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REPORTS

Reservation for OBCs: Hardly An


Abrupt Decision

educational backwardness are grouped


under three heads in part first of the
report, i e, social, educational and
economic:
(A) Social (4 x 3 = 12 points)

Kameshwar Choudhary

(i) Castes/Classes considered as socially


backward by others.
(ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend
on manual labour for their livelihood.
(iii) Castes/Classes where at least 23 per
cent females and 10 per cent males
above the state average get married
at an age below 17 years in rural areas
and at least 10 per cent females and
5 per cent males do so in urban areas.
(iv) Castes/Classes where participation of
females in work is at least 25 per cent
above the state average.
(B) Educational ( 3 x 2 = 6 points)

The policy of reservation may be a 'reform measure' adopted by


the ruling class to maintain the existing inegalitarian system, but
opposing it at the moment would be a retrograde step.
THE decision of the central government
to introduce 27 per cent reservation for
the socially and educationally backward
classes (also called other backward
classes) in the central government services
and public sector undertakings as per the
recommendations of the Backward Classes
Commission (1980) headed by B P Mandal
has spurred vehement criticisms and agitations in different parts of the country.
It is argued that this measure has been
taken in haste, that it is an abrupt decision. But this is not the case. In fact, this
argument only shows the myopic vision
of the critics. The Constitution of India
made a special provision of making reservation for socially and educationally
backward classes (SEBCs) about 40 years
back in 1950. This provision was made in
the section on the 'fundamental rights' of
the citizens and not under the 'directive
principles' of state policy. Hence, the state
had to act immediately and not delay this
step for long. As a consequence the first
Backward Classes Commission was appointed in 1953 under the chairmanship
of Kakasaheb Kalelkar. The commission
submitted its report in 1955. According to
its recommendations, in all government
and local body services the reservation for
SEBCs was to be 25 per cent in Class I,
33 ) per cent in Class II and 40 per cent
in Class 111 and IV services (p 205). But
the recommendations remained unimplemented. When the Janata Party came to
power the second commission on the
SEBCs was appointed under the chairmanship of B P Mandal. This commission submitted its report in 1980 and made
several recommendations including 27 per
cent reservation of jobs for the SEBCs in
the central government services and public
sector undertakings. Again the Congress
government at the centre did not implement the recommendations. However, in
the last Lok Sabha elections in 1989 the
National Front made a commitment to
implement the recommendations of the
Mandal Commission, As a result, only
recently the National Front government
at the centre took a decision to implement
the same.
Hence, making reservation for SEBCs

Economic and Political Weekly

is not an abrupt decision. It was long overdue as a constitutional obligation. It does


not matter much as to what impact the
exit of Devi Lai had on this issue. It could
have been delayed only by months and
years and not by decades. The MPs and
MLAs belonging to the OBCs constitute
a sizeable section of the legislators. They
wanted to implement this measure. So, it
had to be done. Thus, it is good that an
important constitutional goal has been
achieved in the direction of promoting
social justice.
CASTE BASIS

The Mandal Commission is criticised


on the ground that it has recommended
reservation to be made on the basis of
caste which is a communal criterion
whereas a secular one would have been
preferable in a democratic and secular
country like India. It is true that caste has
been adopted as one of the criteria by, the
commission but it is not the sole criterion
for identifying the SEBCs for which the
provision of reservation is made in the
constitution. In fact, the commission
adopted a 'multiple approach' for the
identification of the SEBCs/OBCs (that
is other than SCs and STs) for the purpose of reservation. The main sources
used by the commission for preparation
of the list of the OBCs are:

(i) Socio-educational field survey;


(ii) Census Report of 1961 (for the
identification of backward tribes);
(iii) Personal knowledge gained through
extensive touring of the country and
receipt of voluminous public evidences from members of the general
public, voluntary organisations,
social workers, politicians, legislators,
etc; and
(iv) List of OBCs notified by various state
governments (p 54),
Moreover, the commission applied some
other tests like stigma of low occupation,
criminality, nomadism, beggary, untouchability and inadequate representation in
public services.
In the socio-educational field survey,
the indicators for determining social and

September 1-8, 1990

(v) Castes/Classes where the number of


children in the age-group of 5-15
years who never attended school is at
least 25 per cent above the state
average.
(vi) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in the age-group of
5-15 years is at least 25 per cent above
the state average.
(vii) Castes/Classes amongst whom the
proportion of matriculates is at least
25 per cent below the state average.
(C) Economic ( 4 x 1 = 4 points)
(viii) Castes/Classes where the average
value of family assets is at least 25
per cent below the state average.
(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of
families living in kuccha houses is at
least 25 per cent above the state
average.
(x) Castes/Classes where the source of
drinking water is beyond half a kilometre for more than 50 per cent of
the households.
(xi) Castes/Classes where the number of
households having taken consumption
loan is at least 25 per cent above the
state average (p 52).
Here, separate weigbtage was given Jo
indicators of each group because these
groups were considered to be not of equal
importance in identifying "socially and
educationally backward classes". All the
social indicators were given a weightage
of three points each, educational indicators a weightage of two points each and
economic indicators a weightage of one
point each. Moreover, only those castes/
classes which had a sco^e o f SO per cent
(i e, 11 points out of 22 in all) or aboue
were listed as socially arid educationally
backward and the rest were treated as
'advanced*.
Hence, not only social but educational
and economic criteria were also included
for the purpose of identifying OBCs in the

1929

socio-educational field survey. Moreover,


position in the caste hierarchy was given
only three points out of 12 points in the
social criteria and 22 points in all. Considerations such as dependence on manual
labour, age at marriage, female participation in work, children's attendance at
school, drop-out rate at school level, proportion of matriculates, value of family
assets, residence in kuccha houses, access
to the source of drinking water and
amount of consumption loan cannot be
said to be casteist by any stretch of imagination. If socially, economically and
educationally backward people also
belong to the lower castes, this is not their
fault. This is a consequence of their ageold deprivation, oppression and exploitation by the privileged castes/classes in the
Indian society.
Further, the commission holds that the
method of socio-educational field survey
was 'objective' because the point system
did not allow any subjective assessment.
This method was found to be "highly
dependable in practice" because as a result
of its application most of the well known
socially and educationally backward
castes were identified as backward (p 53).
However, in some cases, the findings
based on socio-educational field survey
happened to be inconsistent with the living social reality. For example, the social
status of Kasera caste in Bihar, Dhobi in
Gujarat, Agasa in Karnataka, Kumbhar
in Rajasthan, Badager in Tamil Nadu, etc,
is known to be very low. Yet these castes
scored below 11 points and, thus, qualified
for ranking as forward. To rectify such
aberrations, it was necessary to have the
"intimate personal knowledge of local
conditions and the use of massive public
evidence" to which the commission took
recourse. The result of the field survey was
"carefully scrutinised and such aberrations rectified as far as possible" (p 55).
Further, for identifying OBCs in the
central government services the commission used two criteria for both Hindu and
non-Hindu communities. In respect of
employees belonging to the Hindu communities, the- following criteria were
adopted: (i) an employee was deemed to
be socially backward "if he does not
belong to any of the three twice born
(Dvij) Varnas' i e, he is neither a Brahmin,
nor a Kshatriya nor a Vaishya"; and (ii) he
was deemed to be educationally backward
"if neither his father nor his grandfather
had studied beyond the primary level". As
regard the non-Hindu communities (i) an
employee was deemed to be socially
backward "if either (1) he is a convert
from those Hindu communities which
have been defined as socially backward as
in case of the Hindu communities above,
or (2) in case he is not such a convert, his
parental income is below the poverty line,
i e, Rs 71 per head per month"; (ii) he was
deemed to be educationally backward "if
1992

neither his father nor his grandfather had


studied beyond the primary level" (Appendix VII, p 91). Here, it must be noted
that an employee is qualified for membership of OBCs only if, both socially and
educationally he was found to be backward according to the above criteria.
Educational backwardness was given
equal importance to position in the varnacaste hierarchy.
Hence, the criticism that the Mandal
Commission has recommended reservation only on the basis of caste is not
justified. In fact, it adopted a "multiple
approach" for the identification of OBCs
for the purpose of reservation. It took into
consideration various criteria i e, noncaste social criteria as well as educational
and economic while placing castes/classes
in the category of OBCs. Caste criterion
has been given only a meagre importance
in the whole scheme.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA

The critics of the Mandal Commission


have advocated the adoption of economic
criteria at two levels. One stream of the
critics opine that reservation should be
made only on the basis of economic backwardness irrespective of social and educational backwardness. But this view is not
in consonance with the provisions of the
constitution. While imposing prohibition
on discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth (Article 15), Article 15(4) declares that nothing
shall prevent the state from making
"special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally
backward
classes of citizens" (emphasis mine).
Moreover, Article 16(4) of the constitution
specifically empowers the state to make
"any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any
backward class of citizens which, in the
opinion of the state, is not adequately
represented in the services under the state
(emphasis mine). In addition, Article 340
of the constitution authorises the president of India to "appoint a commission. . . to investigate the conditions of
socially and educationally
backward
classes and the difficulties under which
they labour and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken
by the union or any state to remove such
difficulties and to improve their condit i o n s . " (emphasis mine). Hence, it is
very clear that the constitution provides
for giving preferential treatment through
special measures such as reservation in
jobs by the state only on the basis of
"social and educational backwardness'.
The advocacy of reservation solely on the
basis of economic criteria does not have
constitutional sanction.
Another stream of opinion supports
reservation for OBCs in principle but suggests that economic criteria should be ap-

plied within that category so that the welloff section amongst OBCs does not corner
the benefits. This concern is genuine but
understanding of the problem seems to be
inadequate. In fact, application o f economic criteria within OBCs for reservation
will largely negate the provision of reservation and amount to opposing this
measure in practice. Here, let us have a
look at the figures regarding representation of OBCs, SCs and STs in central
government services.
From Tables 1 to 3 we find that though
the proportion of the OBCs (including
both Hindu and non-Hindu castes and
communities) is 52 per cent of the total
population; their representation in central
government services is 4.69 per cent in
Class I, 10.63 per cent in Class II and
24.40 per cent in Class III and IV. Their
proportion is even lower than the SCs and
STs who constitute 22.5 per cent of the
population but whose representation is
5.68 per cent in Class I, 18.81 per cent in
Class II and 24.40 per cent in Class 111
and IV. Whereas overall employment of
SCs and STs in central government ser
viccs is 18.71 per cent, it is merely 12.55
per cent for OBCs. Moreover, representation of OBCs in some of the ministries,
departments and public sector undertak
ings has been found to be nil in Class I
and II services (1980 Report, pp 93, 95)
In contrast, the forward castes and com
munitics who constitute about 25 per cent
of the total population have monopolised
about 90 per cent of Class I, 70 per cent
of Class II and 50 per cent of Class 111
and IV jobs under the central government.
Further, it is suggested that economic
criteria should be applied within the
OBCs so that the benefits of reservation
are not skimmed off by the well-off section of this category and the really
backward section left out. However, if the
economically well off and therefore
educationally advanced section of the
OBCs is excluded, only the poor and ill
educated, underqualificd or uneducated
section would remain to take advantage
of the provisions of reservation which
they, in practice, cannot take because of
their educational backwardness. As a
result, jobs reserved for the OBCs shall
largely lie unfilled. The unfilled seats shall
be dereserved after three years, as recomt A b l e i ; REPRESENTATION of OBCs, SCs ANd)
STs IN Central GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Source-. Report of the Backward Classes Commission

(1980), First Part, p 42.

Economic and Political Weekly

September 1-8, 1990

m e n d e d by t h e M a n d a l C o m m i s s i o n a n d
consequently grabbed by t h e candidates
belonging to the forward castes/classes.
T h e net result would be a perpetuation of
the overwhelming away o f the u p p e r
castes/classes over the services for a long
time to come. Moreover, there will be less
competition amongst the O B C candidates
and relatively ill-educated a n d ill-equipped
candidates will get into services. T h e
criterion of merit which is so dear to the
critics will be p u t at an unmanageable discount and efficiency of the administration
severely eroded.
In addition, the advocates of the application of e c o n o m i c criteria within the
O B C s m u s t s t a n d for a d o p t i o n of a
similar yardstick in case o f the SCs a n d
STs. Otherwise they are t o be b l a m e d for
pursuing a d o u b l e s t a n d a r d . It is well
known that as a result of t h e policy of
reservation for the S C s / S R a n elite section
has emerged amongst them. This elite section is economically well-off a n d educationally advanced a n d therefore grabbing
all the benefits of reservation. T h e most
backward section of the SCs/STs is left
high a n d dry. Hence, we can think of
applying e c o n o m i c criteria within the
S C s / S T s a s well. But a d o p t i o n o{
economic criteria for exclusion of relatively advanced section of t h e O B C s a n d
SCs/STfc is n o t desirable a t the present
stage of their progress. Because, in practice, it will nullify the whole provision of
reservation f o r them as a result of a large
number of seats reserved for them remaining vacant. T h i s is b o r n e o u t by the fact
that even now, when the economically well
o f f section o f SCs/STs is n o t excluded a
large number of jobs reserved for them remain unfilled in Class I a n d Class II services. T h e M a n d a l C o m m i s s i o n f o u n d
that the p r o p o r t i o n of the SCs/STs in
Class I and Class II stood at 5.68 per cent
and 18.81 per cent respectively despite
extending an unqualified reservation to
them. Hence, there is n o need of m a k i n g
any qualified reservation for the O B C s as
in the case of the SCs/STC.

CASTE W A R

T h e critics of t h e policy of reservation


have time a n d again raised the bogey of
h e a j t burning to those meritorious candidates whose entry into services would be
barred. They argue that this heart burning
leads to division of hearts, social tensions
a n d caste wars. This a r g u m e n t has been
noted by the M a n d a l C o m m i s s i o n . T h e
commission holds that this reasoning is
based o n 'partisan approach*. Here, the
real motive of the ruling elite is to preserve
its privileges (p 57).
A f t e r all, it is only the students and
people belonging t o the upper castes w h o
are involved in anti-reservation stir. Their
real intent in their concern for preference
to merit a n d efficiency of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
is to p e r p e t u a t e their traditional sway
especially in t h e higher echelons of the administration. In fact, they c a n n o t be expected to give u p their privileged position
without a fight.
We know t h a t certain measures of the
state, whether in economy, politics or administration are meant for sectional interests. In such cases we have to take sides
and behave in a partisan manner. However,
it is o p e n to individual or group choice
to take side o f the p o o r o r the rich, the
privileged or the underprivileged and forward castes/classes or backward castes/
classes. As regards the M a n d a l C o m m i s sion it is S E B C s w h o are going to benefit
a n d forward castes a n d c o m m u n i t i e s to
lose their d o m i n a n c e over administration.
Here, the supremacy of the forward castes
a n d communities is aimed t o be challenged a n d undermined. Hence, the critics call
the M a n d a l C o m m i s s i o n casteist. H a d
there been n o challenge to t h e d o m i n a n c e
of forward castes/classes, they would not
have talked of division o f heart and
created social tensions or caste wars. As
early as 1980, the M a n d a l Commission
commented that the chorus of alarm being
raised against reservation for OBCs on the
plea that this causes heart b u r n i n g was
"sheer sophistry". It also observed that

" t h e furore against reservation is not aimed at t h e principle itself, b u t against the
new class of beneficiaries, a s they are now
clamouring f o r a share of the o p p o r t u nities which were all along monopolised
by the higher castes" (p 58).
It is also argued that reservation will not
remove the dividing lines o f caste but institutionalise them by f u r t h e r codifying
existing caste divisions a n d t h u s causing
a 'civilisations! havoc* to the country. In
fact, it does not matter m u c h if castes are
d o c u m e n t e d w h e n it is m a d e hereditary
and norms and values associated with that
system are actually practised in real life.
T h e caste system has operated as a wellestablished social institution in India since
ages a n d the lower caste p e o p l e have s uf fered a lot under this u n j u s t system.
Whoever has a historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g
cannot blame the Mandal Commission
(1980) for codifying a n d institutionalising
caste. It h a d been with us a n d it is still
with us t h o u g h the degree of its rigidity
a n d severity h a s got reduced to some extent. T h e most essential features of caste
are still almost u n a f f e c t e d such as no^ms
regarding marriage, dining and priesth o o d . Hence, if some special provision is
m a d e for u p l i f t m e n t of backward classes
of the p o p u l a t i o n , caste h a s to be taken
as one of the criteria of social backwardness. This is recognition o f a historical
fact and that is exactly w h a t the M a n d a l
C o m m i s s i o n has done.
T h e M a n d a l Commission is also criticised for taking a static and dogmatic view
of the H i n d u social order. T h e critics present the caste system as a dynamic scheme
and adore it for providing avenue of social
mobility to the lower castes through the
process of Sanskritisation. U n d e r this
traditional channel of social mobility the
lower caste people Sanskritise their way
of life t h r o u g h a d o p t i n g upper caste
n o r m s and values and thus claim a higher
caste status. But this traditional route of
social mobility provided very limited opportunity in s o m e regions to certain castes
w h o were mobile economically or politi-

TABle 2: REPRESENTATION OF OBCs, SCs/STs IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Note:
Figures in brackets represent percentages.
Source: Report of the Backward Classes Commission (1980), First Part, Statement No I, Appendix VIII, p 92.

Economic and Political Weekly

September 1-8, 1990

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Economic and Political Weekly

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1933

cally. The poor and powerless castes continued to suffer from the grave injustices
of the caste system. Moreover, the process
of Sanskritisation did not pose a challenge
to the hierarchical and inegalitarian structure and ethos of the caste system. In fact,
it perpetuated and reinforced the caste
system through providing a safety valve
for a proper channelisation of the anger
and potential revolt of the lower castes.
Socially mobile lower castes did not question the superiority and dominance of the
upper caste but claimed only an upper
berth for themselves. They followed the
norms and values of the upper castes
strictly and with utmost vigour so that
their claim for a higher caste status was
accepted by the dominant castes. Sanskritisation operated as an avenue of social
mobility but not at all as a factor for
transforming the inegalitarian structure of
the caste system.
Not content with the limited scope of
social mobility through Sanskritisation,
the lower castes have asserted their caste
identity to claim their share in the fruits
of development. With the adoption of
land reform measures such as abolition of
zamindari, tenancy reforms and increasing
migration of landowning upper castes/
classes to urban areas, the economic condition of some of the OBCs has improved
after independence. Moreover, under the
new dispensation of parliamentary politics, the OBCs have got opportunities to
send their own caste people to the legislature both at the centre and state levels.
Gradually, they have emerged as a major
force in the political arena. Hence, it is inevitable that they should be claiming their
share in the control over administrative
machinery to which is attached a high
social status, handsome economic gains
and political linkages. The recommendations of the Mandal Commission are a
logical reflection of this phenomenon.

"by increasing the representation of OBCs


in government service^, we give them an
immediate feeling of participation in the
governance of the country" (p 57).
Further, we must notice the fact that the
real aim and game of the ruling class in
adopting the policy of reservation has
been to develop or recognise and co-opt
an elite stratum from amongst the backward castes/classes and rule the country
with an alliance and coalition of the elites
belonging to upper, middle and lower
castes/classes in the interests of the
bourgeois-landlord classes. The policy of
reservation is a Reform measure* adopted
by the ruling class to maintain the existing
inegalitarian system with granting some
concessions to the emerging assertive sections of the backward castes/classes. In
such a scheme of governance, the poor
belonging to upper, middle and lower
castes have to suffer. The policy does not
aim at a fundamental restructuring of the
systemthe task for which the left and
progressive people and political forces in

the country have to organise the suffering


people on class line for acquiring power
irrespective of their caste origin. But at the
moment an opposition to the provision of
reservation for OBCs would be a retrograde step because a section of the traditionally deprived and backward section of
the population is going to benefit from
this. Whatever reforms are possible within
the given bourgeois system have to be
welcomed. But without getting misled
about the real nature of such measures,
the left and progressive people have to
organise and fight for radical restructuring of the Indian society o n egalitarian
lin$s.
The Mandal Commission has suggested
some additional measures for upliftment
of OBCs besides reservation both in
recruitment and promotion at all levels in
services and public sector undertakings
(pp 58-60). The provision of reservation
also encompasses all universities and affiliated colleges, nationalised banks and
all private sector undertakings which have

TABLE 3: PERCENTAGe: DISTRIBUTION OF- INDIAN POPULATION BY CASTE AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS

15.05
07.51
22.56
11.19 (0.02)*
02.16 (0.44)*
01.67 (0.22)*
00.67 (0.03)*
00.47
16.16
05.52
03.90
02.21
01.00
01.88
01.07
02.00
17.58
56.30

N A T U R E OF REFORMS

Here, we must take note of the fact that


under the given framework of a weak and
developing bourgeois regime,' making
reservation for the OBCs is a short-cut,
soft and sly 'reform measure' to cater
more to the psychological aspirations of
that section of the population which constitutes the majority than trigger a process of radical structural change in society.
The benefits of reservation will be mainly
reaped by comparatively advanced section
of the OBCs. The commission recognises
the fact that besides material benefits accruing to the family concerned which gets
the jobs, the psychological spin off of this
phenomenon would be tremendous as the
entire community of that backward class
candidates feel socially elevated the reason
being that their own (caste) person would
be sitting in the "corridors of power".
Moreover, the commission believes that
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43.70*

Economic and Political Weekly

September 1-8, 1990

received financial assistance from the


government in one form or the other. As
regard educational concessions, the commission emphasises the need for "framing of integrated schemes for creating the
proper environment and incentives for
serious and purposeful studies" The*
educational package includes launching of
an intensive and time-bound programme
for adult education in areas with high concentration of OBC population, residential
schools for backward class students, vocational training and 27 per cent reservations of seats in all scientific, technical and
professional institutions run by the centre
as well as the state governments along
with provision for special coaching facilities for OBC students. Regarding financial assistance, the commission proposes
the formation of separate financial institutions and co-operative societies of
occupational groups of OBCs. Moreover,
the commission also advises the g o v e r n
ment to set u p backward classes development corporations and a separate ministry/
department both at central and state levels
to serve the interests of OBCs. All these
are 'reform measures' which the commission thought essential.
Further, the commission has also stressed
the necessity of structural changes. It
observes:

liberty, equality and fraternity guide the


behaviour of all the people in all spheres,
e g, political, economic, social and
organisational.
Besides introducing radical changes in
agriculture, it is necessary that structural
changes are made in industry as well at.
the levels of management and ownerhsip.
As a; first step, the individualistic and
authoritarian management has to be
democratised with adequate representation of workers, both manual and mental.
Moreover, the prevailing structure and
culture of the bureaucracy has to be
altered. Bureaucrats have to be made a
real servant of the people and not master
of the people as they are today. For this
it is necessary that, in practice* they are
made subordinate to the democratic
bodies from the village level upwards. In
addition, it has to be ensured that the
poor, deprived, oppressed and exploited
people who constitute the majority of the
population are in majority in elected
bodies at all levels i e f r o m village to
parliament level. This will enable the people's real representative to formulate and
implement policies in favour of the masses
and eradicate the scourge of poverty,

unemployment, inequality, oppression


and exploitation. State policy has to give
utmost priority to cater to the basic needs
of the masses rather than being guided by
the artificial needs of the privileged strata
of society who are blindly imitating the
consumerist culture of the west. Decisionmaking in bureaucracy has to be made
more and more democratic by involving
lower section of the employees in this process. In addition, wide disparity in salary
and wages should go. All these measures
will go a long way in fundamental restructuring of Our society on democratic and
egalitarian lines. A really democratic functioning of society will finish the lure and
lustre of bureaucracy. Therefore, the
scramble for bureaucratic positions for
acquiring high social status, power and
money will also end.
But such a radical change is not possible under the framework of bourgeois
sponsored programme of social reform
from above of which the recommendations of the Mandal Commission are
largely an example. The masses have to be
involved in this gigantic task of social
reconstruction. A movement of the
masses is the precondition for this change.

It is the commission's firm conviction that


a radical transformation of the existing production relations is the most important single
step that can be taken for the welfare and
upliftment of all other backward classes
CP 60).
But the measures suggested by the commission for radical transformation of the
production relations are half-hearted and
dualistic. It believes that a change of structural nature in the agricultural sector is
both feasible and overdue. Therefore, it
urges radical land reforms. The need for
strict implementation of laws regarding
abolition of zamindari, ceilings and distribution of land to landless is noted in this
connection.
The commission asserts that the stranglehold of the existing production relations
has to be broken through radical land
reforms. But half-heartedness and double
standard of the commission becomes evident because it rules out the-possibility of
a radical transformation in the existing
production relations in the industrial
sector (p 60).
In fact, a fundamental change in the
pattern of social relations is essential in
agriculture as well as in industry and
bureaucracy. This change has to be from
the existing individualistic and inegalitarian system of society to a collectivist
and egalitarian system. Legal and formal
democracy has to be transformed into a
real and operational system in our everyday life so that the ideal principles of

Economic and Political Weekly

September 1-8, 1990

1935

1936

Economic and Political Weekly

September 1-8, 1990

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