even minimum environmental guidelines
for protecting the public.
The materials that could be used to wreak such havoc are dispersed across
thousands of sites in more than a hundred countries, and many of them are
poorly secured. Concerns about the Islamic State are a powerful reminder of
whats at stakeand should provide impetus for governments, the medical
community, and industry globally to immediately secure all such materials or
replace them with alternative technologies.
At home, there are a number of steps we should put on the front burner.
First, although securing the materials is crucial, a better option exists for
some isotopes that would result in permanent threat reduction. Thanks to
recent technological advances, it is no longer necessary to use one of the
most dangerous materials, cesium-137, in medical and scientific equipment.
Cesium-based blood irradiators at hospitals can and should be replaced with
technologies approved by the Food and Drug Administration that dont use
radiological material but achieve equivalent medical outcomes. All hospitals
should replace these irradiators to reduce their risks and potential liability if
their dangerous materials harm others. This risk reduction is a high-priority
national security matter, and governments should render appropriate assistance when required.
Second, liability and insurance gaps must be carefully reviewed by those
possessing and responsible for the security of radiological sources. A hospital, for instance, could be financially devastated if required to pay huge damages in the wake of a dirty bomb attack using its materials unless the hospital
specifically has insurance that covers such losses. Hospital officials should
evaluate their current coverage and likely will find that eliminating their
56
radioactive sources is more cost-efficient than paying high premiums for

expanded coverage and funding proper security. In addition, publicly traded
companies that use radiological sources should provide more specific information about the associated risks in response to Securities and Exchange
Commission disclosure and reporting obligations.
Third, we need to strengthen the regulatory framework for the security of
radiological sources. As noted in a 2012 Government Accountability Office
report, security requirements put forth by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are too broadly written. The NRC should provide medical facilities
with specific steps to develop and sustain a more effective security program.
Fourth, states should immediately be allowed to go beyond a federal
minimum security standard if they choose. As it stands, even if a state wants
to voluntarily increase security for its radiological sources beyond federal
minimums, the NRC regulations dont allow it. State regulators hands are
tied because state regulations for the majority of US radiological material
essentially must be identical to those established by the NRC. One size does
not fit all, however. New York City has a higher risk profile than Kansas City,
Missouri, or New Orleans.
Finally, the international community should do more. In 2014, twenty-three
countries at the Nuclear Security Summit agreed to secure their most dangerous radioactive materials. Other countries should join this pledge. This years
summit offers governments a valuable opportunity to announce their fulfilled
commitments and launch a major new initiative to replace all cesium blood
irradiators and other dangerous radiological sources where alternatives exist.
Given the stated interest by terrorist groups and the widespread availability of potentially dangerous radiological sources, it is nothing short of a
miracle that we have not yet seen a dirty bomb terrorist attack. We must act
before our luck runs out.
Reprinted by permission of the Washington Post. 2015 Washington Post
New from the Hoover Institution Press is The War

that Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear
Deterrence, edited by George P. Shultz and James E.
Goodby. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.
hooverpress.org.
ED U CATI ON
Whose
Standards?
Parents of schoolchildren certainly support
standardized tests; the Common Core, not so
much. Highlights of the latest Education Next poll.
By Michael B. Henderson, Paul E. Peterson, and Martin R. West
he American public is displaying an independent streak when

it comes to education. Critics of testing will take no comfort
from the findings of the 2015 Education Next pollbut neither
will supporters of the Common Core State Standards, school
choice, merit pay, or tenure reform. The unions will not like the publics
opposition to union demands that nonmembers contribute financially to
their activities. Teachers will be unhappy to hear that public enthusiasm
for increasing teacher pay falls through the floor when people are told current salary levels and asked if they are willing to pay additional taxes for
that purpose. The Obama administration will be equally unhappy to hear
what both teachers and the public think about its proposals to require
Michael B. Henderson is research director for the Public Policy Research Lab at
Louisiana State University. Paul E. Peterson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the editor in chief of Education Next. He is also the Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government and the director of the Program on Education Policy
and Governance at Harvard University. Martin R. West is associate professor at
the Harvard Graduate School of Education and deputy director of the Program on
Education Policy and Governance.
58
similar student suspension and expulsion rates across racial and ethnic
groups.
These are among the many findings to emerge from the ninth annual
Education Next survey, administered in May and June 2015 to a nationally
representative sample of some 4,000 respondents, including oversamples
of roughly 700 teachers, 700 African-Americans, and 700 Hispanics (for
full data, see educationnext.org/files/2015ednextpoll.pdf). The large number of survey respondents enabled us to ask alternative questions on the
same topic to determine the sensitivity of opinion to new information and
particular wording. We also posed many new questions this time, allowing us to explore opinion on curricular and other issues that have never
before been examined in a nationally representative survey of the American public.
WHEN IS TESTING OVERTESTING?
In early 2015, as Congress began rewriting the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), no issue loomed larger than the use of student testing to measure
the performance of schools and teachers. Media reports featured teachers decrying a scourge of overtesting. By spring, hundreds of thousands of
parents had chosen to have their children opt out of state tests, garnering
the rousing approval of the teachers unions. Out on the hustings, Republican
presidential candidates escalated their critique of the Common Core. The
movement to put the standardized testing machine in reverse, in the words
of New York mayor Bill de Blasio, seemed to have legs.
It is perhaps surprising, then, that in July a bipartisan Senate supermajority of 8117 passed a revision of NCLB that keeps the federal requirement
that all students be tested in math and reading in grades three to eight and
again in high school. Has the upper chamber ignored the peoples will? Or is
the publics appetite for the information provided by regular student testing
broader and more robust than the media coverage would indicate?
Our polling suggests the latter. A solid 67 percent of members of the public
say they support continuing the federal requirement for annual testing, while
just 21 percent oppose the idea, with the remainder taking a neutral position.
Parental support for testing (66 percent) is about as high as that of the public
as a whole. Teachers are divided down the middle, with 47 percent saying yes
and 46 percent saying no to continuing the policy.
In 2012, the last time we asked this question, 63 percent of the public said
they supported annual testing and only 12 percent opposed. In other words,
the shares of supporters and opponents are both slightly higher in 2015 than
they were three years ago, with the share taking a neutral position declining
from 25 percent to 13 percent. This shift could suggest that public opinion
has crystallized in the intervening years, but it may also reflect the fact that
our survey presented the neutral-response option more prominently in 2012.
Either way, the backlash against standardized testing appears less potent
than opponents claim.
What about opting out? We asked respondents whether they thought
parents should be able to decide whether or not their children take annual
state tests. Our results reveal little public sympathy for giving parents this
option. Only 25 percent of members of the public like the idea of letting
parents decide whether their children are tested, while 59 percent oppose it.
Among parents themselves, just 32 percent favor the opt-out approach,
while 52 percent oppose it. Fifty-seven percent of teachers
also dislike the idea, with only 32 percent giving it
their support.
60
WHOS IN CHARGE HERE?

Another fault line in the debate over the proposed federal education law lies
between Congress and the executive branch. The Obama administration,
backed by civil rights and business groups, wants the feds to have more voice
in defining what constitutes a failing school and in proposing remedies. But
the Senate has nixed the so-called Murphy Amendment, which would require
states to identify and intervene in their lowest-performing schools; high
schools with fewer than 67 percent on-time graduates; and any school where
disadvantaged or disabled students fall short of standardized test goals for
two consecutive years.
Where do people come down on this debate? To find out, we asked our
respondents which level of government (federal, state, or local) should play
the largest role in three key aspects of the design of school accountability
programs:
Setting education standards for what students should know
Deciding whether or not a school is failing
Deciding how to fix failing schools
When it comes to standard setting, members of the public are evenly
divided over whether the federal government or the states should be in the
drivers seat: 43 percent say the states and 41 percent say the federal government, while just 15 percent
suggest that the local
government should play this A solid 67% of members of the
role. But people clearly want public say they support the federal
the feds in the back seat
requirement for annual testing.
when it comes to identifying
and improving failing schools. Only 18 percent of respondents say the federal
government should play the largest role in identifying failing schools, and 20
percent say it should do so when it comes to fixing them. The percentages
of those who say the states should have the lead role in these areas are 50
percent and 51 percent, respectively.
Given the backing of civil rights groups for a larger federal role in this
area, it is worth noting that neither African-Americans nor Hispanics differ
notably in their thinking from that of the broader public with respect to
the role of the federal government in school accountability. Among AfricanAmericans, the share favoring federal leadership across the three topics is 46
percent for setting standards, 23 percent for identifying failing schools, and
23 percent for fixing failing schools. Among Hispanics, the parallel numbers
are 44 percent, 18 percent, and 29 percent.
Former education secretary Arne Duncan indicated last year that the
administration would not support a bill that did not strengthen federal oversight of school accountability measures. Given these poll results, defending
that stance to the public would be an uphill battle.
THE COMMON CORE
While support for standardized testing remains strong, the debate over
the Common Core State Standards continues to divide both teachers and
the general public. Support for using the Common Core, which fell from
65 percent in 2013 to 53
percent in 2014, has now
States, not federal authorities,
slipped slightly further, to
49 percent. Still, only 35
should identify and fix failing
percent of members of the
schools, most respondents say.
public express opposition to
using the standards, with the remaining 16 percent undecided. Democrats
(57 percent) remain much more supportive of the Obama-backed policy than
Republicans are (37 percent).
The latest decline in support for these standards does not arise simply
from a politically tainted Common Core brand. Among a second group of
respondents who answered the same question but without the phrase Common Core, support for the use of shared standards across the states slid
from 68 percent in 2014 to 54 percent in 2015.
It is interesting to note that this years difference between those favoring
the Common Core standards (49 percent) and those favoring generic standards (54 percent) is just 5 percentage points. In 2014, that differential was 15
points. Why? It may be that the debate over national standards has been so
energetic over the past year that the public now is more aware of the issue,
whether or not the Common Core is mentioned.
A third group of respondents were not told the standards would be used
to hold public schools accountable for their performance. Without the
accountability phrase in the question, support for the Common Core falls to
just 39 percent, with 37 percent opposed. The proportion of people with no
opinion increases from 16 percent to 23 percent.
Teacher support is also sliding. In 2013, 76 percent of teachers supported
the Common Coregiving it a far greater approval rating than did the general public. But teacher approval collapsed to 46 percent in 2014 and has now
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fallen to just 40 percent. Meanwhile, the share of teachers expressing opposition has risen to 50 percent, leaving just 10 percent undecided. Unlike the
public at large, teachers are more likely to express support for the Common
Core when the survey question does not include the accountability phrase.
They divide evenly when the question omits that phrase, with 44 percent in
support and 43 percent opposed.
The news for Common Core proponents is not all bad. Those who favor it
continue to outnumber opponents, by 14 percentage points. Also, the rate of
decline in support slowed markedly between 2014 and 2015, perhaps suggesting that opinion on the issue has begun to stabilize. Moreover, the broader
publics opposition to the Common Core appears to rest on a shallow factual
foundation. Asked whether or not the Common Core is being used in their
local school district, fully 58 percent of the members of the public admit that
they do not know. Only 44 percent of residents in states that have adopted
the Common Core realize that the standards are being used in their school
districts; and perhaps more startling, 24 percent of residents in states that
do not have the Common Core believe their districts are using the standards.
Yet among the 34 percent of the public who report that the standards are
being used in their district, respondents who believe the standards have had a
negative effect on schools (51 percent) exceed those who think they have had
a positive effect (28 percent). Twenty-one percent give a neutral response.
Teachers and parents, who claim greater knowledge of whether the standards
are in use, are just as negative in their assessment of
The public thinks schools should
the impact. Seventy-three
place more emphasis on just about
percent of teachers report
everythingwith the possible excep- that the standards are being
used in their district, with 49
tion of sports.
percent of that group reporting negative effects and 32 percent reporting positive effects. Among parents,
49 percent say the standards are being used in their district, with 53 percent
reporting negative effects and just 28 percent reporting positive effects.
In other words, teachers and parents who say their district is implementing the standards are the ones most likely to offer a critical assessment of
their impact. That finding should be of concern to all those hoping to see the
Common Core succeed.
SOME SURPRISING SHIFTS
In retrospect, it looks as if 2014, an election year that swept Republicans into
power in Congress and many state capitals, propelled school reform to a
high-water mark that has proved difficult to sustain. For three years in a row,
we have asked either identical or quite similar questions on several issues.
On a surprising number of them, support for policy changes has slipped in
2015 from peaks attained in 2014, though sometimes the fall is to a level that
remains above the one reached in 2013. None of the changes is large, and
some of the shifts fall short of statistical significance, leaving it unclear as to
whether a true change has taken place. But consider these responses:
Charter schools. Support for charter schools has dipped from a high of
54 percent in 2014 to 51 percent in 2015, the same level as in 2013. However,
the percentage supporting charters remains twice that of the 27 percent
expressing opposition.
64
Tax credits for scholarships for low-income students. Support for a tax
credit for businesses and individuals who contribute to private-school scholarships for low-income families has also fallen, to 55 percent from 60 percent
in 2014. (This question was not asked in 2013.)
Vouchers for low-income students. Backing for the use of government
funds to pay the tuition of low-income students who choose to attend private
schools has fallen steadilyfrom 41 percent to 37 percent between 2013
and 2014, with a further (though not statistically significant) drop to just 34
percent in 2015.
Universal vouchers. Public enthusiasm for universal vouchers without
regard to income has slipped from 50 percent in 2014 to 46 percent in 2015,
just a bit higher than the 44 percent level reported in 2013. (However, these
changes are not statistically significant and the comparison is not exact, as
the question in 2015 for the first time included the word all, clearly presenting vouchers as a universal benefit for every family.)
Merit pay. People are not fully embracing policy reforms affecting teachers. Between 2014 and 2015, public support for merit pay has slid from 57
percent to 51 percent, about the same as in 2013, when merit pay garnered
support from 49 percent of the population. Even so, just 34 percent of the
population opposes merit pay, with the remainder taking a neutral position.
Teacher tenure. Between 2014 and 2015, public opposition to teacher
tenure has also slipped,
from 57 percent to 51
percent, just above the 47
People have wildly divergent ideas
percent level attained in
about how much teachers are paid.
2013. Nonetheless, current
public support for teacher tenure is just 29 percent, a little more than half
the size of the opposition.
One hesitates to read too much into shifts in opinion that are only modestly
larger than what a statistical aberration might account forand in some
cases, not even that big. But school reformers might take the 2015 findings as
a red light on the dashboard, a warning that efforts to alter the publics thinking on education policy may be faltering.
SPENDING AND SALARIES
Media coverage about proposed increases in education funding rarely
address certain basic questions: How much do we spend per pupil? How
much does the federal government contribute to the total expenditure? And
does the public think spending should be increased?
Americans greatly underestimate the amount spent on schools. According

to the federal governments National Center for Education Statistics (NCES),
the school districts in which our survey respondents resided spent an average
of $12,440 per pupil in 2012 (the most recent data available). But when we ask
respondents to estimate per-pupil expenditures in their local school district,
they guess, on average, just $6,307, a little more than half actual spending levels.
Our survey found that people are often willing to alter their thinking when
given additional information. Before asking our respondents if they thought
spending in their districts should be increased, we told half of them what the
current spending levels were. The other half were left uninformed. Among
those not informed, 58 percent favor increases in spending. That support
drops to 42 percent when
people are told the actual
Support for the Common Core slipped
level of expenditures
(after having provided
again, but the opposition appeared to
their own estimate).
have a shaky foundation.
Respondents who most
seriously underestimate spending levels are the ones most likely to change
their minds when told the facts. On the other hand, those who overestimate
expenditures barely budge in their opinions when told their districts spend
less than they thought.
Americans are also poorly informed where the money comes from to run
the nations schools. We asked half of our respondents, randomly selected, to
estimate what percentage of funding for schools currently comes from each
level of governmentfederal, state, and local. NCES data from 201112 (the
most recent available) indicate that the actual levels are 10 percent for the
federal government, 45 percent for state governments, and 45 percent for
local governments. But people greatly overstate the federal share, estimating it as 32 percent. In turn, they believe that state and local governments
contribute less than they actually do.
The other half of respondents were asked how much funding should come
from each of these sources. The average responses are 37 percent for the federal share, 35 percent for the state share, and 28 percent for the local share.
In other words, people think the federal government should assume considerably more of the cost of schooling than its current 10 percent share, and local
government should carry a considerably smaller burden than the 45 percent
share it now bears.
To explore national opinion on teacher pay, we randomly divided our
respondents into four groups. One group was simply asked whether teacher
66
salaries should be raised. Another was asked whether taxes should be raised
to fund salary increases. A third group was first told the average teacher salary in their states before being asked whether salaries should be raised. The
fourth group was told the average teacher salary and then asked whether
taxes should be raised to pay for salary increases.
Among the first group, 63 percent of respondents favor a pay increase for
teachers.
Support falls to 45 percent, however, when the question (posed to the second group) asks about raising taxes to pay for teacher salaries.
In the third group, informed of current salaries, 45 percent of respondents
support pay increases.
And only 32 percent of people in the fourth group, told teacher salaries and
asked if taxes should be raised, support a hike in teacher pay.
In sum, it is hard to say whether the public really wants a salary increase for
teachers or not. It all depends
on how much members of the
public know and whether
they are keeping in mind that the increment has to be covered by themselves
as taxpayers.
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUSPENSION RATES
In 2014 the US Department of Education and the Department of Justice
sent a joint letter to every school district in the country, urging local officials
to avoid racial bias when suspending or expelling students. Officials were
advised that they risked legal action if school disciplinary policies had a
disparate impact, i.e., a disproportionate and unjustified effect on students of
a particular race.
What do members of the publicand what do teachersthink of federally
mandated no disparate impact disciplinary policies? To find out, we split
our sample into two randomly selected groups. The first was asked whether it
supported or opposed federal policies that prevent schools from expelling or
suspending black and Hispanic students at higher rates than other students.
Fifty-one percent of the public oppose such policies, while just 21 percent
back them. That division of opinion is essentially the same among the second
group, which was asked about school district policies of the same sort.
By a large margin, the public opposes no disparate impact policies regardless
of whether the federal government or the local school district formulates them.
The division of opinion within the teaching profession approximates that
of the public as a whole. A hefty 59 percent of teachers oppose federal no
disparate impact policies, while only 23 percent favor them.
Differences emerge along racial and ethnic lines. Among whites, only 14
percent favor the federal policies, while 57 percent oppose them. Higher
levels of support are observed among African-Americans41 percent are in
favor, 23 percent against. However, only 31 percent of Hispanic respondents
approve of such policies, with 44 percent opposed.
NO SUBJECT LEFT BEHIND?
Have federal testing requirements forced schools to place excessive emphasis on math and reading? Have budget squeezes driven the arts out of the
curriculum? Or are science, technology, engineering, and math (known as the
STEM subjects) being ignored in favor of softer subjects? And, quite apart
from striking the right balance among academic subjects, do schools place
enough emphasis on cultivating students character and creativity, educating
them about global warming, and taking steps to prevent bullying?
All these questions provoke passionate discussion. We conducted the
first-ever experimental inquiry into such matters, asking a random half of
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our respondents to estimate (on a scale from 1 to 7) how much emphasis they
think their local schools place on each of several subjects and topics. The
second half was asked to use the same scale to indicate how much emphasis
should be placed on these subjects.
For every subject except sports, respondents in the second group think the
subject should be given more emphasis than their counterparts in the first
group perceive it is getting. In other words, the public thinks schools should
place more emphasis on just about everything. Perhaps it is just human
nature to say that other people should be doing more.
But how much more varies with the subject and the population being interviewed. The public thinks much more emphasis should be placed on reading
and math than do teachers and (to a lesser extent) parents. The public says
that math and reading should be given a better than 1-point increment over the
5.2-point emphasis (on the 7-point scale) it perceives these subjects are now
given. But teachers think the emphasis needs to be increased by only about
half a point in reading and even less in math, while parents would increase the
emphasis in the two subjects by no more than two-thirds of a point.
Meanwhile, teachers would give much greater (+1.7 points) emphasis to
the arts than the 3.6 level teachers estimate it is now getting. Parents would
give the arts only two-thirds of a point more emphasis, and the general public
would boost its emphasis by only 0.8 more points. A similar, if smaller discrepancy is observed among the three groups when they are asked about history.
On other topics, the three groupsteachers, parents, and the general
publicare more like-minded. All three think character development and
creativity deserve much more emphasis. But while parents and the general
public also want far more attention given to bullying prevention, teachers
think the matter needs only modestly more attention.
Reprinted from Education Next (www.educationnext.org), published by
the Hoover Institution. 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Tests,

Testing, and Genuine School Reform, by Herbert J.
Walberg. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.
hooverpress.org.
ED U CATI ON
Fight for the

Bright
Our highest-achieving students have needs, too
and were failing to meet them.
By Chester E. Finn Jr. and Brandon L. Wright
hy pay special attention to high-ability girls and boys?

Wont they do fine anyway? Shouldnt we concentrate on
kids with problemsthe low achievers, the poor kids?
Good questions, particularly when American educa-
tion leaders (and their counterparts in most other advanced countries) are
preoccupied with equalizing opportunity, closing gaps, and giving a boost to
those most challengedand when resources are chronically scarce. Yet such
questions have two compelling answers.
THE SPARK OF PROSPERITY
First, the country needs these children to be highly educated in order to
ensure its long-term competitiveness, security, and innovation. These are
the young people who hold perhaps the greatest promise for making major
advances in science, technology, medicine, the humanities, and much more.
The same point was framed in the 1993 federal report National Excellence: A
Chester E. Finn Jr. is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, former chair
of Hoovers Koret Task Force on K12 Education, and president emeritus of the
Thomas B. Fordham Institute. Brandon L. Wright is the managing editor and
a policy associate at the Fordham Institute. They are co-authors of Failing Our
Brightest Kids: The Global Challenge of Educating High-Ability Students
(2015, Harvard Education Press).
70
Case for Developing Americas Talent: In order to make economic strides, the
authors wrote, America must rely upon many of its top-performing students
to provide leadershipin mathematics, science, writing, politics, dance, art,
business, history, health, and other human pursuits.
This isnt just rhetoric. Economists dont agree on much, but almost all concur that a nations economic vitality and growth depend heavily on the quality
and productivity of its human capital and its capacity for innovation. At the
forefront of creation, invention, and discovery arenearly alwaysthe societys cleverest, ablest, and best-educated men and women. Yes, other personal
and national characteristics also loom large, such as hard work, enterprise,
natural resources, stable laws, reliable banks, and peace in the streets. But
nothing trumps the knowledge and imagination of a countrys people.
The US economy is already hobbled by our shortage of such homegrown
talent, and further shackled by limits on importing such people from overseas. Organizations like the Partnership for a New American Economy and
the US Chamber of Commerce estimate that one-fourth of American science
and engineering firms now face difficulty hiring the workforce they need
and forecast a shortage of 220,000 workers with STEM (science/technology/
engineering/math) degrees by 2018. Yes, changing our immigration policies
would ease the crunch, but what sensible nation would rely on other countries to educate and supply its highly skilled workers?
This challenge extends beyond the tech world. In November 2014, the Wall
Street Journal reported that foreign applicants, especially from India and
China, were besting American candidates for admission to high-status US
business schools because they were doing far better on the quantitative portion of the Graduate Management Admission Test. Some leading universities
are turning to country-specific scoring systems so that American applicants
get compared only with fellow Americansa sort of affirmative-action
scheme for people educated in our own schools and colleges!
The problem is not that the United States lacks smart children; its that such
kids arent getting the education they need to realize their potential. Other countries are forging ahead, while the American record can be described as roughly
flat. Using international test data, economists Eric Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann estimate that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of top-performing students within a country is associated with 1.3 percentage points higher
annual growth in that countrys economy (measured in per-capita GDP). Which
is to say, if the United States propelled as many of its young people into the ranks
of high achievers as, say, the Netherlands, this country would be markedly more
prosperouswith faster growth, higher employment, and better wages.
ITS ONLY FAIR

The second big reason to attend to the schooling of high-ability youngsters is a
version of the familiar equity argument: these kids also deserve an education
that meets their needs and enhances their futures, just like children with other
distinctions and problems. They have their own legitimate claim on our conscience, our sense of fairness, our policy priorities, and our education budgets.
Whats more, many of them also face such challenges as disability, poverty, illeducated parents, non-English-speaking homes, and tough neighborhoods.
Those kids depend more than upper-middle-class youngsters on the public
education system to do right by them. Some will manage to overcome the
constraints of their upbringing but many will fall by the wayside, destined by
circumstances beyond their
control never to realize their
What sensible nation would rely on
potential. As Ford Foundation president Darren
other countries to educate and supWalker recently remarked,
ply its highly skilled workers?
even though talent is
spread evenly across America, opportunity is not. Thats why our failure
to extend such opportunities to more high-ability kids from disadvantaged
backgrounds is, as the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation team recently put it,
both unacceptable and incompatible with Americas long-term prosperity.
Thats also why high-functioning public school systems such as that of Fairfax County, Virginia (FCPS), declare their commitment to widening opportunities for children with talent and to providing challenging learning experiences for all learners that build on individual strengths and optimize academic
potential. In order to meet the needs and develop the potential of advanced
learners, FCPS provides a continuum of advanced academic services.
Yet we have a long way to go before it can be said that advanced learners
from poor circumstances are achieving anywhere near their more fortunate
classmates. A woeful 2 percent of Americans in the lowest socioeconomicstatus quartile reached the uppermost Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) ranks in math, reading, or science in 2012. By contrast, in
the top quartile, 20 percent of US test takers made it to that level in math, as
did 18 percent in reading and 17 percent in science.
Plenty more poor kids have the ability, but lots of them lack the supports
from home and family that middle-class children enjoy, and many attend
schools awash in low achievement, places where all the incentives and pressures on teachers and administrators are to equip weak pupils with basic
skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Such schools understandably invest
72
their resources in boosting low achievers. Theyre also most apt to judge
teachers by their success in doing that and least apt to have much to spare
energy or time, incentive or moneyfor students already above the proficiency bar. These might fairly be termed the kids that No Child Left Behind
forgot.
SOUNDING THE ALARM
We are by no means the first to flag this problem. As the authors of that 1993
report declared:
The United States is squandering one of its most precious resourcesthe gifts, talents, and high interests of many of its students. . . .
This problem is especially severe among economically disadvantaged and minority students, who have access to fewer advanced
educational opportunities and whose talents often go unnoticed.
In the years since, similar alarms have sounded time and again. In A Nation
Deceived, published in 2004, Nicholas Colangelo, Susan G. Assouline, and
Miraca Gross meticulously demonstrate how able children benefit from an
accelerated educationand the damaging role of misguided education beliefs
and practices in holding back such children.
In a 2008 Fordham Institute publication, after analyzing NAEP data over
the previous decade, Tom Loveless of the Brookings Institution cautioned:
Gaps are narrowing because the gains of low-achieving students
are outstripping those of high achievers by a factor of two or three
to one. The nation has a strong interest in developing the talents
of its best students to their fullest to foster the kind of growth at
the top end of the achievement distribution that has been occurring at the bottom end. International comparisons of top students
around the world invariably show American high-achievers falling
short.
In Mind the (Other) Gap, published in 2010, the University of Connecticuts
Jonathan Plucker and colleagues again documented the widening excellence
gap in American education, as the economically disadvantaged, Englishlanguage learners, and historically underprivileged minorities have come
to comprise a shrinking proportion of students scoring at the highest levels
of achievement. The researchers returned to the excellence gap problem
in October 2013, bluntly stating that policy efforts to close the minimum
competency gap, important as they are (an ethical and moral priority), are
not narrowing the excellence gap, a unique problem that will not be solved
without concerted effort.
In Unlocking Emergent Talent, Paula Olszewski-Kubilius and Jane Clarenbach of the National Association for Gifted Children wrote that while our
nation continues to express commitment to closing the achievement gap,
the proportion of low-income students performing at advanced levels on the
National Assessment of Educational Progress remains shamefully low.
Caroline Hoxby and Christopher Avery made waves
Virtually all public-policy presin 2013 with evidence that
sures, incentives, and accountability even low-income youngsters
schemes have pushed schools to
who do exceptionally well in
high school, earning excelconcentrate on low achievers, not
lent grades and lofty SAT
high ones.
or ACT scores, are far less
likely than their affluent peers to wind up in high-status colleges, despite
ample evidence that they could gain admission, obtain sufficient financial aid,
and succeed academically. Why? Because they tend not even to apply to such
colleges; nobody at home or school encourages them to do so and explains
how to go about it. Nor do university outreach efforts manage to find many
of them. Hoxby and Avery estimate that tens of thousands of high achievers
from disadvantaged backgrounds are thus missed by the elite strata of
American higher educationand these are youngsters who have succeeded
in K12 education despite all the obstacles.
EXTRA HURDLES FOR THE TALENTED
One may rightly term this amply documented situation shameful, but one
ought not find it surprising. Consider the childrens differing circumstances.
Its true that not all upper-middle-class kids with strong ability can count
on having education-maximizing parentssome are content for their children to be well-adjusted and popularand some youngsters themselves lack
motivation. Yet the odds are hugely better that such girls and boys will get
an education that does a decent job of capitalizing on their potential, beginning in their earliest months on earth. For they are all but certain to have
adults in their lives who read to them, ask them questions that dont have
simple answers, show them intriguing things, and take them to interesting
placesadults with the knowledge and capacity to navigate our complicated
education system in pursuit of suitable options for their daughters and sons
and to press for access to the best of those options. These are adults who
74
possess resources that enable them to shift to better options when necessary, whether that means changing neighborhoods, purchasing supplemental
education offerings, even sending their children to private schools.
Equally able youngsters from poor families, on the other hand, depend
mainly on their local public
education system to supply
The odds are hugely better for highthem with suitable learning opportunities. Many
er-income girls and boys to get an
start school already lageducation that does a decent job of
ging because they havent
capitalizing on their potential.
learned as many words
or been asked to think about as many complicated things or seen as many
informative places as their more-advantaged classmates. Many also enter
schools that have a weak record of academic achievement and are staffed by
less-experienced teachers.
Able as they may be, they face a double whammy because their schools are
beset by more urgent problems: poor attendance, children arriving hungry
or sick, discipline challenges, language issues, and more. Such schools may
also be strapped for resourcesmoney, expert instructors, materials, and so
on. Maximizing the potential of their high-ability, high-achieving pupils may
be something that principals and teachers yearn to do but simply cant. They
are too swamped to devote the energy and resources it would require.
Whether the children in a particular school are poor or rich, virtually all
the public-policy pressures, incentives, and accountability schemes of recent
decadeswhether arising
from local, state, or fedBright but poor kids might fairly be
eral sources, from private
philanthropy, or from the
termed the ones that No Child Left
priorities and values of
Behind forgot.
educators themselveshave
pushed teachers and administrators to concentrate on low achievers, those
who, in the language of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), are not yet proficient or making adequate yearly progress in reading or math.
Helping students climb over the proficiency bar wins points and plaudits for
the school, but boosting them further up the achievement ladder rarely does.
Schools and teachers earn few incentives or rewards for causing such youngsters to learn more. Meanwhile, plenty of these students peers are termed at
riskin terms of not just lagging achievement but also disabilities, immigrant
status, home language, and other factorsand government (and philanthropic)
funding streams, mandates, accountability systems, and special programs

focus on schools success in mitigating or compensating for such risks.
This is certainly true in the United States in the NCLB era, as that sweeping 2001 federal law focused entirely on low-achieving students. Moreover, it
was recently reframed by former education secretary Arne Duncan to prod
states and districts to
concentrate their enerIn todays culture, creating special
gies and resources on
opportunities for high-flying youngsters the very worst schools
Duncan emphasizes
invites allegations of discrimination.
the lowest-performing
5 percentnot those attended by the children with greatest potential to
become academic superstars. While poorly performing schools harbor some
of those kids, too, government policy effectively marginalizes them as among
the (few) pupils the school does not have to worry about. Their low-achieving
classmates get the attention. Instead of concentrating our policy energies on
both boosting the entire distribution of performance and targeting extra help
on those farthest behind, we have for years been devoted almost exclusively
to the latter.
Government policy is not, however, the only driver of this focus on low achievers and troubled schools. Education discourse in the United States, as well as
the preoccupations of most foundations, think tanks, pundits, and colleges of
education, seems to have forgotten or repressed the grand tension that John
Gardner highlighted a half-century back. Can we, in fact, be equal and excellent too? Despite another claxon sounded two decades later by the National
Commission on Excellence in Education, the quest for excellence has all but
vanished from our education prioritiesand its more thoroughly absent when
such questing means paying attention to the schooling of high-ability children.
GROUND DOWN BY IDEOLOGY
A senior faculty member at one of the countrys top schools of education
commented to us that the very phrase gifted education is a tainted construction among leading thinkers, policy influencers, and institutions in the
field. None of his faculty colleagues focus on such issues, he saidtheyre
much more interested in ending poverty, compensating for disability, fostering cultural pluralism, and boosting low achievementand his schools
placement office wouldnt think of sending graduates anywhere but into the
most troubled and disadvantaged settings. Such comments match our own
76
impressions as we ride the circuit of conferences, workshops, policy seminars, and legislative initiatives around the public education field.
Why this neglect? Briefly stated, Americas failure to solve these problems
arises from a mix of ideology, political correctness, flawed education theories, and disagreements over who qualifies as gifted. Even when we agree
on which children meet that definition, we divide over what to do with them.
Should they be taught within inclusive classrooms or separately? Do they,
in fact, deserve anything different at all? Some say that programs focused on
such children are elitist and contend that these kids will do fine anyway, so
lets concentrate on those who are having difficulty. Others wonder what will
happen to late bloomers. Still others discount talent and ability altogether,
insisting that personal qualities such as grit are the key to high achievement. In todays culture, creating special opportunities for high-ability, highachieving youngsters also invites allegations of discrimination.
Many educators object to separating students in any way. They decry all
forms of tracking and grouping as archaic and unfair. And theyre not
entirely wrong, considering how yesterdays tracking schemes often had
a deterministic, immutable aspect that tended to permanently separate
student populations and limit educational and social mobility. Any successful
(and politically acceptable) approach to education in the United States in the
twenty-first century must instead recognize this as a land of opportunity
and education as a source of second chances. But that doesnt mean ignoring
youngsters of exceptional ability or achievementor assuming that everyone in fifth grade is equally adept at learning math or history, much less that
theyre all at the same level of achievement today.
Adapted from Failing Our Brightest Kids: The Global Challenge of Educating High-Ability Students (2015, Harvard Education Press). 2015
President and Fellows of Harvard College.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is What

Lies Ahead for Americas Children and Their Schools,
edited by Chester E. Finn Jr. and Richard Sousa. To
order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.
org.
ED U CATI ON
Bad News Is Good

News
Low test scores may be unwelcome, but theyre
entirely necessary. Parents shouldnt shoot the
messenger.
By Michael J. Petrilli and Robert Pondiscio
etween 2010 and 2012, more than forty states adopted the
Common Core standards in reading and math, setting dramatically higher expectations for students in our elementary and
secondary schools. Now a critical milestone in this effort has
arrived: parents in most states have received for the first time their childrens scores on new tests aligned to the standards. The news was sobering, in fact for many it was probably a shock. Parents shouldnt shoot the
messenger.
Its important to remember why so many states started down this path in
the first place. Under federal law, every state must test children each year in
grades three through eight to ensure they are making progress. Thats a good
idea. Parents deserve to know if their kids are learning, and taxpayers are
entitled to know if the money we spend on schools is being used wisely.
But it is left to states to define what it means to be proficient in math and
reading. Unfortunately, most states have historically set a very low bar (often
Michael J. Petrilli is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, executive editor
of Education Next, and president of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. Robert
Pondiscio is senior fellow and vice president for external affairs at the Thomas B.
Fordham Institute.
78
called juking the stats). The result was a comforting illusion that most of
our children were on track to succeed in college, carve out satisfying careers,
and stand on their own two feet.
To put it plainly, that was a lie. Most states set absurdly low academic
standards before the Common Core standards were implemented, and
their tests were even worse. In some cases, children could even randomly
guess the answers and
be all but guaranteed to
Dont be surprised if just a third of
pass. Imagine being told
elementary or middle school stuyear after year that youre
doing just fineonly to
dents are on track for college. Thats
find out, when you apply
just what we should expect.
for college or a job, that
youre simply not as prepared as you need to be.
Such experiences were not isolated. Every year, about 20 percent of incoming students at four-year colleges and half of those at community colleges
must take remedial courses when they arrive on campus. The vast majority
of those students will leave without a degree or any other kind of credential.
Thats a lousy way to start life.
The most important step to fixing this problem is to stop lying to ourselves
and ensure that our children are ready for the next grade (and, when they
turn eighteen, for college or work). Several national studies, including analyses of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), show that
just 38 to 40 percent of high school graduates leave our education system at
the college prepared level in reading and math.
Considering that almost 20 percent of our children dont even make it to
graduation day, this means that maybe one-third of our kids nationally are
getting to that college-ready
mark. (Not coincidenRemember the problem? Parents
tally, about a third of young
and states were living under a compeople today complete a
forting illusion that most kids were
four-year college degree.)
The Common Core
on track to succeed in college and the
should help to boost college
workforce.
readiness and completion by
significantly raising expectations, starting in kindergarten. But we shouldnt
be surprised if, in the early goings, we find that just a third of elementary or
middle school students are on track for college. In fact, thats what we should
expect.
LET THE SUNSHINE IN: Third-grader Andres Acosta works on a morning

exercise at Sanders Memorial Elementary, a magnet school in Land OLakes,
Florida. The Common Corebased curriculum at Sanders includes an emphasis on falling forward, or learning from mistakes. Once you fail you can
always try again,Andres says. [Brendan FittererZUMA]
This is a painful shift from the Lake Wobegon days, when all the children
were above average. States that used to claim that 80 or 90 percent of their
students were proficient will now start to admit that one-third or fewer are
on track for college and career. No doubt the truth will hurt.
So what does this mean for parents, especially those who learn that their
kids arent currently headed for success, even though their kids have been
getting good grades and glowing reports from their teachers?
Lets be honest: for the parents of older students especially, this will be
tough medicine. No one likes to hear bad news, but without an accurate diagnosis, you cant get well. Talk to your childrens teachers as soon as possible
and make a game plan for getting them extra help at home and at school.
Some tough questions might also be in order for your schools or school
boards: Are their standards for grading too easy? What are they doing to
help teachers understand and implement the new standards? Are they
up to the task of getting your kidsand your neighbors kidsup to the
new, higher expectations? Local communities are still in charge of setting
80
curricula, designing teacher training, and pulling all of the other levers that
might help them lift kids to these higher expectations. Standards provide
sunshine, nothing more. We
must demand local action to
They may not be perfect, but these
set things right.
Finally, parents should
tools are finally giving us an honest
resist the siren song of
measure of our kids progressa way
those who want to use this
to end the lies and statistical games.
moment of truth to attack
the Common Core or associated tests. They may not be perfect, but these
tools are finally giving parents, educators, and taxpayers an honest assessment of how our students are doinga standard that promises to end the lies
and statistical games. Virtually all kids aspire to go to college and prepare for
a satisfying career. Now, at last, well know if theyre on track to do so.
Reprinted from Education Next (www.educationnext.org), published by
the Hoover Institution. 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is The Best

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R U SS I A
Red Tide Ebbing

Although he may appear to have outmaneuvered
Washington, Vladimir Putin has made missteps
and given the United States a chance to press for a
democratic, responsible Russia.
By Michael A. McFaul
fter Russian president Vladimir Putin intervened militarily in

Syria last year, there was a chorus of commentary on his supposed strategic genius, as there had been after his actions in
Ukraine. He is acting decisively, seizing the initiative and creat-
ing facts on the groundso the narrative goesin contrast with the Wests
feckless pursuits in Syria.
The opposite is true.
Five years ago, Russia was in a much stronger position, both at home and
in the world. Today, Putin is playing defense, doubling down on bad decisions
guided by an outdated theory of international politics.
Recognition of Russias mistakes, however, does not guarantee future
failure. The United States and our allies cannot stand idly by and wait for
Russia to fail. Instead, we must adopt a comprehensive strategy to minimize
the negative consequences of Russias actions and maximize the positive ones
of ours.
Michael A. McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, a member of Hoovers Working Group on Foreign Policy and Grand
Strategy, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
at Stanford University, and a Stanford professor of political science. He recently
served as US ambassador to Russia.
82
PUTIN STUMBLED
Six years ago, Russia was on the move in the world. In 2010 in Ukraine, the
Kremlin helped install its ally, Viktor F. Yanukovych. Elsewhere in the former
Soviet space, Russias leaders were making progress on what would become
the Eurasian Economic Union, their answer to the European Union.
Moscow had also improved relations with Europe and the United States.
President Dmitry Medvedev even attended NATOs Lisbon summit meeting
in 2010 and spoke of developing a strategic partnership that would put the
difficult period in our relations behind us now. The main topic was cooperation on missile defense, not NATO expansion.
Both the American and Russian public noticed the progress. In 2010, about
two-thirds of Russians had a positive view of the United States, while a similar proportion of Americans saw Russia as an ally or partner.
The Russian economy was returning to growth after the 2008 financial crisis.
Trade with the United States was expanding, there were closer ties with European economies, and Russia was on track to join the World Trade Organization.
In 2010, Russia also played an essential role in securing new sanctions
against Iran. In doing so, it demonstrated bold international leadership even
at the price of straining relations with an important ally.
And then, in 2011, the people started getting in the way.
For different reasons, societies in the Arab world, Ukraine, and Russia
began to mobilize against their leaders. Initially, Medvedev sided with the
people in the Middle East, notably abstaining from, rather than vetoing, the
Security Council resolution that authorized the use of force in Libya. Medvedev also engaged with opposition leaders in Russia and introduced some
modest political reforms before exiting the Kremlin in May 2012.
Putin, however, had an opposite approach. He believed that behind these
protesters was an American hand, and that the response to themwhether
in Syria, Egypt, Russia, or Ukraineshould be coercion and force.
After his inauguration as president, Putin pivoted hard against Russias
demonstrators, labeling them traitors. His tactics derailed the oppositions
momentum.
But his short-term successes have produced long-term costs. Putins paranoia about independent political actors nurtured a growing fear of business
interests outside his oligarchical clique. Economic reform stalled, investment
declined, and state ownership grew.
Political stagnation also settled in. For the first two years of his third term as
president, Putins approval rating hovered around 60 percent, his lowest ever.
Only his invasion of Ukraine eventually propelled his approval rating back up.
In Ukraine, though, the crackdown on protesters failed. By the time

Yanukovych tried to clear the streets by force, as the Kremlin advocated,
his halfhearted attempt at
strongman tactics backfired,
The United States has an interest in
compelling him to flee.
the emergence of a strong, rich, and
Angered by what he saw
as another CIA operation
democratic Russia, fully integrated
to overthrow a Russian
into the international community.
ally, Putin struck back: he
annexed Crimea and attempted an even bigger land grab in eastern Ukraine,
called Novorossiya by expansion enthusiasts.
Again, the costs of these brief gains piled up. As a result of sanctions and
falling energy prices, the Russian economy has shrunk to $1.2 trillion from
$2 trillion in 2014. And NATO, once an alliance in search of a mission, is now
focused again on deterring Russia.
Putin has also been compelled to abandon the Novorossiya project: his
proxies in eastern Ukraine neither enjoy popular support nor run an effective government. And his actions have guaranteed that Ukraine will never
join his Eurasian Economic Union or line up with Russia again.
WHAT UKRAINE NEEDS
The United States and Western allies should capitalize on Putins attention
being diverted to Syria to deepen support for Ukraine. In return for progress on economic reform, especially anticorruption measures, we can offer
greater financial aid for infrastructure and social service programs. And
now is the moment to bolster the Ukrainian army by providing more military
training and defensive weapons.
Elsewhere in Europe, NATO should station ground forces on the territory of allies most threatened by Russia. Russias annexation of Crimea and
intervention in eastern
Ukraine violated the
The Russian economy has shrunk to
NATO-Russia Founding
Act and other treaties.
$1.2 trillion. In 2014, it was $2 trillion.
In response, our NATO
allies deserve credible new commitments from us.
Finally, we must continue to pursue long-term foreign policy objectives
that demonstrate US leadership and underscore Russias isolation. Ratifying
the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, closing a multilateral climate deal,
84
deepening ties with India, and managing relations with China are all parts of
Americas grander strategy.
The United States clearly has an interest in the emergence of a strong,
rich, and democratic Russia, fully integrated into the international community of states. Eventually, new Russian leaders also may realize that Russias path to greatness requires reform at home and responsible leadership
abroad. Propping up failing dictators through the use of force is not grand
strategy.
Right now, though, the only way to nudge Russia in a different direction is to
contain and push back on Putins current course, not only by our immediate
response in Syria but in a sustained, strategic manner around the world.
Reprinted by permission of the New York Times. 2015 The New York
Times Co. All rights reserved.

Consequences of Syria, by Lee Smith. To order, call
GR EECE
Poorer, Yes.
But Wiser?
Political regimes in Greece used to be nasty,
brutish, and short-lived. Has the country grown up
at last?
By Niall Ferguson
n Anthony Burgesss dystopian novel A Clockwork Orange, written in

the invented language Nadsat, the degenerate hooligan Alex ultimately resolves to settle down. Tomorrow is all like sweet flowers and
the turning vonny earth, wrote Burgess, and your old droog Alex all
on his oddy knocky seeking like a mate. Burgesss US publisher thought this
ending too happy, and axed the final chapter.
I have come to the conclusion that Burgess was right and his publisher
wrong. Most delinquent youths do eventually grow up, usually without the
brutal aversion therapy inflicted on Alex. The same may be said of countries.
Take Greece, which for a century and a half after regaining its independence
in 1830 had a dire political record marked by three top-level assassinations,
two uprisings, the depositions of three kings, three coups dtat, five military
conflicts, occupation by the Nazis, and subsequent civil war. The remarkable
thing about the current Greek crisis is not that it involves a financial default,
which is the Greek norm; what is remarkable is how narrow the range of political outcomes is, compared with what it would have been in the past.
Niall Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Laurence A.
Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University.
86
As recently as the 1970s we would have had to worry about much nastier
scenarios. There would have been a real communist left, poised to proclaim
the dictatorship of the proletariat. And there would have been a real military
right, ready to crush the left by imposing martial law.
Neither of these things is now conceivable. There might be some demonstrations. A few punches might be thrown. But there will not be a revolution
or a coup, much less a civil war. As for the economic options that Greeks face,
they do not include the expropriation of private property or hyperinflation,
which was how populist governments used to solve their fiscal problems.
Welcome to the world of the Clockwork Olive, where even Greece, Europes
bolnoy veck (sick man in Nadsat), has cleaned up its political act.
OLDER AND WISER
So what has happened? The obvious but wrong answer is the magic of European integration since, in 1981, Greece joined what became the European
Union. The problem with this argument is that it cannot explain the decline
of political delinquency in other parts of the world. For it has diminished
not only in Europe. It has gone down in Latin America, east Asia, and even
sub-Saharan Africa. From the 1940s to the 1980s, assassinations, revolutions, coups, and civil wars were commonplace, from Chile to Cambodia.
Today there are only a few bad-boy countries left in these regions: the likes of
Venezuela and Thailandand even Thailands recent political instability has
produced little violence.
Politically, most of the world has never been more boring. Instead of the
alarms and excursions of the past, we now have technocrats versus populists. Any violence is verbal and the technocrats nearly always win. Even
in the United States, despite what you might glean from television news,
the real story of our time
is the decline of violence.
We in the West no longer have crediWith their cities far safer
ble alternatives to liberal democracy.
than they were in the 1970s
and 1980s, Americans can peacefully ponder such questions as: Can a man
become a woman? (Yes.) Can a white woman become a black woman? (No.)
Will a civil war ever be fought over same-sex marriage? It seems unlikely.
Does a president risk assassination by reforming health care? I think not.
To explain these trends, the psychologist Steven Pinker has revived
Norbert Eliass idea of a long-run civilizing process. But other explanations are possible. Perhaps globalization, by expanding the reach of supranational institutions and multinational corporations, has raised the costs of
delinquent behavior. Perhaps the aging of populations has played a part, as

it is generally young men who make revolutions and fight wars. Maybe some
credit should go to technology, too. It is harder to stage a coup in the age of
the Internet and social media than it was when each capital city had just a
handful of broadcasters.
IDEOLOGY IS STILL A THREAT
Yet any serious explanation for the Clockwork Olive must include ideology.
As the convoluted rhetoric of the Greek leftist party Syriza has reminded
us, we in the West no longer have credible alternatives to liberal democracy.
Francis Fukuyama was right about that in 1989.
One reason ideology looks crucial is that in parts of the world where a violent alternative does exist
namely, radical Islamthe
Europes onetime sick man seems
civilizing process, globalizato be on the mend.
tion, and technology do not
seem to be working. The real
challenge facing Europe today is not the doomed attempt of Greek populists
to retain the euro while losing their debts. It is the radicalization and population displacement unleashed by the forces of jihad to the south and east. And
note to whom this violent ideology appeals: the young.
A central theme of A Clockwork Orange is generational conflict. Yes, Alex
grows up and settles down. But the reader is left to wonder how long it will
be before a freshly minted teenage delinquent kicks his head in. Greece, too,
has grown up. But the new Alexes are just a boat ride away.
Reprinted by permission of the Financial Times. 2015 Financial Times
Ltd. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Across

the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial
Crisis, edited by Martin Neil Baily and John B. Taylor. To
order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
88
I SRA E L
A Rare Win-Win
By improving the lives of Palestinians, Israelis
could improve their own.
By Stephen D. Krasner
sraeli control over parts of the West Bank, as well as its influence over
the movement of goods and people to and from the West Bank and
Gaza, is an anomaly in the modern world. Official and unofficial opposition to Israels policies toward the Palestin-
ians is growing, especially in Europe. But there is

no indication that the status quo will change any
time soon. Why not?
One standard argument among Israelis is that
Israel has tried every option and every option has
failed. Prime ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud
Olmert made serious offers and, in both instances,
the Palestinians walked away from the table. After
Camp David failed, the second Intifada killed about
1,000 Israelis and injured 8,000 more. Israels population in 2002 was 6.57 million. If the same percentage of the US population in 2002 had been killed
and wounded, the totals would have been about
43,000 dead and 344,000 wounded.
Key points
Israels position in
the world continues
to degrade.
Opposition to
Israel may get catastrophically stronger.
Unilaterally improving Palestinians
lives will help both
Palestinians and
Israelis.
Economic steps to
help the West Bank
and Gaza are a way
to bypass political
gridlock.
Stephen D. Krasner is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the chair
of Hoovers Working Group on Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy. He is also the
Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University and
a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and got
rockets in return, this argument continues. If Hamas had eschewed attacks
on Israel and focused on development, not only would the citizens of Gaza
have avoided the consequences of three wars with Israel, they would be much
more prosperous than they are today.
The Palestinian leadership has never regarded Israels peace offers as fully
satisfactory because they would not provide for a right of return, because
territorial arrangements
were suboptimal, and
Some Israelis, certainly not all, fear
because any Palestinian
the impact of the continuing occupa- state would have contion on Israels democratic character. strained sovereignty with
regard to security. Moreover, for the rulers of the West Bank and Gaza, being the leaders of a revolutionary movement may remain more attractive than being the rulers of a
small, poor, hard-to-govern state.
There are, however, other reasons why peace has proven so elusive.
Authorities in Israel and Palestine have very different views about the future.
For Palestinians, the short and medium term does not look attractive. But
in the long term, Arab leaders believe, the majority of the population in the
area that now comprises Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza will be Palestinian.
Israel cannot remain, they believe, a Jewish state, and a one-state solution
would have an Arab majority. In the long term, therefore, Palestinian leaders
are optimistic.
For Israelis, by contrast, the short and medium term looks more acceptable.
Israels international military position has improved dramatically. Two of its
potential enemiesSyria and Iraqhave fallen apart. They no longer pose
any kind of military threat. The major Sunni states look on Iran as a bigger
threat than Israel. There is no reason to think Israels chilly peace with Egypt
and Jordan will be abandoned. Israel and Egypt both have their own reasons
for opposing the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, such as Hamas.
Israel also has dealt successfully with the terrorist threat. There have been
no major or sustained assaults within Israel, even though about 20 percent of
Israels citizens are Palestinian Arabs, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians
live in East Jerusalem using residence permits (many have turned down the
possibility of citizenship), and thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank
work in Israel. Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces troops on the West Bank,
and the security barrier have worked. The streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem
are jammed with people and cars. Mehane Yehuda, Jerusalems main Jewish
90
market, which has been attacked twice in the past, is so crammed with
people on Friday afternoon that it is difficult to move.
The Israeli economy also is doing well: per capita income measured at
purchasing-power parity is above $32,000. Israels GDP in 2013 was higher
than that of Egypt, which has a population almost ten times its size, and four
times as high as in Jordan or Lebanon. Syria is a basket case.
MUNICH MAY BE THE WRONG ANALOGY
But Israel faces two obvious challenges. The first, a long-term problem, is
demographic. The population of the West Bank and Gaza increased from a little
under 2 million in 1990 to 4.2 million in 2014 (World Bank, World Development
Indicators). Eventually the population in the area between the Jordan River and
the Mediterranean Sea is likely to be more Arab than Jewish. The second is the
domestic political characteristics of Israels regime. Some Israelis, but certainly
not all, fear the impact of the occupation on Israels democratic character. No
occupying power can be completely benign, especially one whose citizens have
been killed by individuals from the area that they are occupying.
Neither concern will be enough to compel Israeli leaders to sign any agreement
in the near term that would present mortal risks, if not an existential threat, to
Israels existence as a Jewish state. And population dynamics are not as straightforward as they might seem. The birth rate for ultra-Orthodox Jews is very high.
The birth rate for some parts of the Arab population is declining as incomes rise.
The future of the West Banks relationship with Jordan, and Gazas with Egypt,
is uncertain. The futures of Jordan and Egypt are also unclear. Anti-Semitism is
growing in Europe, at least
in part because of the large
Palestinian leaders think time is on
Muslim populations in many
their side. A one-state solution, they
European countries. French
Jews, for instance, are buybelieve, will be an Arab one.
ing up apartments in Israel.
Some of the thousands of European citizens now fighting for Islamic State will
return to their home countries, where some will commit terrorist acts, including
against Jews. Anti-Semitism in Europe may be combatted; alternatively, Europeans may blame Jews for the terror in their own societies.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many other Israelis believe they
are in a Munich moment. That 1938 agreement was concluded because the
prime minister of the United Kingdom, Neville Chamberlain, believed that
Nazi Germany was a status quo, rather than a revolutionary, power. The
agreement failed to stop Hitler and was a catastrophe for Europe.
BRING IT HOME: Palestinians check out the wares at the Expotech exhibit for
telecom and information technology in Gaza City last October. More reliable
electricity and better Internet access, solar power, mobile phones, and business connectivity are among the technological approaches Israel could take to
improving the lives of Palestinians. [Ashraf AmraZUMA]
Netanyahu is not wrong, certainly not obviously wrong. Iran and ISIS are
committed to the destruction of Israel. Other Arab regimes in the past have
harbored similar sentiments. If Munich is the right analogy, then Israel should
maintain its military strength, do everything that it can to prevent Iran from
getting a nuclear weapon, seed the West Bank with settlements, make life
uncomfortable for the Palestinians on the West Bank, maintain as much control as possible over the movement of goods and people into and out of Gaza,
complete the security barrier, and never give up military control of the Jordan
Valley. If this is a Munich moment, Israels opponents will be satisfied only
with the destruction of the state of Israel. Concessions would only make the
opposition stronger. A geographically larger Israel is a safer Israel.
But what if the Munich analogy is wrong? Perhaps, for Israel, this is not a
Munich moment but a Helsinki moment. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 were
92
understood in both the East and the West as ratifying the outcome of the
Second World War, including boundary changes and the nature of existing
regimes. The accords listed ten fundamental principles. Principle VII stated
that the signatories would have respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.
At the time, principle VII was generally viewed as a throwaway. The communist states routinely signed human rights accords that they never honored. But the provisions for human rights contributed to the undoing of the
Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist empire in Europe. Helsinki
watch groups formed in the East and the West. The Helsinki principles
became a focal point for dissident groups in the Eastern Bloc and facilitated
ties with activists in the West. Fourteen years after the accords were signed,
the Berlin Wall fell. Who could have known?
The erosion of Israels international legitimacy could lead to a comparable
black swan eventan occurrence that has very low probability and is
impossible to predict but is highly consequential if it does occur, like the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. To avoid such
an implosion of its international status it would be prudent for Israel to take
steps to strengthen its normative position, even accepting that such measures would have no impact on its hard-line opponents.
WHERE HAVE ISRAELS FRIENDS GONE?
Israels normative position is weakening internationally. A 201314 survey of
individuals in twenty countries conducted by the PIPA program at the University of Maryland found that 50 percent of respondents thought that Israels
influence on the world was mainly negative, a little worse than Russias, a
little better than North Koreasnot very good company. In a 2012 vote in
the United Nations General Assembly granting Palestine observer status, 138
countries voted in favor and nine were opposed, including the United States,
Canada, and Israel; Germany, Britain, and 39 other states abstained. The boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel is growing.
There are a number of explanations for Israels weakening position. Its
control over the West Bank and Gaza is associated by many with colonialism,
and colonialism is the ultimate sin for most of the countries of Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. Anti-Semitism has never disappeared from Europe or the
Arab world. Muslim populations are growing across Europe and are close to
or exceed 5 percent in Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, the Netherlands,
and Sweden. Important parts of these communities do not share the values
of tolerance associated with liberal democratic Western Europe.
Disenchantment with Israel has not had any significant impact on Israels
security or economic vitality; nevertheless, the situation is brittle. Israels
internal security has depended in
part on cooperation with the PalesThe Helsinki Accords clause
tinian Authority in the West Bank,
on human rights contributed
but the PAs position is weak. Electo the undoing of the Soviet
tions are several years overdue. The
Union. Israel could be vulnerPA has not served its own population
well, as evidenced by the results of
able to similar pressure.
the 2006 electionswhich Hamas
won. Hamas has served the population of Gaza even less well. Palestinians
resent Israeli settlements and control over the movement of goods and people.
Even though most of the larger Israeli settlements are contiguous or close
to the green line, there are smaller settlements scattered throughout the West
Bank. Movement is difficult from the West Bank or Gaza into Israel, and even
within the West Bank itself. There are many checkpoints, and security measures are expensive and time-consuming. Goods moving through the Kerem
Shalom crossing point between Israel and Gaza must be unloaded from trucks
coming from Israel, placed on the ground, picked up by trucks that operate solely within the crossing point, driven into Gaza, placed on the ground, and then
picked up again by trucks from Gaza. The same procedures work in reverse.
BOOTSTRAPPING THE PALESTINIANS
The most obvious initiatives that Israel could take would be a forwardleaning position toward the peace process, a ban on additional settlements
and sharp limits on the growth of existing ones, and the dismantling of illegal
settlements on the West Bank. Considering the national interest, such measures would make eminent sense, yet the present government in Israel has
little incentive to carry out such measures. Different parties with different
leaders might be able to take a different stance.
There is, however, something Israel could do that even the present government should find attractive: improve life for the residents of the West Bank
and Gaza. This would not satisfy all of Israels normative challengers, who
cannot be satisfied. It would, however, be consistent with Israels own normative commitments. It would improve the lives of many individuals. It would
be noted by some of Israels outside observers and critics and would provide
Israels supporters with evidence that could be used to rebut its critics.
Life expectancy in the West Bank and Gaza is comparable to that in Egypt
and Jordan, about seventy-three years; Israels is higher, at eighty-two. While
94
basic well-being in the West Bank and Gaza is reasonable, if life expectancy is a
decent measure, the economic situation is poor. GDP per capita in 2011 international dollars at purchasing-power parity was about $4,500 for the West Bank
and Gaza (the World Bank does not provide separate figures for Gaza and the
West Bank), $11,400 for Jordan, $10,731 for Egypt, and $30,900 for Israel. The
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are not doing well economically.
And that population has grown. Inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza
increased from 2 million in 1990 (the earliest year for which figures are available from the World Bank) to 4.4 million in 2013. Israels Arab neighbors were
never welcoming to these Palestinians and those neighbors look even less
attractive now than in the past. The demographic challenge for Israel is not
going away any time soon.
Were it not for the threat of terrorism, denizens of the West Bank would be
doing much better because of job opportunities in Israel. Israelis look back
nostalgically to the 1980s, before the first Intifada, when many Palestinians
worked in Israel and there was no barrier. Israelis and Palestinians could
sit together at restaurants along the Mediterranean. Those days are gone,
maybe forever. The attractiveness of having Palestinians work freely in Israel
is not worth the cost to Israelis in potential terrorist attacks.
Nevertheless, Palestinians poor economic situation weakens Israels normative position in the world. Even observers who do not see Israel as a colonial
power cannot avoid noting that Palestinians are not doing well, even compared
with Egyptians and Jordanians. In part this reflects poor governance: Gaza and
the West Bank are ruled by rent-seeking or ideologically motivated elites. The
well-being of their people has
not been their first concern.
Israeli policies, however, driv- Israel should try to strengthen its
standing in the world even if its most
en primarily by a well-founded fear of terrorist attacks,
hard-line opponents are unmoved.
have made things worse.
A Palestinian population whose per capita income was higher than that of
its Arab neighbors would make Israel less vulnerable to charges of colonialism and strengthen Israels normative position. Improved economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza would be no panacea; they would not satisfy
Israels external critics or Palestinian demands, or end calls for a two-state
solution. They would, however, make an unwelcome black-swan moment less
likely by peeling off some of Israels detractors.
How could Israel improve Palestinians economic conditions without making terrorist attacks more likely?
We live in a world where increasingly goods and work move but people do
not. This in fact is the core of globalization. Call centers in far-flung countries,
outsourcing of work, and massive online college courses beckon. Israel is a
high-technology country, and that suggests certain advantages. Forty-seven
percent of the West Bank and Gaza population uses the Internet, higher than
in Jordan and Egypt but, unsurprisingly, lower than Israel. Mobile cellular subscriptions at 74 per 100 people are
lower on the West Bank and Gaza
than in neighboring countries
Israel is a high-tech country, and
technology can help both Israelis but still extensive. Labor costs
are much lower in the West Bank
and Palestinians.
and Gaza than they are in Israel.
Goods can be moved much more safely across the green line than can people.
Economic-improvement policies could be designed to circumvent barriers
that might be imposed by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Israel could
make electricity more reliable. Solar technology could give individuals more
control over their own energy supply. Internet connections could be more
secure and faster. Israeli companies could collect incentives to adopt policies
that increase employment in the West Bank and Gaza. Technology could ease
the movement of goods between Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.
Under such policies, the greatest beneficiaries would be the people of Gaza
and the West Bank, but Israel would also gain. The attractiveness of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement would decline because Palestinian
workers engaged with Israeli companies would be the biggest losers from BDS.
Improving the economic situation of people in the West Bank and Gaza is
a rare win-win opportunity in the Middle East. It would not be a permanent
solution, but at least for the time being no permanent solution is on offer.
People may as well live better until one is.
Reprinted by permission of Lawfare, a project of the Harvard Law
School/Brookings Project on Law and Security. 2015 The Lawfare Institute. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is In This
Arab Time: The Pursuit of Deliverance, by Fouad
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96
I RA N
A Chance for
Iranian Reform
The Obama administrations nuclear deal, many
Iranians believe, could encourage changes in Iran
itself.
By Abbas Milani and Michael A. McFaul
he nuclear deal with Iran has sparked a vigorous debate not

only in the United States but also in Iran. Reports in Iranian
media, as well as our own correspondence and conversations
with dozens of Iranians, both in the country and in exile, reveal a
public dialogue that stretches beyond the details of the agreement to include
the very future of Iran. And it seems that everyone from the supreme leader
to the Iranian-American executive in Silicon Valley, from the taxi driver in
Isfahan to the dissident from Evin prison, is engaged. The coalitions for and
against the deal tend to correlate closely with those for and against internal
political reform and normalized relations with the West.
Abbas Milani is co-director of the Hoover Institutions Iran Democracy Project,

a member of Hoovers Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on Islamism and
the International Order, and a Hoover research fellow. He is also the Hamid and
Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, where
he is a visiting professor of political science. Michael A. McFaul is the Peter and
Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a member of Hoovers Working
Group on Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and a professor of
political science at Stanford. He recently served as US ambassador to Russia.
The mere fact that there is such a debate says something about the nature
of the Islamic Republic of Iran today.
HINTS OF AUTONOMY
Iran is a dictatorship. One man, the supreme leader, has most of the power.
He is the commander in chief and thus formally controls the military, the
very powerful internal militia, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), and its external wing, the Quds Force. The supreme leader appoints
the head of the judiciary, the head of the Iranian national radio and television
organization, and most of the National Security Councilan advisory body
similar to the US National Security Council. He also controls tens of billions
of dollars in revenues from religious endowments and foundations. And, as
stated in the constitution, he is the spiritual leader of the country, combining
religious and political power in one office.
And yet nowadays the supreme leader does not decide everything on his
own. Some formal institutions of the Iranian regime, and myriad informal
interest-group networks, also play a role in shaping policy, including on
the nuclear deal. Most important, the Iranian president has some political
autonomy. Through control of the Guardian Councila committee of twelve
men that among other things must approve every candidate wishing to run
for elective officethe supreme leader decides who is allowed to run for
president. But once the list of candidates is determined, the vote is usually
competitive, giving the chief executive an electoral mandate directly from the
people. In the last presidential election, candidates ideologically closest to
the supreme leader garnered only a few million votes, while the one candidate running as a reformer, Hassan Rouhani, received more than eighteen
million. Rouhanis wide margin of victory strengthened his position as a
partially independent actor within the Iranian regime.
In addition to the president, other groups have obtained some political
autonomy within Irans fractured authoritarianism. Civil society is constrained but still fighting. A vibrant underground of publishing, theater,
music, and poetry continues to spread. Divides exist even among the clerics.
Conservatives still dominate, but several top clerics have voiced their support for Irans reformist forces and criticizedsometimes openly, sometimes
more discreetlyconservative policies.
Supreme Leader Ali Khameneis own brother, Hadi Khamenei, recently
described the eight-year presidency of Rouhanis predecessor, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, as some of the darkest [years] in the history of the country, adding that the conservatives are trying to give a bad image to the
98
reformists. This political systemauthoritarian but with pockets of pluralismhas created the relatively permissive conditions for a serious public
debate about the nuclear deal.
Moreover, in refraining from taking a firm public position for or against
the agreement, Khamenei himself has encouraged this debate. Given the
extent of Khameneis control, the Iranian negotiators could not have signed
the accord without his approval. In public, however, the supreme leader has
refrained from praising the work of his negotiating team, saying only that the
deal must be ratified through the proper legal channels and will not change
Iranian policy toward the arrogant US government. Khameneis mixed
signals have allowed others to speak out more forcefully on the nuclear pact.
ROUHANIS WAGER
Those supporting the deal include moderates inside the government, many
opposition leaders, a majority of Iranian citizens, and many in the IranianAmerican diasporaa disparate group that has rarely agreed on anything
until now.
First and most obvious, the moderates within the regime, including
Rouhani and his close friend and political ally, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,
negotiated the agreement, and are now the most vocal in defending it against
Iranian hawks. Rouhani crushed his conservative opponents in the 2013
presidential election in part because he advocated for a nuclear deal. This
agreement is his ObamaCarehis major campaign promise now delivered.
Former presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami,
as well as moderates in the parliament and elsewhere in government, have
also vigorously endorsed the accord. During the negotiations, Rafsanjani,
for example, celebrated the fact that Irans leaders had broken a taboo in
talking directly to the United States. Since the agreement was signed, he has
said that those within Iran who oppose it are making a mistake.
Second and somewhat surprising, many prominent opposition leaders also
support the deal. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a popular presidential candidate in
2009 who is now under house arrest for his leadership of the Green Movement protests against Ahmadinejads re-election, backed the pursuit of the
agreement, albeit with some qualifications. He is joined by other government
critics, some only recently released from Irans prisons. Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian human-rights activist and Nobel laureate now living in exile, expressed
the hope after an interim agreement was reached in April that negotiations
come to a conclusion, because the sanctions have made the people poorer;
she labeled as extremists those who opposed the agreement in Iran and
100
America. Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist who spent more than six years in
prison in Iran, also praised the agreement, writing that step-by-step nuclear
accords, the lifting of economic sanctions, and the improvement of the relations between Iran and Western powers will gradually remove the warlike
and securitized environment
from Iran.
This systemauthoritarian but with
Polls show that most
pockets of pluralismhas created
Iranians agree with these
positions. Public opinion
the relatively permissive conditions
is apparent not just in the
for a serious, public debate.
Iranian governments numbers but also in the results of earlier surveys conducted by the University of
Maryland and Tehran University. The sentiments of many ordinary Iranians
were manifest in the spontaneous demonstrations of joy that took place in
many Iranian cities after the agreement was announced.
PRYING OPEN THE DOOR?
A new poll also indicates that two-thirds of Iranian-Americans favor the agreement, and our own conversations with members of the Iranian diaspora bear
this out. The Islamic Republic has long enjoyed some defense from a handful
of nongovernmental organizations in the West, but support for the nuclear
deal stretches much deeper into the diaspora and includes those who despise
Tehrans theocracy. For instance, many prominent Iranian-American business
leaders have told us they approve of the accord. Iranian-American foundations
and community-service organizations have issued statements backing the deal
while also calling for renewed focus on political reforms inside Iran. Even many
of those who had to flee the country after the 1979 revolution, and have since
helped fund projects to encourage democracy inside Iran (including, in the past,
our own Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution), support it. There
are exceptions. Some in the diaspora still believe that only more pressure, and if
need be a military attack, will bring down the Islamic Republic. But the number
of Iranian-Americans who are at once critical of the regime and supportive of the
nuclear deal is striking.
This coalition has multiple motivations for favoring the deal. A number of
Iranians simply want sanctions lifted. Some moderates within the regime may
want to reduce international pressure on Iran as a means to preserve the power
structure. And its safe to assume that a few Iranian-American business leaders
see new trade opportunities in the diplomatic achievement. But the agreement
could also serve as a first step in alleviating the problems of ordinary Iranian
102
citizens. If the deal represents the beginning of Irans re-engagement with the
outside worldmore trade, more investment, more space inside Iran for the
private sector, more travel, more normalcyall these trends would undermine
the ideological, emotional, and irrational impulses of the theocracy. Especially in
the context of an aging supreme leader, a newly elected reformist president, and
a young, postrevolutionary population, the nuclear deal offers an opportunity for
Iran to modernize politically and economically.
Even dissidents in exile or sitting in jail have expressed these views. Ganji,
for instance, argued that if there are friendly relations between Iran and
Western powers, led by the United States, the West will be able to exert more
positive influence on Iran to improve its state of human rights. Conversely,
members of this coalition have voiced fears that a collapse of the deal would
only reaffirm the United States as the enemy of Iranthe Great Satanand
thereby strengthen the hard-liners internally. Issa Saharkhiz, a journalist
who spent four years in prison, recently warned that such a collapse could
bring Iranian versions of ISISa reference to Shiite conservatives and
their militant alliesto power in the country.
And thats exactly why the most militantly authoritarian, conservative, and
anti-Western leaders and groups within Iran oppose the deal. This coalition
is formidable and includes former president Ahmadinejad, the Iranian leader
who denied the Holocaust and called for the elimination of Israel. Fereydoon
Abbasi, who directed Irans nuclear program under Ahmadinejad, and Saeed
Jalili, the former nuclear negotiator, have repeatedly sniped at the deal. In
a biting interview, Abbasi ripped into every facet of the talks, saying that
the negotiators, especially Mr. Rouhani . . . have accepted the premise that
[Iran] is guilty. Several conservative clerics and IRGC commanders have
expressed similar sentiments. One prominent critic of the deal claimed that
of the nineteen red
lines stipulated by the
An Iranian journalist who spent more
supreme leader, eighteen and a half had been than six years in prison hopes that the
compromised in the cur- deal will gradually remove the warlike
rent agreement. Many
and securitized environment.
publications considered
close to Khameneiincluding most noticeably the daily paper Kayhanhave
been unsparing in their criticism.
Conservative opponents of the deal tend to emphasize its near-term security
consequences for Iran. They point out that the agreement will roll back Irans
nuclear program, which was intended to deter an American or Israeli attack,
and thereby increase Irans vulnerability. They have denounced the system
for inspecting Iranian nuclear facilities as an intelligence bonanza for the CIA.
And they have issued blistering attacks on the alleged incompetence of Irans
negotiating team, claiming that negotiators caved on many key issues and were
outmaneuvered by more clever and sinister American diplomats.
And yet such antagonism appears to be about more than the agreements
clauses and annexes. The deals hard-line adversaries also seem concerned
about the longer-term consequences that the moderates embrace. For
instance, IRGC leaders must worry that a lifting of sanctions will undermine
their business arrangements for contraband trade. In a not-too-discreet reference to these concerns, Rouhani criticized peddlers of sanctions, adding
that they are angry at the agreement while the people of Iran pay the price
for their profiteering. Over time, more exposure to the wider world of commerce is likely to diminish if not destroy the IRGCs lucrative no-bid government contracts for infrastructure and construction projects.
AMERICA: SCAPEGOAT NO MORE
Perhaps more threatening for this coalition is the loss of America as a
scapegoat for all domestic problems. The conservatives need an external
enemy to excuse their corrupt, inefficient, and repressive rule. Some have
even suggested that the United States is trying to do to Iran what it did to
the Soviet Union in
the late 1980s, sayThe number of Iranian-Americans who are ing it was foolish of
Soviet leader Mikhail
at once critical of the regime and supportGorbachev to trust
ive of the nuclear deal is striking.
US president Ronald
Reagan and seek closer ties with the West. The Soviet regime then collapsed.
In a remarkable letter from Evin prison written after the nuclear deal was
announced, Mustafa Tajzadeh, once an influential deputy minister of interior
during the Khatami administration and now a defiant dissident behind bars,
criticized the leader of the conservative faction in Irans parliament, who had
openly warned against the danger of a ratified nuclear deal as a prologue to a
more dangerous domestic challenge from democratic forces. Foreign crises,
the conservative parliamentarian had opined in a statement, are easier to
manage.
Conservatives in Iran may be right. Irans opening to the outside world
may weaken the ruling regime, as eventually Mao Zedongs opening to the
West did in the 1970s in China, and Gorbachevs opening to the West did in
104
the 1980s. But these historical analogies also suggest that Iranian hard-liners
may be worrying prematurely. Chinas overtures to the West undermined
communist ideology and practices but have been essential in keeping the
Chinese Communist Party in power so far. Gorbachevs bold steps toward
international integration eventually allowed both market and democratic
institutions to take hold in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
Yet the current counterrevolutionary
Foreign crises, a dissident suggests, are
backlash inside Russia suggests that the
easier to manage than domestic ones.
struggle for democracy, markets, and integration there will be long and tumultuous. There is no
guarantee that Irans will be any less so.
No one knows what scenario will unfold in Iran. But the debate inside the
country should inform Americas own debate. If the deal, as some American
critics claim, sells out Iranian democrats and strengthens theocrats, why
do so many Iranian reformists, democracy activists, and even dissidents
support it? If it represents a financial windfall for Iranian conservatives and
their terrorist allies abroad, why are Irans most conservative politicians so
passionately against it?
Maybe Irans democrats are naive. And maybe the conservatives are playing a clever game of deception. Yet given Americas less-than-sterling track
record of supporting Irans reformers, perhaps this time its worth listening
to and betting on those in the country whom the United States claims to
champion.
Reprinted by permission of the Atlantic. 2015 Atlantic Monthly Group.
All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Syria,

Iran, and Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance and Its War
on Lebanon, by Marius Deeb. To order, call (800) 8884741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
I RA N
And Now, the

Fallout
Regardless of what Iran gets out of the nuclear
deal, its proxy Hezbollah clearly gainsand Israel
clearly loses.
By Peter Berkowitz
ast summer, President Obama warned Jewish leaders invited to

the White House that if his Iran deal were scuttled and the United
States were compelled to attack Irans nuclear facilities, Youll
see Hezbollah rockets falling on Tel Aviv. Although it is hard to
take the presidents threat to use force at face value, his grim analysis is probably correct.
What the president obscured is that implementing the deal, whatever the
long-term impact on Irans nuclear ambitions, will not lessen Hezbollahs
ability to strike Tel Avivand targets throughout Israelwith substantially
greater firepower than it directed at Israel nine summers ago during the
Second Lebanon War.
As a senior Israeli government official told me, by strengthening and
emboldening Hezbollahs chief financier and principal weapons supplier,
the US-brokered agreement encourages Iran to increase the quantity and
enhance the quality of the formidable aerial arsenallarger than those of
many European countriesthat Hezbollah has aimed at the Jewish state.
Peter Berkowitz is the Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of Hoovers working groups on military history and foreign
policy.
106
In a 2014 New Yorker interview, Obama said his goal was to create a
new equilibrium in the Middle East. In the short run, at least, his signature diplomatic undertaking can be counted on to bring more violence
to this volatile region. Secretary of State John Kerrys recent letter to
Congress, which recognized the need to increase security assistance to
our allies and partners in the region and to enhance our efforts to counter Irans destabilizing activities in the region, tacitly acknowledged this
unpleasant truth.
FREEING U P A CASH HOARD
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the agreement is
formally known, provides the worlds leading state sponsor of terrorism an
infusion of somewhere in the neighborhood of $100 billion of unfrozen assets
and a great deal more in continuing revenues as businesses and governments
around the world rush to profit from oil-and-gas-rich Irans reintegration
into the world economy. The agreement relaxes the international isolation
of the Islamic Republic and ratifies Tehrans status as a nuclear threshold
state. And it relieves restrictions on Irans acquisition of weapons, including
ballistic missiles.
By providing tens of billions up front and greatly increased cash flow, new
political legitimacy, and access to armaments, the JCPOA enables Tehrans
governing ayatollahs to step up their financing and fomenting of aggression in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza
Strip while providing no incentive for them to curtail their armed quest for
regional hegemony.
The delicate
A rehabilitated yet unrepentant Iran will
balance of power
between Israel and ship more sophisticated weaponry to HezHezbollah will be
bollah, most notably technology to improve
one casualty of the
missile accuracy.
deal. Currently,
neither side is spoiling for a fight. Israel has long understood that bombing
Irans nuclear facilities would provoke a punishing retaliatory strike from
Hezbollah, which has served as a deterrent. Tehran knows that to deter
Israel effectively, Hezbollah must hold its fire. Furthermore, Hezbollah has
thousands of soldiers bogged down in Syrias civil war fighting on behalf of
President Bashar al-Assad and can ill afford to open a second front.
As the JCPOA comes into effect, however, a rehabilitated but unrepentant Iran will ship more sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah, most notably
THE FUTURE: Lebanese children affiliated with Hezbollah hold a picture of

Irans leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during the funerals last October of
three Hezbollah militants who died fighting alongside Syrian government
forces. Iranian support for embattled Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad could
enable his Hezbollah proxy fighters to return home to Lebanon, there to confront Israel anew. [EPA/Newscom]
GPS technology that improves missile accuracy. In addition, Tehran will

increase support for Assad and Hezbollah against ISIS and other rebel
forces. While Syria is not likely to be put back together again, a steady
stream of money and equipment from its ascendant Iranian patron will
enable Assad and Hezbollah to carve out a secure colony in a fragment of
the former country. This will permit Hezbollah fighters to return home to
Lebanon. As Irans worries about absorbing a military strike on its nuclear
facilities subside, so too will its incentives for demanding restraint from
Hezbollah diminish.
THE FIRES NEXT TIME
The next round of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah has the potential
to bring significant destruction and loss of life. According to Israel Defense
Force (IDF) estimates, Hezbollah
Hezbollah now has drones that can perpossesses approxiform reconnaissance and ground attacks.
mately 120,000 rocketsfrom Katyushas
with a range of seven to twenty-four miles to Scud missiles with a range of
420 miles. About 1,000 of these have precision-guided capabilities. The IDF
also reports that Hezbollah has acquired remotely operated aircraft that can
conduct reconnaissance and ground attacks. And Hezbollah is about 30,000
fighters strong.
Should Hezbollahs leaders conclude the time is ripe, Irans Lebanon
proxy has the capacity to launch a first strike that could kill civilians in Tel
Aviv and all of Israels major cities, close down Israels major ports and Ben
Gurion International Airport, and bring commerce and culture in Israel to a
standstill.
In the summer of 2014 during the fifty days of Operation Protective
Edge, Hamas fired approximately 4,500 rockets into Israel, according to
IDF Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner. Hezbollahs current stockpile gives
it the capacity to fire almost 4,500 rockets and missiles a day for an entire
month.
To be sure, Israel has great capabilities and would respond swiftly and
decisively.
But Hezbollah, in keeping with its cruel and unlawful conduct of war, has
dispersed its arms depots, rocket launchers, infantry and antitank positions, tunnels, and command and control headquarters in towns and villages
throughout Lebanon, with the heaviest concentration in the south. This will
compel Israel, acting in its self-defense and in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives, to inflict severe damage on Lebanons civilian infrastructure
and kill hundreds if not thousands of noncombatants.
The heightening of the risk of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah is
just one example of how President Obamas Iran deal, whatever the longterm consequences for Irans nuclear program, renders, in the short run,
the tinderbox that is the Middle East even more explosive. Call it the new
disequilibrium.
Reprinted by permission of Real Clear Politics. 2015 RealClearPolitics.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Israel and

the Struggle over the International Laws of War, by
Peter Berkowitz. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
110
R E LI G I OUS F R E E DOM
The Tyranny of
Secular Faith
Progressivism marches relentlessly toward its
destination: the one true secular kingdom.
By Peter Berkowitz
here is a dangerous tendency in contemporary American politics

and law to supplant respect for the diversity of religious belief
with a homogenizing doctrine that punishes the expression of
traditional faith and compels the practice of a secular faith.
Bruce Abramson illuminated this trend in an article last summer in Mosaic,

and, if anything, the problem runs deeper than he suggested.
Rather than a consequence of a broad rethinking of church and state,
as Abramson puts it, the delegitimization of biblically rooted religions that
has been taking place over recent decades reflects a thoughtless enactment of the progressive vision that has been steadily gaining momentum in
America for at least a century and a half. The threat to religious liberty that
Abramson deftly examines, moreover, is only one frontalbeit an exceptionally important onein a more general assault on liberty in the name of an
intolerant alliance of secularism and statism.
That alliance derives support from the progressivism that dominates
our media, entertainment industry, universities, major metropolitan areas,
and the Democratic Party: a sensibility that prides itself on its devotion to
Peter Berkowitz is the Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of Hoovers working groups on military history and foreign
policy.
equality, the pursuit of which it regards as the foremost demand of social

justice. Historicallyand still todaythe progressive impulse to enlist the
state on behalf of the unfortunate, the afflicted, and the exploited has made a
decisive contribution to aligning neglected corners of life in America with the
national promise. But in a free society, the serious moral and political question is not whether equality is good, but which form or forms of equality are
morally relevant and which should government protect.
WHY POWERS WERE LIMITED
Americas founding documents, the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, take a strong position: human beings are equal in relation to
individual freedom, and governments principal task is to provide equal protection of citizens equal natural and inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.
To ensure that government sticks to its principal task, the Constitution
limits its powers. It also separates and disperses them among the three
branches of the federal government and between the federal government and
the states. Further to protect individual freedom, the Constitution adds a Bill
of Rights comprising the first ten amendments, of which the first proclaims:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The pre-eminence assigned to religious freedom stems from the founders respect for Americans competing beliefs about how best to live and the
importance the people attached to living in accordance with the dictates of
their faith. The Constitutions cumbersome mechanisms for legislating give
institutional expression to
this determination to accomThe long-standing progressive projmodate the peoples conflicting opinions about ultimate
ect is to impose equality, redefined
questions by obstructing the
as sameness of belief and conduct.
ability of shallow, temporary,
and headstrong majorities to entrench their momentary will in law. And underlying the Constitutions safeguarding of diversity is its dependence on a still
more fundamental unity: only a citizenry in the habit of tolerating a multiplicity of outlooks and ways of lifeand in the habit of recognizing one another as
equal in freedomwill be capable of honoring constitutional imperatives and
effectively operating the organs of constitutional government.
Progressivism has a root in, but also departs dramatically from, this
spirit of the Constitution. It proceeds from the assumption that human
112
beings are by nature free and equal, but it demotes freedom and expands
the domain of equality.
In the name of equality, progressivism also downgrades the idea of limited
government. It follows the then-political-scientist Woodrow Wilsons latenineteenth-century critique of the original Constitution as an outdated and
antidemocratic encumbrance on the pursuit of justice, and complies with his
exhortation to breathe life into the nations founding charter by reinterpreting it
as endowing the state with the power to do all that in progressive eyes is good.
Progressives also abandon the idea of liberal education. Rather than transmitting the basics of the humanities and sciences, teaching the principles
of freedom, and cultivating the capacity of students to think for themselves,
progressivism supposes that
the purpose of education is
to mold students who think
The question isnt whether equality
and act like progressives.
is good, but which forms of equalThey embrace the pedagogi- ity are morally relevant and which
cal creed of John Dewey,
should government protect.
who held that education is
a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness;
that every teacher is properly a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social growth; and
that in instilling a democratic faith, the true teacher serves as the prophet of
the true God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God.
EVEN FREE SPEECH SUFFERS
The recent controversies over contraception and same-sex marriage highlighted in Abramsons article carry forward the long-standing progressive project
to impose equality, redefined as sameness of belief and conduct, by mandating
the one true secular kingdom. Justice Samuel Alitos majority opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby stressed that exempting Christian owners of small companies from subsidizing forms of contraception that operate as abortifacients
was permissible because the government had available alternative means for
ensuring that female employees would retain access to such contraceptives.
But this wasnt good enough for progressive critics, led by dissenting justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. They attacked the decision because it failed to permit
government to foster a single set of judgments about abortion and contraception and prescribe for all a uniform code of reproductive morality.
In the line of cases that culminated last summer in a landmark decision,
Obergefell v. Hodges, which proclaims a new constitutional right to same-sex
marriage, the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that the only conceivable ground for believing that marriage should be restricted to the union of
one man and one woman is bigotry. This imperiously converts a proposal that
only a few years ago was rejected by President Obama into a truth of reason.
The courts jurisprudence and the self-righteous moralizing that animate it
are of a piece with the efforts by prominent private individuals to shame, and
by state officials to wield the power of law to punish, devout Christian bakers
and photographers who, on religious grounds, have declined to participate in
same-sex marriage ceremonies.
Abramson is justified in observing of these astonishing developments
which are no less astonishing for having been latent in the founding ideas of
progressivismthat we have reached a watershed moment in American
law, society, and culture: for the first time, avoiding participation in a given
event or activity can now be construed as violating someone elses civil (or
human) rightsand can be actionable as sucheven when the avoidance has
been dictated by a religious conviction.
And Abramson is quite correct that the attack on religious liberty is part
and parcel of a larger campaign against free expression. What after all are
the promulgation of speech codes, the demand for trigger warnings, the cultivation of sensitivity to microaggressions, and the disdain for due process
amply in evidence at our institutions of higher education if not the enforcement of progressive orthodoxy through the curtailment of individual liberty?
Accordingly, the progressive attack on religious freedom not only presents,
in Abramsons words, an opportunity for Americas Jews to help Americas
Christians secure the Christian nature of their community as a necessary
step toward securing the Jewish nature of their own. It also provides a summons to action for all those devoted to the principles of individual liberty and
limited government inscribed in the Constitution to reclaim the rights shared
equally by all and the forms of self-government that secure them.
Reprinted by permission of Mosaic. 2015 Mosaic. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is

Democracys Dangers and Discontents: The Tyranny
of the Majority from the Greeks to Obama, by Bruce S.
Thornton. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.
hooverpress.org.
114
CON SC R I PT I ON
Dont Bring Back

the Draft
Abolishing military conscription was a great
victory for freedom. Heres why the volunteer
military should remain just that.
By David R. Henderson
ne of the biggest victories for freedom to which economists

contributed in the last third of the twentieth century was the
abolition of military conscription. Some economists argued that
the draft was an extreme violation of individual liberty because it
forcibly put people in jobsand not just any jobs, but jobs in which they could
be killed in a foreign war. Virtually all economists who participated in the
debate also pointed out a subtle economic point: that conscription would, by
imposing costs on those conscripted, actually make military manpower more,
not less, expensive. By allowing the military to pay less to conscripts than it
would need to pay to volunteers, the draft can reduce the budgetary outlay for
a military of a given size, but many of the people who are drafted have higher
opportunity costs than those of the people who would have been hired.
An increasingly common argument for reviving the draft, though, and one
offered especially by foreign-policy intellectuals, is that conscription would
put the children of the rich and powerful at risk and, therefore, cause their
parents to raise more objections than otherwise to military adventurism.
David R. Henderson is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
In the past few years, many intellectuals have made this argument. Thomas
E. Ricks, for example, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security,
drawing on similar thinking by retired general Stanley A. McChrystal, wrote
in the New York Times that having a draft might make Americans think more
carefully before going to war. Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of history and
international relations at Boston University and a critic of the twenty-firstcentury Iraq war, wrote in Breach of Trust that Americans should insist on
fielding a citizen army drawn from all segments of society. To achieve that goal,
he would have the government force all able-bodied eighteen-year-olds into two
years of national service, either civilian or military. This would mean, he claims,
that it will be incumbent upon civilian and military leaders to make the case
to citizen-soldiers (and their parents) for long, drawn-out, inconclusive wars in
far-off places.
That argument is superficially plausible. But a careful look at economic
incentives shows that the case for using a draft to prevent a war is weak. In
any plausible draft, the rich and powerful would have a cheaper and surer
way to shield their children from harm than by devoting resources to stopping or preventing a war.
A FREE-RIDER PROBLEM
But its also important to make a moral point. Most of us think its wrong to
use innocent people as human shields in war. The immorality is due to two
factors: those innocent peoples lives are put at risk, and they do not get to
choose whether to risk their lives. We dont base our moral judgment on
whether using human shields leads to a desired result. We tend to believe
that using people as human shields is wrong regardless of whether it prevents the other side from firing.
Similarly, it is profoundly immoral to put innocent young people at risk
so that their parents will get politically active, even if it could be shown that
reintroducing conscription would reduce the chance of a war breaking out.
Whatever ones views on the moral issue, the argument that conscription would reduce the probability of wars is unconvincing. Advocates of a
revived draft do make one good point: if the children of rich and powerful
people could be forcibly sent to war, those people would tend to ask more
questions about the war. But if the main goal of the influential is to avoid
having their children put at risk, there is a more direct way to do so: get
their children exempted from the draft or, in the unlucky case that their
children are drafted, use their influence to get their children relatively safe
postings far from the battle. Moreover, many influential people have no
116
draft-aged children; others perhaps would want their eligible children to be

conscripted.
Inadvertently, draft proponents have come up against what economists
call a public-good, free-rider problem. The key characteristic of a public
good thats relevant here is that it is prohibitively costly to exclude nonpayers. So, economists have concluded, there is typically underinvestment in
producing public goods. You and millions of people may value them very
much, but if it is prohibitively costly to exclude noncontributors from getting the benefits, people have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of the
contributors. The result is that many beneficiaries of the public good dont
contribute, and even those who do will often contribute much less than the
value they place on the good.
How does the public-good reasoning apply here? Even if influential people
were against the war because their children would be at risk, two factors would
cause them to invest little in preventing war. First, any resources they put
toward lobbying, writing letters, and so on would only marginally change the
probability of war. Second, they would risk wasting their investment because of
the likelihood that others would free ride and cause the collective effort to fail.
This means that they would
be unlikely to contribute
Most of us think its wrong to use othmuch to the public good of
avoiding the war. A far beters as human shields.
ter investment, from their
viewpoint, would be to invest in a private good, one from which only they and
their children benefit. That private good is to arrange a special dealeither
draft exemption or a safe job in the militaryfor their children.
Those who want a draft to reduce the probability of war might argue that
people are not that narrowly self-interested. But if they so argue, then they
have rejected their own view: recall that it was their belief that the rich and
powerful are self-interested that led them to make this argument for conscription in the first place.
VIETNAM: LEARNING THE WRONG LESSONS
Some people who want to return to the draft to reduce the prospect of military adventurism point to the Vietnam War as Exhibit A for their position.
But a much stronger case can be made, as Chad W. Seagren and I wrote
(Would Conscription Reduce Support for War? Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 2), that the Vietnam War is Exhibit A for the exact opposite
position:
First, the existence of a draft did not prevent the Vietnam War or
even appear to affect how intense the war became. Second, it took
many years of protests and, more important, over 58,000 American military lives lost and over 150,000 wounded before the war
ended. Indeed, it took a few years of high casualties before there
were widespread protests against the Vietnam War.
Moreover, a large body of anecdotal evidence suggests that many children
of the rich and powerful carried out exactly the strategy that I suggest above:
namely, finding ways around the draft or finding relatively safe jobs in the
military. As Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss wrote in Chance and
Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation:
Congressman Alvin OKonski took a personal survey of one hundred inductees from his northern Wisconsin district. Not one of
them came from a family with an annual income of over $5,000. A
Harvard Crimson editor [James Fallows] from the class of 1970 tallied his twelve hundred classmates and counted only fifty-six who
entered the military, just two of whom went to Vietnam.
Note that while an annual income of $5,000 may sound very low, these were
in mid-1960s dolloars. The median family income in 1965 was $6,900. The
advocates of using conscription to cause the rich and powerful to question
wars could argue that their draft would be different from the Vietnam-era
draft in that it would require all able-bodied eighteen-year-olds to serve. That
would be different, but not in a way that matters much: the domestic-service
option that Bacevich and others favor would still give people a way to avoid
going to war. And there would always be the option of lobbying to get ones
children a relatively safe berth in the military.
Recall Bacevichs argument, quoted above, that, with his preferred draft,
it will be incumbent upon civilian and military leaders to make the case to
citizen-soldiers (and their parents) for long, drawn-out, inconclusive wars in
far-off places. Ive already dealt with his argument about their parents. But
Bacevichs claim is profoundly weak in another way: its precisely when people
are conscripted that civilian and military leaders do not have to make the case
for a war. If draftees could say to their leaders, Oh, youve failed to make the
case so I wont fight, the draft would be like none I have ever heard of.
In short, under conscription young people would be heavily coerced in
order to reduce the probability of war only a little. And in the event that the
strategy failed, as it well might, the nation would be stuck fighting wars with
118
conscripts who are both unlikely to be as effective as volunteers and, because

of their relative ineffectiveness, at greater risk of dying.
AN ARMY OF THE WILLING
Moreover, in an important way having to do with the tax burden, relying on volunteers to fight can help discourage wars. The government must entice people to
join the military; to entice those volunteers, it often must pay more than it would
for a conscripted military. When the number of troops in Vietnam increased
starting in 1964, as Seagren and I noted, real military personnel outlays per
military member barely budged. By contrast, real military personnel outlays per
member rose substantially as the US government became involved in wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. From an average of $73,887 per member between 1996 and
2001, real outlays rose to an average of $103,772 from 2004 to 2010, an increase of
40 percent. The government had to increase salaries to meet its staffing targets,
resulting in about an extra $45 billion per year in US government spending.
That higher cost was, admittedly, financed mainly with deficits rather than
current taxes. But deficits now, unless the government later defaults or cuts
spending, lead to higher taxes in the future. And if, as seems likely, the future
tax system even roughly resembles the present tax system in forcing higherincome people to pay a much higher percent of their income in taxes, the rich
and powerful will pay more for war. So a volunteer force does give the rich
and powerful an incentive to oppose war.
This incentive does not appear to be strong, but it exists. More important,
that incentive for high-income taxpayers to oppose war is not clearly weaker
than the incentive that conscription of their children gives them to oppose war.
Ultimately the questionable morality of using innocent young people as
political pawns to get their parents politically active, combined with the small
probability that the strategy will work and the larger probability that it will
backfire, means the new argument for conscription is unpersuasive.
Reprinted by permission of Liberty Fund, Inc. (www.libertyfund.org).
2015 Liberty Fund, Inc. All rights reserved.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is American
Contempt for Liberty, by Walter E. Williams. To order,
CA LI FORNI A
Beating the
Drought,
Aussie Style
The lesson California should learn from Australia:
create a robust market to swap water.
By Carson Bruno
alifornia officials should be required to

read Water Markets in Australia: A Short
History, published by Australias National
Water Commission. More than a snapshot
of how Australias dysfunctional water trading system

evolved into an efficient one, it presents Australias
experience, in many ways, as a blueprint for reform in
a chronically thirsty land.
Australia and California share attributes that
make water reform both challenging and necessary.
Both have Mediterranean coasts and arid interiors
coupled with precipitation patterns where water is
found many miles from the often-at-odds agricul-
Key points
Water set aside
for the environment should be a
funded liability.
Rights holders
with a specified
share of water
should be able to
trade their allotments.
Federal and
state water management needs to
be streamlined.
tural, municipal, and environmental water users.
Carson Bruno is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

120
Both water systems evolved over generations, adding layer on top of layer.
And both are prone to prolonged droughts. Faced with a decadelong water
shortage so severe it was dubbed the Millennium Drought, Australia realized
its inefficient water trading system was only making matters worse. The system wasnt moving water efficiently. Australians determined that a functioning
marketunsurprisinglywould be the best remedy, but just setting up trading
platforms wouldnt be enough. Australias complex system of water demands
and rights created an immense barrier to trade.
So Australia did something radical: a complete water rights overhaul.
First, Australians realized that because water for environmental protection couldnt be effectively integrated into the system, it had to be completely
removed. An aggressive clawback scheme to purchase, at market prices, water
rights from existing holders effectively created exclusive and separate water
for environmental protection. This not only made the water a funded liability
(currently, in California, water for environmental protection is an unfunded liability, effectively stolen from agricultures allocation) but also forced Australian
regulators to more effectively use their now exclusiveand cappedwater for
environmental protection.
Then Australia imposed a cap-and-trade system. Each season, Australias
regulators determine the amount of consumptive water (water that is not
returned to a water system) available to agricultural and municipal water
entitlement holders. These entitlements give the holder a securely specified
share of the seasonally adjusted consumptive water. Moreover, entitlement
holders can trade both their seasons allotment and their entitlements, giving
sellers and buyers immense
flexibility in setting up shortIn Australia, environmental protecand long-term trades.
Naturally, independent
tion has its own protected water
and open trading platforms
allotments.
developed and, with laws
mandating quick regulatory review, Australias markets flourished. Between
20078 and 201011, entitlement trading increased 31 percent and allocation
trades more than doubled. And Australias markets have managed the scarce
resource better. Coming out of a prolonged drought, the Murray-Darling
Basin (Australias equivalent of Californias Central Valley) water stowages
largely returned to near 100 percent capacity within just one year.
Naturally, following Australias example would require systemic shifts in
how Californians view water and water rights, but this drought has exposed
a hard truth: Californias status quo water system can no longer serve the
states population and economy. And while

Australias water markets are not perfect,
their lessons serve as a good starting point
for reform discussions.
Challenges do exist. The federal versus state
management of Californias water conveyance
presents a unique barrier to statewide reform.
Californias overlapping water rights will make reevaluation a political migraine. That said, while Californias water challenges are not solely caused by
its dysfunctional trading systema lack
of storage is another
122
principal causeAustralia proved that it is possible to reform a complicated

status quo water system that serves a diverse hydrological ecosystem into
something efficient and effective. And that is something worth emulating.
Subscribe to Eureka, the online Hoover Institution journal that probes
the policy, political, and economic issues confronting California (www.
hoover.org/publications/eureka).
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Game

Changers: Energy on the Move, edited by George P.
Shultz and Robert C. Armstrong. To order, call (800)
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inte r 2016 123
Thirsting for Answers

A new Hoover Institution survey shows that Californiansacross ideological and regional dividesare open to continuing water conservation and
to sharing groundwater with neighboring communities. The latest Golden
State Poll, administered by the survey research firm YouGov and designed
in conjunction with Stanford Universitys Bill Lane Center for the American
West, shows that dealing with the states water problems is Californians
top priority for state government.
Mandated cutbacks: 54 percent of likely California voters support
required water cutbacks, with limits and fines. (Only 24 percent preferred no
limits, alongside higher costs per gallon for heavier use.)
Sharing water: 62 percent of likely
voters support required sharing of
groundwater supplies; 67 percent support restrictions on groundwater use.
Toilet to tap: Just 10 percent
of Californians outside Orange County
(which already has a wastewater-recycling program) said they would drink
recycled wastewater; 18 percent said they would cook with it; 22 percent
would bathe in it. But after learning more scientific facts about water recycling, support grew to 20 percent, 29 percent, and 43 percent, respectively.
More storage options: Californians prefer an all of the above approach
to augmenting water storage: building dams and reservoirs (70 percent of
likely voters), desalination (82 percent), more storage in underground aquifers (89 percent), collecting and recycling storm water (91 percent).
The environment: Fifty-three percent of likely voters favor relaxing
environmental laws to build water storage and transportation. The issue is
a tougher sell for Democrats (36 percent) than for Republicans (76 percent)
and independents (65 percent).
Subsidies for farmers: Opinion is closely divided on reducing or eliminating subsidies for farmers water, with 49 percent in favor of ending them
versus 30 percent opposed. Republicans split 40 percent in favor to 43
percent opposed; Democrats are 56 percent to 21 percent; independents, 49
percent to 29 percent.
Shifting supplies: Support for giving some of the water currently used
for agriculture to residential and other business use varies with voters
124
LIFELINES: Branches of the California Aqueduct pass through the Central

Valley east of Tracy. [Ian KluftCreative Commons]
familiarity. With no information, only 29 percent favor and 39 percent oppose

reallocating agricultural water. When told that agriculture uses 40 percent
of Californias water, 38 percent favor and 36 percent oppose reallocation.
When a third group was told that agriculture uses 80 percent of the water
put to human use in California, the numbers shift to 47 percent in favor and
30 percent opposed.
The Golden State Poll was conducted from August 31 to September 11 and interviewed 1,500 Californians 18 and older who live in the San Francisco Bay Area,
the Central Valley, and Southern California. The survey has a margin of error of
plus or minus 3.4 percentage points for the full weighted sample. The Hoover investigators were Carson Bruno, Lanhee Chen, Tammy Frisby, and Bill Whalen, with
further guidance by Bruce Cain, the Spence and Cleone Eccles Family Director of
Stanford Universitys Bill Lane Center for the American West.
I N M EMORI AM : R OBE RT CO N QUE ST
The Man Who

Was Right
The late Hoover fellow Robert Conquest detailed
communist horrors when nobody believed them,
or wanted to believe.
By John B. Dunlop and Norman M. Naimark
shining star in the Hoover firmament, Robert Conquest died on

August 3 at the age of ninety-eight. Typically, he was finishing
another book, in this case his memoirs, Two Muses, a title that
evokes his life as both a poet and a historian. Astonishingly
prolific, he wrote twenty-one books on Soviet and international affairs and

eight volumes of poetry, scores of essays, reviews, translations, and commentary, and edited anthologies of poetry.
Bobas everyone knew himwas among the most widely acclaimed and
honored historians and writers of our time, with a host of awards, including
the 1993 Jefferson Lectureship, the highest award given to a humanist by
the United States government, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. The
Polish, Estonian, and Ukrainian governments awarded him their national
Robert Conquest (19172015) was a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He

was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005. John B. Dunlop is a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Norman M. Naimark is a senior fellow at
the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
He is also the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies
at Stanford University, where he is the Fisher Family Director of the Global Studies Division.
134
medals of honor. He was an adviser to Senator Henry Scoop Jackson and

later to Ronald Reagan on Soviet affairs. He also was a particularly significant adviser to Margaret Thatcher and was important in her evolving understanding of the Soviet Union and East-West relations. (He drafted her famous
1976 Iron Lady speech.)
He later noted that he was less interested in the left or right of the political
spectrum than in getting the story straight about the Soviet Union, especially
its Stalinist period. Christopher Hitchens wrote in the Wall Street Journal in
2007 that Bobs view was that fools and knaves of all kinds need to be opposed
and that what was really needed was a united front against bullshit.
AN OFFICEMATE AND A GENTLEMAN
Bob had been at Hoover since 1981, and during that time he was invariably
perceived as part of a potent duoBob and Liddie. His accomplished
American wife, Elizabeth Neece Conquest, whom he married in 1979, was a
rock of support for Bob and took care of him as his health deteriorated over
his last decade or so. They had met because of her scholarly interests in British poetry, a field in which Bob was, of course, a notable practitioner.
For nearly two decades, Bob worked in his cluttered, book-crammed office
on the second floor of Hoovers Lou Henry Hoover Building. Not surprising,
he was a disciplined writer, allotting himself a daily quota of at least a thousand publishable words or four typed pages, double-spaced. More surprising is that, as he later said in an interview, he found writing annoying and
tedious. He found poetry much easier going. Once he had produced his daily
quota, he then happily moved on to other pursuits. He wrote mostly at home,
and in the afternoon was in his office, taking notes on the stream of mainly
Russian-language books that his diligent research assistants delivered to
him, chatting with colleagues, phoning editors, or dealing with problems
affecting the Russian and East European Collection of the Hoover Library
and Archives, for which he served as scholar-curator.
Apparently, Bobs writing was done in just a single draft. He would scrawl
his text in his difficult handwriting, which his secretary, Amy Desai, would
then decipher and type into a computer. Often the item would be ready for
publication with only a few corrections. Bobs steel-trap mind permitted him
to organize his thoughts into final publishable form before he took pen to
paper. Bob treated all of his staffwhether Amy, his research assistants, or
his student helpwith great affection and respect and never made them feel
unappreciated. His gentlemanly demeanor was appreciated by all of them.
Bob dealt with his colleagues the same way: he was unfailingly polite, ready
to engage, modest, and cordial. He also had, as Hoover senior fellow Robert
Service observed, an impish sense of humor that delighted his friends and
colleagues. He loved a good laugh. Broadly read and learned, Bob was fascinated by such diverse subjects as science fiction and Roman Britain, about
which he knew a great deal.
Bobs scholarly work was extraordinary in a number of ways. He was an
indefatigable truth-seeker, someone who chased down new materials in
the most diverse and sometimes obscure Soviet
journals and memoir sources. He assiduously read footnotes and sought out
the sources others had cited. He
was a passionate advocate of
using migr memoirs and
accounts, making the case
in response to episodic
critiques of his method
that one could compare
their insights with other
136
H O O V ER DIGEST Wi n ter 201 6
materials and find ways to verify what seemed to outsiders unlikely facts and
events that turned out to be devastatingly true. He wrote frequently about
the crucial importance of imagination in dealing with Soviet historical reality,
and he was blessed with that quality as were very few others.
THE GREAT TERROR
This gift of insight came in part, no doubt,
from Bobs 193738 flirtation with communism and the Communist Party at
Magdalen College at Oxford, where
he graduated with degrees in politics, philosophy, and economics.
More crucially, it came from
encounters with the brutal
realities of the communist takeover of
Bulgaria at
the
end of the war and beginning of the peace, when he was a member of the
British foreign office, after having served in the infantry. He himself later noted that if you had been [in Bulgaria] in 194445, you became anticommunist
in a shot. They were dreadful and got worse and worse. After the Bulgarian
experience, he returned to London to work in the foreign offices Information
Research Department, where he honed his skills as a Soviet analyst until he
entered academia in 1956.
Bob was able to penetrate reality with the eyes of a poet and a sage, and
convey the flow of history, especially Soviet history, with near perfect pitch.
He believed deeply in knowing the language and culture of the area about
which one studied and wrote. He thought much of the misreading of Soviet
politics was due to a perfectly natural habit of extending the assumptions
of ones own culture more or less automatically, as if they were universally
applicable. He was not a fan of political science and its focus on impersonal
structures and functions.
His Power and Policy in the USSR (1961) was one of the first systematic
attempts to examine Soviet politics in the context of the struggle for power
behind the Kremlin dictatorship. In this book, Bob was one of the first (and
best) practitioners of the art of historical Kremlinology, and we use the word
art deliberately. Those who understood the foundations of the Soviet system,
as Bob did, knew that fierce struggles went on behind the scenes of apparent
unanimity on policy in the Kremlin, and that these could be discerned from
the Soviet press, official pronouncements, stray remarks in newspapers and
journals, and a canny analysis of the day-to-day actions
of the machinery of party
The Polish, Estonian, and Ukrainian
and state. Even without
governments awarded Bob their
the archival material that
national medals of honor
became available only much
later, Bob accurately portrayed the mortally dangerous struggle behind Josef
Stalins throne in the last years of the tyrants life, which included the trial
and execution of Lavrenty Beria and the ascendance of Nikita Khrushchev.
Certainly his most widely acclaimed work was The Great Terror, initially
published in 1968 and then reissued as The Great Terror: A Reassessment in
1990 and 1998. This classic of Soviet history was the first and is still the best
account of the fearsome Stalinist repressions, trials, killing, and torture of
the 1930s that permanently disfigured Soviet society, politics, and culture.
We call this period the Great Terror because of the imprint of Bobs book. By
reconstructing with surgical precision the details of individual cases, each
138
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER: Hoover senior fellow Robert Conquest

reviews research at his Stanford home in 2010. Despite finding writing
annoying and tedious, as he told an interviewer, Conquest demanded of
himself at least a thousand publishable words, or four double-spaced pages, a
day. He happily turned to poetry for relief. [Linda A. CiceroStanford News Service]
traumatic in its own way, Bob managed to etch the purges into the consciousness of his readers. This was a portrait of a world of brutal violence, to be
sure, but also of intense psychological pressure and appalling fear.
The impact of The Great Terror is hard to overestimate, among both historians and commentators about the Soviet Union in the West and intelligentsia
circles in the Soviet Union, where the book circulated in translation in a variety of samizdat editions. When he first met Alexander Solzhenitsyn in Zurich
in 1976, Bob later recounted, I was relieved to find him a great Conquest fan,
with tales of how he and [Andrei] Sakharov read The Great Terror together.
Bob traveled to the Soviet Union in 1989 to see Mikhail Gorbachevs perestroika firsthand, as the editors of Soviet publications supporting Gorbachevs reforms swarmed over him, begging for interviews and permission to publish his writings. The Great Terror became part of the culture
and politics of Russian reform, as it had been crucial to dissenters decades
earlier.
The publication of the 2008 edition was prompted by the availability of new
documentary sources from the Russian archives. Bob lowered his estimates
of the total number of victims of Stalins regime from twenty million to some
thirteen to fifteen million while warning readers that exact numbers may
never be known. New documents helped him detail the mechanisms and personalities of Stalins repressive apparatus, but it is still astonishing how well
Bobs original assessments have been upheld by newly available materials.
YEARS OF FAMINE
Bobs study of the Ukrainian terror-famine of 193233 had a similarly profound impact on Ukrainians and their history. Supported by the Ukrainian
Research Center at Harvard, Bob created another masterpiece of modern
historical writing with The Harvest of Sorrow (1986). The opening paragraph
has reverberated throughout the Western, Ukrainian, and even Russian
historiography of the famine:
Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the
Ukrainian, Cossack, and other areas to the easta great stretch
of territory with some forty million inhabitantswas like one vast
Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men, women, and children, lay dead or dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation
with no strength to bury their families or neighbors. At the same
time (as at Belsen), well-fed squads of police or party officials
supervised the victims.
Once again he assembled an array of memoirs and documentary sources
to provide a truthful narrative of Stalins genocidal attack on the Ukrainian people. He explained it as a part of the Kremlins policy of crushing
Ukrainian national consciousness, in the broader context of Stalinist policy
towards the nationalities in the Soviet Union. This was not like the famine in
the rest of the Soviet Union,
he insisted. Why were there
After Harvest of Sorrow, it was
roadblocks to keep starving peasants from seeking
no longer possible to discount the
relief in the cities? Why
Ukrainian famine as a mere blunder
were Ukrainian peasants,
of collectivization.
unlike those in other areas,
kept from seeking food and work in neighboring republics? Why were grain
requisition quotas in Ukraine increased in the face of the famine when they
were reduced in other areas?
140
Bob also led the effort to get the story of the terror-famine out to the
abysmally informed public in an award-winning documentary film titled
Harvest of Despair. Though released in 1984, the documentary was not
initially accepted by commercial outlets or even PBS. It was first shown
on television in September 1986 as part of a special program of William Buckleys Firing Line, which featured Bob in a discussion about the
events.
In Ukraine and among the Ukrainian diaspora, Bob is a hero. He was the
first to bring this national tragedy to the attention of the broad public, including politicians and publicists. It was no longer posBob found ways to verify what
sible for Western historians
seemed unlikely facts and events.
to discount the famine as a
mere side effect of poorly planned collectivization. Bobs formidable combination of brilliant prose and attention to the facts created a scholarly monument. The archival investigations of Ukrainian historians have confirmed the
conclusions of Harvest of Sorrow, with some adjustment to the numbers of
victims.
Bobs research on the period of Soviet repressive politics in the 1920s
and 1930s spun off a series of specialized historical studies. He wrote a
compact and elegant biography, Stalin: Breaker of Nations (1991), which
made the case that the psychopathic personality, Marxist worldview,
and insatiable drive for power of the Soviet dictator explain most of the
excesses of the repressions. Bob certainly maintained that Lenin and his
Marxism were ultimately responsible for the violence built into the Soviet
system, but he noted differences of scalean observation encapsulated in
one of his pointed yet charming limericks, titled Progress.
There was a great Marxist called Lenin
Who did two or three million men in
Thats a lot to have done in
But where he did one in
The grand Marxist Stalin did ten in.
In Stalin and the Kirov Murder (1989), Bob dissected the assassination
plot against the Leningrad party chief, whose killing in 1934 served as the
pretext for the purges and mass murder to come. In a courtroom-like reconstruction of possible scenarios assessing who was responsible for the killing,
Bob made an excellent case that Stalin was the likely culprit. He mustered
critical new evidence that was made available in Soviet periodicals during
the period of glasnost and employed the impeccable logic characteristic of

all his work.
One of our favorites among Bobs shorter studies is the moving and powerful Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps (1978), which used, among a large number
of memoirs and recollections of the gold mining
region of eastern SibeBob was one of the first (and best)
practitioners of the art of Kremlinology. ria, Varlam Shalamovs
brilliant reminiscences,
Kolyma Tales. Timothy Garton Ash is quoted as calling Bob a Solzhenitsyn
before Solzhenitsyn, and Bobs work on Kolymathe permafrost grave site
of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of prisoners, is as heart-wrenching and disturbing as anything written on the Gulag.
In Kolyma, Bob also delved into a theme that courses through his work as
a whole: the fantastic gullibility of some Western observers to Soviet propaganda, even when they were in the very vicinity of terrible atrocities. Bob
pointed out that Westerners too often saw what they wanted to see through
the lenses of their pro-Soviet politics and inclinations. He also explored this
phenomenon in The Great Terror and The Harvest of Sorrow, where he discussed the shameful reporting of Walter Duranty, the Pulitzer Prizewinning
reporter of the New York Times, who recorded his positive impressions of
the health and welfare of Ukrainian peasants during the terror-famine and
praised the legal procedures of the purge trials. Bob noted that these deceptions were integral to the Stalinist system, which was based (as Pasternak
put it) on the inhuman power of the lie.
POETRY AND HISTORY
Bob was as unhappy with historians who misread the iniquities of the Soviet
system as he was with the journalists, politicians, and cultural figures who
blithely ignored them.
He was especially
dismissive of the reviFacing the clearest atrocities, Westernsionists, who attacked
ers still saw what they wanted to see
his work while trying
through the lens of pro-Soviet bias.
to build alternative
understandings of the Stalinist dictatorship. Although he was mild-mannered
and invariably polite, he appeared to relish the combat. Even as he bested
his opponents, he tried to learn from such exchanges and was always ready
142
to follow up on new materials that he might have missed or correct the rare
errors that might have appeared in his work.
We conclude by turning to the intersection of Bobs poetic and historical
skills. During his meeting with Solzhenitsyn in Zurich in 1976, the great
Russian writer asked Bob if he would translate his little prose poem,
Prussian Nights. Bob agreed, not knowing it was the length of a novella.
The evening concluded with bear hugs, kisses on the cheeks, raspy beard
and all. Prussian Nights is a haunting account of the Red Armys advance
into East Prussia, one of the most violent and horrific campaigns of the
Second World War. Solzhenitsyn himself took part in the campaign and was
shocked by the rape, destruction, and senseless brutality of Soviet soldiers
toward German civilians during the Red Army offensive. In one stanza,
Prussian Nights reads:
Zweiundzwanzig, Hringstrasse
Its not been burned, just looted, rifled.
A moaning, by the walls half muffled:
The mothers wounded, still alive.
The little daughters on the mattress,
Dead. How many have been on it
A platoon, a company perhaps?
A girls been turned into a woman.
A woman turned into a corpse.
Bobs translation stands as tribute to Solzhenitsyns courage, humanity, and
literary gifts. It also stands as a testament to his own.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Women

of the Gulag: Portraits of Five Remarkable Lives, by
Paul R. Gregory. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
I N M EMORI AM : R OBE RT CO N QUE ST
This Be His Verse

As a poet, Robert Conquest could be subtle, blunt,
or blueor all three at once. A brief testament to a
great talent.
By John OSullivan
he opening line in most obituaries of Robert Conquest, who

died last summer, described him as a historian and poet. That
would be a capacious enough description for most men of letters.
In Tom Stoppards The Invention of Love, Charon keeps A. E.
Housman waiting on the banks of the River Styx for a second arrival since he
is expecting two people, a poet and a scholar, until Housman says shyly: I
think that must be me. In Bobs case Charon would have been waiting for a
historian, a poet, a novelist, a satirist, a critic, a diplomat, a strategist, a soldier, a social and political theorist, a limerickist, and of course a scholarand
I have almost certainly left out some of Bobs other professional identities.
Charon probably brought along a second boat.
It is well-nigh impossible to do justice to a life of such varied achievement.
Most of Bobs obituaries rightly focused therefore on the most important
aspects of his public achievement (in particular his histories: The Great
Terror on Stalins purges and The Harvest of Sorrow on Stalins forced Ukrainian famine). They made clear that his accounts of the dictators crimes (in
particular, the number of his victims) had first been challenged and later
vindicated; they attributed a major change in the worlds opinion of Soviet
communism at least in part to his work; they gave lesser but still important
Robert Conquest (19172015) was a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He
was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005. John OSullivan is an
editor at large at National Review.
144
standing to his literary achievements; and they gave a general impression of

a life devoted to truth and crowned by honors. With the exception of a Guardian obituary that hinted so many faults and hesitated so many dislikes (to
paraphrase Alexander Pope) that it revealed its overwhelming animus, they
were all both (largely) accurate and highly favorable. Their main conclusions
need not be further developed here.
For the other half of Bobs public achievement was his life in literature.
That too was extremely varied, and it went very deep. He was a major poet
and critic who in 1956 launched the Movement poetsincluding Philip Larkin, Kingsley Amis, Thom Gunn, Donald Daviein the anthology New Lines.
Much ink has been spent arguing that the Movement poets were no such
thing and soon went their separate ways. That seems over-argued. Poets of
their nature dont remain in formation. What is surely more significant is
that the Movement included many poets who in retrospect are among the
most-read British poets of the postwar years, that the countrys single bestloved poet, Philip Larkin, was among them, and that their work did exhibit
certain common traits, notably concern for technique and formal perfection,
avoidance of rhetorical and romantic excess, strong dislike of pretension, and
belief that poetry should be intelligent as well as moving or powerful.
A WILD MEMORY
Bob himself, having called for a renewed attention to the necessary intellectual component in poetry viewed from a common sense standpoint, was
clearly the moving spirit as well as the anthologist of the Movement. And his
own poetry met that (and most other) criteria.
Is it so necessary
For a wild memory
To fade and blur
Before the full charge
Of an old love or rage
Can really register?
With a lifes long perspectives
The changed picture gives
More depth and scope
As twisted faces shrink
To little more than pink
Blobs on its landscape . . .
A passion, sharp and hot,

Might once have seized the heart
To rip or scald.
So far as this can be
Recalled in tranquillity
Its not recalled.
(Afterwards: Recollected in Tranquillity, Penultimata)
A strong dislike of pretension, accompanied by a happy delight in puncturing it through satire and parody, is also a major element in his literary
criticism. His demolition of Ezra Pound is especially effective because,
as a classical scholar and linguist, he is able to establish that many of
Pounds most admired technical effects are in reality simple errors of
grammar or translation. Some of his satires even merit the judgment too
perfect. His essay Christian Symbolism in Lucky Jim, which appeared
in the Critical Quarterly of 1965, was a parody of the then-dominant literary criticism and contained such absurdities as seeing Jim as a Christ
figure because his surname Dixonread it Di(e)xonwas centered on
an X on which a man might die. After Eng Lit professors started getting
its arguments in their students essays, the Quarterly published a note to
readers that the essay was in fact satirical. Read today it is a masterpiece
of dry irony.
These and other essays in criticism, originally scattered through several
journals, were collected in the 1979 book The Abomination of Moab, which will
serve well as a manifesto of Bobs literary commonsense. In response to the
charge of philistinism leveled by the academic and transgressive critics of
popular or traditional literature, he hurls back the charge of Moabitism. Just
as the Philistines were the enemies of the children of light, the Moabites were
their false friends who set them whoring off after strange doctrines. Most
literary and artistic intellectuals are, in short, the false friends of art and
damage it by their support.
Bob transferred this insight from literature to the wider arena of education as a whole in the 1970s Black Papers, lamenting, with Kingsley Amis
and others, the decline of schooling and cultural standards generally. This
criticism of progressive education made him a controversial right-winger
as the media understand these things. Few other conventional critics of
modern education, however, could have matched this criticisma parody of
one of Bobs favorite nineteenth-century light versifiers, Winthrop Mackworth Praed:
146
Those teach who cant do runs the dictum,

But for some even thats out of reach:
They cant even teachso theyve picked em
To teach other people to teach.
Then alas for the next generation,
For the pots fairly crackle with thorn.
Where psychology meets education
A terrible bullshit is born.
(A Grouchy Good Night to the Academic Year, New and Collected
Poems)
In addition to his writings on Soviet history, critical articles, Black Paper
polemics, and columns for the Daily Telegraph, Bob wrote two novels, a study
of science fiction (with Kingsley Amis again), a constant stream of poetry,
and the limericks of which he is widely regarded as a master. Philip Larkin
admired this skill without reserve and declared that Bobs version of the
seven ages of man had leapt over one major hurdle for deserving the approval of posterity: instant memorability.
DIPLOMATS, BOHOS, AND IRON LADIES
Much more can and should be written on the works, but Bob has also left
behind some autobiographical sketches that fill gaps in our knowledge of the
life too. Not incidentally in such a life, they amuse and enlighten us about
equally on a range of twentieth-century topics. Seeing the communists taking
over Bulgaria, first as a soldier, later as a diplomat, he writes, would have
made anyone a firm anticommunist. The tortures they inflicted on a secretary
to a democratic politician will lead him in time to produce studies, now known
to be accurate, of Soviet behavior for the Information Research Department
of the British Foreign Office and later to write The Great Terror. Immediately,
however, he helps Bulgarians under threat to escape to the West.
Back in England in the literary wars there is his strong and (to my mind)
conclusive defense of Philip Larkin against his biographers charge of pornophilia and general nastiness (and to rebut lesser charges against himself).
Simply put, it wasnt pornography as we now understand the genre but the
equivalent of modern ads for bras.
And there are lighter episodes on every other pageas when, acting as a
liaison officer to the local churches in Scotland, he told the Free Kirk pastor that there didnt seem to be much difference in theology between them
and the Church of Scotland and was informed: Aye, there are not many
differences but there is one important one: we go to heaven and they go to

hell. Or when, acting as diplomatic host at a cocktail party in Sofia, he asked
the exarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church upon entry: Manhattan or
martini, Your Beatitude? (Manhattan, replied the prelate instantly.) Bob
remained calm, balanced, decent, and good-humored through the best and
worst of times, except when faced with cruelty and lying.
Several obituaries wondered hopefully whether Bob was a man of the
left. That doesnt seem to me the most interesting question to ask about him,
but he certainly described himself in those terms, adding that he had voted
Labour in every election until 1979, when he switched to Mrs. Thatchers
Tories. At school and university Bob had been a free-spirited bohemian,
famous for girl-chasing and pranks at least as much for his fling with communism. He found Oxford Conservatives such as Edward Heath priggish.
And though he had proved to be an effective soldier, six years in the army
had not made him more conventional. As he later reflected: In most ways
. . . it strengthened and clarified my dislike of authority and organizations
in general, and an attachment to the principles of personal and civil liberty
(reinforced, also, by seeing what happened to the Balkans in the successive
totalitarian grips). So he was a strong supporter of Labour during the war,
and afterwards he was enthusiastic about working with Labour ministers
such as Christopher Mayhew, who headed the Information Research Department. He also drafted speeches for (and with) the fiery, redheaded left-wing
minister Barbara Castle at the United Nations, finding her very attractive
along Susan Hayward lines, as well as firmly anti-Soviet. As long as the left
was antitotalitarian in foreign policy and liberal in domestic politics, he was
comfortable within it.
None of these tastes and attachments changed at all seriously for the rest
of Bobs life. But as other people have found, the scenery moved sideways
while he remained wedded
to his original ideas. As
He pointed out, scathingly, that most the political left diluted its
literary and artistic intellectuals are
opposition to the Soviets, so
the false friends of art and damage it Bob criticized their appeasement; as the academic left
by their support.
replaced the idea of making
art and literature more available to people with that of deconstructing them
and reconstructing them as transgressive politics, he mocked them. Over
time that resulted in his becoming an adviser to Margaret Thatcher and, in
the partisan terms of the day, a conservative. In a longer-term perspective,
148
FRONT AND CENTER: Robert Conquest (in wheelchair) hobnobs at the

London Review Bookshop in 2009 during a literary event dubbed The Movement Reconsidered, featuring readings from well-known postwar poets and
writers. Standing, left to right: James Fenton, Craig Raine, Zach Leader, Martin
Amis (son of Kingsley Amis, a Movement writer), Blake Morrison, and Anthony Thwaite. [Nick CunardZUMA]
however, as others became radicals, he remained a liberal. Whether a liberal

is a man of the left today, however, is another matter.
MIGHTY APHRODITE
Much of what I have written here is drawn from a friendship with Bob that
began in 1972, when I was invited to join the fascists lunches at Bertorellis.
Two years later, both our marriages having recently ended, I moved into his
Battersea apartment to share the rent. My one additional contribution was
to introduce Bob to Margaret Thatcher, which led to the first Iron Lady
speech and, more important, to their becoming lifelong friends. Otherwise
I was overwhelmingly the beneficiary of this arrangement, enjoying lunch
with Senator Scoop Jackson, a birthday party for Philip Larkin (not at all a
gloomy occasion), several other literary parties fueled by champagne and
kedgeree, and the easygoing education of watching Bob work on anything
from a translation of a Solzhenitsyn poem to a new limerick.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inte r 2016 149
One summer evening I returned to the flat to find Bob looking out at Battersea Park and drinking a gin and tonic. He offered me one, and then said,
Hang on a minute, Ive just thought of something. He sat down and, after
what seemed to me a few pencil strokes, read out this:
My demands upon life are quite modest,
Theyre just to be decently goddessed.
Astarte or Isis
Would do in a crisis,
But the bests Aphrodite, unbodiced.
Those lines met Larkins test of instant memorability as far as I am concerned. I have recalled them without difficulty ever since. They also seem
to me now to express Bobs demands upon life at the time quite accurately.
By the mid-1970s, he already enjoyed a secure reputation as the historian
who had revealed the truth about Soviet communism. Full vindication, other
achievements, and other honors would follow. But while he was attractive to
womenmy then-girlfriend described him as like a lovely teddy bear left
out in the rain overnightand had several companionable former girlfriends to escort around town, he had ultimately been unlucky in love over
two marriages and cursed by tragedy in another. In 1975 he was still a single
man in want of a wife.
Three years later, Aphrodite walked into a party following one of Bobs
poetry readings. A happy marriage lasting thirty-six years and a life that
continued to produce fine work at the rate of a book a year to the very end on
August the third were the results. He was lucky to have her; we were lucky to
have him. RIP Robert Conquest.
Reprinted by permission of the New Criterion. 2015 The New Criterion
(www.newcriterion.com). All rights reserved.

Weavers Lost Art, by Charles Hill. To order, call (800)
150
H E R OI SM
The Heroic Heart

Heroes still walk among us, but no longer must
they kill to win glory. Instead the hero for our time
is a healer.
By Tod Lindberg
chilles and Joan of Arc have no real place in the modern world.
The birth and decline of the classical hero, however, are only
the first part of the story of heroism. Heroism in another form
is alive and well among us. Indeed, the more fully realized the
modern world, the more sharply this other form of heroism comes into relief.
This heroism, while entailing the same risk to life as its classical predecessor, differs in the character of the great deed done and the nature of the
recognition earned from performing it. It is a heroism that not only manages to be compatible with the modern world of democratic and law-abiding
producers and consumers peaceably inclined toward one another, but also,
by its very action, affirms and reinforces the legitimacy of that world. In so
doing it rebuts the chief critique of the modern world, namely, that it will be
home to Nietzsches the mediocre alone. Some people remain willing to put
their lives on the line to serve a higher purpose. Their purpose has not been
the classical heros purposethe actualization of their sense of inner greatnessbut to serve others.
A short story with a personal connection:
Late one September night in 1994, a fire broke out in a house in suburban
New Jersey. A family of eleven lived there. My wifes uncle, Patrolman David
Robins of the Township of Ocean Police Department, was among the first on
Tod Lindberg is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
the scene. Members of the family gathered outside in a state of shock and
hysteria as flames consumed the living room and started spreading throughout the house. The family assured Patrolman Robins that all members were
accounted for.
Over the general din, however, he thought he heard a child screaming from
inside. The parents had said everyone was out and safe. But he heard what
he heard.
Time was critical. He couldnt enter the house through the front door. The
flames and smoke were too thick. So he rushed to the back of the house and
found a sliding glass door that was unlocked. He opened it and went in. He
made his way forward, crawling for twenty-five feet beneath the thick layer
of billowing smoke just above him. In the kitchen, he found one of the children, a six-year-old boy who had apparently wandered back into the house
in confusion. The boy was
unconscious. He grabbed
The modern hero contradicts
the boy and made his way
Nietzsches dread that the world
back through the smoke
and flame, handing the child
belongs to the mediocre alone.
off to another officer and a
firefighter near the back door. An ambulance took the rescued boy off to a
hospital for treatment for smoke inhalation. He made a full recovery. Patrolman Robins had saved his life.
This is the modern face of heroismsomeone willing to take a tremendous
risk or make a personal sacrifice for the sake of others. The firefighters who
rushed into the World Trade Center towers the morning of 9/11 must have
known they were going to have a hard day, maybe their worst ever. They
were not deluded. No doubt each one hoped to live to see the next day, as did
my wifes uncle, a man of great personal charm and bonhomie and no death
wish whatsoever. And entering a burning building is no way to improve your
chances, something he and the 9/11 firefighters understood on their hardest
day and on previous days of danger, when things turned out all right. Their
ability and willingness to undertake such a feat entailed physical and moral
courage, the discipline and the training that underlie it, a willingness to act
selflessly, and an instant determination that overcame hesitation and the
impulse to do what most people in such circumstances would do, namely, run
the other way.
Meanwhile, heroic doctors and other volunteers from Mdecins sans
Frontires have risked their lives in or near zones of civil war, conflict, and
epidemic to treat the wounded, injured, and sick on an impartial basis. Aid
152
workers from many other humanitarian organizations step into hotspots

worldwide to serve those most desperately in need.
The deeds of many lifesaving heroes have gone unsung, but sometimes
their achievements are so extraordinary that they win worldwide acclaim.
Chesley Sully Sullenberger was the US Airways pilot who performed the
first perfect water landing in the history of commercial aviation by setting his plane down safely on the Hudson River in January 2009. Sully had a
powerful personal interest in the success of his efforts: he had his own life to
save as well as those of all his passengers and crew. Yet the sheer technical
virtuosity of the achievement, the evident grace under extreme pressure, the
perfection of the result, and the number of people who might well have died
in that plane that day together made out a special case of the life-saving hero:
supreme competence in near-impossible conditions.
SAVIORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Battlefields continue to be places of heroism, but not only for vanquishing
the enemy in the style of Julius Caesar and Timur the Great. The history of
the congressional Medal of Honor charts an evolution in the kind of action
deemed worthy of the US militarys highest decoration. The highest decoration doesnt require what Abraham Lincoln called the last full measure of
devotion, but exceptionally meritorious action in the course of which one
loses ones life is the norm. The Medal of Honor is not something one plausibly sets out to win. Over time, the percentage of citations that include a saving narrative has increased markedly.
Two broad narratives appear in the citations. In one, the honoree takes
heroic action that results in the death or capture of the enemy (singlehandedly charging the enemy pillboxes and engaging in hand-grenade duels to
silence the gunfire from them, for example). In the other, the honoree takes
heroic action that saves the life or lives of fellow service members (exposing
oneself to fire to retrieve a wounded comrade, for example; the limit case
is surely diving on a grenade in order to absorb the explosion, saving those
nearby). Of course, in some citations, both narratives are present.
Here is an example from World War I. It describes the extraordinary valor
of Samuel Woodfill, generally regarded as the most decorated soldier of the
war:
While he was leading his company against the enemy, his line
came under heavy machine-gun fire, which threatened to hold up
the advance. Followed by 2 soldiers at 25 yards, this officer went
out ahead of his first line toward a machine-gun nest and worked
his way around its flank, leaving the 2 soldiers in front. When he
got within 10 yards of the gun it ceased firing, and 4 of the enemy
appeared, 3 of whom were shot by 1st Lt. Woodfill. The fourth,
an officer, rushed at 1st Lt. Woodfill, who attempted to club the
officer with his rifle. After a hand-to-hand struggle, 1st Lt. Woodfill
killed the officer with his pistol. His company thereupon continued
to advance, until shortly afterwards another machine-gun nest
was encountered. Calling on his men to follow, 1st Lt. Woodfill
rushed ahead of his line in the face of heavy fire from the nest, and
when several of the enemy appeared above the nest he shot them,
capturing 3 other members of the crew and silencing the gun.
A few minutes later this officer for the third time demonstrated
conspicuous daring by charging another machine-gun position,
killing 5 men in one machine-gun pit with his rifle. He then drew
his revolver and started to jump into the pit, when 2 other gunners
only a few yards away turned their gun on him. Failing to kill them
with his revolver, he grabbed a pick lying nearby and killed both
of them. Inspired by the exceptional courage displayed by this
officer, his men pressed on to their objective under severe shell
and machine-gun fire.
And here is an example from the Afghanistan war, a posthumous citation
honoring Jared C. Monti:
Staff Sergeant Jared C. Monti distinguished himself by acts of
gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty while
serving as a team leader with Headquarters and Headquarters
Troop, 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division, in connection with combat operations against an armed enemy in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan,
on June 21, 2006. While Staff Sergeant Monti was leading a mission aimed at gathering intelligence and directing fire against the
enemy, his 16-man patrol was attacked by as many as 50 enemy
fighters. On the verge of being overrun, Staff Sergeant Monti
quickly directed his men to set up a defensive position behind a
rock formation. He then called for indirect fire support, accurately
targeting the rounds upon the enemy who had closed to within
50 meters of his position. While still directing fire, Staff Sergeant
Monti personally engaged the enemy with his rifle and a grenade,
154
PROTECTOR: A bronze firefighter stands guard along the boardwalk of Ocean

City, Maryland. The modern image of a hero includes not only those who seek
out heroism and dangerNavy SEALs, Army Rangersbut also those who
live ordinary, quiet lives until something rare and spectacular appears in their
path. At that point they choose to do what most people, including most of
those nearby, do not. [Andrea R. BakerCreative Commons]
successfully disrupting an attempt to flank his patrol. Staff

Sergeant Monti then realized that one of his soldiers was lying
wounded in the open ground between the advancing enemy and
the patrols position. With complete disregard for his own safety,
Staff Sergeant Monti twice attempted to move from behind the
cover of the rocks into the face of relentless enemy fire to rescue
his fallen comrade. Determined not to leave his soldier, Staff Sergeant Monti made a third attempt to cross open terrain through
intense enemy fire. On this final attempt, he was mortally wounded, sacrificing his own life in an effort to save his fellow soldier.
Staff Sergeant Montis selfless acts of heroism inspired his patrol
to fight off the larger enemy force. Staff Sergeant Montis immeasurable courage and uncommon valor are in keeping with the
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inte r 2016 155
highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon

himself, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron,
71st Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain
Division, and the United States Army.
It is by no means certain that more life-saving goes on on the battlefield today than took place in previous times. Nor is it clear that the actual
conduct on the battlefield meriting the nations highest honor has actually
changed. It would likely be possible, for example, to rewrite Lt. Woodfills
citation to incorporate reference to how his actions saved the lives of his
comrades. It is also certainly possible that some of the apparent increase in
the premium attached to the saving of lives in the awarding of congressional
Medals of Honor is a product of the changing character of the battlefield or
other external influences. Nevertheless, the increasing emphasis on lifesaving activity over time is so starkly apparent that it is tempting to conclude
that no one will get the congressional Medal of Honor any more simply for
exacting a price on the enemy. Absent the saving function, the chance of a
medal being awarded now seems vanishingly low.
If the military itselfindeed, the most powerful military in the world, but
notably the military of a power long steeped in the egalitarianism of modernitynow designates its highest heroes not on the basis of their infliction of
violent death on an enemy but on the saving of lives, then we have perhaps
reached the point in the
development of the modern
The Medal of Honor is not something world at which the modern,
saving form of heroism has
one plausibly sets out to win.
eclipsed the vestigial forms
of classical heroism and their slaying ways for good. This is not to say that
slaying is no longer necessary or, in the proper context, appropriate and
even worthy of praise. But the necessity of slaying is regrettable; the military
itself seems to have incorporated at least that much of the twentieth-century
critique of the pursuit of glory on the battlefield.
Life-saving is at the heart of the vignettes Newsweek included in its edition of November 12, 2012, dubbed the Heroes Issue. It was published
shortly after Hurricane Sandy devastated the New Jersey coast and as the
tempo of US operations in Afghanistan was near its peak. The magazine
offers many inspiring stories, some of them harrowing. One tells of a Coast
Guard rescue swimmer making his way through thirty-foot seas to save
a man who had fallen off a lifeboat after abandoning ship in the storm.
156
Another recreates the amazing feats of DUSTOFF 73, an Army ambulance

corps helicopter and its crew, who over forty-eight hours in Afghanistans
Valley of Death in Kunar province, amid heavy fighting on the ground in
June 2011 and difficult weather in the sky, rescued fourteen wounded Americans, recovered two bodies, and ran three resupply runs, nearly getting
killed themselves in the process.
Not all the stories in the Heroes Issue involve risk to ones own life:
some are about people called on in difficult circumstances to work tirelessly
around the clock to ensure that others get to safety. But many certainly do
entail that risk, as in
the case of members
This is not to say slaying is no longer necof Team Rubicon, a
essary or, in the proper context, approprinonprofit established
and staffed by veterans ate and even worthy of praise. But the
of Iraq and Afghaninecessity of slaying is regrettable.
stan, who mobilize to
provide relief in disaster situations. Two such members, former active-duty
Marines, took it upon themselves to round up a boat and guide it through
chest-deep flood waters to rescue a man trapped in his attic in Gerritsen
Beach, Brooklyn, after Sandy made landfall.
To risk ones life to save a stranger is to place a very high value indeed
on the life of the stranger: a value equal to if not greater than the value one
places on ones own life. You have voluntarily embraced a situation in which
the outcome may be the strangers survival and your demise, when by doing
nothing, the outcomeas certain as one can ever be about such thingsis
your survival. You are unwilling to privilege your very life over a strangers: I
submit that this is the ultimate expression of the spirit of equality.
SACRIFICING THE QUIET LIFE
The hero as slayer versus the hero as lifesaver: that is the crux of the difference between the classical and the modern form of heroism. Greatness
versus equality. Ego versus generosity. I am someone versus I can do
something for someone.
The modern world is, generally speaking, peaceable and devoted to thoroughly bourgeois pursuits. Safety, comfort, and pleasure are for most people
today as much as they want. Yet safety, comfort, and pleasure have always
been, for most people, as much as they want. The modern world differs from
the classical world chiefly in delivering those goods more broadlyindeed,
on a mass scale.
The critics of bourgeois modernity have held, contemptuously, that safety

and comfort are all there is to the modern world. The intention of the
critique that Nietzsche, Ju nger, the twentieth-century philosopher Martin
Heidegger, and others propagated was to
When youre unwilling to privilege your
preserve a vision of a
very life over a strangers, its the ultimate higher type of human
life than one organized
expression of the spirit of equality.
around pleasure and
gain. Nietzsche had his imaginary Superman. Ju nger foresaw and everso-cautiously applauded a fascist social order in which individuals would
understand and embrace their duty to sacrifice themselves for the state or
Das Volk. Heidegger sought philosophical refuge in a rejection of the Cartesian individualism of Western metaphysics and a radical confrontation with
Being.
Those who complain about the pervasiveness of individualistic egalitarianism are generally insufficiently appreciative of the readily discernible desire
of most people, most of the time, and for most all of time, for exactly this kind
of life. Machiavelli had a characteristically economical and witty way of saying the same thing: that a prince can avoid the considerable danger of being
hated by the people if he abstains from the property of his citizens and his
subjects, and from their women. Machiavelli reduces the majority of human
aspiration to the wish to be left alone: first, implicitly, from all other would-be
predators and marauders of the state of nature la Hobbes, protection from
which is the job of the prince; second, once he has established conditions of
public order, from the prince himself.
So we have a general desire on the part of most human beings for a
quiet life, not a uniquely modern desire. Politics has often, if not mostly,
thwarted this desire, but in
the modern world mostly
The tragic hero of the classical age
does not. I am prepared to
stipulate that such desire is
had a desire, ultimately futile, to rise
indeed more prevalent now
above the human.
than in the past, but thats
because so many people used to suppress itor never used to entertain it
in the first placeon the grounds that a quiet life was completely unrealistic. To a young man born in early fourteenth-century Central Asia who
decides to enjoy the marauding ways of the Golden Horde, no suburb ever
beckoned.
158
Was this latent desire corrosive, somehow working slowly over tens of centuries to create the modern world by eliminating the rule of the strong, the
divine right of kings, and hereditary aristocratic privilege? That is the story
as Nietzsche tells it, the loss of the higher possibilities of the human in a
slough of mediocrity: the presumably base desire for a forty-hour workweek,
a good cup of coffee, four hundred cable television channels, and the things
most people choose when they have the freedom to choose.
Nietzsche and many others regard our human prospects as accordingly
diminished. This claim, I submit, is wrong.
The heroic type has never been common among human beings, though
there was once a time when people routinely found themselves in situations where they would have to fight or die, and perhaps the challenge
drew out the heroic in some, even many, who would otherwise have been
content with a quiet life, were one available. In the modern world, people
are not routinely pressed into such circumstances. Yet some still seek
them out. They become Navy SEALs and Army Rangers, maybe cops and
firefighters. Or they live
ordinary, quiet lives until
something rare and specUnlike their classical counterparts,
tacular gets in their path,
life-saving heroes pose no threat to
at which time they choose
modern political order.
to do what most people,
often including most or all of those in their immediate proximity, do not:
jump in the river to try to pull a stranger out after a plane crash; charge
the cockpit once it becomes clear the hijackers plan to crash the plane into
a building.
Unlike their classical counterparts, life-saving heroes pose no threat to
modern political order. These actual individuals have achieved their greatness not for self-aggrandizement, but through helping others. Far from being
subversive, their heroic deeds have actually served to reinforce the democratic political order of the modern world, where the principle of equality has
pride of place. The great deeds heroes have performed and the great risks
they have run in order to save the lives of strangers have contributed to the
egalitarian ethos of the modern world by establishing that the modern meaning of greatness is service to others.
This hero is the firefighter rushing into the Twin Towers on 9/11. Its Lenny
Skutnik, who in 1982 leapt out of his car and jumped into the Potomac River
to pull a woman to safety after a plane crash. Its the two young Marines in
Iraq who made a split-second decision in the last moments of their lives to
open fire on a truck hurtling toward the compound where they were standing guard, thereby preventing the bomb-laden vehicle from entering before
it blew up and so saving the lives of their sleeping comrades. Its all those
willing to risk their lives to save the lives of others.
Celebrities may think adulation is their due and that special rules apply to
them. On the latter point, they may be right. But real heroes of the kind who
risk their lives for others do not demand adulation. On the contrary, like my
wifes uncle, more often than not they are quick to deny any suggestion that
there is anything special about who they are. They specifically disavow any
status of superiority as a result of their heroic deeds. As Tina Brown wrote in
her preface to the Newsweek Heroes Issue,
Dont call me a hero. That short sentencefirm, self-effacing,
nonnegotiableties together all the heroic men and women in this
issue. . . . If there is one factor that unites the American heroes
we spotlight here . . . it is their adamant refusal to be portrayed as
special.
Their reticence is itself a tacit acknowledgment that they understand the
greatness of their particular achievement; otherwise, they could talk matterof-factly about what they had done. But this taciturn self-consciousness is a
long way from the towering ambition and inner drive that gave rise to the
tragic hero of the classical agethe ultimately unsatisfiable desire to rise
above the human.
Contrary to the exhortation of Thomas Carlyle, we dont bow down to
our heroes. But in our egalitarian way, we can and do recognize our saving
heroes in a fashion that actually does evoke Carlyles everlasting adamant
to honor achievement: We award them medals and keys to the city. We give
them a round of applause. We buy them a beer.
Excerpted by permission from The Heroic Heart: Greatness Ancient and
Modern, by Tod Lindberg (Encounter Books, 2015). 2015 by Tod Lindberg. All rights reserved.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is A Memoir
of the Missile Age: One Mans Journey, by Vitaly
Leonidovich Katayev. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or
visit www.hooverpress.org.
160
H E R OI SM
Heroes and
Villains
If we start pulling down heroes who are imperfect,
we should pull them all down. History is tragedy,
and the players always human.
By Victor Davis Hanson
ome Democratic Party groups are renouncing their once-egalitarian idols, the renaissance genius Thomas Jefferson and the
populist Andrew Jackson. Both presidents, some two centuries
ago, owned slaves. Consequently, the two men have suddenly been
deemed unworthy of further liberal reverence.

In Connecticut, for instance, the state Democratic Party has removed the
two presidents names from an annual fundraiser previously known as the
Jefferson-Jackson-Bailey Dinner.
There are lots of strange paradoxes in the current frenzied liberal dissection of past sins.
One, a historic figure must be near perfect in all dimensions of his or her complex life to now pass progressive muster. That Jefferson is responsible for helping to establish many of the cherished human rights now enshrined in American life apparently cannot offset the transgression of having owned slaves.
Two, todays moral standards are always considered superior to those
of the past. Ethical sense supposedly always improves with time. However,
Victor Davis Hanson is the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution and the chair of Hoovers Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict.
would American society of 1915 have allowed a federally supported agency

such as Planned Parenthood to cut apart aborted fetuses to sell infant body
parts? Ivy League enrollment figures suggest that some of these universities
have capped the number of Asian students. Is this really much different from
the effort to curtail Jewish enrollment at Ivy League schools in the 1920s?
Three, the sins of the past were hardly all committed by racist, sexist,
conservative white men.
EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY AGGRESSOR S
Under the new morality, should we not also condemn the Aztec king Monte
zuma as a Hitler-like war criminal? No society before the Nazi Third Reich
had so carefully organized and
institutionalized the machinery of
A historic figure now has to be
mass death that each year executed
near flawless in every way to
tens of thousands of sacrificial
human captives from conquered
pass progressive muster.
neighboring tribes. Perhaps San
Diego State University should stop using the nickname Aztecs for its sports
teams, given the fact that the Aztecs practiced slave-owning, human sacrifice, and ritual cannibalism.
The Zulus are often portrayed as saintly indigenous people, brutally
colonized by rapacious British imperialists. Thats not quite the whole story.
Earlier in their pre-British history, the Zulus King Shaka adopted the sort
of military imperialism and internal police state that would have made Josef
Stalin proud. By the time of his death in 1828, Shakas army had killed more
than one million Africans through systematic imperial conquest and mass
executions.
Applying the morality of the present in crude political fashion to ferret out
the supposed race, class, and gender immorality of the past is tricky. Picking
saints and sinners can boomerang in unexpected ways.
Will Democrats now also damn Americas most openly racist president
since the preCivil War era, the liberal saint Woodrow Wilson? Wilson successfully led the United States in World War I, tried to organize a global
League of Nationsand was an unapologetic Southern racist in word and
deed. It was Wilson who fought the integration of the US military and did
his best as president of Princeton University to deny admission to talented
African-Americans. Should Princeton focus only on that disreputable aspect
of his legacy and thus change the name of its vaunted Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs?
162
Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren is worshipped as a progressive icon who

through his work on the Supreme Court helped enshrine a liberal agenda. But no
American was more responsible for incarcerating Japanese-Americans in internment camps. As Californias attorney general, Warren, in conjunction with liberal
president Franklin Roosevelt, fanned racist paranoia and stripped constitutional
rights from tens of thousands of US citizens. Should we therefore wipe away any
mention of the Warren court or Roosevelts New Deal? Or do historys liberal
sinners alone win special exemption from todays liberal witch hunters?
Should we regard civil rights advocate Malcolm X as unworthy of attention, or instead as a complex historical persona? By present ethical standards, was Malcolm more than just a convicted thief and avowed communist
who dismissed Martin Luther King Jr. as a chump, declared that he was
glad when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and talked of black superiority as he condemned whites as devils?
The architect of Planned Parenthood was the feminist family planner Margaret Sanger. Shouldnt Planned Parenthood denounce Sangers legacy, given
her eugenics agenda that deliberately sought to focus abortions on minority
communities?
CASTING THE FIRST STONE
The past is not simplistic gotcha melodrama in which we convict figures of
history by tabulating their sins on todays moral scorecards.
Instead, history is tragedy. It is complex. Moral assessments are dicey.
With some humility, we must balance past and current ethical standards, as
well as the elements of the good and the bad present in every life.
And we must avoid cheap, politicized moralizing that often tells us more
about the ethics and ignorance of todays grand inquisitors than the targets
of their inquisitions.
Reprinted by permission of Tribune Content Agency. 2015 Tribune Content Agency, Inc. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Issues on

My Mind: Strategies for the Future, by George P. Shultz.
To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.
org.
T H E COL D WAR
Long Telegram,
Long Shadow
Seventy years have passed since diplomat George
Kennan offered his penetrating advice. The
story of one of the most important documents in
American history.
By Bertrand M. Patenaude
n February 22, 1946, a very long telegram arrived at the US

State Department in Washington. Its author was George F.
Kennan, the forty-two-year-old charg daffaires at the US
embassy in Moscow. Kennans massive missive has gone down
in history as the Long Telegram, and in fact it was the longest telegram ever
sent in the history of the State Department. It sounded an alarm about what
Kennan described as the Soviet Unions innate hostility toward the West
and its expansionistic foreign policy agenda, supplying the rationale for the
doctrine of containment that would guide US foreign policy for the duration
of the Cold War. In the judgment of Henry Kissinger, George Kennan came
as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our
history.
Kennans cable was prompted by a speech delivered in Moscow two weeks
earlier by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. In that speech Stalin declared that
the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly
and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. That meant that the
Bertrand M. Patenaude is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
164
USSR, ravaged by the world war and threatened by capitalist encirclement,

was especially vulnerable to imperialist aggression, said Stalin, a situation
that called for heightened vigilance and sacrifice on the part of the Soviet
people. He called for a steep increase in industrial production in the name of
national defense. Stalins speech, known as his election speech because he
pronounced it on the eve of the elections to the Supreme Soviet, was aimed
squarely at his Soviet domestic audience and was intended to prepare the
public for hard economic times ahead. Its analysis and its rhetoric adhered
closely to the Marxist-Leninist playbook. Kennan found nothing especially
noteworthy to report about it, so he sent only a brief summary of its contents
to the State Department.
In Washington, however, officials had begun paying especially close attention to the Kremlins pronouncements, and they were not inclined to read
Stalins speech as the standard party line. Tensions had been mounting
among the former wartime allies in the months since the Potsdam Conference of JulyAugust 1945, where President Harry Truman, who had succeeded Franklin Roosevelt
three months earlier, had
his only face-to-face encoun- The State Department was predister with Stalin. By February posed to interpret Stalins speech as
1946 the most contentious
hostility toward the United States
issues were Iran, where the
and Britain.
Kremlin seemed unlikely
to evacuate its troops by the agreed deadline, and Turkey, from which the
Soviets were demanding territorial concessions and a naval base in the Dardanelles. Against that troubling backdrop, the State Departments European
desk officers were predisposed to interpret Stalins February 9 speech as a
clear indication of the new Soviet line, as one of them phrased itmeaning
a hostile Soviet approach toward the United States and Great Britain. They
decided to ask Kennan for a more elaborate analysis of the speech, a request
sent to him on February 13 over the signature of Secretary of State James F.
Byrnes.
Kennan was in charge of the Moscow embassy during the interim between
Averell Harrimans resignation as US ambassador and the arrival of Harrimans replacement, Walter Bedell Smith. At the moment the State Departments request arrived, Kennan was bedridden with a flu and sinus trouble
and was suffering from a flare-up of his ulcers. He was also burdened by a
deepening frustration with his superiors in Washington for failing to heed
his repeated warnings about the incompatibility of US and Soviet interests
and outlooks. Especially dismaying to Kennan was the ill-conceived attempt

the previous December by Secretary of State Byrnes to achieve a diplomatic
breakthrough by dealing directly with Stalin in the Kremlin. In Kennans
eyes, Byrness initiative was symptomatic of a peculiar weakness of Americas diplomacy: the belief that personal diplomacy could somehow overcome
clashing national interests. In the end Byrnes proved unable to bring Stalin
around to the US point of view on Iran and Turkey, although his Moscow visit
perpetuated the illusion of continued US-Soviet cooperation.
Two months later, when Kennan received the State Departments request
for a closer analysis of Stalins election speech, he decided to make the most
of the opportunity. Here was a case where nothing but the whole truth
would do, he wrote in his memoirs. They had asked for it. Now, by God,
they would have it. On Friday, February 22, working from rough drafts he
had composed, he dictated his prodigious text to his secretary while lying
on his back, which he said helped him think more clearly. Kennans analysis
of the sources of Soviet conduct in the world ran to more than five thousand
wordsextremely wordy by the standards of diplomatic cables. He decided
to divide his message into five sections in order that, as he later explained,
each could pass for a separate telegram and it would not look so outrageously long. All five parts were delivered to the embassys code room that
evening and from there sent by wire to the State Department.
WAKE UP, AMERICA!
Kennans telegram was unusual not only for its length but for its eloquence
and incisiveness, despite its telegraphic format, which entailed the removal
of articles and other nonessential words. Kennans vital point was that the
Soviet Union was not a normal power with which the West could conduct
traditional diplomatic relations. Its leaders viewed the outside world with a
paranoia that made them incapable of pursuing international cooperation.
At bottom of Kremlins neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and
instinctive Russian sense of insecurity, Kennan wrote. Since 1917, the Kremlin viewed the outside world through the prism of Marxism-Leninism, which
preached the incompatibility of communist and capitalist states. This ideology became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks,
even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. And now, in the
postwar era, Marxism-Leninisms honeyed promises to a desperate and war
torn outside world made it more dangerous and insidious than ever before.
Moscows death struggle against Hitlers Germany had made collaboration with its Western allies imperative. But the notion that the wartime
166
RENDEZVOUS AT POTSDAM: President Harry Truman and Soviet leader

Josef Stalin meet for the first time on July 17, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference.
In the front row are Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Truman, and Stalin. The conference laid out
new borders and four occupation zones for defeated Germany and addressed
such matters as reparations, war criminals, demilitarization, and population
exchanges. When this photo was taken, Truman had been informed just a day
earlier of the first US atomic bomb test. [Hoover Institution ArchivesEdward Ellis
Smith Papers]
cooperation of the grand alliance could continue in peacetime was dangerously naive, Kennan advised. Soviet leaders have learned to seek security
only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never
in compacts and compromises with it, he warned. It was high time to face
up to the reality that we have here a political force committed fanatically
to the belief that with [the] US there can be no permanent modus vivendi,
that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority

of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.
Kennan was not saying that military conflict with the Soviet Union was
inevitable. Unlike Hitlers regime, he observed, Soviet power was neither
schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take
unnecessary risks. Impervious to the logic of reason, it is highly sensitive to
the logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdrawand usually does
when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has
sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.
Here were the outlines of the doctrine of the containment of Soviet expansionismalthough Kennan did not use that word in his telegram, which was
notably short on specific policy prescriptions. Kennans analysis, and his
name, would become identified with that term after the appearance in the
July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs of his article The Sources of Soviet Conduct, which he published anonymously as X. (The authors identity was
quickly revealed, leading Kennan to be nicknamed Mr. X.) That article prescribed a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies.
NOT SUBJECT TO CONDENSATION
The arrival in Washington of the Long Telegramidentified as Kennans
511, its place in the State Departments sequential numbering system for
telegraphic communicationsset the political elite abuzz. Its effect was
magnified, as the State Departments Eugene V. Rostow later recalled,
because its somewhat fevered prose was read on the pink cable forms which
usually transmitted terse,
professional messages. H.
Freeman Doc Matthews,
In Kennans eyes, American diplodirector of the Office of
macy had a peculiar weakness: the
European Affairs at the
belief that personal diplomacy could
State Departmentwhose
somehow overcome clashing nationidea it had been to ask
al interests.
Kennan for a more elaborate assessment of Stalins
speechwas delighted with the result, cabling Kennan to tell him that his 511
was magnificent. I cannot overestimate its importance to those of us here
struggling with the problem. Heartiest congratulations and best wishes.
Ambassador Harriman, now in Washington, passed along a copy of Kennans
telegram to James Forrestal, secretary of the Navy (at the time a cabinet-level
168
WARNING: George Kennan was charg daffaires of the US embassy in Moscow when the State Department asked him to analyze a speech by Soviet
leader Josef Stalin. Kennan replied in what came to be known as his Long
Telegram on February 22, 1946, a report that had great influence on US policy
toward the Soviets and the course of the Cold War. He warned of the dangers
of American diplomats placing too much weight on gestures of good will
and conciliation toward a Soviet Union constitutionally incapable of being
conciliated. [NewscomEverett Collection]
post), along with a cover note saying it was well worth reading. Forrestal
decided it was must-reading, so he arranged for it to be mimeographed and
distributed to President Truman, the other members of Trumans cabinet,
and senior US military officers. Deborah Welch Larson, in her book Origins of
Containment, records that the State Department aide charged with preparing
a summary of incoming cables for Secretary of State Byrnes gave him a copy
of the entire telegram with the note: This telegram from George Kennan in
Moscow is not subject to condensation. You will wish to read it in full.
Kennans 511 catalyzed the new thinking taking shape in Washington
regarding the fitness of the Soviet Union. as a partner in peacetime. Kennan
understood that his telegram was well timed: Six months earlier this message would probably have been received in the Department of State with
raised eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would
probably have sounded
redundant, a sort of preaching to the convinced. At the Here was a case where nothing but
the whole truth would do, Kennan
moment it arrived, Byrnes
was preparing a speech
wrote in his memoirs. They had
that would reflect the tough
asked for it. Now, by God, they would
new US attitude toward the
have it.
Soviet Union, remarks he
was to deliver at the Overseas Press Club on February 28. Byrness speech
was already mostly written, but Kennans telegram confirmed the advisability of leaving in its most bracing passages about the unacceptability of Soviet
intimidation tactics.
The hardening US line seemed vindicated when the Soviet Union not only
failed to meet the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal of its forces from
northern Iran (as the British had done), but was reportedly advancing its
troops southward toward Tehran. Iran was the first crisis to confront the
fledgling United Nations, and it would serve as the first occasion for Soviet
diplomats, led by Andrei Gromyko, to walk out of the Security Council in
protest of its refusal to postpone deliberations on the Iran issue.
THE GERMAN QUESTION
Not all US foreign policy officials were ready to hop aboard Kennans 511,
however, certainly not the men in Berlin who were trying to negotiate an
arrangement for the centralized administration of Germany across the four
occupation zonesUS, Soviet, British, and Frenchas had been agreed
at Potsdam. The US military governor of Germany was General Joseph
LAID LOW: A photo of Potsdamer Platz in Berlin suggests the devastation
the victorious Allies saw as they met in summer 1945 to determine Germanys postwar course. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, whose collected
papers are housed at Hoover, would write to Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal from Berlin the following spring: I am not entirely depressed over
central European possibilities. We have come through this winter better
than I had hoped. Notwithstanding a skimpy diet, absence of heating, and
deplorable housing conditions, the German people have struggled through
in better condition than I had imagined they would. [Hoover Institution Archives
German Pictorial Collection]
T. McNarney, but he delegated the handling of German affairs to General

Lucius Clay, his deputy. Clay worked closely with his civilian counterpart,
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, US political adviser on German affairs. Clay
and Murphy saw eye to eye on most things, and when it came to recent diplomatic developments in Berlin, they did not like what they saw.
Murphy summarized the situation in a letter to the State Department on
February 24, 1946, two days after Kennan had sent his Long Telegram, of
which Murphy was as yet unaware. He expressed his and Clays mounting
frustration with the slow progress that had been achieved on realizing the
Potsdam principles. The chief obstacle, as the two men saw it, was not the
Soviets but the French. Not only were the French dragging their feet on the
establishment of centralized agencies to administer Germany; they were
further complicating matters by making territorial demands on Germany,
seeking to possess the Saar, internationalize the Ruhr, and make the Rhineland independent. French officials maintained that their actions were based
not only on fear of future German aggression, Murphy reported, but equally,
if not more, on fear that the United States will lose interest, eventually withdraw from Germany, and that some fine morning they will wake up and find
themselves face to face with the Russians on the Rhine. Murphy expressed
some sympathy for the French view, but he complained that their intransigence was playing into the Kremlins hands, enabling it to pose as the champion of a united Germany whose only salvation lies in close affiliation with
the Soviet Union. Murphy
and Clay felt strongly that
Soviet power was impervious to the Washington ought to bring
logic of reason but highly sensitive diplomatic pressure to bear
on the French government
to the logic of force.
to break the impasse.
In Washington, Murphys report was relayed to Moscow for George
Kennans opinion. The result was the analysis of the Long Telegram as it
applied to Germany. In it, Kennan expressed agreement with Murphy that
the Soviets were eager to be seen as champions of a unified Germany, but
he doubted that for the time being they were genuinely keen to see progress
on the formation of centralized German agencies. As far as we can judge
from here, they were happy to have several months in which to exercise a
completely free hand in their own zone . . . to establish firm foundations for
Communist political control. The Kremlin viewed the agencies as a possibly
indispensable device for Sovietizing the three other zones of occupation at
an appropriate moment. Until that moment arrived, however, the Soviets
172
TAKING STOCK: Allied officials gather in front of the new Allied headquarters
in Berlin in August 1945 after the first meeting of the Allied Control Council.
Left to right: Soviet General Vasily Sokolovsky, US Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, French General Marie-Pierre Knig,
and Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Semyonov. [Hoover Institution ArchivesRobert D.
Murphy Papers]
did not wish to openly oppose the idea of centralized agencies, so Frances
obstructionism served Moscow as a perfect solution.
As for the French territorial claims on Germany, Kennan believed that the
source of the problem was the American and British assent, at Potsdam, to
the Oder-Neisse Line as Germanys revised eastern boundary. The transfer
of a sizable chunk of eastern Germany to Poland, aside from strengthening French claims in western Germany, left the new, truncated Germany
seriously crippled and unbalanced economically, and psychologically
extensively dependent in first instance on the great land power to the east
which controls or holds great food producing areas so necessary to German
economy. Unifying Germany within these redrawn borders would leave it

nominally united but extensively vulnerable to Soviet political penetration
and influence. The better alternative, Kennan believed, would be to carry
to its logical conclusion the process of partition which was begun in the east
and to endeavor to rescue western zones of Germany by walling them off
against eastern penetration and integrating them into international pattern
of western Europe rather than into a united Germany. Kennan was advocating a shift from European-wide engagement with the Soviets to the creation
of spheres of influence, although he did not use that phrase in his report.
THE VIEW FROM BERLIN
Kennans recommendation for how to resolve the German question was very
much at odds with the thinking of Americas diplomats and warriors in Berlin
in the winter of 1946a fact illustrated by a fascinating exchange of letters
between the State Departments Doc Matthews and Ambassador Robert
Murphy, whose papers are housed in the Hoover Archives. Matthews initiated the exchange with a letter, dated March 12, alerting Murphy to the arrival
in General McNarneys office of Kennans Long Telegram: It constitutes to
my mind the finest piece of analytical writing that I have ever seen come out
of the Service. Its distribution was limited, Matthews indicated, because
it contained a lot of raw meat. He characterized the present moment as a
definite turning point in relations with the Soviets, with a showdown over
Iran looming, and added that everyone here takes an extremely serious view
of the present situation.
This changing perception of relations with the Soviet Union, Matthews
informed Murphy, meant that the United States would have to rethink its
policy toward Germany. That policy still bore the stamp of the 1944 Morgenthau Plan, named for thensecretary of the treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr.,
which aimed to deindustrialize Germany. Germans in the American zone
were prohibited from producing more iron and steel than was minimally
required for domestic consumption, and employers were forbidden from
PROBLEMS OF PEACE: In this photo, General Dwight D. Eisenhower stands
next to General Lucius D. Clay, deputy US military governor in Germany, in
1946. Clay handled German affairs for the military governor and worked
closely with his civilian counterpart, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy. Clay and
Murphy grew increasingly frustrated that the Potsdam principles were being
stymied but initially they pinned the blame on the French, not the Soviets.
[Hoover Institution ArchivesRobert D. Murphy Papers]
hiring as executives or skilled workers Germans who had been more than
nominal members of the National Socialist Party. Washingtons new attitude
toward Moscow, however, meant that the top priority was the present Soviet
threat, not a potential German one.
By the time Murphy responded to Matthews, on April 3, the Soviets had
withdrawn their troops from Iran, which seems to have encouraged Murphy
to think that Matthewss (and thus Kennans) alarm about a Soviet threat had
eased. He began by congratulating Matthews for having prompted Kennans
telegramI think that you deserve a large bouquet of orchids for having
engineered this processyet he revealed that Generals McNarney and Clay
had reacted negatively to it.
General McNarney commented with a shrug of his shoulders that after
all the telegram didnt offer anything new and that most of us have been
conscious of these facts for a long time, Murphy reported. Clays reaction was quite different and also pretty violent. The Departments action
in sending the telegram
to General McNarney and
The battle lines of the Cold War hard- the other Army Commandened within a divided Germany and a ers he viewed as a sort of
Pearl Harbor warning . . .
divided Berlin. That, as Kennan had
designed to protect itself
advocated, was the best outcome
against an eventuality. To
under the circumstances.
characterize any reaction of
the hypersensitive and mercurial Clay as pretty violent meant there was
nothing at all pretty about it. Clay, like Murphy, felt that if a showdown were
to take place in Europe, it ought to happen not with the Soviets, who had
been meticulous in their observance of the several principles of [the] Potsdam Agreement, but with the French, who were trying to sabotage the
Potsdam accord. British officials in Berlin shared the French distrust of the
Soviets and their lack of faith in the four-power cooperative management of
Germany, and Clay suspected that Kennans telegram reflected the influence
of the British line.
One feature of US-Soviet cooperation in Berlin that Murphy chose to
emphasize in his letter was the congenial personal relations between American officials and their Soviet counterparts. General Dwight Eisenhower and
Marshal Georgy Zhukov had set the tone at the start by establishing a friendly relationship, Murphy testified. Since then, Soviet officials had consistently
expressed a sincere desire to be friendly with us. . . . I leave it to George Kennan, of course, to place the proper evaluation on a personal contact of this
176
kind. I note that he disparages the importance of such personal contacts. As

for the idea that the Soviets might resort to the use of military force, I would
like to make it quite clear that in our local innocence, we have never and still
do not believe for a minute in imminent Soviet aggression.
Murphys letter disturbed Matthews, who responded on April 18 with a
friendly but firm follow-up on the subject of the famous no. 511. Whatever harmony might prevail among individual soldiers and diplomats
in Berlin, Matthews explained (channeling Kennan), the essential fact
of relations between Russia and the West was a fundamental clash of
worldviews.
While I know that your account of relations with the Soviets in Berlin is
accurate, you get an entirely distorted picture if you attempt to draw general conclusions from it. It was fine for Soviet military officers to express
a desire to cooperate with the United States, but the fact is, the generals
have nothing to do with Soviet policy. As for the prospect of Soviet military aggression, No one here thinks for a moment that the Soviets want
war with us at this time. It is, however, basic doctrine in the Kremlin that
the Soviet and non-Soviet systems cannot exist in this world side by side.
In this letter, Matthews twice used the term Iron Curtain, echoing the
historic speech given by former prime minister Winston Churchill in Fulton,
Missouri, on March 5. In that speech, Churchill stated publicly what was so
far being said only privately among American officials in Washington. In his
memorably dramatic formulation, From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in
the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Although
Truman was careful to distance himself from Churchills bluntly anti-Soviet
message out of concern it would prove to be unpopular with the American
public, Matthewss letter demonstrates that Iron Curtain quickly became
part of official Washingtons vocabulary.
RETREAT FROM POTSDAM
By now Kennan was on a roll, pressing his point about the Kremlins expansionist aims and duplicitous methods. He left Moscow for Washington, stopping in Berlin, where he met with Murphy on April 29 before continuing on
to Paris. From there he wrote to one of Murphys aides, as if to drive home a
point raised in their Berlin conversation, I think that we must declare our
independence of the Potsdam agreement. And indeed, with respect to plans
for the four-power administration of Germany, a US retreat from Potsdam
was well under way. Ambassador Murphy and General Clay soon joined the
exodus. Faced with the prospect of another desperate winter in Europe, they
came to share Kennans apprehension about the allure of Moscows honeyed

promises to Europes destitute people and its aspiration to dominate a united Germany. They would soon begin to advocate the fusion of the American
and British zones of occupation in Germany, the first step in the creation of a
separate West German state, whose founding was still three years away.
A speech that Secretary
of State James Byrnes
delivered on September
In later years, Kennan came to abhor
what he felt was an overemphasis on 6, 1946, in Stuttgart, seat
of the Council of Ministercontainments military dimension
Presidents of the American
and its application in places such as
occupation zone, announced
Vietnam.
a historic shift in Washingtons approach to Germany.
The speech was carefully staged, with Senators Arthur Vandenberg and
Tom Connally, the senior foreign policy leaders of the two major US political parties, seated on stage behind Byrnes to project an image of national
consensus.
The American people want to return the government of Germany to the
people of Germany, Byrnes declared. The American people want to help the
German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free
and peace-loving nations of the world. Byrness tone reflected the American
governments new sense of realism about the possibilities in Central Europe:
We favor the economic unification of Germany. If complete unification cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum
possible unification. Europes economic revival, said Byrnes, will be slow
indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a
poorhouse.
It was now time to allow Germany to move forward, to stop treating it as
a nation on parole, a hostage to its Nazi past. It is the view of the American
government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper
safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of
their own affairs. It is easy to understand why Germans embraced Byrness
address as the Speech of Hope.
KENNANS MISGIVINGS
The Soviet Union and the United States would continue to call for a reunified
Germany jointly administered by the four occupation powers, but the battle
lines of the Cold War were now hardening within the borders of a divided
178
UPON FURTHER REFLECTION: Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1966, former ambassador Kennan recommends
that the United States do everything possible to avoid further escalation of
the war in Vietnam. Kennan, seen as the godfather of containment, came to
abhor what he felt was an overemphasis on the doctrines military dimension
and considered its application in places such as Vietnam inappropriate. I
emphatically deny the paternity of any efforts to invoke that doctrine today in
situations to which it has, and can have, no proper relevance, Kennan wrote in
1967, with the Vietnam War escalating. [ Bettmann/Corbis/Associated Press]
Germany and a divided Berlin. That is what Kennan had been advocating as
the best possible outcome under the circumstances. Yet before long, he began
to have doubts about US policies premised on the analysis he had provided in
his Long Telegram.
Indeed, at a certain point Kennan seems to have come to regard his message as a runaway train. By 1949, as director of the State Departments Policy
Planning Staff, he was advocating a renewed US push for a comprehensive
settlement of the German question. He opposed the establishment of a West
German state, hoping to prevent the Iron Curtain from becoming a permanent fixture on the map of Europe. In an ironic twist, Murphy and Clay had
by then become staunch advocates of spheres of influence in Europe. Their
nemesis at the State Department was Kennan, whom they now considered
dangerously naive about the nature of the Soviet threat and seriously out of
touch with German affairs, which caused him to underestimate how much
Germans feared the Russians. Kennan is all theory, Clay complained.
Kennan played a central role in designing the Marshall Plan with the goal
of stimulating Europes economic recovery, but he was against the Truman
Doctrine, announced in March 1947, which he felt was an overcommitment
of American resources. In the coming decades, he continued to be hailed as
Mr. X, the author of the doctrine of containment, yet as biographer John
Lewis Gaddis recounts, after 1947 he could never regard the doctrine with
which he was credited as his own. He came to abhor what he felt was an
overemphasis on containments military dimension and its inappropriate
application in places such as Vietnam. I emphatically deny the paternity
of any efforts to invoke that doctrine today in situations to which it has, and
can have, no proper relevance, Kennan wrote in 1967, with the Vietnam War
escalating.
Kennan never relented. Even after the Cold War had ended and the Soviet
Union was itself history, Gaddis relates, Kennan regarded the success
of his strategy as a failure because it had taken so long to produce results,
because the costs had been so high, and because the United States and its
Western European allies had demanded, in the end, unconditional surrender. On one occasion he described the outcome of the Cold War as one of
the great disappointments of my life. Yet despite Kennans displeasure with
his role in the origins of containment, most students of the Cold War would
endorse the assessment of French political philosopher Raymond Aron,
echoing Churchill, that it was his finest hour.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Nuclear

Security: The Problems and the Road Ahead, by
George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, Henry A. Kissinger,
and Sam Nunn. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
180
HISTORY A N D C ULT UR E
Sakharov and the

Moral Imperative
The truth is never simple, said the celebrated
Soviet dissident. His was indeed a complex life in
complicated times.
By Serge Schmemann
s Andrei Sakharov himself said so often, the truth is never

simple. Neither is legacy. Certainly there was no one like him
in the dissident movement, no one who rose to such exalted
heights and was so prepared to lose everything in support of
human rights; nobody who had his combination of activism and modesty,
boldness and shyness.
His very existence was something of a miracle. A descendant of priests and
military officers, he was born to that genteel class of Russian intellectuals
and professionals known as the intelligentsia, which through Russian history produced revolutionaries, poets, and scientists convinced that the most
important thing was to do something useful.
Much of the old intelligentsia fled after the Russian Revolution. Many of
those who survived were caught up in the purges; and if they survived that,
there was the war.
Sakharov survived, and his genius found him a place in the machinery created by Josef Stalin and Lavrenty Beria to ensure Soviet military might. The
Serge Schmemann is a member of the editorial board of the New York Times
and its former Moscow bureau chief.
state needed scientists, and the masters understood that science required
not only coercion and threat but also independence and intellectual freedom.
The solution was to seal the scientists in a gilded cage, isolate them in
installations closed not only to foreigners but to most Soviet citizens, give
them the highest level of privilege and equipment, and make clear that all
this was conditional on producing what the state required.
Sakharov was a willing member of that system, convinced like so many
scientists of the era that they were soldiers on the front lines of a global
struggle which required sacrifice and suffering. He never repudiated or
regretted creating a weapon of unimaginable power, believing that only a
balance of power would prevent its use. His embrace of human rights did not
come through a sudden conversion. Scrupulously honest, and almost naive in
his understanding of politics and power, he came to it in stages. Let me give
you a brief chronology of the metamorphosis.
First came his concern about the radioactive fallout from atmospheric testing. But in those years, in the 1950s, the concerns were still new, and raising
them was possible within the scientific and political elite. These were issues
Sakharov could take up directly with Nikita Khrushchev, even though he was
at times rebuffed and put in his place for meddling in politics.
Then came the Academy of Science elections in 1964 at which Sakharov
openly spoke out against accepting an ally of the pseudoscientist Trofim
Lysenko. The Academy of Science, in fact, was probably the closest to a
democratic institution in the Soviet state, where full members could still vote
to reject a candidate pushed by the Kremlin. So far, Sakharovs activities
were still within the bounds of permissible debate for someone of his standing in the elite. Yet as Sakharov noted in his Memoirs, the academy vote, like
the struggle against atmospheric testing, marked another step on the way to
becoming active in civic affairs.
The turning point for Sakharov, as for the entire Soviet dissident movement, came in the mid-1960s. These were years in which Sakharov signed a
petition against the rehabilitation of Josef Stalin, followed by a letter against
the enactment of the law against defaming the Soviet state, which became
WITNESS: Physicist and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov arrives at the
Kremlin in May 1989. Sakharov became known worldwide as a symbol of nonviolent opposition in the tradition of Nelson Mandela or Mohandas Gandhi. Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner, were a beacon of hope for thousands caught up in
the arbitrary injustice of totalitarianism. [Boris YurchenkoAssociated Press]
182
the basis for the prosecution of many dissidents, followed by a decision to

join in a demonstration on Pushkin Square on Constitution Day.
What is amazing to realize now is that in those years, Sakharov had such
high rank that he could pick up a special phone and directly call the KGB
chief, Yuri Andropov, as he did in 1967 to seek the release of the writers
Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel.
Step by step, Sakharov developed what he described as a growing compulsion to speak out on the fundamental issues of the age. Finally, in 1968that
remarkable year of social rebellion the world roundSakharov took the
decisive step of putting his
thoughts on paper in the
Sakharov had only to appear at a dis- milestone essay, Reflecsidents trial to undermine the elabo- tions on Progress, Peaceful
rately concocted accusations.
Coexistence, and Intellectual
Freedom. The work coincided with a turning point in the development of the dissident movement,
the Prague Spring of 1968, the rise and spectacular fall of socialism with a
human face.
A FORM OF UNOBTRUSIVE HEROISM
Reflections defined the direction Sakharovs activism would take from that
point. For the epigraph, Sakharov chose a line from Goethe: He alone is
worthy of life and freedom / Who each day does battle for them anew.
It was not a call to arms; Sakharov did not declare that struggle and heroic
exploits are ends in themselves. They are worthwhile, he wrote, only insofar
as they enable other people to lead normal, peaceful lives.
The meaning of life is life itself, he continued, that daily routine which
demands its own form of unobtrusive heroism.
From this moment on, Sakharovs life moved inexorably toward the recognition of the central importance of openness, justice, and human rights in
shaping a normal life. The essay
also introduced Sakharov to the
When the Soviet state collapsed, West. As his activism gathered
pace, he was often perceived by
Sakharov did not pause to
the outside world as a Russian
celebrate or gloat.
Don Quixote, a tousled, retiring
intellectual who had built a doomsday weapon and was now tilting at the
windmills of an all-powerful state. But his friends saw a different Sakharov
a brilliant, profound, and courageous thinker who, in his purity of vision,
184
posed a fundamental challenge to the state simply by calling evil by its name
and demanding that the state abide by its own laws.
After he met and married Elena Bonner, who so effectively complemented his stature and intellect with her experience in resistance and activism,
the Sakharovs became a beacon of hope for thousands of people caught
up in the arbitrary injustice of totalitarianism. They also became a clearinghouse of information to the outside world. It was enough for Sakharov
to appear at the trial of a dissident and to speak to Western reporters to
undermine the elaborately concocted accusations. And it was through
Sakharov and Bonner that much of the information about the plight of
Jews, Tatars, Germans, Russians, believers, and others came to the attention of the world.
It was inevitable that the state would finally act; and, in the end, the great
scientist who once had the power to call Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andro
pov on their direct lines
was sent into internal exile
Sakharov didnt like the word dissiin an apartment in Gorky,
dent. The human rights movement
isolated and monitored day
and night.
tried not to challenge the system but
In exile he became an
to compel the Soviet Union to live by
even more powerful force,
its own rules.
a symbol of nonviolent
opposition in the tradition of Nelson Mandela or Mohandas Gandhi. But it is
important to note that his power was never in some ideology or teachings,
not in something that disciples would call Sakharovism, like the moral teachings of Tolstoyism or the Holy Russia of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. His power
was in his example, his moral purity, his openness.
Sakharov didnt even like the word dissident, probably because the
thrust of the human rights movement was to compel the Soviet Union to live
by its own rules, not to challenge the system or change it. When the human
rights movement first gained momentum, the term Russians used was
pravozashchitniki, defenders of the law, or inakomyslyashchie, which literally
means those who think differently. The West began referring to them as
dissidents and, in the Russian pronunciation, the word came into general
Russian usage.
NO HOLY FOOL
I have found him variously described as naive, saintly, shy, diffident; to some,
he was akin to that Russian character known as yurodivyi, the holy fool who
WRITING ON THE WALL: A fragment of the Berlin Wall bears an image of the
famed Soviet dissident painted by Russian artist Dmitri Vrubel, along with the
phrase Thank you, Andrei Sakharov. [Joachim F. ThurnCreative Commons]
speaks truth to power; to others he was the consummate scientist, applying

the rigorous discipline of scientific inquiry to politics and human rights.
By all accounts, Sakharov was not easy to work withpeople who
dealt with him found him stubborn and uncompromising. Sakharov was
indeed shy and uncomfortable in social settings, but he certainly did not
avoid confrontations, pushing his way into a courtroom packed with KGB
plants where a dissident was about to be tried. For those who see Sakharov as a meek, retiring, and compassionate genius in the mold of Fyodor
Dostoyevskys Prince Myshkin, Id like to recall one incredible incident he
describes in his Memoirs.
Without any advance warning, Sakharov is paid a surprise visit in Gorky
by Nikolai Yakovlev, one of the sleazy, corrupted writers used by the KGB to
slander its targets. Yakovlev had written an especially foul book attacking
Sakharov and making vile anti-Semitic insinuations about his wife, Elena
Bonner, yet here he comes and offers to interview Sakharov.
Heres how Sakharov describes what happens next: Id realized right away
that I was going to end up hitting him. And sure enough, Sakharov abruptly
interrupts the conversation and says
186
Id rather take care of this matter by slapping you. I dodged

around the table. He flinched and avoided the blow, but I surprised
him with an unexpected left-handed slap on his flabby cheek.
Now get out of here, I yelled, pushing the door open.
I love to imagine that scene: so much for the passive holy fool.
Theres another passage near the end of the Memoirs that has long
intrigued me. It is about that extraordinary phone call from Mikhail Gorbachev on December 16, 1986. Sakharov has been in exile in Gorky for almost
seven years, without a telephone and largely isolated from any contacts, and
suddenly a pair of technicians come in at night and hook up a phone and tell
him to expect a call in the morning.
Hello, this is Gorbachev speaking.
Hello, Im listening.
Gorbachev then tells Sakharov that his trials are over, that he and Lyusia
the name he and most everyone used for Elena Bonnercan come home to
Moscow. So what does Sakharov do? He starts talking to Gorbachev about
the recent death of the dissident Anatoly Marchenko in prison; he starts
demanding that Gorbachev release all prisoners of conscience. It is a remarkable image of Sakharov, instinctively putting the interests of others ahead of
his own at a moment of supreme triumph.
But was it a triumph? The sad truth is that the collapse of the Soviet state,
which seemed to vindicate
everything the dissidents
fought for, did not lead to
Sakharov never repudiated or regretthe democratic state they
ted creating a weapon of unimagipresumed would follow.
nable power. Only a balance of power
Would he be disapwould prevent its use, he believed.
pointed? Probably so, but
I dont think thats the sort
of category he worked in. His approach was to act on what needed to be
changed and reformed and not to succumb to dismay, disappointment, or
despair.
Sakharov would be ninety-four now, and I presume he would be enormously active, writing letters and statements about Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova,
and on behalf of Sergei Guriev, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, gay people, or the
late Sergei Magnitsky. He certainly did not pause to celebrate or gloat when
the Soviet state collapsed. He died on December 14, 1989, while working on a
speech about the rights of suspects in criminal cases. Those were years of a
huge upsurge in violent crime in Russia and, typically, Sakharov was thinking
to the end about the rights of individuals.
He told Lyusia he was going to take a nap, but when she went into his room
later he had passed away.
It was in a clash with Alexander Solzhenitsyn that Sakharov provided what
I think is the best description of himself and his legacy. Im no politician, no
prophet, and certainly no
angel, he wrote. What Ive
When Mikhail Gorbachev phoned
done and what I am are not
Sakharov in his exile, the scientist
the result of any miracle but
the natural consequences of
immediately demanded Gorbachev
what life has made me. . . . It
release all prisoners of conscience.
may be a peculiarity of my
character, but Ive never
lived in luxury, and Im not even sure what it is. . . . As I never tire of repeating, life is a complicated thing.
Most important, he concluded, I have tried to be true to myself and my
destiny.
That is Sakharovs real legacy: his honesty, his greatness, his genius, his
integrity, his compassion for individuals.
Adapted from Andrei Sakharov: The Conscience of Humanity, edited by
Sidney D. Drell and George P. Shultz (Hoover Institution Press, 2015).
2015 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Andrei

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188
H OOVE R A R C H I VE S
War Is . . . Soccer?
Historic posters show how World War I
combatants wove the beautiful game into images,
and memories, of a far-from-beautiful war.
By Jean McElwee Cannon
o many, last summers victory by the US womens soccer team

during the World Cup final meant soccer had finally arrived
the reported 26.7 million viewers who tuned in to the game
in the United States set a record for any soccer game, mens
or womens, ever broadcast to Americans. But soccer in fact arrived on

US shores long ago, rooted in American military operations overseas and
the blending of cultures that occurs when soldiers are stationed abroad.
The wide-ranging poster archive at the Hoover Institution illuminates the
period when soccer began its long rise in popularity among Americans. It
was almost a century ago, and America had joined the First World War.
Soccer clearly has an international appeal in a globalizing age: the Fdration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the governing body of
association football and the World Cup, includes teams from every continent
except Antarctica. The number of viewers who watched the US team beat
Japan 52 last summer proves, argued the New York Times, that although the
American public may traditionally be thought partial to American football,
baseball, and basketball, the US population, both literally and figuratively,
increasingly seems tuned in to soccer.
Jean McElwee Cannon is the assistant archivist for communications and outreach at the Hoover Institution.
At the beginning of the Cold War, American soldiers stationed in Germany, a

nation that has dominated international FIFA competitions since the federations
beginning, sought to earn the goodwill of the population by organizing teams and
tournaments with local citizens. Contemporary sports journalists understandably focus on these German-American ties that emerged during and after the
Cold War. Four of the twenty-three players on the 2014 US mens World Cup
team, for instance, had German mothers and American fathers and learned the
game during childhoods spent on military bases in West Germany. Well-known
players such as Jermaine Jones, Thomas Dooley, and Terrence Boyd, as sons of
American servicemen and dual citizens, were eligible to play for the US Mens
National Team despite having spent much of their time living and playing professionally in Germany. To add to the cross-cultural mode of modern soccer, the US
Mens National Teams coach, Jrgen Klinsmann, is a German who, before managing the US team, had played with and coached the German National Team.
THE SIGNAL TO ADVANCE
In a previous era, American doughboys arrived in France in 1917 with a
penchant for baseball and American football (sports largely unknown to
European troops); once there, they soon found that their British and French
alliesnot to mention their German enemies across no mans landconsidered soccer to have wide transnational appeal in Europe.
One of the most mythologized moments of the First World War (though its
historical validity continues to be questioned) is the halt in hostilities and the
playing of an impromptu soccer game among British and German servicemen during the Christmas truce of 1914. Popular representations of the
Christmas truce commonly treat it as one of the few moments of humanity
and goodwill to emerge from the industrialized battlefields of the Western
Front, with the soldiers romanticized football match emerging as a friendly
meeting of infantrymen briefly relieved of nationalist hostility.
Regardless of the historical veracity of the story of the 1914 soccer match,
it is clear from the diaries of servicemen on the Western Front that for
A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN: A British poster overflows with sports language in
urging would-be recruits to stop the Axis powers and their foul play. The Die
Hards were the most famous of the Football Battalions formed by soccer players who were spurred to fight. Reporters at a 1915 soccer championship had
pointed out the contrast between safe, well-paid athletes and their countrymen who were risking their lives far from home. [Hoover Institution ArchivesHistoric Poster Collection]
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inter 2016 191
almost all belligerent nations soccer was considered a welcome distraction

from combat (when matches were not shelled by the enemy) and soccer balls
were prized items when they arrived in care packages. Private L. S. Price of
the 8th Royal Surrey Regiment reported that on the first day of the Battle
of the Somme he noticed an infantryman emerge from the parapet and, as
he did, he kicked off a football: a good kick, the ball rose and traveled well
toward the German line. That seemed to be the signal to advance.
Although the game of soccer certainly had physical and restorative values
for troops on the front lines, the political posters in Hoovers collections suggest that during 191418 sports in general, and soccer in particular, were used
as recruiting tools and ways to reinforce, not transcend, nationalist ideologies. In one poster, the war is somewhat sarcastically billed as an enormous
soccer match between Great Britain and its allies and Germany and its allies;
America, not privy to the rules of European soccer or warfare, is cast as a
refereea reference, perhaps, to President Wilsons refusal to join the war
and his frequent habit of commenting on it at a wide remove.
Other posters, embracing a metaphor that would later be ironized by
war poets such as Isaac Rosenberg (who in his poem Break of Day in the
Trenches referred to the dead in no mans land as haughty athletes), align
the football field with the field of honorthat is, the battlefield. Repeatedly, the field of honor, where death could be the deciding factor in victory, is
suggested as an elevated form of the public school soccer field. One poster,
encouraging British recruits to Play the Greater Game, quotes a German
newspaper that purportedly remarked that Young Britons prefer to exercise
their long limbs on the football ground rather than to expose them to any
sort of risk in the service of their country. By enlisting, the poster suggests,
young recruits can choose serious action over idle sport.
A HIGH MORAL TONE
The high moral tone of these recruiting posters communicates a change in
attitude toward professional sport brought about by the outbreak of war and
the interruption of leisure that it introduced. In England the 1915 National
CHALLENGE ACCEPTED: A British poster quotes a German newspaper that
mocked British youth for preferring to play soccer rather than fight for their
country. In a trench are British troops awaiting their reinforcements from the
playing fields. This poster was among many that played off the idea of shifting ritualized combat from the athletic fields to the real-world violence of the
greater game. [Hoover Institution ArchivesHistoric Poster Collection]
192
MONEY OR HONOR?: The October 21, 1914, cover of the British satirical magazine Punch shows Mr. Punch admonishing a soccer player for neglecting
his duties on another field, that of honor. Once at the front, combatants from
almost all the belligerent nations considered soccer a welcome distraction
from the fighting. American soldiers, too, developed an interest in soccer from
their deployment in the Great War, and brought that interest home. [Hoover Institution ArchivesHistoric Poster Collection]
Football Association championship was dubbed the Khaki Cup due to the
large number of servicemen in the crowd. After the match, journalists commented on the incongruity of idolizing professional athletes while common
infantrymen fought for king and country on the war-torn battlefields of
France. Bowing to public pressure, Englands national football association
suspended professional competition for the duration of the war, and many
of the players enlisted in the army and formed their own units: the 17th and
23rd regiments of the Middlesex Die Hards being the most famous. These
were known as the Football Battalions, and enlistment posters encouraged
recruits to Follow the Lead Given by Your Favorite Football Players.
Among US troops serving in France in 191718, exposure to European culture caused a craze for many newly discovered voguesjazz, wristwatches,
automobiles, and airplanes, for examplethat soldiers would bring home and
spread throughout the United States. Sport was no exception. To celebrate the
cease-fire and peace negotiations, the US military in JuneJuly 1919 sponsored
a series of inter-Allied games just outside Paris for more than fifteen hundred
athletes from eighteen nations that had contributed to the war effort. Both
American football and European soccer were represented. The host stadium,
built by the US Army and named for its wartime general, John J. Pershing, was
donated as a gift to the people of France as US soldiers, with new knowledge
of such foreign sport as association football, cricket, and rugby, returned to the
United States.
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On the Cover
uring the Great War, making bombs, shells, bullets, and explosives was womens work. In this British poster from the Hoover
Archives, a young woman dresses for her job; in the background
is one of the soldiers whose lives, according to the poster,
depend on her.
World War I introduced many new features to warfare. One was a heavy
reliance on artillery. No longer used just to support infantry attacks, cannon fire saturated the battle zone in the hope of annihilating the enemy or
at least breaking through his barbed wire and other barriers. Fixed positions, so much a feature of the Western Front, made it possible for trains to
bring massive amounts of ammunition to the lines for that purpose. But in
response, the combatants dug still deeper in their trenches, the barrages
became still more intense, and supplies ran short.
A shell crisis toppled the British government in 1915. Shortages of highexplosive shells had appeared almost immediately after the war began the
previous year, and the failure of British forces in the Battle of Aubers Ridge
of 1915the want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to
our success, read a reporters telegramprovoked a public uproar. Munitions supplies, whether as critical as they were portrayed or not, became
a way to criticize the wars leadership in Britain. A minister of munitions,
David Lloyd George, was appointed to fix matters. His handling of the new
Ministry of Munitions would make his political career.
Encouraged by Lloyd George, prominent suffragists organized a Womans
Right to Serve march in 1915, demanding that patriotic women be hired in
the war industries. Eventually, they hoped, would come the vote too. Hundreds of thousands of women got jobs packing shells and making primers,
fuzes, grenades, and other high explosives. They were nicknamed munitio-
nettes, or canaries because the chemicals they worked with turned their
196
skin yellow. Women in

war work gained a salarymany for the first
time, others at much
higher pay than before
a sense of purpose, and
in some cases chronic
health problems from
the toxic materials.
Women also died in
ghastly explosions at
the plants, and not just
in Britain. The Skoda
Works blast in Bohemia
killed 300 workers in
1917; another that year
in Germany killed more
than a hundred, mostly
young women. There
were fatal explosions in
the United States, too.
Notorious blasts in Britain included the Silvertown explosion of 1917
(73 killed, 400 injured)
and a 1918 explosion at
the National Shell Filling Factory at Chilwell that killed 134, of whom only
three dozen could be identified. The Chilwell factory reopened the next day,
and the unidentified bodies were buried in a mass grave.
In 1914, 212,000 women were working on munitions in Britain; by the wars
end there were 950,000, and an estimated 80 percent of all weapons and
shells had been produced by women. They had served commendably while
delivering to the men who depended on them not food and comfort but what
Arthur Conan Doyle described, after a visit to the massive Gretna arms factory, as the devils porridge.
Research by Aryeh Roberts
HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
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198
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Overseers Emeritus
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u u u
The Hoover Institution gratefully acknowledges generous support

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u u u
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