CEQUEA v.

BOLANTA
G.R. No. 137944
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
From 1926 to 1930, Sinforoso Mendoza was paying the tax receipts and declarations
of the contested land in Binangonan, Rizal. Upon his death, his daughter and respondent
Honorata Mendoza-Bolante continued to pay the taxes until 1948. By 1950, Margarito
Mendoza, brother of the late Sinforoso, began paying for the taxes and occupied the same
land. During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a
dispute between Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of petitioners Fernanda Ceque a
and Ruperta Lirio. Both claimed possession over the land. The trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners. However, the appellate court reversed the ruling, saying that the respondent
is the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because she was in
notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners are the preferred possessors of the land.
2. Whethere or not the petitioners has better possessory right over the land.
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the
legal possessor. The possession by the petitioners before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
respondent also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners' father
(Margarito) and brother (Miguel), as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. When respondent came of age in 1948,
she paid realty taxes from 1932 to 1948, while Margarito declared the lot for taxation in
his name in 1953. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. Respondent and
her mother were still living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when
he was physically ousted by the respondent. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the
respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax
declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer
period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
2. The Supreme Court held that Bolante already owned the land when she was disturbed
by the brother of petitioners. Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when
the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the
concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had already ripened into
ownership.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not
acquire ownership. Ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. It will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that
their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother

arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse

possession for 32 years from 1953 to 1985, this supposed ownership cannot extend to the
entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.

JUAN ARAGON v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. 6019
Carson, J.
FACTS:
The land in question in the case is situated near the Manila Bay that when high tide
reaches the area, it was completely covered by the waters; and exposed when the tide
recedes back. However, in 1892 a possessory title to the land was registered in favor of
appellees Inocencio Aragon, Juan Aragon and others. For a long period of years, the parcel
of land have been in possession of Aragon. He and others constructed a house, protected
by a retaining wall against the tides by dumping it with filling materials. But it only took a
time because the waters had risen to such a height along the shores of the bay,
completely overwhelming the land. Previously, the appellees asked the Court of Land
Registration to grant them title over the land. The Insular government as appellant
objected, citing public ownership of shores under the Old Civil Code and the Law of
Waters. The land registration court however ruled in favor of the applicant-appellees.
Hence, the petition by the Insular government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the applicants are still the possessors of the land covered by the
sea.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Citing Art. 460 of the Old Civil Code
(now Art. 555 of the NCC), the Court ruled that the Government is merely justified in
disturbing the possession of the applicants, if they have abandoned their property, or if
the land has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by
the erosive action of the sea. The applicants however never abandoned their possession.
The actual condition of the property only makes it proves that the land has been totally
lost or destroyed preposterous and wholly without the fault of the appellees. It could not
be hardly added that if the applicants have not lost their right of possession, the
Government's claim of ownership, on the ground that this is a part of the shore of Manila
Bay, necessarily falls to the ground. The Court added that its ruling merely affirms that the
owners of the land never abandoned it, and that the land with its condition cannot be said
to have been totally destroyed for the purposes for which it was held by the appeellees.

Cordero vs. Cabral

L-36789 July 25, 1983
Ponente: Abad Santos, J.
FACTS: Felipa Cordero and her children Mauro, Casimiro and Elisea all surnamed Ocampo
sued Victoria Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos in a Complaint which reads
as follows:
1. That the plaintiffs are all residing at Meycauayan, Bulacan; Felipa Cordero is a
widow while Elisea Ocampo is single; and the defendants are all of legal age,
Victoria P. Cabral is married but she is living apart and separate from her husband
so the latter is not included herein as party defendant, and all of them are residing
at Meycauayan, Bulacan
2. That Gregorio Z. Ocampo, husband of Cordero, died on May 17, 1958, left several
properties, which were inherited by the plaintiffs, one of which is a parcel of land
with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Saluysoy, Municipality of
Meycauayan. It had an area of 78,181m2 with TCT NO. 14513 in the name of
Gregorio Z. Ocampo.
3. That after the death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo the plaintiffs herein took
possession of the properties left by him, among others is the afore-described parcel
of land which is a riceland, but they found out that the southern portion of the same
with an area 4,303 square meters, more or less, upon verification, was possessed by
the defendants herein, Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos
and that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion
while her co-defendants co-possessed the same as her tenants.
4. That the plaintiffs demanded of the defendants to surrender to the former
possession of the afore-mentioned portion of land and/or vacate it but they refused
and failed to do so, and the defendant Victoria P. Cabral continued claiming to be
the owner of the same.
5. Plaintiffs failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least 10 cavanes of palay at the
rate of P10 per cavan, from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.

Defendants allege the ff:

1. Cabral and her predecessors in interest before her are the real owners, and have
been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession
2. That the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and his predecessors in interest, as well
as the defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest, have always recognized
as the boundary between their respective properties, Pandayan road which has
existed since the Spanish regime and has continued to exist up to the present time;
and all the residents of the rural areas using said barrio road know for a fact that,
with respect to the respective properties of the parties hereto, said road is the
boundary between said properties
3. That the inclusion of that portion claimed by the plaintiffs in their complaint in the
original registration of their property was obtained thru error or fraud by the original
applicant, but was never possessed by him nor by his successors in interest, as they
have always openly recognized the ownership of said portion as belonging to
defendant Cabral
Plaintiffs counterclaim:
1. Antonio Rodriguez, predecessor of Cabral, requested Ocampo to sell to him a
portion of said land with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to which Mr.
Ocampo agreed. As there was already a meeting of the mind Rodriguez requested
Ocampo that he be allowed to possess the said portion as they were going to make
the formal deed of sale, to which proposition Ocampo likewise agreed. This
proposed sale never materialized so if Rodriguez ever possessed the said portion of
land, now under litigation, he did not possess it as owner but only as a 'prospective
owner'.
2. Such possession cannot also be termed 'continuous' for 50 years because
Ocampo was in possession of the same in 1934 before Rodriguez came in
possession of the same, first, with the consent and later by toleration of Ocampo.
ISSUE:
w/n defendants open and continuous possession of the property was in good faith
HELD:
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the disputed piece of land is registered in
the name of the plaintiffs' predecessor. The defendants claimed in their answer that they
and their predecessors are the owners of the land in dispute but that the plaintiffs'
predecessor was able to register the same in his name through error or fraud.
However, the trial court made no categorical finding on this claim of the defendants
otherwise it would have granted the affirmative relief which they asked, namely: "(b)
declaring the defendant Victoria P. Cabral as the owner of the lot, which has been
erroneously included in the property of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513, Bulacan, and ordering the herein plaintiffs to
execute a deed of transfer of said Lot in favor of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral." The
Court of Appeals did not deal with this issue because there was no appeal made by the
defendants.
The supreme court made the following conclusions:

1. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the
predecessor of the plaintiffs.
2. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated by error or
fraud (as the issue was not appealed).
3. The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is
no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased
when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. (Art. 528, NCC) As
possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits
received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received (Art. 549 NCC).
Defendants shall vacate and surrender the land in question to the plaintiffs; and the
defendants shall also account for the fruits thereof pursuant to Article 549 of the Civil
Code from the service of the summons.

Mendoza vs. De Guzman

G.R. No. 28721; October 5, 1928
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
FACTS:
On November 6, 1916, Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Martin Mendoza for the recovery of
a certain piece of land. Judgment was rendered in that case absolving Mendoza from the
complaint. Mendoza was in fact put in possession of the property. In the decision rendered
in the cadastral case, this lot was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio
Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel
de Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the
land. By virtue of this judgment, De Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance
of a writ of possession for lot No. 687 in his favor which was granted on June 25, 1924.
Since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land.

Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed

for the improvements made on the land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an
action requesting the court to
(a) fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel de
Guzman in introducing the
improvements;
(b) require the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits received by him and
order that the value of
the fruits be applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses; and
(c) decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs.
To the complaint, the defendant filed an answer in the form of a general denial with
special defenses and appended a counter-claim and crosscomplaint, in which a total of
P6,000 was asked. During the pendency of the case, Bernardo Solis, or Max. B. Solis, one
of the persons who was ejected from the land, asked leave to intervene, alleging, among
other things, that De Guzman, in consideration of the sum of P5,000, had transferred all
his rights in the improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of two hundred
coconut trees. This petition was granted by the trial court.
At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties, two commissioners
were appinted with instructions to inspect the land and to count the number of coconut
trees planted thereon, determining the number of fruit-bearing trees and those that are
not fruit-bearing as well as the condition of the same.
Decision of Trial Court: that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor
Bernardo Solis have the right to collect from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio
Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as compensation for the necessary and useful expenditures in
the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis;
and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25, 1924, one-fifth of this amount to be paid by
Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis
ISSUE:
w/n De Guzman is obliged to render an account of the fruits received by him from
June 25, 1924, until the improvements are delivered after same have been paid for
HELD:
YES. With the facts as above indicated, little time need be taken to discuss the
points of law. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word
"indemnizacion." However one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term
"indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity," the
amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles
453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount of the necessary
and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant.
Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators
as those made for the preservation of the thing as those without which the thing would
deteriorate or be lost. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for
cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the
improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the
necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist,

who is not exactly a posessor in good faith within the meaning of the law, seeks to be
reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should
account to the owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.

Everista Robles and Enrique Martin vs Lizarraga Hermanos and the Register of
Deeds
FACTS:

Anastasia de la Rama died, leaving her six children including Evarista Robles, House
No. 4 on Iznart Street in Iloilo City. The three consolidated cases under consideration arose
from the controversy involving said house.
Evarista and her co-heirs entered into a partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in
liquidation and settlement of their accounts, by virtue of which the competent court
awarded to said partnership the properties left by the deceased, including House No. 4.
Evarista, since before the death of her mother, has been with her husband
occupying House No. 4, at the beginning, with the permission of their mother, later on by
the consent of her co-heirs, and lastly by agreement with the partnership, Lizarraga
Hermanos. Evarista had introduced improvements on the house valued at P4,500, and
paid to the partnership P40 monthly rentals for the upper story.
Lizarraga notified Evarista that the rental payment for the upper story shall be
raised to P60 a month, and that, if she did not agree to the new rate, she might vacate the
house. Evarista refused to pay hence, an ejectment case was filed by Lizarraga against
Evarista.
Evarista, in turn, sued Lizarraga Hermanos to recover the value of the
improvements and demanded, in another action, that said value be noted on the
certificate of title as an encumbrance.
Evarista contended that she and Lizarrage Hermanos entered into a contract of sale
involving House No. 4, the deed of sale to be executed as soon as the tile of deeds were
transferred to the name of the partnership. By virtue of this contract, Evarista remained in
the possession of the house and constructed improvements therein. Furthermore, Evarista
agreed to pay P40 per month by way of compensation fro the occupationof the building
until the execution of the deed of sale.
While Lizarraga Hermanos acknowledges the fact of the construction of the
improvements and that their value amounted to P4,500, it, however, denied the existence
of the contract of sale.
Issue:
Whether Evarista is the owner of the improvements and has the right to retain the building
until the said value has been paid to her
HELD:
YES.
Art 434 (NCC: Art. 527.) Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
Lizarraga Hermanos did not allege, nor prove in the first instance the bad
faith characterizing Evarista Robles possession, who, as shown in the records
and heretofore stated, began to occupy the house by permission of the former
owner, her mother Anastasia de la Rama, and continued later in the occupation

by consent of her co-heirs, and afterwards by considering herself the future

owner of the building by virtue of the contract with the present owner, Lizarraga
Hermanos. The evidence shows that the said improvements were begun about
the end of December, 1916, after the agreement with Lizarraga Hermanos for
the sale thereof to Evarista Robles.
Art 453 (NCC: Art. 546) Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession
having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

The expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as

without them the house would have continued to stand just as before, but were
useful, inasmuch as with them the house beter serves the purpose for which it was
intended, being used as a residence, and the improvements consisting of the
assittion of a dining room, kitchen, closet and bathroom in the lwer and upper
stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it is
beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the building.
There is positive evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that when she made
the improvements on the building she was possessing it in good faith.
If the improvements are useful and Evarista Robles possession was in good faith,
the conclusion is inevitable: Evarista Robles is the owner of such improvements, and
entitled to reimbursement thereof, and to retain the building until the same is
made.

MWSS vs CA

FACTS:
The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority NAWASA [now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS)] for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks
System. NAWASA interposed as one of its defenses RA 1383 which vested upon it the
ownership, possession, and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines
and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for
necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.
The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled
to the reimbursement claimed by it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. Hence the instant petition filed by its successor-in-interest, MWSS.
MWSS argued that the pertinent laws on the subject, particularly Art 546, 547 and
549 of the Civil Code do not definitely settle the question of whether a possessor in bad
faith has the right to remove useful improvements.
ISSUE:
DOES A POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMOVE USEFUL
IMPROVEMENTS?
HELD:
NO. It is provided under Art 449 of the Civil Code that he who builds, plants, or
sows in bad faith on the land of anpther, loses what it built, planted or sown without right
to indemnity. As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had
made without the right to indemnity.
Moreover, under Art 546 of the said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Art
547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if it can be

done without the damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the
possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right
given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to improvements
for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the
lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they may have at the
time he enters into possession (Art 549, Id).

Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal

G.R. No. L-30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15
Cuevas, J.
FACTS:
Respondents are applicants for the registration of two agricultural lands located in
Rizal. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence appearing that the property
applied for, designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662, have a total area of 26,015
sq. m. These lots originally belong to one Maria Certeza and that upon her death, the
property was involved in litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza, and
that the lots were given by the latter to Justice de Joya as the latters attorneys fees. The
lots were then sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta. Ana, who in turn sold the same to spouses
Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939. Sometime in November 1955, the said
spouses sold the lots to herein applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. The
spouses Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife, Ignacia
Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes thereon. Prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo had
the two lots surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955.
On the other hand, oppositor (Rizal Cement Company) claims to be the owner of the
subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to have been in continuous
and adverse possession of the property since 1911. To substantiate this claim, petitioner
submitted documentary evidence, one of which is a tax declaration of the said lots.
The Court of First Instance denied the application for registration of respondents and
ordered the issuance of a decree of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co., after
finality of said decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the CFI. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents had been in actual possession of the land in question.
HELD:
Yes. The CA gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents. As a
general rule, it is provided in the Civil Code that possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact that it is subject to the action
of our will, or by the proper acts or legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Petitioners evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not
conclusive and indisputable basis of ones ownership of the property in question.
Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest
ownership of the property upon defendant.

Wong v. Carpio
G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation and which
is from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was
executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00. Then, in 1973, William Giger again
asked an additional amount of P2,500.00 from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to
sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale. In 1972, plaintiff began harvesting only the
coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land for Mr. Giger.
He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any person on
the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman
and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur while the
land in litigation is at Colongan, Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that
he is in actual possession. He knew defendants' laborers were in the land in suit as early
as August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do anything to stop them.
Instead plaintiff was happy that there were people and a hut on the land in suit.
Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to find out if
there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he found

none. So, in July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from
William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela. Ignacio Wong then asked for the delivery of
the title to him and so he has in his possession TCT No. (T-4244) T-974 in the name of
William Giger. Mr. Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name. He
tried to register the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the
registration fee but due to some technicalities, the pacto de retro sale could not be
registered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD:
It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or
by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." And that the execution of
a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there
is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument,
the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use
of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery
has not been effected. Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear
that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado
by virtue of the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of
petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment
the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized
at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal,
the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE vs COURT OF

APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO and JUAN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 80294 March 23, 1990
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.

(Note: I took some of the facts from the case where this motion originated.)

FACTS:

In 1906, Catholic Vicar borrowed the house of the respondent heirs on the subject
parcels of land when the church and convent were destroyed. Catholic Vicar was in
possession of the subject lots 2 and 3 as borrower in commodatum from Heirs of
Octaviano and Heirs of Juan since 1906. In 1951, Catholic Vicar declared the property for
tax purposes under its name thus it repudiated the trust in commodatum.
In 1962, Catholic Vicar filed its application for registration of the said property under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. At that time, Catholic Vicar had been in adverse
possession of the same for at least 11 years (1951-1962). The heirs questioned the
decision of the trial court to register the parcels in the name of Vicar. The heirs also filed
an application for registration. Eventually, both Vicar and the heirs applications were
denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, the heirs filed a separate civil case for the recovery of possession of the
subject parcels of land. The trial court and the appellate court ordered Vicar to return and
surrender possession of the said lots to private respondents, thus this petition.

ISSUES:

1. What is the nature of the subject parcels of land?

2. (MAIN) Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that possession of the property
belong to the heirs.

HELD:

1. Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the two lots in question remained
part of the public lands. This is the only logical conclusion when the appellate court found
that neither the petitioner nor private respondents are entitled to confirmation of
imperfect title over said lots.
2. YES. The right of possession of the heirs is already lost.
It appears that the petitioner Vicar was in possession of the said property as borrower in
commodatum from private respondents since 1906 but in 1951 petitioner repudiated the

trust when it declared the property for tax purposes under its name. When it filed its
application for registration of the said property in 1962, petitioner had been in adverse
possession of the same for at least 11 years.

Article 555 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing or because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not
lost till after the lapse of ten years.

From the foregoing provision of the law, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, it is clear
that the real right of possession of private respondents over the property was lost or no
longer exists after the lapse of 10 years that petitioner had been in adverse possession
thereof. Thus, the action for recover of possession of said property filed by private
respondents against petitioner must fail.

The Court, therefore, finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the private respondents to be entitled to the possession thereof. Much less can
they pretend to be owners thereof. Said lots are part of the public domain.

EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. vs Gerardo Santos

GR. No. 80298, April 26, 1990
Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone

with EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. (EDCA) for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA
prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books. Cruz issued a personal check
covering the purchase price of P8,995.65. Cruz sold 120 of the books to private
respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he
showed her, paid him P1,700.00.

Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz
even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where
he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its
employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA then went
to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation
disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Pea and his sale of 120 of the books he had
ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. EDCA sought the assistance of the police,
which forced their way into the store of Santos and the 120 books without warrant.
Aggrieved filed a suit for recovery and the books was eventually returned to her. The MTC,
sustained by both RTC and CA recognized that ownership belongs to Santos. EDCA files
this petition alleging that it was unlawfully deprived of the ownership of the books.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not ownership of the books was passed to Santos.

2. (MAIN) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books ownership because
of non-payment (the check having been dishonored).

HELD.

1. YES. Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent
to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

The first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with further proof. Leonor
Santos acquired the books in good faith. She first ascertained the ownership of the books
from the EDCA invoice showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was selling
them for a discount because he was in financial need. The Santoses are in the business of
buying and selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to part
with their books at reduced prices.

2. NO. Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon
the actual or constructive delivery thereof.

Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.

It is clear from the above provisions, that ownership in the thing sold shall
not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Absent the stipulation, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to
another. In the case at bar, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of its ownership of
the books since in the actual delivery of the books, Cruz acquired ownership
over them, which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The
fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the
books.

In addition, Santos ascertained first that Cruz owned the books by checking the
invoice. By contrast, EDCA was too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had
never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by
telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. Worse, it indicated in
the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been
paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.

It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice
sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. The SC cannot see the justice in
transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper
care, when they bought the books from Cruz.

LEDESMA VS. CA

FACTS:
Two motor vehicles (Honda Gemini and Holden Premiere Model) were purchased
from Citiwide Motors by a person who identified himself as Jojo Consunji. He bought the
vehicles purportedly for his father. Upon delivery to him of the vehicles, he paid a
managers check drawn against PCIB. The check though was dishonored by the bank on
the ground that the checks value has been materially altered. This was reported to the
police authorities and it was found out that the person misrepresenting himself was
actually Suarez who had a long line of criminal cases against him for his modus operandi.
The Holden car was recovered after being abandoned somewhere in Quezon City. The
Honda on the other hand, was discovered to be sold to Ledesma. Ledesma averred he
purchased the vehicle in good faith from one Neyra, as evidenced by his certificate of
registration. Citiwide Motors was able to recover.

ISSUE: Whether Citiwide has been unlawfully deprived of the vehicle

HELD:
No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide Motors
and Suarez. The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of
consideration which doesn't render a contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the sale. This being the
case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully deprived of the property. It is thus not entitled to
the return of the vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property in good faith and for
consideration.

AZARCON VS. EUSEBIO

FACTS:
Before the dispute regarding the lease application of Eusebio and Homstead
application of Azarcon could be settled, Victor Eusebio filed a complaint alleging that he
had acquired a big parcel of land, 349 hectares in area, by lease from the Bureau of Lands
that while he was in possession thereof defendants occupied a portion containing an area
of 6 hectares more or less. He, therefore, prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the
6hectares occupied by them and pay damages. Defendant Leonardo Azarcon
answered the complaint alleging that he is in actual possession of a portion of
24 hectares since 1941 by virtue of a homestead application, that the lease

application of plaintiff is subsequent to said homestead application of Leonardo Azarcon;

defendants were declared in default. Court ordered defendants to restore possession of
the land to plaintiff.
Writ of execution was issued commanded defendants "to forthwith remove from
said premises and that plaintiff have restitution of the same," defendantsappellants nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then pending harvest.
The court did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon. Under the
law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while
products thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest under
article 545.
HELD:
As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-appellants from
gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and
cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the defendants-appellants committed an act
which is clear violation of the courts' order. Besides, the defendants-appellants had
presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set aside the said order of
execution, and this motion to stay execution was granted.

De Garcia Vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-20264
January 30, 1971
Fernando, J.
FACTS
1. In 1947, Respondent Angelina Guevara bought a ladys diamond ring 18cts. white gold
mounting, with one 2.05cts diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills 0.10 cts. total weight from R.
Rebullida Inc.
2. Said diamond ring was stolen from the house of Angelina in 1952.
3. In 1953, Angelina, while talking to the owner of La Bulakena Restaurant, petitioner
Consuelo de Garcia, recognized her ring in the finger of the latter. So she asked where she
bought it, the latter answered from her comadre.
4. Few days after, Angelina, together with her husband and Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, and
also Consuelo with her lawyer went to the store of Mr. Rebullida who, after examining the
ring, verified that it was the very same ring which Angelina bought from him. De Garcia
made no comment when Rebullida said that the ring was the same ring which he sold to
Guevara
5. The ring was returned to defendant. However, when she was asked to deliver the ring to
Angelina failed to deliver the same. As a consequence, respondent instituted an action for
recovery of said diamond ring. However upon serving of the writ, de Garcia claimed that
the ring was lost.
6. The trial court ruled in favor of de Garcia but the Court of Appeals reversed. Hence the
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the subject diamond ring should be returned to Guevara.
HELD:
Yes, the diamond ring should be returned to Angelina Guevara.
The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides,
The possession of a movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Applying this provision, Angelina Guevara, who was unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring, is entitled to recover it from petitioner who was found in possession of the
same.
There is no merit on the claim of De Garcia that her possession in good faith,
equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent Guevaras claim. As held in Cruz vs
Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith
in the acquisition by the possessor.

Dizon vs Suntay
No. L-30817 September 29, 1972
Fernando, J.
FACTS
1. Respondent Lourdes Suntay is the owner of 3-carat diamong ring. In 1962, Suntay and one
Clarita Sison entered into a transaction wherein the diamond ring was delivered to the
latter for sale on commission.
2. After the lapse of a considerable time without the ring being returned, Suntay made
demands on Sison for the return of the ring but the latter could not comply because
without the knowledge of Suntay, only a few days after the ring was turned over to Clarita,
the niece of her husband, Melia Sison pledged the ring in connivance with Clarita. Said ring
was pledged to the petitioner Dominador Dizons pawnshop named Pawnshop of
Dominador Dizon.
3. Because of Suntays demands, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of
the pledge with Dizons pawnshop.
4. Thereafter, Suntay demanded from Dizons pawnshop that her diamond ring be delivered.
However, the latter refused. As a consequence, Suntay filed an action for recovery of said
ring.
5. The trial court ruled that Suntay had the right to the possession of the ring. Court of
Appeals affirmed. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the subject diamond ring should be recovered by Suntay.
HELD:
Yes, Suntay should be allowed to recover the diamond ring pursuant to Article 559
of the Civil Code which provides that the owner of a movable property who have been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the said
property. In the case at bar, since Suntay was unlawfully deprived of her diamond ring,
when the same was pledged to the pawnshop by Sison who did not have the authority to
do so, she should be allowed to recover it from the latter.
Petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel against Suntay. This is because the
latter delivered the diamond ring to Sison solely for the purpose of putting it for sale on
commission, and not to pawn it as what Sison did. Thus, Suntay is not estopped from
pursuing an action against the pawnshop for the recovery of the diamond ring.