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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which assails the decision dated
September 23, 2002 and the Resolution dated January 3, 2003 of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030 finding petitioner
Nazario Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Petitioner was charged with direct bribery in an Information
which reads:
That on or about October 13, 1990 in Legazpi City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused a public officer being a qualified member of the Police
Force of Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National Police,
taking advantage of his official/public position and committing the
crime herein charged in relation to his office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand, obtain and/or
receive directly from Yu Su Pong[1] and Hian Hian Sy[2] the total
amount of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P5,800.00)
Philippine Currency in consideration for his recovery from alleged
robbers, eighteen Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the
damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victims in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:
who said he was amenable if that [was] the only way to recover
the cylinders and to apprehend the robbers. [4] Based on
information furnished by the asset, the police investigators
proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo in San Roque Legazpi
City, where they found the stolen gas tanks. The group loaded the
gas tanks into the vehicle. Meanwhile, Arnaldo arrived. Petitioner
did not arrest him at that time because he promised to lead them
to the other stolen cylinder tanks. [5] The group returned to the
police station where petitioner made a written report of the
recovery of the gas tanks.
Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of
the Legazpi City police force and occasionally received rewards
from the police for any information of the criminal activities. On
October 13, 1990 at around 4:00 in the morning, he went out to
buy bread and saw three individuals stealing gas cylinder tanks in
the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner and
reported to him the robbery. He went back to his house to feed
the chickens. Sometime thereafter, he dropped by the police
station to discuss with petitioner the reward of P350.00 per
cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him 1,000.00 and told
him to return at 6:00 p.m. for the remainder. At 7:00 p.m., he and
petitioner went to the store of Yu So Pong to collect the balance of
the reward money. Petitioner went inside the store and Arnaldo,
who was left outside, saw a woman giving him a folded
newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so
he ran away.
On September 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery, the dispositive
portion of which reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering that the
agreed act, which did not constitute a crime, was executed,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused NAZARIO
MARIFOSQUE Y NUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Direct Bribery, defined and penalized under the second
paragraph of Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. The
accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 3 years 6 months and 5 days of Prision
Issue:
- Is the act of petitionerreceipt of the sums of money for
delivery to his assetconstitute an offense defined and penalized
under 2nd paragraph of Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code?
- Did the Sandiganbayan err in convicting the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery?
Held:
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all
the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did
not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his
daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he
previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly
represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not
corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers
testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu
So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that
he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had
he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced
courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the
violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an
innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing
the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty,
betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a
corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an
illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the
monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer
complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received
earlier.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full weight and
credence to their version of the events. Petitioner's conviction
must be affirmed. The act of receiving money was connected with
his duty as a police officer. With regard to the fine, the amount of
the fine is erroneous. Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides that if the
act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not be less than 3
10
Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that
cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether the
command is specially against him or generally against him and
others." 55
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of
assets and liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of
office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly
without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free
from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a
compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It
cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, such a
restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an
observance of due process. That leads us to an inquiry into its
significance. "There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the
due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo,
must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified
as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in
the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is
not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a
clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56
67
In that
but only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but
only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and the
prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not
solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither
then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes
from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or
innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his
house, papers or effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory
matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on
the guaranty against self-incrimination is far from decisive. It is
well to note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above
inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it affords
will have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the
existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or
administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no pressing need
to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is
an infringement of the non-incrimination clause. What was said in
an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a
statutory provision requiring any person operating a motor
vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person or
property, to stop and give his name, residence, and his license
number to the injured party or to a police officer was sustained
against the contention that the information thus exacted may be
used as evidence to establish his connection with the injury and
therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the
opinion: "If the law which exacts this information is invalid,
because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt,
might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant,
then all police regulations which involve identification may be
questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any
constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct from
judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a
constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate
the statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular case, the
constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the information
exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense
Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is:
1. An oppressive exercise of police power;
2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to
privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination;
3. An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public
officials.
Presumption of validity
1.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public
official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is
analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to
strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.
1.
Right to privacy
1.
1.
1.